IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U.

MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE

ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

PADILLA, J.:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:

Hon. Marcelo Fernan

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila

Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea

Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Sir:

By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable

Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1,
1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member
of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the
powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte)
Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the
issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as

assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to
the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither

violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation
of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of
Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will
not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present
position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial
 Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the
Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part

of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO

Judge

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City

Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of
detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee
are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final
or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of
his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed

prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative

functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of
rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is
provided that—

Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall

be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary
of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of
the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be

enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a
plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in
him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to
be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility
no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied
with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure.
As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when
such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

DECISION
(En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

I. THE FACTS
 Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as
member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3,
1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who
have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election

protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly.
The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own
resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on
or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner
sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied
his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution
of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No.
2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given
the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation
of powers?

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative
of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

 Casibang v. Aquino 92 SCRA 642

Facts:

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected

Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his
only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and
irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral
precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5)
excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial
Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the
1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935
Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people
of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme
Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed
presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the
election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the
same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally)
Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political
question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that “... the provisions in the
1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973
Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of
government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.” He further submitted
that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They
are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution,
and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973
Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like
him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue
in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same
has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the
Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National
Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local
government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of
which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still
continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to
take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.

Issue:

whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held:

No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and
academic pending election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in
office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials
or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly
construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be
performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject
to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory
Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new
fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective
position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced
proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed
candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely

arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally
from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the
November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to
their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their
functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed
to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of

respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has
been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the
electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or
presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII
of the 1973 Constitution.

There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office.
A‘term’ of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold
office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a
public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of
the office. In other words, the ‘term’ refers to the period, duration of length of time during
which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or
indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of
the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an
election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their respective
office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the ‘term’ to the
office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-
extensive with the ‘term’ thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9,
Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired,
and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold their
respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is
now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance
to hear, try and decide election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution
provides that ‘all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And there has been no
amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave
the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected,”
and “according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing at the
time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until
otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said
courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.’ Consequently, the
Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and
exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein
petitioners.”

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal
elective positions.
 General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his
powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend
thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include
electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the
jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the
Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply
removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as
the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President
or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and
orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein
involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been
interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative
Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the
election protest. The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure”.

The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and
therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its
cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to
which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the
Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the
competence of the judiciary to pass upon.

 Tanada v. Cuenco 103 PHIL 1051

Facts:

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who
belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial
candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET
should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme
Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since
there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the
minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So
did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then
he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest.
Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot
take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power
to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada
and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before
the bar of public opinion.

Issue:

Whether or not the issue is a political question.

Ruling:

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked
by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was
whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does
not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though
those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members
of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET
may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
  Sanidad v. Comelec 73 SCRA 333

Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers.

20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related

decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, a m e n d i n g t h e p r e v i o u s P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e 9 9 1 ,
b y d e c l a r i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f Presidential Decree 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"(Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential
Decree 991.

On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033,
stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's
continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C.
Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking toenjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,
and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend
that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutionst h e r e i s n o g r a n t t o t h e i n c u m b e n t P r e s i d e n t t o e x e r c i
s e t h e c o n s t i t u e n t p o w e r t o p r o p o s e amendments to the new Constitution.

As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has

no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by
Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention,a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e p o w e r t o p r o p o s e a m e n d m e n t s t o , o r r e v i
s i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n d u r i n g t h e transition period is expressly conferred
on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5October 1976
by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714,
to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to
the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue:

Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Ruling:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the
1 9 7 3 C o n s t i t u t i o n o n A m e n d m e n t s o r d a i n s t h a t " ( 1 ) A n y amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may,
by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority
voteof all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in
an election.

"Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending
power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified
in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods
contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of a l l i t s
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-
t h i r d s o f a l l t h e Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times
of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court
in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the
i n c u m b e n t P r e s i d e n t i s v e s t e d w i t h t h a t prerogative of discretion as to
when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional
Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the
same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene
the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the
interim National Assembly soon found support from the
peoplet h e m s e l v e s . I n t h e p l e b i s c i t e o f J a n u a r y 1 0 -
1 5 , 1 9 7 3 , a t w h i c h t h e r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e 1 9 7 3 Constitution was s
ubmitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim Nation
a l Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly.
Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether
the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because
some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members o
f t h e i n t e r i m N a t i o n a l Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that
referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu
striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not
legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a
peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that
power is provided for Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National
Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate
for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of
theC o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t l e g i s l a t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r . I n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e a d i s
t i n c t i o n i s m a d e b e t w e e n constitutional content of an organic character and
that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.
Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer.
The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases
of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments
to the Constitution.

 Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496

Facts:

The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and
correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its

representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by
the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber
elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting
initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued
a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the
respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. His claim is that
the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.

Issue:

whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Held:

No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is
not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us
because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the
act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

The term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, it refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1,
of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.





  Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Cesar V. Purisima, August 14, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A.
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials
and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the
law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is
no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR
or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment
on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in
the executive branch.

Rulings:

1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.

2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the
said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,”
“justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In
this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered
moot and academic.

DELEGATION OF POWERS

 Garcia v. Executive Secretary 211 SCRA 219

Facts:
The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other
oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings
on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and
appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied
a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil
products.
Issue:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the
nature of revenue-generating measures?
Ruling:
The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff
bills is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in
question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited
to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or
imposts…”
The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and
Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof.

 People v. Vera 65 PHIL 112-125

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated
to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower
court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging
that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI
directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that
the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of
laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the
force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or
guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by
Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act,
the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
 Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification
of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA supra

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No.
2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given
the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation
of powers?

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative
of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

 Ynot v. IAC 148 SCRA 659

Facts:

Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these were
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which
prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer
be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.

The same result was decided in the trial court.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the
outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court
as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power
by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was
given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.

Issue:

Is the E.O. constitutional?

Ruling:

The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.

Justice Laurel's said, “courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.”

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential

decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the
grant of legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.

Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the
due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This
was due to the avoidance of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all circumstances.
There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection
for the changing conditions.

Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined
to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.

There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection
between facts proved and fact presumed. An examplesis a passport of a person with
a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both
restrains and is restrained bydure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to
626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception. While 626-A has the same lawful
subjectas the original executive order, it can’t be said that it complies with the existence of a
lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.Summary action
may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical only due
to the urgency needed to correct it.

There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of
justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution. The challenged measure was
an invalid exercise of police power because the method to confiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense
and punished immediately. This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against
the separataion of powers. The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the law during
that time was valid.

 Tablarin v. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730

Facts:

Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought
admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission
into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board
of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23
August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission,
from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering
the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for
issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly
filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the
RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation
is invalid and/or unconstitutional.

