PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT

Manila

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 174269 August 25, 2010

POLO S. PANTALEON, Petitioner, 


vs.

AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent American

Express International, Inc. (AMEX) dated June 8, 2009,1 seeking to reverse
our Decision dated May 8, 2009 where we ruled that AMEX was guilty of
culpable delay in fulfilling its obligation to its cardholder –petitioner Polo
Pantaleon. Based on this conclusion, we held AMEX liable for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.2

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The established antecedents of the case are narrated below.

AMEX is a resident foreign corporation engaged in the business of

providing credit services through the operation of a charge card system.
Pantaleon has been an AMEX cardholder since 1980.3

In October 1991, Pantaleon, together with his wife (Julialinda), daughter

(Regina), and son (Adrian Roberto), went on a guided European tour. On
October 25, 1991, the tour group arrived in Amsterdam. Due to their late
arrival, they postponed the tour of the city for the following day.4

The next day, the group began their sightseeing at around 8:50 a.m. with a
trip to the Coster Diamond House (Coster). To have enough time for take a
guided city tour of Amsterdam before their departure scheduled on that day,
the tour group planned to leave Coster by 9:30 a.m. at the latest.
While at Coster, Mrs. Pantaleon decided to purchase some diamond pieces
worth a total of US$13,826.00. Pantaleon presented his American Express
credit card to the sales clerk to pay for this purchase. He did this at around
9:15 a.m. The sales clerk swiped the credit card and asked Pantaleon to
sign the charge slip, which was then electronically referred to AMEX’s
Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m.5

At around 9:40 a.m., Coster had not received approval from AMEX for the
purchase so Pantaleon asked the store clerk to cancel the sale. The store
manager, however, convinced Pantaleon to wait a few more minutes.
Subsequently, the store manager informed Pantaleon that AMEX was
asking for bank references; Pantaleon responded by giving the names of
his Philippine depository banks.

At around 10 a.m., or 45 minutes after Pantaleon presented his credit card,

AMEX still had not approved the purchase. Since the city tour could not
begin until the Pantaleons were onboard the tour bus, Coster decided to
release at around 10:05 a.m. the purchased items to Pantaleon even
without AMEX’s approval.

When the Pantaleons finally returned to the tour bus, they found their travel
companions visibly irritated. This irritation intensified when the tour guide
announced that they would have to cancel the tour because of lack of time
as they all had to be in Calais, Belgium by 3 p.m. to catch the ferry to
London.6

From the records, it appears that after Pantaleon’s purchase was

transmitted for approval to AMEX’s Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m.; was
referred to AMEX’s Manila office at 9:33 a.m.; and was approved by the
Manila office at 10:19 a.m. At 10:38 a.m., AMEX’s Manila office finally
transmitted the Approval Code to AMEX’s Amsterdam office. In all, it took
AMEX a total of 78 minutes to approve Pantaleon’s purchase and to
transmit the approval to the jewelry store.7

After the trip to Europe, the Pantaleon family proceeded to the United
States. Again, Pantaleon experienced delay in securing approval for
purchases using his American Express credit card on two separate
occasions. He experienced the first delay when he wanted to purchase golf
equipment in the amount of US$1,475.00 at the Richard Metz Golf Studio
in New York on October 30, 1991. Another delay occurred when he wanted
to purchase children’s shoes worth US$87.00 at the Quiency Market in
Boston on November 3, 1991.

Upon return to Manila, Pantaleon sent AMEX a letter demanding an

apology for the humiliation and inconvenience he and his family
experienced due to the delays in obtaining approval for his credit card
purchases. AMEX responded by explaining that the delay in Amsterdam
was due to the amount involved – the charged purchase of US$13,826.00
deviated from Pantaleon’s established charge purchase pattern.
Dissatisfied with this explanation, Pantaleon filed an action for damages
against the credit card company with the Makati City Regional Trial Court
(RTC).

On August 5, 1996, the RTC found AMEX guilty of delay, and awarded
Pantaleon ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱300,000.00 as exemplary
damages, ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱85,233.01 as litigation
expenses.

On appeal, the CA reversed the awards.8 While the CA recognized that

delay in the nature of mora accipiendi or creditor’s default attended AMEX’s
approval of Pantaleon’s purchases, it disagreed with the RTC’s finding that
AMEX had breached its contract, noting that the delay was not attended by
bad faith, malice or gross negligence. The appellate court found that AMEX
exercised diligent efforts to effect the approval of Pantaleon’s purchases;
the purchase at Coster posed particularly a problem because it was at
variance with Pantaleon’s established charge pattern. As there was no
proof that AMEX breached its contract, or that it acted in a wanton,
fraudulent or malevolent manner, the appellate court ruled that AMEX could
not be held liable for any form of damages.

Pantaleon questioned this decision via a petition for review on certiorari

with this Court.

In our May 8, 2009 decision, we reversed the appellate court’s decision and
held that AMEX was guilty of mora solvendi, or debtor’s default. AMEX, as
debtor, had an obligation as the credit provider to act on Pantaleon’s
purchase requests, whether to approve or disapprove them, with "timely
dispatch." Based on the evidence on record, we found that AMEX failed to
timely act on Pantaleon’s purchases.
Based one ly, tual obligations. 271,ct; moral damages le. uitable that
attorney'workers;plaitniff' the testimony of AMEX’s credit authorizer
Edgardo Jaurique, the approval time for credit card charges would be three
to four seconds under regular circumstances. In Pantaleon’s case, it took
AMEX 78 minutes to approve the Amsterdam purchase. We attributed this
delay to AMEX’s Manila credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurique, who had to go
over Pantaleon’s past credit history, his payment record and his credit and
bank references before he approved the purchase. Finding this delay
unwarranted, we reinstated the RTC decision and awarded Pantaleon
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation.

THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

In its motion for reconsideration, AMEX argues that this Court erred when it
found AMEX guilty of culpable delay in complying with its obligation to act
with timely dispatch on Pantaleon’s purchases. While AMEX admits that it
normally takes seconds to approve charge purchases, it emphasizes that
Pantaleon experienced delay in Amsterdam because his transaction was
not a normal one. To recall, Pantaleon sought to charge in a single
transaction jewelry items purchased from Coster in the total amount of
US$13,826.00 or ₱383,746.16. While the total amount of Pantaleon’s
previous purchases using his AMEX credit card did exceed US$13,826.00,
AMEX points out that these purchases were made in a span of more than
10 years, not in a single transaction.

Because this was the biggest single transaction that Pantaleon ever made
using his AMEX credit card, AMEX argues that the transaction necessarily
required the credit authorizer to carefully review Pantaleon’s credit history
and bank references. AMEX maintains that it did this not only to ensure
Pantaleon’s protection (to minimize the possibility that a third party was
fraudulently using his credit card), but also to protect itself from the risk that
Pantaleon might not be able to pay for his purchases on credit. This careful
review, according to AMEX, is also in keeping with the extraordinary degree
of diligence required of banks in handling its transactions. AMEX concluded
that in these lights, the thorough review of Pantaleon’s credit record was
motivated by legitimate concerns and could not be evidence of any ill will,
fraud, or negligence by AMEX.

AMEX further points out that the proximate cause of Pantaleon’s

humiliation and embarrassment was his own decision to proceed with the
purchase despite his awareness that the tour group was waiting for him
and his wife. Pantaleon could have prevented the humiliation had he
cancelled the sale when he noticed that the credit approval for the Coster
purchase was unusually delayed.

In his Comment dated February 24, 2010, Pantaleon maintains that AMEX
was guilty of mora solvendi, or delay on the part of the debtor, in complying
with its obligation to him. Based on jurisprudence, a just cause for delay
does not relieve the debtor in delay from the consequences of delay; thus,
even if AMEX had a justifiable reason for the delay, this reason would not
relieve it from the liability arising from its failure to timely act on Pantaleon’s
purchase.

In response to AMEX’s assertion that the delay was in keeping with its duty
to perform its obligation with extraordinary diligence, Pantaleon claims that
this duty includes the timely or prompt performance of its obligation.

As to AMEX’s contention that moral or exemplary damages cannot be

awarded absent a finding of malice, Pantaleon argues that evil motive or
design is not always necessary to support a finding of bad faith; gross
negligence or wanton disregard of contractual obligations is sufficient basis
for the award of moral and exemplary damages.

OUR RULING

We GRANT the motion for reconsideration.

Brief historical background

A credit card is defined as "any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit
device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor
or services or anything of value on credit."9 It traces its roots to the charge
card first introduced by the Diners Club in New York City in
1950.10 American Express followed suit by introducing its own charge card
to the American market in 1958.11

In the Philippines, the now defunct Pacific Bank was responsible for
bringing the first credit card into the country in the 1970s.12 However, it was
only in the early 2000s that credit card use gained wide acceptance in the
country, as evidenced by the surge in the number of credit card holders
then.13
Nature of Credit Card Transactions

To better understand the dynamics involved in credit card transactions, we

turn to the United States case of Harris Trust & Savings Bank v.
McCray14 which explains:

The bank credit card system involves a tripartite relationship between the
issuer bank, the cardholder, and merchants participating in the system. The
issuer bank establishes an account on behalf of the person to whom the
card is issued, and the two parties enter into an agreement which governs
their relationship. This agreement provides that the bank will pay for
cardholder’s account the amount of merchandise or services purchased
through the use of the credit card and will also make cash loans available
to the cardholder. It also states that the cardholder shall be liable to the
bank for advances and payments made by the bank and that the
cardholder’s obligation to pay the bank shall not be affected or impaired by
any dispute, claim, or demand by the cardholder with respect to any
merchandise or service purchased.

The merchants participating in the system agree to honor the bank’s credit
cards. The bank irrevocably agrees to honor and pay the sales slips
presented by the merchant if the merchant performs his undertakings such
as checking the list of revoked cards before accepting the card. x x x.

These slips are forwarded to the member bank which originally issued the
card. The cardholder receives a statement from the bank periodically and
may then decide whether to make payment to the bank in full within a
specified period, free of interest, or to defer payment and ultimately incur
an interest charge.

We adopted a similar view in CIR v. American Express International, Inc.

(Philippine branch),15 where we also recognized that credit card issuers are
not limited to banks. We said:

Under RA 8484, the credit card that is issued by banks in general, or by

non-banks in particular, refers to "any card x x x or other credit device
existing for the purpose of obtaining x x x goods x x x or services x x x on
credit;" and is being used "usually on a revolving basis." This means that
the consumer-credit arrangement that exists between the issuer and the
holder of the credit card enables the latter to procure goods or services "on
a continuing basis as long as the outstanding balance does not exceed a
specified limit." The card holder is, therefore, given "the power to obtain
present control of goods or service on a promise to pay for them in the
future."

Business establishments may extend credit sales through the use of the
credit card facilities of a non-bank credit card company to avoid the risk of
uncollectible accounts from their customers. Under this system, the
establishments do not deposit in their bank accounts the credit card drafts
that arise from the credit sales. Instead, they merely record their
receivables from the credit card company and periodically send the drafts
evidencing those receivables to the latter.

The credit card company, in turn, sends checks as payment to these

business establishments, but it does not redeem the drafts at full price. The
agreement between them usually provides for discounts to be taken by the
company upon its redemption of the drafts. At the end of each month, it
then bills its credit card holders for their respective drafts redeemed during
the previous month. If the holders fail to pay the amounts owed, the
company sustains the loss.

Simply put, every credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely:
(a) the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or
the business establishment which accepted the credit card; (b) the loan
agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and
lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the
merchant or business establishment.16

Credit card issuer – cardholder relationship

When a credit card company gives the holder the privilege of charging
items at establishments associated with the issuer,17 a necessary question
in a legal analysis is – when does this relationship begin? There are two
diverging views on the matter. In City Stores Co. v. Henderson,18 another
U.S. decision, held that:

The issuance of a credit card is but an offer to extend a line of open

account credit. It is unilateral and supported by no consideration. The offer
may be withdrawn at any time, without prior notice, for any reason or,
indeed, for no reason at all, and its withdrawal breaches no duty – for there
is no duty to continue it – and violates no rights.
Thus, under this view, each credit card transaction is considered a separate
offer and acceptance.

Novack v. Cities Service Oil Co.19 echoed this view, with the court ruling
that the mere issuance of a credit card did not create a contractual
relationship with the cardholder.

On the other end of the spectrum is Gray v. American Express

Company20 which recognized the card membership agreement itself as a
binding contract between the credit card issuer and the card holder. Unlike
in the Novack and the City Stores cases, however, the cardholder in Gray
paid an annual fee for the privilege of being an American Express
cardholder.

In our jurisdiction, we generally adhere to the Gray ruling, recognizing the

relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder as a
contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the
card membership agreement.21 This contract provides the rights and
liabilities of a credit card company to its cardholders and vice versa.

We note that a card membership agreement is a contract of adhesion as its

terms are prepared solely by the credit card issuer, with the cardholder
merely affixing his signature signifying his adhesion to these terms.22 This
circumstance, however, does not render the agreement void; we have
uniformly held that contracts of adhesion are "as binding as ordinary
contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is
free to reject it entirely."23 The only effect is that the terms of the contract
are construed strictly against the party who drafted it.24

On AMEX’s obligations to Pantaleon

We begin by identifying the two privileges that Pantaleon assumes he is

entitled to with the issuance of his AMEX credit card, and on which he
anchors his claims. First, Pantaleon presumes that since his credit card has
no pre-set spending limit, AMEX has the obligation to approve all his
charge requests. Conversely, even if AMEX has no such obligation, at the
very least it is obliged to act on his charge requests within a specific period
of time.

i. Use of credit card a mere offer to enter into loan agreements

Although we recognize the existence of a relationship between the credit
card issuer and the credit card holder upon the acceptance by the
cardholder of the terms of the card membership agreement (customarily
signified by the act of the cardholder in signing the back of the credit card),
we have to distinguish this contractual relationship from the creditor-debtor
relationship which only arises after the credit card issuer has approved the
cardholder’s purchase request. The first relates merely to an agreement
providing for credit facility to the cardholder. The latter involves the actual
credit on loan agreement involving three contracts, namely: the sales
contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business
establishment which accepted the credit card; the loan agreement between
the credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and the promise to pay
between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business
establishment.

From the loan agreement perspective, the contractual relationship begins

to exist only upon the meeting of the offer25 and acceptance of the parties
involved. In more concrete terms, when cardholders use their credit cards
to pay for their purchases, they merely offer to enter into loan agreements
with the credit card company. Only after the latter approves the purchase
requests that the parties enter into binding loan contracts, in keeping with
Article 1319 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified
acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.

This view finds support in the reservation found in the card membership
agreement itself, particularly paragraph 10, which clearly states that AMEX
"reserve[s] the right to deny authorization for any requested Charge."
By so providing, AMEX made its position clear that it has no obligation to
approve any and all charge requests made by its card holders.

ii. AMEX not guilty of culpable delay

Since AMEX has no obligation to approve the purchase requests of its

credit cardholders, Pantaleon cannot claim that AMEX defaulted in its
obligation. Article 1169 of the Civil Code, which provides the requisites to
hold a debtor guilty of culpable delay, states:
Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from
the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the
fulfillment of their obligation. x x x.

The three requisites for a finding of default are: (a) that the obligation is
demandable and liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the
creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance.26

Based on the above, the first requisite is no longer met because AMEX, by
the express terms of the credit card agreement, is not obligated to approve
Pantaleon’s purchase request. Without a demandable obligation, there can
be no finding of default.

Apart from the lack of any demandable obligation, we also find that
Pantaleon failed to make the demand required by Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.

As previously established, the use of a credit card to pay for a purchase is

only an offer to the credit card company to enter a loan agreement with the
credit card holder. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no
obligation relating to the loan agreement exists between them. On the
other hand, a demand is defined as the "assertion of a legal right; xxx an
asking with authority, claiming or challenging as due."27 A demand
presupposes the existence of an obligation between the parties.

Thus, every time that Pantaleon used his AMEX credit card to pay for his
purchases, what the stores transmitted to AMEX were his offers to execute
loan contracts. These obviously could not be classified as the demand
required by law to make the debtor in default, given that no obligation could
arise on the part of AMEX until after AMEX transmitted its acceptance of
Pantaleon’s offers. Pantaleon’s act of "insisting on and waiting for the
charge purchases to be approved by AMEX"28 is not the demand
contemplated by Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

For failing to comply with the requisites of Article 1169, Pantaleon’s charge
that AMEX is guilty of culpable delay in approving his purchase requests
must fail.

iii. On AMEX’s obligation to act on the offer within a specific period of

time
Even assuming that AMEX had the right to review his credit card history
before it approved his purchase requests, Pantaleon insists that AMEX had
an obligation to act on his purchase requests, either to approve or deny, in
"a matter of seconds" or "in timely dispatch." Pantaleon impresses upon us
the existence of this obligation by emphasizing two points: (a) his card has
no pre-set spending limit; and (b) in his twelve years of using his AMEX
card, AMEX had always approved his charges in a matter of seconds.

Pantaleon’s assertions fail to convince us.

We originally held that AMEX was in culpable delay when it acted on the
Coster transaction, as well as the two other transactions in the United
States which took AMEX approximately 15 to 20 minutes to approve. This
conclusion appears valid and reasonable at first glance, comparing the time
it took to finally get the Coster purchase approved (a total of 78 minutes), to
AMEX’s "normal" approval time of three to four seconds (based on the
testimony of Edgardo Jaurigue, as well as Pantaleon’s previous
experience). We come to a different result, however, after a closer look at
the factual and legal circumstances of the case.

AMEX’s credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, explained that having no pre-

set spending limit in a credit card simply means that the charges made by
the cardholder are approved based on his ability to pay, as demonstrated
by his past spending, payment patterns, and personal resources.
29 Nevertheless, every time Pantaleon charges a purchase on his credit

card, the credit card company still has to determine whether it will
allow this charge, based on his past credit history. This right to review
a card holder’s credit history, although not specifically set out in the card
membership agreement, is a necessary implication of AMEX’s right to deny
authorization for any requested charge.

As for Pantaleon’s previous experiences with AMEX (i.e., that in the past 12
years, AMEX has always approved his charge requests in three or four
seconds), this record does not establish that Pantaleon had a legally
enforceable obligation to expect AMEX to act on his charge requests within
a matter of seconds. For one, Pantaleon failed to present any evidence to
support his assertion that AMEX acted on purchase requests in a matter of
three or four seconds as an established practice. More importantly, even if
Pantaleon did prove that AMEX, as a matter of practice or custom, acted on
its customers’ purchase requests in a matter of seconds, this would still not
be enough to establish a legally demandable right; as a general rule, a
practice or custom is not a source of a legally demandable or enforceable
right.30

We next examine the credit card membership agreement, the contract that
primarily governs the relationship between AMEX and Pantaleon.
Significantly, there is no provision in this agreement that obligates
AMEX to act on all cardholder purchase requests within a specifically
defined period of time. Thus, regardless of whether the obligation is
worded was to "act in a matter of seconds" or to "act in timely dispatch," the
fact remains that no obligation exists on the part of AMEX to act within a
specific period of time. Even Pantaleon admits in his testimony that he
could not recall any provision in the Agreement that guaranteed AMEX’s
approval of his charge requests within a matter of minutes.31

Nor can Pantaleon look to the law or government issuances as the source
of AMEX’s alleged obligation to act upon his credit card purchases within a
matter of seconds. As the following survey of Philippine law on credit card
transactions demonstrates, the State does not require credit card
companies to act upon its cardholders’ purchase requests within a specific
period of time.

Republic Act No. 8484 (RA 8484), or the Access Devices Regulation Act of
1998, approved on February 11, 1998, is the controlling legislation that
regulates the issuance and use of access devices,32 including credit cards.
The more salient portions of this law include the imposition of the obligation
on a credit card company to disclose certain important financial
information33 to credit card applicants, as well as a definition of the acts that
constitute access device fraud.

As financial institutions engaged in the business of providing credit, credit

card companies fall under the supervisory powers of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).34 BSP Circular No. 398 dated August 21, 2003 embodies
the BSP’s policy when it comes to credit cards –

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) shall foster the development of

consumer credit through innovative products such as credit cards under
conditions of fair and sound consumer credit practices. The BSP
likewise encourages competition and transparency to ensure more efficient
delivery of services and fair dealings with customers. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on this Circular, "x x x [b]efore issuing credit cards, banks and/or
their subsidiary credit card companies must exercise proper diligence by
ascertaining that applicants possess good credit standing and are
financially capable of fulfilling their credit commitments."35 As the above-
quoted policy expressly states, the general intent is to foster "fair and
sound consumer credit practices."

Other than BSP Circular No. 398, a related circular is BSP Circular No.
454, issued on September 24, 2004, but this circular merely enumerates
the unfair collection practices of credit card companies – a matter not
relevant to the issue at hand.

In light of the foregoing, we find and so hold that AMEX is neither

contractually bound nor legally obligated to act on its cardholders’ purchase
requests within any specific period of time, much less a period of a "matter
of seconds" that Pantaleon uses as his standard. The standard therefore is
implicit and, as in all contracts, must be based on fairness and
reasonableness, read in relation to the Civil Code provisions on human
relations, as will be discussed below.

AMEX acted with good faith

Thus far, we have already established that: (a) AMEX had neither a
contractual nor a legal obligation to act upon Pantaleon’s purchases within
a specific period of time; and (b) AMEX has a right to review a cardholder’s
credit card history. Our recognition of these entitlements, however,
does not give AMEX an unlimited right to put off action on
cardholders’ purchase requests for indefinite periods of time. In acting
on cardholders’ purchase requests, AMEX must take care not to abuse its
rights and cause injury to its clients and/or third persons. We cite in this
regard Article 19, in conjunction with Article 21, of the Civil Code, which
provide:

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 19 pervades the entire legal system and ensures that a person
suffering damage in the course of another’s exercise of right or
performance of duty, should find himself without relief.36 It sets the standard
for the conduct of all persons, whether artificial or natural, and requires that
everyone, in the exercise of rights and the performance of obligations,
must: (a) act with justice, (b) give everyone his due, and (c) observe
honesty and good faith. It is not because a person invokes his rights that he
can do anything, even to the prejudice and disadvantage of another.37

While Article 19 enumerates the standards of conduct, Article 21 provides

the remedy for the person injured by the willful act, an action for damages.
We explained how these two provisions correlate with each other in GF
Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:38

[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle

of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though
by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

In the context of a credit card relationship, although there is neither a

contractual stipulation nor a specific law requiring the credit card issuer to
act on the credit card holder’s offer within a definite period of time, these
principles provide the standard by which to judge AMEX’s actions.

According to Pantaleon, even if AMEX did have a right to review his charge
purchases, it abused this right when it unreasonably delayed the
processing of the Coster charge purchase, as well as his purchase
requests at the Richard Metz’ Golf Studio and Kids’ Unlimited Store; AMEX
should have known that its failure to act immediately on charge referrals
would entail inconvenience and result in humiliation, embarrassment,
anxiety and distress to its cardholders who would be required to wait before
closing their transactions.39

It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and

that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging it.
40 Although it took AMEX some time before it approved Pantaleon’s three

charge requests, we find no evidence to suggest that it acted with

deliberate intent to cause Pantaleon any loss or injury, or acted in a manner
that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. We give
credence to AMEX’s claim that its review procedure was done to ensure
Pantaleon’s own protection as a cardholder and to prevent the possibility
that the credit card was being fraudulently used by a third person.

Pantaleon countered that this review procedure is primarily intended to

protect AMEX’s interests, to make sure that the cardholder making the
purchase has enough means to pay for the credit extended. Even if this
were the case, however, we do not find any taint of bad faith in such
motive. It is but natural for AMEX to want to ensure that it will extend credit
only to people who will have sufficient means to pay for their purchases.
AMEX, after all, is running a business, not a charity, and it would simply be
ludicrous to suggest that it would not want to earn profit for its services.
Thus, so long as AMEX exercises its rights, performs its obligations, and
generally acts with good faith, with no intent to cause harm, even if it may
occasionally inconvenience others, it cannot be held liable for damages.

We also cannot turn a blind eye to the circumstances surrounding the

Coster transaction which, in our opinion, justified the wait. In Edgardo
Jaurigue’s own words:

Q 21: With reference to the transaction at the Coster Diamond House

covered by Exhibit H, also Exhibit 4 for the defendant, the approval came at
2:19 a.m. after the request was relayed at 1:33 a.m., can you explain why
the approval came after about 46 minutes, more or less?

A21: Because we have to make certain considerations and evaluations of

[Pantaleon’s] past spending pattern with [AMEX] at that time before
approving plaintiff’s request because [Pantaleon] was at that time
making his very first single charge purchase of US$13,826 [this is below
the US$16,112.58 actually billed and paid for by the plaintiff because the
difference was already automatically approved by [AMEX] office in
Netherland[s] and the record of [Pantaleon’s] past spending with
[AMEX] at that time does not favorably support his ability to pay for
such purchase. In fact, if the foregoing internal policy of [AMEX] had been
strictly followed, the transaction would not have been approved at all
considering that the past spending pattern of the plaintiff with [AMEX] at
that time does not support his ability to pay for such purchase.41

xxxx

Q: Why did it take so long?

A: It took time to review the account on credit, so, if there is any

delinquencies [sic] of the cardmember. There are factors on deciding the
charge itself which are standard measures in approving the authorization.
Now in the case of Mr. Pantaleon although his account is single charge
purchase of US$13,826. [sic] this is below the US$16,000. plus actually
billed x x x we would have already declined the charge outright and asked
him his bank account to support his charge. But due to the length of his
membership as cardholder we had to make a decision on hand.42

As Edgardo Jaurigue clarified, the reason why Pantaleon had to wait for
AMEX’s approval was because he had to go over Pantaleon’s credit card
history for the past twelve months.43 It would certainly be unjust for us to
penalize AMEX for merely exercising its right to review Pantaleon’s credit
history meticulously.

