KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al.

, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015

PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe

TOPIC: Biometrics validation

FACTS:

RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a

mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption
of biometric technology.

RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometricshave not been
captured shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation
on or before the last day of filing of applicationfor registration for purposes of the May
2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.”

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and
10013. Among others, the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of
voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last
day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections shall be deactivated.

Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing
the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367,
as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional

requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October
31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise
of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State
has the right to reasonably regulate.

The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process of
registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.

Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless

still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a

literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of
the Constitution -that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft
of any rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the
public good -the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

Presence of compelling state interest

Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA

10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate
the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing -if not eliminating,
the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants.
The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-
said interest
 Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometricsvalidation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office
of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his
photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded.

Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters
to submit themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required
the voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in
succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter.

Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising
their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could
still apply for reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall, however, be

conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the
prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The
subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to conductvoter registration up to such
time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended
depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies.
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT v. COMELEC, GR No. 222731, 2016-03-08
Facts:
Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-VNP,
Inc.) and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this Petition[2] for mandamus before
this court to compel respondent Commission on Elections to implement the Voter Verified Paper
Audit Trail security feature.
The Commission on Elections is a government entity[9] "vested by law to enforce and administer
all laws relative to the conduct of elections in the country."... epublic Act No. 8436[11] authorized
the Commission on Elections to use an automated election system for electoral exercises.
Republic Act No. 9369 introduced significant changes to Republic Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, and other election-related statutes.
In 2010 and 2013, the Commission on Elections enforced a nationwide automated election system
using the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. For the 2016 National and Local Elections,
the Commission on Elections has opted to use the Vote-Counting Machine.[16] The vote-counting
machine is a "paper-based automated election system,"[17] which is reported to be "seven times
faster and more powerful than the PCOS because of its updated processor."[18] Likewise, it is
reported to have more memory and security features,[19] and is "capable of producing the Voter
Verification Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)."[20] This VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed
receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting machine.[
Issues:
whether the Commission on Elections may be compelled, through a writ of mandamus, to enable
the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail system capability feature for the 2016 Elections.
Ruling:
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." One of
the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election system to have the capability of
providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.
he current vote-counting machines should meet the minimum system capability of generating a
VVPAT. However, the Commission on Elections' act of rendering inoperative this feature runs
contrary to why the law required this feature in the first place.
. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify whether
the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should
be paper based
 # 9 Naval vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014

CASE:
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari to assail the (a)
COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution granting the petition filed by Julia,
seeking to cancel the COC as Member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of Naval, who is allegedly
violating the three-term limit imposed upon elective local officials; and (b)
COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution denying Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration to
the Resolution issued by COMELEC Second Diviosn.
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as
a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.

On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out of 10
towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District.
The present Second District is composed of the two remaining
towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.

In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of
the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of
the Sanggunian, Third District.

Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the
2013 elections. He filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel COC of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the
entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of
the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. Allowing
Naval to run as a Sanggunianmember for the fourth time is violative of the
inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which
must be strictly construed.
Naval alleges: First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are
not merely renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities. With the
separation of Gainza and Milaorfrom the other eight towns which used to
comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative District are no
longer the same ones as those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and
2007 elections.
OSG contends: Seeking the denial of the instant petition, OSG contends
that Naval had been elected and had fully served the same local elective post for
three consecutive terms. Naval thus violated Section 78 of the OEC when he filed
his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility.
COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution: Cancelled Naval’sCOC on grounds:
When a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the
elective posts he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary
requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation
cognizable under Section 78 of the OEC.

The new Third District where Naval was elected and has served is composed of
the same municipalities comprising the previous Second District, absent the
towns Gainza and Milaor. The territorial jurisdiction Naval seeks to serve for the
term 2013-2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously served.
The electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 is the same electorate
who shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of
voters who elected him into office for three consecutive terms.
COMELEC en banc’s Resolution: Denied Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration to
the above. The COMELEC pointed out that absent the verification required under
Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Naval’s motion was
instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, according to the COMELEC, it is clear that the
position to which Naval has filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 elections is
the same position for which he had been elected and had served for the past nine
(9) years. The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert Naval’s post into
one different from what he previously had.

ISSUE:
WON Naval’s, a provincial board member, election to the same position for the
third and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed district, a
violation of the three-term limit rule.
RULING:
YES. With 26 in favor and 17 against, the Constitutional Commission approved
that there is no immediate reelection after three successive terms. For the Body
believed that the imposition of term limits would be tantamount to squandering
the experience of seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the power of the
citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in the office.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms. The “limitation” under this first branch of the provision is expressed in
the negative—“no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms.” This formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear
command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. This examination of the
wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its
formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high
priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and
which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal
constitutional worth.
In Naval’s case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second
District is to be created, but the Third District is to
be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to
achieve equality of representation among the districts.The aim of legislative
apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The
basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province
and not the number of registered voters therein. It is with this mindset that the
Court should consider Naval’sargument anent having a new set of constituents
electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.

Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought

about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation.”
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule,
does not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts
in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he
labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another
eligible person.
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by
Naval. For the Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous
precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716.
Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a
result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission,
no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Further,
sustaining Naval’sarguments would practically allow him to hold the same office
for 15 years.
The Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real
sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be
reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our
Constitution and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.

The drafters of the Constitution recognized the propensity of public officers to

perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a
guarantee of every citizen’s equal access to public service. These are the
restrictions statesmen should observe for they are intended to help ensure the
continued vitality of our republican institutions.

Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the COMELEC are AFFIRMED

Nolasco v COMELEC

FACTS

A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged
performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code – giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts
of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is
allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided
against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as
intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him.
The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolasco’s motions thus this
petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

Held:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to
prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blanco’s contention that the minimum
quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require
is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate’s
proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case
of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer
would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be
assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the
disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed