An Introduction

To Reasoning
—
Notes & Bibliography

Cathal Woods

Cathal Woods
2007-2019
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An Introduction To Reasoning

Notes & Bibliography

Notes — Overall
For Instructors: Primary Features Of These Materials
For Instructors: Coverage & Ordering
For Instructors: Self-Paced, Competency-Based
For Instructors: Paper vs. Electronic Devices

Notes — Preface

Notes — Real-World Reasoning (RW)

For Instructors: Instructions For The Exercise Sets In RW

Notes — Propositional & Categorical Reasoning (P&C)

Notes — Inductive & Scientific Reasoning (I&S)

Bibliography

The image on the front cover is the "Rollers" illusion by Japanese psychologist ​Akiyoshi
Kitaoka.​ For more illusions, see ​http://www.psy.ritsumei.ac.jp/~akitaoka/index-e.html​.

Abbreviations
RW: Real-World Reasoning
P&C: Propositional & Categorical Reasoning
I&S: Inductive & Scientific Reasoning
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Notes — Overall

For Instructors: Primary Features Of These Materials

I was prompted to compose these materials by three concerns:
1. I wanted to produce materials that were free for students, avoiding even
printing costs (if desired);
2. I wanted to produce materials that were customizable by instructors;
3. I wanted to produce materials that included scientific reasoning.
With respect to 1, many reasoning/logic textbooks in the US cost well over 100 dollars. I
regard this as an excessive amount. A cause of the high cost is in part that textbooks try
to cover everything, so as to satisfy a wide range of instructors who might teach different
things. This adds to the cost to the students without giving them anything of additional
value.
Publishers are aware of this unhappy state of affairs (for the students) and have
long promised instructors the ability to compose a textbook by choosing only certain
parts of texts or even by combining pieces from different texts – which brings us to 2.
Regretfully, I have not been impressed with their efforts and even those that are
workable in my experience do not save the students money.
An Introduction To Reasoning is a set of three books (Real-World Reasoning,
Propositional & Categorical Reasoning, and Inductive & Scientific Reasoning), each of
which contains material sufficient for a 15-week term. Instructors can not only assign
only one of these books, but individual chapters (and these can be further customized by
the instructor in the sense that they can be edited by the instructor).
Though it adds to the bloat mentioned in 1, I ​am glad that many of the most
popular (US) textbooks now include chapters on scientific reasoning. Scientific
reasoning was the purpose of courses in critical reasoning and logic all the way from
Aristotle to (say) Cohen & Nagel's 1934 textbook ​An Introduction to Logic and Scientific
Method. ​Around this time, scientific reasoning seems to have fallen out of favor as a
subject for courses in critical reasoning (at least in philosophy) and was replaced by
increasing emphasis on predicate and higher-order logics, and meta-logic.
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I concur with the tradition of thinking that scientific reasoning – reasoning about
experience – is a core and perhaps the foremost purpose of reasoning courses. Thus a
book — Inductive & Scientific Reasoning (I&S) — devoted to scientific reasoning.
These materials likewise assume an audience interested in critical reasoning and
logic as a tool for understanding the inferences and explanations put forward in real-life,
rather than exclusively interested in logic and logical systems for their own sake.
Consistent with this practical bent of the materials, the chapters on symbolic logic all
contain word-problems as well as problems expressed symbolically.
If you share any of these preferences, I hope you will find these materials to be of
service.

For Instructors: Coverage & Ordering

1. There is much more material here than can be covered in a 15-week term.
Indeed, there is material here for three semester-long courses. RW by itself is sufficient
for a whole critical thinking/critical reasoning course. P&C by itself is sufficient for an
introductory logic course.1 And I&S by itself is sufficient for a course in scientific
reasoning.2
Limitations of the current materials include: no discussion of heuristics and
biases and intellectual virtues; only a rudimentary treatment of categorical reasoning;
the chapters on induction and scientific reasoning, even taken together, don't get very
far compared with dedicated courses in probability or statistics – the material in I&S is
conceptual rather than mathematical. If any of these is essential to your course, you will
need to find additional materials.
2. The text and exercises have been written so that the three main parts (RW,
I&S, P&C) can be taught in any order.
Concerning the ordering ​of the parts, whether one is teaching more than one part

1
Note that P&C is not suitable for an intermediate/second logic course, as it does not cover
predicate logic. For this purpose, I recommend ​P. D. Magnus's ​ForAllX or Rob Loftis's ​"remix" of ForAllX
for his Lorain County Community College students, or Craig DeLancey's ​A Concise Introduction To Logic.​
2
See the first few minutes of Robert Frank's ​talk at Google for some cautionary data about
covering too much in a single term.
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in multiple semesters or making selections from each of the parts for a single-term
course, there are two general approaches, based on whether one thinks symbols are
easier or harder than English. The most common is to teach RW and then teach P&C
(and then I&S).
The grounds for this ordering are that if the students are English speakers, they
have some familiarity with reason-giving in natural language, while the unusual and
more rigorous methods of evaluating reasoning in P&C (and I&S) are unfamiliar and
more difficult.
Another is to teach the patterns of inference in P&C (and I&S) first and then turn
to RW. The formalizations of P&C and I&S remove much of the confusion and the
difficulty that arises when dealing with real-world reasoning. Being familiar with these
patterns of inference means that students have basic structures that will help them
tackle reasoning "in the wild", that is, reasoning as they encounter it in the speech and
writing of their friends and family, in articles in newspapers and magazines, in talking
heads on television and radio, and in popular reports of scientific papers. Everyday
presentations are messy often because they are incomplete (at least, relative to the
inference patterns), but the traditional ordering (that is, basic analysis followed by some
logic) means that the work done on these schemas never gets used in real-world
contexts.3
P&C can be covered before I&S or vice versa. As mentioned above, I&S is only
lately making its way (back) into reasoning courses and is regrettably not a part of most
"intro" courses, whether critical reasoning or intro logic. This is regrettable because, to
my mind, the single ​greatest improvement that can be made in people's cognitive toolkit
is a firm understanding of the concept of ​association​ (correlation).
3. Concerning the coverage and ordering ​within each part, some parts have more
flexibility than others.
RW​: Before discussing the ordering, here is a brief overview of RW.

3
For the same thought, see Croy (2010) p. 263 and 268. Croy in more than one place suggests
that truth-functional analyses of connectives provide only one interpretation that their English
counterparts might take and that proof techniques provide (only) a model.
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There are a number of chapters which can considered as introductory, in the

sense of preparatory for evaluation. These concern analysis, classification (including a
chapter on the difference between inference and explanation), ​Reason Substitutes​, and
Problems With Meaning​.
After these introductory chapters, RW is concerned with ​inference evaluation.
(I&S takes up the logic of ​explanation.​)
A few chapters treat inference evaluation generally – ​Evaluating The Reasoning
and ​Warrants – while a number concern various specific modes of inference – the
chapters on "Everyday Inferences" such as argument from a source, emotional reasons,
basic patterns using properties, classes, and propositions.
The cluster of chapters on diagramming reviews and extends both the students'
skills of analysis (in the form of structural indicator words, extended arguments, coping
with long passages) and their powers of evaluation (with issues such as evaluating a pile
of reasons, evaluating arguments with objections, and evaluating very long passages).
Instructors who wish to get to diagramming early might remove the instructions in the
exercises to "Evaluate" the inferences or tell students to ignore this instruction.
The ​ordering of chapters can generally follow the basic outline in the overview
just given: analysis (and other preparatory chapters), general evaluation, specific
evaluation, diagramming. But some variation is possible, as are some omissions.
Explanation is distinguished from inference in ​Classifying 2 in case students go
on to I&S; if they will not, this chapter can be omitted. From this chapter, students
should in particular begin to comprehend that epistemic reasons (reasons-for-believing)
do not always suffice as explanatory reasons (reasons-which-explain).
The chapters on ​Reason Substitutes and ​Problems With Meaning could go in
many places (or excluded completely); it is advised that the former follow soon after
basic analysis (and classification) and the latter precede evaluation.
Warrants – which is a general chapter on evaluation – is difficult without having
done the chapters on Everyday Inferences. This chapter could be done alongside (the
other general evaluation chapter) ​Evaluating The Reasoning​, but I think it is in fact
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better left until after all of the Everyday Inference chapters.

The Everyday Inferences chapters can be done in any order.
After the introductory chapters, instructors could add ​Basic Diagramming (and
Diagramming Complex Reasoning​) as extensions of the students' analysis skills. (Note
that if these are added the instruction to "evaluate" in the exercises should be removed.)
It is less advisable to complete the other diagramming chapters (​Diagramming Dialogue
and ​Diagramming Very Long Passages​) at this point, as the passages grow more
sophisticated and longer, and speaking generally, the more of the other chapters
students cover before these two the better, and at a minimum students should have
done ​Basic Evaluation ​(and ​Warrants​, too, though see just above) before ​Diagramming
Dialogue​. ​Diagramming Very Long Passages would ideally be kept until all other
sections have been completed, as students need all the preparation they can get in order
to confront long passages, especially those from non-academic sources such as are
newspaper editorials.
The table below presents a suggested sequence for RW.
Classifying 1

Analyzing 1

Reason Substitutes

Classifying 2

Analyzing 2

Problems With Meaning

Basic Evaluation – Evaluating The Reasoning

Basic Evaluation – Ignoring Confidence Indicators

Everyday Inferences – Sources/Character/Motives

Everyday Inferences – ​Emotional Reasons

Everyday Inferences – ​Practical Conclusions

Everyday Inferences – Properties, Parts, Relations

Everyday Inferences – Classes, Propositions

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Warrants

Diagramming – Basic

Diagramming – Complex

Diagramming – Dialogue 1

Diagramming – Dialogue 2

Diagramming – Very Long

(To give weights to these chunks, use ​the self-paced/competency-based spreadsheet​.)

P&C​: The chapters in P&C have a natural order, except that the chapter on the
Venn diagram method/categorical reasoning floats free. It could be covered before
propositional logic or after (and the two together are a good segue to predicate logic, if
you have materials for predicate logic).
The chapter on ​Logically Structured English is essential if students are to do the
word problems​ in the chapter on ​Derivation/Proofs​.
The chapter on ​necessary and sufficient conditions is not essential for the word
problems in Derivation (or any other chapter) but is highly valuable in its own right.
The ​Big 8 Method can be skipped if you think your students can handle
derivations immediately.
The table below gives a suggested sequence for P&C. (A change of color indicates
a different document.)
Validity

Negations, Conjunctions, Disjunctions

Conditionals

Necessary & Sufficient Conditions

Big 4

Big 8
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Symbolic

6 Rules

6 Rules, No Interim

9 Rules

9 + 4 Rules

9 + 7 Rules

Condition & Indirect Derivation

Truth Functionality

Truth Tables

Logical In/Equivalence

Targeted Truth Tables

Truth Trees

Categorical Logic

(Suggested weights for these chunks are given in ​the self-paced/competency-based

spreadsheet​.)

I&S​: Many of the "chapters" in I&S are in fact mini-chapters of only a few
sections. This is because the ordering of I&S is particularly fluid.
Many people will want to start with induction, but I do not, preferring to start
with discussion of what "cause" means.
Note that, as an alternative to the chapter on (​Explanation-Building and)
Experimental Methods​, ​Mill's Methods are presented in a chapter of their own. Mill's
Methods are a simpler presentation of the methods of scientific reasoning and one that
is easier to examine by means of exercises.
Problems In Induction is text-only, no exercises.
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The table below gives a suggested ordering for I&S. (A change of color indicates a
different document.)
Valid, Strong, Weak

Cause

IC, IE

Analogy

IBE

Experimental Methods

(Mill's Methods)

IG

IS, IP

(Problems In Induction)

Association Diagrams

Cross-Tabs

Explanation-Building

(To give weights to these chunks, use ​the self-paced/competency-based spreadsheet​.)

Further suggestions for each part, concerning which sections to use and in what
order, are included at the beginning of the notes to each part, below (as well as on the
title page of each chapter).

For Instructors: Self-Paced, Competency-Based

If you want to set up your course so that students work through material at their
own pace, ​a spreadsheet with suggestions for weighted point scores for each section of
the material is available. These are only a suggestion; instructors are free to reassign
weights.
A syllabus for a course using a self-paced, competency-based process can be
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found in ​this document​. Again, modify to suit your own goals and situation.
I have taught VWU's freshfolk-level "Critical Reasoning" course and our
sophomore-level "Methods Of Logic" course in this (self-paced, competency-based)
fashion. I was inspired to teach in this fashion by the ​Teaching Philosophy article
Step-By-Step by Cahill & Block-Schulmann (which is currently (= 2017-07) freely
available). The main difficulty with self-paced learning (that I have found) is in keeping
students motivated. Persistence rates are lower with self-paced learning than traditional
(classroom) methods. It might be because of the absence of due dates (to counter which
I include in the syllabus a schedule for someone proceeding at regular pace throughout
the material; I also have students fill out a 'time diary' to track their effort – neither of
these has resolved the problem) or perhaps because the students are not going through
the course together (for which I have not attempted any remedy).

For Instructors: Paper vs. Electronic Devices

One goal of these materials is to provide instructors and students with electronic,
and indeed on-line, materials. Students and instructors are encouraged ​not to print out
either the text or the exercises. (The book encourages this in a few small ways. One is
that while URLs are written out in full for pedagogically important links, some links are
made without visible URLs. Another is that the exercise sets are presented ​without l​ arge
areas of white-space for writing answers by hand on a printed page; those who want to
complete exercises on paper must thus insert spaces before printing. Electronically, of
course, one need only place a cursor below an exercise and begin typing – space is
created as one types.)
Allowing students to use electronic devices for just ​the text ​will save the printing
of about three hundred pages per student per term, depending on how many chapters
you intend to cover. Accepting ​exercises​ electronically will save more paper.
There are after each section or several sections links for each Exercise Set (1) and
each Exercise Set (2).
Exercise sets can be completed electronically, printed, and turned in. Students
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could also e-mail or share their electronic documents with the instructor.
Moreover, there are now two Google tools available either of which will allow you
to hand out work and receive it into folders, and grade and return it to students: the
Doctopus add-on to Google Sheets, and, if you are an instructor at a G-Suite/Google
Apps For Education (GAFE) institution, ​Google Classroom​. (You might need to have
your director of Instructional Technology or Information Technology turn on Classroom
for your domain.)
Both Classroom and Doctopus "hand out" an assignment to a roster of students
and create a folder (either for each student or for each assignment) into which returned
work is placed. Moreover, at a given deadline or at the click of a button the instructor
can block the student from making further changes while the work is assessed. With
another click, work can subsequently be returned to students.
One caveat: Classroom and Doctopus distribute and gather files that ​you own. Thus,
there is a little bit of work to be done in making a copy for yourself of each master file
(the chapters and exercises) that you wish to use; you might also want to delete the links
to exercises contained within the chapters, though I have found it sufficient to simply
instruct students to ignore these links and use Classroom instead.
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Notes — Preface

Preface
General Remarks: The ​Preface is not essential and could be skipped, but can
make good material for the opening day(s) of a course (perhaps along with ​RW –
Reason Substitutes​). Section 2 of the ​Preface (on the critical reasoner) is germane no
matter what. My own take on the intellectual virtues (which has not yet been worked
into this text) is linked to in the text and can be found ​here​.
If you have able students and will be jumping straight into P&C, the chapter ​RW
– Everyday Inferences – Basic Logic might make a good prelude, as it introduces simple
patterns of inference and the idea of good and bad inferences.
​ tarting in 1.2, 'reasoning' and 'reason-giving' are used
1.1 ​reason-giving. S
interchangeably in this book, as there is no reasoning that is not available to the reader
for inspection. In particular, the reader (in the examples in the text and in the exercises)
gets to eavesdrop on people in the act of inferring a conclusion from evidence; strictly
speaking, we might want to describe inferring as 'reason-using' rather than
'reason-giving'. This confusion stems, more deeply, from a monological view of
reasoning rather than a dialogical: we can evaluate the inferences made privately by
people only when they are shared, at which point they are either arguments or
explanations. Someone might say: there is no such thing as an inference, only an
inferring, until the inference is shared and no longer 'private property'. Or, we might say
that we should indexically speak of a proposition serving as 'a reason for Bill' (or
whoever) in an inferring until Bill evaluates the strength of the proposition as a reason
(typically with another person).
But ​Analyzing 1, ​and ​Classifying 2​, like the ​Preface​, immediately treats inferring
as an inference. And similarly, ​Classifying 1 simply asks us to decide whether reasons
are present, without regard to whether they are used or given.
'Reason-giving' is also a useful word as it includes the presentation of
explanations; arriving at an explanation is reasoning, but presentation of an explanation
to an audience is not. Evaluating the strength of an explanation (rather than the truth of
 13

the explainer) involves thinking about whether the explainer raises the likelihood of the
explainee compared to when the the explainer is absent, which means evaluating the
reasoning that generated the explanation.
Thus, one might say that reasoning/to reason = inferring/to infer, that is, that
reasoning is the generation of a new claim (whether about a cause or otherwise), while
reason-giving = arguing and explaining. But, that ​a reason can be ​either used (as a
reason) creatively (typically privately) ​or ​given (as part of an inference or the
explanation) educationally (typically publically) (and can be either a
reason-which-explains (a causal factor) or a reason-for-believing).
2.1 ​the self-critical reasoner. See the work of Sperber & Mercier for thoughts on
why the rigor applied to others' reasoning is much greater than that applied to our own.
The magnum opus is ​The Enigma Of Reason.​
2.2 ​habits. ​The talk of reasoning as an art and of developing skills and habits to
use in novel situations is intended seriously and is worth constantly reinforcing.
Readers/Students will hopefully feel a developing sense of power and confidence. In my
own class, I use tropes such as "master of the art" and being able to give a "flexible
response to <the given> passage", attempting to convey that reasoning is not merely
machine-code translation and symbol manipulation. The book aims to give
readers/students a toolbox of techniques that they can bring to bear when confronted
with instances of reason-giving, so long as they do not panic. While the tools being
practiced are sometimes outstripped by the passage under scrutiny, such that it is
difficult to see what the right answer is, readers should notice (and instructors should
insist upon, and highlight successes in,) improved skill and insight.

Notes — ​Real-World Reasoning (RW)

General Remarks: The purpose of this book is to consider difficulties that arise
when encountering reasoning "in the wild". (RW treats reasoning dialogically,
particularly the chapters on diagramming.)
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For Instructors: Instructions For The Exercise Sets In RW

Once evaluation has been introduced, the exercise sets in RW (and in general) all
have the same (basic) instructions: analyze and evaluate.
Since the chapters are cumulative, analyzing and evaluating becomes increasingly
complicated.
As they become more complicated, the exercises sets, done thoroughly, will take
longer and longer and perhaps become too long for the time available.
For this reason, it can be helpful to distinguish between the new skill of the
chapter and the skills already acquired, and to instruct students to focus on the new
skill. For example, I will often say, "Do any two exercises completely and for the rest just
focus on <the new skill>."