Finally, we said in Garciano v. Court of Appeals that "the right to recover

[moral damages] under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to
court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be
construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who
are not themselves at fault."44 As will be discussed below, Pantaleon is not
a blameless party in all this.

Pantaleon’s action was the proximate cause for his injury

Pantaleon mainly anchors his claim for moral and exemplary damages on
the embarrassment and humiliation that he felt when the European tour
group had to wait for him and his wife for approximately 35 minutes, and
eventually had to cancel the Amsterdam city tour. After thoroughly
reviewing the records of this case, we have come to the conclusion that
Pantaleon is the proximate cause for this embarrassment and humiliation.
As borne by the records, Pantaleon knew even before entering Coster that
the tour group would have to leave the store by 9:30 a.m. to have enough
time to take the city tour of Amsterdam before they left the country. After
9:30 a.m., Pantaleon’s son, who had boarded the bus ahead of his family,
returned to the store to inform his family that they were the only ones not
on the bus and that the entire tour group was waiting for them. Significantly,
Pantaleon tried to cancel the sale at 9:40 a.m. because he did not want to
cause any inconvenience to the tour group. However, when Coster’s sale
manager asked him to wait a few more minutes for the credit card approval,
he agreed, despite the knowledge that he had already caused a 10-minute
delay and that the city tour could not start without him.

In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes,45 we ruled that a person who

knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages
for the resulting injury:

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to
injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so.

This doctrine, in our view, is wholly applicable to this case. Pantaleon

himself testified that the most basic rule when travelling in a tour group is
that you must never be a cause of any delay because the schedule is very
strict.46 When Pantaleon made up his mind to push through with his
purchase, he must have known that the group would become annoyed and
irritated with him. This was the natural, foreseeable consequence of his
decision to make them all wait.

We do not discount the fact that Pantaleon and his family did feel
humiliated and embarrassed when they had to wait for AMEX to approve
the Coster purchase in Amsterdam. We have to acknowledge, however,
that Pantaleon was not a helpless victim in this scenario – at any time, he
could have cancelled the sale so that the group could go on with the city
tour. But he did not.

More importantly, AMEX did not violate any legal duty to Pantaleon under
the circumstances under the principle of damnum absque injuria, or
damages without legal wrong, loss without injury.47 As we held in BPI
Express Card v. CA:48
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent
suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card.
However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury
is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there
must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury.

Pantaleon is not entitled to damages

Because AMEX neither breached its contract with Pantaleon, nor acted
with culpable delay or the willful intent to cause harm, we find the award of
moral damages to Pantaleon unwarranted.

Similarly, we find no basis to award exemplary damages. In contracts,

exemplary damages can only be awarded if a defendant acted "in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner."49 The
plaintiff must also show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.50

As previously discussed, it took AMEX some time to approve Pantaleon’s

purchase requests because it had legitimate concerns on the amount being
charged; no malicious intent was ever established here. In the absence of
any other damages, the award of exemplary damages clearly lacks legal
basis.1avvphi1
Neither do we find any basis for the award of attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation. No premium should be placed on the right to litigate and not every
winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorney's fees.51 To be
entitled to attorney’s fees and litigation costs, a party must show that he
falls under one of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.52 This, Pantaleon failed to do. Since we eliminated the award of
moral and exemplary damages, so must we delete the award for attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.

Lastly, although we affirm the result of the CA decision, we do so for the

reasons stated in this Resolution and not for those found in the CA
decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we SET ASIDE our May 8, 2009

Decision and GRANT the present motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated August 18, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*

Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*Designated additional Member of the Special Second Division, per Raffle
dated August 10, 2010.
1 Rollo, pp. 1504-1514.
2 Id. at 1488-1503.
3 Id. at 14-15.
4 Id. at 735-736.
5 Id. at 739-749.
6 Id. at 20-21.
7 Id., citing defendant’s Exhibit "9-G," "9-H," and "9-I."
8 In a decision dated August 18, 2006 penned by Associate Justice E. J.
Asuncion, with the concurrence of Associate Justices J. Mendoza and A.
Tayag.
9 Section 3(f), Republic Act 8484.
10 See M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of: Credit Cards, TIME Magazine, April
2 3 , 2 0 0 9 , h t t p : / / w w w. t i m e . c o m / t i m e / m a g a z i n e / a r t i c l e /
0,9171,1893507,00.html
11 http://home3.americanexpress.com/corp/os/history.asp
12See Advice on Wise Credit Card Use and Money Management, Business
Section of the February 9, 2009 issue of the Philippine Star, http://
www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=438524
13 http://www.economywatch.com/credit-card/international/philippines-
credit-cards.html
14 21 Ill.App.3d 605, 316 N.E.2d 209 (1974).
15 G.R. No. 152609, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 197.
16 In Presta Oil, Inc. v. Van Waters & Rogers Corporation, the court
characterized the nature of this last contract, thus:

Credit cards are more automatic in their operation than checks or notes,
but courts which have examined whether a credit card is legal tender have
concluded that it is not. Instead, these courts held that the debt incurred in
a credit card transaction is discharged when the merchant receives
payment from the card issuer.

276 F.Supp.2d 1128, (2003) citing Porter v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526,
384 S.E.2d 631, 634 (1989), cert denied *1137 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct.
1297, 108 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990); Berry v. Hannigan, 7 Cal.App.4th 587, 9
Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 215 (1992), rev. denied Sept. 02, 1992; Cade v.
Montgomery Co.,83 Md.App. 419, 575 A.2d 744, 749 (1990), rev.
denied Aug. 30, 1990, cert denied 498 U.S. 1085, 111 S.Ct. 960, 112 L.Ed.
2d 1047 (1991).
17 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974).
18 116 Ga.App. 114, 156 S.E.2d 818 (1967).
19149 NJ Super 542, 374 A.2d 89 (1977), aff’d, 159 NJ Super. 400, 388 A.
2d 264 (1978).
20 743 F.2d 10, 240 US.App.D.C. 10 (1984).
21See BPI Express v. CA, G.R. No. 120639, September 25, 1998; Aznar v.
Citibank, G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2007; Sps. Ermitano v. CA, G.R. No.
127246, April 21, 1999; Acol v. Philippine Commercial Credit Card
Incorporation,G.R. No. 135149, July 25, 2006; Equitable Banking
Corporation v. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004; Bankard v.
Feliciano, G.R. No. 141761, July 28, 2006.
22 See BPI Express Card Corp. v. Olalia, 423 Phil. 593, 599 (2001).
23 Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 247, 255 [1998].
24Palmares vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126490, 288 SCRA 422, 433
(1998), citing Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
119706, 255 SCRA 48, 58 (1996).
25 An offer is defined as "a manifestation of willingness to enter into a
bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his
assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it." Black’s Law
Dictionary, 5th edition, p. 976.
26See Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. UCPB, G.R.
No. 165662, May 3, 2006.
27 Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 386.
28 Rollo, p. 1429.
29 Id. at 210.
30See Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Campos, G.R. No. 138814, April 16,
2009.
31 RTC records, p. 893-894.
32 Defined in Section 3 of RA 8484 as "any card, plate, code, account
number, electronic serial number, personal identification number, or other
telecommunications service, equipment, or instrumental identifier, or other
means of account access that can be used to obtain money, goods,
services, or any other thing of value or to initiate a transfer of funds (other
than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument)."
33 Credit card companies are required to provide information on the annual
interest rates on the amount of credit obtained by the card holder, the
annual membership fees, if any, the manner by which all charges and fees
are computed, among others.
34 Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7653, or the New Central Bank Act,
provides:

Section 3. Responsibility and Primary Objective. - The Bangko Sentral shall

provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall
have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such
regulatory powers as provided in this Act and other pertinent laws over the
operations of finance companies and non-bank financial institutions
performing quasi-banking functions, hereafter referred to as quasi-banks,
and institutions performing similar functions.

The primary objective of the Bangko Sentral is to maintain price stability

conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy. It shall
also promote and maintain monetary stability and the convertibility of the
peso.
35 Subsections X320.3 and 4301N.3 of BSP Circular No. 398.
36Albano, Ed Vincent. Persons and Family Relations, 3rd Edition, 2006, p.
66, citing the Report of the Code Commission, p. 39.
37 Id., at 67.
38 G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 466.
39 Rollo, p. 50.
40 Barons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126486, February
9, 1998, 286 SCRA 96, 105.
41 RTC Records, p. 210.
42 Id. at 1064.
43 Id. at 1074.
44 G.R. No. 96126, August 10, 1992, citing Mabutas v. Calapan Electric Co.
[CA], 50 OG 5828 (cited in Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 ed.,
p. 87).
45 G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005.
46 RTC records, pp. 1299-1300.
47 See 17 C.J., 1125; Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542.
48 G.R. No. 120639, September 25, 1998.
49 CIVIL CODE, Article 2232.
50 Ibid. Article 2234.
51Tanay Recreation Center and Development Corp. v. Fausto, 495 Phil.
400 (2005).
52 Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the

plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and

skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s

liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be

reasonable.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010

ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J.

ARCILLA, LOURDES J. CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO
R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL
JONGCO, Petitioners, 

vs.

ISMAEL VELOSO III, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 dated

January 31, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610, which
affirmed with modification the Resolution2 dated September 2, 2003 of
Branch 227 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC-Branch 227) of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-02-48341.

We partly reproduce below the facts of the case as culled by the Court of
Appeals from the records:

This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed by [herein

petitioners] Ermelinda C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra, Flordeliza J. Arcilla,
Lourdes J. Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt, Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R.
Jongco, Jr. and Joel Jongco against [herein respondent]. In said complaint
for unlawful detainer, it was alleged that they are the lessors of a residential
house located at No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village, Quezon
City [subject property] which was leased to [respondent] at a monthly rental
of ₱17,000.00. The action was instituted on the ground of [respondent's]
failure to pay rentals from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite
repeated demands. [Respondent] denied the non-payment of rentals and
alleged that he made an advance payment of ₱825,000.00 when he paid
for the repairs done on the leased property.

After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) decided in favor of

[petitioners] by ordering [respondent] to (a) vacate the premises at No. 42
Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City; (b) pay [petitioners]
the sum of ₱306,000.00 corresponding to the rentals due from May 23,
1997 to November 22, 1998, and the sum of ₱17,000.00 a month thereafter
until [respondent] vacates the premises; and (c) pay [petitioners] the sum of
₱5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [Branch 88, Quezon City], the
MeTC decision was reversed. [Respondent] was ordered to pay arrearages
from May 23, 1997 up to the date of the decision but he was also given an
option to choose between staying in the leased property or vacating the
same, subject to the reimbursement by [petitioners] of one-half of the value
of the improvements which it found to be in the amount of ₱120,000.00.
[Respondent] was also given the right to remove said improvements
pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code, should [petitioners] refuse to pay
₱60,000.00.

When both parties moved for the reconsideration of the RTC decision, the
RTC issued an Order dated February 23, 2001 modifying its previous ruling
by increasing the value of the improvements from ₱120,000.00 to
₱800,000.00.
After successive appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
the decision of the RTC dated November 29, 2000 which reversed the
decision of the MeTC, became final and executory.3

Whilst respondent's appeal of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)

judgment in the unlawful detainer case was pending before the RTC-
Branch 88, respondent filed before the RTC-Branch 227 on November 26,
2002 a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages4 against the
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-48341. The said complaint
alleged two causes of action. The first cause of action was for damages
because the respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and
humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of the above-mentioned
MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of
Horseshoe Village while respondent's appeal was still pending before the
Quezon City RTC-Branch 88. The second cause of action was for breach of
contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make continuing repairs on
the subject property to preserve and keep it tenantable. Thus, respondent
sought the following from the court a quo:

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after

hearing the court render a decision against the [herein petitioners] and in
favor of the [herein respondent] by -

1. Ordering [petitioners] to pay [respondent] the following amounts:

a) ₱1,500,000.00 as moral damages and consequential damages;

b) ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

c) ₱425,000.00 representing the difference of the expenses of the

improvements of ₱825,000.00 and ₱400,000.00 pursuant to Art. 1678 of
the Civil Code;

d) ₱594,000.00 representing interest for three (3) years from 1998 to 2000
on the ₱825,000.00 advanced by the [respondent] at the rate of 24% per
annum;
e) ₱250,000.00 as compensation for the [respondent's] labor and efforts in
overseeing and attending the needs of contractors the repair/renovation of
the leased premises;

f) ₱250,000.00, plus 20% of all recoveries from [petitioners] and ₱2,500.00

per hearing as attorney's fees;

g) Cost of suit.

[Respondent] further prays for such other reliefs and remedies which are
just and equitable under the premises.5

The petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion6 on February 18, 2003 praying for,
among other reliefs, the dismissal of respondent's complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-02-48341. Petitioners argued that respondent had no cause of action
against them because the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was
a matter of public record and its disclosure to the public violated no law or
any legal right of the respondent. Moreover, petitioners averred that the
respondent's present Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages was
barred by prior judgment since it was a mere replication of respondent's
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the unlawful detainer case before
the MeTC. The said unlawful detainer case was already judicially decided
with finality.

On September 2, 2003, the RTC-Branch 227 issued a Resolution

dismissing respondent's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 for
violating the rule against splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and
failure to disclose the pendency of a related case. The RTC-Branch 227
adjudged that Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 involved the same facts, parties,
and causes of action as those in the unlawful detainer case, and the MeTC
had already properly taken cognizance of the latter case.

Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 decision in Civil Case

No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration7 of said judgment on October 10, 2003, which RTC-
Branch 227 denied in an Order8 dated December 30, 2003.

Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 order denying his

Motion for Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of
Appeal9 on March 1, 2004. However, the RTC-Branch 227, in an
Order10 dated March 23, 2004, dismissed respondent's appeal for being
filed out of time.

Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 27 order dismissing his

appeal on April 30, 2004 and he filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the
same on May 3, 2004. The RTC-Branch 227, in another Order12 dated May
31, 2004, granted respondent's latest motion because it was "convinced
that it is but appropriate and fair to both parties that this matter of whether
or not the Appeal was filed on time, be resolved by the appellate court
rather than by this Court." The RTC-Branch 227 then ordered that the
records of the case be forwarded as soon as possible to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution13 dated February 8, 2005, resolved to

give due course to respondent's appeal. Said appeal was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 82610.

On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 82610. The Court of Appeals fully agreed with the RTC-
Branch 227 in dismissing respondent's second cause of action (i.e., breach
of contract) in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341. The appellate court, however,
held that RTC-Branch 227 should have proceeded with the trial on the
merits of the first cause of action (i.e., damages) in Civil Case No.
Q-02-48341, because "[a]lthough [herein respondent] may have stated the
same factual antecedents that transpired in the unlawful detainer case,
such allegations were necessary to give an overview of the facts leading to
the institution of another case between the parties before the RTC acting in
its original jurisdiction."14

The Court of Appeals then went on to find that petitioners were indeed
liable to respondent for damages:

No doubt, distributing the copies was primarily intended to embarrass

[herein respondent] in the community he mingled in. We are not unmindful
of the fact that court decisions are public documents and the general public
is allowed access thereto to make inquiries thereon or to secure a copy
thereof. Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, although court
decisions are public documents, distribution of the same during the
pendency of an appeal was clearly intended to cause [respondent] some
form of harassment and/or humiliation so that [respondent] would be
ostracized by his neighbors. The appeal may have delayed the attainment
of finality of the determination of the rights of the parties and the execution
in the unlawful detainer case but it did not justify [herein petitioners'] pre-
emption of the outcome of the appeal. By distributing copies of the MeTC
decision, [petitioners] appeared to have assumed that the MeTC decision
would simply be affirmed and therefore they tried to cause the early ouster
of [respondent] thinking that a humiliated [respondent] would scurry out of
the leased premises. Clearly, there was evident bad faith intended to mock
[respondent's] right to appeal which is a statutory remedy to correct errors
which might have been committed by the lower court.

Thus, moral damages may be awarded since [petitioners] acted in bad

faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill
will that partakes of the nature of fraud. However, an award of moral
damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there
must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

But it must again be stressed that moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. When
awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously
excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court judge. For this reason, this Court
finds an award of ₱30,000.00 moral damages sufficient under the
circumstances.

On the other hand, to warrant the award of exemplary damages, the

wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless or malevolent manner. Accordingly, exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱10,000.00 is appropriate.15

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with

the MODIFICATION that the case is dismissed only as to the second cause
of action. As to the first cause of action, [herein petitioners] are ordered to
pay [herein respondent] moral damages of ₱30,000.00 and exemplary
damages of ₱10,000.00.16

Hence, the instant Petition for Review.

Petitioners assert that respondent's appeal of the RTC-Branch 227

Resolution dated September 2, 2003, which dismissed the latter's
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341, was filed out of time. Respondent
received a copy of the said resolution on September 26, 2003, and he only
had 15 days from such date to file his appeal, or until October 11, 2003.
Respondent, instead, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution on
October 10, 2003, which left him with only one more day to file his appeal.
The RTC-Branch 227 subsequently denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the
respondent received on February 20, 2004. Respondent only had until the
following day, February 21, 2004, to file the appeal. However, respondent
filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 1, 2004. Hence, petitioners
conclude that the dismissal of respondent's complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-02-48341 already attained finality.

Petitioners argue in the alternative that the award of damages in

respondent's favor has no factual and legal bases. They contend that the
Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages to
respondent based on the bare and unproven allegations in the latter's
complaint and without the benefit of any hearing or trial. While the appellate
court declared that RTC-Branch 227 should have proceeded with the trial
on the merits involving the action for damages, it surprisingly went ahead
and ruled on petitioners' liability for said damages even without trial. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that respondent's allegations in his
complaint are true, he still has no cause of action for damages against
petitioners, for the disclosure of a court decision, which is part of public
record, did not cause any legal and compensable injury to respondent.

Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that his appeal of the September
2, 2003 Resolution of the RTC-Branch 227 to the Court of Appeals was
timely filed and that the same was aptly given due course. In addition,
respondent asserts that the appellate court was correct in holding
petitioners liable for damages even without any hearing or trial since
petitioners, in filing their omnibus motion praying for the dismissal of
respondent's complaint on the ground of "no cause of action," were
deemed to have hypothetically admitted as true the allegations in said
complaint.

The petition is partly meritorious.

We note, at the outset, that the propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-
Branch 227 of respondent's second cause of action against petitioners
(e.g., for breach of contract) was no longer disputed by the parties. Thus,
the present appeal pertains only to respondent's first cause of action (e.g.,
for damages), and in connection therewith, we are called upon to resolve
the following issues: (1) whether respondent timely filed his appeal of the
Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 before the
Court of Appeals; and (2) whether respondent is entitled to the award of
moral and exemplary damages.

We answer the first issue on the timeliness of respondent's appeal

affirmatively.

Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule," according to which, an

ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either
from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the
final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso,17 we presented a survey
of the cases applying the fresh period rule:

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of

Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal
and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-
day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated:

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15

days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15
days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3.

The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Reyes, to wit:

Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14

September 2005 while the present Petition was already pending before us.
x x x.

xxxx

With the advent of the "fresh period rule" parties who availed themselves of
the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of
appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.

The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken "within
fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from." The
use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence
of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," x x x.

xxxx

The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-
day appeal period should be counted - from receipt of notice of judgment or
from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from.

Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set
aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five days
late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file the
notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle

granting a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, we held that a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either
within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days
from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of

"fresh period rule," expostulating that procedural law refers to the adjective
law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may
be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably procedural,
prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be
computed or determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions
pending upon its effectivity, such as the present case, without danger of
violating anyone else's rights.18 (Emphases supplied.)

Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh

period rule to cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity:

The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal
had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14,
2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v.
Homena-Valencia, stating thus:

The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in

Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had
lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That
question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in
the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or
remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing.19(Emphases supplied.)

In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated
September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter,
on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the
respondent received on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after
nine days from receipt of the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh
period rule, respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the
prescriptive period of 15 days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving
due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the RTC-Branch 227
should not have dismissed respondent's complaint for damages on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.

According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is

the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of
action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the
complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters
aliunde. The test, therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in
the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance
with the prayer stated therein.20

Respondent made the following allegations in support of his claim for

damages against petitioners:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

28. After the promulgation of the Metropolitan Trial Court of its Decision
dated August 3, 1999, ordering the [herein respondent] and all person
claiming rights under him to -

(a) Vacate the leased premises;

(b) pay the [herein petitioners] the sum of ₱306,000.00 as unpaid rentals
from May 23, 1997 to November 22, 1998; and

(c) pay the sum of ₱5,000.00 as attorneys fees;

But while said Decision was still pending appeal with the Regional Trial
Court, the [petitioners], through [petitioner] Manaloto, already distributed
copies of said Decision to some of the homeowners of Horseshoe Village,
who personally know the [respondent]. This act is a direct assault or
character assassination on the part of the [respondent] because as stated
in the said decision, [respondent] has been staying in the premises but did
not or refused to pay his monthly rentals for a long period of time when in
truth and in fact was untrue.

29. That from the time the said decision was distributed to said members
homeowners, the [respondent] became the subject of conversation or talk
of the town and by virtue of which [respondent's] good name within the
community or society where he belongs was greatly damaged; his
reputation was besmirched; [respondent] suffered sleepless night and
serious anxiety. [Respondent], who is the grandson of the late Senator
Jose Veloso and Congressman Ismael Veloso, was deprived of political
career and to start with was to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman
within their area which was being offered to him by the homeowners but
this offer has started to fade and ultimately totally vanished after the
distribution of said Decision. Damages to his good names and reputations
and other damages which he suffered as a consequence thereof, may be
reasonably compensated for at least ₱1,500,000.00 as moral and
consequential damages.

30. In order to deter [petitioners] and others from doing as

abovementioned, [petitioners] should likewise be assessed exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00.21

A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are

present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.22 We find
that all three elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent may not have
specifically identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined
from the allegations in his complaint.

First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name,
and reputation. Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a
good name. This right is protected by law with the recognition of slander
and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or tortuous
conduct.23
Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondent's good name even
though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article
19 of the Civil Code requires, "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith." A violation of such principle
constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. We expounded in Sea
Commercial Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals24 that:

The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the
classical theory that "he who uses a right injures no one." The modern
tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even
when the act is not illicit.

Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting

adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. If
mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for
injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make
him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good
faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law,
together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would
render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means
good faith as understood by men of affairs.

While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle,

the "cardinal law on human conduct" expressed in said article has given
rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does
so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in
keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The
elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right
or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.25

Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent's "dignity, personality,

privacy and peace of mind" under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which
provides:

ART. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly

station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral
damages for acts and actions referred to in Article 26, among other
provisions, of the Civil Code.

In Concepcion v. Court of Appeals,26 we explained that:

The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in
our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the
human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality
is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every
country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a
person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not
exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for
violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.

It is petitioner's position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any
of those enumerated in Arts. 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear.
The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are
merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts.
Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's dignity,
such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.
Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury,
although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.27
And third, respondent alleged that the distribution by petitioners to
Horseshoe Village homeowners of copies of the MeTC decision in the
unlawful detainer case, which was adverse to respondent and still on
appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, had no apparent lawful or just purpose
except to humiliate respondent or assault his character. As a result,
respondent suffered damages - becoming the talk of the town and being
deprived of his political career.1avvphi1

Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them

since the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was part of public
records.

It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial
records and documents.28 However, this is not a case of the public seeking
and being denied access to judicial records and documents. The
controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioners of the MeTC
judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were
not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting
negatively respondent's good name and reputation among said
homeowners. The unlawful detainer case was a private dispute between
petitioners and respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent
was then still pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect
petitioners' intentions for distributing copies of said MeTC decision to non-
parties in the case. While petitioners were free to copy and distribute such
copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whether they did
so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latter's good
name and reputation in the community.

Nevertheless, we further declare that the Court of Appeals erred in already

awarding moral and exemplary damages in respondent's favor when the
parties have not yet had the chance to present any evidence before the
RTC-Branch 227. In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is incumbent upon the party
claiming affirmative relief from the court to convincingly prove its claim.
Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof
under our Rules. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.29

At this point, the finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on
the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to
the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the
other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm.30

We cannot subscribe to respondent's argument that there is no more need

for the presentation of evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving
for the dismissal of respondent's complaint for damages, hypothetically
admitted respondent's allegations. The hypothetical admission of
respondent's allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining
whether said complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a
cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is
meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the
hearing of the case for presentation of evidence by the parties.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The
award of moral and exemplary damages made by the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondent Ismael Veloso III is DELETED. The complaint of
respondent Ismael Veloso III in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 is hereby
REINSTATED before Branch 227 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City only in so far as the first cause of action is concerned. The said court is
DIRECTED to hear and dispose of the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson
 ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
NACHURA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Per Raffle dated September 27, 2010.
1 Rollo, pp. 5-13; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon with
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano C. del Castillo
(now a member of this Court), concurring.
2 Records, pp. 186-187.
3 Rollo, pp. 6-7.
4 Records, pp. 1-109.
5 Id. at 16-17.
6 Id. at 112-130.
7 Id. at 189-196.
8 Id. at 205.
9 Id. at 209-210.
10 Id. at 214.
11 Id. at 215-217.
12 Id. at 224-225.
13 CA rollo, pp. 158-159.
14 Rollo, pp. 11-12.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 12.
17 G.R. No. 162518, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 450, 455-459.
18 Id. at 455-457.
19 Id. at 457-458.
20Associated Bank v. Montano, Sr., G.R. No. 166383, October 16, 2009,
604 SCRA 134, 144.
21 Records, pp. 12-14.
22 Vergara v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 336, 341 (1999).
23 Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568, 571 (2004).
24 377 Phil. 221 (1999).
25 Id. at 229-230.
26 381 Phil. 90 (2000).
27 Id. at 99.
28 Hilado v. Judge Reyes, 496 Phil. 55, 68 (2005).
29 Mayor v. Belen, G.R. No. 151035, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 561, 567.
30 Arra Realty Corporation v. Guarantee Development Corporation and
Insurance Agency, G.R. No. 142310, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 441,
469.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189311 December 6, 2010

DENNIS R. MANZANAL and BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB

CORPORATION, Petitioners, 

vs.

RAMON K. ILUSORIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The only issue presented in this case is whether the complaint for damages
filed by Ramon K. Ilusorio (respondent) against petitioners Dennis R.
Manzanal and Baguio Country Club Corporation (BCCC) states a cause of
action.

On July 7, 1994, a penthouse unit (PH-1) at the BCCC building in Baguio

was assigned to respondent by one Felix Adolfo B. Lopez, Jr., with the
conformity of BCCC.

By respondent’s claim, he, for a period of five (5) years since the
assignment, enjoyed the use of the unit and the club’s facilities, along with
his business colleagues and friends but that when conflict within the family
arose in 1998 and escalated to great proportions, he was barred from using
the unit and was almost expelled as member of the club. Hence, spawned
his filing of multiple suits against BCCC before the courts and SEC.
Respondent sent a May 31, 2001 letter to BCCC requesting for his current
statement of account. Replying, BCCC charged him the amount of
₱102,076.74 which he paid under protest. He, however, requested a
breakdown of the amount which BCCC, thru Manzanal, complied with, via
letter of November 26, 2001 to which was attached respondent’s Statement
of Account itemizing the amount which in fact totaled ₱2,928,223.26. The
letter reads:

Attached herewith please find Statement of Account with total amount of

₱2,928,223.26.

Our records also show that from April 1995 to July 1999, you sponsored an
estimated ninety-seven guests, many of whom are Multinational Investment
Bancorporation partners and personnel, Club charges for which amount to
Two Million Four Hundred Thirty One thousand Pesos (₱2,431,000.00) for
guest room charges exclusive of interest, guest fees and penalties.

This is also to follow-up payment due from you regarding our letter of
December 20, 20001, copy attached herewith for your reference.

In light of the foregoing, please remit in full the amount of ₱2,928,223.26. to

BCC within seven (7) days from receipt hereof, otherwise we shall be
constrained to take the appropriate action and remedies to enforce
payment of your obligation.2

BCCC subsequently sent a final demand letter dated December 19, 2001
to respondent for the immediate payment of the unpaid charges, failing
which, BCCC stated, it "shall be constrained to take the necessary action
available under the club’s rules to protect the interests of the club."

Respondent questioned, by reply letter of January 18, 2002, Manzanal’s

authority as an Assistant Vice President, as well as the billing for
₱2,431,000 and ₱599,300 as bereft of bases, thus:

I understand you are one of the lawyers of my estranged siblings (Sylvia,

Lin, and Max) and now you claim to be the Assistant Vice-President of
Baguio Country Club. Under what authority are you holding the said
position in the Club? Please present the proof of your authority.

You claim that I have incurred charges from April 1995 to July 1999
amounting to P2,431,000.00. There is no basis for your claim. It is highly
irregular for a member to be billed for charges allegedly incurred 6 years
ago.1avvphi1

With regard to your claim pertaining to the alleged Penthouse rectification

works amounting to P599,300.00, the same has no basis in fact and in law.

It is obvious that you and your principals are using the Club to harass me.
Please refrain from dragging the Club into the family feud.3

Taking the demand letters letter as a form of harassment from his family
who was utilizing Manzanal and BCCC (petitioners) for that purpose,
respondent filed in 2002 a complaint for damages against petitioners before
the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC), alleging:

xxxx

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

20. The recent act of BCCC and MANZANAL to collect the amount of
P2,928,223.26 is another form of harassment against the plaintiff. To be
precise, it is part of the series of harassment, characterized with bad faith
and malice, being done by BCCC, MANZANAL, and plaintiff’s estranged
siblings.

21. Plaintiff has no obligation to pay the amount of P2,928,223.26 to

BCCC. It bears to note that under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, obligations arise from law; contracts; quasi-contracts; acts or
omissions punished by law; and quasi-delicts. In the present case, it is
quite clear that the collection of the amount of P2,928,223.26 is clearly
without legal or factual basis. Corollary thereto, BCCC and MANZANAL
have no right to collect the amount of P2,928,223.26 from the plaintiff.

22. Collecting room charges purportedly incurred as far as six (6) years
ago, aside from the fact that it is baseless, is also dubious and scheming.
As owner of the subject UNIT, plaintiff should not be held liable for its use
and enjoyment considering that use and enjoyment of the UNIT are
incidence of ownership.

23. Assuming without conceding that BCCC has the right to collect the
amount of P2,928,223.26 from the plaintiff the same had already
prescribed.
24. Assuming without conceding that BCC has the right to collect the
amount P2,928,223.26 from the plaintiff, the latter is already guilty of laches
and estoppel to effect collection thereof.

25. Moreover, it is improper for BCCC and MANZANAL to collect the

amount pertaining to the rectification works regarding a purported
encroachment on BCCC common areas because the matter is still subject
of a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City entitled
"Baguio Country Club vs. Ramon K. Ilusorio" docketed as Civil Case No.
4750-R.

26. Under the foregoing circumstances, BCCC and MANZANAL should be

enjoined from collecting from the plaintiff or in any way extra-judicially
enforcing the payment of said claim or imposing any sanction against the
plaintiff on account of said claim.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

27. As a consequence of the unlawful act of MANZANAL and BCCC in

initiating collection of the amount of P2,928,223.26 from the plaintiff,
characterized with utter malice and gross and evident bad faith, plaintiff has
suffered moral damages, consisting of mental anguish, social humiliation,
anxiety and the like, which, considering his business and social standing in
the community, is reasonably estimated in the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00).4

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Respondent averred that, inter alia, he should not be charged for the use of
the unit as he, as owner, is entitled to its use and enjoyment. And he cast
doubt on billing him for charges dating back to 1995.

In lieu of an Answer, Manzanal filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a cause of action, he alleging that being merely an officer
who signed on behalf of BCCC, he should not be personally liable. He
explained that the act of sending a demand letter does not constitute a
cause of action against the obligee/creditor. Alternatively, Manzanal
claimed that respondent’s asseverations against him and BCCC should be
ventilated as a matter of defense in the collection suit filed against him.
BCCC also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia, it
having filed a collection suit against respondent before the RTC of Baguio
City docketed as Civil Case No. 4750-R,5 to recover the cost of removing
illegal structures in his unit.

Branch 145 of RTC Makati to which respondent’s complaint was raffled,

dismissed the complaint, by Order of October 10, 2002 in this wise:

x x x To sustain plaintiff ILUSORIO’s assertions that this Complaint states a

cause of action would be to rule that the act of sending a demand letter by
itself constitutes a cause of action. When a creditor sends a demand letter
to a debtor, according to plaintiff ILUSORIO’s theory, that is already an
actionable wrong, a cause of action. x x x 6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of November 26,

2008,7 reversed the RTC Makati and ordered the reinstatement of
respondent’s complaint, holding as follows.

x x x In this case, if the allegations in the complaint that (1) the plaintiff-
appellant [Ilusorio] is a member of the Baguio Country Club and an owner
of one of the units of the Club’s House Building, thereby entitling him to the
possession and use of such unit subject to reasonable membership
charges. (2) the defendants-appellees had been unreasonably charging
him

charges and bills for the use of his unit without factual and legal basis, and
(3) despite his objections to the amount charges billed in his name, the
defendants-appellees had threatened to enforce the said charges in the
manner provided under the Club’s rules are assumed to be true, then the
plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint.
8 (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of August

24, 2009. Hence, the filing of the present petition for review.

The petition is meritorious.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another, entitling the injured party to relief. Its existence is determined
from the allegations in the complaint.9
The Court finds from the tenor of the demand letters, which respondent
annexed to his complaint, that it did not deviate from the standard practice
of pursuing the satisfaction of a club member’s obligations. Respondent did
not indicate in his complaint how tenuous petitioners’ claim for unpaid
charges is.10 In his reply to petitioners’ final letter of demand, he in fact did
not contradict petitioners’ statement that his work partners and employees
used his unit, thereby admitting that he welched on his undertaking in the
contract that only family members are allowed free usage.

As an exclusive organization which primarily derives life from membership

fees and charges, BCCC is expected to enforce claims from members in
default of their contractual obligations.

Even under the principle of abuse of rights, Cebu Country Club, Inc. v.
Elizagaque11 which expounds as follows:

In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, we expounded Article 19 and correlated it

with Article 21, thus: This article, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under Article 20
or Article 21 would be proper. (citation omitted, underscoring supplied),

respondent cannot seek refuge.

In fine, the RTC did not err in ordering the dismissal of the complaint
against petitioners for lack of cause of action. It was thus error for the
appellate court to set aside the RTC decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of
November 26, 2008 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 145 dated October 10, 2002
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 It is inferred that the Letter of December 20, 2000 pertained to the amount
representing the cost of rectification works in Ilusorio’s unit as ordered by
the Office of the City Fire Marshall, which shall become the basis of a
collection suit against Ilusorio before the RTC of Baguio City.
2 Rollo, p. 143.
3 Id. at 144.
4 Records, pp. 5-6.
5 In the said case, BCCC alleged that Ilusorio constructed a mezzanine in
his unit, violating BCCC’s Deed of Restrictions. Upon inspection, the Office
of the City Fire Marshall ordered BCCC to remove the constructed works
as it obstructed a service manhole located at the fire exist stairwell. For the
expenses it incurred in rectification works and for failure of Ilusorio to pay,
BCCC filed a collection suit to enforce its claim.
6 Records, pp. 159 – 161.
7 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-
Sison, rollo, pp. 83-93.
8 Id. at 91.
9 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. Heirs of Mrcelina
L. Sero, G.R. No. 174672, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 633.
10 Vide St. Michael School of Cavite, Inc. v. Masaito Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 166301, February 29, 2008, 547 SCRA 263.
11 G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008, 542 SCRA 65, 73.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG
Express Liner," Petitioner, 

vs.

MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 164747

MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner, 


vs.

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG
Express Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO and VINCENT D.
TECSON, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated March 16, 2004 as modified by the
Resolution2 dated July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69113, which affirmed with modifications the Decision3 dated May
31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 85 in
Civil Case No. 98-35332.

The factual antecedents:

Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana

Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing
inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry
manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an
Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).

Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing

Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry
vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for
sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran
known as the SEACAT 25.4
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of
Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City,
a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase
of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement
dated August 7, 1997.5 Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding
Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the
price of US$1,465,512.00.6 Per agreement between Robinson and
Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or
22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.7

Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia,
and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and his family and
Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He
shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations,
transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for long
distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go,
Tecson and Landicho.

However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with

Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines
that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their
company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua
told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the
second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then
staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but
they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls.
Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only
to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating
for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no
explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even
made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and
ACG Express Liner.

In a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998, Cordero informed Go that such
act of dealing directly with Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship
and demanded that they respect the same, without prejudice to legal action
against him and Robinson should they fail to heed the same.8 Cordero’s
lawyer, Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of ACCRA law firm, also wrote ACG
Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations
committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers (Landicho and Tecson) in
breach of Cordero’s exclusive distributorship appointment.9

Having been apprised of Cordero’s demand letter, Thyne & Macartney, the
lawyer of AFFA and Robinson, faxed a letter to ACCRA law firm asserting
that the appointment of Cordero as AFFA’s distributor was for the purpose
of one (1) transaction only, that is, the purchase of a high-speed catamaran
vessel by ACG Express Liner in August 1997. The letter further stated that
Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship, the terms of which were
contained in a draft agreement which Cordero allegedly failed to return to
AFFA within a reasonable time, and which offer is already being revoked by
AFFA.10

As to the response of Go, Landicho and Tecson to his demand letter,

Cordero testified before the trial court that on the same day, Landicho,
acting on behalf of Go, talked to him over the telephone and offered to
amicably settle their dispute. Tecson and Landicho offered to convince Go
to honor his exclusive distributorship with AFFA and to purchase all vessels
for ACG Express Liner through him for the next three (3) years. In an effort
to amicably settle the matter, Landicho, acting in behalf of Go, set up a
meeting with Cordero on June 29, 1998 between 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. at
the Mactan Island Resort Hotel lobby. On said date, however, only
Landicho and Tecson came and no reason was given for Go’s absence.
Tecson and Landicho proposed that they will convince Go to pay him
US$1,500,000.00 on the condition that they will get a cut of 20%. And so it
was agreed between him, Landicho and Tecson that the latter would give
him a weekly status report and that the matter will be settled in three (3) to
four (4) weeks and neither party will file an action against each other until a
final report on the proposed settlement. No such report was made by either
Tecson or Landicho who, it turned out, had no intention to do so and were
just buying time as the catamaran vessel was due to arrive from Australia.
Cordero then filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to
prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on misdeclaration
and undervaluation. Consequently, an Alert Order was issued by Acting
BOC Commissioner Nelson Tan for the vessel which in fact arrived on July
17, 1998. Cordero claimed that Go and Robinson had conspired to
undervalue the vessel by around US$500,000.00.11

On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to
hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for
conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship
in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his
due commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the sale of the first
vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale
of the second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him
actual, moral and exemplary damages, including ₱800,000.00 representing
expenses for airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and
entertainment, on account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive
distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.12

Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his

person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no
act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion
was denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was
likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period
granted by the trial court.13 As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss
based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial
court on February 26, 1999.14 Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying
that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s
authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the contrary, they
averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection
with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part
in making progress status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his
principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to
Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to
the Philippines. As to the inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship
engine for AFFA’s other on-going vessel construction, this was merely
requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that
Go was buying a second vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson had no
transaction whatsoever with Cordero who had no document to show any
such shipbuilding contract. As to the supposed meeting to settle their
dispute, this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to be given
US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the alleged
undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any case, Cordero no longer
had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel
under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering
the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26, 1998.15
Pre-trial was reset twice to afford the parties opportunity to reach a
settlement. However, on motion filed by Cordero through counsel, the trial
court reconsidered the resetting of the pre-trial to another date for the third
time as requested by Go, Tecson and Landicho, in view of the latter’s
failure to appear at the pre-trial conference on January 7, 2000 despite due
notice. The trial court further confirmed that said defendants misled the trial
court in moving for continuance during the pre-trial conference held on
December 10, 1999, purportedly to go abroad for the holiday season when
in truth a Hold-Departure Order had been issued against them.
16 Accordingly, plaintiff Cordero was allowed to present his evidence ex

parte.

Cordero’s testimony regarding his transaction with defendants Go,

Landicho and Tecson, and the latter’s offer of settlement, was corroborated
by his counsel who also took the witness stand. Further, documentary
evidence including photographs taken of the June 29, 1998 meeting with
Landicho, Tecson and Atty. Tabujara at Shangri-la’s Mactan Island Resort,
photographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero, Go with his family,
Robinson and Landicho, and also various documents, communications,
vouchers and bank transmittals were presented to prove that: (1) Cordero
was properly authorized and actually transacted in behalf of AFFA as
exclusive distributor in the Philippines; (2) Cordero spent considerable
sums of money in pursuance of the contract with Go and ACG Express
Liner; and (3) AFFA through Robinson paid Cordero his commissions from
each scheduled payment made by Go for the first SEACAT 25 purchased
from AFFA pursuant to Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825.17

On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson,
Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. As prayed for, defendants are hereby
ordered to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily, the following:

1. On the First Cause of Action, the sum total of SIXTEEN MILLION TWO
HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO
AND FORTY THREE CENTAVOS (P16,291,352.43) as actual damages
with legal interest from 25 June 1998 until fully paid;
2. On the Second Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;

3. On the Third Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS

(P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

4. On the Fourth Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS

(P1,000,000.00) as attorney’s fees;

Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.18

Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson filed a motion for new trial, claiming
that they have been unduly prejudiced by the negligence of their counsel
who was allegedly unaware that the pre-trial conference on January 28,
2000 did not push through for the reason that Cordero was then allowed to
present his evidence ex-parte, as he had assumed that the said ex-parte
hearing was being conducted only against Robinson who was earlier
declared in default.19 In its Order dated July 28, 2000, the trial court denied
the motion for new trial.20 In the same order, Cordero’s motion for execution
pending appeal was granted. Defendants moved to reconsider the said
order insofar as it granted the motion for execution pending appeal.21 On
August 8, 2000, they filed a notice of appeal.22

On August 18, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration
and on August 21, 2000, the writ of execution pending appeal was issued.
23 Meanwhile, the notice of appeal was denied for failure to pay the

appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period.24 Defendants filed a
motion for reconsideration and to transmit the case records to the CA.25

On September 29, 2000, the CA issued a temporary restraining order at the

instance of defendants in the certiorari case they filed with said court
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 questioning the execution orders
issued by the trial court. Consequently, as requested by the defendants, the
trial court recalled and set aside its November 6, 2000 Order granting the
ex-parte motion for release of garnished funds, cancelled the scheduled
public auction sale of levied real properties, and denied the ex-parte Motion
for Break-Open Order and Ex-Parte Motion for Encashment of Check filed
by Cordero.26 On November 29, 2000, the trial court reconsidered its Order
dated August 21, 2000 denying due course to the notice of appeal and
forthwith directed the transmittal of the records to the CA.27

On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting aside the trial court’s orders
of execution pending appeal. Cordero appealed the said judgment in a
petition for review filed with this Court which was eventually denied under
our Decision dated September 17, 2002.28

On March 16, 2004, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 affirmed the trial
court (1) in allowing Cordero to present his evidence ex-parte after the
unjustified failure of appellants (Go, Tecson and Landicho) to appear at the
pre-trial conference despite due notice; (2) in finding that it was Cordero
and not Pamana who was appointed by AFFA as the exclusive distributor in
the Philippines of its SEACAT 25 and other fast ferry vessels, which is not
limited to the sale of one (1) such catamaran to Go on August 7, 1997; and
(3) in finding that Cordero is entitled to a commission per vessel sold for
AFFA through his efforts in the amount equivalent to 22.43% of the price of
each vessel or US$328,742.00, and with payments of US$297,219.91
having been made to Cordero, there remained a balance of US$31,522.09
still due to him. The CA sustained the trial court in ruling that Cordero is
entitled to damages for the breach of his exclusive distributorship
agreement with AFFA. However, it held that Cordero is entitled only to
commission for the sale of the first catamaran obtained through his efforts
with the remaining unpaid sum of US$31,522.09 or ₱1,355,449.90 (on the
basis of US$1.00=₱43.00 rate) with interest at 6% per annum from the time
of the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid. As to the
₱800,000.00 representing expenses incurred by Cordero for transportation,
phone bills, entertainment, food and lodging, the CA declared there was no
basis for such award, the same being the logical and necessary
consequences of the exclusive distributorship agreement which are normal
in the field of sales and distribution, and the expenditures having
redounded to the benefit of the distributor (Cordero).

On the amounts awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary

damages, as well as attorney’s fees, the CA reduced the same to
₱500,000.00, ₱300,000.00 and ₱50,000.00, respectively. Appellants were
held solidarily liable pursuant to the provisions of Article 1207 in relation to
Articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the New Civil Code. The CA further ruled that
no error was committed by the trial court in denying their motion for new
trial, which said court found to be pro forma and did not raise any
substantial matter as to warrant the conduct of another trial.

By Resolution dated July 22, 2004, the CA denied the motions for
reconsideration respectively filed by the appellants and appellee, and
affirmed the Decision dated March 16, 2004 with the sole modification that
the legal interest of 6% per annum shall start to run from June 24, 1998
until the finality of the decision, and the rate of 12% interest per annum
shall apply once the decision becomes final and executory until the
judgment has been satisfied.

The case before us is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule
45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No.
164747) in which petitioners raised the following arguments:

G.R. No. 164703

(Petitioner Go)

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE RULES

OF COURT AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENT IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
CAUSE OF ACTION;

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN HOLDING HEREIN PETITIONER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREACH
IN THE ALLEGED EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT WITH
ALUMINIUM FAST FERRIES AUSTRALIA;

III. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW AND

ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING
PETITIONER LIABLE IN SOLIDUM WITH THE CO-DEFENDANTS WITH
RESPECT TO THE CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT;

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FOUND PETITIONER LIABLE FOR UNPAID COMMISSIONS, DAMAGES,
ATTORNEY’S FEES, AND LITIGATION EXPENSES; and
V. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED HEREIN PETITIONER OF HIS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT’S
DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.29

G.R. No. 164747

(Petitioner Cordero)

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE

JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AWARDING PETITIONER ACTUAL
DAMAGES FOR HIS COMMISSION FOR THE SALE OF THE SECOND
VESSEL, SINCE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD
WHICH PROVES THAT THERE WAS A SECOND SALE OF A VESSEL.

A. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATED 7 AUGUST 1997

PROVIDES THAT RESPONDENT GO WAS CONTRACTUALLY BOUND
TO BUY TWO (2) VESSELS FROM AFFA.

B. RESPONDENT GO’S POSITION PAPER AND COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT/

POSITION PAPER THAT WERE FILED BEFORE THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, ADMITS UNDER OATH THAT HE HAD INDEED
PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL FROM AFFA.

C. RESPONDENTS ADMITTED IN THEIR PRE-TRIAL BRIEF THAT THEY

HAD PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS

NOT ENTITLED TO HIS COMMISSIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF A
SECOND VESSEL, SINCE IT WAS PETITIONER’S EFFORTS WHICH
ACTUALLY FACILITATED AND SET-UP THE TRANSACTION FOR
RESPONDENTS.

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT IMPOSING THE PROPER
LEGAL INTEREST RATE ON RESPONDENTS’ UNPAID OBLIGATION
WHICH SHOULD BE TWELVE PERCENT (12%) FROM THE TIME OF
THE BREACH OF THE OBLIGATION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE ORIGINAL

AMOUNT OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AWARDED TO PETITIONER
BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERING THE BAD FAITH AND
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF RESPONDENTS IN MISAPPROPRIATING
THE MONEY OF PETITIONER.30

The controversy boils down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether petitioner
Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and (2) whether the respondents may be held liable for damages
to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive
distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.

I. Real Party-in-Interest

First, on the issue of whether the case had been filed by the real party-in-
interest as required by Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
defines such party as the one (1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The purposes of this
provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without
any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party
entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a
multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain
bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.31 A case is dismissible for lack of
personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.32

On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not
Pamana who is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines as
shown by the Certification dated June 1, 1997 issued by Tony Robinson.
33 Petitioner Go mentions the following documents also signed by

respondent Robinson which state that "Pamana Marketing Corporation

represented by Mr. Mortimer F. Cordero" was actually the exclusive
distributor: (1) letter dated 1 June 199734; (2) certification dated 5 August
199735; and (3) letter dated 5 August 1997 addressed to petitioner Cordero
concerning "commissions to be paid to Pamana Marketing
Corporation."36 Such apparent inconsistency in naming AFFA’s exclusive
distributor in the Philippines is of no moment. For all intents and purposes,
Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone made decisions in
the performance of the exclusive distributorship, as with other clients to
whom he had similarly offered AFFA’s fast ferry vessels. Moreover, the
stipulated commissions from each progress payments made by Go were
directly paid by Robinson to Cordero.37 Respondents Landicho and Tecson
were only too aware of Cordero’s authority as the person who was
appointed and acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA, which can be
gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank
transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson, who in turn
transfers a portion of funds received to the bank account of Cordero in the
Philippines as his commission. Out of these partial payments of his
commission, Cordero would still give Landicho and Tecson their respective
"commission," or "cuts" from his own commission. Respondents Landicho
and Tecson failed to refute the evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of
receipts signed by them. Said amounts were apart from the earlier
expenses shouldered by Cordero for Landicho’s airline tickets,
transportation, food and hotel accommodations for the trip to Australia.38

Moreover, petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised petitioner

Cordero’s lack of personality to sue on behalf of Pamana,39 and did so only
before the CA when they contended that it is Pamana and not Cordero,
who was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor for AFFA.40 It was
Robinson who argued in support of his motion to dismiss that as far as said
defendant is concerned, the real party plaintiff appears to be Pamana,
against the real party defendant which is AFFA.41 As already mentioned, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed by Robinson.

We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinson’s

objection over the improper resort to summons by publication upon a
foreign national like him and in an action in personam, notwithstanding that
he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a
civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in
the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court
and their submission to its authority.42 A party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the
ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court.43

In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson

specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal
jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to
file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in
the summons by publication.44 Such motion did not state that it was a
conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of
summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by
acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and
praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently,
Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and also
having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in
his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial
court’s jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even
before this Court.45

II. Breach of Exclusive Distributorship, Contractual Interference and

Respondents’ Liability for Damages

In Yu v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court ruled that the right to perform an

exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from
such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect. Thus,
injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with
contracts by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is
insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. In that case, the former
dealer of the same goods purchased the merchandise from the
manufacturer in England through a trading firm in West Germany and sold
these in the Philippines. We held that the rights granted to the petitioner
under the exclusive distributorship agreement may not be diminished nor
rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interposing a person or
firm to obtain goods for which the exclusive distributorship was
conceptualized, at the expense of the sole authorized distributor.47

In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cordero was not paid
the balance of his commission by respondent Robinson. From the time
petitioner Go and respondent Landicho directly dealt with respondent
Robinson in Brisbane, and ceased communicating through petitioner
Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, Cordero
was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane. In other
words, Cordero had clearly been cut off from the transaction until the arrival
of the first SEACAT 25 which was sold through his efforts. When Cordero
complained to Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts
prejudicial to his rights and demanded that they respect his exclusive
distributorship, Go simply let his lawyers led by Landicho and Tecson
handle the matter and tried to settle it by promising to pay a certain amount
and to purchase high-speed catamarans through Cordero. However,
Cordero was not paid anything and worse, AFFA through its lawyer in
Australia even terminated his exclusive dealership insisting that his
services were engaged for only one (1) transaction, that is, the purchase of
the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997.

Petitioner Go argues that unlike in Yu v. Court of Appeals48 there is no

conclusive proof adduced by petitioner Cordero that they actually
purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA and hence there was
no violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Further, he
contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in holding them solidarily
liable to Cordero, relying on Articles 1207, 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code despite absence of evidence, documentary or testimonial, showing
that they conspired to defeat the very purpose of the exclusive
distributorship agreement.49

We find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero, there was indeed
no sufficient evidence that respondents actually purchased a second
SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA. But this circumstance will not absolve
respondents from liability for invading Cordero’s rights under the exclusive
distributorship. Respondents clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing
Cordero as they completed the remaining payments to AFFA without
advising him and furnishing him with copies of the bank transmittals as they
previously did, and directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson regarding
arrangements for the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and
negotiations for the purchase of the second vessel pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement which Cordero signed in behalf of AFFA. As a
result of respondents’ actuations, Cordero incurred losses as he was not
paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel and his
exclusive distributorship revoked by AFFA.

Petitioner Go contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in holding
them solidarily liable for Cordero’s unpaid commission, which is the sole
obligation of the principal AFFA. It was Robinson on behalf of AFFA who, in
the letter dated August 5, 1997 addressed to Cordero, undertook to pay
commission payments to Pamana on a staggered progress payment plan
in the form of percentage of the commission per payment. AFFA explicitly
committed that it will, "upon receipt of progress payments, pay to Pamana
their full commission by telegraphic transfer to an account nominated by
P a m a n a w i t h i n o n e t o t w o d a y s o f [ A F FA ] r e c e i v i n g s u c h
payments."50 Petitioner Go further maintains that he had not in any way
violated or caused the termination of the exclusive distributorship
agreement between Cordero and AFFA; he had also paid in full the first and
only vessel he purchased from AFFA.51

While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of
contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a
contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing
another to commit such breach.

Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall
be liable for damages to the other contracting party.

The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract;
and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.52

The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the
letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor
of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly aware of the contract
between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact, evidence on
record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero
as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the
Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered
into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825
with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.

As to the third element, our ruling in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of
Appeals53 is instructive, to wit:

A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of
others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an
unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his
private property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person
induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In
the case before us, petitioner’s Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to
execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent corporation of the latter’s property right. Clearly, and as
correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort
interference above-mentioned are present in the instant case.

Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the

defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or
economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for
interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor’s
motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole
motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities
believe that it is not necessary that the interferer’s interest outweigh that of
the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an
economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that
wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.
Moreover, justification for protecting one’s financial position should not be
made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject
matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in
a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.

As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was no malice in
the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one’s conduct lies in
a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot
be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially
interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that
he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon
DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of
respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of
respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes
deliberate wrongful motives or malice in him.

xxx

While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest

to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find
that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits
forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice.
The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the
contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it
does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and
causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly
confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages.
The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused
by petitioner’s interference.54 [emphasis supplied.]

Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith
or bad motive.55 In the case of Lagon v. Court of Appeals,56 we held that to
sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted
with malice or must have been driven by purely impure reasons to injure
the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference cannot be justified. We
further explained that the word "induce" refers to situations where a person
causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or
intimidation. As to the allegation of private respondent in said case that
petitioner induced the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property
to petitioner despite an alleged renewal of the original lease contract with
the deceased landowner, we ruled as follows:

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such

knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference. x x x

Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private

respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the
property to him. The word "induce" refers to situations where a person
causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or
intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and
that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private
respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In
short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the
renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was
unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing
the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never
established.57
In their Answer, respondents denied having anything to do with the unpaid
balance of the commission due to Cordero and the eventual termination of
his exclusive distributorship by AFFA. They gave a different version of the
events that transpired following the signing of Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825. According to them, several builder-competitors still entered the
picture after the said contract for the purchase of one (1) SEACAT 25 was
sent to Brisbane in July 1997 for authentication, adding that the contract
was to be effective on August 7, 1997, the time when their funds was to
become available. Go admitted he called the attention of AFFA if it can
compete with the prices of other builders, and upon mutual agreement,
AFFA agreed to give them a discounted price under the following terms and
conditions: (1) that the contract price be lowered; (2) that Go will obtain
another vessel; (3) that to secure compliance of such conditions, Go must
make an advance payment for the building of the second vessel; and (4)
that the payment scheme formerly agreed upon as stipulated in the first
contract shall still be the basis and used as the guiding factor in remitting
money for the building of the first vessel. This led to the signing of another
contract superseding the first one (1), still to be dated 07 August 1997.
Attached to the answer were photocopies of the second contract stating a
lower purchase price (US$1,150,000.00) and facsimile transmission of
AFFA to Go confirming the transaction.58

As to the cessation of communication with Cordero, Go averred it was

Cordero who was nowhere to be contacted at the time the shipbuilding
progress did not turn good as promised, and it was always Landicho and
Tecson who, after several attempts, were able to locate him only to obtain
unsatisfactory reports such that it was Go who would still call up Robinson
regarding any progress status report, lacking documents for MARINA, etc.,
and go to Australia for ocular inspection. Hence, in May 1998 on the
scheduled launching of the ship in Australia, Go engaged the services of
Landicho who went to Australia to see to it that all documents needed for
the shipment of the vessel to the Philippines would be in order. It was also
during this time that Robinson’s request for inquiry on the Philippine price
of a Wartsila engine for AFFA’s then on-going vessel construction, was
misinterpreted by Cordero as indicating that Go was buying a second
vessel.59

We find these allegations unconvincing and a mere afterthought as these

were the very same averments contained in the Position Paper for the
Importer dated October 9, 1998, which was submitted by Go on behalf of
ACG Express Liner in connection with the complaint-affidavit filed by
Cordero before the BOC-SGS Appeals Committee relative to the shipment
valuation of the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA.60 It appears that
the purported second contract superseding the original Shipbuilding
Contract No. 7825 and stating a lower price of US$1,150,000.00 (not
US$1,465,512.00) was only presented before the BOC to show that the
vessel imported into the Philippines was not undervalued by almost
US$500,000.00. Cordero vehemently denied there was such modification
of the contract and accused respondents of resorting to falsified
documents, including the facsimile transmission of AFFA supposedly
confirming the said sale for only US$1,150,000.00. Incidentally, another
document filed in said BOC case, the Counter-Affidavit/Position Paper for
the Importer dated November 16, 1998,61 states in paragraph 8 under the
Antecedent facts thereof, that --

8. As elsewhere stated, the total remittances made by herein Importer to

AFFA does not alone represent the purchase price for Seacat 25. It
includes advance payment for the acquisition of another vessel as part of
the deal due to the discounted price.62

which even gives credence to the claim of Cordero that respondents

negotiated for the sale of the second vessel and that the nonpayment of the
remaining two (2) instalments of his commission for the sale of the first
SEACAT 25 was a result of Go and Landicho’s directly dealing with
Robinson, obviously to obtain a lower price for the second vessel at the
expense of Cordero.

The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to
enter into another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a
lower price for the second vessel resulted in AFFA’s breach of its
contractual obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and
unceremonious termination of Cordero’s appointment as exclusive
distributor. Following our pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy (supra), such
act may not be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest
rather than in wrongful motives. The attendant circumstances, however,
demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible
financial interest to benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero.
Respondents furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero had worked
hard to close the deal for them to purchase from AFFA two (2) SEACAT 25,
closely monitored the progress of building the first vessel sold, attended to
their concerns and spent no measly sum for the trip to Australia with Go,
Landicho and Go’s family members. But what is appalling is the fact that
even as Go, Landicho and Tecson secretly negotiated with Robinson for
the purchase of a second vessel, Landicho and Tecson continued to
demand and receive from Cordero their "commission" or "cut" from
Cordero’s earned commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25.

Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when Go, Robinson,
Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased communicating with him, without
giving him any explanation. While there was nothing objectionable in
negotiating for a lower price in the second purchase of SEACAT 25, which
is not prohibited by the Memorandum of Agreement, Go, Robinson, Tecson
and Landicho clearly connived not only in ensuring that Cordero would
have no participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT 25, but
also that Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from the
sale of the first SEACAT 25. This, despite their knowledge that it was
commission already earned by and due to Cordero. Thus, the trial and
appellate courts correctly ruled that the actuations of Go, Robinson, Tecson
and Landicho were without legal justification and intended solely to
prejudice Cordero.

The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule,
findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
conclusive on this Court.63 We see no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in
utter disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclusive distributorship
agreement.

The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness,
honesty and good faith in securing better terms for the purchase of high-
speed catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of Cordero as the duly
appointed exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article 19 of
the Civil Code:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

As we have expounded in another case:

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is to
set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards
are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law x x x. Article 21, on the
other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done
with intent to injure.

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.64

Petitioner Go’s argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot be held
liable solidarily with Robinson for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney’s fees awarded to Cordero since no law or contract
provided for solidary obligation in these cases, is equally bereft of merit.
Conformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary.65 In Lafarge
Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation,66 we held:

[O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary. We have
assiduously maintained this legal principle as early as 1912 in Worcester v.
Ocampo, in which we held:

x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to

recognize that the basis of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize
the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable
for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort
feasors. x x x

It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after
it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the
same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves. x x x

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than
1avvphi1

all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are
jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that
the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was
insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist
upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.
They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x

A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of
course satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. There can
be but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by
agreement generally operates to discharge all. x x x

Of course, the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort
feasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release
some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort
feasors. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally.
67 [emphasis supplied.]

The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual
relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party
who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable.68 Respondents
Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the
balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first
SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which
AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship
agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998
until the same is fully paid.

Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered

under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.69On the other hand, the requirements
of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of
example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimant’s right to them has been established; (2) that they cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the
amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
and (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.70 The award of exemplary
damages is thus in order. However, we find the sums awarded by the trial
court as moral and exemplary damages as reduced by the CA, still
excessive under the circumstances.

Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical

suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injuries
unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount
must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended
to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no hard-
and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
facts. Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount, with the
limitation that it "should not be palpably and scandalously excessive."
Indeed, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.71

We believe that the amounts of ₱300,000.00 and ₱200,000.00 as moral

and exemplary damages, respectively, would be sufficient and reasonable.
Because exemplary damages are awarded, attorney’s fees may also be
awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1).72 We affirm the appellate
court’s award of attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated March 16,
2004 as modified by the Resolution dated July 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are
hereby reduced to ₱300,000.00 and ₱200,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the petitioner in G.R. No. 164703.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a Member of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and
Eliezer R. Delos Santos.
2Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a Member of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis
and Eliezer R. Delos Santos.
3 Penned by Judge Pedro M. Areola.
4 Folder of plaintiff’s exhibits, pp. 1-34.
5 Id., pp. 35-39.
6 Id., pp. 43-51.
7 Id., pp. 40-42.
8 Id., pp. 52-53.
9 Id., pp. 54-56.
10 Id., pp. 56-57.
11 TSN, April 5, 2000, pp. 27-35; folder of plaintiff’s exhibits, p. 58.
12 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-16.
13 Id., pp. 155-157, 167-171, 186-189, 249-251.
14 Id., pp. 70-77, 178.
15 Id., pp. 213-214.
16 Id., pp. 298-299.
17 TSN, April 14, 2000, pp. 2-44.
18 Records, Vol. I, pp. 445-446.
19 Id., pp. 460-465.
20 Id., pp. 477-480.
21 Id., pp. 481-485.
22 Id., p. 486.
23 Id., pp. 500-502.
24 Id., p. 503.
25 Id., pp. 512-514.
26 Records, Vol. II, pp. 550-620.
27 Id., pp. 621-622.
28 Cordero v. Go, G.R. No. 149754, 389 SCRA 288.
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 164703), pp. 23-24.
30 Rollo (G.R. No. 164747), pp. 21-22.
31Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348,
358.
32Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158397, November 26, 2004,
444 SCRA 509.
33 Folder of exhibits, Exhibit "A-6", p. 7.
34 Id., Exhibit "A-9", p. 10
35 Id., Exhibit "A", p. 1.
36 Id., Exhibit "A-3", p. 4.
37Id., Exhibits "J" to "J-2", "K" to "K-4", "M", "Y’ to "Y-4", pp. 59-66, 69-71,
314-318.
38Id., Exhibits "R-6", "P", "R-7", "V", "W" , "X" to "X-7", "Y" to "Y-4" and "Z"
to "Z-2", pp. 232, 236-238, 239, 301-321.
39 Records, Vol. I, pp. 70-73, 203-213, 265-267, 460-464.
40 CA rollo, pp. 78-84.
41 Records, Vol. I, pp. 241-242.
42Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No.
172242, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170, 186.
43United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26,
2001, 368 SCRA 464, 470.
44 Records, Vol. I, pp. 168-170.
45See Dole Philippines, Inc.(Tropifresh Division) v. Quilala, G.R. No.
168723, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 433, 437-438.
46 G.R. No. 86683, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 328.
47 Id., pp. 331, 332.
48 Supra.
49 Rollo (G.R. No. 164703), pp. 33-34.
50 Id., pp 36-37; Exhibit "A-3", folder of exhibits, p. 4.
51 Rollo (G.R. No. 164703), p. 39.
52So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120554, September 21, 1999,
314 SCRA 751, 758, citing 30 Am Jur, Section 19, pp. 71-72 and
Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. v. Vasquez, et al. (Court of Appeals, 68 O.G.
7666).
53 Supra.
54 Id., pp. 758-760.
55Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301
SCRA 1, 28.
56 G.R. No. 119107, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 616, 626.
57 Id., p. 626.
58 Records, Vol. I, pp. 204-206.
59 Id., pp. 206-207.
60 Folder of exhibits, Exhibit "BB", pp. 324-342.
61 Id., Exhibit "CC", pp. 343-361.
62 Id., p. 345.
63Ramas v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA
172, 178.
64 Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259, February 28,
2005, 452 SCRA 532, 546-547, citing Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 25.
65Ngo Sin Sing v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 170596, November
28, 2008, 572 SCRA 625, 638, citing Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., G.R.
No. 160283, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 177, 186.
66 G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 522.
67 As cited in Ngo Sin Sing v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., supra.
68 Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587 (1919).
69Magat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124221, August 4, 2000, 337 SCRA
298; Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 783
(1995); and Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130030,
June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 141, 145-146.
70National Steel Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Br.
2, Iligan City, G.R. No. 127004, March 11, 1999 304 SCRA 609.
71Samson, Jr. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 150487, July 10,
2003, 405 SCRA 607, 611-612, citing Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 368 Phil. 444 (1999); De la Serna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
109161, June 21, 1994, 233 SCRA 325; Visayan Sawmill Company, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83851, March 3, 1993, 219 SCRA 378; Flores v.
Uy, G.R. Nos. 121492 & 124325, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA 347;
Pagsuyuin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72121, February 6,
1991, 193 SCRA 547; Northwest Airlines v. Laya, G.R. No. 145956, May
29, 2002, 382 SCRA 730; Cavite Development Bank v. Sps. Lim, 381 Phil.
355 (2000); Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. v. Roque, 367 Phil. 493 (1999);
Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117228, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA
282; Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 942 (1999); Singson v.
Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 831 (1997); Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,
334 Phil. 812 (1997); Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 326
Phil. 326 (1996); Mayo v. People, G.R. No. 91201, December 5, 1991, 204
SCRA 642; Policarpio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94563, March 5, 1991,
194 SCRA 729; Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. v. Rodriguez,
G.R. No. 83768, February 28, 1990, 182 SCRA 899; and Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc., No. L-33836, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA
440.
72B.F. Metal (Corporation) v. Lomotan, G.R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008,
551 SCRA 618.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 163280 February 2, 2010

DORIS U. SUNBANUN, Petitioner, 


vs.

AURORA B. GO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the 30 September 2003

Decision2 and the 18 March 2004 Resolution3of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67836.

The Facts

Petitioner Doris U. Sunbanun is the owner of a residential house located at

No. 68-F Junquera Street, Cebu City. On 7 July 1995, respondent Aurora
B. Go leased the entire ground floor of petitioner’s residential house for one
year which was to expire on 7 July 1996. As required under the lease
contract, respondent paid a deposit of ₱16,000 to answer for damages and
unpaid rent. To earn extra income, respondent accepted lodgers, mostly
her relatives, from whom she received a monthly income of ₱15,000.
Respondent paid the monthly rental until March 1996 when petitioner drove
away respondent’s lodgers by telling them that they could stay on the
rented premises only until 15 April 1996 since she was terminating the
lease. The lodgers left the rented premises by 15 April 1996, and petitioner
then padlocked the rooms vacated by respondent’s lodgers.

On 10 May 1996, respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner.

Respondent alleged that she lost her income from her lodgers for the
months of April, May, and June 1996 totaling ₱45,000. Respondent, who
worked in Hongkong, also incurred expenses for plane fares and other
travel expenses in coming to the Philippines and returning to Hongkong.

On the other hand, petitioner argued that respondent violated the lease
contract when she subleased the rented premises. Besides, the lease
contract was not renewed after its expiration on 7 July 1996; thus,
respondent had no more right to stay in the rented premises. Petitioner also
moved to dismiss the complaint in the trial court for failure to comply with
prior barangay conciliation.

During the pre-trial, petitioner moved for the case to be submitted for
judgment on the pleadings considering that the only disagreement between
the parties was the correct interpretation of the lease contract. Respondent
did not object to petitioner’s motion. The trial court then directed the parties
to submit their respective memoranda, after which the case would be
considered submitted for decision.4

In its decision dated 28 March 2000, the trial court held that the case is not
covered by the barangay conciliation process since respondent is a
resident of Hongkong. The trial court noted that petitioner did not controvert
respondent’s allegation that petitioner ejected respondent’s lodgers
sometime in March 1996 even if the contract of lease would expire only on
7 July 1996. The trial court found untenable petitioner’s contention that
subleasing the rented premises violated the lease contract. The trial court
held that respondent’s act of accepting lodgers was in accordance with the
lease contract which allows the lessee "to use the premises as a dwelling
or as lodging house." Thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay
respondent actual damages of ₱45,000 for respondent’s lost income from
her lodgers for the months of April, May, and June 1996, and attorney’s
fees of ₱8,000.

Both parties appealed before the Court of Appeals. On 30 September 2003,

the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of respondent and
modified the trial court’s decision. Aside from actual damages and
attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals also ordered petitioner to pay moral
and exemplary damages and the cost of the suit. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the trial

court is hereby MODIFIED by ordering defendant-appellant [Doris U.
Sunbanun] to pay plaintiff-appellant [Aurora B. Go] the following amounts:
1. ₱45,000.00 as compensation for actual damages;

2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. ₱8,000.00 as Attorney’s Fees;

5. Cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.5

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s act of forcibly ejecting

respondent’s lodgers three months prior to the termination of the lease
contract without valid reason constitutes breach of contract. Petitioner also
violated Article 1654 of the Civil Code which states that "the lessor is
obliged to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of
the lease for the duration of the contract." The Court of Appeals awarded
₱50,000 as moral damages to respondent for breach of contract and for
petitioner’s act of pre-terminating the lease contract without valid reason,
which shows bad faith on the part of petitioner. The Court of Appeals also
awarded respondent ₱50,000 as exemplary damages for petitioner’s
oppressive act.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF

ACTUAL DAMAGES BY THE TRIAL COURT.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT

OF THE TRIAL COURT AND AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND COSTS OF SUIT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF

ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.6

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition without merit.

In this case, the trial court rendered a judgment on the pleadings. Section
1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender

an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.

The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the
pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after
the answer is filed.7 A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts
as pleaded,8 and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the
pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes.

This case is unusual because it was petitioner, and not the claimant
respondent, who moved for a judgment on the pleadings during the pre-
trial. This is clear from the trial court’s Order9 dated 7 October 1997 which
reads:

ORDER

When this case was called for pre-trial, parties appeared together with
counsel. Defendant [Doris U. Sunbanun] moved that considering that there
is no dispute as far as the contract is concerned and the only disagreement
between the parties is on the interpretation of the contract so that the issue
boils down on to which of the parties are correct on their interpretation.
With the conformity of the plaintiff [Aurora B. Go], this case is therefore
considered closed and submitted for judgment on the pleadings. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, in moving for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof

as to the truth of her own allegations and without giving respondent the
opportunity to introduce evidence, is deemed to have admitted the material
and relevant averments of the complaint, and to rest her motion for
judgment based on the pleadings of the parties.10 As held in Tropical
Homes, Inc. v. CA:111avvphi1
As to the amount of damages awarded as a consequence of this violation
of plaintiff’s rights, the lower court based its award from the allegations and
prayer contained in the complaint. The defendant, however, questions this
award for the reason that, according to the defendant, the plaintiff, in
moving for judgment on the pleadings, did not offer proof as to the truth of
his own allegations with respect to the damages claimed by him, and gave
no opportunity for the appellant to introduce evidence to refute his claims.
We find this objection without merit. It appears that when the plaintiff moved
to have the case decided on the pleadings, the defendant interposed no
objection and has practically assented thereto. The defendant, therefore, is
deemed to have admitted the allegations of fact of the complaint, so that
there was no necessity for plaintiff to submit evidence of his claim.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner ejected respondent’s lodgers

three months before the expiration of the lease contract on 7 July 1996.
Petitioner maintains that she had the right to terminate the contract prior to
its expiration because respondent allegedly violated the terms of the lease
contract by subleasing the rented premises. Petitioner’s assertion is belied
by the provision in the lease contract12 which states that the lessee can
"use the premises as a dwelling or as lodging house." Furthermore the
lease contract clearly provides that petitioner leased to respondent the
ground floor of her residential house for a term of one year commencing
from 7 July 1995. Thus, the lease contract would expire only on 7 July
1996. However, petitioner started ejecting respondent’s lodgers in March
1996 by informing them that the lease contract was only until 15 April 1996.
Clearly, petitioner’s act of ejecting respondent’s lodgers resulted in
respondent losing income from her lodgers. Hence, it was proper for the
trial court and the appellate court to order petitioner to pay respondent
actual damages in the amount of ₱45,000.

We likewise sustain the award of moral damages in favor of respondent. In

this case, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 21. The pertinent provisions
read:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

analogous cases:

xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35.

Art. 2220. Wilfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

We agree with the appellate court that petitioner’s act of ejecting

respondent’s lodgers three months before the lease contract expired
without valid reason constitutes bad faith. What aggravates the situation
was that petitioner did not inform respondent, who was then working in
Hongkong, about petitioner’s plan to pre-terminate the lease contract and
evict respondent’s lodgers. Moral damages may be awarded when the
breach of contract was attended with bad faith.13

Furthermore, we affirm the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s

fees. Exemplary damages may be awarded when a wrongful act is
accompanied by bad faith or when the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner which would justify
an award of exemplary damages under Article 223214 of the Civil Code.
15 Since the award of exemplary damages is proper in this case, attorney’s

fees and cost of the suit may also be recovered as provided under Article
220816 of the Civil Code.17

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the
30 September 2003 Decision and the 18 March 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67836.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 RENATO C. CORONA*

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 812.
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices

2

Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.

3 Rollo , p. 108.
4 Id. at 81.
5 Id. at 94.
6 Id. at 12-13.
7 Sps. Hontiveros v. RTC, Br. 25, Iloilo City, 368 Phil. 653 (1999).
8 Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 733 (2000).
9 Rollo, p. 81.
10 Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 823 (1926).

338 Phil. 930, 943 (1997), citing Santiago v. Basilan Lumber Co., No.
11

L-15532, 31 October 1963, 9 SCRA 349, 353.

12 Rollo, pp. 67-69.

Frias v. San Diego-Sison, G.R. No. 155223, 3 April 2007, 520 SCRA 244;
13

Bankard, Inc. v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 141761, 28 July 2006, 497 SCRA 52.
14Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that "in contracts and quasi-
contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."

Amado v. Salvador, G.R. No. 171401, 13 December 2007, 540 SCRA

15

161; Tanay Recreation Center and Development Corp. v. Fausto, 495 Phil.
400 (2005).
16 Article 2208 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of

litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the

plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In action for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s

liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be

reasonable. (Emphasis supplied)

Unlad Resources Development Corporation v. Dragon, G.R. No. 149338,

17

28 July 2008, 560 SCRA 63.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, 


vs.

EMMA M. ROSQUETA, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right
committed by a superior public officer in preventing a subordinate from
doing her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.

The Facts and the Case

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy

Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the
Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from
that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she
withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and
that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.1

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera)
to respondent Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment,
Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction
against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of
Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial
Court2 (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the
RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and
the Finance Secretary3 from implementing Valera’s appointment. On August
28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary
injunction.4
Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the
injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On
September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60
days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.

On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto
case was again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs
Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers
and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.

During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary in February

2002, its special Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs
deputy commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir
program, authorized by the Bureau’s Steering Committee headed by
petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where
Rosqueta’s picture was supposed to be but it instead stated that her
position was "under litigation." Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard
displayed at the Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s picture but not
Rosqueta’s.

On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint5 for damages

before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case
Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented
her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her
salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the
RTC to award her ₱1,000,000.00 in moral damages, ₱500,000.00 in
exemplary damages, and ₱300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

But the RTC dismissed6 respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that

petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that
entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and
legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the
Bureau’s centennial anniversary.

But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision,7 holding instead that petitioner
Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in
the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral
damages from him.8 Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that
Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing
her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official
recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial
anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered Villanueva to
pay ₱500,000.00 in moral damages, ₱200,000.00 in exemplary damages
and ₱100,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. With the denial
of his motion for reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for
ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo
warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do
her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially
recognized as such public officer.

