MANUEL L. QUEZON UNIVERSITY v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Yes. Republic Act No.
. Republic Act No. 7641 intends to give the minimum retirement
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 141673, 17 October 2001
RETIREMENT PAY
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU) is a private
educational institution which established a retirement plan for its
employees. Respondents Juat and Azurin, who are instructors, both
received letters from the school informing them of their eligibility to
avail the said retirement plan.
However, Juat received under protest the two installments of her
retirement pay in the total amount of P71,674.91, when the alleged
correct amount should be P149,401.62. Azurin also received under
protest the amount of P34,282.02 when he should have received
the total amount of P150,215.75 based on the last salary and
benefits received by him.
MLQU contended that Juat is not entitled to receive retirement
benefits as she was only a “part-time employee” of MLQU, much
less to the payment of deficiency. The school also failed and refused
and continuously refuse to heed Azurin’s demand. The parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement during the conciliatory
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent-teachers are entitled to the retirement
benefits provided for under Republic Act No. 7641, even if the
petitioner has an existing valid retirement plan. The Supreme Court
ruled that they are so entitled.
RULING:
benefits to employees not entitled thereto under collective
bargaining and other agreements. Its coverage applies to
establishments with existing collective bargaining or other
agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are less
than those prescribed under the proviso in question.
The Court ordered petitioner University to pay the teachers their
retirement differential pay (i.e., the difference between the
retirement pay under R. A. No. 7641 and the MLQU Retirement
Plan) plus legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of filing of their complaints on March 27, 1997 up to actual
payment.
PAL vs ALPAP
G.R. No. 143686 January 15, 2002
facts of the case
PAL and ALPAP, the exclusive bargaining representative of all
commercial airline pilots of PAL, stemmed from petitioner's act of
unilaterally retiring airline pilot Captain Albino Collantes under
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan.
ALPAP claims illegal dismissal and union busting and filed a
Notice of Strike with DOLE. Pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code, the Secretary of the DOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute.
The Secretary issued the assailed order upholding PAL’s action
of unilaterally retiring Capt. Collantes and recognizing the same as a
valid exercise of its option under the CBA. He further ordered that
the basis of the computation of Captain Collantes’ retirement
benefits should be Article 287 of the Labor Code (as amended by
Republic Act No. 7641) and not Section 2, Article VII, of the PAL-
ALPAP Retirement Plan and in the exercise of its option to retire
pilots, PAL should first consult the pilot concerned before
implementing his retirement.
CA: Denied appeal and motion for reconsideration.
issue
Whether the CBA or LC 287 should be the basis for computation of
retirement pay in this case. CBA.
WON PAL has to first consult w/ the pilot concerned before retiring
him? NO.
ratio
An employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining
and other agreement shall not be less than those provided in the
Labor Code.
PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan (CBA):
SECTION 1. Normal Retirement. (a) Any member who
completed twenty (20) years of service as a pilot for PAL or
has flown 20,000 hours for PAL shall be eligible for normal
retirement. The normal retirement date is the date on
which he completes 20 years of service, or on which he logs
his 20,000 hours as a pilot for PAL. The member who retires
on his normal retirement shall be entitled to either (a) a
lump sum payment of P100,000 or (b) to such termination
pay benefits to which he may be entitled to under existing
laws, whichever is the greater amount.
SECTION 2. Late Retirement. Any member who remains in
the service of the Company after his normal retirement date
may retire either at his option or at the option of the
Company and when so retired he shall be entitled either (a)
to a lump sum payment of P5,000 for each completed year
of service rendered as a pilot, or (b) to such termination pay
benefits to which he may be entitled under existing laws,
whichever is the greater amount.
Upon retirement, each pilot stands to receive the full
amount of the contribution. In sum, therefore, the pilot gets an
amount equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly income for every
year of service he rendered to petitioner. This is in addition to the
amount of not less than P100,000 that he shall receive under the
1967 Retirement Plan.
LC 287
…That an employee’s retirement benefits under any
collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less
than those provided herein. In the absence of a retirement
plan or agreement plan providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee upon
reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond
sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared as the
compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5)
years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be
entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half
(1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of
at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term
‘one-half (1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days
plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the
 cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leaves.
The retirement benefits that a pilot would get under the
provisions of the above-quoted Article 287 of the Labor Code are
less than those that he would get under the applicable retirement
plans of petitioner.
Retirement of an employee may be done upon initiative and
option of the management.
Where there are cases of voluntary retirement, the same is
effective only upon the approval of management. The fact that
there are some supervisory employees who have not yet been
retired after 25 years with the company or have reached the age of
sixty merely confirms that it is the singular prerogative of
management, at its option, to retire supervisors or rank-and-file
members when it deems fit. There should be no unfair labor
practice committed by management if the retirement of private
respondents were made in accord with the agreed option.
The requirement to consult the pilots prior to their
retirement defeats the exercise by management of its option to
retire the said employees. It gives the pilot concerned an undue
prerogative to assail the decision of management. Due process
only requires that notice be given to the pilot of petitioner’s
decision to retire him. Hence, the Secretary of Labor overstepped
the boundaries of reason and fairness when he imposed on
petitioner the additional requirement of consulting each pilot prior
to retiring him. Furthermore, when the Secretary of Labor and
Employment imposed the added requirement that petitioner should
consult its pilots prior to retirement, he resolved a question, which
was outside of the issues raised, thereby depriving petitioner an
opportunity to be heard on this point.
JOSE T. CAPILI v. NLRC and UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO
G.R. No. 120802, 17 June 1997
RETIREMENT PAY
FACTS:
Capili was an instructor at UM, a private educational institution. In
1993, the school informed Capili that he would be eligible for
retirement when he would reach the age of 60 years. Capili
answered that he was not opting to retire but would continue to
serve until he reaches the age of 65.
When the school reiterated its position that it could retire him,
Capili filed a complaint questioning his forced retirement. UM
invoked Article 287 of the Labor Code which provides that any
employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age
established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract. It contended that it has a
retirement plan, known as the University of Mindanao & Associated
Enterprises Retirement Plan. Capili contended that he was not a
member of said retirement plan, therefore it is not applicable to
him.
Later, after receiving the Labor Arbiter’s decision but before filing
his appeal, Capili received partial payment of his retirement pay.
During the pendency of his apppeal with the NLRC, he received full
payment of his retirement benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee can be compelled to retire at the age
of sixty years.
Whether or not the subsequent acceptance of retirement benefits
estops an employee from pursuing his complaint questioning the
validity of his forced retirement.
RULING:
No, an employee cannot be compelled to retire at the age of sixty
years in the absence of a provision on retirement in the CBA or if
the employer has no retirement plan.
Under the Labor Code, as amended by R. A. No. 7641, the option of
the employer to retire an employee at age 60 no longer exists.
Under the present rule, the option to retire upon reaching the age
of 60 years or more but not beyond 65 is the exclusive prerogative
of the employee if there is no provision on retirement in the CBA or
any agreement or if the employer has no retirement plan.
In this case, UM failed to show that Capili was a member of the
school’s retirement plan. The Court finds that it is not applicable to
all employees of UM and its associated enterprises. It applies only to
those who opted to become members thereof.
Yes, the acceptance of retirement benefits will estop the employee
from pursuing his case. By accepting the retirement benefits, the
employee is deemed to have opted to retire under the present rule
stated above. This could only mean that he has already acceded to
his retirement, effective on such date—when he reached the age of
60 years.
JACULBE vs SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY
FACTS:
Petitioner began working for respondents university medical center
as a nurse.
Respondent, through its Human Resources Development Office,
informed petitioner that she was approaching her 35th year of
service with the university and was due for automatic retirement on
November 18, 1993, at which time she would be 57 years old. This
was pursuant to respondents retirement plan for its employees
which provided that its members could be automatically retired
“upon reaching the age of 65 or after 35 years of uninterrupted
service to the university.” Respondent required certain documents
in connection with petitioner’s impending retirement.
A brief exchange of letters between petitioner and respondent
followed. Petitioner emphatically insisted that the compulsory
retirement under the plan was tantamount to a dismissal and
pleaded with respondent to be allowed to work until the age of 60
because this was the minimum age at which she could qualify for
SSS pension. But respondent stood pat on its decision to retire her,
citing “company policy.”
Petitioner filed a complaint in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for “termination of service with preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order.” On November 18, 1993,
respondent compulsorily retired petitioner.
After the parties submitted their position papers, the labor arbiter
rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of illegal dismissal and
ordered that petitioner be reinstated and paid full backwages. On
appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s decision and
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC likewise denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the assailed decision and
resolution, the CA affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE:
1. Did respondent’s retirement plan imposing automatic retirement
after 35 years of service contravene the security of tenure clause in
the 1987 Constitution and the Labor Code?
2. Did respondent commit illegal dismissal by retiring petitioner
solely by reason of such provision in its retirement plan?
RULING:
1.
Retirement plans allowing employers to retire employees who are
less than the compulsory retirement age of 65 are not per se
repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure.
Article 287 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 287. Retirement – Any employee may be retired upon reaching
the retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract. xxx
By its express language, the Labor Code permits employers and
employees to fix the applicable retirement age at below 60 years.
However, after reviewing the assailed decision together with the
rules and regulations of respondent’s retirement plan, we find that
the plan runs afoul of the constitutional guaranty of security of
tenure contained in Article XIII, also known as the provision on
Social Justice and Human Rights.
The CA, in ruling against petitioner, premised its decision to uphold
the retirement plan on her voluntary participation therein:
The petitioner in this case may, however, argue that the Pantranco
case is not applicable in the case at bar as the controversy in the
said case involves a compulsory retirement on the basis of the
length of service rendered by the employee as agreed in an existing
CBA, whereas in the present case, the private respondent
compulsorily retired the petitioner not based on a CBA but on the
retirement scheme provided for in the private respondent’s
retirement plan. Nonetheless, this argument must fail. The contract
fixing for retirement age as allowed under Article 287 of the Labor
Code does not exclusively refer to CBA which provides for an agreed
retirement age. The said provision explicitly allows, as well, other
applicable employment contract to fix retirement age.
The records disclose that the private respondent’s Retirement Plan
has been in effect for more than 30 years. The said plan is deemed
integrated into the employment contract between private
respondent and its employees as evidenced by the latter’s voluntary
contribution through monthly salary deductions. Previous retirees
have already enjoyed the benefits of the retirement plan, and ever
since the said plan was effected, no questions or disagreement have
been raised, until the same was made to apply to the petitioner. xxx
The problem with this line of reasoning is that a perusal of the rules
and regulations of the plan shows that participation therein was not
voluntary at all.
Rule III of the plan, on membership, stated:
SECTION 1 – MEMBERSHIP
All full-time Filipino employees of the University will automatically
become members of the Plan, provided, however, that those who
have retired from the University, even if rehired, are no longer
eligible for membership in the Plan. A member who continues to
serve the University cannot withdraw from the Plan.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 2 – EFFECTIVITY OF MEMBERSHIP
Membership in the Plan starts on the day a person is hired on a full-
time basis by the University.
SECTION 3 – TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP
Termination of membership in the Plan shall be upon the death of
the member, resignation or termination of employee’s contract by
the University, or retirement from the University.
According to the assailed decision, respondent’s retirement plan
“had been in effect for more than 30 years.” What was not pointed
out, however, was that the retirement plan came into being in
197018 or 12 years after petitioner started working for respondent.
In short, it was not part of the terms of employment to which
petitioner agreed when she started working for respondent. Neither
did it become part of those terms shortly thereafter, as the CA
would have us believe.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the
latter, after reaching a certain age agrees to sever his or her
employment with the former.
In this case, neither the CA nor the respondent cited any agreement,
collective or otherwise, to justify the latter’s imposition of the early
retirement age in its retirement plan, opting instead to harp on
petitioner’s alleged “voluntary” contributions to the plan, which was
simply untrue. The truth was that petitioner had no choice but to
participate in the plan, given that the only way she could refrain
from doing so was to resign or lose her job. It is axiomatic that
employer and employee do not stand on equal footing, a situation
which often causes an employee to act out of need instead of any
genuine acquiescence to the employer. This was clearly just such an
instance.
Not only was petitioner still a good eight years away from the
compulsory retirement age but she was also still fully capable of
discharging her duties as shown by the fact that respondent’s board
of trustees seriously considered rehiring her after the effectivity of
her “compulsory retirement.”
2. Yes.
As already stated, an employer is free to impose a retirement age
less than 65 for as long as it has the employees’ consent. Stated
conversely, employees are free to accept the employer’s offer to
lower the retirement age if they feel they can get a better deal with
the retirement plan presented by the employer. Thus, having
terminated petitioner solely on the basis of a provision of a
retirement plan which was not freely assented to by her,
respondent was guilty of illegal dismissal.
At this point, reinstatement is out of the question. Petitioner is now
71 years old and therefore well over the statutory compulsory
retirement age. For this reason, we grant her separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement. It is also for this reason that we modify the award
of backwages in her favor, to be computed from the time of her
illegal dismissal on November 18, 1993 up to her compulsory
retirement age.
LOURDES A. CERCADO, Petitioner, v. UNIPROM, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes A. Cercado (Cercado) started working for
respondent UNIPROM, Inc. (UNIPROM) on December 15, 1978 as a
ticket seller assigned at Fiesta Carnival, Araneta Center, Quezon
City. Later on, she was promoted as cashier and then as clerk typist.
On April 1, 1980, UNIPROM instituted an Employees Non-
Contributory Retirement Plan which provides that any participant
with twenty (20) years of service, regardless of age, may be retired
at his option or at the option of the company.
On January 1, 2001, UNIPROM amended the retirement plan in
compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7641. Under the revised
retirement plan, UNIPROM reserved the option to retire employees
who were qualified to retire under the program.
Sometime in December 2000, UNIPROM implemented a company-
wide early retirement program for its 41 employees, including
herein petitioner, who, at that time, was 47 years old, with 22 years
of continuous service to the company. She was offered an early
retirement package amounting to P171,982.90, but she rejected the
same.
UNIPROM exercised its option under the retirement plan and
decided to retire Cercado effective at the end of business hours on
February 15, 2001. A check of even date in the amount of
P100,811.70, representing her retirement benefits under the
regular retirement package, was issued to her. Cercado refused to
accept the check.
UNIPROM nonetheless pursued its decision and Cercado was no
longer given any work assignment after February 15, 2001. This
prompted Cercado to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter (LA), alleging, among others, that UNIPROM did not
have a bona fide retirement plan, and that even if there was, she
did not consent thereto.
For its part, respondent UNIPROM averred that Cercado was
automatically covered by the retirement plan when she agreed to
the company’s rules and regulations, and that her retirement from
service was a valid exercise of a management prerogative.
The LA rendered a decisionfinding petitioner to be illegally
dismissed. Respondent company was ordered to reinstate her with
payment of full backwages.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LAs
decision, adding that there was no evidence that Cercado consented
to the alleged retirement plan of UNIPROM or that she was notified
thereof. On certiorari, the CA set aside the decisions of the LA and
the NLRC. Cercado moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied. Hence, the instant recourse.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether UNIPROM has a bona fide retirement plan; and,
[2] Whether petitioner was validly retired pursuant thereto.
HELD:
LABOR LAW
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the
latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her
employment with the former.
Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7641, pegs
the age for compulsory retirement at 65 years, while the minimum
age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. An employer is,
however, free to impose a retirement age earlier than the foregoing
mandates. This has been upheld in numerous cases as a valid
exercise of management prerogative.
In this case, petitioner was retired by UNIPROM at the age of 47,
after having served the company for 22 years, pursuant to
UNIPROM’s Employees Non-Contributory Retirement Plan, which
provides that employees who have rendered at least 20 years of
service may be retired at the option of the company. At first blush,
respondents retirement plan can be expediently stamped with
validity and justified under the all encompassing phrase
management prerogative, which is what the CA did. But the
attendant circumstances in this case, vis-vis the factual milieu of the
string of jurisprudence on this matter, impel us to take a deeper
look.
In Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court upheld the
retirement of private respondent pursuant to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) allowing Pantranco to compulsorily
retire employees upon completing 25 years of service to the
company. Interpreting Article 287, the Court ruled that the Labor
Code permits employers and employees to fix the applicable
retirement age lower than 60 years of age. The Court also held that
there was no illegal dismissal involved, since it was the CBA itself
that incorporated the agreement between the employer and the
bargaining agent with respect to the terms and conditions of
employment. Hence, when the private respondent ratified the CBA,
he concurrently agreed to conform to and abide by its provisions.
Thus, the Court stressed, "providing in a CBA for compulsory
retirement of employees after twenty-five (25) years of service is
legal and enforceable so long as the parties agree to be governed by
such CBA."
Similarly, in Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) v. Airline Pilots Association
of the Philippines(APAP), the retirement plan contained in the CBA
between PAL and APAP was declared valid. The Court explained that
by their acceptance of the CBA, APAP and its members are obliged
to abide by the commitments and limitations they had agreed to
cede to management.
It is axiomatic that a retirement plan giving the employer the option
to retire its employees below the ages provided by law must be
assented to and accepted by the latter, otherwise, its adhesive
imposition will amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
In the above-discussed cases, the retirement plans in issue were the
result of negotiations and eventual agreement between the
employer and the employees. The plan was either embodied in a
CBA, or established after consultations and negotiations with the
employees bargaining representative. The consent of the employees
to be retired even before the statutory retirement age of 65 years
was thus clear and unequivocal. Unfortunately, no similar situation
obtains in the present case. In fact, not even an iota of voluntary
acquiescence to UNIPROMs early retirement age option is
attributable to petitioner.
The assailed retirement plan of UNIPROM is not embodied in a CBA
or in any employment contract or agreement assented to by
petitioner and her co-employees. On the contrary, UNIPROM’s
Employees Non-Contributory Retirement Plan was unilaterally and
compulsorily imposed on them. This is evident in the provisions of
the 1980 retirement plan and its amended version in 2000:
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION
Section 1. Any regular employee, as of the Effective Date, shall
automatically become a Participant in the Plan, provided the
Employee was hired below age 60.
Verily, petitioner was forced to participate in the plan, and the only
way she could have rejected the same was to resign or lose her job.
The assailed CA Decision did not really make a finding that
petitioner actually accepted and consented to the plan. The CA
simply declared that petitioner was deemed aware of the
retirement plan on account of the length of her employment with
respondent.
Implied knowledge, regardless of duration, cannot equate to the
voluntary acceptance required by law in granting an early
retirement age option to an employer. The law demands more than
a passive acquiescence on the part of employees, considering that
an employers early retirement age option involves a concession of
the formers constitutional right to security of tenure.
We reiterate the well-established meaning of retirement in this
jurisdiction: Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties,
a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee
whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his
or her employment with the former.
Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option
must be explicit, voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While an
employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the
legally permissible ages under the Labor Code, this prerogative must
be exercised pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement plan.
In other words, only the implementation and execution of the
option may be unilateral, but not the adoption and institution of the
retirement plan containing such option. For the option to be valid,
the retirement plan containing it must be voluntarily assented to by
the employees or at least by a majority of them through a
bargaining representative.
We disagree with the CAs conclusion that the retirement plan is part
of petitioners employment contract with respondent. It must be
underscored that petitioner was hired in 1978 or 2 years before the
institution of UNIPROMs retirement plan in 1980. Logically, her
employment contract did not include the retirement plan, much less
the early retirement age option contained therein.
We also cannot subscribe to respondents submission that
petitioners consent to the retirement plan may be inferred from her
signature in the personnel action forms containing the
phrase: Employee hereby expressly acknowledges receipt of and
undertakes to abide by the provisions of his/her Job Description,
Company Code of Conduct and such other policies, guidelines, rules
and regulations the company may prescribe.
It should be noted that the personnel action forms relate to the
increase in petitioners salary at various periodic intervals. To
conclude that her acceptance of the salary increases was also,
simultaneously, a concurrence to the retirement plan would be
tantamount to compelling her to agree to the latter. Moreover,
voluntary and equivocal acceptance by an employee of an early
retirement age option in a retirement plan necessarily connotes
that her consent specifically refers to the plan or that she has at
least read the same when she affixed her conformity thereto.
Hence, consistent with the Courts ruling in Jaculbe, having
terminated petitioner merely on the basis of a provision in the
retirement plan which was not freely assented to by her, UNIPROM
is guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner is thus entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to full backwages
computed from the time of her illegal dismissal in February 16, 2001
until the actual date of her reinstatement. If reinstatement is no
longer possible because the position that petitioner held no longer
exists, UNIPROM shall pay backwages as computed above, plus, in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one-month pay
for every year of service. This is consistent with the preponderance
of jurisprudence relative to the award of separation pay in case
reinstatement is no longer feasible.
GRANTED
CAINTA CATHOLIC SCHOOL and MSGR. BALBAGO vs. CCSEU
G.R. No. 151021
May 4, 2006
FACTS: A CBA was entered into between Cainta Catholic School
(School) and the Cainta Catholic School Employees Union (CCSEU).
The Union held an election of officers, with Llagas and Javier being
elected as President and Vice-President respectively.
Subsequently, the School retired Llagas and Javier, who had
rendered more than 20 years of continuous service, pursuant to
Section 2, Article X of the CBA, to wit:
An employee may be retired, either upon application by the
employee himself or by the decision of the Director of the School,
upon reaching the age of 60 or after having rendered at least 20
years of service to the School the last 3 years of which must be
continuous.
3 days later, the Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB. Later,
the Union struck and picketed the School’s entrances.
ISSUE: Was the forced retirement of Llagas and Javier a valid
exercise of management prerogative?
HELD: YES
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the
latter after reaching a certain age agrees and/or consents to sever
his employment with the former.
By their acceptance of the CBA, the Union and its members are
obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they had
agreed to cede to management. The questioned retirement
provisions cannot be deemed as an imposition foisted on the Union,
which very well had the right to have refused to agree to allowing
management to retire retire employees with at least 20 years of
service.
We can thus can comfortably uphold the principle, as reiterated in
Philippine Airlines, that the exercise by the employer of a valid and
duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not
constitute unfair labor practice.