RW – Introduction
Section 1 contains definitions of ​reasoning and ​critical reasoning which might be
helpful in demystifying these terms. It also covers briefly what is covered at greater
length in ​Classifying 2:​ the difference between inferring, arguing, and explaining.
Section 2 tries to explain ​real-world. The claim that RW is harder than P&C is an
interesting one for pedagogical reasons: critical reasoning involves a host of
language-skills and discourse-interpretation skills that are difficult to articulate. (RW is
an on-going and gradual attempt to articulate these skills.)
Section 3 gives an overview, which might be helpful in allowing students to see
the entirety of RW and how its parts interconnect.

General remarks on the ​Classifying ​and​ Analyzing​ chapters:

You might do one or both Classifying chapters first, or one or both Analyzing
chapters first. In a critical thinking course (without any scientific reasoning), I have
students do (in order) Analyzing 1, (Reason Substitutes,) Classifying 1, Analyzing 2, and
we skip Classifying 2, since my 'critical reasoning' course does not include scientific
reasoning.
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The variety of possible orders is why the instructions for the exercise sets for
these four chapters are written as "Classify (and analyze)" and "Analyze (and classify)".
You can have your students do either everything they have covered so far or just the new
skill.

These materials allow that the target of reasoning is not always a descriptive
proposition but can be a practical proposition. The is in line with the intuition of
Johnson & Blair and many others that, for example, advertisements are arguments, even
though an ad's "conclusion" is that you should buy something.
In general, my reason for allowing non-descriptive targets is that we (instructors)
claim that reasoning courses are concerned with a central part of life. But it feels to
students like a 'bait-and-switch' to start a course with the claim that students use
logic/reasoning all the time and then restrict the content of the course to descriptive
statements and reasons to believe them.
Similarly but more controversially, this text differs from others in that (contrary
to the advice of Walton (1996) p. 58) it does ​not exclude explanations from the
classifying and analyzing chapters. The great majority of textbooks focus on inference
and take pains to ​exclude ​explanation. The difference between inference and
explanation is discussed explicitly in ​Classifying 2 because an entire book (I&S) is given
over to the generation and evaluation of explanations. Instructors who will not be
covering I&S can omit ​Classifying 2.​
No rigorous distinction is made here between ​trying to argue or explain and
succeeding ​in doing so, though the word "try" (and other phrases such as "think",
"thought to be") indicate that arguments and explanations can be faulted. As a result,
bad arguments and explanations are still arguments or explanations. This is explicitly
stated in a "bonus" (blue-bordered) box. This is a topic for discussion with students.

RW – Classifying (1)
2.1 make the best sense you can … . This could get us into the distinction between
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good and bad reason-giving, between analysis and evaluation; but this is not mentioned
explicitly until the "straying" in the very last sub-section of the chapter.

RW – Classifying (2)
1.1 The nature of explanation is a difficult and controversial subject. See
Woodward's (2009) ​entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for more and a
bibliography.
Philosophers often distinguish causal/scientific reasoning from other types.
Scriven (1962, section 3), has doubts.
Harman (1973) takes inductive generalizations to be explanatory but not to
identify causes (8.2; see also 8.4 on statistical claims). I take it that they can be causal, if
the other conditions (temporal priority and no common cause) are satisfied. (The other
examples he gives in this section are examples of other types of explanation, such as
instruction and composition.)
In mathematics, there might not be any difference between, on the one hand,
inference/argument (and proof) and, on the other, explanation, except in the case of
axioms and the most specific theorems.
1.1 Textbooks (including this one) describe the differences between inference and
explanation in terms of whether or not the target is already accepted. This difference is
the result of a more fundamental difference, namely the distinct cognitive activities of
explaining and justifying. As mentioned (exceedingly briefly) in the Preface, the aim of
argument is expansion/revision of one's belief-set while the aim of explanation is
increase in understanding. There is an example in the chapter on Diagramming in which
the speaker first justifies and then explains a phenomenon.
2.1 ​an inference.​ There is (tellingly) no good word for the set of propositions
(suggesting the priority of inferring and arguing as activities/processes). Many texts use
"argument" and this is fine; I predominantly use "inference" as it goes with the idea that
to argue is to present an inference (which seems marginally better than using
"argument" and maintaining that when an individual infers she argues with herself).
 17

3.3 ​explainer and explainee.​ There doesn't seem to be any widely adopted
language for the parts of an explanation, analogous to "premises" and "conclusion" for
inferences.
"Explainer" and "explainee" are a little barbaric, but these days so too are the
Latin terms "explanandum" and "explanans". "Explainer" is also used in the context of
causal inferences​. For "explainee", no distinction is made between the explainee as ​the
​ hich expresses the phenomenon and the phenomenon described. Students
proposition w
do not seem to have a problem moving between the state and the statement.
Note that "explanation" means explainers and explainee together, analogous to
"inference" or "argument" for the premises and conclusion together. English is
ambiguous in this regard (as it is with "argument"); sometimes "explanation" means just
the explainers, though always in the context of an explainee which is in need of
explanation.

RW – Analyzing (1)
(See the notes below for Analyzing (2) section 2.3 for brief discussion of why the
chapter does not begin by discussing propositions.)
1.1 ​target. ​We get to "premises and conclusion" and "explainers and explainee" in
due course (Classifying 2). If explaining is admitted as a form of reason-giving (though
not a form of reasoning), we need other words than "premise" and "conclusion", if these
are to be restricted to inferences. "Target" is used, though it is not a perfect word,
especially in the context of inferring, as "target" gives the impression that the conclusion
is already believed and we are ​fixing the evidence around​ it.
​ hat's unusual (and better) here, in comparison to
1.2 ​flag words/phrases. W
many texts, is that the flag words are (by omission of any definite statement) correctly
left ambiguous as between inference and explanation. A course which presents these in
a context restricted to ​inference (only) risks confusing students when they run into these
words in other contexts (such as textbooks in any didactic discipline!) – they will
immediately think that they are looking at an inference/argument when in fact they will
 18

be looking at an explanation.
2.2 ​we always break up conjunctions. The injunction to break up conjunctions is
consistent with the rules of simplification (Simp.) and conjunction (Conj.) in ​P&C – The
Method Of Derivation, section 5​.
2.2 conditionals and disjunctions: This warning is necessary. Repeatedly.

RW – Reason Substitutes
General Remarks: The chapter on reason(s) substitutes deals with various ways
in which people avoid engaging in arguing and explaining at all. It concerns ways in
which speakers attempt to avoid giving reasons or short-circuit the process of
reason-giving, especially in dialogical contexts (i.e. when there are two or more people
involved).
This chapter floats free of the others in RW and can be covered at any point. (This
is probably a sign that its contents are not theoretically unified. Apologies.) Two obvious
places it might be inserted are as an addendum to Analyzing (1) or just before or after
Evaluating The Reasoning.
Up to a certain limit, the ways of circumventing reason-giving included in this
chapter can be thought of as (often weak) arguments for the (implied) conclusion that
the proper conditions for reason-giving do not obtain, rather than as arguments against
the specific claim under discussion. The principles of 'sincerity & charity', however, are
discussed in the chapter on Warrants.

1.1 On the need for the right attitude towards argument (and explanation) as
opposed to ego-defensiveness and status-seeking see the 'Beliefs As Possessions'
epilogue to chapter 5 of Gilovich (1991), Goffman on maintaining face (e.g. 1959),
Grice's cooperative principle (e.g. 1975; here is ​the WP page on Grice's maxims​), Kahan,
Wittlin, et al. (2011).
​ related phenomenon
1.1 more complicated to remember and produce reasons. A
is that of ​source amnesia​.
 19

​ an Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans

1.1 ​avoiding … appearing. V
(2002) use ​escaping from ​and ​evading the burden of proof​ (p. 116, 184)​.
[blue box] I originally read about the Langer study in Cialdini (2006). With the
exception of a brief discussion of ​comparison bias,​ Cialdini's is a book all about the
impact of social pressures on decision-making.

RW – Analyzing (2)
1.1 ​in full.​ The injunction to make each proposition independent (like the
injunction to split up sentences, and in particular conjunctions,) is made mainly as an
aid when considering the truth of the premises, in ​RW – Basic Evaluation​.
2.1 ​things people can do with sentences. ​The ​Neo-Futurists 2-minute version of
Greg Allen's play ​Title is effective: it's funny, fairly accessible (play it for students twice,
if necessary), and makes the point.
​ his might be called an exclamation, but there are
2.2 ​ouch … crying out in pain T
different kinds of exclamation (in anger, in surprise, in fear, …) so it is better to be more
specific.
​ any books (include this one in previous
2.3 ​in the context of reason-giving. M
editions) contain a section on propositions vs. non-propositions prior to getting into
reason-giving (usually limited to reasoning/inference).
And most books, operating under the assumption that all propositions are
descriptive, give as a test for propositions, "Can you put "It is true that …" or "It is false
that" in front of the sentence and yield something grammatical?".
But if we allow that non-propositions (by this test) and non-descriptive
propositions (if we allow practical propositions) can be involved, this way of formulating
the test is compromised: we get, for example, "It is true/false that you should shut the
door.", which doesn't sound quite right; it is good that I should shut the door.
(Similarly, third-person future-tense sentences might not be true or false. See,
famously, Aristotle's example of the sea-battle in ​On Interpretation​ ​9.)
We might thus change the test to something to do with proposing or asserting,
 20

such as "Can you put "The speaker proposes that …" in front of the sentence and yield
something grammatical?". This is an improvement as it allows for practical
propositions. But it brings with it its own problem, namely the difficulty of what it is to
propose and when a speaker has gone from proposing to something else. Commands
might be easy enough but what about requests, such as "Could you pass the salt?" or
"Pass the salt, please."? which fail the test of putting "The speaker proposes that …" in
front of the sentence. Perhaps the sentence could be rewritten as "(I propose that) You
should pass the salt."? There are levels of deferentiality.
The core issue is that there are very often multiple things being done with a
sentence simultaneously, both proposals for descriptions of the world/courses of action
and performative aspects. And audiences can respond to all of these aspects of an
utterance. A command, indeed, might be taken as a proposal and refused.
We can cut through a lot of problems, it seems to me, if we operate "in the
context of reason-giving". That is, if we make reason-giving prior (for our purposes) to
propositions. If it is clear that reason-giving is taking place, we immediately become
interested in the sentences insofar as they provide reasons and express a target, and ​the
critical audience (i.e. the reader, rather than the recipient of the utterance, if different)
takes both reasons and target as proposals.
5.1 ​extracting the reasons and target. If you have covered P&C prior to RW, and
especially if you have covered ​only P&C prior to RW, this point needs to be emphasized,
for in P&C there are rarely extraneous premises (and premises are taken directly from
the passage and there is almost never the need to add a warrant) – everything has a role
and you just chop up the passage without remainder.
[blue box] ​obviously bad reasons​. The issue of simultaneous analysis and
evaluation receives some explicit discussion.