The Court’s Ruling

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,9 a
person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He
would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice
another. Complementing this principle are Articles 2010 and 2111 of the Civil
Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of
such abuse of right or duty.12

Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of

the Solicitor General (OSG) when he allowed Valera to assume the office
as Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held the position
merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked the Career Executive
Service eligibility required for the job.

But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the
OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a
preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed,
especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace respondent
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent
to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy
Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he
withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the
position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez,13 a party’s
refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise
lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.1avvphi1

That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for

another division of the Bureau is immaterial. While such appointment, when
accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did not
have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on account of
petitioner Villanueva’s treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent
action.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such

damages may be awarded when the defendant’s transgression is the
immediate cause of the plaintiff’s anguish14 in the cases specified in Article
221915of the Civil Code.16

Here, respondent Rosqueta’s colleagues and friends testified that she

suffered severe anxiety on account of the speculation over her employment
status.17 She had to endure being referred to as a "squatter" in her
workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her
exclusion from the Bureau’s centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did
not have to endure all these affronts and the angst and depression they
produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by the court’s order in her
favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.

The Court, however, finds the award of ₱500,000.00 excessive. As it held

in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro,18 moral damages
are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant’s grief and
suffering. Moral damages should reasonably approximate the extent of hurt
caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be
₱200,000.00.

The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or

correction for the public good but, in line with the same reasoning, reduces
it to ₱50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the award of attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses but reduces it to ₱50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 85931 with
MODIFICATION in that petitioner Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay
respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum of ₱200,000.00 in moral
damages, ₱50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 in attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Former Commissioner of Customs, Renato A. Ampil.
2 Branch 51.
3 Hon. Jose Isidro Camacho.
4 Records, p. 12. It is hereby ordered by the undersigned Judge of the
Regional Trial Court that until further orders, you, the said respondents and
all your attorneys, representatives, agents and any other persons assisting
are hereby enjoined from implementing or enforcing the appointment of
respondent GIL A. VALERA to the position of Customs Deputy
Commissioner for Revenue Collection and Monitoring and respondent
Valera from assuming the said office or exercising its functions until further
orders from this Court.
5 Id. at 1-8.
6 Rollo, pp. 80-109. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
7 Id. at 48-65. Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas and
concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
8 Id. at 63.
9Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
10Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
11Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals or good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
12 Carpio v. Valmonte, 481 Phil. 352, 362 (2004).
13 404 Phil. 586, 594 (2001).
14Art. 2217, Civil Code. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission.
15Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:

1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

4) Adultery or concubinage;

5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

6) Illegal search;

7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

8) Malicious prosecution;

9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34
and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to

in No. 3 of this Article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring
the action mentioned in No. 9 of this Article, in the order named.
16 Carpio v. Valmonte, supra note 12, at 364.
17Testimony of Wilnora Cawile, TSN, March 5, 2003, pp. 16-18; testimony
of Wilhelmina Faustino, TSN, May 15, 2003, pp. 10-13, 19-25; testimony of
John Aclaro, June 6, 2003, pp. 20-26.
18 G.R. No. 175587, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 738, 757-758.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160273 January 18, 2008

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D.

ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI,
RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, petitioners, 

vs.

RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
Decision1 dated January 31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 2, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506.

The facts are:

Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation

operating as a non-profit and non-stock private membership club, having its
principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are
members of its Board of Directors.

Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary

member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior
Vice President and Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as
a special non-proprietary member. The designation was thereafter
approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors.

In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary

membership. The application was indorsed by CCCI’s two (2) proprietary
members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito
Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for
only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain
Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI
issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.

During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI
Board of Directors, action on respondent’s application for proprietary
membership was deferred. In another Board meeting held on July 30,
1997, respondent’s application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on
August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI’s
corporate secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his
application for proprietary membership.

On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI

a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on
October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept
silent. On November 5, 1997, respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring
whether any member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI
did not reply.

Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 67190.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor
of respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:

1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount

of P2,340,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.

2. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount

of P5,000,000.00 as moral damages.

3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount

of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount
of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees and P80,000.00 as
litigation expenses.

5. Costs of suit.

Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.2

On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated

January 31, 2003, affirmed the trial court’s Decision with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February

14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in Civil Case
No. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:

1. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-

appellee the amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;

2. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-

appellee the amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-

appellee the mount of P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P50,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and

4. Costs of the suit.

The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.3

On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and motion

for leave to set the motion for oral arguments. In its Resolution4 dated
October 2, 2003, the appellate court denied the motions for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition.

The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving respondent’s

application for proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to
respondent for damages, and if so, whether their liability is joint and
several.

Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
exorbitant damages to respondent despite the lack of evidence that they
acted in bad faith in disapproving the latter’s application; and in
disregarding their defense of damnum absque injuria.

For his part, respondent maintains that the petition lacks merit, hence,
should be denied.

CCCI’s Articles of Incorporation provide in part:

SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation and membership therein as

well as the right of participation in its assets shall be limited to qualified
persons who are duly accredited owners of Proprietary Ownership
Certificates issued by the corporation in accordance with its By-Laws.

Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws provides:

SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED – The procedure for the

admission of new members of the Club shall be as follows:

(a) Any proprietary member, seconded by another voting proprietary

member, shall submit to the Secretary a written proposal for the admission
of a candidate to the "Eligible-for-Membership List";

(b) Such proposal shall be posted by the Secretary for a period of thirty (30)
days on the Club bulletin board during which time any member may
interpose objections to the admission of the applicant by communicating
the same to the Board of Directors;

(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, if no objections
have been filed or if there are, the Board considers the objections
unmeritorious, the candidate shall be qualified for inclusion in the "Eligible-
for-Membership List";

(d) Once included in the "Eligible-for-Membership List" and after the

candidate shall have acquired in his name a valid POC duly recorded in the
books of the corporation as his own, he shall become a Proprietary
Member, upon a non-refundable admission fee of P1,000.00, provided that
admission fees will only be collected once from any person.

On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to read as follows:

(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, the Board may,
by unanimous vote of all directors present at a regular or special
meeting, approve the inclusion of the candidate in the "Eligible-for-
Membership List".

As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as

the "black ball system" of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in
the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the admission of an
applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c),
as amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required.
When respondent’s application for proprietary membership was voted upon
during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1)
black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was disapproved.

Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation,

has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary
membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide
restrictions, thus:

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,5 we expounded Article 19 and correlated it

with Article 21, thus:

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle

of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though
by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. (Emphasis in
the original)

In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership, we find

that petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in
disapproving respondent’s applications. This is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages pursuant
to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.

It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI’s Amended

By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of the directors present at a special
or regular meeting was not printed on the application form respondent filled
and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original
provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes
needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.

Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the

application form due to economic reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and
unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant,
was introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before
respondent filed his application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious
and exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose members are all
affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated
application form.

It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why
his application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a
unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a letter
for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his
application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did
not deserve this kind of treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel
Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of CCCI, he should have
been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they
should have informed him why his application was disapproved.

The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in

accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily,
unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.6 It bears
reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners’
disapproval of respondent’s application is characterized by bad faith.

As to petitioners’ reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or

damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced.
In Amonoy v. Gutierrez,7 we held that this principle does not apply
when there is an abuse of a person’s right, as in this case.

As to the appellate court’s award to respondent of moral damages, we find

the same in order. Under Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, moral
damages may be recovered, among others, in acts and actions referred to
in Article 21. We believe respondent’s testimony that he suffered mental
anguish, social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary
denial of his application. However, the amount of P2,000,000.00 is
excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would
be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the same should not
be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended
to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the
expense of the defendant.8 Taking into consideration the attending
circumstances here, we hold that an award to respondent of P50,000.00,
instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.

Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 allows it by way of

example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, since exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions,9 we reduce the amount from P1,000,000.00
to P25,000.00 only.
On the matter of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, Article 2208 of the
same Code provides, among others, that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation may be recovered in cases when exemplary damages are
awarded and where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered, as in this case. In any
event, however, such award must be reasonable, just and equitable. Thus,
we reduce the amount of attorney’s fees (P500,000.00) and litigation
expenses (P50,000.00) to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.

Lastly, petitioners’ argument that they could not be held jointly and severally
liable for damages because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of
respondent’s application lacks merit.

Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:

SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees

who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary
interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall
be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered
by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
(Emphasis ours)

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506
are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a) the award of moral
damages is reduced from P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the award of
exemplary damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c)
the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is reduced
from P500,000.00 and P50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Also referred to as "Ramonito" in the records of the case.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
concurred in by then Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of
this Court) and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam.
2 Annex "C" of the petition, rollo, pp. 65-91.
3 Annex "A" of the petition, id., pp. 40-62.
4 Annex "B" of the petition, id., pp. 63-64.
5 G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 466.
6Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No.
153535, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 409, 428, citing Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Act Theater, Inc., 432 SCRA 418,
422 (2004).
7 G.R. No. 140420, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 731.
8 Lamis v. Ong, G.R. No. 148923, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 510, 519.
9Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.,G.R. No. 136914, January 25, 2002, 374
SCRA 653.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner, 


vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.

O. Pythogoras Oliver for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, modifying the decision of the trial court in a civil case for
recovery of damages against petitioner corporation by reducing the award
to private respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages from P40,000 to
Pl5,000, and attorney's fees from P3,000 to P2,000.

The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram

sent through its Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading
as follows:

176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO

DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY

WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER

LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER

115 PM

SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG

PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

(p. 19, Annex "A")

Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on
the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him
undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well
because other people have come to know of said defamatory words.
Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in
Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators
and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore
did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not
defamatory. The telegram sent through its facilities was received in its
station at Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator manned the
teletype machine which automatically receives telegrams being transmitted.
The said telegram was detached from the machine and placed inside a
sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is. The additional
words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the telegram
when delivered.

The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:

There is no question that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous. They
clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were
intended for the plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is the same. Any person
reading the additional words in Tagalog will naturally think that they refer to
the addressee, the plaintiff. There is no indication from the face of the
telegram that the additional words in Tagalog were sent as a private joke
between the operators of the defendant.

The defendant is sued directly not as an employer. The business of the

defendant is to transmit telegrams. It will open the door to frauds and allow
the defendant to act with impunity if it can escape liability by the simple
expedient of showing that its employees acted beyond the scope of their
assigned tasks.

The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on Article 33 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines but on the following articles of said Code:

ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes

damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog words. The office file
of the defendant containing copies of telegrams received are open and held
together only by a metal fastener. Moreover, they are open to view and
inspection by third parties.

It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. The
plaintiff is a businessman. The libelous Tagalog words must have affected
his business and social standing in the community. The Court fixes the
amount of P40,000.00 as the reasonable amount of moral damages and
the amount of P3,000.00 as attorney's fee which the defendant should pay
the plaintiff. (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal)

The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision confirming the

aforegoing findings of the lower court stated:

The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to appellee, was the

failure of the appellant to take the necessary or precautionary steps to
avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The
company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and
this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for
their clientele's interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is
imputable to appellant and not to its employees.

The claim that there was no publication of the libelous words in Tagalog is
also without merit. The fact that a carbon copy of the telegram was filed
among other telegrams and left to hang for the public to see, open for
inspection by a third party is sufficient publication. It would have been
otherwise perhaps had the telegram been placed and kept in a secured
place where no one may have had a chance to read it without appellee's
permission.

The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the telegram are, as

correctly found by the lower court, libelous per se, and from which malice
may be presumed in the absence of any showing of good intention and
justifiable motive on the part of the appellant. The law implies damages in
this instance (Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, L-22794, January 16, 1968; 22
SCRA 44). The award of P40,000.00 as moral damages is hereby reduced
to P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00 is awarded.
(pp. 22-23, record)
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court,
petitioner came to Us with the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer

should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the
criminal act of its employee.

II

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient
publication of the alleged libelous telegram in question, as contemplated by
law on libel.

III

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of

petitioner-company-employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, Articles on Human Relations.

IV

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees. (p. 4,

Record)

Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for

damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent
corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of
Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on
Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent's
breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. 1

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving

and transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message
through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon
receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the
message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous
matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or
knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the
petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to
the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through
its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and
transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the
petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of
petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services
of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases,
negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However,
since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply
the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by
considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the appellate court is

hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 In contracts the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of

the employer (master). This is the master and servant rule.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39019 January 22, 1988

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO, petitioners-

appellants, 

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR.,
ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O. CHAVES, and JUAN O.
CHAVES, respondents-appellees.

YAP, J.:
In an action for recovery of damages for embarassment, humiliation, wounded feelings and hurt pride, caused to
herein private respondents, by reason of the disconnection of their electrical service by the petitioners, the then Court
of First Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District, Branch XXIV, rendered a decision dated December 13,1967,
ordering herein petitioners jointly and severally to pay private respondents the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos as moral damages, Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages and, One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees, and dismissing petitioners' counterclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals and in toto the trial court's decision. Their
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the instant
petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility

corporation providing electric power for the consumption of the general
public in Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of
MERALCO.

Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O. Chaves, husband and

wife, filed the complaint for damages, together with their children, Isaac O.
Chaves, Jr. and Rosendo O. Chaves. Isaac Sr. and Isaac Jr. and Rosendo
were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac, Sr. and Isaac, Jr. were
practicing lawyers and Rosendo was a Legal Officer at the Agricultural
Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a public school teacher.

The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals
are as follows:
Plaintiff Isaac Chaves became a customer of defendant MERALCO in the
year 1953 when he and his family were residing at No. 211-D Rubi, Manila.
In connection with the contract for electrical service, he deposited the sum
of P5.00 (Exh. "A") with defendant MERALCO on February 12, 1953. This
deposit in the name of plaintiff Isaac Chaves was retained by MERALCO
and made to apply to subsequent contracts for electrical service entered
into after subsequent transfers of the Chaves family to other residences
and up to the time this family went to reside at the place aforementioned, at
No. 2656 Mercedes Street, Singalong, Manila. ...

At or about the end of March, 1965, defendant Pedro Yambao went to the
residence of plaintiffs and presented two overdue bills, one for January 11
to February 9,1965, for the sum of P7.90 (Exhibit "C"), and the other for
February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the amount of P7.20 (Exhibit "C"). Juana
O. Chaves, however, informed Yambao that these bills would be paid at the
MERALCO main office.

Accordingly, on April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the defendant's main

office at San Marcelino, Manila, but paid only the bill marked as Exhibit 'C"
leaving the other bill Identified as Exhibit "C-l" unpaid.

Past 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 21,1965, MERALCO caused the
electric service in plaintiff's residence to be discontinued and the power line
cut off.

The next day, April 22, 1965, at about 9:00 a.m., plaintiff Rosendo O.
Chaves went to the MERALCO main office and paid the amount of P7.20
for the bill marked as Exhibit "C-l", and the sum of P7.00 for the
subsequent bill corresponding to the period from March 10 up to April 8,
1965 (Exhibit "C-2") after his attention was called to the latter account.
Rosendo O. Chaves then sought the help of Atty. Lourdy Torres, one of the
defendants' counsel, and, thereafter, the power line was reconnected and
electric service restored to the Chaves residence at about 7:00 p.m. of that
same day. 1

Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice given to herein
respondent. However, since only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioners, 'for the sake of argument and for the purpose of giving focus on
the legal issues', do not take issue with such finding.
Petitioners contend that in the absence of bad faith, they could not be held
liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. The
failure to give a notice of disconnection to private respondents might have
been a breach of duty or breach of contract, but by itself does not constitute
bad faith or fraud; it must be shown that such a failure was motivated by in
or done with fraudulent intent.Petitioners also maintain that ' private
respondents were in arrears in the payment of their electricity bills when
their electric service was connected, no moral damages may be recovered
by them under the 'clean hands' doctrine enunciated in Mabutas vs.
Calapan Electric Company, CA-G.R. No. L-9683-R, May 26, 1964.

In its decision, the respondent Court of Appeals held that MERALCO's right
to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer "is an absolute
one, subject only to the requirement that defendant MERALCO should give
the customer a written notice of disconnection 48 hours in advance." This
requirement is embodied in Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the
Public Service Commission which provides as follows:

Section 97. Payment of bills. — A public service, may require that bills for
service be paid within a specified time after rendition. When the billing
period covers a month or more, the minimum time allowed will be ten days
and upon expiration of the specified time, service may be discontinued for
the non-payment of bills, provided that a 48 hours' written notice of such
disconnection has been given the customer: Provided, however, that
disconnections of service shall not be made on Sundays and official
holidays and never after 2 p.m. of any working day: Provided, further, that if
at the moment the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders
payment of the unpaid bill to the agent or employee of the operator who is
to effect the disconnection, the said agent or employee shall be obliged to
accept tender of payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount and
shall desist from disconnecting the service. 2

The respondent court stressed the importance and necessity of the 48-hour
advance written notification before a disconnection of service may be
effected. Said the court:

... It sets in motion the disconnection of an electrical service of the

customer by giving the notice, determining the expiration date thereof, and
executing the disconnection. It, therefore, behooves the defendant
MERALCO that before it disconnects a customer's electrical service, there
should be sufficient evidence that the requirements for the disconnection
had been duly complied with, otherwise, the poor consumer can be
subjected to the whims and caprices of the defendant, by the mere
pretension that the written notice had been duly served upon the
customer. 3

We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from. One can not
deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some
nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas.
Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas justifying
the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business of
supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is
engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97
of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the
conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as
MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer.
Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before
disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a
tort, as held by us in a similar case, 4 where we said:

... petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without

prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent
tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause
additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear
violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code.
Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which
provides that wilfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Likewise, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that being in arrears in

the payment of their bills, the private respondents are not entitled to moral
damages under the doctrine that "he who comes to court in demand of
equity, must come with clean hands." We rejected this argument in the
Manila Gas Corporation case, supra, wherein we held that respondents'
default in the payment of his bills "cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat
or null the claim for damages. At most, this circumstance can be
considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to
which respondent ... is entitled."

Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent

court in affirming the trial court's decision. The petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p.

2 Rollo pp. 35-36.

3 Ibid., p. 39.

4 Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992

ESTERIA F. GARCIANO, petitioner, 


vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EMERITO LABAJO, LUNISITA
MARODA, LALIANA DIONES, CANONISA PANINSORO, DIONISIO
ROSAL, REMEDIOS GALUSO, FLORDELUNA PETALCORIN,
MELCHIZEDECH LOON, NORBERTA MARODA and JOSEPH
WIERTZ, respondents.

Basilio E. Duaban for petitioner.

Julius Z. Neri for private respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the
private respondents.

The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13,
1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave
of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her
daughter was employed (Exh. B). The application was recommended for
approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the
President of the school's Board of Directors (Exh. B-1).

On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner

through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing
her of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in
by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty,
to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1)
the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the
school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a
substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position
without a written contract (Exhs. C and 1). Upon her return from Austria in
the later part of June, 1982, she received the letter informing her that her
services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She
made inquiries from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the
members of the Board of Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr.
Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to
report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5,
1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before
this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this
Institution, therefore it is declared null and void . . ." (Exhs. D and 2).

On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three

members of the Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine (9),
resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty,
has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs.
Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's
decision" (Exh. E).

On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the

Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo,
and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and
unjust and illegal dismissal.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, ordering
the defendants jointly and severally to pay her P200,000 as moral
damages, P50,000 exemplary damages, P32,400 as lost earnings for nine
years, and P10,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of

Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 10692), which on August 30, 1990 reversed the
trial court's decision thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, the complaint is

dismissed, and defendants-appellants are absolved from any liability to
plaintiff-appellee. With costs against plaintiff-appellee. (p. 13, Rollo.)
The plaintiff-appellee (now petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration
which the Court of Appeals denied on October 26, 1990. Hence, this
petition for review wherein the lone error assigned by petitioner reads:

Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in absolving the private

respondents from liability by faulting the petitioner for her failure to report
back to her work. (p. 6, Rollo.)

After a careful perusal of the petition and the respondents' comments, the
Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.

The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone

possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers and other employees of
the school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her to report for
work. While the private respondents sent her a letter of termination through
her husband, they admittedly had no authority to do so. As the Court of
Appeals aptly observed:

We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should not have

been held liable to plaintiff-appellee for damages. Defendants-appellants
had no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee and the latter was aware of
this. Hence, the letter of termination sent to her through her husband (Exhs.
C and 1) by defendants-appellants had no legal effect whatsoever. It did
not effectively prevent her from reporting for work. What is more, it was
subsequently repudiated by the Board of Directors which directed her to
report for work. (Exhs. D and 2) There was, therefore, no reason why she
did not continue with her teaching in the school. No evidence had been
presented to show that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting
for work. The fact that defendants-appellants had "acidly" received the
action of the Board of Directors repudiating their decision to terminate
plaintiff-appellee is not proof that defendants-appellants had effectively and
physically prevented plaintiff-appellee from resuming her post. It was
nothing more than a reaction to what defendants-appellants perceived as
an affront to their collective prestige. It would appear, therefore, that
plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her teaching job in the school
and has no right to recover damages from defendants-appellants. (p.
13, Rollo.)

Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises
only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or
morals, good customs or public policy.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance

from teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly
wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically
prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of
Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the
Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to
resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages.
They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to
dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law,
morals, good customs or public policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her
for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report
for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order.
Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost
earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.

With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover
them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to
demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be
construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who
are not themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG
5828, cited in Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral
damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation
to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the case at bar, petitioners
is not without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and
failed to report back in time for the regular opening of classes. Secondly, for
reasons known to herself alone, she refused to sign a written contract of
employment. Lastly, she ignored the Board of Directors' order for her to
report for duty on July 5, 1982.
The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for
she is not entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages. (Art.
2234, Civil Code).

In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the damages awarded by
the trial court to the petitioner for they did not have any legal or factual
basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz , Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, 

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B.
CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision   1 of respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled
"Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at
Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September
3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of
this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the court below, the evidence of
record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings,
which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered
indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had
sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband
and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-
appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his
application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a
quo, which adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we
paraphrased as follows:
Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single
and had finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974).
It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her
way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack, defendant,
Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion.
Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before
September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk
matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda at
the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios
Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n.,
pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while
Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right side. The car travelled north on its
way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in
Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but
which the duo ignored and instead threatened her not to make any noise as
they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if she
persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B.
Harrison Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and
dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and pleas. In
spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two male
combatants because of her natural weakness being a woman and her
small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the
defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and consent. She
could not fight back and repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had
forced her to lie down and embraced her, his companion held her two feet,
removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he
would ask his companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not
surrender her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on her
virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of
her private parts after her vagina was penetrated by the penis of the
defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to
allow her to go home but the latter would not consent and stated that he
would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry her,
so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him.
Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they used had
already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at
9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10)
o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag,
Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday,
she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license,
which they did. They filed their applications for marriage license (Exhibits
"A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the
house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from
September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned,
humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents on October
3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep
and eat because of the deception done against her by defendants-
appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio
Bansagan who declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to
arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister who is the mother of
plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his
sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6,
March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his
sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain
Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and
Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him to go
and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon
in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag,
Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the
matter and have them married."
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her
honor, she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father
promised they would be married.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant
Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8,
1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to
their relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this
fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez.
The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September
8, 1973, when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend
Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named
Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then
proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some
snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where
she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took
a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a
room, but these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel,
where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence
certificate number. Three hours later, the couple check out of the hotel and
proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where
they stayed until September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that
bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats
made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.
During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to
the house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be
wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado
Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the
evening of September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the
whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's whereabouts
when he was told of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of
September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied
having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to
her marriage to his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed
by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado
Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20,
1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and
raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering
petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of
temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as
the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any
and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision
disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other
hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal
several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which were summarized
by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant
Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in
finding that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she
would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in
awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-
appellants' promise of marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the
decision of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review,
contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits,
testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the
misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on preparation of
judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and
jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not
just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of
excessive damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts
failed to take into consideration the alleged fact that he and private
respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible
abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry.
It is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by
the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented
in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses
and evidence presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in
the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect,
what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew
the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before and
calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and
discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We
are, therefore, once again constrained to stress the well-entrenched
statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law,
distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case
law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited
to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings
of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not
its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained
of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must
stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the
oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does
the instant case reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions
which under our decisional rules may warrant a review of the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our
review of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of
private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to
marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart
from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon
the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively,
under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article
2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the
countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner
in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with
her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to
escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts
contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly
justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of
Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were
awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of
forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint
therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate
of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if
the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another
and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with
rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation
stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not
in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil
action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the
penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings
involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules
as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal
and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by
preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be
first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based
on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted
and prosecuted to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the
assailed judgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concur.
Nocon, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon, with Associate Justices
Antonio M. Martinez and Asaali S. Isnani, concurring; Annex A,
Petition; Rollo, 14.
2 Rollo, 24-26.
3 Ibid., 15-19.
4 Ibid., 27-57; Annex C, Petition; per Executive Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza.
5 Ibid., 15.
6 Ibid., 7.
7 Morales vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 197 SCRA 391 (1991).
8 De Jesus, et al. vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866 (1933).
9 Ford vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 186 SCRA 21 (1990).
10 Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
176 SCRA 778 (1989).
11 Calalang, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 194 SCRA 514
(1991).
12 Sec. 2(b), Rule 111, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; Faraon, et al. vs.
Prieta, 24 SCRA 582 (1968).
13 Ocampo, et al. vs. Jenkins, et al., 14 Phil. 681 (1909).
14 107 Phil. 783 (1960).
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, 


vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking

to review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939
Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel,

filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the
school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited
the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a
virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated
and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod
City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to
pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees
and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just
and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal

circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the
rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her
to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took
place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to
incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-
Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,

Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic)
of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,

Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,

Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
(sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil
Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that
(a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is
not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of
October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives
and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry
her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good
customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the
temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary
of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision,
digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few
days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August
20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them
of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs
Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of
plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended
to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because
plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his
proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they
were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan
City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in
the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and
feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in
the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following
day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to
marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant,
went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her
lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain
went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married
to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at
the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for
pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to
the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of

Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,
9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for

lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged

decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who
was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose
morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed 

"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the
lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so
the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in
the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to
plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at
(sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic)
a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when
he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of
the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first
proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why
plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted
defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod
City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod
City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but
did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending
to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country
girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-

appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise
to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep
said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-
in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of
appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and
public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to
our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in
one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for
the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower
court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26
March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21
of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had

not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar
with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim
Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and
concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he
does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial
"common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been
solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if
responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement.
F i n a l l y, p e t i t i o n e r a s s e v e r a t e s t h a t e v e n i f i t w a s t o b e
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to
the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's

arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which
boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is
the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial
court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and
trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could
alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this
Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, 

L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica
v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); 

(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the
above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of
the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an

actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed
Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to

marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus
vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to
abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience
which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm
suits in many of the American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which
is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of
justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of

willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common
law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes
not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent
acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence
of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated
by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner
could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article
337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied
in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied
recovery of damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of

seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger
than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and
as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner,
then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance
found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at

possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was
eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction
existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made
in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth
in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who
had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more
than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise

or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion

or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual

desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization
of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill
his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that
no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance
in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,

who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was

due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 

L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise
to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that
there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages
will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of
moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the

expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil.
471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,

notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of
age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit
as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the

effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him,
both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even
goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any
injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own
doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a
mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25,
1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can
give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial
assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament
prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It
is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and

traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal
fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most,
it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where
his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by 

fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be
no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent,
let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the

instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

# Footnotes

1 Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Per Associate Justice Alicia V.

