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DPM
24,2
166
Received 25 April 2014
Revised 15 September 2014
Accepted 1 October 2014
Disaster Prevention and
Management
Vol. 24 No. 2, 2015
pp. 166-184
© Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0965-3562
DOI 10.1108/DPM-09-2014-0187
RESEARCH PAPER
Disaster logistics in small island
developing states:
Caribbean perspective
Denise D.P. Thompson
Department of Public Management, John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
City University of New York, New York, New York, USA
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to review the current state of disaster logistics among
Caribbean small island developing states that are Caribbean Community (CARICOM) members, and,
based on those findings propose a coherent logistics framework that could influence the development
of a robust system that can effectively respond to disasters in the region.
Design/methodology/approach – Consisted of a series of in-depth interviews with national and
regional disaster managers in the Caribbean. Secondary sources augmented the interviews. Data analysis
conformed to Pope, et al. guidelines for qualitative research. There are limitations to this approach, but, the
lack of existing research on the region and the need for information on the topic justify the approach.
Findings – The main findings show the lack of a coherent and integrated logistics strategy. Missing
or weak components like transportation and distribution infrastructure, a procurement strategy,
inadequate port facilities and insufficient human resources undermine the overall logistics performance.
Although limitations of small island status further weigh on the development and implementation of a
regional logistics approach is possible. The paper proposes one.
Research limitations/implications – The proposed framework has implications for disaster
management and disaster policy in the Caribbean. From a disaster policy perspective it suggests
important logistics governance decisions including funding, scalability issues and formalized
agreements that must be made collectively.
Practical implications – From a management perspective the shows how to strengthen the regional
response mechanism (RRM), builds efficiency in response and provides redundancies in the regional
logistics system.
Originality/value – This paper’s value lies in its focus on a region that is often omitted in academic
literature, but is disaster-prone. Importantly, the research proposes a workable framework on which to
build a robust logistics infrastructure and improve logistics capacity based on primary research.
Keywords Aftercare, Disasters, Emergency response, Natural hazard, Disaster logistics, Caribbean,
SIDS, Regional logistics framework
Paper type
A. Introduction
Each year the small island developing states (SIDs) as well as those on continental land
masses around the Caribbean Sea endure frequent natural hazard impacts. In the last
This research was funded by the Professional Staff Congress, City University of New York
(PSC-CUNY). The author wishes to thank PSC-CUNY. The author would also like to thank the
Executive Director and senior staff at the CDEMA for making time to talk with me and for
encouraging national disaster directors in the region to complete interviews at their annual
conference in Montego Bay, Jamaica During December 2013. My special appreciation to the
national disaster directors of St Kitts and Nevis, Antigua, Guyana, Montserrat, and Jamaica who
took time out of their busy schedules to talk with me.
decade alone there have been three large-scale disasters, multiple flooding, and Small island
landslides and a few droughts that have exposed weaknesses in the regional logistics developing
approach, and capacity. For instance, the 2004 hurricanes and tropical storms that
devastated Grenada and Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic and the Bahamas exposed
states
weaknesses in relief coordination (Economic Commission of the European Union,
Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid, ECHO, 2005). The region struggled to get
relief supplies to affected territories in a coordinated and timely manner. Three years 167
later, Hurricane Dean battered several countries simultaneously and although the
countries again mobilized through the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management
Agency (CDEMA), the response presented a logistical nightmare for impacted countries.
The 2010 earthquake in Haiti highlighted the fears of regional disaster managers.
Granger (2011) found that the poor coordination of relief activities put additional strain
on already limited regional resources (p. 9). Again, despite mobilizing through CDEMA
with support from international aid agencies, the region was ill-equipped to handle such a
large and unusual disaster. For example, Kirton (2013) found misaligned logistics capacity
compared to the demands on the ground after the earthquake. He also found limited
response capacity for the multiple catastrophic events that the region faces.
The purpose of this paper is to review the current state of disaster logistics among
Caribbean SIDs that are Caribbean Community (CARICOM) members, and, based
on those findings propose a coherent logistics framework that could influence the
development of a robust system that can effectively respond to disasters in the region.
Despite the extensive and growing body of literature on disaster logistics there is little
meaningful coverage of the Caribbean region. This paper tries to fill some of the
lacunae in that literature.

B. Regional disparities, common threats

The United Nations has designated most of the CARICOM member countries as SIDs
(United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UNCED, 1992).
CARICOM’s members are mainly English-speaking islands in the Greater and Lesser
Antilles-Barbados, Jamaica, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua &
Barbuda, Montserrat, Turks & Caicos, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Trinidad
and Tobago, Turks and Caicos, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Kitts & Nevis. However
there are members and associates located on the continental land masses of South and
Central America including Guyana, Suriname, and Belize, the latter two are non-
English-speaking members. Haiti is CARICOM’s newest member.
Together these countries have a population of over 16 million; Haiti alone holds aver
60 percent of this population (Caricomstats, 2008). The disparities in socio-economic
and demographic characteristics among the countries complicates efforts to establish a
regional logistics approach. Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the Western
Hemisphere with a GDP of around US$600 and based on Center for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) data, it remains among the top ten countries for
disaster mortality (Guha-Sapir et al., 2012). Countries like the British Virgin Islands are
high income with per capita GDP of over US$40,000 (Caribbean Journal, 2013). The
Bahamas, and Barbados have per capita GDP of over $US21,000; Trinidad, Antigua,
St Kitts and Nevis with just under $US15,000; the others are less than $US10,000 per
capita (Caribbean Journal, 2013). This income disparity impacts many country’s ability
to commit to building its their logistics capacity or contribute to developing that of the
region. Nevertheless, CDEMA members share common risks that they must tackle
DPM together; individually they cannot commit the level of resources needed to mount an
24,2 effective response.
C. CDEMA
CDEMA is an inter-governmental organization focusing on regional comprehensive
disaster management (CDM) among CARICOM members and associate members. It is
one of the specialized agencies of CARICOM that functions through a mutual aid
168 arrangement in which countries pool resources to respond when any member experiences
a disaster (CDEMA, n.d.). CDEMA’s regional coordinating unit (CU) in Barbados supports
disaster management capacity building among participating members. It mobilizes and
coordinates the supply and delivery of relief from governmental, inter-governmental,
international aid agencies, and non-governmental organizations to members impacted by
a disaster (CDEMA, n.d.).
Since its inception CDEMA has been reinventing itself. Most recently (2009) it
changed its name from Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)
to CDEMA to better reflect its shift from disaster response to CDM. By doing so,
CDEMA also positioned itself to access resources from international arrangements like
the Hyogo Framework for Action and other international and bilateral arrangements
(Thompson, 2012). However, CDEMA has been unable to develop and implement an
effective disaster logistics strategy.
D. Disaster logistics
Logistics is the inbound and outbound flow and storage of goods, services and
information within and between organizations (Gundlach et al., 2006). Properly planned
and executed, disaster logistics ensures that resources are mobilized in a cost-effective
manner to help those in need. The typical logistics architecture brings together elements
including warehousing, transportation, procurement and distribution, sheltering, and
human resources. Transportation is crucially important because, without it, disaster
logisticians are unable to move the necessary people, and resources to impacted
destinations in an efficient manner (Tseng et al, 2005). Warehousing is a key component
because properly pre-positioning supplies reduces response time and allows for better
procurement planning while also improving distribution costs (Bozorgi-Amiri et al., 2012).
Procurement considers the supplies needs, competitive pricing for those supplies and
contingency arrangements in the event of shortages (Bozorgi-Amiri et al., 2012). Available
sheltering options ensure that people can be moved out of dangerous situations and their
basic needs supplied until they can return home safely. Distribution is the storage and
flow of supplies to their end users (Rushton et al., 2014). Without trained personnel any
logistics operation will fail since they ensure that all the pieces are in place and turn up to
mount an effective response.
There is no consensus in the literature on whether a centralized strategy is preferred
to a decentralized one when organizing logistics elements. However, Dolinskaya et al.
(2011), argue that centralization facilitates effective coordination and control, important
attributes in disaster logistics. Centralizing elements also facilitates pooled decision
making, eliminating duplication of efforts and financing efficiency. Decentralization
allows for capacity building at the sub-regional level, adds diversity to the overall
logistics system and improves response time.
1. No overarching framework
In the literature on humanitarian logistics, Kovács and Spens (2007) suggest that
perhaps because humanitarian logistics has received little attention by academics
studying logistics, there is currently no overarching framework for humanitarian Small island
logistics. They note that in crafting such a framework logisticians could learn from developing
business logistics. However, they caution that attention should remain on the unique
requirements of humanitarian logistics. For instance, the instability and uncertainty of
states
disaster environments require unique considerations not seen in normal business
logistics. The pace of change is fast and evolving and the players are constantly
changing as the requirements on the ground change. The frequent changes in relief 169
networks even during the same disaster add an extra dimension of complication to the
coordination efforts (Whybark et al., 2010).
Informational needs and ability to communicate also change as the overall priorities
and conditions shift throughout the response lifecycle, heightening uncertainty levels
and raising the probability for error (Whybark et al., 2010). This was evident in the
response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The weakened communication infrastructure
added to the burden of logistics during disaster relief (Whybark et al., 2010). Lastly,
the skills needed by disaster logisticians are broader than business logisticians.
Tatham et al. (2013) suggest that this breadth of responsibility runs the entire range
of logistics plus some ancillary duties including facilities management and security. As
such, disaster logisticians must be more rounded than their business counterparts.

2. Considering the disaster supply chain

The disaster logistics literature suggests that a logistics strategy is more robust
when it considers the disaster relief supply chain. By incorporating supply chain
considerations into disaster logistics planning, we are better able to identify process
overlaps, and redundancies that might not have shown up (Tomasini and Van
Wassenhove, 2009). In addition, we are better able to incorporate an understanding of
sourcing, research and development, marketing, order management, distribution, into
logistics planning (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). These components must all
be streamlined in a seamless fashion to optimize performance. However, existing
barriers can limit integration and synergy and hence diminish the overall logistics
performance (Maon et al., 2009).

