Biraogo - p481
Gerochi - p120
Santiago - p445
Lambino - p447
Tanada vs Tuvera (April 24, 1985)
Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be
informed on matters of public concern,
as well as the principle that in order for
laws to be valid and enforceable, they
must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, Lorenzo Tanada and
Movement of Attorney’s for Brotherhood
Integrity and Nationalism filed a
petition seeking a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to
publish, and or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter
of implementation and administrative
orders. The respondents, through the
Solicitor General, contended that the
case should be dismissed outright on
the ground that petitioners have no
legal standing. Petitioners maintain
that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public
duty, they need not show any specific
interest in their petition to be given due
course.
Respondents further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not
a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted
that since the presidential issuances m
question contain special provisions as
to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivifcy. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2
of the Civil Code:
"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided"
The interrpretation given by respondent
is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions/ this Court has ruled
that publication in the Official Gazette
is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date—for then the date of
publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication—
but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effeet.
Issue: Whether or not Publication in the
Official Gazette is an indispensable
requisite for laws to be effective and
binding
Held: Yes. The clear object of the above-
quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the
maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructlve one. The publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden
on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as
adminisfcrative and executive orders
need not be published on the
assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. It is
needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be
bound by law, he miist first be officially
and specifically informed of its
contents.
Tanada vs Tuvera (December 29,
1986)
Facts: In the decision of this case on
April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of
the presidential decrees mentioned by
the petitioner, ordering respondents to
publish in the official gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect. The petitioners
are again before the court, asking for
reconsideration/clarification of the
decision. Specifically asking the
following questions on ----
1. What is meant by "law of public
nature-" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between
laws of general applicability and laws
which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Petitioners suggest that there should be
no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not;
that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication
must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. The former Solicitor General
claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on
the merits, that the clause "unless it is persons not aware of it would be
otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the prejudiced as a result; and they would
Civil Code meant that the publication be so not because of a failure to comply
required therein was not always with ifc but simply because they did not
imperative; that publication, when know of its existence. the conclusive
necessary, did not have to be made in presumption that every person knows
the Official Gazette. the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal
Issue: Whether or not there should be a justification at all. It is no less
distinction between laws of general important to remember that
applicability, and those which are not Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes
as regards publication "the right of the peopie to information
on matters of public concern," and this
Held: No. The Court ruled that "unless certainly applies to, among others, and
it is otherwise provided" refers to the indeed especially, the legislative
date of effectivity and not to the enactments of the government. The
requirement of publication itself, which term "laws" should refer to all laws and
cannot in any event be omitted. This not only to those of general application,
clause does not mean that the for strictly speaking all laws relate to
legislature may make the law effective the people in general albeit there are
immediately upon approval, or on any some that do not apply to them directly.
other date, without its previous
publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteenday period shall be
shortened or extended. It is not correct
to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a
law shall become effective immediately
upon its approval notwithstanding the
lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that
---
Digest #2 (1986)
Facts:
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed
the necessity for the publication to the
Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding
force and effect. Decision wasconcurred
only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the
decision on various questions. Solicitor
Generalavers that the motion is a
request for advisory opinion. February
Revolution took place, which
subsequently required the
new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder
on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18
of the Rules of Court).
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in
light of the clause “unless otherwise
provided”.
Held:
1. Publication imperative
The clause “unless it is otherwise
provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law
effectiveimmediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous
publication. The legislature may in its
discretion provide that theusual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened
or extended.
2. Scope of laws requiring publication
The term “laws” should refer to all
laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people ingeneral
albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public
interest even if itmight be directly
applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.Publication
requirements applies to (1) all statutes,
including those of local application
and private laws; (2) presidential
decrees andexecutive orders
promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated
by thelegislature or directly conferred
by the Constitution; (3) Administrative
rules and regulations for the purpose of
enforcing or implementing existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4)
Charter of a city notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of thenational
territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary
Board circulars to “fill in the details” of
the CentralBank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.Publication
requirements does not apply to (1)
interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating
only thepersonnel of the administrative
agency and not the public; (2) Letters of
Instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning therules or
guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of
their duties; and (3) instructions of
Ministry heads on casestudies,
assignments of personnel, etc.
Municipal ordinances are not covered
by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
3. Publication must be full
Publication must be in full or it is
no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents
of the laws. As correctlypointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the
title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g.,“with Secretary Tuvera”), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a
mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy thepublication
requirement.
4. Medium of Publication
It should be published in the Official
Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if
newspapers of general circulation could
better perform thefunction of
communicating the laws to the people
as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and
come outregularly, this kind of
publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law.
5. Publication essential for due
process
Omission of publication would offend
due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed togovern it. it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it
would be prejudiced as a result; and
they would be so not because of a
failure tocomply with it but simply
because they did not know of its
existence. Publication is required, even
if their enactment is
“otherwiseprovided” or effective
immediately.

6. Right to information
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes
“the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern,” and this
certainly appliesto, among others, the
legislative enactments of the
government.The Supreme Court
declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval,
or as soon thereafter as possible,
bepublished in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after
15 days from their publication, or on
another date specified by thelegislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code.
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the
Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, as
amended by Resolution No. 4, calling
for a Constitutional Convention to
propose amendments to the Philippine
Constitution. Said Resolution was
implemented by Republic Act No. 6132,
for the election of delegates of the said
Convention. Hence, the 1971
Constitutional Convention began to
perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
While the Convention was in session on
September 21, 1972, the President
issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing
the entire Philippines under Martial
Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention
approved its Proposed Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines. The
next day, November 30, 1972, the
President of the Philippines issued
Presidential Decree No. 73, which is an
order for setting and appropriating of
funds for a plebiscite for the ratification
or rejection of the proposed
Constitution as drafted by the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas
filed a case against the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the Auditor General, to
enjoin said respondents or their agents
from implementing Presidential Decree
No. 73, on the grounds that the
President does not have the legislative
authority to call a plebiscite and the
appropriation of public funds for the
purpose are lodged exclusively by the
Constitution in Congress and there is
no proper submission to the people of
said Proposed Constitution set for
January 15, 1973, there being no
freedom of speech, press and assembly,
and there being no sufficient time to
inform the people of the contents
thereof.
On December 23, 1972, the President
announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection
of the Proposed Constitution. The Court
deemed it fit to refrain, for the time
being, from deciding the
aforementioned case.
In the afternoon of January 12, 1973,
the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-
35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying
that said case be decided "as soon as
possible, preferably not later than
January 15, 1973." The next day,
January 13, 1973, the Court issued a
resolution requiring the respondents to
comment and file an answer to the said
"urgent motion" not later than Tuesday
noon, January 16, 1973." When the
case was being heard, the Secretary of
Justice called on and said that, “upon
instructions of the President, he is
delivering a copy of Proclamation No.
1102, which had just been signed by
the President earlier that morning.”
Proclamation No. 1102, declares that
Citizen Assemblies referendum was
conducted, and that the result shows
that more than 95% of the members of
the Citizens Assemblies are in favor of
the new Constitution and majority also
answered that there was no need for a
plebiscite and that the vote of the
Citizens Assemblies should be
considered as a vote in a plebiscite. The
then President of the Philippines,
Marcos, hereby certify and proclaim
that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention has
been ratified by an overwhelming
majority of all of the votes cast by the
members of the Citizens Assemblies
throughout the Philippines, and has
thereby come into effect.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana
filed case against the Executive
Secretary and the Secretaries of
National Defense, Justice and Finance,
to restrain said respondents "and their
subordinates or agents from
implementing any of the provisions of
the propose Constitution not found in
the present Constitution" referring to
that of 1935.
Javellana alleged that the President had
announced "the immediate
implementation of the New
Constitution, thru his Cabinet,
respondents including," and that the
latter "are acting without, or in excess
of jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed Constitution" upon the
ground: "that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, is without
authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies"; that the same "are without
power to approve the proposed
Constitution ..."; "that the President is
without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed Constitution"; and "that the
election held to ratify the proposed
Constitution was not a free election,
hence null and void."
Issue:
1. Whether or not the issue of the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102
involves a justiciable or political
question.
2. Whether or not the proposed new or
revised Constitution been ratified to
said Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution.
3. Whether or not the proposed
Constitution aforementioned been
approved by a majority of the people in
Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held
throughout the Philippines.
4. Whether or not the people acquiesced
in the proposed Constitution.
5. Whether or not the parties are
entitled to any relief.
Ruling:
The court was severely divided on the
following issues raised in the petition:
but when the crucial question of
whether the petitioners are entitled to
relief, six members of the court
(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted
to dismiss the petition. Concepcion,
together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando
and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief
being sought, thus upholding the 1973
Constitution.
First Issue
On the first issue involving the political-
question doctrine Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee
and myself, or six (6) members of the
Court, hold that the issue of the validity
of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a
justiciable and non-political question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro did not
vote squarely on this question, but,
only inferentially, in their discussion of
the second question. Justice Barredo
qualified his vote, stating that
"inasmuch as it is claimed there has
been approval by the people, the Court
may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been
such an approval, and, in the
affirmative, the Court should keep
hands-off out of respect to the people's
will, but, in negative, the Court may
determine from both factual and legal
angles whether or not Article XV of the
1935 Constitution been complied with."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra,
or three (3) members of the Court hold
that the issue is political and "beyond
the ambit of judicial inquiry."
Second Issue
On the second question of validity of
the ratification, Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee
and myself, or six (6) members of the
Court also hold that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV, section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution, which provides
only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an
election or plebiscite held in accordance
with law and participated in only by
qualified and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote,
stating that "(A)s to whether or not the
1973 Constitution has been validly
ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still
maintain that in the light of traditional
concepts regarding the meaning and
intent of said Article, the referendum in
the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in
the manner the votes therein were cast,
reported and canvassed, falls short of
the requirements thereof. In view,
however, of the fact that I have no
means of refusing to recognize as a
judge that factually there was voting
and that the majority of the votes were
for considering as approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of
the usual form of plebiscite followed in
past ratifications, I am constrained to
hold that, in the political sense, if not in
the orthodox legal sense, the people
may be deemed to have cast their
favorable votes in the belief that in
doing so they did the part required of
them by Article XV, hence, it may be
said that in its political aspect, which is
what counts most, after all, said Article
has been substantially complied with,
and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution
has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, or three (3) members of the
Court hold that under their view there
has been in effect substantial
compliance with the constitutional
requirements for valid ratification.