Sempio-Diy, concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and
Jaime M. Lantin.

2 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 20-22.

3 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 23-24.

4 Annex "C", Id.; Id., 25.

5 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-33. Per Judge Antonio M. Belen.

6 Id., 33.

7 Rollo, 31-33.

8 Rollo, 54-55.

9 Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50.

10 Annex "G", Id.; Id.; 53-62.

11 Rollo, 58-59.

12 Rollo, 61.
13 Id., 11.

14 In support thereof, he cites Despi vs. Aliosco, [CA] 64 O.G.; Wassmer

vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 [1964]; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109
Phil. 629 [1960]; and Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].

15 People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA
465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs. Arciaga,
98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs.
Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414 [1991];
and People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991].

16 191 SCRA 218 [1990], footnote omitted; see also, Remalante vs. Tibe,
158 SCRA 138 [1988].

17 Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs.
Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].

18 58 Phil. 866 [1933].

19 Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, 14 May 1949, 2352.

20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978].

21 Report of the Code Commission, 39-40. This passage is quoted, except

for the last paragraph, in Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA 994,
996-997 [1966]; the Article 23 referred to is now Article 21.

22 Report of the Code Commission, 161-162.

23 TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code

of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72.

24. Rollo, 61.

25. Supra.

26. Supra.

27 At pages 997-999.
28 Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. I, Eleventh ed., (1984),
91-92.

29 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,

vol. 1, 1985 ed., 76-77, omitting footnotes.

30 7 Phil. 156 [1906].

31 Article 21.

32 Supra.

33 Rollo, 16.

34 Id., 16-17.

35 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004.

36 37 Am Jur 2d, 401, omitting citations.

37 11 SCRA 158 [1964]; see also, Liguez vs. Court of Appeals 102 Phil.
577 [1975].
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 45125 April 22, 1991

LORETA SERRANO, petitioner, 


vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and LONG LIFE PAWNSHOP, INC., respondents.

Cecilio D. Ignacio for petitioner.


Hildawa & Gomez for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

Sometime in early March 1968, petitioner Loreta Serrano bought some

pieces of jewelry for P48,500.00 from Niceta Ribaya. On 21 March 1968,
petitioner, then in need of money, instructed her private secretary, Josefina
Rocco, to pawn the jewelry. Josefina Rocco went to private respondent
Long Life Pawnshop, Inc. ("Long Life"), pledged the jewelry for P22,000.00
with its principal owner and General Manager, Yu An Kiong, and then
absconded with said amount and the pawn ticket. The pawnshop ticket
issued to Josefina Rocco stipulated that it was redeemable "on
presentation by the bearer."

Three (3) months later, Gloria Duque and Amalia Celeste informed Niceta
Ribaya that a pawnshop ticket issued by private respondent was being
offered for sale. They told Niceta the ticket probably covered jewelry once
owned by the latter which jewelry had been pawned by one Josefina
Rocco. Suspecting that it was the same jewelry she had sold to petitioner,
Niceta informed the latter of this offer and suggested that petitioner go to
the Long Life pawnshop to check the matter out. Petitioner claims she went
to private respondent pawnshop, verified that indeed her missing jewelry
was pledged there and told Yu An Kiong not to permit anyone to redeem
the jewelry because she was the lawful owner thereof. Petitioner claims
that Yu An Kiong agreed.
On 9 July 1968, petitioner went to the Manila Police Department to report
the loss, and a complaint first for qualified theft and later changed to estafa
was subsequently filed against Josefina Rocco. On the same date,
Detective Corporal Oswaldo Mateo of the Manila Police also claims to have
gone to the pawnshop, showed Yu An Kiong petitioner's report and left the
latter a note asking him to hold the jewelry and notify the police in case
some one should redeem the same. The next day, on 10 July 1968, Yu An
Kiong permitted one Tomasa de Leon, exhibiting the appropriate pawnshop
ticket, to redeem the jewelry.

On 4 October 1968, petitioner filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila for damages against private respondent Long Life for
failure to hold the jewelry and for allowing its redemption without first
notifying petitioner or the police. After trial, the trial judge, Hon. Luis B.
Reyes, rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, awarding her P26,500.00
as actual damages, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
the complaint, P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.

Judge L.B. Reyes' decision was reversed on appeal and the complaint
dismissed by the public respondent Court of Appeals in a Decision
promulgated on 26 September 1976.

The Court of Appeals gave credence to Yu An Kiong's testimony that

neither petitioner nor Detective Mateo ever apprised him of the
misappropriation of petitioner's loan, or obtained a commitment from him
not to permit redemption of the jewelry, prior to 10 July 1968. Yu An Kiong
claims to have become aware of the loan's misappropriation only on 16
August 1968 when a subpoena duces tecum was served by the Manila
Fiscal's Office requiring him to bring the record of the pledge in connection
with the preliminary investigation of the estafa charge against Josefina
Rocco. Consequently, the appellate court ruled, there could have been no
negligence, much less a grave one amounting to bad faith, imputable to Yu
An Kiong as the basis for an award of damages.

In this Petition for Review, petitioner seeks reversal of the Public

respondent's findings relating to the credibility of witnesses and the
restoration of the trial court's decision.

Deliberating on the present Petition for Review, the Court considers that the
public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering
its questioned Decision.
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from
the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their
candor or lack thereof.1 While the Supreme Court ordinarily does not rule
on the issue of credibility of witnesses, that being a question of fact not
properly raised in a petition under Rule 45, the Court has undertaken to do
so in exceptional situations where, for instance, as here, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals arrived at divergent conclusions on questions of fact
and the credibility of witnesses.2

The Court of Appeals rejected what it considered to be the incredible

testimony of petitioner and Detective Mateo. It faulted petitioner for failing
to report to the police authorities the loss of her jewelry immediately on 21
March 1968 when Josefina Rocco failed to return to her either the loan
proceeds or the jewelry. But it must be noted that Josefina Rocco simply
disappeared without a trace on said date. Petitioner had no way of knowing
if Josefina had misappropriated her jewelry, or had first pledged the jewelry
as instructed and then misappropriated the proceeds of the loan. In the
latter case, which was in fact what had occurred, petitioner could have had
no idea as to the identity of the pawnbroker. Moreover, this Court has
several times recognized that different people may have diverse reasons
for failing to report promptly to the police their having been victimized by
some criminal or fraudulent scheme and that such failure does not by itself
render their subsequent testimony unworthy of credence.3

The Court of Appeals also found it hard to believe that Detective Mateo had
failed to obtain a written acknowledgment from Yu An Kiong of the receipt
of the note as corroboration for his testimony. However, absent evidence
that it was an established practice for police officers to obtain such
acknowledgment in situations like the one here, it is difficult to see why
Detective Mateo's behavior should be considered unbelievable. On the
other hand, as the trial court pointed out, it would not have been sensible
for Detective Mateo to leave a note reminding Yu An Kiong to hold unto the
jewelry if the latter had in fact then told the policeman that the jewelry had
already been redeemed.

The public respondent apparently believed petitioner had failed to establish

her ownership of the jewelry pledged by Josefina Rocco, such failure
purportedly engendering doubt that Tomasa de Leon may have redeemed
jewelry different from that owned by petitioner. This is curious and
untenable because the record on appeal indicates that Yu An Kiong had
admitted in his answer and memorandum before the trial court that he
received pledged jewelry from Josefina Rocco and, in his memorandum,
that such jewelry had been entrusted to Josefina by petitioner as the latter's
employer. It is clear from these judicial admissions that he considered
petitioner to have been the true owner of the jewelry.

Finally, the Court of Appeals did not believe petitioner's testimony because
of a claimed material inconsistency therein. On direct examination,
1âwphi1

petitioner said she "immediately" went to the private respondent's

establishment upon being informed by Niceta Ribaya of the possible
whereabouts of her jewelry. On cross-examination, she said she went to
the establishment "a few days later." If this is an inconsistency, it relates to
an unimportant detail. What is clear is that in any event, petitioner testified
that she went to the respondent's pawnshop to meet Yu An Kiong and
notify him of the misappropriation before anyone had redeemed the jewelry.

We must also note that the Court of Appeals apparently over-looked a fact
of substance which did not escape the attention of the trial court.
Petitioner's version of events was corroborated by Police Detective Mateo
and by Niceta Ribaya. These were two (2) individuals who had nothing to
gain from the outcome of the case. Certainly, their disinterested testimony
should have been accorded more probative weight than the negative,
uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of Yu An Kiong, which presented
a diametrically opposed version of events calculated to show that in
permitting redemption of the jewelry, he was acting in good faith.4

The testimony of Detective Mateo was moreover supported by the

presumption that he had acted in the regular performance of his official
duty as a police officer, a presumption that Yu An Kiong did not try to rebut.

This being a civil case, it was enough for petitioner to show, by a

preponderance of evidence, that her version of events did in fact occur. We
agree with the trial court that this burden of proof had been discharged by
petitioner because her evidence was direct and more credible and
persuasive than that propounded by Yu An Kiong,5 and corroborated by
disinterested witnesses.

Turning to the substantive legal rights and duties of the parties, we believe
and so hold that, having been notified by petitioner and the police that
jewelry pawned to it was either stolen or involved in an embezzlement of
the proceeds of the pledge, private respondent pawnbroker became duty
bound to hold the things pledged and to give notice to petitioner and the
police of any effort to redeem them. Such a duty was imposed by Article 21
of the Civil Code.6 The circumstance that the pawn ticket stated that the
pawn was redeemable by the bearer, did not dissolve that duty. The pawn
ticket was not a negotiable instrument under the Negotiable Instruments
Law nor a negotiable document of title under Articles 1507 et seq. of the
Civil Code. If the third person Tomasa de Leon, who redeemed the things
pledged a day after petitioner and the police had notified Long Life, claimed
to be owner thereof, the prudent recourse of the pawnbroker was to file an
interpleader suit, impleading both petitioner and Tomasa de Leon. The
respondent pawnbroker was, of course, entitled to demand payment of the
loan extended on the security of the pledge before surrendering the jewelry,
upon the assumption that it had given the loan in good faith and was not a
"fence" for stolen articles and had not conspired with the faithless Josefina
Rocco or with Tomasa de Leon. Respondent pawnbroker acted in reckless
disregard of that duty in the instant case and must bear the consequences,
without prejudice to its right to recover damages from Josefina Rocco.

The trial court correctly held that private respondent was liable to petitioner
for actual damages which corresponded to the difference in the value of the
jewelry (P48,500.00) and the amount of the loan (P22,000.00), or the sum
of P26,500.00. Petitioner is entitled to collect the balance of the value of the
jewelry, corresponding to the amount of the loan, in an appropriate action
against Josefina Rocco. Private respondent Long Life in turn is entitled to
seek reimbursement from Josefina Rocco of the amount of the damages it
must pay to petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 23 September 1976 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Court of First Instance dated 22 May 1970 is hereby
REINSTATED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 436 (1989).
2 Robleza v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 354 (1989).
3E.g., People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 (1985); People vs. Coronado,
145 SCRA 250 (1986).
4 Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, supra.
5 Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619 (1989).
6 Article 21 of the Civil Code provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.

The problems exemplified in this case are now addressed by P.D. No. 114
entitled the "Pawnshop Regulation Act," dated 29 January 1973. Section 13
of this statute grants the pawner an automatic grace period of ninety (90)
days from the date of maturity of the obligation, within which to redeem the
pawn by payment of the principal of the debt with interest, principal and
interest being compounded at the time the obligation matured. Under
Section 15 of the same statute, the pawnbroker is expressly forbidden to
sell or otherwise dispose of things received in pawn or pledge to anyone
other than the pawner, except at public auction, under the control and
direction of a licensed auctioneer, and then only after publication of notice
in at least two (2) daily newspapers during the week preceding the date of
such public auction sale. Section 14 expressly requires the pawnbroker to
notify the pawner of the date, hour and place of the sale.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 127358 : March 31, 2005]

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL

LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.

[G.R. NO. 127449 : March 31, 2005]

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL

LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage,

which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the
ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer,
petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he
and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.1

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel
A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4,
1979, null and void ab initio;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of

2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6%
interest from the date of this decision plus attorney's fees of P100,000.00;

3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation

of P50,000.00, plus costs;

4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership

property[,] particularly the plaintiff's separation/retirement benefits received
from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying
to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79
or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of
this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;

5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification
as the necessity arises;

6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to
his mother, the herein defendant; and cralawlibrary

7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden
family name Singh.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and
registries of properties.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the
case was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to
increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh
Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be
denied or that such incident be set for oral argument.3

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing

the support pendente lite to P20,000.4 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.5

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing

petitioner's appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial court's
decision.6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals

denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996
Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the son.7 Petitioner filed
a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.

On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the Petition
for Certiorari9 were ordered consolidated by this Court.10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:

1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE

AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION,
WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY
LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;

2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND P50,000.00

EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,
WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;

3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-

APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS
RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12%
I N T E R E S T T H E R E O N F R O M T H E D AT E O F I T S D E C I S I O N ,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS
AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES,
ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS
MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND

4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES'

MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD
(WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO
WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY
OVER HIS PERSON.11

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR
THE PARTIES' SON FOR HEARING.12

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY'S

MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT
PRESENT PRICES.13

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY'S

SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF
EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONER'S
OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS
ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO
MINIMAL."14

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN

OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT
AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVY'S SUPPORT.15

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals
articulated:

On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained

from the testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-
appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on
the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-
appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to
her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of
pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into
marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that
he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but
also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the
marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out,
that of leaving defendant appellee and their son; that he had no desire to
keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later,
refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused
defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together
but also after and throughout their separation.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court's decision on the ground that unlike
those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a
consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there
is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason
of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded,
it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made.

Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral

and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower
court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding at
least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the
ruling of the trial court.16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and
21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:

ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917 of the Civil Code
enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it
mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21
states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There
is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In
granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were
based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages
would have no leg to stand on.

On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null
and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological
incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code
states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to

be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. . . .18

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner
after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a
product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and
hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond
the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on
the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be
predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific
evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No
such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and
discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If
the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the
part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without
basis in law and in fact.

Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of
exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.19

With respect to the grant of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation the
trial court explained, thus:

Regarding Attorney's fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as
in this case the plaintiff's act or omission has compelled the defendant to
litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2),
and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)20

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is
fully justified, the award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation by the trial
court is likewise fully justified.21

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his
psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment
of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private
respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner's psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter
inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a
ground for attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the
award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.

Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co.
and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group
of Companies, the trial court said:

The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the
assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment
of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration
of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17,
1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 - 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.

The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all
property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116,
New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code
enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they
are the following:

1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one
of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or
both of the spouses;

3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage
from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive
property of each spouse. . . .

Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an

inventory of what are the parties' conjugal properties and what are the
exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings
in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later
as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/
retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00
which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net
amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995
(Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations other than
those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of
the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband
and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular case,
however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor
had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant
wife's share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and
transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house
and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise
Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement
of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had
allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law
strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets,
the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what
was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so
that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half
was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.

Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of
her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that
she be given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits
received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership
properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or
profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of
the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of
the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila
Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.22

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:

On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial

court for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far
East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee
as the latter's share in the conjugal partnership.

On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the
Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same
Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth, their
conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/

retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank &
Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for
the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiff appellant's service for the
bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to
defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true
with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park
and Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-
appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is
entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find
no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.23

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of
the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab
initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.

In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this Court
expounded on the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations
of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such
as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article
144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it
provides:

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivosof his or her share
in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,

suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit
of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph
of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any
of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through

their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership
of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has
clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly
provides that -

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or
her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during
the period of cohabitation; and cralawlibrary

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or
her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default
thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the

parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52,
in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates
only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity
of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that
somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages
are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty
on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code,
on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice.
In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to
have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the
latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of
Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.25

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were

found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been
acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the
co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear
to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties
herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on
the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains.

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of
age on May 27, 200526 and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.

With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari,
these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996

and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the
Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of
litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the
retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-
half of petitioner's shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the
Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision
and Resolution are AFFIRMED.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court
of Appeals' Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which
increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties' son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and

Carpio, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 Rollo (G.R. No.127449), p. 54.

2 Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 76.

3 Rollo (G.R. No. 127358), pp. 7-8.

4 Id. at 136.

5 Id. at 138.

6 Id. at 144.

7 Id. at 153.

8 G.R. No. 127449.

9 G.R. No. 127358.

10 Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 100.

11 Id. at 32.

12 Rollo (G. R. No.127358) p. 11.

13 Id. at 15.

14 Id. at 17.

15 Id. at 20.

16 Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), pp. 81-82.

17ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35.

...

18Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA
20, 34. Emphasis supplied.

19Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of

example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

20 Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 67.

21 Id. at 82.

22 Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), pp. 69 -71.

23 Id. at 82-83.

24 G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996, 260 SCRA 221.

25 Id. at 226-234. (Emphasis in the original.)

26Javy Singh Buenaventura was born on May 27, 1980; Rollo (G.R. No.
127449), p. 56.
 SECOND DIVISION

G. R. No. 154259 - February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY

LIM, Petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY
BISAYA," respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila

Garden (Hotel Nikko) 1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution 4 of
the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought
under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat
(respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen
name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of
13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel
Nikko, 5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who
then approached him. 6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the
hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr.
Masakazu Tsuruoka. 7Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which
she replied: "of course." 8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart
carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the
celebrant. 9At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the
celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. 10 After a
couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the
buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel
Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. 11 In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the
buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain,
hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). 12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he
was invited by Dr. Filart. 13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance,
however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation. 14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic
experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the
hotel. 15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
policeman. 16Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual
damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees. 17

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party
but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim
narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty
(20) years. 18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of
the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. 19 The year 1994 was no
different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list
and extended invitations accordingly. 20 The guest list was limited to
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. 21 At the party,
Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. 22 Mindful
of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr.
Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes
who was not invited. 23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the
group of Dr. Filart. 24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another
guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from
the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not
invite Mr. Reyes. 25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to
leave the party as he was not invited. 26Mr. Reyes, however, lingered
prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not
want to leave. 27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing
with a Captain Batung whom she later approached. 28 Believing that Captain
Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the
same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave
the party as he was not invited. 29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim
spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as
there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity. 30However, as Mr.
Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. 31 When
Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and
said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho
kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po
umalis na kayo." 32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would
show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and
making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her. 33

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court,
also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr.
Reyes to the party. 34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to
carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going
to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. 35 When they
reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not
properly dressed and was not invited. 36 All the while, she thought that Mr.
Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col.
Batung. 37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting. 38 She ignored Mr. Reyes. 39 She was embarrassed and did not want
the celebrant to think that she invited him. 40

After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, 41 giving
more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking
Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr.
Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited:

Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of
Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to
leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host.
Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach
of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had
against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at
fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not
the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and
took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail. 42

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it
found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim
ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several
guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he

should not finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance
of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for
which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered
by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The
liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited,
but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of
a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to
another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs. 43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in
approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes
exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have
approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes
in private:

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by
appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should
have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as
the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs.
Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited
appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant
could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally
liable.

...

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon
mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of
the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for
damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA
603). 44

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and
Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2)
moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000). 45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed
its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply
discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered." 46

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that
the Court of Appeals seriously erred in

I.
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING
THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER

II.

HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA
"COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR.
FILARTS INVITATION"

III.

DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS

REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE
HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA

IV.

IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF

HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD

V.

IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE

APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury" 47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury 48 or to the
consent to injury 49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one who
has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat
him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in
asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he
was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with
her.

As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and
irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the
case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review
such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of
facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of
law. 51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court. 52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as
she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food
and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both
courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that
brought Mr. Reyes to the party.

The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?

From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower
courts findings of fact.

First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, 53 for-invitation-

only, thrown for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came
a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could not
just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor.
While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the
very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the
celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants
instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the
"gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention
to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the
displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention
to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability
to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and
some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to
prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not
offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining
a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-
examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim
talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you
were at the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?

A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.

Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she
shouted?

A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na
lang."

Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

...

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many. 55

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr.
Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she
would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the
hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues
to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary
does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was
correct in observing that

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for
the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each
other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have
been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was
plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests
aware of what transpired between them. . .

Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the
police to take him out. 56

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr.
Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his
witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only
that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party. 57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to
which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. 58

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of

abuse of rights, 59 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
Article 19 states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which

does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible." 60 The object of this article, therefore, is to
set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. 61 These standards
are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. 63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law 64 which does not obtain
herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Article 21, on the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 21 65 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done
with intent to injure. 66

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, 67 and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional. 68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown
that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not
know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive
conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old,"
had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced
by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen." 69 The
lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a
complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail
if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we
cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims
act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs.
Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
"predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person,
which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity." 70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-
passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she
did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not
invite Mr. Reyes. 71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners
Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary
damages 72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals held

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the
latters lowly station in life. This has to be limited somewhere. In a
democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by
the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and
propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or
correction for public good and to avert further commission of such acts,
exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees. 73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter

with the very facts of the case and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed
that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long
standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the
Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a
showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of
the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of
humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74 During his direct
examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income 75 and
nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of
any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby
Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage
which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a
legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be
his to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 Now Dusit Hotel Nikko.

2Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de
Guia-Salvador concurring (Rollo, pp. 48-57).
3 Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
4Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de
Guia-Salvador concurring (Rollo, pp. 59-60).
5 TSN, 08 March 1995, p. 8.
6 Id. at 10.
7 Ibid.
8 Id. 11.
9 Id. at 13.
10 Id. at 13 & 16.
11 COMPLAINT, RTC Record, p. 2.
12 Supra, note 5 at 17.
13 Supra, note 11.
14 Ibid.
15 Id. at 2-3.
16 Id. at 3.
17 Ibid.
18 TSN, 27 July 1996, p. 9.
19 Id. at 10.
20 Id. at 12-13, 15.
21 Id. at 15-17, 25.
22 Id. at 25.
23 Id. at 27.
24 Ibid.
25 Id. at 31-32.
26 Id. at 33.
27 Id. at 37.
28 Id. at 38-39.
29 Ibid.
30 Petition, Rollo, p. 18.
31 Supra, note 29 at 41-42.
32 Id. at 42-43.
33 Answer, pp. 32-33, RTC Records; RTC Decision, Rollo p. 62; TSN, 27 July 1995, pp. 43-46.
34 TSN, 05 November 1997, p. 15.
35 Violeta Filarts "ANSWER WITH COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM," RTC Records, p. 21.
36 Supra, note 34 at 17.
37 Or "Captain Batung" from the testimony of Ruby Lim; Id. at 18.
38 Id. at 19.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41Dismissed as well were the counterclaims filed by then defendants Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, Ruby
Lim and Violeta Filart, RTC Records, p. 347.
42 RTC Records, p. 342.
43 CA Rollo, p. 205.
44 Id. at 208-209.
45 Id. at 238.
46 CA Rollo, pp. 239-240.
47 E.L. Pineda, Torts and Damages Annotated, p. 52 (2004 ed).
48 Garciano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96126, 10 August 1992, 212 SCRA 436, 440.
49cf. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74553, 08 June 1989, 174
SCRA 80, 88.
50 Sangco, Torts and Damages Vol.1 , pp. 83-84.
51 Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, 02 June 1995, 244 SCRA 713, 720.
52 Ibid.
53 TSN, 22 May 1999, p. 11.
54 Admitted by Mr. Reyes, see TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 10.
55 TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 20.
56 RTC Records, pp. 340-341.
57 Danny Rodinas and Pepito Guerrero (TSN, 18 May 1995), Alexander Silva (TSN, 21 June 1995).
58 Article 2180, Civil Code.
59Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, 25 August 1989, 176
SCRA 779, 783.
60Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993, 217 SCRA 16,
25.
61 Supra, note 61 at 783-784.
62 Ibid.
63 Supra, note 62.
64Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same. See Globe Mackay, supra, note 61 at 784.
65 Civil Code.
66 Supra, note 62 at 25.
67 Civil Code.
68 Ibid.
69 "COMMENT," Rollo, p. 302; "MEMORANDUM," Rollo, p. 417.
70 CA Rollo, p. 209.
71 In fact, Mrs. Filart herself, in her testimony and in her pleadings, consistently disclaimed having
invited Mr. Reyes to the party such that when Mr. Reyes was being escorted out of the penthouse, she
lifted nary a finger to his rescue.
72 Art. 2234, Civil Code.
73 CA Rollo, pp. 209-210.
74 Appellants Brief, CA Rollo, p. 27; see also TSN, 08 March 1995, pp. 7-8.
75 TSN, 29 October 1998, p. 11.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, 


vs.

ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel

respect for one's personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy
and non-interference demands respect."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case
MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander
Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land
(Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817
situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are
the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots
1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents
constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot
1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed
as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that
petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the
said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application
for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in
order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13,
2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec
two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property;11 that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of
petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and
that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus,
petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video
surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not
install the video surveillance cameras,16nor did they order their employees
to take pictures of petitioners’ construction.17 They also clarified that they
are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application
for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ

of Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond
by petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and
Allan Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the
revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building
overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed
within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec,
facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same
in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order
dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for
Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued
with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear
and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the
right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not
violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of
the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.
29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical

personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed
orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the
respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32

Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:

I.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18
OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
 II.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED

THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO
PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE
I L L E G A L LY I N S TA L L E D S U R V E I L L A N C E C A M E R A S O F
RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE
ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND
EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED

THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT
AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE
CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE
PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15
MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM
DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33

Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of

petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper
parties to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction because respondents’ installation of a stationary
camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving camera
covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of
petitioners’ right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code,
which enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of others.
35Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence,
petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M.
Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is
used for business, it is still covered by the said provision.37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case,

petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that
respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s corporate fiction.38 They point
out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where the
video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business
consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners
cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property involved is not used
as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with
the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by
Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41as additional security for its
building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is

defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an
individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not
necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be
let alone."47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects
them against the State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State
recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not
even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only
under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy
of their homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded

therefrom and only certain individuals

are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s
right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right
to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any
act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of
another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the
privacy of another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the
residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M.
Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s

residence." This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled
to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is
entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only
such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places
where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as
private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals
may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting
the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The "reasonable expectation of


privacy" test is used to determine

whether there is a violation of the right

to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use

the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the
reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part
test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices
may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of
privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy
must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these
cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business
office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime
under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction,
ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a

temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents of a revolving
camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of
privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera
does not only focus on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at
the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans
through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing
was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up
deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The
monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the
purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the
building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards
their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be made to
extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over
the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as
property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation

of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without
their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then,
the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor
that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of
the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with,
unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here,
there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred
in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper
parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a


correlative legal obligation to redress a

wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of

the defendant's act or omission which

had violated the legal right of the

former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to

redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or
omission which had violated the legal right of the former."57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that
since they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video
surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact
that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video
surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video

surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used
against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application
for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents
installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his
concerns but they did not seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter
to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against
respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there
has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family
concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these
factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper
parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct

from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation
managed by the Choachuy family.63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim
that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the
compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for
respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and
answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the
video surveillance cameras. 64 And when respondents moved for
reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video
surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these
instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that

respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to
protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that
respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July

10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No.
MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415,434 (1968).
2 Rollo, pp. 10-33.
3CA rollo, pp. 111-116; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and
concurred in by Associate Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Stephen C.
Cruz.
4 Id. at 128-129.
5 Records, pp. 1-8.
6 Id. at 2.
7 Id. at 3.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 4.
13 Id. at 5.
14 Id. at 8.
15 Id. at 23-26.
16 Id. at 24.
17 Id. at 25.
18 Id. at 24.
19 Id. at 51-56; penned by Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap.
20 Id. at 55-56.
21 Id. at 75-79.
22 Id. at 98-99.
23 Erroneously dated as February 6, 2005.
24 Records, p. 99.
25 CA rollo, pp. 2-12.
26 Id. at 111-116.
27 Id. at 113-114.
28 Id. at 114.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 115.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 116. Emphases in the original.
33 Rollo, pp. 20-21.
34 Id. at 173-176.
35 Id. at 172.
36 Id. at 174-175.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 27.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 153-154.
41 Id. at 152.
42 Id. at 154.
43 Id. at 152.
44 Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
45Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. Nos.
157870, 158633 & 161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 431.
46Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code
of the Philippines, 1990 Edition, Volume I, p. 108.
47 Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 970 (1998).
48Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. v. Judge Español, 493 Phil. 507,
516 (2005), citing Villanueva v. Querubin, 150-C Phil. 519, 525 (1972).
49Pineda, Ernesto L., Torts and Damages (Annotated), 2004 Edition, p.
279.
50 Supra note 46 at 110.
51In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 715 (2006).
52 Supra note 47 at 980.
53 Id. at 981.
54 Id. at 980.
55 Records, p. 55.
56Overseas Workers Welfare Administration v. Chavez, G.R. No. 169802,
June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 451, 471.
57 Reyes v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 86, 92.
58 CA rollo, pp. 114-115.
59 Records, p. 3
60 Id. at 54.
61 Id. at 52.
62 Id. at 53-55.
63 Id. at 80-91.
64 Id. at 58-71.
65 Id. at 71.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 September 11, 2013

UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME J.

MARTINEZ, Petitioners, 

vs.

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 168, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 192073

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., Petitioner, 


vs.

HON. MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, in her capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 and
UNICAPITAL, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on

certiorari1 assailing separate issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) as
follows:

(a) The petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 filed by Unicapital, Inc.,
(Unicapital), Unicapital Realty, Inc. (URI), and Unicapital Director and
Treasurer Jaime J. Martirez (Martirez)assail the CA’s Joint Decision2 dated
October 20, 2005 and Resolution3 dated October 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 64019and 64451 which affirmed the Resolution4 dated September
14,1999 and Order5 dated February 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68 (RTC-Pasig City) in SCA No. 1759,
upholding the denial of their motion to dismiss; and
(b) The petition in G.R. No. 192073 filed by Rafael Jose Consing, Jr.
(Consing, Jr.) assails the CA’s Decision6dated September 30, 2009 and
Resolution7 dated April 28, 2010 inCA-G.R. SP No. 101355 which affirmed
the Orders dated July16, 20078 and September 4, 20079 of the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 60 (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No.
99-1418,upholding the denial of his motion for consolidation.

The Facts

In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela
Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an ₱18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital,
₱12,000,000.00 of which was acquired on July 24, 1997 and the
remaining₱6,000,000.00 on August 1, 1997. The said loan was secured by
Promissory Notes10 and a Real Estate Mortgage11 over a 42,443 square
meter-parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite, registered in the name of Dela
Cruz as per Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 (subject
property).12 Prior to these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real
estate company, was already interested to develop the subject property into
a residential subdivision.13 In this regard, PBI entered into a joint venture
agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate development arm, URI. In
view of the foregoing, the loan and mortgage over the subject property was
later on modified into an Option to Buy Real Property14 and, after further
negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For
this purpose, Dela Cruz appointed Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact.15

Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-half of the subject

property for a consideration of ₱21,221,500.00 (against which Dela Cruz’s
outstanding loan obligations were first offset), while PBI bought the
remaining half for the price of ₱21,047,000.00.16 In this relation, Dela Cruz
caused TCT No. T-687599 to be divided into three separate titles as
follows: (a) TCT No. T-851861 for URI;17 (b) TCT No. T-851862 for PBI;
18 and (c)TCT No. T-51863 which was designated as a road lot.19 However,

even before URI and PBI were able to have the titles transferred to their
names, Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital
that they are the lawful owners of the subject property as evidenced by TCT
No.T-114708;20 that they did not sell the subject property; and that Dela
Cruz’s title, i.e., TCT No. T-687599, thereto was a mere forgery.21 Prompted
by Teng and Yu’s assertions, PBI conducted further investigations on the
subject property which later revealed that Dela Cruz's title was actually of
dubious origin. Based on this finding, PBI and Unicapital sent separate
demand letters22 to Dela Cruz and Consing, Jr., seeking the return of the
purchase price they had paid for the subject property.

From the above-stated incidents stemmed the present controversies as

detailed hereunder.

The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285

On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex

Action for Declaratory Relief23 and later amended to Complex Action for
Injunctive Relief24 (Consing, Jr.’s complaint) before the RTC-Pasig City
against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General Manager Mariano
Martinez (Martinez), Dela Cruz and Does 1-20, docketed as SCA No. 1759.
In his complaint, Consing, Jr. claimed that the incessant demands/recovery
efforts made upon him by Unicapital and PBI to return to them the
purchase price they had paid for the subject property constituted
harassment and oppression which severely affected his personal and
professional life.25 He also averred that he was coerced to commit a
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 2226 as Unicapital and PBI, over threats
of filing acase against him, kept on forcing him to issue a post-dated check
in the amount sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their knowledge that
he had no funds for the same.27 He further alleged that Unicapital and URI
required him to sign blank deeds of sale and transfers without cancelling
the old one sin violation of the laws on land registration and real estate
development.28 Likewise, Consing, Jr. added that Unicapital and PBI’s
representatives were" speaking of him in a manner that was inappropriate
and libelous,"29 and that some John Does "deliberately engaged in a
fraudulent scheme to compromise Consing, Jr.’s honor, integrity and
fortune x x x consisting of falsifying or causing to be falsified, or attempting
to present as falsified certain transfers of Land Titles and Deeds for
profit,"30 classifying the foregoing as ultra vires acts which should warrant
sanctions under the corporation law, Revised Securities Act and related
laws.31 Accordingly, Consing, Jr. prayed that: (a) he be declared as a mere
agent of Dela Cruz, and as such, devoid of any obligation to Unicapital,
URI, and PBI for the transactions entered into concerning the subject
property; (b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI be enjoined from harassing or
coercing him, and from speaking about him in a derogatory fashion; and (c)
Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him actual and consequential damages in the
amount of ₱2,000,000.00, moral damages of at least ₱1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages of ₱1,000,000.00, all per month, reckoned from May
1, 1999 and until the controversy is resolved, and attorney's fees and costs
of suit.32

For their part, Unicapital, URI, and Martirez (Unicapital, et al.) filed separate
Motions to Dismiss33 Consing, Jr.’s complaint (Unicapital, et al.’s motion to
dismiss) on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, considering
that: (a) no document was attached against which Consing, Jr. supposedly
derived his right and against which his rights may be as certained; (b) the
demands to pay against Consing, Jr. and for him to tender post-dated
checks to cover the amount due were well within the rights of Unicapital as
an unpaid creditor, as Consing, Jr. had already admitted his dealings with
them; (c) the utterances purportedly constituting libel were not set out in the
complaint; and (d) the laws supposedly violated were not properly
identified. Moreover, Unicapital, et al. posited that the RTC-PasigCity did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that Consing, Jr. failed to pay
the proper amount of docket fees. In the same vein, they maintained that
the RTC-Pasig City had no jurisdiction over their supposed violations of the
Corporation Code and Revised Securities Act, which, discounting its merits,
should have been supposedly lodged with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Finally, they pointed out that Consing, Jr.’s complaint suffers
from a defective verification and, thus, dismissible.34

Similar to Unicapital et al.’s course of action, PBI and its General Manager,
Martinez (Unicapital and PBI, et al.), sought the dismissal of Consing, Jr.’s
complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action. They also
denied having singled out Consing, Jr. because their collection efforts were
directed at both Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz, which should be deemed as
valid and, therefore, should not be restrained.35

On September 14, 1999, the RTC-Pasig City issued a Resolution36 denying

the above mentioned motions to dismiss, holding that Consing, Jr.’s
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages
pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It ruled that where there is abusive
behavior, a complainant, like Consing, Jr., has the right to seek refuge from
the courts. It also noted that the elements of libel in a criminal case are not
the same as those for a civil action founded on the provisions of the Civil
Code, and therefore, necessitates a different treatment. It equally refused
to dismiss the action on the ground of non-payment of docket fees, despite
Consing, Jr.’s escalated claims for damages therein, as jurisdiction was
already vested in it upon the filing of the original complaint. Moreover, it
resolved to apply the liberal construction rule as regards the subject
complaint’s verification and certification, despite its improper wording,
considering further that such defect was not raised at the first opportunity.
Consequently, it ordered Unicapital and PBI, et al. to file their Answer and,
in addition, to submit" any Comment or Reaction within five (5) days from
receipt hereof on the allegations of Consing, Jr. in his rejoinder of
September 9, 1999regarding the supposed filing of an identical case in
Makati City,"37 i.e., Civil Case No. 99-1418. Unperturbed, Unicapital and
PBI, et al. moved for reconsideration therefrom which was, however,
denied by the RTC-Pasig City in an Order38 dated February 15, 2001 for
lack of merit. Aggrieved, they elevated the denial of their motions to dismiss
before the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition,39 docketed as CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 64019 and 64451.

On October 20, 2005, the CA rendered a Joint Decision40 holding that no

grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC-Pasig City in refusing
to dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint. At the outset, it ruled that while the
1âwphi1

payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its

non-payment will not automatically cause the dismissal of the case. In this
regard, it considered that should there be any deficiency in the payment of
such fees, the same shall constitute a lien on the judgment award.41 It also
refused to dismiss the complaint for lack of proper verification upon a
finding that the copy of the amended complaint submitted to the RTC-Pasig
City was properly notarized.42 Moreover, it upheld the order of the RTC-
Pasig City for Unicapital and PBI, et al. to submit their comment due to the
alleged existence of a similar case filed before the RTC-Makati City.43

Anent the substantive issues of the case, the CA concurred with the RTC-
Pasig City that Consing Jr.'s complaint states a cause of action. It found
that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s purportedly abusive manner in enforcing
their claims against Consing, Jr. was properly constitutive of a cause of
action as the same, if sufficiently proven, would have subjected him to
"defamation of his name in business circles, the threats and coercion
against him to reimburse the purchase price, fraud and falsification and
breach of fiduciary obligation." It also found that the fact that Consing Jr.'s
complaint contains "nebulous" allegations will not warrant its dismissal as
any vagueness therein can be clarified through a motion for a bill of
particulars."44 Furthermore, it noted that Consing, Jr. does not seek to
recover his claims against any particular provision of the corporation code
or the securities act but against the actions of Unicapital and PBI, et al.;
hence, Consing, Jr.’s complaint was principally one for damages over
which the RTC has jurisdiction, and, in turn, there lies no misjoinder of
causes of action.45

Dissatisfied, only Unicapital, et al. sought reconsideration therefrom but the

same was denied by the CA in a Resolution46 dated October 25,2006.
Hence, the present petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos.175277
and 175285.

The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 192073

On the other hand, on August 4, 1999, Unicapital filed a complaint47 for sum
of money with damages against Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the
RTC-Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1418, seeking to recover
(a) the amount of ₱42,195,397.16, representing the value of their
indebtedness based on the Promissory Notes (subject promissory notes)
plus interests; (b) ₱5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) attorney's
fees; and (d) costs of suit.48

PBI also filed a complaint for damages and attachment against Consing, Jr.
and Dela Cruz before the RTC of Manila, Branch 12, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95381, also predicated on the same set of facts as above
narrated.49 In its complaint, PBI prayed that it be allowed to recover the
following: (a) ₱13,369,641.79, representing the total amount of installment
payments made as actual damages plus interests; (b) ₱200,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (c) ₱200,000.00 as moral damages; (d) attorney's
fees; and (e) costs of suit.50 Civil Case No. 99-95381 was subsequently
consolidated with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City.51

For his part, Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 99-1418
which was, however, denied by the RTC-Makati City in an Order52 dated
N o v e m b e r 1 6 , 1 9 9 9 . T h e r e a f t e r, h e f i l e d a M o t i o n f o r
Consolidation53 (motion for consolidation) of Civil Case No. 99-1418 with
his own initiated SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City.

In an Order54 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC-Makati City dismissed Consing,
Jr.’s motion for consolidation and, in so doing, ruled that the cases sought
to be consolidated had no identity of rights or causes of action and the
reliefs sought for by Consing, Jr. from the RTC-Pasig City will not bar
Unicapital from pursuing its money claims against him. Moreover, the RTC-
Makati City noted that Consing, Jr. filed his motion only as an after thought
as it was made after the mediation proceedings between him and
Unicapital failed. Consing, Jr.'s motion for reconsideration therefrom was
denied in an Order55 dated September 4, 2007. Hence, he filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101355, ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Makati City in refusing to
consolidate Civil Case No. 99-1418 with SCA No. 1759 in Pasig City.

On September 30, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision56 sustaining the

Orders dated July 16, 2007 and September 4, 2007 of the RTC-Makati City
which denied Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation. It held that
consolidation is a matter of sound discretion on the part of the trial court
which could be gleaned from the use of the word "may" in Section 1,
Rule38 of the Rules of Court. Considering that preliminary steps (such as
mediation) have already been undertaken by the parties in Civil Case No.
99-1418 pending before the RTC-Makati City, its consolidation with SCA
No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City "would merely result in
complications in the work of the latter court or squander the resources or
remedies already utilized in the Makati case."57 Moreover, it noted that the
records of the consolidated Pasig and Manila cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759
and Civil Case No. 99-95381, respectively, had already been elevated to
the Court, that joint proceedings have been conducted in those cases and
that the pre-trial therein had been terminated as early as October 23,
2007.Therefore, due to these reasons, the consolidation prayed for would
be impracticable and would only cause a procedural faux pas. Undaunted,
Consing, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom but was denied by
the CA in a Resolution58 dated April 28, 2010. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 192073.

The Proceedings Before the Court

After the filing of the foregoing cases, the parties were required to file their
respective comments and replies. Further, considering that G.R. No.
192073 (Makati case) involves the same parties and set of facts with those
in G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 (Pasig case), these cases were ordered
consolidated per the Court's Resolution59 dated November 17, 2010. On
March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to give due course to the instant
petitions and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.60

The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues in these cases are as follows: (a) in G.R. Nos.175277
and 175285, whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City’s
denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss; and (b) in G.R. No. 192073,
whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati City’s denial of
Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation.

The Court’s Ruling

A. Propriety of the denial of


Unicapital, et al.’s motion to

dismiss and ancillary issues.

A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates

a right of another.61 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action
is determined by the allegations in the complaint.62 In this relation, a
complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for.63 Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which
the complaint can be maintained, then the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.64 As
edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro,65 citing
H o n g k o n g a n d S h a n g h a i B a n k i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , L i m i t e d . v.
Catalan66 (HSBC):

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.
Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts
alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient
basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless
of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.67 (Emphasis
supplied)

Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an

analysis on whether or not the complaint is able to convey a cause of
action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be
misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a
motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 1668 of the Rules of
Court(Rules), while the latter is not a ground for dismissal under the same
rule.
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint in SCA No.1759
properly states a cause of action since the allegations there insufficiently
bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code.

Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations which

aim to demonstrate the abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al.
enforced their demands against him. Among others, the complaint states
that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed and bothered by Unicapital
and PBI, et al.; x x x besieged by phone calls from them; x x x has had
constant meetings with them variously, and on a continuing basis, such that
he is unable to attend to his work as an investment banker."69 In the same
pleading, he also alleged that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s act of "demanding
a postdated check knowing fully well that he does not have the necessary
funds to cover the same, nor is he expecting to have them is equivalent to
asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive force."70 Accordingly,
these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the
recovery of damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states
that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." As explained in the HSBC case:

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must beheld
responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because it is recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith;
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right
when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it
was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be
no intention to injure another.71 (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for damages

under Article 26 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly

station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

The rationale therefor was explained in the case of Manaloto v. Veloso III,
72 citing Concepcion v. CA,73 to wit:

The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in
our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the
human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality
is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every
country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a
person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not
exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for
violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.74

To add, a violation of Article 26 of the Civil Code may also lead to the
payment of moral damages under Article 2219(10)75 of the Civil Code.

Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged that "he has
come to discover that Unicapital and PBI, et al. are speaking of him in a
manner that is inappropriate and libelous; and that they have spread their
virulent version of events in the business and financial community such that
he has suffered and continues to suffer injury upon his good name and
reputation which, after all, is the most sacred and valuable wealth he
possesses - especially considering that he is an investment banker."76 In
similar regard, the hypothetical admission of these allegations may result
into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 26, and even
Article2219(10), of the Civil Code.

Corollary thereto, Unicapital, et al.’s contention77 that the case should be

dismissed on the ground that it failed to set out the actual libelous
statements complained about cannot be given credence. These incidents,
as well as the specific circumstances surrounding the manner in which
Unicapital and PBI, et al. pursued their claims against Consing, Jr. may be
better ventilated during trial. It is a standing rule that issues that require the
contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full
ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the
province of a mere motion to dismiss,78 as in this case. Hence, as what is
only required is that the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the Court – in view of the above-stated
reasons – finds that the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action was not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would necessitate the reversal
of the CA’s ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law.79 This the Court does not perceive in the case
at bar.

Further, so as to obviate any confusion on the matter, the Court equally

finds that the causes of action in SCA No. 1759 were not – as Unicapital, et
al. claim – misjoined even if Consing, Jr. averred that Unicapital and PBI, et
al. violated certain provisions of the Corporation Law and the Revised
Securities Act.80

The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following conditions under
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules results in a misjoinder of causes of action:81

SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action . - A party may in one pleading assert,

in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on
joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special
rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional
Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction
of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery
of money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied)

A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not seek to
hold Unicapital and PBI, et al. liable for any specific violation of the
Corporation Code or the Revised Securities Act. Rather, he merely sought
damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s alleged acts of making him sign
numerous documents and their use of the same against him. In this
respect, Consing, Jr. actually advances an injunction and damages
case82 which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig City.
83 Therefore, there was no violation of Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules,

particularly, paragraph (c) thereof. Besides, even on the assumption that

there was a misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect should not
result in the dismissal of Consing, Jr.’s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the
Rules explicitly states that a "misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground
for dismissal of an action" and that "a misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded
with separately."

Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to
the dismissal of his complaint. It has long been settled that while the court
1âwphi1

acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does
not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the
fees are paid within a reasonable period.84 Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s
insistence that the stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated
in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA85 should be
applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that
Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay the
correct amount of filing fees. As pronounced in the case of Heirs of
Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor:86

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional

requirement, even its

non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the

dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and
there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule
does not apply.87 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.'s apprehension that

Consing, Jr.'s "metered" claim for damages to the tune of around
₱2,000,000.00 per month88 may balloon to a rather huge amount by the
time that this case is finally disposed of, still, any amount that may by then
fall due shall be subject to assessment and any additional fees determined
shall constitute as a lien against the judgment as explicitly provided under
Section 2,89Rule 141 of the Rules.

Finally, on the question of whether or not Consing, Jr.'s complaint was

properly verified, suffice it to state that since the copy submitted to the trial
court was duly notarized by one Atty. Allan B. Gepty and that it was only
Unicapital, et al.’s copy which lacks the notarization, then there was
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the rules on pleadings.90

In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in

sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital et al.’s motion to
dismiss. As such, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 must be
denied.

B. Propriety of the denial of


Consing, Jr.’s motion for

consolidation.

The crux of G.R. No. 192073 is the propriety of the RTC-Makati City’s
denial of Consing, Jr.’s motion for the consolidation of the Pasig case, i.e.,
SCA No. 1759, and the Makati case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-1418.Records
show that the CA upheld the RTC-Makati City’s denial of the foregoing
motion, finding that the consolidation of these cases was merely
discretionary on the part of the trial court. It added that it was "impracticable
and would cause a procedural faux pas

"if it were to "allow the RTC-Pasig City to preside over the Makati case."91

The CA’s ruling is proper.

It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same
parties and affect closely related subject matters, the same must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interest of the
parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a
speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In addition, consolidation
serves the purpose of avoiding the possibility of conflicting decisions
rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which otherwise could be
disposed of in a single suit.92 The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of
the Rules which provides:

SEC. 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a common question of law

or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA
No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418, although involving the same parties
and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should remain unconsolidated
since they proceed from different sources of obligations and, hence, would
not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction and
damages case based on the Civil Code provisions on abuse of right and
defamation, while Civil Case No. 99-1418 is a collection and damages suit
based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In
particular, SCA No. 1759 deals with whether or not Unicapital and BPI, et
al, abused the manner in which they demanded payment from Consing, Jr.,
while Civil Case No. 99-1418 deals with whether or not Unicapital may
demand payment from Consing, Jr. based on the subject promissory notes.
Clearly, a resolution in one case would have no practical effect as the core
issues and reliefs sought in each case are separate and distinct from the
other.