RW — Problems With Meaning

RW – Evaluating The Reasoning ​& Ignoring Confidence Indicators

 21

Inferences are sound when they have true premises and strong or valid
reasoning. In this chapter, students practice these two criteria (and really just the
latter), and do so without reference to any particular patterns of reasoning.
(There are in fact ​three types of criticism that can be made against inferences and
explanations. In addition to the two discussed here (and in every other textbook) there
is the criticism that some better reason is available. In the context of argument, a
speaker can be held to be epistemically vicious if she fails to hold a belief for the
strongest reasons possible. In the context of explanation, a speaker can be criticized for
presenting a partial cause but not the most important cause (whatever "most important"
means) – not only must the explainer on offer be ​a c​ ause but it must satisfy the criteria
for "best" discussed in Inference To The Best Explanation.
This type of criticism happens rarely with inferences, though purely epistemic
reasons for believing, such as appeal to a source, can be replaced by scientific reasons
which also give understanding. This type of criticism happens frequently with
explanations, but this chapter deals only with inferences and we stick to the two basic
criticisms.)

​ ith respect to inferences, specifically, the following also makes a good

1 ​slogan. W
slogan: ​Are the premises true? (​ pause) ​Does the conclusion follow?
properly (convincing/satisfying). Again the difference between trying and
succeeding pokes through. It might be helpful to emphasize at this juncture that when
​ f
we evaluate, we evaluate by comparing with ​correct reasoning, with ​standards o
reasoning.
explanatory. There doesn't seem to be in English a parallel to "sound" other than
"explanatory". But the idea is the same as with inferences: there are standards of
reasoning that should be observed when forming explanations.
​ hile arguments are said to be, pragmatically, convincing,
satisfyingly. W
explanations are satisfying. For a good time, see Gopnik (1998).
 22

RW – Everyday Inferences – Sources, Character, Motives

General Remarks: This chapter and Reasoning With Emotions (along with the
manoeuvres in ​RW – Reasoning Substitutes​), are (to some extent) equivalent to the
section(s) on "informal fallacies" found in other texts. No detailed typology is attempted.
The exercise sets for this chapter are very long because there is a Part 2 which
exercises extended reasoning and a Part 3 which exercises responses based on bias,
character, and motives​. You might just want students to tackle 'Part 1', which is the basic
evaluation of appeals to a source.

​ ather than the more typical name 'argument from

1.1 ​argument from a source. R
authority', as "authority" nowadays often connotes the power to enforce compliance
with (if not belief of) some proposition. (Ob ​Cartman clip​.)
2.6 ​third … ​This feature is added because experts are experts in a field, where the
field involves some well-established propositions and some fringe propositions. The
third feature, therefore, in effect asks, is this proposition in the core, or at the fringe?

RW – Everyday Inferences – Emotional Reasons For Practical Conclusions

2.1 ​descriptive conclusions​. Practical and descriptive conclusions might not

exhaust the types for claims for which justificatory reasons can be given. There are also
evaluative claims, such as "This painting is beautiful." or "This action is immoral.".
These might be categorized along with practical claims, for when we gives reasons for
thinking that the painting is beautiful or the action is immoral, we present factual claims
(e.g. about the formal properties of the painting, about the harmful consequences of the
action) and ask the audience to "see" them in a certain, emotional, light (the properties
are pleasing, the harm is displeasing).
2.4 A premise about desire might also be required. But the factual premises
(describing the threat or the outcome) are supposed to elicit the desire as well as
 23

promoting the specific option. In other words, in a belief-desire psychology, the belief is
the conclusion of the practical inference (that "Option-A best satisfies various values")
and the desire is also a consequence (if not a conclusion) of being presented with the
features ("I desire the satisfaction of these").
2.7 The one mistake that students make is in making sure that the 'features' or
'criteria' are correctly written so that the largest number in the right-hand column is the
winning option. Instead, students will sometimes give features that are striking or
important but which should be scored negatively. For example, the ​expense of smoking
is greater than of not smoking; if a table has a column for 'cost', the 'smoking' option will
get more points towards the overall decision!

A good strategy for the ​practical conclusions ​exercise sets is to treat the exercises
as real decisions that students have made or will make.

RW – Everyday Inferences – Reasoning With Properties, Parts, & Relations

General Remarks: The inference patterns are given names, but the names are not
important (as stated in subsection 1.2). The important thing is to recognize the
reasoning as familiar and to (begin to) see the different features of each kind of
reasoning. Encourage students to make up their own (additional) names for the patterns
in order to have them take ownership of them.
No abstraction or symbolism is used but could easily be introduced/hinted at as
desired.

​ imply in virtue of being able to get along

1 ​without needing a pencil and paper. S
in the world and to speak a language, we have various reasoning skills. As it gets more
complicated, at some point students will leave the territory of ways of thinking that are
facile and cross over into ways of thinking that they are capable of, but lack facility with.
Students can be encouraged to keep an eye out for what reasoning each of them,
personally, has a facility for (what reasoning is easy for her), what reasoning she has a
 24

capacity for (even if it means pencil and paper and/or hard thinking) and what
reasoning is entirely beyond her (hopefully, nothing in this book falls into this category).
The category of reasoning for which a person has "capacity but not facility" is
important because it offers hope; the first time that an inference pattern is not familiar,
you have to force yourself through it, and do so over and over again until it makes sense
— like writing letters of the alphabet for the first time or learning to knit "over, and
around, then back up …".
Section 6 of this chapter presents examples which hopefully make the point about
the difference between facility and capacity.
2 and 3 ​properties. No distinction is made between accidental and essential
properties.
4 ​part-whole. There is potential for a lot of confusion, given the difficulties
associated with "part". Artificial composites such as groups of people make safe
examples.
5 and 6 The logic of spatial and temporal relationships is treated in Goodwin &
Johnson-Laird (2005).
5 ​symmetrical The word is used here as a success term (i.e. only those relations
that yield valid inferences/true conclusions are symmetrical) but we also talk about
arguments that ​appear ​or ​look symmetrical​ because of the repetition of terms.
6 ​chain reasoning. ​Chain reasoning also occurs with states (expressed in
propositions) and classes or categories. See the chapter on ​Reasoning With Classes &
Propositions​.
6.1 ​speaker thinks the relation being used is ​transitive. As with "symmetrical"
there are inferences which "look" transitive, where the speaker "attempts" a transitive
inference.
​ ne could here introduce a distinction between
6.4 ​not necessarily transitive. O
intransitive and non-transitive.
[Blue box] some of the exercises might provoke conversation about the different
types of "is".
 25

6.1 ​fallacious reasoning​. The example is here described as an attempt at

transitivity. That is, even though it is not a ​correct ​argument, it still looks like an
instance of the type. In connection with this, see Walton's (2010) "Why Fallacies Appear
To Be Better Arguments Than They Are" (freely available on-line at ​Informal Logic ​–
see the URL in the Bibliography)
6.2 ​mental model. ​See the work of Johnson-Laird. The link in the text is to an
overview paper; the ​magnum opus​ is Johnson-Laird (2006).

RW – Everyday Inferences – Reasoning With Classes & Propositions

​ hough in everyday English, sometimes "If it's a dog, it has a
2.1 ​not universal. T
tail." might be used for "​Most dogs have tails.". And should "Dogs have tails." be
understood as "All dogs have tails." or "Most dogs have tails."? What about "Water is
H​2​O."? (In ​P&C - The Venn Diagram Method​, section 2.4, these are given universal
scope.)
4 Specific conditionals might depend on categorical generalizations for their
justification, but this (the categorical generalization) is not used in the inference.
All of the examples are of single events, but all that is needed is that the
conditional premise is one level of generality greater than the "specific" premise (and
conclusion).
4.2 The material conditional can be understood as a disjunction, which turns
cases of asserting the antecedent into cases of elimination.

RW – Basic Evaluation – Warrants

Please see the initial note for Evaluating The Reasoning, above, on the third type
of criticism. As in Evaluating The Reasoning, this type of criticism is not included in this
chapter.