Ruling: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the
“Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c)
the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The
Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements
for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps
to make quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to
enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all
who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.”
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks
of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to
the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.
.
 Pelaez v. Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

Facts:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as
taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan

Issue:

Whether or not the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create
a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
Ruling:

On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved,
not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at
the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix
such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption
of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority
to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other
courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative
power”

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
— it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law;
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the
law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements
for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give
a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti implies
the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by
law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution
to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said
local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the
same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance
which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a
duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial
officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul
an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of
the corresponding provincial board.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the
barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had
it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him
by the Constitution.

 Pacific Stream Laundry Inc. v. Laguna Lake Devt. Authority, Dec. 18, 2009
Facts:

Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services.
On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection
report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner’s plant located at 114 Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated
wastewater generated from petitioner’s laundry washing activities was discharged directly to
the San Francisco Del Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that
petitioner’s plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from
LLDA. On 5 September 2001,the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted
wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-
compliance with effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand
(BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of
Violation. Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA
that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water pollution. No compliance followed. It was
reported that petitioner’s wastewater treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently,
another wastewater sampling was conducted but the results still failed.

A Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. Petitioner requested
another test. This time, it showed compliance. Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30
October 2001 and its corresponding daily penalty beset aside and that the imposable penalty be reckoned
from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September 2001. It is respondent’s position that the
Notice of Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already
installed the necessary wastewater treatment to abate the water pollution. This Public Hearing
Committee finds respondent’s arguments devoid of merit. Presidential Decree No. 984 prohibits
the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] forevery day during which such violation continues. The
mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD
No. 984.CA held that LLDA has the power to impose fines.

Issue:

Whether or not LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984?

Ruling:

YES.

Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions,
which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the
Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192). SC disagree. Presidential
Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the Office of the President. EO 192, which
reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary
which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927), LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively
perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement.

Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may
be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of
Appeals, the Court upheld the power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such
power is not expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its
express power sunder its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same manner,
we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function asa regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
I. — General Provisions
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or
the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected
by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of
signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections,
hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod,
Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay,
as the case may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all
registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per
centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for
the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of
the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and
only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly
of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by
at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;
Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at
least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated
if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the
municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed
by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at
least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of
the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
II. — National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call and supervise
the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining
the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier
than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission
of the sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment,
approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of
the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the
national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days
following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by
a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become
effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the
certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall
remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called
for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the
Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum
petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress
by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The
petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization
proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative
measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence
over the pending legislative measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30)
days from notice thereof.
III. — Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in
case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in
case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly
or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any
law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation,
the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government
or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90)
days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case
of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of
signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the
presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the
case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the
local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures
has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the
initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government
unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the
Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case
of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be
certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes
cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action
thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain
said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local
legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition
presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire,
apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution
approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed,
modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3)
years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of
barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local
legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or
approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days
in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
IV. — Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus Election Code and other
election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of
this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current
year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional,
the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means
of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition
already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or
coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before
the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the
date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and
distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of
the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
system shall not be considered resigned.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able
to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for
candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote
for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives:
Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall
not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May
1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the
electorate on the matter of the party-list system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the
number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by
the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions
to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy
shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted
to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If
the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same
salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided
in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the
General Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for
purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts
or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary
December 8, 1994
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third,
Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section
5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum
population requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?
Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical
consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the
provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise
provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show
that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to
justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were
not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative district.The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested

342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38
additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-
list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to
promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system
to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes.”
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats for concerned party

Issue: Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

Held: Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
Issue: How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well
as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party
is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-
list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec
acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.
RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha facts
attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the
criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of
the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the
pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist
the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine
compliance by the party lists.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC

FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case
of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat,
must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by
the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share
of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in
the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides
that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will
be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections,
there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to
Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the
ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million
votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties
get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get
a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-
lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each.
The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats
for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available
for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for
the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations
deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his
separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of
the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution
– and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the
party-list system.

Aquino III V. Comelec

Apr. 7, 2010
FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional
of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment.” Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009
creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four
(4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province.
Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando
were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue: w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province?
Held: We deny the petition.
Ruling: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
“each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province”
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the
Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections
558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions
(ARMM) – Population Requirement
FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite
held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato
City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district
of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of
Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained;
however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as
a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and
that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from
there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of
a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the
HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan
being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay
must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria
fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils,
the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established
in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province,
once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a
legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the
population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly
create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally
possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can
create are barangays not cities and provinces.
COMELEC vs AKB
694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against
COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-
lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have
a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system
which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people
should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is
also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in
the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during
1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman
of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for
the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and
also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite
her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that
she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC
is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
 AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)
Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition
for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13
days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the
Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Issue: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant thedi
squalification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
Held: The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The
purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community
from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community
for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident
of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila)
indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence
or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
Facts:
 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
 Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
 Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
 The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
  A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
On Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak,
to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or
not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a
matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
[1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of
the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
On Citizenship
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in
the case ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should
have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the
municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412
[1965])

Dimaporo vs. Mitra (1991)

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO,
petitioner
vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and HON. CAMILO L. SABIO
Secretary,House of Representatives,
respondents

Facts: Petitioner Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
during the 1987 congressional elections. In January 1990, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the ARMM with the Comelec. Upon being informed of this development,
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives (HOR) excluded petitioner’s name
from the Roll of Members of the HOR pursuant to Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881) enacted in 1985. He was excluded from all proceedings of the House, was not paid the emoluments
due his office, and his office suites were occupied by other persons. When he lost his bid for the
gubernatorial race, petitioner expressed his intention to resume performing his duties and functions as
an elected Member of Congress. He is now claiming that Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is not operative
under the present Constitution which provides specific grounds by which the term of members of the
House can be shortened
Issues:
1.W/N Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is operative under the 1987 Constitution
2.W/N the respondent Speaker and/or respondent Secretary by administrative act could exclude
petitioner from the rolls of the HOR

Ruling: Yes. Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution as the voluntary
act of resignation contemplated in the said provision falls within the term “voluntary renunciation of
office” in Sec. 7(2), Art. VI of the Constitution. “Term” is different from “tenure” of office. The term of
office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature. However, the
period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within
or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not even exist at all.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, NOT his term. The term remains
and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution provides that all public officers to the exclusion of the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office as provided by law. This clearly recognizes that the 4 grounds
found in Art. VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are NOT
exclusive. The legal maxim should not be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a
statute because the maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. It serves
only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.
Petitioner failed to discern that the purpose of the statutory provision is not to cut short the term
of office of public officials but rather to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public office. Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 makes it clear
that should incumbent public officials fail in their candidacy for another office, they cannot go back to
their former position. This is in perfect consonance with the constitutional edict that all public officials
must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received
from their constituents.
The ground for forfeiture in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed
in Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Sec.
7, Art. VI of the Constitution. As discussed by Constitutional Commissioners, the filing of the certificate
of candidacy is already an overt act of an intention to relinquish the office currently held. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore
the ousted official. A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people.
As such, the holder of such an office is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and
he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
Since the legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy have already been spelled out in Sec. 67, Art. IX
of BP Blg. 881, respondents cannot be said to have indulged in any statutory interpretation. Both of them
perform ministerial functions as administrative officers and it was their duty to remove petitioner’s name
from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881. They cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing such duty because it
might hinder the transaction of public business. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest
are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang

17 SCRA 876 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech and Debate
FACTS: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That
such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas,
was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,
among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general
circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang
alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed
because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by
the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and
for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at
the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
 PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

POBRE vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

(A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009)
PETITIONER
Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
speech delivered on the senate floor. The following excerpts are the ones in question:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country
of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded
by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator were disrespectful and requested that the latter be
disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action.
RESPONDENT
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge
of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. She claims to have made those comments to expose
anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar Council for the next Chief Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI Section 11 which states that:
"A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof."
ISSUE: WON Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary
SUPREME COURT: NO.
The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal
of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency and good conduct
for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The court is not
hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and legal circumstances of
this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her.
Petition is DISMISSED

Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon

208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress
felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials.
However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking
the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644)
because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera.
Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed.
The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the
allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included
therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such
obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary. However, President Aquino
again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the
GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item
and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed
some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill
in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this
case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed
the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering
obligations to the other departments of the government.

Eugenio Puyat vs Sixto De Guzman, Jr.

113 SCRA 31 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court

FACTS: In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe
Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the
votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s
group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979)
to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for
Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel
(to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the
said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect
granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case
without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such
courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is
still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference
he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution
he instead presented himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act
after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 Case Digest
FACTS: On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th
Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator
Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator
Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion,
Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP --
numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader.
No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7 members of
the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated
President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo
warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
 Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
 Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
 Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
 Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona
as the minority leader?

RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not
been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court’s judicial power
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President recognized
Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself,
not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner
of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long practice,
are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court
is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by
the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise
to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution,
the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in
no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority
parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party
that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein
both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be accused of
“capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.” Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate
has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED

Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity
FACTS: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”.
In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently,
House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by
Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be
subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers
that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court
has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic
world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and
conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is
dismissed.

Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan

252 SCRA 641 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress – RA
3019
FACTS: In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case
against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet
(counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a
copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact,
no arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was
able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him
never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part
maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of
the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents.
Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
congress. The SC ruled:
“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the
power of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend
or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty
of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

United States vs Juan Pons

4 Phil. 729 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived
in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso.
Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities
noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso
not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25
barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act
No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved
while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the
said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was
adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire
into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. VS GIMENEZ

FACTS: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid
the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it
maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it
issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor
General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate
and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the
synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par
18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not
be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for
the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be
construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements
in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.
RULING: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product,
which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do
not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive
upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and
formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
.

ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a
roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House.
RULING: No. Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other
than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Carmelo Lazatin vs Commission on Elections

157 SCRA 337 – Political law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals – HRET’s Jurisdiction over
Electoral Protests
Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of
Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests.
Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition had
become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and
executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges
that the petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The order issued by
the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of
the Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board,
to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation
of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin
without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin
himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the
petition. The petition is impressed with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed winner of the
Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and
assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been
previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and
despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

BONDOC VS PINEDA 201 SCRA 792

Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987,Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP
were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of
the House of Representatives (5members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter,
a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP
voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the
contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a
letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join
said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a
letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision
freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein
Held: No. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office,
devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They
must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of
party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by
the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore,
null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives
is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole
judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not
be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of
office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be
expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally
affiliated with another.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

211 SCRA 315

Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez,
private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest
available means this Court’s Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial
election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6)
accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the
name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to
count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992,
the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list
of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all “Chavez” votes in favor of
petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez’ name in the list of qualified candidates.
Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the
members of the Senate.
Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the
controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation.
While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed
in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15
of Republic Act 7166 provides: “For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the
certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

PIMENTEL VS HRET
FACTS: On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On May 11, 1998, in accordance with
the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election
through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members
of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including
petitioners from party-list groups.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these
two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of
House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. From available records, it does not
appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House
contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and
Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. Petitioners contend that, under the
Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in
the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of February 8,
2000. the Court en banc directed the consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-
LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HRET.
RULING: No. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the
power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal.
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to
designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required
numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with
the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the
CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners
may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is
premature.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject
to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Neither can the Court speculate on what
action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET
and the CA.
It does appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives
from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the
party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process.
The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant
petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for
election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the
House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

PALPARAN VS HRET
FACTS: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed
a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat
Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just
its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns
of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R.189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won
a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others
alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because
he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely,
the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and
security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives.
Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility
as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that
party-list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations.
HELD: Yes. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction
over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

BELLO VS COMELEC
FACTS: On March 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List,
represented by Teodoro Casiño, (collectively referred to as certiorari petitioners) filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification against Arroyo, pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, in relation with
Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 794112 (the Party- List System Act).
The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization factually and truly
represent the marginalized and the underrepresented; the nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, citing in this
regard the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.14 On this basis, the certiorari
petitioners concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector, particularly, the sector which the AGPP represents – tricycle drivers and
security guards – because he is not only a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent
member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the House’s Energy Committee; and, (c) a
member of key committees in the House, namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources,
Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security, Public Works and Highways, Transportation
and Ways and Means.
On July 28 and 29, 2010, two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the
House of Representatives. On September 7, 2010, the HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a
Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions.
Arroyo counter-argues that the petitions should be dismissed outright because upon his proclamation,
oath and assumption to office as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives, the
jurisdiction over issues relating to his qualifications now lies with the HRET as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as AGPP’s
nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives.
HELD: Yes.
In the case of Palparan vs HRET The Supreme Court had stated that; What is inevitable is that Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to,
among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less
than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
In the case of Perez vs Comelec the Supreme Court had stated; that at the time of the filing of this
petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House of Representatives,
this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the
declaration of private respondent’s ineligibility.

DAZA V SINGSON
FACTS: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section
18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat
occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on
Appointments
HELD: No.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution.
32. COSETENG VS MITRA
Facts: Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties
Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the “Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino” or LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out
of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees,
including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of
KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership in the
Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A.
Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th
member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying
that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero,
Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of
the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that
their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation
Issue: WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Holding/
Held: Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: “Sec.
18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio
Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are
160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be
rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would
equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two
seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced
Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is
no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was
done “on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.” There is no merit in the
petitioner’s contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been
nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were
nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their
party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the
Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is
unassailable.
 GUINGONA VS GONZALES
Facts: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must
have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of
a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce
7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-
LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded
off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of
the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
Issue: whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the Commission
on Appointments
Held: Yes. It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership
on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal
interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP
majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator
by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be
based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave
more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS
NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the
CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order
to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the
other party.

TANADA VS COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr., (Wigberto) and respondents Angelina D. Tan (Angelina) and
Alvin John S. Tañada (Alvin John) were contenders for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in the just concluded May 13, 2013 National
Elections. Wigberto ran under the banner of the Liberal Party; Alvin John was the official congressional
candidate of Lapiang Manggagawa; while Angelina was fielded by the National People’s Coalition.
In a related development, despite the cancellation of Alvin John’s CoC due to his material
misrepresentations therein, his name was not deleted from – and thus, remained printed on – the ballot,
prompting Wigberto to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC)
asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him instead in accordance with the
Court’s ruling in Dela Cruz v. COMELEC and COMELEC Resolution No. 9599.20 The PBOC, however, denied
Wigberto’s motion in a Resolution dated May 16, 2013, holding that the votes of Alvin John could not be
counted in favor of Wigberto because the cancellation of the former’s CoC was on the basis of his material
misrepresentations under Section 78 of the OEC and not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69
of the same law. Consequently, the PBOC canvassed the votes of all three contenders separately, and
thereafter, on May 16, 2013, proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. According to Wigberto, it was for
the foregoing reason that he impleaded Angelina as a party-respondent in the instant petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: Wigberto assails the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring that Alvin John
was not a nuisance candidate as defined under Section 69 of the OEC. In consequence, he seeks that the
votes cast in favor of Alvin John be credited to him and, thereafter, to be declared the winning candidate
for the congressional post.
HELD: Petition was dismissed.
Sec. 17 of Article VI The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" refers
to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. In particular, the term "election" refers to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of the votes; "returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his CoC.
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House
of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her
oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to
resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the
resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the
terms "election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole
jurisdiction.

Section 21 and 22

35. BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on
Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG
allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette.
Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people.
Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some big business enterprises such as
MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear
viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers
(petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the
purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25
million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce
Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo
Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into possible violation
of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but
Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzon s plea and voted to pursue
its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1 .WON the SBRC s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
2. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is
beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
HELD: 1. NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to
be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy
Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved. The inquiry also
is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR 2123), as the committee alleges. The inquiry
under SR 2123 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in
connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution.
2. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as private
citizens, hence such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but
of the courts. Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the
respondent committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be
an encroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.

36. SABIO ET AL VS GORDON ET AL

FACTS:Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked
Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there
is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which
the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the
committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where
it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being
a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry
is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section
21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot
be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even
abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it
creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with
the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to
public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.

37. SENATE ET AL VS ERMITA ET AL

Facts: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the
Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent
a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
“afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive
Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to
attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col.
Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced
court marshal for such attendance.
Issue: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Ruling: To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different
functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to
conduct inquiry during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon
the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of
department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may
be exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege
or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of
the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter
assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has
determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section
1(a) are however valid.
38. GUDANI ET AL VS LT. GEN. SENGA ET AL
FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al
from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared
before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle
of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING: Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to
do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial
order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power
as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in
executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President
to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to
pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court
is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent
from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.
39. NERI VS SEANTE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for
his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.
RULING: Yes. The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications
privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-
making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity”
with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

40. REGHIS ROMERO VS SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA ET AL

FACTS: Reghis, owner of R-II Bulders, received an invitation from the Senate Committee on Labor,
Employment and Human Resources inviting him to shed light in connection with the alleged loss by the
Overseas Welfare Workers Administration (OWWA) of some P450 Million investment in the Smokey
Mountain Project. The inquiry purportedly was for the purpose of review and possible amendment of
Republic 8042, the Migrant Workers Act. By way of reply, Reghis requested that he be excused from the
proceedings, which the Committee denied, again by letter. Invitations were also sent to the entire board
of R-II Builders for the hearing on September 4, 2006; subpoena ad testificandum was also served on
Reghis for him to attend the hearing. Thus, Reghis and the board of directors filed a petition for certiorari
with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court. Having failed to secure a TRO,
Reghis had no choice but to attend the hearing. He later on filed another filed another manifestation
reiterating his plea for a TRO; according to him, when another resource person, Atty. Frank Chavez, was
recognized, he talked about issues which were raised in Chavez vs. National Housing Authority (then
pending before the Supreme Court), none of which had any relation to the subject in inquiry. He was
required to attend the next hearing. The board followed suit, arguing that they were merely being
harassed, as their names were never mentioned in any of the investigation.
Essentially, Reghis and company argues in support of their petition that the hearing in aid of inquiry was
a violation of the sub-judice rule as there is a pending case (Chavez vs. NHA) still pending before the
Supreme Court; the same is a violation of their right against self-incrimination; since the hearing was
being conducted to ascertain their liability for plunder, the same is not in aid of legislation;
The Senate Committee, in their comment, argued that the conduct of inquiry in aid of legislation was a
political question; that the pendency of the Chavez case was not a valid ground to stop them from
conducting the inquiry; the resource persons’ right against self-incrimination are amply protected since
they may invoke the right if they feel the question is incriminatory.
ISSUE: Whether the Senate Committee’s inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition thus:
“Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committee’s assailed
investigation, is no longer sub judice or “before a court or judge for consideration.” For by an en banc
Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No. 164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez,
as the petitioner in Chavez, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated August 15, 2007. In
fine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground,
the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and
academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An
issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that
a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition.14 Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of
mootness, save in certain exceptional instances,15 none of which, however, obtains under the premises.
Thus, there is no more legal obstacle––on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable––to the
continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in this proceeding.
At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court,
still, such circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation. What we said in
Sabio v. Gordon suggests as much:
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues
being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative
purpose.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand,
courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand,
inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to
improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any
potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation. Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial
Institutions and Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank) provides the following reason:
[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative
investigation.
As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v. Nazareno––
[T]he power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information––which is not infrequently true––recourse must be
had to others who possess it.
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases
before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or
reason that these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed
cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this Court.”
 41. TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA
7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a
mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate
days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD: No. The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but
the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would
be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But
this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and
of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

42. ALVAREZ VS GUINGONA

Facts: HB 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives,
subsequently passed by the House of Representatives, and transmitted to the Senate. A counterpart of
HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the Senate, and was passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to and
signed by the Chief Executive as RA 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great
majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
Issue: whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 7720
can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
Held:
Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate, it
cannot be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.
Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993). The SB was filed
19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does
not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House
bill.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court said that what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected
as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute
bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

Section 25

GARCIA VS MATA
Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an
action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his
rank and pay emoluments.

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion
of officers with at least 10 years of service.

On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or
pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an
appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the
relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government
while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the
reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation

of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new
and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the
title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the
act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

44. DEMETRIA VS ALBA

FACTS: Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit
Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1,
Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the
Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the
same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which
said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA
may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one
department to another here.

45. PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the
ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves. President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension
funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive.
the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

Section 26

PHILCONSA VS GIMENEZ

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the
same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on
retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the
members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of
the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members
and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent
to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or
re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after
at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on
vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress
are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation
of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in
question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave
benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each
retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
Issue:
whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads
as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by
law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems
and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their
respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places
of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
Held:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special
proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval
of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the
National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of
such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether
the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term “other
emoluments.”
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received
as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and
perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a
part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.
47. TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
FACTS: In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate
the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms
has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may
be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross
receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following
grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the
law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in
enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general
object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate.
What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution,
enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority
of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies
concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”
 48. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSICIATION VS PRADO

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a
privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of
charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court
processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn
from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking
privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of
Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that
need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot
be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in
order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut
expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have
removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the
loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all
agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved
by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial
distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary,
which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking
privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because
its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes
result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all
persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of
adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong.
If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for
the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact
greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
 49. TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA
7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a
mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate
days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD: No. The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but
the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would
be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But
this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and
of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

50. TAN VS DEL ROSARIO

Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the simplified income taxation scheme
(SNIT) under Arts (26) and (28) and III (1). The SNIT contained changes in the tax schedules and different
treatment in the professionals which petitioners assail as unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal protection clause in the constitution.
Issue:
Is the contention meritorious?\
Ruling:
No. uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal protection, merely require that
all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated alike both privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity, does not offend classification as long as it rest on substantial distinctions, it is germane to
the purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only and must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the scheduled
approach in taxation of individual taxpayers and maintain the present global treatment on taxable
corporations. This classification is neither arbitrary nor inappropriate.

52. GONZALES VS MACARAIG

FACTS: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section
55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the
1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision;
(2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to
be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions
on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted
by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto
power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are
beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not
“provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be
treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

53. BENGZON VS DRILON

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A
of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted
members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices
was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto
in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus
there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it
tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also
produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate,
the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground
that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores
these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special
protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared
valid and subsisting.

54. PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

Facts: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An Act
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to
December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the President and vetoed some of the
provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the
Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the
Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII
of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and
questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt
services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the
same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added
to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in
the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.
Issue: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?
Held: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o
vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct
relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire
item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income & creation
of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by
Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to
existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of
roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the
entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance
& cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress
required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an
admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law.
VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds
through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power
pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation
of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law
(PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend
existing laws. VETO VALID.
Section 28

55. KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS VS TAN

FACTS:
EO 372 was issued by the President of the Philippines which amended the Revenue Code, adopting the
value-added tax (VAT) effective January 1, 1988. Four petitions assailed the validity of the VAT Law from
being beyond the President to enact; for being oppressive, discriminatory, regressive and violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses, among others, of the Constitution. The Integrated Customs
Brokers Association particularly contend that it unduly discriminate against customs brokers (Section
103r) as the amended provision of the Tax Code provides that “service performed in the exercise of
profession or calling (except custom brokers) subject to occupational tax under the Local Tax Code and
professional services performed by registered general professional partnerships are exempt from VAT.
ISSUE: Whether the E-VAT law is void for being discriminatory against customs brokers
RULING: No. The phrase “except custom brokers” is not meant to discriminate against custom brokers
but to avert a potential conflict between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. The
distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation tax under
the Local Tax Code is based on material differences, in that the activities of customs partake more of a
business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the percentage tax under Section 174 of
the Tax Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with
the VAT. If the Association did not protest the classification of customs brokers then, there is no reason
why it should protest now.
56. PROVINCE OF ABRA VS JUDGE HERNANDO
FACTS: The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued.
Judge Harold Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that there
“is no question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.” Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties
including their produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that “charitable institutions,
mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” are required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and
improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious
or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if
granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, in this case, there is no showing that
the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.
57. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS AQUINO
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice
of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of
real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents
Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the
said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned
decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being
used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern
Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively
for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said
petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational
purposes.ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which
are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In
the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot
by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of
exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed
tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being
used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education
(residence of the director).

PASCUAL VS SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS

Facts: In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual,
then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually
going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio
Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same
Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in
Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at
the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the
other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent
donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the
constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private
property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for
the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were
to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
AGLIPAY VS RUIZ
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such
issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose –
for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason: The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent
does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise
the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event
considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the
separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a
constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine
Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.
The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
GUINGONA VS CARAGUE
Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled “Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act),” by P.D. No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled “An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177,
and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees.
Issue: Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1),
Article VI of the Constitution?
Held: No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form
of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except
that it be “made by law,” such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly
(as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of
laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific
terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations
act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for
specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.

OSMENA VS ORBOS
" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which implies
that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."
FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO
137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose
additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases.
The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation
of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies
collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof
is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge
posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D.
1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?
HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted
in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from
the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed
in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the
scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the
constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose
additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must
be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and
subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts
to augment the resources of the Fund.
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
Facts: The General Appropriations Act appropriated Php 86.3 billion for debt services. Congress added a
special provision which provided that the amount appropriated shall be used for payment of the national
debt only and not to be paid to the liabilities of the Central Bank. The appropriation for DPWH also
provided that the maximum amount to be contracted for the maintenance of national roads and bridges
should not exceed 30% the appropriation for medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines required
approval Congress for the release of funds.
In the General Appropriations Act of 1994 the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
contains a provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the appropriation to augment the
pension and gratuity fund of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The President vetoed the authorization
given by the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension and gratuity fund. Several Senators
questioned the validity of the veto.
Issue: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Congress can not include in the general appropriations matters that should
be enacted in a separate legislation and if it does so, the inappropriate provision must be treated as an
item and can be vetoed by the President.
The provision in GAA authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension and gratuity
fund violates Section 25 (paragraph 5) and Section 29 (paragraph 1) of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
Only the President is authorized to augment items from savings in the general appropriation to the
executive branch. Also pursuant to Section 29 – no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. 117680 February 9, 1996
Vitug, J.
Facts: Petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., was registered as a “non-pioneer enterprise” with
public respondent BOI having been so issued a Certificate of Registration under Executive Order NO.
226, also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, in the manufacture of glazed floor tiles.
Among the specific terms and conditions imposed on First Lepanto’s registration were that: (1) The
enterprise shall export at least 50% of its production; and (2) The enterprise shall produce only glazed
floor tile.
In a letter addressed to the BOI, First Lepanto requested for an amendment of its registered
product to “ceramic tiles” in order to likewise enable it to manufacture ceramic wall tiles; however,
before the BOI could act on First Lepanto’s request for amendment, Mariwasa and Fil-Hispano Ceramics,
Inc., already had on file their separate complaints with the BOI against First Lepanto for violating the
terms and conditions of its registration by the use of its tax and duty-free equipment in the production
of ceramic wall tiles.
The BOI rendered a decision finding First Lepanto guilty and imposing on the latter a fine of P797,950.40
without prejudice, however, 1) to an imposition of additional penalty should First Lepanto continue to
commit the same violation; and 2) to the Board’s authority to consider/ evaluate First Lepanto’s request
for an amendment of its certificate of registration, including, among other things, a change in its
registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.”
After paying the imposed fine, First Lepanto formally filed its application with the BOI to amend its
registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.”
On 06 August 1992, another verified complaint was filed by Mariwasa with the BOI which asseverated
that, despite BOI’s finding that First Lepanto had violated the terms and conditions of its registration,
the latter still continued with its unauthorized production and sale of ceramic wall tiles. Respondent BOI
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, Mariwasa
appealed the case to the Office of the President.
In the meantime, First Lepanto caused the publicationin the Manila Bulletin of a notice on the official
filing with the BOI of the aforementioned application for amendment of Certificate of Registration No.
EP 89-452. Mariwasa opposed the application. On 10 December 1992, respondent BOI handed down its
decision approving First Lepanto’s application.

Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the decision of the Board of
Investments
Held: The BOI is the agency tasked with evaluating the feasibility of an investment project and to
decide which investment might be compatible with its development plans. The exercise of administrative
discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by the government agency
concerned and not by the courts. BOI has allowed the amendment of First Lepanto’s product line because
that agency believes that allowing First Lepanto to manufacture wall tiles as well will give it the needed
technical and market flexibility, a key factor, to enable the firm to eventually penetrate the world market
and meet its export requirements.
It is basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
 Diaz v. CA
G.R. No. L-109698 December 5, 1
Bellossillo, J.

Facts: On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in
service.

The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990
at One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos
(P1,141,774,000.00).

On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million
Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used
by DLPC in its operation.

On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for proper
disposition to the Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the
filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition
did not comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when
the petitioners received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly
received the denial of their motion by ERB.

On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that our
resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the above circular.

In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.

Issue: whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution

Held: Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have
amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals
to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS COMELEC

FACTS:On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared
national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the
preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye
1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic
Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents
Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10,
Serye 1993.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met. The Sangguniang
Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof
was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation
No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of
Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum. On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of
Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes an amendment of a national law.
Issue: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which
governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong to
enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
Ruling:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made
preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a
"Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were
called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said
body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at
the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to
the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which
in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself,
akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence
the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and
not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people
reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted
for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced
or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue
upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848
to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority
in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any
"branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made
no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action
made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire
jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

Executive Department
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer.
This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

4. Honasan’s failed coup

5. Communist insurgency movements

6. secessionist movements in Mindanao

7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He
also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel
which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.

Decision: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1,
Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same
article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of
the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in
the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to
protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for
the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened
before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation
of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
 Maximo Soliven vs Ramon Makasiar
167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – President’s Immunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by
the President
FACTS: Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel
by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others.
Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from
suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president
would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for
contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,
Respondents.
CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND TRAINING
CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-
ACE)Petitioners-Intervenors. PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
Carpio, 2009
Facts:
- There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were
circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center
and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two
of the examinations’ five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results
came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful
examinees.
- President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules
and Regulations).
- Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers,
asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to
operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional
organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed
that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.
- A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner filed
before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent review center from
the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up
with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHED’s coverage to public
and private institutions of higher.
- In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of
independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the
said Executive Order No. 566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an
HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.
- Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment
of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and
the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other
organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.
- On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008)
extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review centers
to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC
resolved to require the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the
RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.
Issues: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands the CHED’s jurisdiction [Yes, it expands CHED’s jurisdiction, hence unconsititutional]; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power. [Yes, it is invalid.]
Held/Ratio: 1. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED’s coverage under RA 7722.
The CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education
and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO
566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar
entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or
course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations" given by
the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered "programs x x x of higher
learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as
"education beyond the secondary level” or "education provided by a college or university."
Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in areas not
covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college
entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial
services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.
2. ) The exercise of the President’s residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by
the OSG to justify GMA’s action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of
the President’s other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law
granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as
the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere
with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted administrative power.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
the legislative policy.

Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the
CHED’s quasi-legislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making
power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making
power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and
similar entities.
Other issues: Re: issue judicial hierarchy, the alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive
Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the
case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an action
due to its importance to the public.
Re: police power, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to
regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers.
Re: RA 8981 as the appropriate law, the PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve the integrity
and inviolability of licensure examinations. However, this power should properly be interpreted to refer
to the conduct of the examinations. The power to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure
examinations should be read together with these functions. These powers of the PRC have nothing to do
at all with the regulation of review centers.

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or
limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter
to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either
to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),particularly Section
3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
“Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a
vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing
is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right”
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds
reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate
funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source
of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Dennis Funa vs Agra

FACTS
 March 1, 2010 – Arroyo appointed Hon. Alberto C. Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice

 March 5, 2010 – Arroyo appointed him as Acting Solicitor General

 April 7, 2010 – Petitioner filed a case as a taxpayer, alleging that the appointments were
prohibited under Section 13 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution (…prohibits the President, Vice-
 President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution), and

 Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive
official from holding any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.

 August 5, 2010 – During the pendency of the suit, Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Atty.
Jose Cadiz as Solicitor General and the latter commenced his duties

 (Agra says: he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated
him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been
appointed as the Secretary of Justice;

 That on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice
vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for
Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor
General.)

 Respondents contend that Agra’s concurrent designations were only in a temporary capacity,
the only effect of which was to confer additional duties to him. Thus, as the Acting Solicitor
General and Acting Secretary of Justice, Agra was not “holding” both offices in the strict
constitutional sense (which must be regular and permanent and not a mere designation)

 Respondents further contend that, even on the assumption that Agra’s concurrent designation
constituted “holding of multiple offices,” his continued service as the Acting Solicitor General
was akin to a hold-over; that upon Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, his term
as the Acting Solicitor General expired in view of the constitutional prohibition against holding
of multiple offices by the Members of the Cabinet; that under the principle of hold-over, Agra
continued his service as the Acting Solicitor General “until his successor is elected and
qualified”10 to “prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when a successor may be
chosen and inducted into office;”

 And that during his continued service as the Acting Solicitor General, he did not receive any
salaries and emoluments from the OSG after becoming the Acting Secretary of Justice

 Petitioner counters that there was no “prevailing special circumstance” that justified the non-
application to Agra of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;

 And that Agra’s invocation of the principle of hold-over is misplaced for being predicated upon
an erroneous presentation of a material fact as to the time of his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice

ISSUES
1. Whether or not petitioner has locus standi
 2. Whether or not the case is moot and academic by virtue of the appointment of Cadiz as
SolGen

3. Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General, violated the constitutional prohibition against dual or
multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants

HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

 (1) Yes:

o This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has “far-reaching

implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar,
and the public in future analogous cases.

