Landmark Case: Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No.

L-14639 March 25, 1919 (Digested Case)

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent
to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said that the women
were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of
residence. This case justifies one of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around
170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power
of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as
Mayor.

Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and
thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women
are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those
women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The
court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court;
or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present.

Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100
pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his
hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this
other municipality.
 We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it
in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao,
the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has
lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer

(The Steel Seizure Case)
Citation. 22 Ill.343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 30 LRRM 2172 (1952)

Brief Fact Summary. During the Korean War, President Truman in order to avoid a strike that would impede the
war effort, issued an executive order seizing the mills and operating them under federal direction.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President has limited inherent authority. He may have a legislative power in “theaters
of war”. The President can act without Congress when it is an emergency and Congress has not negated such action
that the President wishes to undertake.

Facts. During the Korean War, President Truman seized the steel mills so that a strike would not impede the Korean
War effort. The United Steel Workers were upset that they were not getting paid enough and wanted a raise.
President Truman was afraid that a strike would cause the United States to run out of steel. Congress had allowed the
strike with the Taft Hartley Act passed in 1947 over President Truman’s veto. The Act gave the president the power
to get an injunction against such strikes but Congress had rejected an amendment to permit government seizures to
avoid serious shutdowns.

Issue. Can President Truman acting under the aggregate of his powers, exercise a law making power independent of
Congress in order to protect serious national interests?

Held. Justice Black opinion. No.

Although Article II Section: 1 grants executive power to the President to execute the laws. His general executive
power is inapplicable since there was no relevant law here to execute. Under Section 2, the Commander in Chief
power does not warrant the seizure here either, since it was lawmaking and too far removed from the “theater of war”.
That power did not include the President being able to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. That is the job for the Nation’s lawmakers and not for its military authorities. The
Founders of the Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in good and bad times.
Dissent. Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Reed and Minton dissenting.
There was legislation authorizing the supplying of the forces engaged in the Korean War. The President had a duty to
execute the foregoing legislative programs and successful execution depended upon continued production of steel
and stabilized prices for steel.
Work stoppage would have resulted in a serious curtailment of production of essential weapons and munitions of all
kinds. The President was acting to save the legislative programs and in that sense he was there to take care that the
laws were faithfully executed. He had to execute a defense program which Congress had enacted and strike would
have had a disastrous effect on those programs. The President acted to preserve those programs by seizing the steel
mills. It was temporary and subject to congressional direction. Presidents in the past have acted in the same way.
Concurrence. All of the Justices who joined Justice Black’s opinion for the Court also wrote individual concurring
opinions.
Justice Frankfurter stated that questions concerning the extent of the Presidential power in the absence of legislation
were not before the Court. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was an explicit Congressional negation of
the authority asserted by the seizure
Justice Burton stated that the controlling fact was that Congress had prescribed specific procedures and they did
include seizure for this emergency.
Justice Douglas emphasized the Fifth Amendment’s requirement for compensation for takings of property.
Justice Jackson said that the President had inherent legislative powers to act in preserving the nation, but only when
there was an absence of any provision passed by Congress purporting to deal with the situation.
Justice Clark stated that the President must follow the procedures laid down by Congress in the Act. If Congress had
not acted, then in the absence of Congressional action, the President’s independent power to act depends on the
gravity of the situation confronting the nation.

Discussion. The majority described this as inherent power, while the dissent argued this was implied power.
If there had been an emergency and Congress had declined or neglected to act, then the President would have had the
narrow sliver of authority to seize the steel mills. This is inherent power.
The dissent argued that the President exercised his implied powers to take care that the laws were faithfully executed.
Since the list in the United States Constitution of the President’s powers is not exclusive, then as long as the
President’s act seems reasonably related to carrying out the laws made by Congress, the Court will not strike the act
merely because it does not fall within any narrow enumerated presidential power.
 YNOT v. IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said
order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose) and carabeef.

The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In
the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI)
may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo.
These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order.

He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After
trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no
longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the
constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity.
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from
invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.
HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present:

(a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference, and;
(b) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.

In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that is, the
carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a
lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive.

The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon
issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding,
and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it
fails to observe the second requirement.

Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement.
The object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing.

It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that
moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there.

Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is
invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the
Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government.

Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such
as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs.

However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which
the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative
powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are
granted unlimited discretion.

The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the
distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously,
this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
 Meyer v. Nebraska
Citation. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2655, 29 A.L.R. 1446 (U.S.
June 4, 1923)

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed
the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation that restricts liberty
interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of
foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld
the conviction.

Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to
reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that
the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the
state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a
fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be
reasonably regarded as harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary and not
reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

Citation. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 1925 U.S. LEXIS 589, 39 A.L.R.
468 (U.S. June 1, 1925)

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining order
prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their children to
public school. Appellants appealed the order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or guardian’s right to decide
the mode in which their children are educated. State’s may not usurp this right when the questioned legislation does
not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.

Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or schools
and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and
military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a
public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control?

Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no
reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’ schools.
The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the
appropriate preparation for their children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th Amendment
provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are educated.

Wisconsin v. Yoder
Citation. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 1879, 402 U.S. 994, 91 S. Ct. 2173, 29 L. Ed. 2d 160 (U.S. May 24,
1971)

Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting them of failing to send their children
to school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to send their children to public school until the age of 16 is
unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly interferes with the Amish religious beliefs.

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish religion. Wisconsin’s
compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until they
reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to public school after completion of the eighth grade.
Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.
Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.

The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked variance from the
Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an environment hostile to their beliefs and takes them
away from their community during a crucial period in their life. The Amish do not object to elementary education.
Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance could result in not only great psychological harm to
Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community.

The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. Previous
precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately
operated system. The State’s power is subject to a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as
those protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with
respect to the religious upbringing of their children.

In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State does not deny the free exercise
of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. This Court determines that the Amish objection to the
attendance is rooted in religious beliefs that directly conflict with the compulsory school attendance law.

The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to
participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system. Second, education prepares individuals to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced
shows that an additional one or two years of formal high school would do little to serve those interests. Such
education may be necessary for preparation for the modern society in which we live, but is not for the separated
agrarian community of the Amish faith.

The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must be protected by the State.
However, the record shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society,
producing productive and law-abiding citizens. The State also supports its position on the possibility that some
children will choose to leave the Amish community. This argument is highly speculative on the record, and the
practical agricultural training and habits of industry would support children that did choose to leave.

The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development, designed to not only provide
educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced idleness. In these terms, Wisconsin’s interest in
compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish children than for children generally.

The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the children’s substantive right to a
secondary education, giving due regard to the power of the State as parens patriae. On this record there is no need to
decide an issue in which the Amish parent’s are preventing children who wish to further their education from
attending school.

Dissent. The majority assumes that the interests at stake are only those of the parents and the State. The children also
have a legitimate interest in their education. The inevitable effect of the decision is to impose the parents’ notions of
religious duty upon their children. It is the future of the student, not the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision.
The views of the two children in question were not canvassed, and should be on remand.
Discussion. The majority’s decision did not determine that the statute would violate Constitutional rights if the
children wanted to pursue further education, but found that such a decision was unnecessary because no such claim
was made on the record. The dissent suggested that the cause should be remanded to determine the desire of the
children.