Third Issue
On the third question of acquiescence
by the Filipino people in the
aforementioned proposed Constitution,
no majority vote has been reached by
the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely,
Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra hold that "the people
have already accepted the 1973
Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely,
Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that
there can be no free expression, and
there has even been no expression, by
the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or
repudiation of the proposed
Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is
conceded that the doctrine stated in
some American decisions to the effect
that independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once
accepted acquiesced in by the people
must be accorded recognition by the
Court, I am not at this stage prepared
to state that such doctrine calls for
application in view of the shortness of
time that has elapsed and the difficulty
of ascertaining what is the mind of the
people in the absence of the freedom of
debate that is a concomitant feature of
martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express
their lack of knowledge and/or
competence to rule on the question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro are
joined by Justice Teehankee in their third question that they could not state
statement that "Under a regime of with judicial certainty whether the
martial law, with the free expression of people have accepted or not accepted
opinions through the usual media the Constitution; and
vehicle restricted, (they) have no means Two (2) members of the Court, namely,
of knowing, to the point of judicial Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that
certainty, whether the people have the Constitution proposed by the 1971
accepted the Constitution." Constitutional Convention is not in
force; with the result that there are not
Fourth Issue enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.
On the fourth question of relief, six (6)
members of the Court, namely, Justices ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, majority of six (6) votes of Justices
Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
the petition. Justice Makalintal and Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4)
Castro so voted on the strength of their dissenting votes of the Chief Justice
view that "(T)he effectivity of the said and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Constitution, in the final analysis, is Teehankee, all the aforementioned
the basic and ultimate question posed cases are hereby dismissed. This
by these cases to resolve which being the vote of the majority, there is
considerations other than judicial, and no further judicial obstacle to the new
therefore beyond the competence of this Constitution being considered in force
Court, are relevant and unavoidable." and effect. It is so ordered.
Four (4) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee
and myself voted to deny respondents'
motion to dismiss and to give due
course to the petitions.
Fifth Issue
Four (4) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra hold that it is in force by
virtue of the people's acceptance
thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando
and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on
the premise stated in their votes on the
Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
Facts:
1.EDCA (Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement) is an
agreement between the Philippines and
America wherein it authorizes the U.S.
military forces to have access to and
conduct activities within certain
"Agreed Locations"1 in the country.
*Others:
ü gives U.S. troops, planes and ships
increased rotational presence in
Philippine military bases; and,
ü allows the U.S. to build facilities to
store fuel and equipment
ü others such as security cooperation
exercises; joint and combined
training activities; humanitarian
and disaster relief activities; and
such other activities that as may be
agreed upon by the parties. (in the
agreed locations)
2.After eight rounds of negotiations for
two years, the Secretary of National
Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to
the Philippines signed the agreement
on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S.
Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June
2014. It was not transmitted to the
Senate on the executive's
understanding that to do so was no
longer necessary.
1
Agreed Locations are facilities and areas that are
provided by the Government of the Philippines through
the AFP and that United States forces, United States
3.Senators file Senate Resolution (SR) (2) WON the provisions under EDCA
105.91. The resolution expresses the are consistent with the
"strong sense" of the Senators that for Constitution, as well as with
EDCA to become valid and effective, existing laws and treaties.
it must first be transmitted to the
Senate for deliberation and Held: Petition DISMISSED.
concurrence. 1. EDCA is constitutional in its
arrangement as an executive
v Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and agreement.
former legislators, argued that the use 2. It remains consistent with
of executive agreement as medium of existing laws and treaties that it
agreement with US violated the purports to implement.
constitutional requirement of Art 18,
Sec 252 since the EDCA involves Ratio:
foreign military bases, troops and
facilities whose entry into the country 1. NO. The EDCA need not be submitted
should be covered by to the Senate for concurrence because
a treaty concurred in by the Senate. it is in the form of a mere executive
agreement, not a treaty.
à Petitioners also point out that EDCA
is strongly reminiscent of and in fact THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE CONSTI
bears a one-to-one correspondence with PROHIBITS THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN
the provisions of the 1947 MBA. They MILITARY BASES, TROOPS OR
assert that both agreements (a) allow FACILITIES, EXCEPT BY WAY OF
similar activities within the area; (b) TREATY CONCURRED IN BY THE
provide for the same "species of SENATE—a clear limitation on the
ownership" over facilities; and (c) grant President’s DUAL ROLE as defender
operational control over the entire or the State and as sole authority in
area. |(see full text for ruling on these foreign relations.
issues)
BUT under the the Constitution, the
Issues: President is empowered to enter into
(1) WON W/N the non-submission executive agreements on foreign
of the EDCA agreement for military bases, troops or facilities if
concurrence by the Senate (1) such agreement is not the
violates the Constitution. instrument that allows the entry of
such and
contractors, and others as mutually agreed, shall have the that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
right to access and use pursuant to this Agreement. allowed in the Philippines except under (1) a treaty (2) duly
2
VFA violates Sec. 25, Art. 18 (since they posit Art. 18 is concurred in by the Senate . . . and (3) recognized as a treaty by
applicable, not Art 21) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides the other contracting State.”