 (2) Yes, BUT:

o the Court did not desist from resolving an issue that a supervening event meanwhile
rendered moot and academic if any of the following recognized exceptions obtained,
namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the
constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading
review.

 (3) Yes:

o The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the
constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

o Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article
VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could
not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor
General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

o In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in

possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

o To be sure, Agra’s concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting

Solicitor General did not come within the definition of an ex officio capacity***. Had
either of his concurrent designations been in an ex officio capacity in relation to the
other, the Court might now be ruling in his favor.

o The OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor included by the powers of
the DOJ—MEANING, one position was not derived from the other.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and prohibition; ANNULS AND VOIDS
the designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with
his position as the Acting Solicitor General for being unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that l-Ion. Alberto C. Agra was a de facto officer during his
tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting
Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective
as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. 54 This clarification is necessary in
order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority
emanates from the State.
NOTES
*** Ex officio likewise denotes an “act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office.” The ex officio
position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office.

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO
284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU)
assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the
Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article
7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec
8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for
all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.
Funa vs Executive Secretary with Notes
G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President,
SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as Undersecretary of
the Department of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime
Industry Authority (MARINA), Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the
designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed
the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the
MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this
case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the
appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the
relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present
petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to
enjoin.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the
constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he
filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such
illegal act by public officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. In the
present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the
disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of "any other office" is not qualified by the
phrase "in the Government" unlike in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives from holding "any other office or employment in the Government"; and
when compared with other officials and employees such as members of the armed forces and civil
service employees, we concluded thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in
the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or
acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-
in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her
position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Note:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by
law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of
Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where,
under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of
a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term.
However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall
hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.
In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure on the person named.

Dominador Aytona vs Andres Castillo

4 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Appointing Power – Midnight Appointments
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during the last day of
his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When the next president,
Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at the
same time he appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo
warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was
validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the ex-president’s appointments were
scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to
subvert the incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to
continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough,
his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcia’s appointments are hurried
maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next
president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here
it may be since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service,
it is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta

AM No. 98-5-01-SC | November 9, 1998
FACTS:On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were
deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety."
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of
appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was in the position that “election ban had no application to the CA based on the
Commission’s records”. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration together
with the Council’s nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive Secretary
transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day
immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments), which implies that the President’s
Office did not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the “list of final
nominees” for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13, date present
vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled
after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view (hypothesis)
proposed by the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it appeared
that the Justice Secretary and the other members of the Council took action without waiting for the CJ
reply. This prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter from the President
in reply of the May 6 letter where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to
executive appointments, the whole article being entitled “EXECUTIVE DEPT”. He posited that
appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof."
Article 8 Sec 9
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacanang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned.
Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining
the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming
he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should be noted that the originals of the
appointments for both judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latter’s
office and had not been transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7
Malacanang copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential election, Art8 shall apply where vacancies in
SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art7 must be considered where the President
shall not make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in order not to tie
the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.
ISSUE: WON the President can fill vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to Article 8 Sec 4 and 9, during the
appointment ban period stated in Article 7 Sec 15.
HELD: Article 8 Sec 4 and 9 simply mean that the “President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within
the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Article7 Sec15. Thus, the President is neither
required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. Likewise, the prohibition on
appointments comes into effect only once every six years. The Court also pointed out that Article8 Sec4
and 9 should prevail over Article7 Sec15 as they may be considered later expressions of the people when
they adopted the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, declared the appointments signed by the President on March
30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta VOID. They are ordered to cease and desist from
discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed on the said date.
They come within the operation of the prohibition on appointments. While the filling of judiciary
vacancies is in the public interest, there is no compelling reason to justify such appointment within the 2
months appointment ban.
In view of Valenzuela’s oath taking, the authenticity of the letter of which was not verified from the Office
of the Court Administrator, SC reiterated the standing practice and procedures in appointments to the
Judiciary that originals of all appointments are to be sent by the Office of the President to the Office of
the Chief Justice. The Clerk of Court of the SC, in the Chief Justice’s behalf, will advice the appointee of
their appointments as well as the date of commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be
conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new judges.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.
FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the
presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of
the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the
Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a
resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position
of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a
result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for
that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of
February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of
Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The
compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of
the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the
next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the
In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred
to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise
by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.

3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.

4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
nominees by the JBC.
HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal
standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the
petitioners “are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive
the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.”
2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy
that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for
the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for
consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the
position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing
President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next
steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the
“interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.” The resolution of the controversy will surely
settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process
that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of
the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect
their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article
VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and
16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is
one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise
of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be
complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the
defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the
performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
(e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

SARMIENTO V. MISON, G. R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 (CASE DIGEST)

Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla v. Salvador Mison in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and Guillermo Carague in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET
G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987
Padilla, J.:
FACTS: Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by
then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is being questioned by
petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and
both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since the appointment
was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from COA is
valid.
HELD: Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that
needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups whom
the President shall appoint:
 Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls, Officers of
the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;

The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by the President
that requires approval from the COA and the following instances are those which does not require
approval from COA:
 All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;

 Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

  Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Mary Concepcion-Bautista vs Senator Jovito Salonga

172 SCRA 150 – Political Law – Appointments – Commission on Human Rights – Security of Tenure
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting
Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista
permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to
submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a
letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her position as
chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento
vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio
Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s
appointment as “ad interim”.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on
his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at
the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to
confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in
the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by
the Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and
Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation
of the COA because they are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint.” The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the
CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in
nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without
the participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is
done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latter’s
approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the
chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and
was the incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position
of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR
are always permanent and cannot be ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may
be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional.
Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term
of 7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause
and with the observance of due process.

Teresita Quintos-Deles vs Commission on Constitutional Commissions

177 SCRA 259 – Political Law – Appointment of Sectoral Representatives

Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral
representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in
session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the
Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that
their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does
not need the concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to
qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives
to the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These
four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
(or the first group abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, ‘the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.’ All other appointments by
the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase “and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution“. The provision of the Constitution which provides
power to the president in this regard is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by
the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1),
Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.

Peter John Calderon vs Bartolome Carale

208 SCRA 254 – Political Law – Appointment – List of Appointees Requiring COA
Confirmation Cannot Be Expanded by Law
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code.
RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as
the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were
however not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned
the appointment saying that without the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment
is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he
asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive
contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the
President in addition to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required
to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required
exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the
members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to the
other officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
“Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose
appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution
would have said so by adding the phrase “and other officers required by law” at the end
of the first sentence, or the phrase, “with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments” at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has
significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the
Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those
officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the
president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but
omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for
such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law.

Jesus Armando Tarrosa vs Gabriel Singson

232 SCRA 553 – Political Law – Appointments – Congress Can’t Expand the Appointing
Power of the President
FACTS: Gabriel Singson was appointed as the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
by then president Fidel Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a taxpayer, opposed the said
appointment and he argued that Singson cannot perform such position without
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa invoked Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 7653 which provides that the Governor of the BSP if appointed is subject to the
confirmation of the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s confirmation.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An
appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the COA cited in Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot
by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

Flores vs. Drilon

G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993

FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this case. Paragraph (d) reads —

(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional

manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be
determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget,
who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City
of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional.

RULING:
The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.

In the case at bar, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official,
i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to
prevent, there is not doubt to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B,
of the Constitution.
 In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of
the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to
the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.

The appointment of Gordon as Chairman of the SBMA is null. However, despite his
appointment to the said office, Gordon did not automatically forfeit his seat as Mayor of
Olongapo City.
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,
notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically
forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary,
since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or
designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This
provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference between the two
provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts
only after they have been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent
elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk
of losing the elective post as well as not being appointed to the other post.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer who may retain the benefits he may received from the position he may have assumed

Luego v. Civil Service Commission (G. R. No. L-69137)

Posted: August 10, 2011 in Case Digests, Political Law
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu
City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as
“permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary.” On 22 March
1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent
in place of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June
1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier
permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and
the private respondent’s title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment
in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service
Commission’s resolution is set aside.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.

FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17,
2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman
Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC,
requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be
commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a
resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling
up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the
JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or
opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the
process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the
JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the
position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which
led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC
to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of
appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent
frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago
City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the
Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period
therein fixed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.

3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.

4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
nominees by the JBC.

HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by
the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases,
suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.”

2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already
commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short
list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact
that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although
it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing
President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination,
because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the
short list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”
The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions
that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that
are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy
in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution
were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect
their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can
be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the
powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of
the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or
discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be
complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be
the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the
defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act
to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994Cruz, J.
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187of the Local
Government Code
1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal
to himof four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794(Manila Reven
ue Code) null and void for non-compliance with theprocedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certainprovisions contrary to law and public
policy. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained theordinance. It
declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because itvests on the Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of
thepolicy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretaryargues that the
annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that theprocedural requirements for the
enactment of tax ordinances as specifiedin the Local Government Code had indeed not
been observed. (Petitionoriginally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit
certified truecopy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider theconstitutionality of Sec 187 of the
LGC
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civilcases in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniaryestimation. Moreover, Article X, Section
5(2), of the Constitution vests inthe Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and ordersof lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of
anytreaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.In the exercise of this
jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to actwith the utmost circumspection, bearing in
mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws,
no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that
everycourt, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation
before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first
carefully studied by the executive and the
legislativedepartments and determined by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption
of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed
an infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either
or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is
not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted themeasure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with
his own version of what the Code should be.. Wha the found only was that it was illegal.
All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the citygovernment under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was anact not of control but of mere
supervision.An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re
done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.Supervision does not cov
er such authority. The supervisor orsuperintendent merely sees to it that the rules are f
ollowed, but hehimself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion
tomodify or replace them.Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the
LocalAutonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspendthe
effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee leviedwas unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of theseflaws would involve the exercise of
judgment or discretion and not merelyan examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of thelaw had been observed; hence, it would smack of
control rather thanmere supervision. That power was never questioned before this
Court but,at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude
underSection 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality
orlegality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in hisopinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has nodiscretion on this matter. In fact,
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the
inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-
compliance with the prescribedprocedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the
legality, not thewisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in theenactment of the Manila Revenue
Code is another matter. (allegations:
Nowritten notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, nominutes of
public hearing, no posting, no translation into
Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirementshad been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code andthat the City of Manila had
not been able to prove such compliance beforethe Secretary only because he had given
it only five days within which togather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of
25 exhibits)
latersubmitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that theprocedural requir
ements have indeed been observed. Notices of thepublic hearings were sent to
interested parties as evidenced. The minutesof the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-
1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B andC show that the proposed ordinances were published in
the Balita and theManila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the
approvedordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the ManilaStandard
and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q,Q-1, Q-2, and Q 3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approvedbut this omission does
not affect its validity, considering that itspublication in three successive issues of a news
paper of generalcirculation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the
text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but thisrequirement
applies to the approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.

Jose Villena vs Secretary of the Interior

67 Phil. 451 – Political Law – Control Power – Supervision – Suspension of a Local Government Official –
Power to suspend comes with the power to remove
Facts: Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior
recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The
Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the
matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188
of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of
supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective
municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words,
the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power
under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter
provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while
sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.
HELD: Yes.
There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is
under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of
the Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other
form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude“.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative
Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the
Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral
argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of
his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably
to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it
would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity
would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec.
2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official.
The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give
way for an impartial investigation.
 Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Jose Paño

21 SCRA 895 – Political Law – Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary
FACTS: Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land
was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands
denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated
to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of
the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not
contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the
matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person.
However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The
president may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally.
The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our
constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President
has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until
reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the
decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.

Gascon v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989
Padilla, J.
Facts: Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the “Agreement to Arbitrate” entered into by and
between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker T. Arroyo, and ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., dated 6 January 1987,
to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for the return of radio and television stations (TV Station Channel 4), and
to enjoin the Arbitration Committee created under the aforesaid agreement from adjudicating the
claims of ABS-CBN.
Issue: whether the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the
“Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation
Held: Yes. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also known as the
Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the “Agreement to Arbitrate” was signed by
the parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative and executive powers
of the Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) “assisted by a Cabinet”
composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the President. In
other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various departments, are the assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into the “Agreement
to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President
when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines, as a party thereto.

Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. v.
Dominguez
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts: Petitioners questopn the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos
G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of
the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department’s regulatory and supervisory powers under
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a
Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3)
the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all assets, properties and records of
the KBMBPM the Management Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general
membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in the removal of the members of
the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership” of the cooperative and that the
ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors shows that the
management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the
Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed therein
that the Order was issued by the Department “in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers
under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.

Issue: whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is illegal
Held: Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides
the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the
members entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall have an
opportunity to be heard.
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM’s by-laws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. — Any elected director or committee member
may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at
the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity to
be heard at the assembly.

Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general assembly
and a special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision
on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that
right.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto
himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants
him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may
to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials
or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the
department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that
they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of
official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4)
review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the foregoing as
both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and
officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to disregard these procedures
and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by
Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly.
We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretary’s power
under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the
registration of any cooperative includes the “milder authority of suspending officers and calling for the
election of new officers.” Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of
incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated. Secondly, even
granting that the law intended such as postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was
conducted.

BELGICA VS OCHOA

710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government – Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the
latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard
projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft
projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social
Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about
1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-
government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being
used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then
conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes
of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before
the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because
it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of
the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to
which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork
barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to –
a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel,
then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to
get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for
it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member
of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items
in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify
the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president
veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval
of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders
the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of
the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution
on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund,
as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided
for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings
shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.