3. Barriers to effective logistics planning and execution

Cost presents a significant barrier to effective logistics planning and execution. The
cost of mounting an effective logistics operation is extremely high, and, in some cases,
is prohibitive. Scholars agree that logistical operations are the most expensive part of
disaster relief efforts (see van Wassenhove, 2006; Altay et al., 2009; Christopher and
Tatham, 2011). Christopher and Tatham (2011) calculate that of the overall annual
expenditure of aid agencies alone, logistics account for approximately 75percent of
their annual budgets. If logistics spending from national governments is added, they
note, spending is much higher. Compounding this, unfortunately, is the approximately
40 percent of funds that are wasted due to poor planning and pressure to respond
quickly (Tatham et al., 2013).
Moreover, Kovács and Spens (2009) observe that coordinating logistics activities
might be the biggest challenge to sound logistical practice. The wide array of players,
the need to pull the required skills and resources together, the information sharing
barriers, and so on make coordination difficult (Dolinskaya et al., 2011). However, a
single logistics integrator can pull all the players and pieces together so effectively that
he improves the overall coordination of the entire logistics operation.
DPM E. Data and methods
24,2 The research utilized in-depth unstructured interviews with those involved in logistics
operations within CDEMA. Since many Caribbean islands do not have a dedicated
logistics manager, interviews were conducted with the heads of disaster agencies
who must themselves oversee logistical operations when there is a disaster. In total,
eight in-depth interviews were conducted with national disaster managers and senior
170 officers at the CU of CDEMA. Although time consuming, this research approach was
chosen primarily because the disaster management literature on the region is
small. The research strategy therefore relies upon the collection of rich textual data
that could then be explored inductively by generating categories and explanations
(Pope et al., 2000).
Selection of the islands studied is based on the need to capture the range of diversity
in the region. For instance, Antigua was selected because it is a small island in the
Eastern Caribbean and staging areas for disaster relief (sub-regional focal point, SRFP).
In addition, its national director leads the CDEMA effort to examine how it could
improve its logistics operations. Jamaica was selected because it is located in the
western Caribbean and is the largest SRFP. Montserrat is a very small island that is a
dependent of the UK. St Kitts and Nevis are small territories and isolated in terms
of location, and are important in understanding the scope of logistics response and
assets. Guyana is located on the continental South America and is underdeveloped
when compared to many of the other CDEMA members. The executive director as well
as the Technical Manager for Preparedness and Country Support at the CU have
intimate knowledge of the logistics capacity of the overall system and are anxious to
initiate improvements to it.
Interviews were conducted at the CDEMA annual conference held in Montego Bay,
Jamaica in between November 2013 and January 2014. Each taped interview lasted
approximately 70 minutes. The following research questions guided the interviews:
RQ1. What is your current logistics approach?
RQ2. What are the gaps in logistics?
RQ3. What are the strengths of your existing logistics approach?
RQ4. What are some strategies to improve disaster logistics in the region?
Interview questions were crafted after a detailed literature review into the general
logistics, humanitarian logistics and supply chain management literature. Secondary
research augments the interview findings by adding context to them.
A written text of the interviews was prepared for analysis. Data analysis follows
Pope et al. (2000) five-step approach to qualitative data analysis formulated around the
following areas: (1) familiarization, (2) identifying a thematic framework, (3) indexing,
(4) charting, (5) mapping and interpretation. Transcripts of the interviews were
reviewed six times to have a general understanding of their content (familiarization).
The researcher took notes as she reviewed transcripts to identify and index themes and
categories. She deployed two techniques in constructing themes. First, she used word
repetition to generate themes (Ryan and Bernard, 2003; see also Bradley et al., 2007).
These themes were then employed in coding the transcribed research text. Second, new,
but important themes were identified through multiple readings of the text and an
understanding of the literature to pinpoint salient issues that were mentioned, but
infrequent in the text. This technique is also known as the unmarked text technique
(Ryan and Bernard, 2003). The researcher then revisited the data to confirm the themes. Small island
All data relevant to a particular theme were grouped together to form categories under developing
that theme (identifying a thematic framework).
She then applied numerical codes under each theme throughout the data (e.g. all
states
transportation information are labeled ¼ 1, funding ¼ 2 and so on) (indexing). She then
arranged the data to form charts around the various identified theme entries from each
respondent (charting). Then using the charts, the researcher conducted an analysis 171
to find associations between themes (mapping and interpretation). From there,
she determined the meaning of the information gathered under each theme using the
study’s purpose as a guide.
A limitation of qualitative research is the risk of being co-opted by the process.
This researcher was constantly vigilant to maintain the finding’s fidelity given the
relevance of the research for policy interventions in the region. In addition, qualitative
research calls into question the issue of generalizability. However, as qualitative
researchers (Pope et al., 2000) show, qualitative studies are not designed to be statistical
generalizability. The in-depth interviews allowed the researcher to add depth of
understanding to the process and context of disaster logistics in the Caribbean that
strengthens the validity of the findings. Secondary research adds important contextual
information thereby strengthening validity.