(2) if it merely aims to implement an
existing law or treaty.
OTHERWISE à senate concurrence is
needed pursuant to Art 18, Sec 25.
It is evident that the constitutional
restriction refers solely to the initial entry
of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the
subsequent acts are thereafter subject
only to the limitations provided by the
rest of the Constitution and Philippine
law, and not to the Section 25
requirement of validity through a treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive
agreement since it merely involves
“adjustments in detail” in the
implementation of the MDT and the
VFA. These are existing treaties
between the Philippines and the U.S.
that have already been concurred in by
the Philippine Senate and have thereby
met the requirements of the
Constitution under Art 18, Sec
25. Because of the status of these prior
agreements, EDCA need not be
transmitted to the Senate.
à The admission and
presence of U.S. military and
civilian personnel in
Philippine territory are
already allowed under the
VFA, the treaty supposedly
being implemented by EDCA.
What EDCA has effectively
done, in fact, is merely provide
the mechanism to identify the
locations in which U.S.
personnel may perform allowed
activities pursuant to the VFA.
As the implementing
agreement, it regulates and
limits the presence of U.S.
personnel in the country.
à The Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) already
authorizes the presence of
United States (U.S.) military
equipment in the country.—
The provisions in EDCA
dealing with Agreed Locations
are analogous to those in the
aforementioned executive
agreements. Instead of
authorizing the building of
temporary structures as
previous agreements have
done, EDCA authorizes the
U.S. to build permanent
structures or alter or improve
existing ones for, and to be
owned by, the Philippines.
EDCA is clear that the
Philippines retains ownership
of altered or improved facilities
and newly constructed
permanent or non-relocatable
structures. Under EDCA, U.S.
forces will also be allowed to
use facilities and areas for
“training; x x x; support and
related activities; x x x;
temporary accommodation of
personnel; communications”
and agreed activities. Concerns
on national security problems
that arise from foreign military
equipment being present in the
Philippines must likewise be
contextualized. Most
significantly, the VFA already
authorizes the presence of
U.S. military equipment in
the country. Article VII of the
VFA already authorizes the
U.S. to import into or acquire
in the Philippines “equipment,
materials, supplies, and other
property” that will be used “in
connection with activities”
contemplated therein. The
same section also recognizes
that “[t]itle to such property
shall remain” with the US and
that they have the discretion to
“remove such property from
the Philippines at any time.”
o THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT AS
THE EXECUTOR OF THE LAW
INCLUDES THE DUTY TO DEFEND
THE STATE, FOR WHICH PURPOSE
HE MAY USE THAT POWER IN THE
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.
The manner of the President's
execution of the law, even if not
expressly granted by the law, is justified
by necessity and limited only by law,
since the President must "take
necessary and proper steps to carry
into execution the law”. It is the
President's prerogative to do
whatever is legal and necessary for
Philippine defense interests
(commander-in-chief powers).
 EDCA is considered an executive International International treaty are considered
agreement, therefore may be bound agreements agreements ineffective
through the President without the involving embodying adjustme
need of senatorial votes for its political nts of detail, carrying
execution. issues or out well established
o The President is not authorized by
changes of national policies and
The right of the Executive to enter into law to allow foreign military bases,
o national traditions and those
binding agreements without the troops, or facilities to enter the
policy and involving arrangemen
necessity of subsequent Congressional Philippines, except under a treaty
those involvin ts of a more or less
approval has been confirmed by long concurred in by the Senate.—To this
g temporary nature
usage. Court, a plain textual reading of Article
agreements of
XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to the
a permanent
conclusion that it applies only to a
• The term "international agreements" does character
proposed agreement between our
not include the term "executive Considered Must remain
government and a foreign government,
agreements. superior to traceable to an
whereby military bases, troops, or
• EDCA increases the likelihood that, in an executive express or implied
facilities of such foreign government
event requiring a defensive response, the agreements authorization under
would be “allowed” or would “gain entry”
Philippines will be prepared alongside the and is the Constitution,
Philippine territory. Note that the
U.S. to defend its islands and insure its regarded as statutes, or treaties
provision “shall not be allowed” is a
territorial integrity pursuant to a being on the
negative injunction. This wording
relationship built on previous treaties, same level as
signifies that the President is not
particularly the Mutual Defense Treaty of a statute as
authorized by law to allow foreign
1951 (MDT) and Visiting Forces they are
military bases, troops, or facilities to
Agreement of 1999 (VFA). products of
enter the Philippines, except under a
the acts of
treaty concurred in by the Senate.
