PROPERTY – MIDTERM REVIEWER d.

Pledge
e. Antichresis
RIGHT OF ACCESSION
Art. 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right of the soil, and the young and other products of
by accession to everything which is produced animals.
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached Industrial are those produced by lands of
thereto, either naturally or artificially. (353) any kind through cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the
Accession defined: price of leases of lands and other property and the
Accession is the right of the owner of a thing, real or amount of perpetual or life annuities or other similar
personal, to become the owner of everything which is income. (355a)
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially. Definitions of the diff. kinds of fruits:
Does not apply to property that belongs to the property 1. Natural fruits
domain Kinds:
a. Spontaneous products of the soil
Distinguished from accessory b. The young and other products of animals
ACCESSION ACCESSORY 2. Industrial fruits
Are the fruits of, or Are things joined to, or 3. Civil fruits
additions to, or included with, the principal
improvements upon, a thing for the latter’s 3 things that are considered civil fruits:
thing (principal) embellishment.  rents of building
The concept has three  prices of leases and other property
forms of building, planting,  the amount of perpetual
and sowing
Are not necessary to the Both principal and Art. 443. He who receives the fruits has the
principal thing accessory must go together obligation to pay the expenses made by a third
person in their production, gathering, and
Accession not a mode of acquiring ownership preservation.

Accession is not one of the modes of acquiring ownership. Art. 444. Only such as are manifest or born are
It is merely a consequence or incidence of ownership. considered as natural or industrial fruits.
With respect to animals, it is sufficient hat
Kinds of Accession they are in the womb of the mother, although
1. Accession discrete- is the extension of the right of unborn.
ownership of a person to the products of a thing which
belongs to such person Art. 445. Whatever built, planted or sown on the land
of another and the improvements or repairs made
thereon, belong to the owner of the land subject to
2. Accession continua- is the extension of the right of
the provisions of the following articles
ownership of a person to that which is incorporated or
attached to a thing which belongs to such person. Basic Principles:
a. With respect to real property: may be Accession A. Accession follows the principal
industrial or natural B. Incorporation or union must be intimate- means
b. With respect to personal property that it must be such that removal or separation
1. Conjunction or adjunction cannot be effected without substantial injury to
2. Commixtion either or both.
3. Specifications C. Effect of good faith and bad faith- good faith
Art. 441 to the owner belongs: exonerates a person from liability but bad faith
1. The natural fruits may give rise to consequences.
2. The industrial fruits; the civil fruits D. Effect where both parties in bad faith- bad faith of
3. The civil fruits. one neutralizes the bad faith of the other.
E. Principle against unjust enrichment
Right of owner to the fruits:
1. General fruits- all fruits belong to the owner of a Art. 446. All works, sowing, and planting are
thing presume made by the owner and at his expense,
2. Exceptions: unless the contrary is proved.
a. Possession in good faith
Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon,
b. Usufruct
personally or through another, plantings,
c. Lease of rural lands constructions, or works with the materials of

PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 1

another, shall pay their; and, if h acted in bad faith,
he shall also be obliged to the reparation of
damages. The owner of the materials shall have the
right to remove them only in case he can do so
without injury to the work constructed, or without
the plantings, constructions or works being
destroyed. However, if the landowner acted in bad
faith, the owner of the materials may remove them
in any event, with a right to be indemnified for
damages
A. Rights and liabilities of the owner who used
materials of another
1. If he acted in good faith, he becomes the
owner of the materials but he shall pay their
value. However the owner of the materials can
remove them if the removal can be done
without injury to the plantings, etc. for in such
case there is no accession.
2. In bad faith, he becomes the owner of the
materials, however he shall pay their value
such damages. The owner of the materials
may remove them even if such removal may
cause injury to the plantings, etc.
B. Rights and liabilities of the owner of
materials who acted in good faith
1. If the landowner acted in good faith, the
owner of the materials is entitled:
a. Reimbursement of the value of the
materials or, alternatively
b. Removal of the materials if the same
can be done without injury to the
plantings, etc.
2. If the landowner acted in bad faith, the
owner of the materials is entitled:
a. Indemnification for the damages and
absolute right of removal whether or not injury
would be caused.
C. Rights and liabilities of owner of materials
who acted in bad faith
a. when the landowner is in good faith and the
owner of materials is in bad faith, the latter
would be liable for any consequential damages
without right of removal whether or not injury
would be caused
b. Both parties are in bad faith, both shall be
treated as being in good faith.
Art 448. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
“Good faith” consists in the honest belief of the builder,
sower or planter, that the land he is building, sowing, or
planting on, is his or that by some title he as right to build,
etc., and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.\
Requirements of Good Faith:
1. Existence of good faith
-builder, sower or planter acted in good faith. But
one cannot be a builder in good faith where there is
a presumptive knowledge of the Torrens Title issued
to the registered owner of the land in dispute.
2. It does not apply where one’s interest in the land is
merely that of a holder such as a tenant or lessee.
3. Good faith is presumed, he who alleged bad faith on
the part of the builder has the burden of proof.
CASES:
In the case of Rosales vs. Castelltort, the landowner can
choose between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the
land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay
reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the
conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule
that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse
to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of
the building to remove it from the land.
JM Tuazon vs Vda de Lumanlan. Lumanlan had chosen to
ignore the Torrens title of Tuazon & Co., Inc. and relied instead
upon the Deudors' claim of ownership, perhaps because such
course appeared to her as more advantageous; hence, she has
only herself to blame for the consequences now that the
Deudors' claim has been abandoned by the Deudors
themselves, and cannot pretend good faith.
Quevada vs CA. Petitioner is not the owner of or claiming
title to the land, but a mere tenant occupying only a portion
of the house on it under the lease contract between him and
private respondent. No supporting evidence was presented
showing that petitioners construction of the house was with
the consent of the lands previous owner, but good faith
should be presume, particularly since the lease relationship
was open and in plain view.
Neither is there a showing of bad faith
in petitioner’s refusal to vacate the land. On the other hand,
there is no indication that private respondent will oblige
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 2
petitioner to pay the price of the land. In fact, the former
refuses to sell it to the latte.
As a mere tenant, however, petitioner must pay
reasonable rent for the continued use and occupancy of the
leased premises from the time the lease contract expired until
he finally vacates and surrenders it to private respondent
receives reimbursement for its value. Similarly, by insisting on
ejecting petitioner, private respondent in effect elects to
appropriate the building.
The fundamental doctrine of unjust enrichment is
the transfer of value without just cause or consideration.
Therefore, to have a just transfer of the leased portion of the
house, its value should be offset against the reasonable rent
due for its continued use and occupancy until the
former vacates and surrenders it to the latter. Private
respondent shall not be inequitably profited or enriched
at petitioner’s expense.
Macasaet vs Macasaet. Based on therefore cited special
cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual milieu. The
established facts of this case show that respondents fully
consented to the improvements introduced by
petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots
upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and
approved of the construction of the improvements
introduced thereon. Thus, petitioners may be deemed to
have been in good faith when they built the structures on
those lots.
Mores vs Yu-go. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of
the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the
lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the
improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to
reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, because any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
In the case of Del Campo vs. Abesia, the co-ownership is
terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square
meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the
defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions
of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
Boyer-Roxas vs. CA. The construction of the unfinished
building started when Eriberto Roxas, husband of Rebecca
Boyer-Roxas, was still alive and was the general manager of
the respondent corporation. The couple used their own
funds to finance the construction of the building. The Board
of Directors of the corporation, however, did not object to
the construction. They allowed the construction to continue
despite the fact that it was within the property of the
corporation.
Under these circumstances, we agree with the
petitioners that the provision of Article 453 of the Civil Code
should have been applied by the lower courts. Article 453 of
the Civil Code provides: If there was bad faith, not only on
the part of the person who built, planted or sown on the
land of another but also on the part of the owner of such
land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as
though both had acted in good faith.
Sarmiento vs Agana. Ernesto and his wife (BPS) were
clearly in good faith as they believed that Rebecca’s mother
has the capacity to eventually transfer the title of the land
to them. In line with this, Sarmiento (LO) was required to
exercise only 2 options: To purchase the house or to sell the
land to them, in this case, based on the value decided by
the courts. Since Sarmiento failed to exercise the option
within the allotted period, and based on Art. 448, the LO is
compelled by law to exercise either option. Not choosing
either is a violation of the law.
II. Option given to Landowner:
1. Options
b. To appropriate improvement upon payment of the
required indemnity based on its present or current value,
pursuant to Arts. 546 and 548
i. Liability of the builder to account for the fruits
received
1. Once the landowner elects to appropriate
the improvements, the builder cannot
exactly be considered a possessor in good
faith
2. Fruits that the builder receives during the
period of retention must be deducted
from whatever indemnity is due him; in
case it exceeds the value of the
indemnity, the excess shall be returned to
the owner of the land.
3. If the building is occupied by the builder
himself who acted in good faith, the
landowner has no right to collect rents for
the occupation of the land while the latter
retains the building.
c. To oblige the builder or planter to pay the price of the land
and the sower to pay the proper rent
i. When this right cannot be exercised
1. If the value of the land is considerably
more than that of the building or trees.
ii. Fixing of price remedies of landowner if
builder/planter refuses to pay
2. He shall pay reasonable rent – they
entered into a “Forced Lease.” The parties
shall agree on the terms of the lease and
in case of disagreement, the court shall
fix the terms thereof.
d. Reason for the Option
1. Just and equitable solution to conflict of rights – if all
parties are in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners, and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvement without
causing injustice to the landowner.
2. Principle of accession – landowner is entitles to the
ownership of the accessory thing because the
accessory follow the principal.
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 3. Benefit to builder – instead of being outrightly ejected
from the land, he can compel the landowner to make
a choice either to pay for the improvement or to sell
the land.
CASE:
Ochoa v. Apeta, G.R. No. 146259, Sept. 13, 2007
Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been
occupying Lot No. 1580. They built their houses and
apartment building thereon. Respondents, found that they
are the true owners of Lot No. 1580 being occupied by
petitioners.
Neither can prescription be allowed against the hereditary
successors of the registered owner, because they step into
the shoes of the decedent and are merely the continuation
of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. Applied
to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it.
Respondents have the option to pay for the houses and
apartment building constructed by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest on Lot No. 1580; or to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the lot in an amount not more
than the value of the said improvements.
III. Right of the Landowner to Remove or Demolish
Improvement:
 Since the option is given to the landowner and it is
limited to paying for the improvement or selling his
land to the builder, he cannot refuse to exercise his
right of choice and compel the builder to remove
or demolish the improvement.
 The landowner is entitled to such removal only
when after having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same.
 The improvement that is transitory in character or
is transferable, there is no accession, therefore, the
landowner has every right to have the same
removed from his property.
CASE:
Depra v. Dumlao, G.R. No. L-57348, May 16, 1985
FACTS:
It should be considered that the parties themselves
stipulated that Dumlao, the builder, was in good faith and it
was later found that Depra, the owner, was also in good
faith. Hence, what applies is the provisions of Article 448 of
the Civil Code, which provides in sum that:
a. Builder in good faith – entitled to retain the possession of
the land on which he built in good faith until he is paid the
value of the building he built in good faith;
b. Owner in good faith – has the option to either (i) pay for
the building OR (ii) sell his land to the builder in good faith
but builder cannot be forced to buy said land if the same is
considerably more than the value of the building.
Forced rent only comes in if the owner exercises his right to
sell the land but the builder rejects it by reason of the price
thereof being considerably more than the value of the
building – in such case, the parties shall agree to the terms
of the lease, if they can’t agree then they may bring the
issue to court.
IV. Builder’s/Sower’s/Planter’s Right to Retain
Improvement
CASE:
Nuguid v. CA, G.R. No. 151815, Feb. 13, 2005
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised
by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is
to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the
actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been
reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for
possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and
useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed.
Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay
rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his
possession by ordering him to vacate.
V. Effect of Alienation by the Landowner with
Improvements:
a. Where purchaser paid only price of land - a purchaser,
in accordance with Art. 453, who buys with
improvements belonging to another knowing such
fact, places himself in the position of an owner of
land who has acted in bad faith.
b. Where purchaser paid also value of improvements – if
the new owner has paid for the improvements, the
action may still be brought against him without
prejudice to his right to recover from the former
owner.
c. Option given to purchaser – if the former owner had
not exercised his option, either to pay for the value
of the house, or require the builder to pay for the
value of the land, the owner of the land by purchase
where the builder is in good faith is given the choice.
d. Where the land registered under the Torrens system
– if the land is registered under the Torrens system
and the certificate of the shows the holder to be the
owner of the land and the improvements thereon,
any purchaser for value, without notice, who buys
the land on reliance on such title will take the
property free from the builder’s lien.
Art 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right to indemnity
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Art 450. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand
the demolition of the work, or that the planting or
sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person who
built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder
or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower
the proper rent
Art 451. In case of the two preceding articles, the
landowner is entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower
Art 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is
entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses
of preservation of the land
B. Builder/Planter/Sower in Bad Faith (Art. 449 –
452)
I. Instances of Bad Faith
1. Bought a house from another with full knowledge
of the fact that the land belonged to the landlord
of the seller
2. Simply took possession of a land which its former
possessors were compelled to abandon by reason
of war
3. Bought a land with notice that there was some
defect in the title of the vendor and could not have
failed to know that another had been holding the
land under a claim of ownership or had
presumptive knowledge of the owner’s Torrens
title
4. Had been found by the RTC to be a builder in bad
faith and ordered to deliver improvements to the
owner which finding is presumed correct until
reversed, and, therefore, notwithstanding
allegation of good faith, is not entitled to retain
possession until reimbursed pending appeal
5. Bought a parcel of land and then constructed a new
building after the filing of action against him for
annulment of the sale of the land
6. Bought a parcel of land with the knowledge that the
property was under litigation and then planted
about 3.000 coconut trees thereon
7. Built a house on a lot after his predecessor-in-
interest, his parents, had been summoned in civil
case regarding said lot, even reconstructed the
house into a bigger one while case was pending
CASE:
Rodriguez, Sr. v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-13343, Dec. 29,
1962
The possession having begun in good faith the presumption is that
it continued to be enjoyed in the same character until it could be
proven that the possessor was not unaware that his possession was
wrongful (Article 528 and 529, Civil Code).
However, we agree with appellant's alternative contention that on
the date of the service of summons upon appellee in this case,
considering that the former was thereafter declared owner by final
judgment, appellee's possession in good faith was interrupted and
hence from that time he lost the right to the fruits.
Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap, G.R. No. L-17681,
Feb. 26, 1965
Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and
hence as between themselves their rights would be as if both of
them had acted in good faith at the time of the transaction, this legal
fiction of Yap's good faith ceased when they sold the properties as
theirs alone; but so did the court's declaration of liability for the rents
thereafter is correct and proper.
A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his
possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes
place upon service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and 1123, Civil
Code).
Lumungo v. Usman, G.R. No. L-25359, Sept. 28, 1968
It should be noted that such improvements are not necessary
expenses of preservation which a builder, planter or sower in bad
faith my recover under the first paragraph of Arts. 452 and 456.
The facts and finding of the RTC and CA leave no room for doubt
that Jose Angeles was a purchaser and builder in bad faith.
According to Art. 449, He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith
on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without
right to indemnity.
Santos v. Mojica, G.R. No. L-25450, Jan. 31, 1969
Leonardo Santos' house having been built and reconstructed (after
March, 1962) into a bigger one after his predecessors-in-interest,
his parents, had been summoned in 1959 in Civil Case No. 217-R,
he must be deemed a builder in bad faith. As builder in bad faith
he lost the improvement made by him consisting of the
reconstructed house to the owners of the land without right to
indemnity, pursuant to Article 449
The Allanigue brothers and sisters therefore became owners of the
improvement consisting of the house built in bad faith by Leonardo
Santos if they chose to appropriate the accession. (Article 445 and
449) However, said owners could choose instead the demolition of
the improvement or building at the expense of the builder,
pursuant to Article 450 of the Civil Code.
II. Consequences for Bad Faith (Arts. 449 and 450)
Art 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith
on the land of another, loses what is built, planted
or sown without right to indemnity
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 5
Art 450. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand
the demolition of the work, or that the planting or
sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person who
built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder
or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower
the proper rent
a. Loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity
b. Owner may demand demolition, have the planting
or sowing removed at the expense of the person
who built, planted or sowed
c. Builder or planter to pay the price of the land; Sower
pay the proper rent
III. Rights of Builder/Planter/Sower in Bad Faith (Art.
452)
1. Examples of necessary expenses for the preservation
of land
 Defense work to prevent erosion
 Litigation in defense of the land against claims of
usurpers
 Real property taxes
NOTE: Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor, including one in bad faith but only th possessor in
good faith is entitled to retain the thing until he is reimbursed.
(Art. 546)
2. Right of retention (Art. 546); Right to expenses of
production
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to
every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the
possessor in food faith with the same retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession
having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the
thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
IV. Rights of Owner of the Land (Art. 450 – 451)
1. 3 Alternative rights of a landowner in good faith:
a. To appropriate what has been built, planted, or
sown in bad faith without any obligation to pay
any indemnity therefor except for necessary
expenses for the preservation of the land, plus
damages
b. To ask the removal or demolition of what has
been built, etc. at the builder’s, etc. expense,
plus damages
c. To compel the builder or planter to pay the price
or the value of the land, whether or not the value
of the land is considerably more than the value
of the improvements, and the sower to pay the
proper rent, plus damages
NOTE: Basis for the damages is the amount which
reasonably corresponds with the value of the properties lost
or destroyed as a result of the occupation in bad faith, as well
as the fruits from the properties that the owner of the land
reasonably expected to obtain.
Art 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part
of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land
of another, but also on the part of the owner of such
land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same
as though both had acted in bad faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the
part of the landowner whenever the act was done
with his knowledge and without opposition on his
part.
C. Landowner and the Builder/Planter/Sower are both in
Bad Faith (Art. 453)
a. Both are considered in good faith – where both parties
acted in bad faith, their rights shall be determined as if both
acted in good faith
b. When both in bad faith – the second paragraph of Art. 453
defines bad faith on the part of the landowner but not bad
faith on the part of the builder, etc. nevertheless, a builder
is in bad faith if he builds knowing that the land does not
belong to him, and that he has no right, permission, or
authority to do so.
CASE:
Floreza v. Evangelista, G.R. No. L-25462, Feb. 21, 1980
FACTS:
Issue of reimbursement is not moot because if Floreza has no right
to retention, then he must pay damages in the form of rentals. CA
was correct in saying that Art. 448 is inapplicable because it applies
only to builder in good faith. Art. 453 is also not applicable because
it requires that both parties should be in bad faith.
Petitioner has no right to reimbursement of the value of the house
which he has erected on the residential lot of the Evangelista’s, much
less to retention of the premises until he is reimbursed. The rights
of the petitioner are more akin to those of a usufructuary who, under
Art. 578 may make on the property useful improvements but with
no right to be indemnified therefor.
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 6
 Landowner
Good faith
Option 1: Appropriate whatever has been built, planted,
or sown after paying indemnity which includes necessary,
useful and luxurious expenses (if he wishes to
appropriate the luxurious expenses)
Prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary
and useful expense with the fruits received by the BP in
good faith
Option 2: To oblige the BP to buy the land or the S to pay
the proper rent unless the value of the land is
considerably more than that of the building or trees
Legal implication of planter v sower:
Owner can’t compel sower to buy, only rent.
Good faith
Option 1: To acquire whatever has been built, planted or
sown without paying indemnity except necessary
expenses for preservation of land and luxurious expenses
(should LO want to acquire luxurious improvement) plus
damages
Option 2: To oblige BP to buy land or S to pay proper
rent plus damages, regardless of valuation
Option 3: To compel BPS to remove or demolish work
done plus damages
Bad Faith
Acquire whatever has been built, planted or sown by
paying indemnity plus damages
Bad Faith
Both are considered in good faith. Rule on good faith applies.
Builder/Planter/Sower
Good faith
Receive indemnity for necessary, useful and luxurious expenses (depends
on landowner) with right of retention over the land without obligation to
pay rent until full payment of indemnity
Remove useful improvement provided it does not cause any injury (part of
right of retention)
If LO does not appropriate luxurious improvements, BPS can remove the
same provided there is no injury to the principal thing (land or building)
Right of retention only applies when LO chooses to appropriate (but does
not apply if property of public dominion)
To purchase land at fair market value at time of payment when value is not
considerably more than that of the building or trees
To pay rent until the purchase has been made
If BP cannot pay purchase price of the land, LO can require BP to remove
whatever has been built, planted, or sown.
If the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building or
trees, BP cannot be compelled to buy the land. In such case, BP will pay
reasonable rent if LO does not choose option 1.
If BPS cannot pay the rent, LO can eject BPS from the land.
Note: Rental period of sower is only until he gathers what he sowed. He
doesn’t have the remedy of removal.
Bad Faith
Loses whatever has been built, planted or sown without indemnity and liable
to pay damages
Entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses for preservation of land
but no right to retention (and also 443)
NOT Entitled to reimbursement for useful expenses and cannot remove
useful improvements even if removal will not cause injury
Not entitled to luxurious expenses except when LO wants to acquire (value
of which will be the one at the time LO enters into possession)
Entitled to remove luxurious improvements if it will not cause injury and LO
does not want to acquire them. If it will cause injury and LO doesn’t want
to acquire, he gets it for free
Obliged to pay for land or proper rent and pay damages
Obliged to remove or demolish work done at his expense and pay damages
Good Faith
BPS can remove whatever has been built, planted or sown regardless of
whether or not it will cause injury and will be entitled to damages
If LO acquires whatever has been built, planted or sown, BPS must be
indemnified the value thereof plus damages
If LO does not acquire, BPS cannot insist on purchasing land
Bad Faith
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 7

C. Landowner is in Bad Faith, Builder / Planter / Sower
in Good Faith.
Art. 454. When the landowner acted in bad faith and
the builder, planter or sower proceeded in good faith,
the provisions of article 447 shall apply.
Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon,
personally or through another, plantings,
constructions or works with the materials of another,
shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he
shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages.
The owner of the materials shall have the right to
remove them only in case he can do so without injury
to the work constructed, or without the plantings,
constructions or works being destroyed. However, if
the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the
materials may remove them in any event, with a right
to be indemnified for damages.
E. Landowner, builder and owner of materials are
different persons.
Art. 455. If the materials, plants or seeds belong to a
third person who has not acted in bad faith, the owner
of the land shall answer subsidiarily for their value
and only in the event that the one who made use of
them has no property with which to pay.
 It involves 3 parties: the landowner, the builder, the
one who furnishes the materials.
 If the owner of the materials was paid by the builder
in good faith. The builder may demand
reimbursement from the landowner.
 The landowner is subsidiarily liable to the third party
who furnished the materials in good faith.
 If bad faith was committed on any of the three
parties, that party has no right to demand
reimbursement.
 If bad faith was committed on all of the three
parties, it is considered that all have acted in good
faith.
F. Good Faith and Negligence.
Art. 456. In the cases regulated in the preceding
articles, good faith does not necessarily exclude
negligence, which gives right to damages under
article 2176.
 Good Faith and Negligence can co-exist.
 Negligence – there is no intent to do wrong or harm.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
VI. Alluvion
a. Requisites
 The deposit should be gradual and
imperceptible.
 The cause is the current of the river.
 The current must be that of a river.
 The river must continue to exist.
 The increase must be comparatively little.
b. Riparian Owner
 It lands formed by accretion which belong to
the riparian owner. Accretions deposited
gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, and rivers, lakes by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof.
CASES:
Office of the City Mayor vs. Ebio
Facts of the Case:
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of
land consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781
Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Paraaque City and covered
by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of
respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut
creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor
of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez.
Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez.
From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and
possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit
declaring possession and occupancy, Pedro was able to obtain a
tax declaration over the said property in his name. Since then,
respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for
the said property.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married
Pedros daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedros advice, the couple
established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in October
1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paraaque
municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
compound. On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer
of Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of
Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedros name
were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebios name.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang
Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1999
seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the
construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the
said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8) meters
wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the
main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the
respondents. When the city government advised all the affected
residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately
registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was
temporarily suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised
when several officials from the barangay and the city
planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees
planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 8
before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the
Department of Interior and Local Government and the Office
of the Vice Mayor.
On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held
a meeting to discuss the construction of the proposed road.
In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition
to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over
the affected property.
In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted
before the trial court that they have a pending application
for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Ruling:
An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or
command the performance of an act. It is distinct from the
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot
exist except only as part or as an incident to an independent
action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction,
the auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or
mandatory injunction may issue.
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for
injunction to prevent the local government of Paranaque
City from proceeding with the construction of an access road
that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim
is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was
formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled
along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the
law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the
banks of a creek. It reads:
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually
upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof, belong
to the owners of such lands.
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that
alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part
of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically
belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that
the owner of the adjoining property must register the same
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property
may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public
dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks
does not form part of the public domain by clear provision
of law.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in
the controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect
his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their
presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in
the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy
but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be
made in their absence without affecting them.
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin
the city government of Paraaque from proceeding with its
implementation of the road construction project. The State is
neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where
no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall
be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be
an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor
any of its rights infringed.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party
seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she
possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should
not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may
never arise.
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their
predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed
the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio
secured a permit from the local government of Paraaque for the
construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro
executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to
declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously,
it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered
owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by
the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of
Paraaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more
than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought
to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are
deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription.
A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer,
ownership. Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land
may be done either through judicial proceedings or through
administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted
that they opted to confirm their title over the property
administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
Republic vs. Abrille
Facts of the Case:
Defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa
Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of
Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 9
(525.652), more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, issued
in her name;
Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision
of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as
Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was approved by the Land
Registration Commissioner on March 17,1967;
under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-B-
1 contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-
B-2B-2 contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total
area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters
more than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-1439 in the name of said defendant Luisa Villa
Abrille;
on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land
Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to
secure an order from the Court of First Instance of Davao in
LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of Deeds for
the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to cancel the
same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered
Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the
name of Luisa Villa Abrille and on the same date registered Lot
No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of
Luisa Villa Abrille; the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2,
which includes the aforementioned excess area of 82,127
Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the
required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as
amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law; the
excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of
the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was
formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason
of the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land
belonging to the public domain; and as a consequence thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887 which covers Lot No.
379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein
the excess area of land belong to the public domain (not private
land) is null and void ab initio.
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City
filed her answer averring that she, "in the performance of her
ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected the
registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No.
379B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886
and TCT No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in view of the
approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of
First Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title
No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT
Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".
The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 5609 of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name
of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T. 1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille
and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of
Milagros Huang, T20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-
20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name
of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779
square meters, or 82,127 square meters.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to
include the increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the Commissioner of Land
Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new title under Section
44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this court, which was assigned to
Branch
IV.
Ruling:
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille owners of the adjacent estate, might
have acquired a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it
under the operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for
registration under Act 496 should have been filed. More so when the
title acquired is by continuous possession for at least 30 years under
a claim of ownership and even assuming that the land is an accretion,
the fact that the riparian estate is registered does not bring ipso facto
effect its accretion thereto under the operation of the Land
Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based upon final
judgment promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction after due
publication, notice and hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner
of Land Registration and transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Davao
in the registry, for the reason that no initial or original registration
proceedings have been instituted by the owner. And the only way by
which a title to the land in question can be issued for the first time is
for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of
registration based upon final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction after trial.
For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a
land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites
should all be satisfied:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed
private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by
the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing
together with all the documents or other evidences attached
thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration
Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date
and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and
those known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether
named in the notice or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision
final and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a
decree of confirmation and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
corresponding Register of Deeds, and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration
book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate
of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment
of the prescribed fees.
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 10
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied
with, the lower court committed no error in its appealed decision
dated January 27, 1970.
GRANDE v. CA
FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who
likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930’s,
the Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for
registration purposes. The land was described to have
Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in
the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of
the current of the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000
sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes filed an
action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that
they were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land
created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs
allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs,
however, stated that they were the rightful owners since prior
to 1933.
The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to
vacate the premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the
CA, however, the decision was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically
belongs to the riparian owners?
HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the
owners of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure
become theirs merely believing that said land have become
imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a
specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included,
and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the
Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land
since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the
Grande’s single witness who claims that the Calalungs only
entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have
acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by
prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934,
when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil
Code, which only took effect in 1950.
IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO
FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land
(mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion
since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His
application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano
Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public
domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that
said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at
bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD:
1. YES. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the
present case because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks
of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay, which is held
to be part of the sea
2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added
to shores by accretions caused by actions of the sea form part of
the pubic domain when they are no longer necessary for purposes
of public utility, only the executive and the legislative departments
have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any
said land is no longer necessary for public use. Until such
declaration is made by said departments, the lot in question forms
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC
Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public domain, even
if the accretion results from rivers emptying into the sea. It
cannot be registered.
FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The
story begins on 1946 upon his desire to register land on the
northern section of his existing property. His current registered
property is bounded on the east by Talisay River, on the West by
Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila bay. Both rivers
flow towards the Manila Bay. Because of constantly flowing water,
extra land of about 17hectares formed in the northern most
section of the property. It is this property he sought to register.
The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land
and part of public domain. His Motion for Reconsideration likewise
burned. In 1960, he attempted registry again, claiming that the
Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on
accretion. He claimed this land as riprarian owner. The Director
of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.
Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the
fray opposing the same application, stating the he leased part of
the property sought to be registered. He sought to protect his
fishpond that rested on the same property. Sinforoso was not
amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that
Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy a portion of his
land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed.
During the appeal, his original land registration case was
consolidated and tried jointly. The heirs of Pascual took over the
case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land
and therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed the
complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and also
denied his land registration request. Pascual’s heirs appealed and
the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The Apellate court granted
petition for registration! The reason? The accretion was caused
by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence it wasn’t foreshore land.
Aggrieved, the Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration.
The Apellate court denied all motions of the Director and the
Government.
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 11

The matter went to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accretion taking place on property
adjacent to the sea can be registered under the Torrens
system.
HELD:
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain.
Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil
Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an
accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring
property and requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the
action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where
the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based
on Art 457 is misplaced. If there’s any land to be claimed, it
should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan.
The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river
bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of
land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank
is foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art 457 but
Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while
old, holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be
registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by
government for public use and declared as private property
capable of alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866
provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial
deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the
public domain. When they are no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment of special industries,
or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare
them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set
aside. Registration cannot be allowed.