F. Regional response mechanism (RRM)

RQ1: what is the current logistics approach?
Understanding the response mechanism is fundamental to appreciating the current
logistics arrangement in the region. Arthurs (2009) provides good background information.
He notes that the CU coordinates regional disaster relief by dividing the region into
four sub-regional focal groups (SRFGs) (Figure 1); each SRFG comprises three to four
islands and a coordinator, the SRFP. Designated SRFPs are islands with the most
developed infrastructure and capacity including telecommunication system, emergency
system, warehousing infrastructure, and support professionals. SRFPs-Antigua, Barbados,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago- are CDEMA’s frontline disaster response mechanism

CDEMA-CU

Jamaica Trinidad Barbados Antigua

•Bahamas •Grenada •Dominica •Anguilla
•Belize •Guyana •St. Lucia •British Virgin
•Haiti •Suriname •St. Vincent & Island
•Turks & Caicos The Grenadines •Montserrat
•St. Kitts & Nevis Figure 1.
Regional SRFGs
showing sub-regional
Source: Adapted from www.cdema.org/publications/Overview_of_CDEMA.pdf focal points
DPM that coordinate relief efforts within its sub-regional focal group, without involving the
24,2 entire CDEMA system (Arthurs, 2009). The CU coordinates focal point activities.
When a disaster overwhelms the response capacity of both impacted island and
SRFPs, the CU activates the RRM (Arthurs, 2009). The RRM (Figure 2) is a response
framework that consists of the Regional Coordination Plan (RCP), Response Teams,
Memoranda of Understanding, Standard Operating Procedures, Agreements and Acts,
172 the CARICOM Disaster Relief Unit, the Regional Telecommunications Plan, and the
Eastern and North-western Caribbean Donor Groups (NCDG) (CDEMA, n.d.).
The RCP supports national response plans and is activated once a member can no
longer cope and has requested assistance. At the same time, the Regional Coordination
Center (RCC) is triggered and the CARICOM Disaster Reduction Unit (CDRU) is
activated (Arthurs, 2009). The RCC provides the necessary communication and
coordination support to member states during a disaster. Strict guidelines and operating
procedures govern its activation, operation and de-activation (Arthurs, 2009). The CDRU
is the operational component of the RRM and is responsible for coordinating relief
supplies, provide emergency telecommunications, conduct damage assessments, and
send in crews to repair critical life support services (NOW Grenada, 2013). It comprises a
35-member team of military officers, police forces and firefighters from the 18 CARICOM
member states (Hoy, 2014).

CDRU
Operations
Order
MOUs
National SOPs
Disaster Response
Plans Teams
Acts

Regional
REGIONAL RESPONSE ECDG
Disaster
MECHANISM (RRM) Operations
Plans

Regional
Specialized
Coordinating
Plans
Center

Regional
Warehousing

Notes: Adapted from General Earl Arthurs, CDEMA CU Technical

Manager October 5, 2009, www.sela.org/DB/ricsela/EDOCS/
Figure 2.
RRM SRed/2009/10/T023600003793-0-CDEMA_and_the_Regional_
Response_Mechanism_(RRM).pdf
Although there is a broad logistics architecture in place, findings show that the overall Small island
capacity and support infrastructure are weak. Table I presents a detailed summary of developing
the research findings. These findings are discussed below.
states
G. Findings
RQ2: what are the gaps in logistics?
Raising the necessary funding is a challenge (Table I). Even the SRFP in-charge of
173
sub-regional logistics are under-funded. According to Person A, “focal points do not
even have a budget for logistics” (personal communications, December 6, 2013). The CU
receives some funding from private sector companies and from international donors,
but most of its funding comes from member states. Governments must contend with
other competing and on-going needs, which often take precedence over capacity building
for logistics. Inadequate funding limits access to other key logistics components as well
including access to trained logisticians, and appropriate transportation assets, which are
most pressing.
Interviewees agree that transportation is the area of highest priority (Table I). The
transportation assets relied upon for regional relief work are “often not government
assets and cannot be fully commandeered when needed” (Person B, personal
communications, December 7, 2013). Available transportation resources are inadequate
for the complex set of constraints associated with disaster response in the region. For
example, when supplies for the 2010 Haitian earthquake response got to Jamaica, “Jamaica
had its own challenges to move supplies to Haiti” (Person A, personal communications,
December 6, 2014). Currently each island arranges its own transportation during disasters.
Those islands with greater resources (like the British Virgin Islands, the Bahamas, and
Trinidad) have better assets and are better able to respond adequately.
Countries like Guyana do not have the necessary transportation assets including
multi-modal transportation, to tackle the various terrains (Person C, personal
communications, December 7, 2014). Moreover, aircraft used for disaster response are
primarily assigned to other activities such as drug intervention which takes priority
(Person B personal communications, December 7, 2013). Commercial shippers and
couriers also play a role in disaster logistics, but without formal arrangements
countries must rely on the shippers’ goodwill during disasters (Person B, personal
communications, December 7, 2013; Person A, personal communications, December 6,
2013). Whereas the larger islands can rely on their coast guards for water transport; the
smaller islands, with limited coast guard capability, often do not have this opportunity.
Human resources. The shortage of logistician permeates the entire CDEMA system
(Table I). According to Person B, “most of the major studies for CDEMA have pointed
to HR as an under-resourced area” (personal communications, December 7, 2013). The
shortage is particularly troubling in smaller islands where “they cannot attract and
keep trained logisticians” (Person D, personal communication, December 7, 2013).
Current personnel are inadequately trained and stretched to provide logistics support
in addition to other routine duties. The larger islands often rely on their military for
logistics support (Person B, personal communications, December 7, 2013). However,
they have not utilized the military as effectively as they could because of
non-formalized and uncoordinated relationships. Person A (personal communications,
December 6, 2013) wants to see “greater planning and coordination between the disaster
office and the military in the countries that have them (Trinidad, Jamaica, Barbados,
Antigua)”. At the same time, disaster managers are generally apprehensive about using
 24,2