TREATIES EXECUTIVE the Executive
Hence, the constitutionally restricted
AGREEMENTS3 and the
authority pertains to the entry of the
Formal Become binding Senate
bases, troops, or facilities, and not to the
documents w through executive If there is an Cannot create new
activities to be done after entry.
/c action without the irreconcilable international
require need of a vote by the conflict, a obligations that are
Verba Legis; Under the principles of
ratification Senate or by later law or not expressly allowed
constitutional construction, of
with the Congress treaty takes or reasonably implied
paramount consideration is the plain
approval of precedence in the law they
meaning of the language expressed
two-thirds of over one that purport to
in the Constitution, or the verba legis
the Senate is prior implement. Once
rule. —It is presumed that the
inconsistent with
provisions have been carefully crafted in
either a law or a
order to express the objective it seeks to

3
In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 “international agreements embodying adjustments of traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or
SCRA 351 (1961), executive agreements are defined as detail carrying out well-established national policies and less temporary nature.”
attain. It is incumbent upon the Court to
refrain from going beyond the plain
meaning of the words used in the
Constitution. It is presumed that the
framers and the people meant what they
said when they said it, and that this
understanding was reflected in the
Constitution and understood by the
people in the way it was meant to be
understood when the fundamental law
was ordained and promulgated.
Foreign Military Bases; It is evident
that the constitutional restriction
refers solely to the initial entry of the
foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized,
the subsequent acts are thereafter
subject only to the limitations
provided by the rest of the
Constitution and Philippine law, and
not to the Section 25 requirement of
validity through a treaty.
Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
OTHER ISSUES--
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as
“citizen’s suit” satisfy the
requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of
a governmental act, petitioners suing as
citizens may dodge the requirement of
having to establish a direct and
personal interest if they show that the
act affects a public right. But here,
aside from general statements that the
petitions involve the protection of a
public right, and that their
constitutional rights as citizens would
be violated, the petitioners failed to
make any specific assertion of a
particular public right that would be
violated by the enforcement of
EDCA. For their failure to do so, the
present petitions cannot be considered
by the Court as citizens’ suits that
would justify a disregard of the
aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal
standing as “taxpayers”
No. Petitioners cannot sue as
taxpayers because EDCA is neither
meant to be a tax measure, nor is it
directed at the disbursement of
public funds.
A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in
which the official act complained of
directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. Here, those challenging
the act must specifically show that they
have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of public money,
and that they will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of
the assailed act. Applying that
principle to this case, they must
establish that EDCA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. A reading of the
EDCA, however, would show that there
has been neither an appropriation nor
an authorization of disbursement.
o Presidency; Foreign Military Bases;
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as
“legislator’s suit”
No. The power to concur in a treaty or
an international agreement is an
institutional prerogative granted by the
Constitution to the Senate. In a
legislator’s suit, the injured party
would be the Senate as an institution
or any of its incumbent members, as
it is the Senate’s constitutional
function that is allegedly being
violated. Here, none of the petitioners,
who are former senators, have the legal
standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its
Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal
standing, they raise matters
of transcendental importance which
justify setting aside the rule on
procedural technicalities. The
challenge raised here is rooted in the
very Constitution itself, particularly Art
XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides
for a stricter mechanism required
before any foreign military bases, troops
or facilities may be allowed in the
country. Such is of paramount public
interest that the Court is behooved to
determine whether there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive Department.
Notes.
Despite the President’s roles as
defender of the State and sole
authority in foreign relations, the
1987 Constitution expressly limits
 his ability in instances when it
involves the entry of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities.—Despite
the President’s roles as defender of the
State and sole authority in foreign
relations, the 1987 Constitution
expressly limits his ability in instances
when it involves the entry of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities. The
initial limitation is found in Section 21 of
the provisions on the Executive
Department: “No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
The specific limitation is given by
Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions,
the full text of which reads as follows:
SECTION 25. After the expiration in
1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for
that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.
o The President has the inherent power
to enter into agreements with other
states, including the prerogative to
conclude binding executive
agreements that do not require
further Senate concurrence.—As the
sole organ of our foreign relations and
the constitutionally assigned chief
architect of our foreign policy, the
President is vested with the exclusive
power to conduct and manage the
country’s interface with other states and
governments. Being the principal
representative of the Philippines, the
Chief Executive speaks and listens for
the nation; initiates, maintains, and
develops diplomatic relations with other
states and governments; negotiates and
enters into international agreements;
promotes trade, investments, tourism
and other economic relations; and
settles international disputes with other
states. As previously discussed, this
constitutional mandate emanates from
the inherent power of the President to
enter into agreements with other states,
including the prerogative to conclude
binding executive agreements that do
not require further Senate concurrence.
The existence of this presidential power
is so well-entrenched that Section
5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution,
even provides for a check on its exercise.
As expressed below, executive
agreements are among those official
governmental acts that can be the
subject of this Court’s power of judicial
review: (2) Review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in: (a) All
cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
o The special nature of an executive
o The Philippines retains primary
responsibility for security with
respect to the Agreed Locations.—
From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed
Locations are territories of the
Philippines that the U.S. forces are
allowed to access and use. By
withholding ownership of these areas
and retaining unrestricted access to
them, the government asserts
sovereignty over its territory. That
sovereignty exists so long as the Filipino
people exist. Significantly, the
Philippines retains primary
responsibility for security with respect to
the Agreed Locations. Hence, Philippine
law remains in force therein, and it
cannot be said that jurisdiction has been
transferred to the U.S. Even the
previously discussed necessary
measures for operational control and
defense over U.S. forces must be
coordinated with Philippine authorities.
Jurisprudence bears out the fact that
even under the former legal regime of the
MBA, Philippine laws continue to be in
force within the bases. The difference
between then and now is that EDCA
retains the primary jurisdiction of the
Philippines over the security of the
Agreed Locations, an important
provision that gives it actual control over
those locations. Previously, it was the
provost marshal of the U.S. who kept the
peace and enforced Philippine law in the
bases. In this instance, Philippine forces
act as peace officers, in stark contrast to
the 1947 MBA provisions on
jurisdiction.
agreement is not just a domestic
variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the
use of various forms and designations
of international agreements, ranging
from the traditional notion of a treaty —
which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument — to engagements
concluded in modern, simplified forms
that no longer necessitate rati cation.
212 An international agreement may
take different forms: treaty, act,
protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis d'arbitrage, convention,
covenant, declaration, exchange of
notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed
minute, memorandum of agreement,
modus vivendi, or some other form. 213
Consequently, under international law,
the distinction between a treaty and an
international agreement or even an
executive agreement is irrelevant for
purposes of determining international
rights and obligations. aICcHA
However, this principle does not mean
that the domestic law distinguishing
treaties, international agreements, and
executive agreements is relegated to a
mere variation in form, or that the
constitutional requirement of Senate
concurrence is demoted to an optional
constitutional directive. There remain
two very important features that
distinguish treaties from executive
agreements and translate them into
terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must
remain traceable to an express or
implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The
absence of these precedents puts the
validity and effectivity of executive
agreements under serious question for
the main function of the Executive is to
enforce the Constitution and the laws
enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat
or interfere in the performance of these
rules. 214 In turn, executive
agreements cannot create new
international obligations that are not
expressly allowed or reasonably implied
in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very
nature, considered superior to
executive agreements. Treaties are
products of the acts of the Executive
and the Senate 215 unlike executive
agreements, which are solely executive
actions. 216 Because of legislative
participation through the Senate, a
treaty is regarded as being on the same
level as a statute. 217 If there is an
irreconcilable con ict, a later law or
treaty takes precedence over one that is
prior. 218 An executive agreement is
treated differently. Executive
agreements that are inconsistent with
either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective. 219 Both types of
international agreement are
nevertheless subject to the supremacy
of the Constitution.
o This rule does not imply, though, that
the President is given carte blanche to
exercise this discretion. Although the
Chief Executive wields the exclusive
authority to conduct our foreign
relations, this power must still be
exercised within the context and the
parameters set by the Constitution, as
well as by existing domestic and
international laws. There are
constitutional provisions that
restrict or limit the President's
prerogative in concluding
international agreements, such as
those that involve the following:
§ The policy of freedom from
nuclear weapons within
Philippine territory

§ The fixing of tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts, which must be
pursuant to the authority
granted by Congress 

§ The grant of any tax exemption,
which must be pursuant to a law
concurred in by a majority of all
the Members of Congress
§ The contracting or guaranteeing,
on behalf of the Philippines, of
foreign loans that must be
previously concurred in by the
Monetary Board
§ The authorization of the presence
of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in the country must
be in the form of a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate.
§ For agreements that do not fall
under paragraph 5, the
concurrence of the Senate is
required, should the form of the
government chosen be a treaty.
o 1. Treaties, international
agreements, and executive
agreements are all
constitutional manifestations of
the conduct of foreign affairs
with their distinct legal c. Executive agreements
characteristics. are generally intended to
implement a treaty
a. Treaties are formal
already enforced or to
contracts between the
determine the details of
Philippines and other
the implementation
States-parties, which are
thereof that do not affect
in the nature of
the sovereignty of the
international
State. 228
agreements, and also of
municipal laws in the 2. Treaties and international
sense of their binding agreements that cannot be mere
nature. 226 executive agreements must, by
constitutional decree, be concurred in
b. International
by at least two-thirds of the Senate.
agreements are similar
instruments, the 3. However, an agreement — the
provisions of which may subject of which is the entry of foreign
require the ratification of military troops, bases, or facilities — is
a designated number of particularly restricted. The
parties thereto. These requirements are that it be in the form
agreements involving of a treaty concurred in by the Senate;
political issues or that when Congress so requires, it be
changes in national ratified by a majority of the votes cast
policy, as well as those by the people in a national referendum
involving international held for that purpose; and that it be
agreements of a recognized as a treaty by the other
permanent character, contracting State.
usually take the form of
4. Thus, executive agreements can
treaties. They may also
continue to exist as a species of
include commercial
international agreements.
agreements, which are
executive agreements
essentially, but which
proceed from previous
authorization by
Congress, thus
dispensing with the
requirement of
concurrence by the
Senate. 227 EHaASD
Velarde vs. Social Justice Society
GR No. 159357 April 28, 2004
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
Brother MARIANO “MIKE” Z.
VELARE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL
JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
FACTS:
● On January 28, 2003, Social
Justice Society filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief before the
RTC-Manila against Velarde and
his co-respondents Eminence,
Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive
Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother
Eddie Villanueva and Brother
Eliseo F. Soriano. RTC-Manila
issued a decision that did not
contain a statement of facts and
a dispositive portion. Petitioner
then filed a Clarifacatory Motion
and Motion for Reconsideration
before the trial court. The latter
issued an order that the petition
cannot be reconsidered because
what it was asked to do was only
to clarify a Constitutional
provision and declare whether
acts are violative thereof.
● SJS, sought the interpretation of
several constitutional provisions,
specifically on the separation of
church and state; and a
declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of
religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or
urging or requiring the members
of their flock to vote for a
specified candidate.
● Velarde and co-respondents filed
a Motion to dismiss before the
trial court owing to the fact that
alleged that the questioned SJS
Petition did not state a cause of
action and that there was no
justiciable controversy.
● The trial court’s junked the
Velarde petitions under these
reasons:
o 1. It said that it had
jurisdiction over the SJS
petition, because in
praying for a
determination as to
whether the actions
imputed to the
respondents were violative
of Article II, Section 6 of
the Fundamental Law, the
petition has raised only a
question of law.
o 2. It then proceeded to a
lengthy discussion of the
issue raised in the Petition
– the separation of church
and state – even tracing,
to some extent, the
historical background of
the principle. Through its
discourse, the court
quipped at some point
that the "endorsement of
specific candidates in an
election to any public
office is a clear violation of
the separation clause."
● The trial court’s essay did not
contain a statement of facts and
a dispositive portion, however.
Due to this aberration, Velarde
and Soriano filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration
before the trial court owing to
these facts. The lower court
denied these Motions. Hence,
this petition for review.
● On April 13, 2004, the Court en
banc conducted an Oral
Argument. Brother Mike Velarde
submitted a petition for review
on certiorari of the decision and
order of RTC-Manila
ISSUES:
In its oral argument, the Supreme
Court condensed Velarde’s issues and
divided it into 2 groups:
A. Procedural Issues
1. Did the Petition for
Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable
controversy?
2. Did it state a cause of action?
3. Did respondent have any legal
standing to file the Petition for
Declaratory Relief?
B. Substantive Issues
1. Did the RTC Decision conform
to the form and substance
required by the Constitution, the
law and the Rules of Court?
2. May religious leaders like
herein petitioner, Bro. Mike
Velarde, be prohibited from
endorsing candidates for public
office? Corollarily, may they be
banned from campaigning
against said candidates?
DECISION:
Petition for Review GRANTED. The
assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and
July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS
Petition for Declaratory Relief is
DISMISSED for failure to state a cause
of action.
HELD:
Procedural Issues:
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief
raise a justiciable controversy?
NO. A justiciable controversy to an
existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory.
Petition also did not sufficiently state
what specific legal right of the
petitioner was violated by the
respondents. A petition filed with the
trial court should contain a plain,
concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim.
The SJS Petition fell short of the
requirements to constitute a justiciable
controversy under these considerations:
a. It stated no ultimate facts. The
petition simply speculated or
anticipated without factual
moorings that that the people
elected who were endorsed by
these religious leaders might
become beholden to the latter.
b. It did not sufficiently state a
declaration of its rights and
duties, what specific legal right
of the petitioner was violated
by the respondents therein, and
what particular act or acts of the
latter were in breach of its rights,
the law or the constitution,
c. The petition did not pray for
a stoppage of violated rights. It
merely sought an opinion of the
trial court. Courts, however, are
proscribed from rendering an
advisory opinion.
2. Did it state a cause of action?
NO. A cause of action is an act or an
omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of another,
causing injury to the latter. Its
essential elements are the following: (1)
a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) such defendant’s
act or omission that is violative of
the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the
obligation of the former to the latter.
The Court found nothing in the
SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit
allegation of fact that SJS had a legal
right in its favor, from its bare
allegation that it sought to protect.
In special civil actions for declaratory
relief, the concept of cause of action
under ordinary civil actions does not
strictly apply. The reason for this
exception is that an action for
declaratory relief presupposes that
there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or
violation should be impending,
imminent or at least threatened.
The justices could only infer that
the interest from its allegation was its
mention of “its (SJS) thousands of
members who are citizens-taxpayers-
registered voters and who are keenly
interested”. Aside from the fact that this
general averment did not constitute a
legal right or interest, the court’s
inferred interest too vague and
speculative in character. Rules require
that the interest must be material to
the issue and affected by the
questioned act or instrument.