1 ​adding a warrant. ​When adding a missing reason one is thinking about the
connection between the particular information and the target. (In many texts, the topic
 26

of adding missing premises appears in a chapter on analyzing the passage.) As

mentioned in the text, the chapters on the various modes of reasoning provide students
with a variety of ways of thinking about what is missing.
What is a warrant? Toulmin talks about the ​warrant, ​smartly described as the
move from "What have you go got to go on?" (i.e. the ​grounds)​ to "How are you going to
get there?" (i.e. the ​warrant)​ (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik p. 44). Less metaphorically, he
describes a warrant as a generalized, legitimating principle.
I borrow the word from Toulmin. But in some cases what is missing is ​not a
legitimating generalization but specific information. A speaker might give only a general
proposition ("Dogs have tails.") and omit the specific information, which is taken as
obvious (e.g. "Jim is a dog."). Similarly, to an argument about relationships, e.g. "A is
west of B. So, A is west of C." one might add a piece of particular information, e.g. that B
is west (or not east of) of C.
Further, there's an issue here (alluded to in the main text's discussion) as to the
status of the conditional in (e.g.) an instance of Matching the Antecedent (a.k.a. ​modus
ponens)​ . This is a warrant. But it is not general. (The general principle is the schema for
MA: If "If p then q" and "p", then "q".) Similarly, the disjunction used in disjunctive
syllogism is not general, at least insofar as it concerns two or more specific options. (I
​ otices this in her
think Salmon in her ​Introduction to Logic & Critical Thinking n
treatment of "unstated" premises, as she gives an example where the unstated premise
is a disjunction.)
On the one hand, this unfortunately means that there's no simple definition of
warrant.​ On the other hand, the definition of warrant as ​whatever i​ s needed to allow
that target follows or is explained by the specific information allows for all kinds of
warrant, whether they are conditionals or categorical propositions or information about
how a sample was collected or the typicality of a case. (It would even allow one to
entangle oneself in Dodgson's ​What The Tortoise Said To Achilles worry: "Now, if only I
had ​another premise which says "If I have a premise which says "If one thing, then
another, and the one, then the other." and I have "If one thing then the other" and "the
 27

one", ​then​ I could conclude "the other".".)

​ ere is a (reasonably
1.5 ​Each specific mode of reasoning has its own warrants. H
complete) list of connecting premises with the modes of reasoning to which each
applies:
a. The sample is large enough: IG, IP.
b. The sampling method yields a representative sample: IG, IP.
c. (Near) Universal Relation (All/Most Fs are Gs): IS
d. The specific case is a typical F with respect to G (total evidence): IS, IP, IE,
IC.
e. F and G are associated: Cause/Expl.
f. F occurs no later than G: Cause/Expl.
g. There is no common explanation (total evidence): Cause/Expl.
h. There is no better explanation (total evidence): IBE.
i. There are no relevant disanalogies (total evidence): AAn.
j. All Fs are Gs: IS, Barbara categorical syllogism.
k. If p then q: MA, CC, Chain.
l. p or q: Elim., CD, DD.
m. The source is (i) an expert on the subject and (ii) unbiased and (iii) there is
consensus among the experts: Argument From A Source
n. Option ​N ​satisfies the values … better than any alternative: Emotional
Reasoning

3 ​sincerity and charity​. Walton (1996) p. 213 has a useful list of five different
principles which might be at work when people share and interpret arguments. By title
they are loyalty, clarity, neutrality, charity, and principled preference.
3.2 As a general rule, information should not be discarded, but, contrary to what
is written here, there is often a need to throw out information in order to make a set of
propositions consistent, though the sets involved are usually much larger than a single
argument or explanation. Aristotle advises (​Metaphysics ​2.1) that when information is
 28

discarded we should be able to "save the phenomena", that is, say why the speaker
thought as she did, why things might have appeared thus-and-so to her.
3.3 This subsection is included because it is a skill in philosophy to attempt to
​ ight have meant it. This is particularly true, as
reconstruct an argument as ​the author m
the first line says, when the author is not present (or no longer alive).
The alternative would be to move straightaway to taking the argument for oneself
and forgetting that it comes from a source.
3.5 ​left with. ​Why should one tackle this "found" argument at all? And more
generally, what passages are worth spending time on? Whose opinions should we listen
to? The ancients? The moderns? The many? The wise?

RW – Diagramming – Basic
General Remarks: The diagramming method described in this book is descriptive.
That is, it is intended to be used (as much as possible) prior to evaluation and so with as
little knowledge of good and bad reasoning as possible. Some understanding of linked
premises is required and the chapters on Everyday Inference give quasi-formalizations
of various inference patterns, but hopefully those chapters merely put into words
something approximating the critical reasons that students can do when being careful.
There is no requirement in this chapter to supply warrants – though you can certainly
impose one if you have covered the chapter on warrants – or to impose decisions about
sufficiency on the reasons when this is not clear from the passage (see the next note, on
the split-tailed arrow).
1.3 ​the split-tailed arrow. I​ n other texts on argument, a distinction is made
between ​dependent ​and ​independent p
​ remises. This distinction is not used here. The
first reason for this is that "independent" premises are typically diagrammed with
multiple arrows, one for each premise. This, however, makes diagramming disputes
which contain rebuttals difficult, for which see the notes on section 4. Further, multiple
arrows suggests multiple inferences or explanations. But it's often not clear that this is
what the speaker intends — perhaps the support from multiple reasons is being
 29

combined, in order to reach some tipping point.

The second reason is that the distinction is difficult to maintain. When a piece of
reasoning is fully articulate, it is possible to see how the reasons are related, but in many
passages the reasoning is not articulate and in others the speaker has only the vaguest
idea about the relationship between the reasons.
Instead, the text makes a very basic distinction between when we (the audience)
cannot tell that the reasons should be combined in some way and when we can tell.
Under "combined in some way" one might distinguish different modes of
combination, such as the combined support from unrelated reasons and the articulation
of a single line of thought in multiple premises (as in, e.g. an instance of ​modus ponens.​ )
This distinction is alluded to, but no classification of combinations is attempted here
because (again) there are too many cases in which it is impossible to distinguish. See
also the next note.
1.6 ​we diagram with a plus-sign​. In a previous edition, I had used different
symbols for "joined" premises (as in 1.3) and "combined" reasons (as here in 1.4). But,
when it comes to evaluation, it makes no difference. Hence, the same symbol (the
plus-sign) is used in both cases. This is controversial; the key claim is "joined premises
provide no support for the target without their partner(s) being true" or to use a bit of
lingo, "if a dependent premise is false, its dependents provide no support". I take this to
be false as a general claim (even though in many and perhaps most specific cases, it is
true) for the reasons discussed in the notes on 'warrants' under RW – Basic Evaluation.

RW – Diagramming Complex Reasoning

2 ​conjunction conclusion reasoning is more rare than having its own section
might suggest. And in practice, instances of this type often divide into two arguments
(that is, some premise(s) speaks to one of the conjuncts and other premises to the other)
or they are extended arguments (that is, one conjunct is the reason for the other). But it
does sometimes happen and so is included.
​ his is perhaps unnecessary (or
4 ​evaluating the various argument structures. T
 30

redundant, if you have already worked through the Basic Evaluation and/or Everyday
Inferences chapters), but it provides an opportunity for a set of exercises on the two
criteria, reasons and the reasoning. This distinction cannot be repeated enough.

RW – Diagramming Dialogue
Objections, support for objections, and rebuttals. The treatment here follows
​ see the URL in the
Woods (2011) (freely available on-line at ​Informal Logic –
Bibliography).
For propositions which support ​objections I use regular arrows moving in the
same direction as the objection arrow​. I​ n class I make use of the metaphors of a
"tug-of-war" and of "clashing tides".
It is not clear how we should diagram an attack on a person's character or
motives (as discussed in greater detail in an Everyday Reasoning chapter) when used as
a response to an initial argument. ​Ad hominem f​ orms an interesting case because it does
not engage with the reasons or the reasoning. For example:
A politician speaks against government support for the struggling auto
industry: ​My opponent argues that 1 ​handouts to the auto industry must be continued
because 2 [those companies provide jobs to many workers]. But my opponent only says
this because 3 [he receives a lot of contributions from Big Auto].

In 2, "those companies" = Auto companies

In 3, "he" = the speaker's opponent

The accusation here is that the original speaker is biased. What does this mean in
terms of non-agreement and objection? Does the critic think that handouts should ​not
be continued? What does the critic think about the truth of the reason (that auto
companies provide jobs)? What does the critic think about the reasoning (that, because
they provide jobs, they should be supported)? Perhaps the speaker is warning us to be
skeptical, in effect saying "Watch out! This guy is under the influence of the auto
 31

companies.".
1.2 ​non-agreement. There's not much difference between "non-agreement" and
"disagreement", but the latter connotes a definite/expressed counter-position, though
sometimes the counter is not expressed.
2.1 ​the diagram shows this. ​This point bears repeating. Students have trouble
thinking about the relationships between propositions. The relationship of primary
focus is implication.

RW – Diagramming Very Long Passages

I tell my students that editorials are useful ​because they're so sloppy. But it's
really a cherry on a turd — it's hard to keep reminding oneself what great practice one is
getting, as opposed to succumbing to anger at how poorly they're constructed. Although
in this chapter we have been building up the length and complexity of passages,
editorials are a big step up in the level of difficulty, and many students doubt
themselves. It is crucial to emphasize that they should not panic.
 32

Notes — ​Propositional & Categorical Reasoning (P&C)

General Remarks: The chapters Validity and Logically Structured English are
preparatory to the methods of evaluation.
I find that the concept of validity is easy enough to get across to students so long
as one does not overdo it; this chapter is kept brief. However, omitting the all-important
combination of 'true premises + false conclusion' in the early stages means that it must
explicitly be brought into play when you get to truth tables and truth trees.
The chapter on logically structured English could be skipped if one had students
with ​very s​ trong syntactical skills, such as to be able to intuit the equivalences between
different English expressions of the operators and the difference between 'if … then ...'
and 'only if' (all of which are covered in section 3).
The chapter on The Big 8 Method is a gentle introduction to propositional logic
and could be skipped if one had strong students.