C. Ponds or Lagoons
Art. 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds or
lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by the
natural decrease of the waters, or lose that
inundated by them in extraordinary floods.
VII. Avulsion
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or
torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a
known portion of land and transfers it to another
estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership
of it, provided that he removes the same within two
years.
a. Alluvion vs. Avulsion
ALLUVION AVULSION
The deposit of the soil Sudden or abrupt process
here is gradual. may be seen.
The soil cannot be Identifiable or verifiable.
identified.
It belongs to owner of It belongs to the owner
property to which it is from whose property it
attached. was detached.
VIII. Change of Course of Rivers.
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the
new course in proportion to the area lost. However,
the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by paying the value
thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the
area occupied by the new bed.
Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural
causes, opens a new bed through a private estate, this
bed shall become of public dominion.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself
into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof
isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He
also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the
estate by the current.
ix. Rule on Uprooted Trees
Art. 460. Trees uprooted and carried away by the current
of the waters belong to the owner of the land upon which
they may be cast, if the owners do not claim them within
six months. If such owners claim them, they shall pay the
expenses incurred in gathering them or putting them in a
safe place.
x. Ownership of Islands
Art. 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas
within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on lakes,
and on navigable or floatable rivers belong to the
State. (371a)
Art. 465. Islands which through successive
accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non-
navigable and non-floatable rivers, belong to the
owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of
them, or to the owners of both margins if the island
is in the middle of the river, in which case it shall be
divided longitudinally in halves. If a single island
thus formed be more distant from one margin than
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 12
from the other, the owner of the nearer margin shall
be the sole owner thereof.
1. Right of Accession with Respect to Movable
Property
i. Adjunction
 It is the process by virtue of which two movable
things belonging to different owners are united in
such a way that they form a single object.
a. Kinds
 Inclusion – sapphire set on a ring.
 Soldering – joining legs made of lead to a body also
made of lead.
 Ferruminatio – objects are of the same metals.
 Plumbatura – objects are of different metals.
 Escritura - writing
 Pintura – painting
 Weaving
b. Ownership
Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to
different owners are, without bad faith, united in
such a way that they form a single object, the owner
of the principal thing acquires the accessory,
indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value.
c. Tests to determine which is the principal thing
Art. 467. The principal thing, as between two things
incorporated, is deemed to be that to which the
other has been united as an ornament, or for its use
or perfection.
Art. 468. If it cannot be determined by the rule given
in the preceding article which of the two things
incorporated is the principal one, the thing of the
greater value shall be so considered, and as between
two things of equal value, that of the greater
volume.
In painting and sculpture, writings, printed
matter, engraving and lithographs, the board, metal,
stone, canvas, paper or parchment shall be deemed
the accessory thing.
d. Separation of things united, when allowed
Rules when there is bad faith, Indemnity.
Art. 469. Whenever the things united can be
separated without injury, their respective owners
may demand their separation.
Nevertheless, in case the thing united for the
use, embellishment or perfection of the other, is
much more precious than the principal thing, the
owner of the former may demand its separation,
even though the thing to which it has been
incorporated may suffer some injury.
Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing
has made the incorporation in bad faith, he shall lose
the thing incorporated and shall have the obligation
to indemnify the owner of the principal thing for the
damages he may have suffered.
If the one who has acted in bad faith is the
owner of the principal thing, the owner of the
accessory thing shall have a right to choose between
the former paying him its value or that the thing
belonging to him be separated, even though for this
purpose it be necessary to destroy the principal
thing; and in both cases, furthermore, there shall be
indemnity for damages.
If either one of the owners has made the
incorporation with the knowledge and without the
objection of the other, their respective rights shall
be determined as though both acted in good faith.
Art. 471. Whenever the owner of the material
employed without his consent has a right to an
indemnity, he may demand that this consist in the
delivery of a thing equal in kind and value, and in all
other respects, to that employed, or else in the price
thereof, according to expert appraisal.
ii. Mixture
a. Kinds
 COMMIXTION – if solids are mixed.
 CONFUSION – if liquids are mixed.
b. Rules
Art. 472. If by the will of their owners two things of the
same or different kinds are mixed, or if the mixture occurs
by chance, and in the latter case the things are not
separable without injury, each owner shall acquire a right
proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing in mind
the value of the things mixed or confused.
Art. 473. If by the will of only one owner, but in good
faith, two things of the same or different kinds are
mixed or confused, the rights of the owners shall be
determined by the provisions of the preceding
article.
If the one who caused the mixture or confusion
acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing belonging
to him thus mixed or confused, besides being obliged
to pay indemnity for the damages caused to the
owner of the other thing with which his own was
mixed.
iii. Specification
a. Rules
Art. 474. One who in good faith employs the material of
another in whole or in part in order to make a thing of a
different kind, shall appropriate the thing thus transformed
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 13
 as his own, indemnifying the owner of the material for its
value.
If the material is more precious than the transformed thing
or is of more value, its owner may, at his option, appropriate
the new thing to himself, after first paying indemnity for the
value of the work, or demand indemnity for the material.
If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened, the owner
of the material shall have the right to appropriate the work
to himself without paying anything to the maker, or to
demand of the latter that he indemnify him for the value of
the material and the damages he may have suffered.
However, the owner of the material cannot appropriate the
work in case the value of the latter, for artistic or scientific
reasons, is considerably more than that of the material.
iv. Sentimental Value
Art. 475. In the preceding articles, sentimental value
shall be duly appreciated.
 It is often that a thing for some sentimental reasons
may be worth much more than its actual value.
b. QUIETING OF TITLE
1. Cloud on Title
i. Requisites
a.) An instrument, deed, contract, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding.
b.) Which is apparently valid or effective.
c.) But is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished, or
barred by extinctive prescription.
d.) And may be prejudicial to the title.
ii. Instances
a.) An agent, with the written authority of his
principal to sell the latter’s property, sold the
same AFTER the death of the principal but
antedated the contract of sale.
b.) If the contract is forged.
c.) A contract by an incapacitated person.
d.) A mortgage, valid on its face and will cause
prejudice although in reality invalid.
2. Action to Quiet Title
I. Meaning
Heirs of E. Diaz vs. Virata
Facts of the Case:
On 13 September 1996, respondent Elinor Virata, in her
capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Antenor Virata
(Antenor), filed with the RTC a Complaint4 with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
against Enrique Diaz (Enrique), John Doe, Richard Doe, and all
others taking rights or title under him, praying for the
declaration of the validity of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
No. 4983,5 4984,6 4985,7 4986,8 5027,9 5028,10 5029,11 5030,12
5031,13 5032,14 and 5033,15 all issued in the name of Antenor
S. Virata (Antenor) and registered with the Registry of Deeds
of the Province of Cavite.
In 1959, the deceased Antenor purchased from Miguela
Crisologo, in good faith and for consideration, two parcels of
land located in Palico, Imus, Cavite, covered by TCTs No. (T-
3855) RT-2633 and NO. (T-11171) RT-1228, and registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;16 by virtue of the sale, the
specified titles were cancelled, and in its place were issued
TCTs No. 517 and No. 518, likewise, in the name of Antenor;17
the two lots covered by the aforementioned titles were
thereafter subdivided by Antenor into several lots, and titles
were issued thereon in Antenor’s favor, viz: TCTs No. 4983,
4984, 4985, 4986, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5031, 5032, and
5033;18 and that sometime in March 1992, Enrique filed a claim
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in continuous possession of the same lots owned by
Antenor. Respondent further proffered that the claim of
Enrique over the subject properties created a cloud which may
be prejudicial to the titles issued in the name of Antenor, and
now managed by his Estate.
Enrique had fenced the subject properties and had constructed
a driveway thereon; despite respondent’s demand to desist
from fencing the properties and using the same as driveway,
Enrique persisted in his occupation of the subject properties;
and respondent will suffer irreparable injury by the continued
occupation, use, and construction of the driveway traversing
the subject properties.
On 23 October 1996, Enrique filed his Answer with Counter-
Claim,20 and asserted, among others, that he filed with the
DENR a protest action to enforce his valid and legitimate rights
over the subject properties.21 He denied respondent’s
allegation that the subject properties were purchased by
Antenor.22 Moreover, he interposed that his ancestors and
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual and continuous
possession of the subject properties since time immemorial.23
In opposition to respondent’s application for preliminary
injunction, Enrique argued that the driveway and the fence are
within the boundaries of the lots exclusively owned by him and
his heirs, and covered by TCTs No. T-304191 and No. T-66120.
On 15 November 1996, the RTC issued an Order31 allowing
respondent to survey the property subject matter of the
case. A relocation survey was conducted on 3, 6, 7, 10, and
13 of January 199734 by Geodetic Engineer Severino
Raymundo, who testified in open court that the driveway
was outside Antenor’s property line.35 Thus, respondent
sought a withdrawal of their application for preliminary
injunction, which was granted by the court a quo in the
Order36 dated 13 February 1997. Respondent’s motion to
file an appropriate pleading was similarly granted by the
court without objection from Enrique.
Enrique had fenced the subject properties; and constructed
therein one concrete house of about 30 square meters,
more or less; the unauthorized construction was done
despite Enrique’s full knowledge of the invalidity of his
claim; and despite demand to desist from fencing the
subject properties, Diaz refused to take heed of the same
and continued to usurp the subject properties under a
feigned claim of right.
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 14
 Ruling:
1.) An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be
availed of only when by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but
is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a
cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real
property or any interest therein.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Further, Article 47772 of the same Code mandates that in an
action to quiet title, the party bringing the action must have
a legal or, at least, an equitable title73 to the real property
subject of the action and that the alleged cloud74 on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid. Verily, for an action to
quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
First requisite: The court a quo found that in 1959, Antenor
purchased from Miguela Crisologo two parcels of land
located at Palico, Imus, Cavite, and covered by TCTs No. T-
3855 and No. T-11171. Antenor paid for the aforesaid
properties in installment, and after having fully paid for the
same, TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171 in the name of
Miguela Crisologo were cancelled, and TCTs No. T-517 and
No. T-518 were issued to Antenor. In 1963, the properties
were subdivided and, therefrom, TCTs No. T-4983, T-4984,
T-4985, T-4986, T-5027, T-5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-5031,
T-5032 and T-5033, all in the name of Antenor were issued.
On 4 May 1982, respondent was appointed administratrix of
the Estate of Antenor.
Second. Antero’s certificates of title, as found by the trial
court and sustained by the appellate court, were issued as
early as 22 October 1959. Time and again, we have upheld
the fundamental principle in land registration that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of
ownership of a parcel of land.78 The validity of Antero’s
titles were upheld by the court a quo and the Court of
Appeals and were not found to be tainted with any defect.
Even as Enrique possessed certificates of title over certain
portions of the subject properties, these were issued only
on 7 March 1973 and 6 March 1991. On this matter, we do
not find basis to digress from the ruling articulated by the
Court of Appeals, to wit:
Well-established is the principle that the person holding a
prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who
relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date
of the certificate of title. Absent any muniment of title issued
prior to 1959 in favor of appellants [Enrique, et al.] which
could prove their ownership over the contested lots, this Court
is left with no other alternative but to declare appellants’ claim
over the properties as void.
2.) SEC. 48. – Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of
the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is
to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.
3.) Res judicata exists when the following elements are
present:
(a) The former judgment must be final;
(b) The court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter;
(c) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(d) There must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
Civil Case No. N-501 was dismissed without prejudice by the
CFI of Cavite on 16 October 1969. The same cannot be
deemed a judgment on the merits. A judgment on the
merits is one rendered after a determination of which party
is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.82 The
dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the
absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties
free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though
the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other
words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits does
not bar another action on the same subject matter.83
4.) Laches has not set in to bar respondent from recovering
possession of the subject properties.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense
is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.84
Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his
right to recover the possession of his registered property by
reason of laches.85 However, in the case at bar, laches
cannot be appreciated in petitioners’ favor. For laches to
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 15
 apply, it must be shown that there was lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that complainant
would assert the right in which he bases his suit.86
Petitioners cannot be said to be without knowledge of
respondent’s claims over the subject properties as even
prior to 1969, Antenor filed Civil Case N-501, an action for
recovery of possession against Enrique. On 16 October
1969, the CFI of Cavite dismissed the case without prejudice
to the filing of a subsequent action. The dismissal without
prejudice was adequate to apprise petitioners that an action
to assert respondent’s rights was forthcoming.
I. Requisites
Calacala vs. Republic
Facts of the Case:
The spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala,
predecessors-in-interest of the herein petitioners, are the
registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Balincanaway, Rosales, Pangasinan and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-21204 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
To secure the provisional release of an accused in a criminal
case then pending before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Pangasinan, the spouses offered their
aforementioned parcel of land as a property bond in said
case. For failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled
arraignment on 4 November 1981, the CFI ordered the bond
forfeited in favor of the government, and, following the
bondmans failure to produce in court the body of the
accused, rendered judgment against the bond in the
amount of P3,500.00. Thereafter, the court issued a Writ of
Execution[1] directing the provincial sheriff to effect a levy
on the subject parcel of land and to sell the same at a public
auction to satisfy the amount of the bond. In compliance
with the writ, the deputy provincial sheriff issued on 26 July
1982 a Notice of Levy[2] addressed to the Register of Deeds
of Pangasinan who, on 19 August 1982, caused the
annotation thereof on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83188.
Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject parcel of
land was held on 24 September 1982, at which respondent
Republic submitted its bid for P3,500, which is the amount
of the judgment on the bond. Hence, on that same day, a
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale[3] was issued in favor of the
Republic as the winning bidder.
On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was
registered and annotated on TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No.
83793, thereby giving the spouses Calacala a period of one
(1) year therefrom within which to redeem their property.
Unfortunately, they never did up to the time of their
respective deaths on 13 January 1988 and 8 January 1994.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the
deceased spouses, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court at Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint[4] for Quieting of
Title and Cancellation of Encumbrance on TCT No. T-21204
against respondents Republic and Sheriff Juan C. Marquez.
In the main, it is petitioners submission that their complaint
a quo sufficiently states a cause of action because they are
still the owners of the subject parcel of land despite their
failure to redeem it within the 1-year redemption period.
They premise their argument on the Republics failure to
secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession
over the same property within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale on 5 October 1982.
Prescinding therefrom, they thus argue that the Republics
right over the property in question has already prescribed
or has been abandoned and waived, citing, in support
thereof, Article 1142 of the Civil Code. In short, it is
petitioners thesis that respondent Republic failed to perfect
its title.
On the other hand, it is respondents posture that its rights
and title as owner of the same property are already
perfected by the mere failure of petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest to redeem the same within one (1)
year from the registration/annotation of the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale on TCT No. T-21204, in accordance with
Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ruling:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial
court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property. Originating in equity
jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure x x x an adjudication
that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to
that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant
and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free
from any danger of hostile claim. In an action for quieting
of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, x
x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make
the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and
not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so
that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt
over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards
without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to
use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best xxx
(Italics supplied).
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be
availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but
is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a
cloud is thereby casts on the complainants title to real
property or any interest therein. The codal provision reads:
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 16
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-
matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property.
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal
title or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as
a cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this
case.
To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not
on the strength of any independent writing in their favor but
simply and solely on respondent Republics failure to secure
the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession
over the property in dispute within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners predecessors-in-
interest lost whatever right they had over land in question
from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the
1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the Republics failure
to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten
(10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale
cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights
petitioners predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For
sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule
of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect
that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a
Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession
over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from
the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring
ownership back to him whose property has been previously
foreclosed and sold.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the Republics failure to
do anything within ten (10) years or more following the
registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale cannot give rise
to a presumption that it has thereby waived or abandoned its
right of ownership or that it has prescribed, for prescription
does not lie against the government, nor could it be bound or
estopped by the negligence or mistakes of its officials and
employees.
Quite the contrary, Section 33,[11] Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that [u]pon the expiration
of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall
be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and
claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of
the levy.
Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and
are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws
cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because
no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligors right to redeem and
that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and
mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the
purchaser.
Robles vs Court of Appeals
Facts
Leon Robles primitively owned a land in Morong Rizal. When
Leon died, his son Silvino Robles inherited the land. Both of
them declared the property under their name for taxation
purposes. Upon the death of Silvino, his widow Maria dela Cruz
and his children inherited the property. They took adverse
possession of it and paid the taxes thereon. The task of
cultivating the land was assigned to one of Silvino’s son, Lucio
Roles while the payment of the taxes was entrusted to their
half brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel
of land in the name of Silvino Robles was canceled and
transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea Robles
who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter,
Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank,
using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax
declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural Bank
and later on, was transferred to the name of defendant Hilario
Robles and his wife. In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan
from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as
security. For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure
proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as
the highest bidder during the auction sale in October 1968.
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 17
 The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property
and so the tax declaration was transferred in the name of
defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant
Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and
Ruth Santos who took possession of the property and was
able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names.
Issue:
(1)Whether or not the petitioners have the appropriate title
that is essential for them to avail themselves of the remedy
of quieting of title?
(2) Whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid?
(3) Whether issuance of free patent is valid?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The land had previously been occupied by Leon and
later by Silvino Robles, petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest, as evidenced by the different tax declarations
issued in their names. Also, the petitioners continued
occupying and possessing the land from the death of
Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly ousted therefrom
in 1988. The title of the petitioners over the land in
dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner
which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession
of petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be
defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is
defective from the beginning since Hilario mortgaged the
disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his
capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said
transaction did not divest them of title to the property at
the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of
title.
2. Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and
open occupation and possession as owners of the subject
property. In this case, the cloud on petitioners’ title
emanate from the apparent validity of the free patent
issued and the tax declarations and other evidence in
favour of respondents ultimately leading to the transfer of
the property to spouses Santos. WRT title of the spouses
Santos, such is deemed invalid/inoperative insofar as it is
rooted in the title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario
could not have prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-
owners of the real estate. He must have first repudiated
the ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed to consider
the irregularities in the transactions involving the
property. No instrument/deed of conveyance was
presented to show any transaction between petitioners
and Ballane or even Hilario.
3. Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilario’s undivided
interest is concerned there being co-ownership between
the heirs. Court also delved into gross negligence which
amounted to bad faith on part of bank by not exercising
due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land
considering such was unregistered. Free patent was also
not valid, the land in question having been converted ipso
jure to private land by virtue of the adverse possession in
the concept of owners since.
4. 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering
private lands is out of the jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands or Bureau of Lands. Hence, the sale of the property
in favour of the spouses Santos WRT the share of Hiario
was valid but the patent issued was null.
II. Suitor
Tan vs. Valdehueza
Facts of the Case:
An action instituted by the plaintiff-appellee Lucia Tan
against the defendants-appellants Arador Valdehueza and
Rediculo Valdehueza for (a) declaration of ownership and
recovery of possession of the parcel of land described in the
first cause of action of the complaint, and (b) consolidation
of ownership of two portions of another parcel of
(unregistered) land described in the second cause of action
of the complaint, purportedly sold to the plaintiff in two
separate deeds of pacto de retro. The parcel of land was the
subject matter of the public auction sale held on May 6,
1955 at the Capitol Building in Oroquieta, Misamis
Occidental, wherein the plaintiff was the highest bidder and
as such a Certificate of Sale was executed by MR. VICENTE
D. ROA who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff in
favor of LUCIA TAN the herein plaintiff. Due to the failure of
defendant Arador Valdehueza to redeem the said land
within the period of one year as being provided by law, MR.
VICENTE D. ROA who was then the Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff executed an ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE in favor of
the plaintiff LUCIA TAN. Defendants ARADOR VALDEHUEZA
and REDICULO VALDEHUEZA have executed two
documents of DEED OF PACTO DE RETRO SALE in favor of
the plaintiff herein, LUCIA TAN of two portions of a parcel
of land with the total amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P1, 500.00).
Ruling:
1. The principle of res judicata does not apply
because the 1st Case involved only the possession
of the land and the fruits thereof, while the second
case involves ownership of the land, with
possession as a mere attribute of ownership. The
judgment in the first case could not and did not
encompass the judgment in the second, although
the second judgment would encompass the first.
Moreover, the new Civil Code provides that suitors
in actions to quiet title "need not be in possession
of said property.
2. Under article 2125 of the new Civil Code, If the
instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is
nonetheless binding between the parties. (Article
2125, 2nd sentence). The Valdehuezas having
remained in possession of the land and the realty
taxes having been paid by them, the contracts
which purported to be pacto de retro transactions
are presumed to be equitable mortgages, 5
whether registered or not, there being no third
parties involved.
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 18
 3. The Valdehuezas claim that their answer to the
complaint of the plaintiff affirmed that they
remained in possession of the land and gave the
proceeds of the harvest to the plaintiff; it is thus
argued that they would suffer double prejudice if
they are to pay legal interest on the amounts
stated in the pacto de retro contracts, as the lower
court has directed, and that therefore the court
should have ordered evidence to be adduced on
the harvest. The record does not support this
claim. Nowhere in the original and the amended
complaints is an allegation of delivery to the
plaintiff of the harvest from the land involved in the
second cause of action. Hence, the defendants'
answer had none to affirm. The imposition of legal
interest on the amounts subject of the equitable
mortgages, P1, 200 and P300, respectively, is
without legal basis, for, "No interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing."
(Article 1956, new Civil Code) Furthermore, the
plaintiff did not pray for such interest; her thesis
was a consolidation of ownership, which was
properly rejected, the contracts being equitable
mortgages
Pingol vs Court of Appeals
Facts of the Case:
Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral
Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters,
located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and more
particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. On 17
February 1969, he executed a "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
OF ONE-HALF OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF
A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which
was acknowledged before a notary public. The PARCEL OF
LAND in favor of Donasco was payable in 6 years. In 1984,
Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000
downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs of
Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to
settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to
accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the
heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance
(with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol
were encroaching upon Donasco’s lot). Pingol averred that
the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full
payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale).
With Donasco’s breach of the contract in 1976 and death in
1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs’
continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to
Donasco
(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title
RULING:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a
contract of sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of the
parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract,
clearly show that the parties intended an absolute deed of
sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the
Donasco upon its actual (upon Donasco’s possession and
construction of the house) and constructive delivery (upon
execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot divested
Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title
unless the contract is resolved or rescinded under Art. 1592
of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the
expiration of the period stipulated as long as no demand for
rescission has been made upon him either judicially or by
notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has
equitable title over the property.
(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an
action for specific performance, it was actually an action to
quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite
the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the
execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object
of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the
payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer had
the obligation to transfer the title.
Donasco, who had made partial payments and
improvements upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to
clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to
him. It is not necessary that Donasco should have an
absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him
with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos
because an action to quiet title to property in ONE’s
POSSESSION is imprescriptible.
III. Nature of Action
 It is an action in personam.
 The result is not binding on the whole world.
 It is enforceable only against the defeated party or
privies.
IV. Prescriptibility of Action
 If the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the
action DOES NOT PRESCRIBE.
 If the plaintiff is NOT in possession of the property,
the action MAY PRESCRIBE by LACHES, where
there is no excuse offered for failure to assert the
title sooner.
V. Title and Possession of Plaintiff
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid
or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 19
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to,
or interest in the real property which is the subject matter
of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or
remove a cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument or
other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated,
or has been barred by extinctive prescription.
VI. When Action to Quiet Title Allowed
 To authorize an action to prevent a cloud being
cast on title, it must be made clear that there is a
fixed determination on the part of the defendant
to create a cloud , and it is not sufficient that the
danger is merely speculative.
VII. Obligation of Plaintiff
Art. 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant
all benefits he may have received from the latter, or
reimburse him for expenses that may have
redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.
D. RUINOUS BUILDINGS AND TREES IN DANGER OF
FALLING.
Art. 482. If a building, wall, column, or any other
construction is in danger of falling, the owner shall
be obliged to demolish it or to execute the necessary
work in order to prevent it from falling.
If the proprietor does not comply with this
obligation, the administrative authorities may order
the demolition of the structure at the expense of the
owner, or take measures to insure public safety.
Art. 483. Whenever a large tree threatens to fall in
such a way as to cause damage to the land or
tenement of another or to travelers over a public or
private road, the owner of the tree shall be obliged
to fell and remove it; and should he not do so, it shall
be done at his expense by order of the administrative
authorities.
CO-OWNERSHIP
Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-
ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this
title.
Definition.
Co-ownership is that form of ownership which exist
whenever an undivided thing of right belongs to different
persons.
Requisites.
1. Plurality of subjects- many owners
2. Unity of material (indivision) of object of ownership
3. Recognition of ideal shares
Characteristics
There are two or more co-owners
There is a single object which is not materially or physically
divided and over which and his ideal share of the whole,
each co-owner exercises ownership, together with the other
co-owners
There is no mutual representation by the co-owners
It exist for the common enjoyment of the co-owners
It has no distinct legal personality
It is governed first of all by the contract of the parties;
otherwise,
by special legal provisions, and in default of such provisions,
by the provisions of title III on co-Ownership.
TN.
There is no Co-ownership when the different portions
owned by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.
SI vs CA
- In this case, the lot in question had already been
partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of
sales (sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all
surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which documents
purports to have been registered with the Register of Deeds
of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and as a
consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably,
every portion conveyed and transferred to the three sons
was definitely described and segregated and with the
corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is
what we call extrajudicial partition.
-Moreover, every portion belonging to the three sons has
been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's
Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the
unblinkable facts that the portion sold to defendant spouses
Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana
Armada was concretely determined and identifiable. The
fact that the three portions are embraced in one certificate
of title does not make said portions less determinable or
identifiable or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among
co-owners exists."
-After the physical division of the lot among the brothers,
the community ownership terminated, and the right of
preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer
available. Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, 23 there is co-
ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership
when the different portions owned by different people are
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 20
 already concretely determined and separately identifiable,
even if not yet technically described. 24 This situation makes
inapplicable the provision on the right of redemption of a
co-owner in the Civil Code
Heirs of M. Cabal vs Spouses Lim
- In this case, it is undisputed that Marcelino built his house
on the disputed property in 1949 with the consent of his
father. Marcelino has been in possession of the disputed lot
since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that
even before his father died in 1954, when the co-ownership
was created, his inheritance or share in the co-ownership
was already particularly designated or physically
segregated. Thus, even before Lot G was subdivided in
1976, Marcelino already occupied the disputed portion and
even then co-ownership did not apply over the disputed lot.
-Elementary is the rule that there is no co-ownership where
the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable,
though not technically described, 45 or that said portion is
still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does
make said portion less determinable or identifiable, or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over
each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners.
-Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has been occupying
the disputed portion since 1949, with the consent of his
father and knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been
just and equitable to have segregated said portion in his
favor and not one adjacent to it. Undoubtedly, the
subdivision survey effected in 1976 spawned the dilemma
in the present case. It designated Lot G-1 as Marcelino's
share in the inheritance notwithstanding his possession
since 1949 of a definite portion of Lot G, now the
southernmost portion of Lot 1-E.
- Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until
the time he was informed by respondents of his
encroachment on their property. In accordance with Depra
v. Dumlao, this case must be remanded to the trial court to
determine matters necessary for the proper application of
Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548. Such matters
include the option that respondents would take and the
amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they
decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots.
Sources of Co-ownership
1. Law
2. Contracts
3. Succession
4. Fortuitous event/chance- commixtion
5. Occupancy
6. Donation
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits
as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to
their respective interests. Any stipulation in a
contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-
ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved. (393a)
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as
not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according
to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may
be changed by agreement, express or implied.
(394a)
Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment. (n)
Cases:
Navarro vs. Escobido
- In this case, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners
of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek
possession of these properties. Applying Article 484 of the
Civil Code, which states that "in default of contracts, or
special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the
provisions of this Title", we find further support in Article
487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to
bring an action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned
property.
-While ejectment is normally associated with actions
involving real property, we find that this rule can be applied
to the circumstances of the present case, following our
ruling in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman. 24 In this case,
one spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit, a
personal property considered conjugal property, without
including the other spouse in the action.
-Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an
action against Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo
Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This
conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code,
supporting as it does the position that either spouse may
act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they
do not dispose of or encumber the property in question
without the other spouse's consent.
Plasabas vs CA
- In this case, Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any
one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment.
The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reivindicatory action. A co-owner may file suit without
necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will
benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse,
the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-
owners. 13
-With this disquisition, there is no need to determine
whether petitioners' complaint is one for ejectment or for
recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code
applies to both actions.
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 21
-Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead
their co-owners as parties. The only exception to this rule is
when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who
claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the
possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not
prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners
who are indispensable parties. 14
-Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that
they are the sole owners of the property in litigation is
immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the
trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her
siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the
co-owners to pursue the case on the latter's behalf. 15
Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not
mandatory, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
Adlawan vs Adlawan
- In this case, the Court notes, however, that the RTC lost
sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by
petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole
owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was
survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife,
Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador
on May 28, 1987. 24 By intestate succession, Graciana and
petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. 25 The death of
Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the
absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana
passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to
petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court
of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no
authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of
Lot 7226.
-Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-
owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant
case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 487.Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.
-A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity
of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because
the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-
owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit
is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the
sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated
property, the action should be dismissed
De guia vs CA
In this case, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for
recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property.
However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of
the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the
actual partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial
or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical
division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An
action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting
the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND.
However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition,
ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and
enjoy the entire FISHPOND.
-The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the
entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA's lease expired
in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND
without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the
entire FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice
ABEJO's right to receive rent, which would have accrued to
his ½ share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others
Art. 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will
of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable, first
notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs.
Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be
decided upon by a majority as determined in Article 492.
(n)
Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house
belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do
not specify the terms under which they should contribute
to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement
on the subject, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other
things used in common, shall be preserved at the
expense of all the owners in proportion to the value
of the story belonging to each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the
floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front
door, common yard and sanitary works common to
all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the
owners pro rata;
(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story
shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners
pro rata, with the exception of the owner of the
ground floor; the stairs from the first to the second
story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except
the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the
first story; and so on successively. (396)
Rights of each co-owner.
(1) Under Article 493. — They are the following:
(a) He shall have full ownership of his part, that is, his undivided
interest or share in the common property;
(b) He shall have full ownership of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto;
(c) He may alienate, assign or mortgage his ideal interest or
share independently of the other co-owners; and
(d) He may even substitute another person in the enjoyment of
his part, except when personal rights are involved.
Nature of right of co-owner before partition
- Before a property owned in common is actually
partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire property.
(Engreso v. De La Cruz),
Bailon-Casilao vs CA
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 22
 - The sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon
which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares,
and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale
to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable
thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land
as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced
the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment
thereof.
Pamplona v. Moreto
A co-owner may validly sell his undivided share of the
property owned in common. (If the part sold happens to be
his allotted share after partition, the transaction is entirely
valid). Now then, if there has been no express partition as
yet, but the co-owner who sells, points out to his buyers the
boundaries of the part he was selling, and the other co-
owners make no objection, there is in effect already a partial
partition, and the sale of the defi nite portion can no longer
be assailed.
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended
by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
coheir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership. (400a)
Right to demand partition
i. Partition
- Partition is the division between two or more
persons of real or personal property which they
own in common so that each may enjoy and
possess his sole estate to the exclusion of and
without interference from the others.
Cruz vs Cristobal
- The subject property was a conjugal property of
Buenaventura and Donata (second wife). Upon their
deaths, all the four children of the first marriage and the
four children of the second marriage shall share equally
in the subject property.
- Buenaventura’s 8 children are entitled to an equal share
of his 534 sqm lot. (66.875 sqm each)
Monteroso vs CA
- Partition is the proper remedy for compulsory or
legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the
inheritance from the decedent. An action for partition
is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and
for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion
of the properties involved.
- BEING A COMPULSORY HEIR OF DON FABIAN,
TIRSO HAS THE RIGHT TO COMPEL PARTITION OF THE
PROPERTIES COMPRISING THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
DON FABIAN AS A MEASURE TO GET HIS HEREDITARY
SHARE. Before partition and eventual distribution of Don
Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among
the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of
Don Fabian.
ii. Exceptions to right
The right to demand partition finds exceptions in the
following:
(1) When the co-owners have agreed to keep the thing
undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding
ten years;
(2) When the partition is prohibited by the donor or
testator for a certain period not exceeding twenty
years;
(3) When the partition is prohibited by law (Art. 494.);
(4) When partition would render the thing
unserviceable for the use for which it is intended (Art.
495.); and
(5) When another co-owner has possessed the
property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient
to acquire it by prescription.
Prescription
As a general rule, prescription does not run
in favor of or against a co-owner or co-heir. The
reason is obvious. The possession of the co-owner or co-
heir is ordinarily not adverse to the others but, in fact,
beneficial to all of them. He recognizes, expressly or
impliedly, the co-ownership. Thus, an action to compel
partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners
against the actual possessor.
cases
Vda. De Alberto vs CA
- Junior’s action has already been barred by
prescription
- An action to rescind a partition on account of lesion
(as per Article 1100 of CC) or an action to rescind a
partition with preterition of any of the compulsory
heirs (as per Article 1104) both have a prescriptive
period of 4 years after the approval of the
agreement of the partition
- Junior only initiated this action in 1960, 7 years after
the intestate proceeding
- General rule is that the action for partition
among co-owners does not prescribe UNLESS
the other co-owners never recognized the one
filing the action as a co-owner
o Imprescriptibility of the action to partition by
a co-owner only applies if the co-ownership is
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 23
 expressly or impliedly recognized (this is the
principle Bathan is looking for)
Bicarme vs CA
- In the present case, acquisitive prescription cannot apply
because
(1) no written evidence that the lands were acquired from
Spouses Bidaya,
(2) Payment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient
repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse
to Cristina’s rights,
(3) Maria did not make known such repudiation to Cristina
- Hence, the doctrine of imprescriptibility of partition will
apply. Cristina’s right to partition will therefore prosper.
Petition is DENIED.
Pangan vs. CA
For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner,
however, there must be a clear showing that he has
repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they
have been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is
making to the property in question. It is only when such
unequivocal notice has been given that the period of
prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners
and ultimately divest them of their own title if they do not
seasonably defend it.
Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the
following circumstances:
1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting
to an ouster of the cestui que trust;
2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made
known to the cestui que trust; and
3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
SC said that the case at bar did not meet all 3 requirements.
Fangonil-Herrera Vs Fangonil
- As to the issue of prescription, petitioner's
possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into sole and
exclusive ownership thereof. First, prescription applies to
adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive possession.
- Clearly, petitioner cannot claim adverse possession in
the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed
documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-
owner.
- Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of
a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. An action to demand partition among co-
owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common
property.
Vda. De Arceo vs CA
- It has been held that in order for prescription to set in, the
following requisites must concur:
1. there is a clear showing that the claimant has
repudiated the co-ownership;
2. he has made known to the rest of the co-owners
that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the
property;
3. there is clear and convincing evidence thereof;
and
4. his possession is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious.
- The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us
that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by lapse
of time.
- The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession
thereof, so we hold, does not amount to adverse
possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of
enjoyment, and his use thereof cannot by itself prejudice
the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid
taxes thereon is not controlling either because payment
of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer title upon
a claimant. The fact finally that Virginia, et al. had
sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing
conclusive because there is no showing that they,
Virginia, et al. had made this known to Pedro, et al.
Under these circumstances, we can not validly say that
the lands had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of
prescription.
Repudiation
- Acts which may be adverse to strangers may not be
sufficiently adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-
owners.
Heirs of J. Reyes vs Reyes
- In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed
adverse to that of the cestui que trust or the other co-
owners, the following elements must concur:
1. The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation of the co-ownership amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-
owners;
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust or the other co-
owners;
3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and
conclusive; and
4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious.
- The concurrence of the foregoing elements was not
established herein. For one, Alejandro did not have adverse
and exclusive possession of the property, as, in fact, the
other co-owners had continued to possess it, with Alejandro
and his heirs occupying only a portion of it. Neither did the
cancellation of the previous tax declarations in the name of
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 24
 Leoncia, the previous co-owner, and the issuance of a new
one in Alejandros name, and Alejandros payment of the
realty taxes constitute repudiation of the co-ownership. The
sole fact of a co-owner declaring the land in question in his
name for taxation purposes and paying the land taxes did
not constitute an unequivocal act of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the other co-owner and could not constitute
adverse possession as basis for title by prescription. In fine,
the respondents did not present proof showing that
Alejandro had effectively repudiated the co-ownership.
Heirs of F. Restar vs. Heirs of D.R. Cichon
- In a case, however, where F, one of the heirs took
possession of the lot in question after the death in 1935 of
his father, tilling and cultivating the land, introducing
improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof, while the
other children never possessed the lot, much less asserted
their claim thereto until 1999 when they filed the complaint
for partition, it was held that the statutory period of
prescription commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when F,
who had neither title nor good faith secured a tax
declaration in his name, the date when it can be said he
adversely claimed ownership of the lot and the other
children were also deemed to have been aware of the
adverse claim.
Delima vs CA
- It has been held that when a co-owner of the property in
question executed a deed of partition and on the strength
thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of
their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he
appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect
denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-
owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started
to run from such issuance for the purpose of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence
of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder. As the
certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his
exclusive title to the land, the issuance of the new title
constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or
coownership and the lapse of ten years of adverse
possession (see Art. 1134.) was sufficient to vest title in the
co-owner by prescription.
Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a
physical division of the thing owned in common,
when to do so would render it unserviceable for the
use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership
may be terminated in accordance with Article 498.
(401a)
- Article 495 denies to a co-owner the right to demand a
physical or material division of a thing which is essentially
indivisible (e.g., car, piano) when to do so could render it
unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. It does
not prevent the termination of the co-ownership
such as the assignment of the thing to one of them
or the sale of the thing and the distribution of the
proceeds as provided in Article 498.
Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court
insofar as they are consistent with this Code. (402)
Action for partition.
1. An action for partition may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues: first, whether the
plaintiff is indeed a co-owner; and second, assuming he
successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary
issue of how the property is to be divided, i.e., what
portion should go to which co-owner.
2. Functionally, an action for partition may be seen to be at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership of the
subject property and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved
3. Needless to state, an action for partition (see Art. 494.)
will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over
the subject property. (see Rules of Court, Rule 69, Sec.
o 1.) It would be premature for a court to issue an
order to divide a property until an unless it first
makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership.The issue of ownership or co-ownership
must first be resolved in order to effect a partition
of properties. (Reyes-De Leon v. Del Rosario,
435 SCRA 232 [2004];
o Whether the action for partition is dismissed or
partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is
a final one and may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby; otherwise, it becomes final and
executory. (Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot)
Application for statute of frauds
- The Statute of Frauds does not apply to partition
because it is not legally deemed a conveyance or a sale
of property resulting in change of ownership but
simply a segregation and designation of that part of
the property which belongs to each of the co-owners
Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot
- Partition is, therefore, valid and enforceable although
made orally where no third persons are involved. On
general principle, independent and in spite of the
Statute of Frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral
partition when it has been completely or partly
performed. Thus, it has been held or stated in a
number of cases involving an oral partition under
which the parties went into possession, exercised acts
of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the
partition agreement, that equity will confirm such
partition and in a proper case, decree title in
accordance with the possession in severalty. They are
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 25
 estopped to question title to portion alloted to another
party.
Participation of Creditors and assignees
Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners
may take part in the division of the thing owned in
common and object to its being effected without
their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any
partition already executed, unless there has been
fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a
formal opposition presented to prevent it, without
prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to
maintain its validity.
(1) Scope of “creditors’’ and “assignees.’’ — In
view of the existing rights and interests of creditors and
assignees of the coowners in the common property,
they are given the right to participate in the partition.
- As the law does not distinguish, the term
“creditors,’’ as used on the provision.
- The term “assignees’’ refers to transferees of
the interests of one or more of the co-owners.
o If the sale covers the entire share of
a co-owner and there has been a
delivery, the buyer takes the place of
the co-owner who loses all interest in
the co-ownership, and, of course,
has no right to take any part in the
partition of the property.
(2) Right to notice of partition. — The law does not
expressly require that previous notice of the proposed
partition be given to the creditors and assignees. But as they
are granted the right to participate in the partition, they
have also the right to be notified thereof. In the absence of
notice, the partition will not be binding on them. Thus, in a
case, where an extrajudicial partition was made without
notice to a creditor-bank, the Supreme
(3) Right to object to or impugn partition. — The
following rules may be given:
(a) If no notice is given, the creditors or assignees
may question the partition already made;
(b) If notice is given, it is their duty to appear and
make known their position; they may concur
with the proposed partition or object to its
being effected; and
(c) They cannot impugn a partition already
executed or implemented unless:
 There has been fraud, whether or not notice was
given, and whether or not formal opposition was
presented; or
 The partition was made notwithstanding that formal
opposition was presented to prevent it, even if there
has been no fraud. The debtor or assignor (co-owner
or former co-owner) has always the right to show
the validity of the partition.
Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
Sale of thing co-owned to a third person
- Although the thing owned in common being
essentially indivisible (e.g., car) cannot be physically
divided (see Art. 495.), the co-ownership may
nevertheless be terminated in accordance with the
above provision pursuant to the rule in Article 494
(par.1.) by adjudication of the thing to one of the co-
owners who shall indemnify the others or by its sale
with the proceeds thereof divided among the co-
owners. The sale may be public or private, and the
purchaser may be a co-owner or a third person.
Note that the sale shall be resorted to only when the right
to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners
but because of the nature of the property it cannot be
divided without prejudice to the co-owners and the co-
owners cannot agree that the entire property be allotted or
assigned to one of them upon reimbursement of the shares
of the other co-owners.
There is nothing to prevent the co-owners of an essentially
indivisible property from effecting partition as provided in
Article 498. Under the Rules of Court, where real estate
cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interests of
the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of them,
or sold at public sale.
Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common
shall not prejudice third persons who shall retain the
rights of mortgage, servitude, or any other real
rights belonging to them before the division was
made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons
against the coownership shall also remain in force,
notwithstanding the partition. (405)
Rights of third persons, protected.
(1) “Third persons,’’ as used in Article 499, refers to all
those with real rights, such as mortgage and servitude
over the thing owned in common or with personal
rights against the co-owners who had no participation
whatever in the partition.
(2) “Real rights’’ and “personal rights’’ are used in their
accepted legal meaning. (see Art. 493.) Such rights of
third persons existing before the division was made are
retained by them or remain in force notwithstanding
the partition.
Art. 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual
accounting for benefits received and
reimbursements for expenses made. Likewise,
each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by
reason of his negligence or fraud. (n)
Art. 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be
liable for defects of title and quality of the
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 26
 portion assigned to each of the other co-owners.
(n)
Obligations of co-owners upon partition.
As provided above, they are as follows:
(3) Mutual accounting for benefits received, for
the fruits and other benefits of the thing
belong to all the co-owners (see Art. 485.);
(4) Mutual reimbursements for expenses (i.e.,
necessary expenses, taxes, and others in
proper cases), for if they share in the benefits,
they should also share in the charges (Ibid.);
(5) Indemnity for damages caused by reason of
negligence or fraud, for example, in the
making of expenses or alterations, for it is
logical and just; and
(6) Reciprocal warranty for defects of title or quality of
the portion assigned to a co-owner (e.g., land
alloted to a co-owner belongs to a third person or
property assigned is of inferior quality or has
hidden defects), for it is also justified by
considerations of reason and justice.
RA No. 4726
AN ACT TO DEFINE CONDOMINIUM, ESTABLISH
REQUIREMENTS FOR ITS CREATION AND
GOVERN ITS INCIDENTS
Sec. 4 Provisions of this Act shall apply to property
divided or to be divided into condominium only if a Master
Deed has been recorded in the Register of Deeds of the
province or city in which the property lies, and duly
annotated in the corresponding certificate of title of the
land, if the latter had been patented or registered under
either the Land Registration or Cadastral Acts
Evidence of ownership – In house and lot, evidenced by
original or transfer certificate of title while in
condominium, ownership is evidenced by condominium
certificate of title (ownership of a condominium unit
issued by the Register of Deeds of the city or municipality
where the condominium project is located).
Capacity to buy – In house and lot, or lot only or
townhouse, alien acquisition is not allowed. In the
condominium concept, alien ownership not to exceed
40% interest in the project is legally allowed
Extent of ownership – the interest of the owner in house
and lot consists of absolute ownership of the inner and
outer structures of the building (the entire building). In
the condominium concept, the unit owner is the absolute
owner of the space within the interior surface of his unit,
but is only a co-owner of the exterior or façade of the
unit
Definition of Terms (Sec 3)
Condominium – an interest in real property consisting
of absolute ownership in a unit in a residential, industrial
and commercial building and common ownership in the
land on which its located and in common areas of the
condominium project.
Condominium Unit – the space bounded by the interior
surface of those intended for independent use or
absolute ownership.
Common areas – the entire project, such as the land,
building structures, hallways, elevators, stairways,
electrical, water and plumbing system, and all amenities
in a condominium project, the exception is the inside of
the individual condominium unit.
Condominium corporation – a non-stock and non-
profit corporation consisting of condominium unit owners
which is the management body of the condominium
project and owner of its common areas. This is
synonymous in function and nature to the homeowners
association in subdivisions except that it is taking the
form of a corporation. Take note therefore that it is the
reason why a condominium unit can be personally owned
by possession and title by foreigners but only up to 40%
of the total number of units of the whole condominium
project.
Condominium project – the entire parcel of land
including all the structures thereon.
Master deed – the enabling act which creates the
condominium and contains the description of the land,
building, common areas facilities use of the building,
declaration of restrictions and plans of the land and
buildings and annotated on the certificate of title.
Declaration of restrictions – refers to the set of rules,
procedures, policies and limitations as to the
management and usage of units and common areas in a
condominium project which constitutes a lien upon the
project and each unit and building upon all unit owners,
occupants, and others holding any right or interest in the
project, pursuant to the provisions of the Condominium
Act and other related laws.
STEPS IN FORMING CONDOMINIUM
1. Preparation of a Master Deed with Declaration
of Restrictions and registration with the Registry
of Deeds for annotation in the title.
2. Organization of a condominium corporation
with the project owners as incorporators.
3. Causing issuance of individual tax declarations
and condominium titles for the units and common
areas from the Assessor’s Office and the Registry
of Deeds respectively.
4. Execution of Deed of Conveyance on the land
and common areas in favor of the condominium
corporation.
5. Application for registrations with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
1.
CONTENTS OF A CONDOMINIUM MASTER DEED
1. Description of the land including survey plan
2. Description of the building/s, enclosing
technical and diagrammatic plans.
3. Description of the common areas and facilities
4. Deed of registration
5. Certification of the registered owner of the
property if it is other than the one executing the
Master Deed, that he consents of the registration
of the deed.
1.
PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 27
Note: The enabling or master deed may be amended or
revoked upon registration of an instrument executed by
a simple majority of the registered owners of the
property. (RA 7899 Amending Secs 4 and 16 of RA 4726)
Sec. 19. Where the enabling or master deed provides
that the land included within a condominium project are
to be owned in common by the condominium owners
therein the Register of Deeds may at the request of all
the condominium owner and upon surrender of all their
condominium owner’s copies, cancel the certificate of
title of the property and issue a new one in the name of
said condominium owners as pro-indiviso co-owners
thereof.
CONTENTS OF A DECLARATION OF RESTRICTION
1. Formation of the condominium corporation,
the project’s management body.
2. Procedures and guidelines on maintenance of
units and common areas.
3. Rules and restrictions on the occupancy and
usage of units and common areas.
4. Provision for insurance coverage.
5. Realty taxes and assessments on units and
common areas.
6. Right of assignees, mortgagees, tenants and
occupants of the units.
7. Provision for assessments and fees.
8. Penalty provisions.
9. Procedures in amending restrictions.
RIGHTS OF A CONDOMINIUM OWNER (Sec 6)
1. Absolute ownership of his unit.
2. Limited ownership of walls, ceilings and floor
3. Co-ownership of the land and common areas
in proportion to the unit/s owned.
4. Exclusive easement of the air space within his
unit.
5. Non-exclusive easement to common areas for
ingress and egress.
6. Repair, decorate the inner surfaces of his unit
as he pleases.
7. Sell, lease, mortgage his unit.
8. Vote and be voted upon during meetings of the
condominium corporation.
CONVEYANCE (Sec 18)
Requisites:
1. A copy of the description of land
2. Brief description of condominium conveyed
3. Name and personal circumstances of the
condominium owner
Upon registration and payment of fees of an instrument
conveying a condominium, the Register of Deeds shall
enter and annotate the conveyance on the certificate of
title covering the land included within the project.
Transferee is then issued a “condominium owners” copy
of the pertinent portion of such certificate of title.
In case of condominium project registered under the
provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law or Act 3344 as
amended, the registration of the deed of conveyance of
a condominium is sufficient if the Register of Deed has
the original or signed copy, together with the certificate
of the management body of the project. A copy of said
deed of conveyance will be given to the condominium
owner duly acknowledged and stamped by the Register
of Deeds in the same manner as in the case of
registration of conveyance in accordance with the
provisions of the declaration of restrictions of such
project.
DISSOLUTION OF A CONDOMINIUM PROJECT
1. Term of corporation – the life of the condominium
corporation shall be co-terminus with the existence of the
condominium project and the registration and regulation
of the condominium corporation shall be vested to the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (Sec 11).
2. As per Building Code, a building has a life of 50 years
subject to an extension of another 25 years upon
issuance of the soundness of its structure.
Note: A condominium corporation shall not, during its
existence, sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of
the common areas owned or held by it in the
condominium project unless authorized by the affirmative
vote of a simple majority of the
registered owners (RA 7899 Amending Secs 4 and 16 of
RA 4726)
3. Effects of Voluntary Dissolution: (Sec 12)
a. The corporation shall be deemed to hold a power-of-
attorney from all unit owners/ members to sell their
separate interests in the project. (Sec 15)
b. Liquidation of the corporation shall be effected by the
sale of the entire project subject to the rights of the
corporation and individual creditors. (Sec 15)
c. The common areas held by the corporation shall be
transferred to the unit owners in the proportion to their
interests. (Sec 19)
EXCEPT as provided by Sec 13
3. Effects of Involuntary Dissolution:
The transfer shall be deemed full liquidation of the
interest of the members in the corporation.
SOME ADVANTAGES OF CONDOMINIUM
OWNERSHIP
- Enhances affordability
- Accessibility to the amenities of the metropolis.
- Better security
- Maximizes land efficiency
- Lesser cost of facilities, services and maintenance
- Privacy
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PROPERTY REVIEWER-MIDTERM EH 407 29