SJS cited the Corpus Juris
Secundum and submitted that the
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment
action does not seek to enforce a claim
against the defendant, but sought a
judicial declaration of the rights of the
parties for the purpose of guiding their
future conduct. The Court holds that
SJS merely conjectures that herein
petitioner might actively participate
in partisan politics. During the Oral
Argument petitioner and co-
respondents strongly asserted that
they had not engaged to partisan
politics.
Even if the SJS petition asserted
a legal right, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be
invaded by the said respondents.
3. Did respondent have any legal
standing to file the Petition for
Declaratory Relief?
NO. Legal standing or locus standi has
been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such
that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of
the challenged act.
Interest means a material
interest in issue that is affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from a mere incidental
interest in the question involved. SJS
has no legal interest in the
controversy and has failed to establish
how the resolution of the proffered
question would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging
the constitutionality of a law, an act or
a statute must demonstrate that they
have been, or are about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which they
are lawfully entitled, or that they are
about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.
If the petition were to be valid, it should
satisfy:
1. Parties suing as taxpayers
must specifically prove that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation, particularly that of Congress'
taxing power.
2. There was no showing in the
Petition for Declaratory Relief that
SJS as a political party or its members
as registered voters would be
adversely affected by the alleged acts
of the respondents below, such as the
deprivation of votes or barring of
suffrage to its constituents.
3. The allegedly keen interest of
its "thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is
too general and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by
our jurisprudence. Not only is the
presumed interest impersonal in
character; it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to
satisfy the requirement of standing.
In not a few cases, the Court has
liberalized the locus standi
requirement when a petition raises
an issue of transcendental
significance or importance to the
people (IBP v Zamora). The Court
deemed the constitutional issue raised
to be both transcendental in
importance and novel in nature.
Nevertheless, the barren allegations in
the SJS Petition as well as the
abbreviated proceedings in the court
would prevent the resolution of the
transcendental issue.
Substantive Issues:
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the
form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of
Court?
NO. The Constitution commands that
no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based. No
petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the basis
therefore.
Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court on Criminal Procedure,
Administrative Circular No. 1. states
that:
“A judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be rendered.
The decision shall be in writing,
personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and law on which
it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk
of court.”
The SC has reminded magistrates to
heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII
of the contsitution. This was evinced in
Yao v. Court of Appeals where Davide,
CJ said that faithful adherence to the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution is indisputably a
paramount component of due
process and fair play.
In People v. Bugarin, the court held that
the requirement that the decisions of
courts must be in writing and that they
must set forth clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which they are
based is intended, among other things,
to inform the parties of the reason or
reasons for the decision so that if any of
them appeals, he can point out to the
appellate court the finding of facts or
the rulings on points of law with
which he disagrees.
Assailed Decision contains no
statement of facts or of the court’s
findings as to the probable
facts. Decision begins with a statement
of the nature of the action and the
question or issue presented. Then a
brief explanation of the constitutional
provisions involved, and what the
Petition sought to achieve. The Decision
proceeds to a full-length opinion on the
nature and the extent of the separation
of church and state. Without expressly
stating the final conclusion she has
reached or specifying the relief
granted or denied, the trial judge ends
her “Decision” with the clause “SO
ORDERED.”
A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law
on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial
to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher
tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment,
the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning.
RTC’s Decision did not adhere to the
Bugarin precedent, failing to express
clearly and distinctly the facts on which
it was based. The significance of factual
findings lies in the value of the decision
as a precedent. Respondent SJS
insisted that the dispositive portion can
be found in the body (p. 10) of the
assailed Decision. Stating
“Endorsement of specific candidates in
an election to any public office is a clear
violation of the separation clause.”
The Court held that the statement is
merely an answer to a hypothetical
legal question and just a part of the
opinion of the trial court. It does not
conclusively declare the rights of the
parties to the Petition. Neither does it
grant any -- much less, the proper --
relief under the circumstances, as
required of a dispositive portion.
The standard for a dispositive was set
in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards
where the resolution of the Court on a
given issue as embodied in the
dispositive part of the decision or order
is the investitive or controlling factor
that determines and settles the
rights of the parties and the
questions presented therein,
notwithstanding the existence of
statements or declaration in the body of
said order that may be confusing.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: In
the case where there is a conflict
between the dispositive part and the
opinion, the former must prevail over the
latter on the theory that the dispositive
portion is the final order while the
opinion is merely a statement
ordering nothing.
issued in careless disregard of the
constitutional mandate are a patent
nullity and must be struck down as
void.
2. May religious leaders like herein
petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be
prohibited from endorsing candidates
for public office? Corollarily, may they
be banned from campaigning against
said candidates?
It is not legally possible to take up, on
the merits, the paramount question
involving a constitutional principle. It is
a time-honored rule that the
constitutionality of a statute or act will
be passed upon only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy
and is essential to the protection of the
rights of the parties concerned.

The statement quoted by SJS does not

conclusively declare the rights of the
parties to the Petition. Neither does it
grant proper relief under the
circumstances, as required of a
dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional

injunction is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders