Facts
The
Law involved
Legal Question re law
Ruling of the Court re law
Rule of Stat Con applied
Ramirez v. CA
G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995.
Kapunan:
Facts:
1. A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner
Ramirez against the private respondent, Garcia.
During a confrontation in Garcia’s office, the
respondent has allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated the petitioner in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's
dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."
2. To support her claim, the petitioner produced a
verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
3. The respondent alleged that the petitioner’s act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal.
Hence, she filed a criminal case against the
petitioner for violation of Republic Act 4200 or the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.
4. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
and granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that (1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200 and that (2)
the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the
taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. However, the CA
reversed the trial court’s decision.
Issue: Whether RA 4200 does not apply to the taping of
a private conversation by petitioner?
Held:
1. First, legislative intent is determined principally
from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a
literal interpretation would be either impossible or
absurd or would lead to an injustice. Section 1 of
R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal
for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.
law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved
in the private communication. The statute's intent
to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any."
2. Second, the nature of the conversation is
immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications
by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a
tape recorder would sufficient to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
3. Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase
"private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows
the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
“to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,
or signifies the “process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)”.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at
bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC
G.R. No. 82511. March 3, 1992.
Romero:
Facts:
1. In May 1982, private respondent Salazar was
employed by GMCR as general systems analyst. Also
employed by petitioner as manager for technical
operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom
private respondent was allegedly very close.
2. GMCR conducted investigation on Saldivar’s
activities because of reports that company
equipment and spare parts worth thousands of
 dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing.
It likewise appeared on the investigation that
respondent Salazar has signed as a witness to the
articles of partnership between Yambao and
Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full
knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the
Fedders air-conditioner but failed to inform her
employer.
3. Salazar was placed on suspension for 1 month and
gave her 30 days to explain her side. Instead of
submitting an explanation, private respondent filed
a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension.
4. LA ordered petitioner to reinstate private
respondent to her former position. NLRC affirmed
LA’s decision.
Issue:
Held:
1. Preventive suspension was the proper remedial
recourse available to the company pending Salazar's
investigation. Preventive suspension does not
signify that the company has adjudged the
employee guilty of the charges she was asked to
answer and explain. But while we agree with the
propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we
hold that her eventual separation from employment
was not for cause.
2. To go back to the instant case, there being no
evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal,
cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she
had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages.
3. The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin
remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the
dismissed employee to her status before she lost
her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word
"reinstate" is "to restore to a state, condition,
position, etc. from which one had been removed"
15 and in the latter, to give her back the income lost
during the period of unemployment. Both
remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make
her "whole."
4. In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private
respondent. In the first place, the wording of the
Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An
employee who is 'unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement . . . and to his full
backwages . . . " Under the principles of statutory
construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. If in
the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or
grounds for non-application of the above-cited
provision, this should be by way of exception, such
as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due
to ensuing strained relations between the employer
and the employee.
5. Obviously, the principle of "strained relations"
cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise,
reinstatement can never be possible simply because
some hostility is invariably engendered between the
parties as a result of litigation. Besides, no strained
relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who
shall assert his right could be easily separated from
the service, by merely paying his separation pay on
the pretext that his relationship with his employer
had already become strained. Here, it has not been
proved that the position of private respondent as
systems analyst is one that may be characterized as
a position of trust and con6dence such that if
reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does
not constitute an exception to the general rule
mandating reinstatement for an employee who has
been unlawfully dismissed.
6. It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara
report came out after Saldivar had already resigned
from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not
have the opportunity to refute management's
findings, the report remained obviously one-sided.
Stringent examination should have been carried out
to ascertain whether or not there existed
independent legal grounds to hold Salazar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her
dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find
her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public
respondent NLRC dated December 29, 1987 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE
private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her back
wages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2)
years only.
Basbacio v. Drilon
G.R. No. 109445. November 7, 1994.
Mendoza:
Facts:
1. This case presents for determination the scope of
the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which
among other things provides compensation for
persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and
 imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and
ordered released.
2. Petitioner Basbacio and his son-in-law, Balderrama,
were convicted of frustrated murder and two
counts of frustrated murder for the killing of
Federico Boyon and wounding of the latter's wife
Florida and his son Tirso. The CA rendered a
decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that
the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between
him and his son-in-law.
3. Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under
Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the
payment of compensation to "any person who was
unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal." Board of Claims of the DOJ denied the
claim on the ground that while petitioner's
presence at the scene of the killing was not
sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood
between him and the deceased as a result of a land
dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is
his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he
was "probably guilty."
Issue:
Held:
1. Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would
require that every time an accused is acquitted on
appeal he must be given compensation on the
theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial
court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to
petitioner's professed canon of construction that
when the language of the statute is clear it should
be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the
provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly".
However, sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be
"unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The
fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused
is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous
conviction was "unjust.
2. To say then that an accused has been "unjustly
convicted" has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An
accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did
not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily
mean that he is entitled to compensation for having
been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If his
conviction was due to an error in the appreciation
of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is
not unjust. That is why it is not correct to say, that
under the law, liability for compensation depends
entirely on the innocence of the accused.
3. Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust
conviction as a result of which the accused is
unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust
accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly
accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly
convicted and then imprisoned. t is important to
note this because if from its inception the
prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his
conviction by the court is, in all probability, also
wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not
malicious any conviction even though based on less
than the required quantum of proof in criminal
cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
4. Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable
guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction
based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an
unjust judgment but only an erroneous one.
5. In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to
show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court
was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or
gross ignorance or gross negligence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Catiis v. CA
G.R. No. 153979. February 9, 2006.
Austria-Martinez:
Facts:
1. Petitioner filed a letter-complaint against private
respondents for violation of Art 315, No. 2(a) of RPC
in relation to PD 1689 (syndicated estafa) and other
related offenses.
2. Assistant Prosecutor Jurado issued a Resolution
finding the existence of a probable cause for
syndicated Estafa against private respondents and
Tafalla with no bail recommended.
3. On the other hand, Judge Bersamin issued an Order
reconsidering his earlier Order of November 7, 2001
by declaring that the offense charged is bailable.
4. CA reversed the judge’s decision and granted the
petitioner’s prayer for issuance of TRO.
5. However, unknown to petitioner, private
respondents had already filed or posted their surety
bonds with the Office of Executive Judge Zenarosa
who approved the same on the same day and
ordered the immediate release of private
respondents unless held for other lawful cause.
6. CA affirmed the two judges’ decision.
7. Petitioner contends that under Section 1 of P.D. No.
1689, the term "any person" must be understood
 and read in its singular meaning so that even only
one person can be indicted for committing "estafa
or other forms of swindling" in relation to P.D. No.
1689.
Issue:
Held:
1. P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life
imprisonment to death regardless of the amount
involved, provided that a syndicate committed the
crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law as
"consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme." Under the
second paragraph, it is provided that if the
offenders are not members of a syndicate, they
shall nevertheless be held liable for the acts
prohibited by the law.
2. Petitioner's interpretation that the term "any
person" in the first paragraph of section 1 could
mean that even one person can be indicted for
syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the
law. It bears stressing that the law must be
considered as a whole, just as it is necessary to
consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp
its true meaning. It is a dangerous practice to base
construction upon only a part of a section since one
portion may be qualified by the other portion. In
fact, there is no need for any construction or
interpretation of P.D. No. 1689 since the law is clear
and free from any doubt or ambiguity. Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1689 has defined what constitutes a
syndicate and such definition is controlling. Where a
requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous
terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must
see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
3. In this case, the Information specifically charged
only four persons without specifying any other
person who had participated in the commission of
the crime charged, thus, based on the definition of
syndicate under the law, the crime charged was not
committed by a syndicate. We find no reversible
error committed by the CA when it upheld the
ruling of Judge Bersamin that with only four persons
actually charged, the estafa charged has no relation
to the crime punished with life imprisonment to
death under section 1 of P.D. No. 1689.
4. Since the crime charged was not committed by a
syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of
life imprisonment to death cannot be imposed on
private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 14, 2002 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SWS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 208062. April 7, 2015.
Leonen:
Facts:
1. Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a
private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields. On
the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation.
2. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act),
which provides that: “Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election”.
3. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other
pollsters conducted and published the results of
surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections
up to as close as two days before the election day
without causing confusion among the voters and
that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an
immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting
process posed by election surveys. No similar
restriction is imposed on politicians from
explaining their opinion or on newspapers or
broadcast media from writing and publishing
articles concerning political issues up to the day of
the election. They contend that there is no reason
for ordinary voters to be denied access to the
results of election surveys, which are relatively
objective.
4. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the
restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to
prevent the manipulation and corruption of the
electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous
surveys just before the election. It contends that
(1) the prohibition on the publication of election
survey results during the period proscribed by law
bears a rational connection to the objective of the
 law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the
electoral process resulting from manipulated
surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply;
(2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought
to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom
of expression is minimal, the restriction being
limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before
the national election and the last 7 days before a
local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit
election survey results but only require timeliness.
Issue: Whether Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Elections Act
be interpreted in its plain meaning?
Held:
1. Petitioners harp on what they claim to be Section
5.2 (a)'s "plain meaning" and assert that there is no
room to entertain COMELEC's construction of
Section 5.2 (a).
2. It has been said that "[a] cardinal rule in statutory
construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room
for application.
3. First, verba legis or the so-called plain-meaning rule
applies only when the law is completely clear, such
that there is absolutely no room for interpretation.
4. Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to
pedantic rigor that foments absurdity. The dangers
of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are
commonsensical and need not be belabored. These
dangers are by no means endemic to legal
interpretation.
5. Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a
universal plain language is erroneous. In reality,
universality and uniformity of meaning is a rarity. A
contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is
static.
6. The more appropriate and more effective approach
is, thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider
context and the interplay of the historical, the
contemporary, and even the envisioned.
7. Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2 (a) of the Fair
Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider not an
abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of
the whole that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair
elections.
8. As with all the other provisions of the Fair Election
Act, Section 5 is a means to guarantee equal access
to the deliberative forums essential to win an
elective public office. Any reading of Section 5 and
of its individual components, such as Section 5.2 (a),
cannot be divorced from this purpose
JMM Promotions v. NLRC
G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993.
Cruz:
Facts:
1. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in applying Article 223 of
Labor Code and Rule 6, Section 6 of the new Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC to decisions rendered by
the POEA.
2. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in
the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required
under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules
not only to pay a license fee but also to post a cash
bond and a surety bond.
3. The Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond
requirement but suggests that the rules cited by the
NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor
Arbiters and not of the POEA.
Issue: Whether petitioner is still required to post an
appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the
POEA to the NLRC? Yes.
Held:
1. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily
shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds
and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the
POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to
further insure the payment of the monetary award
in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed
on appeal to the NLRC.
2. It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the
money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee
the payment of all valid and legal claims against the
employer, but these claims are not limited to
monetary awards to employees whose contracts of
employment have been violated. The POEA can go
against these bonds also for violations by the
recruiter of the conditions of its license, as well as
the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may
incur.
3. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent
requirements because of the special risks to which
our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign
employers. The bonds and the escrow money are
intended to insure more care on the part of the
 local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to
whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
4. It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in
interpreting a statute, care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the theory
that it was enacted as an integrated measure and
not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut
res magis valeat quam pereat. The Court finds that
Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole.
5. Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in
favor of the working class, conformably to the
mandate of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner.
Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. v. IAC
G.R. No. 75222. July 18, 1991.
Bidin:
(See Online Digest for Facts)
Facts:
1. Three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary
insolvency of private respondents Carlos Gatmaytan
and Teresita Gatmaytan at the CFI of Pampanga and
Angeles City.
2. Sometime in March 1983, through their
representative, they caused to be investigated the
real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan
and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to
find out that some of the aforesaid properties were
already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil., Inc.
Hence, petitioners claimed that without an
insolvency order and a resolution of the case which
was ripe for resolution as early as March 3, 1982,
the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors
would be injured and jeopardized.
3. RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner,
ordering private respondents and their co-
defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay
petitioner, jointly and severally.
4. On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the
consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said
properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City
refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of
petitioner.
5. The IAC denied the petition and MR.
Issue: Whether the levy on attachment in favor of the
petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings
against respondent spouses commenced four months
after said attachment.
Held:
1. The provision of Section 32 of the Insolvency Law is
very clear — that attachments dissolved are those
levied within one (1) month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and
judgments vacated and set aside are judgments
entered in any action, including judgment entered
by default or consent of the debtor, where the
action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately
prior to the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period —
one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30)
days in judgments entered in actions commenced
prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on
the other hand, relied upon by private respondents,
provides for the right of the plaintiff if the
attachment is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant,
if the claim upon which the attachment suit was
commenced is proved against the estate of the
debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the
two provisions
2. But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be
stated that in construing a statute, courts should
adopt a construction that will give effect to every
part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is
expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam
pereat or that construction is to be sought which
gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every
word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more
than one interpretation, the court should adopt
such reasonable and beneficial construction as will
render the provision thereof operative and effective
and harmonious with each other.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and
SET ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil
Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due
course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered
consolidated
De Guia v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 104712. May 6, 1992.
Bellosillo:
Facts:
1. Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
2. He claims that Sec. 3 (c) of R.A. 7166, which
requires the apportionment into district of said
municipalities, does not specify when the members
of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by
district. He would consequently lean on Sec. 3 (d),
to support his view that the elected members of
these municipalities should continue to be elected
at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.
3. Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the
regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws. However, beginning
with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be
elected by district."
Issue:
Held:
1. Petitioner has no legal standing but the court
brushed aside the question on procedural infirmity
considering the importance of the issue involved.
The petition is a declaratory relief.
2. If the statute needs construction, as it does in the
present case, the most dominant in that process is
the purpose of the act. Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved
and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and
they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and
secure the benefits intended. A construction should
be rejected that gives to the language used in a
statute a meaning that does no accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted, and
that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to
be attained by the enactment.
3. A careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows
that the purpose of districting/apportionment of
the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of
positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of
electoral process. Considering that the single-
district provinces and the municipalities in the
Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts,
and under pars. But beginning the regular elections
of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district.
By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to
apportion the single-district cities and the
municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.
4. Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside
Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not
having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of
R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected
at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although
starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to
affect the full implementation of the letter and
spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par.
(d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands,
petitioner must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less
grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit,
the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Sallenillas v. CA
G.R. No. 78687. January 31, 1989.
Sarmiento:
Facts:
1. The property subject matter of the case was
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application
No. 192765, in favor spouses Florencia H. de Enciso
and Miguel Enciso.
2. The spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the
property in favor of the petitioners spouses
Sallenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner
Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos.
3. The petitioners mortgaged the property with TCT
No. T-8104 for the second time as security for a
long of P2,500.
4. For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan,
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to
Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine
National Bank against the mortgage and the
property was sold at a public auction.
5. Private respondent Guerra emerged as the highest
bidder in the said public auction and as a result
thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him.
6. However, the petitioners refused to vacate and
surrender the possession of the same and instead
offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act. Instead, the petitioners made a
formal offer to repurchase the property and moved
for reconsideration but denied by the RTC. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision and dismissed the case for
lack of merit.
Issue:
1. Whether petitioners have the right to repurchase
the contested property under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act? Yes.
2. Whether right to repurchase had already
prescribed? No.
Held:
1. Section 119 of Public Land Act explicit provides that
only three classes of persons are bestowed the right
to repurchase - the applicant-patentee, his widow,
or other legal heirs. The petitioners-spouses are the
daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees
of the contested property. At the very least,
petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the
Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and
even on this score alone, she may therefore validly
repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of
the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs,"
makes no distinction.
2. To indorse the distinction made by the private
respondent and the appellate court would be to
contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the
Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for himself and
his family the land that the State had gratuitously
given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and
cultivating it. Considering that petitioner Salenillas
is a daughter of the spouses Enciso, there is no
gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her
husband to repurchase the property would be more
in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time
and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the
purpose of the law should prevail
3. Further, the five-year period for the petitioners to
repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Comendador v. Demetrio Camera, et. al.
G.R. No. 93177. G.R. No. 95020. G.R. No. 96948. [G.R.
No. 97454. August 2, 1991.
Cruz:
Facts:
1. These four cases have been consolidated because
they involve practically the same parties and related
issues arising from the same incident.
2. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and
the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d'etat.
3. The charges against them are violation of Articles of
War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW
94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the
RPC (Murder).
4. Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a
Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to
investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and
96948.
5. The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-
trial investigation of the charges as mandated by
Article of War 71. They also allege that the initial
hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call
and that no prosecution witnesses were presented
to reaffirm their affidavits.
6. At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in
G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory
challenges against the president and members of
GCM No. 14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act
No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled,
however, that peremptory challenges had been
discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
7. The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with
this Court a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that they were being detained in Camp
Crame without charges. Finding after hearing that
no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest,
the trial court ordered their release.
Issue:
Held:
1. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were
given several opportunities to present their side at
the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after
the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990,
when they were given until March 7, 1990, to
submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they
filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration
which they were again asked to submit in writing.
This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in
effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to
recommend that the charges be referred to the
General Court Martial for trial. The said petitioners
cannot now claim they have been denied due
process because the investigation was resolved
against them owing to their own failure to submit
their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena sent them that "failure to
 submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on
the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver
of (their) right to submit controverting evidence."
They chose not to heed the warning.
2. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that
when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis
est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
3. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal
of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39
became ineffective when the apparatus of martial
law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045. As a result, the old rule
embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the
right to peremptory challenge.
4. We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No.
96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for
emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed,
even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered
no longer operative, having been cast out under the
new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom
Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime."
5. The Court realizes that the recognition of the right
to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a
respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the
proceedings and defer his deserved punishment. At
any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the
light of present circumstances, is a matter
addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court.
The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws
without regard to its own misgivings on their
adverse effects. This is a problem only the political
departments can resolve.
6. As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R.
No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to
justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal
of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such
action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948,
where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R.
Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private
respondents should not have been ordered
released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is GRANTED.
Chua v. CSC, NIA, DBM
G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992.
Padilla:
Facts:
1. RA 6683 was approved providing for benefits for
early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary
separation due to reorganization.
2. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified
to avail of the benefits of the program filed an
application with respondent NIA which, however,
denied the same. Instead, she was offered
separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2)
month basic pay for every years of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to
the Civil Service Commission yielded negative result.
Issue:
Held:
1. Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
2. Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early
Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause were we to sustain respondents' submission
that the bene;ts of said law are to be denied a class
of government employees who are similarly
situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be
the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine
of necessary implication.
3. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute
is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate
legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power,
right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser.
4. The Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by
the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's
application for early retirement benefits under Rep.
Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and
oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
 voluntary retirement within a reasonable period
and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While
the application was filed after expiration of her
term, we can give allowance for the fact that she
originally filed the application on her own without
the assistance of counsel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
City of Manila v. Gomez
G.R. No. L-37251. August 31, 1981.
Aquino:
Facts:
1. Esso, Philippines, paid under protest its additional
1/2% realty tax for the third quarter of 1972 and
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the recovery of the same, contending
that Tax Ordinance No. 7125 of the City of Manila
imposing said additional 1/2% tax pursuant to the
1949 Revised Charter of Manila which fixed the
realty tax at 1/2% and to the 1968 Special Education
Fund Law which imposed an annual additional tax
of one per centum but definitely fixing 3% as the
maximum real property tax, of which one percent
would accrue to the Special Education Fund, is void,
because it is not authorized by the City Charter nor
by any law and that the maximum tax fixed in the
Special Education Fund Law refers to a contingency
and cannot be construed as an authority to impose
an additional realty tax beyond the 1% fixed by said
law.
2. The trial court declared the tax ordinance void and
ordered the City Treasurer of Manila to refund to
Esso said tax.
Issue: Validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the
additional one-half percent realty tax.
Held:
1. Section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code,
Presidential Decree No. 464 provides that a city
council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of
not less than one-half of one percent but not more
than two percent of the assessed value of real
property".
2. Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one
percent tax on real property for the Special
Education Fund in addition to the basic two percent
realty tax. So, there is no question now that the
additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under
the Real Property Tax Code. What is in controversy
is the legality of the additional one-half percent
realty tax for the two-year period from the third
quarter of 1972 up to the second quarter of 1974
3. We hold that the doctrine of implications in
statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's
contention that the additional one-half percent
realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4
of the Special Education Fund Law that "the total
real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of
three per centum."
4. The doctrine of implications means that "which is
plainly implied in the language of a statute is as
much a part of it as that which is expressed".
5. The obvious implication is that an additional one-
half percent tax could be imposed by municipal
corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two
percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or
municipality. And the fact that the 1974 Real
Property Tax Code speci9cally fixes the real
property tax at two percent con9rms the prior
intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as
the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed
intention of the questioned ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed
and set aside.
DAR v. PCSC
G.R. No. 152640. June 15, 2006
Azcuna:
Facts:
1. The controversy involves a parcel of land owned by
respondent PHILCOMSAT situated within the area
which had been declared a security zone under PD
No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848.
2. PHILCOMSAT is the owner of a parcel of land
situated in Rizal where its Philippine Space
Communications Center (PSCC) is located. The PSCC
serves as the communications gateway of the
Philippines to more than two-thirds of the world.
3. Incidentally, the property had been planted with
fruit trees, rice and corn by farmers occupying the
surrounding areas of the PSCC.
4. The 3-kilometer security zone includes the 700
hectares owned by PHILCOMSAT that is being
subjected to the CARP of the government.
5. A Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by
petitioner DAR informing the former that the land
in question shall be placed under CARP's
compulsory acquisition scheme. PHILCOMSAT wrote
to DAR seeking an exemption of the subject
property from CARP coverage. However, it was
rejected by CARP. CA reversed CARP’s decision.

Issue: Whether the subject property of PHILCOMSAT
which had been declared a security zone under P.D. No.
1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be subjected to
CARP?
Held:
1. P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was
issued way before the effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. P.D.
No. 1848, amending P.D. No. 1845, subjected the
security zone to the authority of the Ministry of
National Defense, consequently conferring on the
Minister of National Defense the power and
authority to determine who can occupy the areas
within the security zone, and how the lands shall be
utilized.
2. The law, in effect, by declaring the area a security
zone, has granted to the Ministry of National
Defense the control and administration of the
same. As a rule, where a general power is conferred
or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of one or the performance of the
other is also conferred.
3. The area in question which is included within the
security zone is agricultural. It has been planted
with different crops and fruit trees by its occupants,
and has been found by DAR to be suitable for
agriculture.
4. The area, however, should be exempt from CARP
coverage by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended,
which, as stated earlier, declared the area to be a
security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of National Defense
5. It is evident from the very wording of the law that
the government recognized the crucial role of
PHILCOMSAT's operations to national security,
thereby necessitating the protection of its
operations from unnecessary and even anticipated
disruption. Thus, every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and logically inferred from its terms.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
PPL v. Manantan
G.R. No. L-14129. July 31, 1962.
Regala:
Facts:
1. Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a
violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
2. The defense moved to dismiss the information on
the ground that as justice of the peace, the
defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
3. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Upon
second motion, the lower court dismissed the
information against the accused based on the ruling
in People v. Macaraeg.
Issue: Is a justice of the peace included in the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Held:
1. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was
modified or qualified by the phrase “of First
Instance”, while under Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, no such modification exists.
2. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly
included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code. In Section 54, however, there
was no necessity anymore to include justice of the
peace in the enumeration because the legislature
had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any
word or phrase and was intended to comprehend
all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First
Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations,
judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and
justices of the peace.
3. In other words, whenever the word "judge" was
qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance," the
words "justice of the peace" would follow;
however, if the law simply said "judge," the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted. The above-
mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology
would seem to justify the conclusion that when the
legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace"
in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the
said o8cer from its operation. Rather, it had
considered the said o8cer as already comprehended
in the broader term "judge".
4. The rule "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est"
has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim
"casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and
when the omission has been clearly established. In
the case under consideration, it has already been
shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the enumeration of
o8cers precluded from engaging in partisan political
 activities. Rather, they were merely called by
another term.
5. The rule that penal statutes are given a strict
construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of
penal laws. Another factor which fortifies the
conclusion reached herein is the fact that even the
administrative or executive department has
regarded justices of the peace within the purview of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
6. The rule rule of expresio unius est exclusio alterius
has no application. If the legislature had intended to
exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of
Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of
Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion.
Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
change.
do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes
evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova
cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943
without eroding the long settled holding of the
courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open
to attack.
2. "It is against public policy that matters already
decided on the merits be relitigated again and
again, consuming the courts' time and energies et
the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae
ut Enis sit litium."
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be
meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil
Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal

entered by the trial court should be set aside and this
case is remanded for trial on the merits

JM Tuason v. Mariano
G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978.
Aquino:

Facts:
1. Plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the owners
of a parcel of land which they claimed was acquired
by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to
him on May 10, 1977. They alleged that the land
had been fraudulently included in OCT No. 735 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. To support their
action, they cited the 1965 decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal invalidating OCT No. 735. That
decision, however, was reversed by the Supreme
Court which reiterated its ruling in previous cases
upholding the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles
derived therefrom.
2. Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches
and prior judgment. The trial court denied the
motion.

Issue: Whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived

therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova?

Held:
1. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis
et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and