P&C is entirely monological (single voice). With some difficulty and occasional
awkwardness, P&C does not use words like "arguing" which imply the presentation of
reasons to another. (In contrast to P&C (in particular) and I&S, RW is dialogical.)
Instead of "arguing", P&C uses "inference" and often "the connection between premises
and conclusion" instead of "(the) reasoning." (Though, as described in the notes to P&I
with respect to the word "inference", "reasoning" serves as an alternative to "inference"
in the sense of the process or the relationship between premises and conclusion.)
In other books this part would be called ​Deduction. Deduction might reduce to
validity and P&C indeed covers only valid inference. But the inference patterns IS
(instantiation) and IE (inference to an effect) and IBE (inference to the best
explanation) might be deductions (in which case Sherlock Holmes might indeed be
making deductions). One (alternative) classification is thus to think of P&C as
concerning inferences in which the propositions are all at the ​same level ​of generality,
whereas inductions move from particular to general (moving ​up)​ , and instantiations
move from general (plus particular) to particular (moving ​down)​ .
 33

The verb "to infer" is used without introduction (beyond that in P&I and RW).
Conclusions are clearly marked with the word "so", throughout. The word "proposition"
is used without introduction (beyond that in P&I and RW).
The exercises for Big 8 Method and Method Of Derivation provide some
questions solely in symbols and some in English, the latter thus requiring an initial step
of translation. Instructors teaching a course focused exclusively on ​symbolic logic might
consider skipping the exercise questions involving English passages. However, the
translation step is kept very simple by limiting the English words for logical operators to
those words mentioned as "disguises" Logically Structured English and words very
similar to them; only in RW are there English passages in all of their glorious mess. As
Croy (2010) writes, "​The strict separation of form and content, explicitly emphasized in
propositional logic, … becomes untenable in a natural language context" ​(p. 263)​. (I&S
occupies a middle position: it presents patterns of inferences, but it also brings in the
fact that these inferences are made against a body of background knowledge, to which
the data in the premises add and against which, in part, the inference is made.)

P&C – Validity
General Remarks: This chapter distinguishes only between valid and non-valid
inference, which is all that is needed for P&C. (There is a section (with exercises) on the
trio of strengths 'valid', 'strong', and 'weak' in ​I&S - Valid, Strong & Weak Inference​.)
Toulmin and Johnson & Blair dispense with the distinction between valid and
strong support, on the grounds that most reasoning is strong (at best) because
arguments are (almost always) about experience. But to my mind the set of artificial
contexts (and natural laws) in which validity is possible is large enough to warrant
introduction of the concept and term ​validity​.

1.1 and 1.3 ​In general … the actual truth or falsity of the premises … do not tell
you …. ​The case of true premises and a false conclusion ruling out a valid argument is
mentioned parenthetically but I have found that introducing this early confuses students
 34

and that it is better to keep the two tasks (the truth of the premises, the strength of the
reasoning) separate.

P&C – Logically Structured English

General Remarks: Logically Structured English is a preparatory step on the route
to symbolic. The chapter is not to be skipped, however, because of the discussion of
ambiguity in section 2 and the instruction in rendering various English-language
constructions into logically structured English (sections 3 and 4).

1.2 A negated simple proposition is a complex proposition; "S" can stand for (e.g.)
"~a".
As noted in the text, the fact that the parts of a complex proposition can
themselves be complex bears emphasizing and repeating.
Note that we continue to refer to these propositions as logically structured
English even after the content is replaced by letters and the only English that remains is
the words for the logical operators.
3.2 ​rule out. ​In fact, often a simple "or" is used and background knowledge is
used to understand the disjunction as inclusive or exclusive. For example, "Jack is at the
gym or in his barracks." will be understood exclusively. Students who notice this can be
encouraged to us "(S or T) and not (S & T).".
The terminology of inclusive- and exclusive-or is mentioned in ​P&C – Truth
Tables & Tree Trees​, section 2.2.
4.1 ​only if. "​ only if" is sometimes (perhaps when it is contextually understood to
be the last remaining condition) understood as a sufficient condition, equivalent to "if",
but there are still enough contexts where it is used properly.
4.1 ​provided. "provided" is even more controversial. It is defined in the dictionary
as "on the condition that" and is likewise in the text rendered as "if". But in many
contexts "provided" connotes "if and only if" and so students will give either translation
– "if p, then q" or "if q, then p" – as an answer. In the exercises, for example, "Sue is
 35

there provided that John isn't." is understood (by student and ordinary speakers) to
mean "If John isn't there, then Sue is." and "If Sue is, John is not.", but this is incorrect,
according to the text, which allows that is possible that, (even) if John ​is there, Sue will
be there; we only know for sure that if he isn't there, she is. Moreover, "provided" can
also be used in context to mean "is a necessary condition", for example, as speakers
outline the various conditions necessary for the consequent: "I'll go provided (= only if)
John doesn't go. And provided we stop for fish-and-chips on the way back. And
provided …".

P&C – Necessary & Sufficient Conditions

General Remarks: This short chapter only covers the basic ideas related to
necessary and sufficient conditions. It does not, for example, cover joint sufficiency; this
is covered in I&S.

P&C – The Big 8 Method

​ s a gradual introduction to propositional
General Remarks: The ​Big 8 method a
logic was an idea of Bill's and much of this chapter retains his impression. Confident
students and/or students in "intro logic" (as opposed to CR) courses might move
directly to ​P&C – The Method Of Derivation​ from ​P&C – Logically Structured English​.

1 ​standard form. ​There is currently no exercise specifically for standard form

though many exercises for other chapters will ask students to put arguments into
standard form.
3-9. I use the names "Chain" and "Elimination" because they are more descriptive
than "Hypothetical Syllogism" and "Disjunctive Syllogism", respectively, and I change
the names of the basic conditional forms from their more traditional "affirming" and
"denying" to "matching" and "contradicting" because students get confused by the fact
that one can affirm a negative proposition and (to a lesser extent) deny a negative
proposition. People for whom a course in logic merely encodes their thinking and who
 36

are already simply pattern-matching have no problem with such ideas, but many people
are not those people.
8 ​constructive dilemma; destructive dilemma. I​ n some textbooks, the
conditionals are conjoined in a single proposition.
9 Note that a "left-hand only" version of Elim. is given. None of the examples or
exercises require Commutation in order to reverse the order of disjuncts. Making
mention of this will foreshadow ​The Method Of Derivation​, section 6.5.

P&C – The Method Of Derivation

General Remarks: In most (all?) other texts covering propositional logic, interim
conclusions do not occur. But this seems unreal; reasoning from a set of premises to a
distant conclusion will not be found outside text-books. For, those teaching introductory
'formal logic' courses, in section 4 and beyond, interim conclusions are dropped and
many exercises of the typical "manipulate the symbols to produce the conclusion" type
are provided.

2 ​operator. ​The term "operator" now takes the place of "logical word".
3.4 ​becomes a proposition which can be used in subsequent inferences.​ This is a
crucial idea to emphasize. Without it students attempt to derive the conclusion in a
single step using illegitimate means.
5.4 Johnson-Laird (rightly) criticizes addition as being a loss of information
(2006, p. 12), but it does have a function when an antecedent is a disjunction, and that is
how it is introduced here.
6 ​any part of a proposition.​ This cannot be stressed and repeated enough.
7 Exportation and Transposition are not much used. Exportation is suggested
only when (S & T) are together and we have a proposition with two horseshoes, or they
are apart and there is a conjunction in the antecedent. Similarly, in many inferences,
transposition from the version with negations followed by MA can be achieved by
leaving it with the negations and using DN + CC + DN; it is only ever the obvious move
 37

to make when setting up for Chain.

P&C – The Truth Table Method & The Truth Tree Method
General Remarks: Truth trees are perhaps the most elegant method, but truth
tables are helpful for understanding the truth tree rules, and are covered first at some
length. Also, the targeted truth table method makes a good segue to truth trees.

2.2 ​exclusive-or,​ ​inclusive-or​. The English "… or else …" is a better indicator of
exclusive-or, but many everyday uses of "or" are intended as exclusive, given what we
know about the entities involved. If we are worried about informativeness (and we are),
we should give a full translation of exclusive-or. It can then be simplified if necessary for
the derivation.
As in sections 4 and 5 of P&C – Logically Structured English​, a general topic to
mention or discuss with students here is the loss of information when we extract only
the logical meaning, (e.g.) by translating "but" as "and".
conditional. I try not to deviate from what I have written here, as anything else is
like to be false and/or confusing. Many students do not understand the explanation here
the first time around and need to consider the text slowly by themselves. Some never
grasp it. Using epistemic language seems to help, along with giving examples where
there is no (obvious) causal connection between antecedent and consequent, e.g. "Let's
just say, if (we knew that) the moon was full, then (we also know that) crime rates go up.
I have no idea if it's true, or, if it is true, why it's true, but let's just run with it …"
For weird (non-conditional) uses of "if … (then) …" in English, see this Language
Log post and the posts linked to within it:
http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=1469
6 ​targeted truth tables. ​You can hold out the promise of targeted truth tables to
smarter students who get the basic truth table method quickly.
​ his needs to be emphasized.
7.3 ​after the decomposition of each proposition. T
 38

P&C – The Venn Diagram Method

General Remarks: A brief and rudimentary treatment of the Venn diagram
method for categorical logic is included in particular because some students benefit
from the pictorial representation.
It is also possible that a chapter will be added, perhaps as rudimentary as the
chapter on categorical logic, on predicate logic, at the end of P&C, in order to complete a
(brief) narrative of categorical logic + propositional logic => predicate logic. In general,
though, categorical logic is over-rated and over-treated the books that treat it. The
propositional calculus provides the same kind of logical training but with a greater
chance of being used in other studies and in real life.

2.4 This is controversial. At least, in ordinary parlance positive "universals"

would seem to mean "​Most dogs have tails.". In the context of reasoning with classes,
however, they are useful only if (or, are only securely useful if) they are treated as
universals. See also ​RW – Some Everyday Inferences​, section 6.
4 The problem of the existential commitment of universal propositions is
analyzed and dissolved by Toulmin (1958) pp. 113-118.
The modern logician. Aristotle assumed commitment in his logic, since logic was
a tool of (physical) science.
Time can be saved by simply pointing out that an asterisk must be used and
omitting the discussion of existential commitment.
 39

Notes — ​Inductive & Scientific Reasoning (I&S)

General Remarks: As mentioned above, there are many small chapters in this
part, in order to facilitate a variety of orderings and to allow for coverage choices. I&S is
not a part of many CT or intro logic courses, so you might just want to add one or more
highlights, whatever you think is important. (​Induction is perhaps the most frequently
covered topic.)
One way the chapters of this part might be structured would be to treat the
scientific method from start to finish, from the generation of hypotheses, to
experimental methods, to sample collection and generalization to association.
Another is to structure the part in terms of familiarity, from greater to lesser
familiarity, beginning with the meaning of "cause" (​Causation, Causal Inference, &
Explanation​) (and drawing on ​P&C – Necessary & Sufficient Conditions for inferences
based on universal cause-and-effect relationships) and proceeding to break the idea
down, until we reach association and the idea of cause as INUS condition.
Were the text longer, the part might cover multi-valued variables (though this is
perhaps best left for a statistics course), Bayes's Rule, and statistical analyses as formal
methods for calculating conditional probability and updating hypotheses in the light of
new evidence.

I&S – Valid, Strong & Weak inference

General Remarks: Note that there is a separate section (with exercises) on
validity vs. non-valid, ​P&C – Validity​.

​ roy (2010) notes that the instruction booklet for (U.S.) tax form
1.2 ​tax code. C
1040 "contains 2,036 instances of "and," 8,609 occurrences of "or," 2,448 occurrences
of "if," and (somewhat regrettably) 1,029 occurrences of "not," all in space of fifty pages"
(p. 260). See the article generally for ideas concerning where deductive reasoning might
have practical applications.
1.7 and 1.9 ​(degree of) confidence​. This kind of talk is used without comment.
There is a debate about how quantified categorical propositions should be understood,
 40

and whether they should be understood in this way. See, for example, Hacking (2001)
chapters 11-19. In ​Induction section 2.5, the term "confidence level" is used in
connection with sampling, but in general I stick to "likelihood".
​ rom ​DeRose (1992)​.
1.7 ​bank is open on Saturday. F

Some On-Line Scientific Reasoning Resources

Brief accounts of many explanations:
http://www.edge.org/responses/what-is-your-favorite-deep-elegant-or-beautiful-expla
nation​ .

WP page of obsolete theories"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Obsolete_scientific_theories

Metamia – Bank of analogies:

http://www.metamia.com/analogize.php?q=e

I&S – Causation, Causal Explanation & Causal Inference

1.3 ​causation. Correlation is a statistical notion with a mathematical meaning. It
is thus strictly speaking unrelated to causation. It is possible to have causation without
correlation. See
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/causation-without-association-is-possible/
1.4 An association is ​reversible.​ That is, either F or G can be the subject of the
proposition (though the percentage will change).
1.4 ​F occurs prior to G. This applies both to case​1 and to the association between
F and G generally.
The relationship between causal order and temporal order is controversial, but
none of the philosophical discussion is hinted at here; we simply use temporal order.
 41

Moreover, we simply say 'F before G'. It might ​not ​be necessary that the effect (G)
happens ​after the cause (F), only that it cannot happen prior to the cause. It is possible
that two states might occur ​at the same time​. Consider the following:

Jack was so likeable because he was generous and self-deprecating.

In this example, the qualities which are the causes of Jack's likeability occur
simultaneously with Jack's likeability. Though perhaps Jack is not recognized as being
likeable until his generosity and self-deprecation have been experienced.
Similarly, one of the main examples in the chapter on diagramming concerns the
features that make a school excellent – dedicated teachers, modern facilities, etc. Are
these the cause of its excellence or constituents?
Another example might be the cause of water's liquidity, which is (presumably) a
function of various aspects of its chemistry, and these exist at the same as it is liquid.
Perhaps, in these cases, however, it might be more natural to speak of ​constitution
rather than ​causation.​
2.5 ​more than one cause. This idea (of multiple causes) is discussed further in
Explanation-Building, on causes as INUS conditions.
3.7 and 4.3 ​inference to a cause ​and especially the 'most common' version of it is
treated here in terms of necessity or requirement, which is perhaps more intuitive than
the sufficiency of the non-states.
Note that over-determination is not mentioned here. That the (explicit or
implicit) explanations in the 'most common' form of IC are rivals is assumed.

I&S – Analogy & Inference To The Best Explanation

1 ​Analogy is particularly confusing. It is sometimes close to (indistinguishable
from?) IG or IP, depending (i) on how nearly 'the same' the analogues are and (ii) on
whether the inference is presented in the second manner rather than the first (that is, as
a list of elements rather than a model of inter-related elements).
In this section, I present analogy as involving a relation more complex than
simple co-occurrence; these can be very simple (as in the example of the tail as a ​part of
 42

the dog).
It is presented as an argument, but even as an argument it is used in a
problem-solving way. It is often incogent, but suggestive.
Many of Gentner's papers on analogy are available at
http://groups.psych.northwestern.edu/gentner/publications2.htm​ .
2 ​inference to the best explanation. I​ BE is presented here in the context of a
summary of the qualities on which theoretical explanations can be judged and
compared, assuming that the strength of association cannot be tested.
If we have (a lot of) prior experience with the topic at hand, we might be able to
usefully make an inference to the most common explanation (mentioned in sections 3
and 4 of Causation, Explanation, & Causal Inference). Abduction of the sort that Holmes
and House do is to the most common explanation, combined with scope.
It's only in rare circumstances that we have two explanations that are equally
likely (perhaps because the explanation being promoted is entirely new) and we must
resort solely to the formal features but which have attracted much attention in the
philosophy of science.

I&S – Experimental Methods

General Remarks: This chapter presents a brief introduction to observational
studies and experimental design. It does not go very far because (i) at this point we are
moving out of logic (in the sense of patterns of reasoning applicable to every discipline)
and (ii) having students design studies or experiments is rather involved and can involve
data-gathering.
Hempel's (1966) provides a foundational text for thinking about the scientific
method in natural science contexts.
For the purposes of quizzing students in a classroom setting (rather than with
games or in a lab), the appendix on ​Mill's Methods might be more suitable, due to their
limitations.
 43

I&S – Mill's Methods

General Remarks: Mill's methods are included here as a way of familiarizing
oneself with the four possible combinations of presence and absence and thinking about
the information afforded by the four. They are also similar to the ​experimental methods​.
There is controversy over what precisely Mill meant by the double and joint
methods. I separate the double and joint methods. See the (long) parenthetical note in 1
(along with 3). For discussion, see van Heuveln (2000).
Mill's methods are criticized on the grounds that they can only be used for the
purpose of deciding which of a number of already identified (possible) causes has
brought about the effect in the particular case under examination. Mill's methods are
thus deprecated in favor of association and correlation. The criticism is somewhat
unfair, as, on the one hand, every investigation takes place against a background of
already existing knowledge and, on the others, Mill's methods can be used to identify
previously-unsuspected factors as causes. Indeed, as mentioned at the end of this
chapters, Mill's methods are in effect used in experimental investigation both natural
science and in social science's case studies methodology. The real reason for their
deprecation is that they are silent when no sufficient cause is among the factors
represented; for example, if a factor is absent in even one case in which the effect occurs,
Mill's method returns no result, whereas the percentage and the association/correlation
are worth knowing. In other words, Mill does without the idea of causal factor or risk
factor.
Hempel (1966, p. 47 ff.) makes a distinction between accidental generalizations
and causal connections but this distinction is only possible because of an existing body
of knowledge about cause. Where this is lacking, an accidental generalization would
seem like a good place to start investigating (assuming that there is temporal priority).

I&S – Induction
General Remarks: The essential section is 1 (IG). This has its own exercise sets.
There is then a pair of sets on IG, IS and IP.
 44

​ here are two main issues in the background: the distinction between
Induction. T
induction and deduction, out of which arises (secondly) the definition of induction.
An argument is typically (or at least sometimes) said to be ​deductive i​ f its
conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, or is intended to follow necessarily
from the premises, while an argument is ​inductive ​if the conclusion follows
probabilistically from the premises, or is intended to follow probabilistically from the
premises. Now, anyone can intend anything. Does inserting the word "necessarily" into
a probabilistic syllogism make it deductive? Surely not. (And in RW students are
instructed to ignore what speakers think of their arguments.) Perhaps then we should
remove the "intended" and stick only with successful arguments? But then the
deductive-inductive distinction is the same as the distinction between ​valid ​and ​cogent
arguments.
The distinction between deduction and induction is sometimes expressed
alternately in terms of moving from the general to the specific (deductive) vs. from the
specific to the general (inductive) but this is thought not to hold water, since argument
by analogy and instantiation/statistical syllogism each has a specific conclusion but is
"inductive" in the sense of "cogent (at best)".
As a third alternative, Johnson-Laird (2006, p. 4) maintains that we would do
better to talk about the informativeness of the propositions, by talking about the
alternatives that are ruled out by them. Conclusions in inductive arguments close off
more possibilities than the premises, while deductions only make explicit what is
implicit in the conclusions. I think there is something right here about deduction—I take
deduction to describe or rely on a definite or constrained environment with well-defined
entities—but I disagree with his use of "induction" to cover "everything else". This
overextends the meaning of "induction" and so I narrow it. Further, it is not clear what
we should say about e.g. Affirming/Matching the Consequent or Denying/Contradicting
the Antecedent, which "look like" deductive arguments and are intended to be valid.
Concerning this (latter) issue, I think we must stick to some version of "intended".
Students recognize AC and DA as attempts at deductive arguments because of their
 45

similarity to the valid forms: the use of a conditional and a non-conditional proposition,
and the repetition of antecedent and consequent. See Walton's (2010).
Concerning the former issue, if we distinguish between inferences which generate
generalizations from those which employ them (or, to put it another way, we distinguish
ascending from descending inferences, the way up from the way down) the line of
thinking which distinguishes deductive from inductive arguments on the grounds that
one moves from general to specific while the other moves from specific to general is
correct about induction — induction generates generalized propositions from specific
cases. And this is how I use the term. I use "induction" to mean arguments which move
from observed cases to unobserved cases on the basis of the number and frequency (of
co-occurrence of features) alone.
Instantiation syllogisms with probabilistic "major" premises are not inductions,
even though they are treated in this chapter. (Argument By Analogy is thus not inductive
also, since the co-occurring features mentioned in the argument must additionally be
elements within a structure.)

​ here are other names, but this one seems to be most

2 ​Inductive Generalization. T
accessible and memorable for students.
2.1 The phrase "universal or near-universal" is important to stress.
2.2 ​Important Note: … ​This point is worth emphasizing.
general form. ​In this chapter, and beyond, (quasi-)formalizations are given for
various forms of argument.
The terms "formal" and "informal" are typically used to described whether or not
the strength of the inference can be evaluated without regard to the content of the
premises. ​Formal logic i​ s the evaluation of inference by examining only the form of the
argument, in order to see whether it matches forms which are thought to indicate a
strong connection, or whether its conclusion can be derived from the premises by use of
such rules. Formal logic is typically ​symbolic,​ since symbols are used to keep us from
being distracted by the specific content and focused on the structure of the argument.
 46

Evaluation of inferences which criticizes them in terms of the specific inference between
the specific propositions, appealing to the specific content and without appealing to
​ o my mind, however, the
general forms (or, e.g. to parallel arguments) is ​informal. T
distinction between formal and informal is one of degree rather than type. Every
argument can be given some kind of formal treatment, and no formal treatment is
immune from having to look at the specifics of the argument in question.
Take as an example the argument "The (U.S.) President says it will rain this
afternoon at the White House. So, it will rain this afternoon at the White House." In
evaluating the inference informally, we think about whether the premise ("The
President says it will rain this afternoon at the White House.") could be imagined to be
true and yet the conclusion ("It will rain this afternoon at the White House.") could be
false. The basic problem with this argument is that we don't know whether or not we
should trust the President when he predicts the weather. We might be convinced by this
argument if we added to it propositions such as "The President is an expert on weather."
(and "The President is unbiased." and perhaps various other things). This is our
informal evaluation of the argument—we are inclined not to believe the conclusion
because of worries about ​the President's ​expertise. We are then led to think about the
meaning and truth of this additional proposition (and any others). If we can be assured
of its truth, we accept the conclusion.
To give a formal treatment of this argument, we must abstract the concrete
information from the propositions given and compare what remains against, or derive it
from, the argument forms we have pre-determined as being strong. If we abstract away
as much as possible we get (perhaps) "Asserter-A asserts "Proposition-​p"​ .". This form is
not one we will find in our store of strong inference forms. We could, however, add
generalized forms of the additional propositions ("The President is an expert on
weather." and so on,) as additional premises, to give a fuller form of what is commonly
known as an argument from authority: "Asserter-A asserts "​p"​ . Asserter-A is an expert
on the subject matter of ​p. ​Asserter-A is unbiased with respect to ​p​. ​p i​ s not
controversial amongst experts. So, ​p.​ " Even this form, however, might not be thought
 47

sufficiently abstract, as it contains unanalyzed terms such as "expert", "unbiased" and

others.
Abstraction might also be inadvisable, because the particulars of the argument
sometimes make a difference. Philosophers debate as to how much abstraction must
take place in order for an argument to be formalized. This is the problem of ​logical
constants.​ The hope is that there are ​some ​forms which are universally valid. But
instances of even the most basic forms of propositional logic can be invalid, due to a
connection between the items mentioned in the propositions. For example, the
argument form commonly known as ​disjunctive syllogism (​ "<proposition 1> or
<proposition 2>. It is not the case that <proposition 1>. So, <proposition 2>.") generally
give us true conclusions when the premises are true, but if proposition 1 is "The table is
colored." and proposition 2 is "The table is brown." then the conclusion "The table is
brown." is false, even though the premises are true. (This is because, if the table is not
colored it cannot be brown—there is a very tight connection between being brown and
being colored, one which over-rides the connection between the propositions in the
argument. The logic of determinate-determinable, and other relations between entities
and properties, would require too much articulation of particular relations to be useful
when compared with ordinary grammatical ability.
(For discussion of formalization, see MacFarlane's (2005) entry on ​Logical
Constants​ i​ n the SEP, Johnson-Laird (2006) Ch. 12, and Massey (1981).)
2.5 ​confidence level.​ See note on 1.7 above.
2.6 ​add the generic premises.​ Students are thus required to think of the qualities
of good samples every time.
2.11 ​the total evidence rule. This bears emphasis. We'll see it repeatedly in a
variety of contexts. In this chapter, it is also mentioned as the typicality requirement for
IS.
3 ​Instantiation (Syllogism). As with IG, a slightly different name than normal —
most commonly called ​statistical s​ yllogism — but one that seems to work well.
3 ​%​. To repeat from the note on formalization just above, that the number needed
 48

to make the argument cogent cannot be determined in advance shows that this
argument "form" is not truly formalized. That is, what F and G in fact are can be
important to the strength of the argument.
4 ​Induction To A Particular​. I'm inclined to think there's always a generalization
step. But IP is included in any case. It serves as an opportunity to repeat IG and IS.

I&S – Problems In Inductive Logic

General Remarks: This appendix of philosophical issues in induction can be used
for a separate discussion section or as reading for advanced students, or pieces of it can
be included as they arise.

I&S – Association Diagrams & Cross-Tabulations

1.2 ​exhaustive. ​Often the wider class is formed by disjunction and is not a natural
class, e.g. the class of 'dogs or cats' is exhaustively divided into dogs and cats. Exclusivity
is thus the more important in practice.
1.4 ​visually represent. ​These diagrams are a version of the diagrams in Giere
(1997). His book, ​Understanding Scientific Reasoning​, in any edition, is highly
recommended as background for the issues in this chapter.
1.5 ​instruction in statistics. Giere's (1997) continues beyond this point with
minimal mathematics.
1.8 ​Smoking.​ Of related interest: NBC news report of January 11, 1964:
http://video.msnbc.msn.com/nightly-news/45958853
1.9 ​Association.​ Not to be confused with Ass. in the method of Derivation.
When there is no association, we often offer randomness as an explanation (for
example, why streaks appear in coin-tosses or in scoring success, or the apparent impact
of criticism — see ​Gilovich (1991) chapter 1) even though such "explanations" are largely
an admission that we do not have an explanation.
​ his is the sustained use of the 'four possibilities' first
2.4 ​variables ... values. T
mentioned earlier.
 49

2.4 ​cross tabulations​ are also called "contingency tables".

I&S – Explanation-Building
1 The aim of this section, generally speaking, is to get students thinking about the
variety of statuses a state or event can have as a cause and the possible complexity of
explanations. The trajectory followed here is to begin from the weakest status available
to a state or event as a cause, namely, being associated with the effect, and
strengthening this into other types of causal relationship.
Mackie seems to think that being an INUS condition is the weakest – see the note
to 1.5, below.
1.2 ​Defeaters.​ Toulmin (1958) puts the defeater after the reasoning (he calls it a
qualifier), as a possible exception about which the speaker is ignorant in the particular
case. Qualifiers weaken the strength of sufficient and necessary causes; if they do so too
much, they must be built into the explanation and accounted for (i.e. ruled out) in the
particular case. If they are highly unlikely, they can be left unchecked. What counts as
"too much" is not specified, just as "near universal" is not specified.
​ ackie (1965) claims that "it is often a condition of this
1.5 ​Mackie speculated. M
sort [i.e. an INUS condition] that we have in mind" when we use the word "cause" (p.
245). But he gives no evidence for this, only some examples. I assert, equally without
evidence, that in everyday life there are causes with all sorts of statuses – individually
sufficient, individually necessary, jointly sufficient, INUS, individually or jointly
necessary – and that this variety (which is due in part to the difference between
explaining a particular event in a specific situation with a limited causal field, to use
Mackie's term, under a variety of assumptions, and explaining an event in general by
specifying all of its causes explicitly) contributes to the general confusion surrounding
"cause".
He does allow that INUS conditions can be strengthened, particularly into an
individually necessary cause. (He uses the locution "at least an INUS condition".) But he
does not seem to countenance weaker statuses. For a condition to be an INUS condition
 50

at least two separate jointly sufficient causes are required. But having even one jointly
sufficient cause is sometimes beyond our ken. (The example used in this section is heart
disease.) Mackie might favor INUS conditions because of the example he starts from
(the short-circuit causing the house-fire), a familiar example and one already
well-understood; in other areas of life, particularly at the micro level and at the edge of
our current understanding, we are very much at a loss. He also (later in the paper)
works with Mill's Methods, which similarly require an investigator to have a number of
possible sufficient causes already in mind, rather than with association and correlation
as an attempt to find causes.
not necessary. Mackie must mean here that ​in general the short-circuit is not
necessary; in the specific situation, it is necessary: if it had not happened the house
would still be standing. There's a blurring of particular and general in Mackie.
1.1 ​the weather forecaster says … ​. If one believes in ​magic​, however, one believes
that saying or thinking some thing can ​make it so. For example, "I failed to get through
all of the traffic lights because I jinxed it when I got through the first four." or "The
universe exists because a god willed it into existence.". In such cases, the distinction
between justification and explanation might in large part vanish.
The distinction between justification and explanation is discussed at greater
length in ​RW – Classifying & Analyzing Reasoning​.

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