174
DPM

Table I.

managers
interviews with
Summary of the
main findings of

regional disaster
Themes Main summary of findings

General condition of logistics in the region

Logistics capacity Overall logistics capacity is poor to very poor; General lack of logistics resources
CDEMA CU coordinates regional logistics operations, but no trained logistician on staff
HR and transportation might be the weakest area of the region’s logistics capacity The Smaller islands have trouble finding logisticians
Moving supplies between the islands is extremely challenging part of regional logistics operations
The Eastern Caribbean Donor Group (ECDG), USAID SOUTHCOM, FEMA, UN agencies, EU, CIDA provide support for the region
CDRU is a major component of the existing logistics capacity
Financing Major constraint in the region; always urgently needed
Limited finances to fund logistics operations
Donations constitute a major source of financing
St. Lucia model may be instructive in donations collection management; they use the postal service - manage those giving, and those receiving donations

Missing or weak logistics elements

Warehousing capacity Weak, but strongest part of the regions logistics capacity
International aid agencies helped many countries to build warehouses ;
There are currently 4 regional warehouses - Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Antigua; inventory update every April
Some islands have only 1 warehouse. If compromised, the entire logistics process is disrupted
Private companies hold warehouses that are not fully utilized, these can be used by disaster managers; some agencies borrow warehousing space
Warehouse management is a challenge in the region; limited personnel to manage warehouses including stocking, management and locations of stocks
Trinidad can provide smart practices in warehouse management since it is strong in manufacturing and export
Transportation Extremely weak; very few assets including air, maritime assets
infrastructure Supplies often sit on the ground for weeks before getting to final destination due to a lack of adequate transportation
Moving people for disaster response with their sustainability supplies difficult
Commercial carriers often give concessions on weight; priority seating/reservation to emergency relief staff, but no formal arrangement in place
Courier services like DHL, DIGICEL loan pilots, vans and drivers to move supplies for 4-6 weeks, but these relationships are not formalized
No cargo service in the region, moving supplies can be a challenge
Haiti showed the limits of the region’s disaster transportation system - commercial rates had to be paid to move some supplies
Regional arrangements may be better than individual country arrangements; inland transportation can be handled nationally
Human resources Very weak; No logisticians in most of the countries, including those countries that house focal points; none in the CU
Ambivalence about depending on volunteers, not sure they will be reliable
Need to train logisticians; military could help; best concentration of logistics capacity in the region
Procurement Needs strengthening
Different sources of procurement; food locally, others from Europe, N. America, Canada

(continued )
Themes Main summary of findings
No comprehensive pricing strategy; each country does its own procurement
No economies of scale - market not big enough to drive large imports
Very few formalized arrangements, purchases based on need
Procurement is linked to packaging and even manufacturing. supplies need to be packaged a certain way for greater efficiency in transportation and warehousing
costs
Distribution Extremely challenging to move supplies between the different countries
Little resources to move supplies from staging areas to affected locations
Need more formal arrangements with commercial carriers to distribute disaster supplier, transport people with sustainability supplies
Need to put transportation system in place to manage in-island distribution; need to develop a distribution infrastructure
Naval ships can carry supplies, but limited capacity in the region
Sheltering Very little emphasis placed on sheltering in the region
Need other options besides schools for shelters in many countries
Other countries may have to provide shelters to those impacted, e.g. Montserrat’s volcanic eruption
Problem with the majority of shelters being schools; they cannot be used long term; cannot move too many supplies into schools - cots, blankets, water;
The Red Cross is a great asset in the area of shelter and shelter management
Port sizes Capacity extremely limited
Port sizes cannot facilitate the vessels needed to bring in supplies; too small
British have ships in the region that they use to help with disaster response; need to leave vessels outside port area and use small vessels to transport supplies into port
No airport supporting large aircrafts on the smaller islands
Customs arrangements Once there is a disaster supplies come through the disaster management office in each country,
The government actually issue pre-release paperwork routing supplies. These customs arrangements are part of a UN agreement that countries in the region are party
to, need improvement
Poor enforcement of standardized regional and international arrangements
Focal points Focal point arrangements need to be strengthened
Haiti showed that focal points need strengthening; Jamaica was limited in support capacity; got help from Canadians to airlift supplies to Haiti
Jamaica is the largest focal point, but issues with warehousing, port facilities
Tools Individual countries have bits of needed logistics tools. e.g. Montserrat has good communications system ; e.g. radios and could provide support to member states;
Trinidad with warehousing
Some countries like Guyana have geographic areas that are only accessible by air. GIS technology can help with mapping logistics assets; There are tools, equipment
that are specialized; many countries cannot afford to purchase them
Warehousing management system in place developed by PAHO, but limited
developing
states
Small island

Table I.
175
DPM civilian volunteers since they are unsure how reliable they would be. Person A notes,
24,2 “there is no guarantee that they will show up and perform at
fifty percent or even twenty-five percent when needed” (personal communication,
December 6, 2013).
Procurement is inefficient. Largely because of the absence of a strategy, supplies are
usually procured from whatever suppliers are available. There are few agreements in
176 place for sourcing regular or contingency disaster supplies. Person E laments that,
“there are at best only gentlemen’s arrangements in place” (personal communications,
December 7, 2013). This might have to do with the region’s traditional focus on distribution
as the key element in disaster relief, neglecting procurement (Person A, personal
communication, December 6, 2013). Ad hoc procurement arrangements negatively impact
warehousing and transportation costs. Arranging with suppliers familiar with disaster
situations is beneficial because their development and packaging methods allow for
reductions in warehousing and transportation costs (Person A, personal communications,
December 6, 2013).
Distribution, sheltering, human resources, port capacity and custom arrangements
are all inadequate. The unavailability of assets to move supplies from staging to
affected areas pose the largest threat to distribution. Although there are no formal
arrangements, commercial carriers usually respond to requests to move relief supplies
(Person E, personal communications, December 7, 2013). However, inter-island
transfers can be very challenging logistically. The small sea ports in some territories
make it difficult to move supplies between them (Person B, personal communications,
December 7, 2013; Person A, personal communications, December 6, 2013). When large
vessels are used, smaller vessels are needed to get supplies near shore and inland. In
addition, inland transport poses additional challenges because of inadequate distribution
networks. The ad hoc nature of distribution plus the need for diverse transportation
modes escalate distribution costs.
Sheltering. Person F laments that “so very little emphasis is placed on sheltering”
(personal communication, November 28, 2013). The two main issues with sheltering
are – the physical facilities and shelter management. The “location of shelters, supplies
for shelters, length of stay are all issues that require better planning” states Person D
(personal communication, December 7, 2013). For instance, the use of schools, which are
the primary sheltering source, is restrictive when school is in session. In addition,
schools do not have the storage capacity needed to house supplies like cots, blankets,
and water over the long term because these items are bulky. Person F (personal
communications, November 28, 2013) opined that the Red Cross, whose expertise
resides in sheltering, is under-utilized in the region.
Port facilities and capacity in the region are very limited, even among the larger
islands like Jamaica. Person D notes that, “large cargo ships have great difficulty
coming to port, and often must off-load supplies unto smaller vessels to move them
inland” (personal communications, December 7, 2013). Airports are small and, the smaller
islands like Montserrat, cannot support large aircraft (Person E, personal
communications, December 7, 2013). An inventory of ports, including smaller ones,
might help disaster managers work with small carriers to optimize distribution suggests
Person B (personal communications, December 7, 2013).
Communications. Currently telecommunications rely on satellite link, which is
vulnerable to wind damage (Person E, personal communications, December 7, 2013).
In addition, most islands rely on cell phones, but in disaster conditions this can be
challenging since cell life is finite and cell towers are sometimes destroyed (Person G, Small island
Personal Communications, January 6, 2014). Two-way radios and satellite phones are developing
used in some countries as backup. However, many NDOs do not even have two-way
radios (Person E, personal communications, December 7, 2013). Person G notes that,
states
“technology to access, manage and coordinating information to aid decision making is
lacking” (personal communication, January 6, 2014).
177
RQ3: what are the strengths of your existing logistics approach?
Warehousing, although the strongest element of the regional logistics architecture, is
weak. There are different warehousing arrangements in each island (Person G, personal
communication January 6, 2014; Person B, personal communications, December 7, 2013).
Some warehouses are government owned, others are borrowed from the private sector.
The CU only recently developed a regional warehousing plan that locates possible
warehousing facilitates in which to pre-positioning supplies, but the plan needs to be
strengthened and implemented across the region to be effective (Person B, personal
communications, December 7, 2013).
There are intra-regional custom arrangements through the CARICOM Single
Market and Economy (CSME) that provide priority passage for disaster relief personnel
and supplies. Also, there are extra-regional arrangements through the United Nations
that give priority clearance to disaster relief personnel and supplies (Person D, personal
communications, December 7, 2013). These arrangements need to be better enforced
to be effective.

H. RQ4. What are some strategies to improve disaster logistics in the

region?
Proposed logistics framework
There is consensus among disaster managers that creating a regional logistics
framework would serve to streamline regional logistics operations. The proposed
framework (Figure 3) provides the broad organizing approach for getting supplies to
affected areas and supports the integration of national and regional efforts to this end.
It reflects some of the smart practices used by the International Federation of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Red Cross), and draws insights from the Association
of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance
on Disaster Management (AHA).

CDEMA CU
Red
Cross
Regional Logistics
Center United
NEEDS Decentralized
Nations
(Sub-Regional Centralized
Focal Groups): -Procurement US
-Financing RRM-
IMPACT •Distribution -HR CDRU SouthCom
AREA •Sheltering -Transportation Coord.
-Customs arrangements World Food
•Warehousing -Communication & Tools Program
-Port facilities
RESOURCES •Port Facilities Figure 3.
Pan American Proposed regional
Disaster logistics framework
Response Unit
DPM The Red Cross logistics approach emphasizes three broad strategies: scalability,
24,2 regionalization, and integration of supply chain considerations into disaster planning
(see Thompson, 2014). That system is built on a scalable nested system that can handle
small emergencies or be ramped up to handle large-scale disasters by tapping into its
multiple levels of operation (Thompson, 2014). The organization employs a regionalized
strategy to decentralize and create redundancies, build capacity, efficiently pre-stage
178 supplies and cut response time. (Thompson, 2014). Connecting with the disaster supply
chain brings stability to logistical operations. This strategy allows the Red Cross to
reduce logistics costs and control the type, quality and quantity of supplies (Thompson,
2014). AHA leads the ASEAN regional coordinated response (APEC, 2008). Since its
establishment, the logistics approach has been tested by multiple typhoons including
Haiyan most recently.
The proposed framework builds on the existing RRM and proposes the development
of a regional logistics plan to guide the work of the RRM. This regional logistics plan
would identify supply sources; review transportation needs; identify who conducts
resource needs assessments; where items are prepositioned and how much; logistics
stakeholders in the region; distribution, warehousing and procurement and so on.
The framework also proposes a regional logistics center (RLC) as an organizational
unit within the CU (large Circle in Figure 3). A trained logistician should manage
the RLC and work to integrate the key logistics elements and resources for effective
performance. This includes building alliances, formalizing agreements, facilitating and
managing regional logistics planning, and establishing communications tools to
support logistics (Regional Logistics Program, n.d.). The RLC should house the CDRU.
The framework is scalable (dotted lines emanating from the CDEMA CU box in
Figure 3). It can pull on other resources should a disaster overwhelm the region. Scaling
up would rely on more formalized arrangements with international and extra-RRMs
including the Red Cross, World Food Program and the Pan-American Disaster
Response Unit that already provide logistics support in sheltering, food distribution,
and pre-positioning of supplies. In addition, the US Southern Command can support air
and sea transportation, and human resources.

Issues to consider
1. Use of the military. Currently, military, police and fire personnel staff the CDRU.
Although the value of military-delivered humanitarian relief has been repeatedly
demonstrated including their discipline, ability to coordinate response and their assets,
the limitations are worth considering. Robinson (2004), and others show that the cost to
compensate the military in some circumstances where the military does cover the costs
is a limitation to using military responders. In addition, military responders often
ignore civilian responders and take over the relief operation. While these barriers could
prove challenging, there it is not only expeditious to continue their use, it is also
practical since theirs are the only institutions with the expertise and assets to handle
complex disasters.
2. Centralized elements. Transportation. Centralizing transportation planning
(Figure 3) at the regional level would allow several benefits. Centralization increases
leverage by providing a regional group with greater collected resources to lobby and
negotiate with transportation interests. A single entity would coordinate transportation
logistics and make decisions about these activities on behalf of members (Dolinskaya
et al., 2011). Formalized agreements with regional transportation interests including
cruise ships, and courier services can play a positive role in boosting efficiency Small island
and cost savings. Inland transportation can be handled nationally since the developing
national disaster offices are more familiar with their island’s needs and types of assets
available.
states
Procurement. Figure 3 presents procurement as a centralized element in the logistic
framework. Centralizing procurement allows for larger purchase volume than can be
done by individual countries and, in turn, facilitates economies of scale. In addition, 179
today’s disaster organizations are benefitting from the competitive advantage that
integration of the complete disaster supply chain can offer disaster logistics. With a
centralized strategy the region would be better able to plan for and accommodate
different levels of deployment. It would also provide the added benefit of influencing
the type, quality and price of supplies.
Funding. Pooling Funds is a feasible option to leverage this scarce resource because
duplication and waste can be more readily identified and eliminated. A central body
would make better spending decisions, and coordinate funds collection and disbursement
more efficiently. The CDEMA membership should jointly agree on how funds are used.
Human resources. A central authority planning for personnel needs is well positioned
to appreciate the full range of disaster logistics human resource needs and manage their
deployment. It is also able to train and deploy a volunteer pool to supplement existing
personnel during disaster response. An appropriate training and development program
for volunteers should be created and used to build volunteer capacity. Volunteers should
be placed in a working environment that enables meaningful contribution so as to keep
them motivated.
Customs arrangements. Customs arrangements play a key role in efficiently moving
disaster supplies (World Customs Organization, n.d.). Best practices suggest a
simplification of customs procedures and administrative requirements to reduce
bottlenecks (Logistics Cluster, n.d.). The CSME facilitates the free movement of supplies
in the region. However, the special circumstances involved in moving disaster supplies
including food items, medication complicate shipping arrangements because they are
highly regulated and can disrupt regular customs procedures causing delays in supply
delivery (World Customs Organization, n.d.). A central body is best positioned sort
through these issues.
Communications. Logistics is also concerned with moving and coordinating non-
material resources necessary to support it (Gundlach et al., 2006). Inadequate
communications tools including decision support systems and tracking technologies to
support the movement of supplies and people remain limiting factors in regional
logistics. Social media is a cost-effective resource to track people and supplies and
disseminate and gather information during disasters. A central authority could
efficiently integrate technologies to aid information flow and decision-making.
3. Decentralized elements. Decentralized elements are represented by the broken box
in Figure 3. Sheltering is of key consideration. Preplanning is essential for post-disaster
sheltering success. It includes finding shelter locations, oversight mechanisms, assessing
adequacy, and anticipating duration of needs vs shelter availability (Hamilton, 2012). It
ultimately helps to lower sheltering costs since arrangements and discounted pricing
agreements are better made beforehand (Wright et al., 2012). Decentralizing shelter
planning and management facilitates integration of sub-regional nuances, and releases
the CU to address other logistical issues. The SRFGs, working with the proposed RLC can
coordinate and monitor this.
DPM Warehousing. Pre-positioning supplies in strategic locations to minimize cost and
24,2 maximize response time can be expensive. Three considerations stand out. First, there
is no international best practice governing warehousing practices per se because these
largely depend on regional and sub-regional nuances. Second, warehouse location
should consider shelter location, transportation networks and modalities, and other
response infrastructure such as medical facilities. Third, regional disaster logisticians
180 should agree on the inventory for these warehouses, the best location for them,
distribution triggers and so on (Balcik and Beamon, 2008). Balcik and Beamon (2008)
find that the number and location of warehouses and the relief supplies they hold
directly affect costs and response time. By decentralizing warehouses, logisticians
can plan on using the more available smaller vessels to move supplies and be better
accommodated by small ports. That said, emphasis should be placed on building
warehouse management capacity and linking that to the sub-regional distribution
strategy.
Distribution. A distribution strategy is most effective at the sub-regional level
because it allows for greater certainty of needs and timeliness in delivery. To be
effective, it should be linked with the broader transportation strategy and matched
with existing port facilities. Wilmsmeier and Sánchez (2009) found three types of
transshipment centers in the region. First are the global transshipment centers in
Kingston, Jamaica and Freetown, Bahamas. These are well established in the global
transshipment liner network and are pivotal to any sub-regional distribution strategy
(Wilmsmeier and Sánchez, 2009). In fact, Kingston lies along the main transshipment
route between Europe and the Panama Canal, and is in the process of building a large
state-of-the-art logistics hub to capitalize on the increased traffic from the expanded
Panama Canal that could further boost distribution of supplies. Second are the regional
transshipment centers in Bridgetown Barbados and Port of Spain, Trinidad that are
not as developed as the first type, but important is regional transshipment. Third
are inter-island transshipment centers in Bridgetown, Barbados, and Castries, St Lucia.
A decentralized distribution strategy could better integrate these considerations into
distribution planning.
Port facilities. Many of the smaller islands like Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis and St
Vincent and the Grenadines cannot accommodate the large ships needed to distribute
disaster relief. Upgrading Inter-island and intra island port facilities and developing
allied port infrastructure is pressing even for the larger ports in Jamaica, Barbados and
Trinidad. A central authority might be better able to push for improvements here.

I. Barriers to development and implementation

Barriers exist to the development and effective implementation of the proposed
framework. The most important is that the countries are at different stages of
development. Mayberry showed that the challenges of states’ differing levels of
development weighed on the region’s response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Asia-Pacific
region. Specific challenges included financial, technical, and human resources
limitation that weighed on capacity development. In the latest strategy for disaster
risk reduction and emergency preparedness and response in the Asia-Pacific region
2009-2015, ASEAN governments acknowledged that their best strategy is to prepare
for disasters jointly (APEC, 2008). CDEMA members must find ways to do the same,
even amid existing competing interests that preoccupy governmental leaders.
J. Conclusion Small island
The main findings show the lack of a coherent and integrated logistics strategy. developing
Missing or weak components like transportation and distribution infrastructure, a
procurement strategy, inadequate port facilities and insufficient human resources
states
undermine the overall logistics performance. The limitations of small island status
further weigh on the development and implementation of a regional logistics approach.
However, there is consensus among disaster managers that a regional logistics 181
approach would streamline logistics and improve performance.
The proposed framework builds on the existing RRMs. It considers the missing or
weak components and lays out how these components can be integrated to improve
logistics performance. In that regard, it strengthens the RRM, builds efficiency in
response and provides redundancies in the regional logistics system. The paper also
has implications for disaster policy in that it suggests important logistics governance
decisions including funding, scalability issues and formalized agreements that must
be made collectively.
Nonetheless, this paper should be viewed as a starting point to building the region’s
disaster logistics architecture, infrastructure and capacity. Much more work needs to
be done in this research area.

Glossary
AHA ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster
Management (AHA)
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CDEMA Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency
CDERA Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Response Agency
CDM Comprehensive Disaster Management
CDRU CARICOM Disaster Reduction Unit
CRED Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
CSME CARICOM Single Market and Economy
CU CDEMA regional coordinating unit
ECDG Eastern Caribbean Donor Group
ECHO Economic Commission of the European Union, Directorate General
for Humanitarian Aid
NCDG North-western Caribbean Donor Group
RRM Regional Response Mechanism
SIDS Small Island Developing States
SRFGs Sub-regional focal groups
SRFPs Sub-regional focal points
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

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About the author

Dr Denise D.P. Thompson is assistant professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City
University of New York where she mainly teaches courses in Policy Analysis, Emergency
Management and Organization Theory and Management. Dr Thompson’s research and
publications focus on risk reduction among the small-island developing states of the Caribbean
(learning; logistics; social vulnerability and climate change), as well as performance in multi-state
disaster management systems. She has presented at numerous conferences on these issues.
Dr Denise D.P. Thompson can be contacted at: dthompson@jjay.cuny.edu

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