Likewise, as the CA correctly pointed out, the RTC-Makati City could not
have been failured in retaining Civil Case No. 99-1418 in its dockets since
pre-trial procedures have already been undertaken therein and, thus, its
consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City would
merely result in complications on the part of the latter court or squander the
resources or remedies already utilized in Civil Case No. 99-1418.93 In this
light, aside from the perceived improbability of having conflicting decisions,
the consolidation of SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418 would,
contrary to its objective, only delay the proceedings and entail unnecessary
costs.
All told, the Court finds the consolidation of SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case
No. 99-1418 to be improper, impelling the affirmance of the CA’s ruling.
Consequently, the petition in G.R. No. 192073 must also be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277, 175285 and 192073 are
DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ Joint Decision dated October
20, 2005 and Resolution dated October 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
64019 and 64451 and the Decision dated September 30, 2009 and
Resolution dated April 28, 2010 in CA-G.R. No. 101355 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes
1Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 35-76; rollo (G.R. No. 192073),
pp. 10-34.
2 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 9-29. Penned by Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes (nowretired member of the Supreme Court), with
Associate Justices Aurora Santiago Lagman and Sesinando E. Villon,
concurring.
3 Id. at 31-32.
4 Id. at 191-193. Penned by Judge Santiago G. Estrella.
5 Id. at 279-281. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Florito S. Macalino.
6Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 38-49. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias
Dicdican, with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
7 Id. at 70-71.
8 Id. at 160-162. Penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
9 Id. at 177-178.
10 Id. at 88-89.
11 Id. at 90-93.
12 Id. at 357-358.
13 Id. at 83.
14 Id. at 84-86.
15 Id. at 87.
16 Id. at 42.
17 Id. at 345-346.
18 Id. at. 347-348.
19 Id. at 349-350.
20 Id. at 354-356.
21 Id. at 359-360. See Letter dated April 21, 1999.

Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 131-132 (Dated April 27, 1999 of
22

PBI); and rollo (G.R. No.192073), pp. 112-113 (Dated April 26, 1999 of
Unicapital).
23 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 114-123.
24 Id. at 149-157. Dated June 16, 1999.
25 Id. at 153.

"AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE

26

OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as "The Anti-Bouncing Check Law."
27 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 153-154.
28 Id. at 154-155.
29 Id. at 120.
30 Id.
31 Ibid.
32 Id. at 121-122.
33Id. at 124-127 (Dated May 24, 1999); and id. at 159-166 (Dated August
23, 1999).
34 Id. at 187-188. See Reply dated September 7, 1999.
35Id. at 128-130 (Dated May 26, 1999); id. at 167-168 (Dated August 27,
1999).
36 Id. at 191-193. See also id. at 86.
37 Id. at 193.
38 Id. at 279-281.
39 Id. at 282-315. Dated March 28, 2001.
40 Id. at 83-103.
41 Id. at 92-95.
42 Id. at 100-101.
43 Id. at 101-102.
44 Id. at 98-99.
45 Id. at 99-100.
46 Id. at 105-106.
47 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 124-135. Dated July 28, 1999.
48 Id. at 133.
49 Id. at 21-22, and 205.
50 Id. at 207-209.
51Id. at 146-150. See Order in Civil Case No. 99-95381 dated October 8,
2001. Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the CA) Rosmari D.
Carandang.

Id. at 403-407. Signed by Acting Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz

52

Maceda.
53 Id. at 153-159. Dated June 18, 2007.
54 Id. at 160-162. Dated July 16, 2007.
55 Id. at 177-178. Dated September 4, 2007.
56 Id. at 38-49.
57 Id. at 47.
58 Id. at 70-71.
59Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 562; and rollo (G.R. No. 192073),
p. 495.
60Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 566-567; and rollo (G.R. No.
192073), pp. 530-531. Court Resolution dated March 9, 2011.
61 See Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
62 Peltan Dev., Inc. v. CA, 336 Phil. 824, 833 (1997).
63See Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao
City, Br. 8, G.R. No.147058, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 281.
64 The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. CA, 274 Phil. 947, 955 (1991).
65 G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 153.
66 483 Phil. 525, 538 (2004).
67 Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, supra note 65, at 162.
68Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be
made on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

x x xx
69 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 153.
70 Id. at 153-a.
71 Supra note 66, at 538-539. (Citation omitted)
72 G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 347.
73 381 Phil. 90 (2000).
74 Supra note 72, at 365-366.
75 Article 2219.

Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

xxxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35.

xxxx
76 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p 154.
77 Id. at 61-64.
78NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company, G.R. No.175799, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 328,
347.
79De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506,
514-515.
80 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 64-68.
81See Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 90,
104.
82Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 156. In his complaint, Consing, Jr.
essentially seeks that Unicapital, et al.: (a) "should be restrained from
harassing plaintiff by threats of criminal prosecution, or any other coercive
demand, or any other threats by reason of the transactions over the
property in question"; (b) "should be forever barred from speaking about
him in a derogatory fashion in so far as the surrounding circumstances of
the transfers of property in question"; (c) pay him "x x x actual damages
and consequential damages in the sum of ₱2,000,000.00 continuing at the
same rate per month for the whole period from May 1, 1999 until the
controversy is resolved"; (d) pay him "x x x moral damages in the amount
of at least ₱1,000,000.00 per month from May 1, 1999 until the controversy
is resolved"; (e) pay him "x x x exemplary damages punitive in nature in the
amount of atleast ₱1,000,000.00 per month from May 1, 1999 until the
controversy is resolved; and (f) pay him" x x x attorney’s fees, costs of suit
and any other reliefs that may be equitable in the premises."
83 See Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.
84 See Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-
Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339, 347.
85 G.R. No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562.
86 495 Phil. 422 (2005).
87 Id. at 436.
88 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 69.
89SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment awards a
claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the
pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of
court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
90 See rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 100-101.
91 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 47-48.

See Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., G.R.
92

Nos. 190462 and 190538, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 403, 415-416.
93 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), p. 47.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. P-11-2999 February 27, 2012 


(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3517-P)

SHEILA G. DEL ROSARIO, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela,Complainant, 

vs.

MARY ANNE C. PASCUA, Court Stenographer III, same
Court, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Sheila G. del Rosario charges Mary

Anne C. Pascua (respondent), Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela, with Dishonesty (1) for traveling
to Hong Kong from June 1 to 6, 2008 without securing a travel authority
from the Supreme Court and for not stating in her leave application her
foreign travel; and (2) for misrepresenting in her official documents in the
Supreme Court her date of birth as June 27, 1974, when her registered
date of birth in the National Statistics Office (NSO) is August 7, 1974.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed the respondent to

comment on the complaint.2

The respondent admitted that she failed to secure a travel authority from
the Supreme Court, but explained that it was due to mere inadvertence.
She alleged that her true date of birth, as reflected in her baptismal
certificate and her marriage contract, is June 27, 1974, and she was in the
process of correcting with the NSO her registered date of birth to reflect her
true date of birth. She insisted that she did not commit any act of
dishonesty.3

The OCA recommended that the present matter be redocketed as a regular

administrative matter. It found the respondent guilty of violation of
 reasonable office rules and regulations for traveling abroad without the
required travel authority. It recommended that the respondent be
reprimanded for her first offense.4

The OCA also found the respondent guilty of simple dishonesty for failing to
disclose in her leave application her foreign travel. It recommended the
penalty of suspension for one (1) month. It noted that the respondent did
not commit any dishonesty regarding the discrepancy in her date of birth
since she wanted to reflect her true date of birth as June 27, 1974, though
her registered date of birth has not yet been corrected.5

We adopt the OCA’s findings, but modify the recommended penalties.

OCA Circular No. 49-20036 provides that "court personnel who wish to
travel abroad must secure a travel authority from the Office of the Court
Administrator." Section 67 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave7 provides that
"[a]ny violation of the leave laws, rules or regulations, or any
misrepresentation or deception in connection with an application for leave
shall be a ground for disciplinary action." Under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,8 violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations is a light offense punishable with the penalty of
reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one (1) day to thirty (30) days
for the second offense, and dismissal from the service for the third offense.

In this case, since the respondent traveled without securing a travel

authority and did not state her foreign travel in her leave application, she is
guilty of violating at least two (2) office rules and regulations. These twin
violations should be reflected in her penalties, particularly in the second
offense – failure to state in her leave application her travel abroad – which,
to our mind, strongly suggests deception on her part amounting to
dishonesty. She should be suspended without pay for three (3) months for
her twin infractions. Let this be a warning to all who might be minded to risk
a one-month suspension if only to avoid disclosing to the Court that they
shall be traveling abroad.1âwphi1

We find that the discrepancy in the respondent’s date of birth in her records
does not amount to dishonesty, as she made no false statement. No
deliberate intent to mislead, deceive or defraud appears from the cited
circumstances of this case. Dishonesty means "the concealment of truth in
a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the performance
of his duties. It is an absence of integrity, a disposition to betray, cheat,
deceive or defraud, bad faith."9 The respondent’s date of birth is not a fact
directly relevant to her functions or qualification to office or connected with
the performance of her duties. Besides, her other records, i.e., baptismal
certificate and marriage contract, reflected June 27, 1974 as her true date
of birth; she simply wanted to reflect this fact in her records.

WHEREFORE, respondent Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela, is
found GUILTY of violation of the rules requiring court permission for travel
abroad and for failing to disclose her intended foreign trip in her leave
application. For her twin violations, she is hereby SUSPENDED for three
(3) months without pay, and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be penalized more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

Footnotes
1 Dated October 4, 2010; rollo, pp. 6-7.
2 Id. at 19.
3 Dated November 30, 2010; id. at 20-23.
4 Memorandum dated May 2, 2011; id. at 31-35.
5 Ibid.
6 Dated May 20, 2003.
7As amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41,
s. 1998; Nos. 6, 14 and 24, s. 1999.
8Promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No.
99-1936 dated August 31, 1999 and implemented by Memorandum Circular
No. 19, s. 1999.
9Basilla v. Ricafort, A.M. No. P-06-2233, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA
425, 433.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

Complainant alleged that respondent, during her approved leave of

absence, traveled to Hong Kong on 1 to 6 June 2008 without securing a
travel authority from the Supreme Court and that she omitted to state her
intended foreign travel in her leave application. Furthermore, complainant
charged respondent of dishonesty for misrepresenting her date of birth as
27 June 1974 in her official documents, when her registered date of birth in
the National Statistics Office is 7 August 1974.

Respondent maintained that she failed to secure a travel authority from the
Supreme Court due to inadvertence. Respondent assumed that since she
did not have custody of and is not accountable for government funds, then
she is not required to secure a clearance from the Office of the Court
Administrator before she can travel abroad. On the discrepancy in her date
of birth, respondent claimed that she is in the process of correcting her
Certificate of Live Birth to reflect her true date of birth which is 7 August
1974.
The ponente finds that "the discrepancy in the respondent's date of birth in
her records does not amount to dishonesty, as she made no false
statement." However, the ponente holds that respondent has violated OCA
Circular No. 49-2003,1 for failure to secure permission to travel abroad and
for failing to disclose her intended foreign trip in her leave application.
The ponente finds respondent "guilty of violation of the rules requiring court
permission for travel abroad and for failing to disclose her intended foreign
trip in her leave application." Thus, respondent is imposed the penalty of
three-month suspension without pay and warned that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be penalized more severely.

I disagree with the ponente on the issue of respondent's unauthorized

foreign travel. This issue involves a government employee’s constitutional
right to travel abroad during her approved leave of absence.

My dissent in the recent case of Leave Division, OCA-OAS v. Heusdens,2 is

applicable to this case, thus:

Under Section 60 of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), officers and
employees in the Civil Service are entitled to leave of absence, with or
without pay, as may be provided by law and the rules and regulations of the
Civil Service Commission.

xxx

[A] citizen’s right to travel is guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution:

SEC. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

Although the constitutional right to travel is not absolute, it can only be

restricted in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law. As held in Silverio v. Court of
Appeals:

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean

that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without court order, the
appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only
on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as
may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973
text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987,
p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. L-53622,
25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

The constitutional right to travel cannot be impaired without due process of

law. Here, due process of law requires the existence of a law regulating
travel abroad, in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health. There is no such law applicable to the travel abroad of respondent.
In the absence of such a law, the denial of respondent’s right to travel
abroad is a gross violation of a fundamental constitutional right. The only
exception recognized so far is when a court orders the impairment of the
right to travel abroad in connection with a pending criminal case. Another
possible exception is if Congress, pursuant to its power of legislative
inquiry, issues a subpoena or arrest order against a person. These
exceptions, however, do not apply in the present case. Here, respondent
was not even facing a preliminary investigation or an administrative
complaint when she left the country.

xxx

During her approved leave of absence, respondent’s time was her own
personal time and she could be wherever she wanted to be. The Court
cannot inquire what respondent does during her leave of absence since
that would constitute unwarranted interference into her private affairs and
would encroach on her right to privacy. The right to privacy is "the right of
an individual to be let alone, or to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to
live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the
public is not necessarily concerned." Under Article 26 of the Civil Code, the
right to privacy is expressly protected:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

1. Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

2. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

4. Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly

station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Furthermore, respondent’s travel abroad, during her approved leave, did

not require approval from anyone because respondent, like any other
citizen, enjoys the constitutional right to travel within the Philippines or
abroad. Respondent’s right to travel abroad, during her approved leave,
cannot be impaired "except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law." Not one of these grounds is
present in this case.

There is no doubt that the use of leave of absence can be regulated without
impairing the employees’ right to privacy and to travel. In fact, the Civil
Service Commission has promulgated the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, of which Rule XVI is the Omnibus
Rules on Leave. Such rules and regulations are adopted to balance the
well-being and benefit of the government employees and the efficiency and
productivity in the government service. Thus, the requirement of securing
approval for any leave of absence is a reasonable and valid regulation to
insure continuity of service in the government. However, once a leave of
absence is approved, any restriction during the approved leave on the right
to travel of the government employee violates his or her constitutional right
to travel.

This Court should be the first to protect the right to travel of its employees,
a right enshrined not only in the Bill of Rights but also in the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Philippines is a signatory to the
Declaration and a state party to the Covenant. In fact, the duty of this Court
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution is to "promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights," not to
curtail such rights. Neither can this Court promulgate rules that "diminish"
or even "modify" substantive rights like the constitutional right to travel.
(Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the administrative complaint against Mary

Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Santiago City, Isabela.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Footnotes
1 GUIDELINES ON REQUESTS FOR TRAVEL ABROAD AND
EXTENSIONS FOR TRAVEL/STAY ABROAD. The pertinent provisions of
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 read:

B. VACATION LEAVE TO BE SPENT ABROAD

Pursuant to the resolution in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC dated 06 November

2000, all foreign travels of judges and court personnel, regardless of the
number of days, must be with prior permission from the Supreme Court
through the Chief Justice and the Chairmen of the Divisions.

1. Judges and court personnel who wish to travel abroad must secure a
travel authority from the Office of the Court Administrator. The judge or
court personnel must submit the following:

(a) For Judges:

· application or letter-request addressed to the Court Administrator stating

the purpose of the travel abroad

· application for leave covering the period of the travel abroad, favorably
recommended by the Executive Judge

· certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office, OCA

as to the condition of the docket

(b) For Court Personnel:

· application or letter-request addressed to the Court Administrator stating
the purpose of the travel abroad

· application for leave covering the period of the travel abroad, favorably
recommended by the Presiding Judge or Executive Judge

· clearance as to money and property accountability

· clearance as to pending criminal and administrative case filed against

him/her, if any

· for court stenographer, clearance as to pending stenographic notes for

transcription from his/her court and from the Court of Appeals

· Supreme Court clearance

2. Complete requirements should be submitted to and received by the

Office of the Court Administrator at least two weeks before the intended
period. No action shall be taken on requests for travel authority with
incomplete requirements. Likewise, applications for travel abroad received
less than two weeks of the intended travel shall not be favorably acted
upon.

xxx

4. Judges and personnel who shall leave the country without travel
authority issued by Office of the Court Administrator shall be subject to
disciplinary action.
2 A.M. No. P-11-2927, 13 December 2011. Citations omitted.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 183026 November 14, 2012

NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN, Petitioners, 


vs.

NELSON D. LAVINA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision1 rendered on February 14, 2008 and

Resolution2 issued on May 20, 2008 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 81810. The CA affirmed, albeit with modification relative to the
award of attorney's fees, the Decision3 rendered on October 3, 2003 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 165, which ordered herein
petitioner Nestor Padalhin (Nestor), to pay herein respondent Nelson D.
Lavina (Lavina) the total amount of P775,000.00 as damages.

Antecedent Facts

Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as

Ambassador and Consul General, respectively.

In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided
twice. Prior to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan4 (Pasturan) delivered
messages to the Filipino household helpers in the ambassador’s residence
instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take
photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein.

The first raid on April 18, 1996 was conducted while Laviña and his wife
were attending a diplomatic dinner hosted by the Indian High Commission.
Lucy Ercolano Muthua, who was connected with the Criminal Investigation
Division’s Intelligence Office of Kenya and David Menza, an officer in the
Digirie Police Station in Nairobi, participated in the raid. Photographs of the
first and second floors of Laviña’s residence were taken with the aid of
James Mbatia,5 Juma Kalama,6 Zenaida Cabando7 (Cabando), and Edna
Palao8 (Palao). The second raid was conducted on April 23, 1996 during
which occasion, the ambassador and his spouse were once again not
present and additional photographs of the residence were taken.

On September 27, 1996, Laviña received an information from the

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Manila that an investigating team
was to be sent to Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed against him by
the employees of the Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his
own complaint against the spouses Padalhin, on the other. The
investigating team was led by Rosario G. Manalo (Manalo) and had
Franklin M. Ebdalin (Ebdalin) and Maria Theresa Dizon (Dizon) as
members. The team stayed in Kenya from April 20, 1997 to April 30, 1997.
On April 29, 1997, the team entered Laviña’s residence unarmed with a
search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Laviña alleged
that in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed cabinet locks,
damaged furnitures and took three sets of carved ivory tusks.

Subsequently, both Nestor and Laviña were recalled from their posts in
Kenya.

On November 17, 1997, Laviña filed before the RTC a complaint for
damages against Nestor and his wife, petitioner Annie Padalhin (Annie)
Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. On July 6, 1998, Laviña
amended his complaint to include Pasturan as a defendant.

Laviña’s complaint alleged the following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront
against his privacy and the sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic
residence during the two raids conducted by the Kenyan officials,
supposedly instigated by Padalhin and participated by all the defendants as
conspirators; (b) infringement of his constitutional rights against illegal
searches and seizures when the investigating team sent by the DFA
entered into his residence without a warrant, court order or letter from the
DFA Secretary and confiscated some of his personal belongings; and (c)
bad faith, malice and deceit exhibited by the defendants, including
Padalhin, in conspiring on the conduct of the raids, engaging in a smear
campaign against him, and seizing without authority his personal effects.
Laviña sought payment of actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of suits.
In the course of the trial, Nestor denied any involvement in the raids
conducted on Laviña’s residence. As counterclaims, he alleged that the suit
filed by Laviña caused him embarasssment and sleepless nights, as well
as unnecessary expenses which he incurred to defend himself against the
charges. On the other hand, Annie denied prior knowledge of and
participation in the raids.

On February 24, 2000, the RTC, upon oral motion of Laviña’s counsel
informing the court that a settlement had been reached, dismissed the
charges against Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. As a
consequence, the RTC deemed it proper to no longer resolve the claims of
Laviña relative to the alleged seizure of his personal effects by the DFA
investigating team. Laviña pursued his charges against Nestor, Annie and
Pasturan.

The Ruling of the RTC

On October 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision9 ordering Nestor to pay

Laviña P500,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as nominal damages,
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, P150,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, and costs of suit for the former’s participation in the raid
conducted in the Ambassador’s residence on April 18, 1996. The RTC ruled
that:

Defendant Nestor N. Padalhin admitted in his sworn statement dated

October 10, 1997 which was subscribed and sworn to on October 13, 1997
before the Executive Director Benito B. Valeriano, Office of Personnel and
Administrative Services of the Department of Foreign Affairs, that he
caused the taking of pictures of the raw elephant tusks in the official
residence of the ambassador (Exh. "B"). x x x.

xxxx

The said affidavit was submitted by Nestor Padalhin in answer to the

administrative charge filed against him by then Secretary of the Department
of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, Jr. in connection with the violation of
the diplomatic immunity of the residence of the Philippine

Ambassador to Kenya on April 18, 1996. x x x.

xxxx
When Nestor Padalhin was presented by the plaintiff as hostile witness, he
affirmed the truth of the contents of his affidavit marked as Exhibit "B". x x
x.

It is therefore clear that the taking of the pictures of the elephant tusks
inside the residence of Ambassador Nelson Laviña while the latter and his
wife were out and attending a diplomatic function, was upon order of Nestor
Padalhin to his driver James Mbatia with the cooperation of Juma Kalama,
a gardener in the ambassador’s residence. The admission of defendant
Nestor Padalhin that he was the one who caused the taking of the pictures
of the elephant tusks in the official residence of Ambassador Laviña in
effect corroborates the latter’s testimony that it was Nestor Padalhin who
masterminded the invasion and violation of the privacy and inviolability of
his diplomatic residence in Kenya on April 18, 1996.

The invasion of the diplomatic residence of the plaintiff in Kenya and the
taking of photographs of the premises and the elephant tusks inside the
residence upon order of defendant Nestor Padalhin without the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiff were done by the said defendant in bad faith.
The intention to malign the plaintiff is shown by the fact that Nestor
Padalhin even went to the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reported
the raw elephant tusks of Ambassador Laviña as admitted in paragraph 2.a
of his affidavit marked as Exhibit "B".

This incident reached not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya but
also the Filipino community in Kenya, the Department of Foreign Affairs in
Manila and the circle of friends of plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff felt insulted,
betrayed, depressed and even feared for his life because the intelligence
and local police were involved in this incident. Plaintiff suffered humiliation,
sleepless nights, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation and wounded
feeling.

The admission of defendant Nestor Padalhin in his affidavit (Exh. "B")

regarding the first cause of action is binding upon him only but cannot bind
his co-defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan who were not
included in the administrative case where the affidavit of

Nestor Padalhin was submitted.

The affidavits of plaintiff’s maids Zenaida Cabando and Edna Palao who
implicated Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan in this case is hearsay
evidence because the said househelpers did not appear to testify in this
case and to identify their affidavits although the record will show that
plaintiff exerted all efforts to present them as witnesses but failed because
their address/whereabouts could not be traced and/or ascertained. In view
of this, defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan did not have
the opportunity to cross-examine the said affiants.10 (Italics ours)

The RTC was, however, not convinced of Nestor’s involvement in the raid
staged on April 23, 1996. Laviña’s testimony relative to the raid was not
based on his own personal knowledge as it was only derived from the
affidavits subscribed and sworn to before him by Cabando, Palao, Helen
Tadifa,11 John Ochieng12 and Leonidas Peter Logarta.13 During the trial before
the RTC and even in the proceedings before the DFA, Laviña had not
presented the aforementioned persons as witnesses. Their affidavits were
thus considered as hearsay evidence since the witnesses were not
subjected to cross-examination. The RTC likewise found no sufficient
evidence to render Annie and Pasturan liable and to grant Nestor’s
counterclaims.

Both Laviña and Nestor filed their respective appeals to assail the RTC
decision. Laviña ascribed error on the part of the RTC when it absolved
Annie and Pasturan from liability anent their supposed participation in the
raid conducted on April 18, 1996. Laviña likewise assailed as insufficient
the amount of exemplary and nominal damages imposed on Nestor by the
RTC. Laviña also challenged the propriety of the RTC’s dismissal of his
claims relative to the conduct of the second raid on April 23, 1996. On the
other hand, Nestor lamented that his participation in the April 18, 1996 raid
was not proven by clear and substantial evidence, hence, the award of
damages made by the RTC in favor of Laviña lacked basis.

The Ruling of the CA

On February 14, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision14 denying the appeals of

both Laviña and Nestor. The CA, however, reduced to P75,000.00 the
award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses made in Laviña’s favor. In
affirming, albeit with modification, the RTC’s disquisition, the CA explained:

There is no doubt in our mind that defendant-appellant indeed participated

in the first raid that happened on April 18, 1997 [sic]. This conclusion of
ours is based on the admission made by the defendant- appellant himself
in his affidavit dated October 10, 1997. x x x.
xxxx

Defendat-appellant’s affidavit constitutes as [sic] an admission against his

interest. Being an admission against interest, the affidavit is the best
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The
rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would
declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it
is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is
his fault if it does not. As a Consul General of the Republic of the
Philippines, defendant-appellant cannot pretend that the plain meaning of
his admission eluded his mind. On the witness stand, he testified that he
was the one who voluntarily and freely prepared his affidavit. He further
stated that the contents thereof are true. His affidavit likewise contained an
apology for his lack of judgment and discretion regarding the April 18, 1996
raid.

Anent plaintiff-appellant’s second cause of action, the court a quo correctly

ruled that plaintiff-appellant was not able to prove defendant- appellant’s
participation in the second raid that happened on April 26, 1996 [sic]. Basic
is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof is on the part of the party
who makes the allegations x x x. Plaintiff-appellant’s testimony regarding
the second raid was not of his own personal knowledge. Neither does the
affidavit of defendant-appellant admit that he had anything to do with the
second raid. Plaintiff-appellant came to know of the second raid only from
the stories told to him by his household helps and employees of the
Philippine Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Inasmuch as these people were not
presented as witnesses in the instant case, their affidavits are considered
hearsay and without probative value.

x x x.

Next, plaintiff-appellant bewails the dismissal of the complaint against

Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan. He contends that the affidavits of
Cabando and Palao, which were executed and sworn to before him, linking
defendant Annie Padalhin and B[ie]nvenido Pasturan to the two raids are
binding upon the latter two.

Such a contention by the plaintiff-appellant must fail. The failure of the

plaintiff-appellant to put Cabando and Palao on the witness stand is fatal to
his case. Even if defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan
failed to object to the hearsay evidence presented by the plaintiff-appellant,
it would only mean that they have waived their right of confrontation and
cross-examination, and the affidavits then are admissible. But admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.

xxxx

Defendant-appellant contends that there is no factual basis to conclude that

he was motivated by malice, bad faith or deceit, which would warrant the
award of damages in favor of the plaintiff-appellant.

x x x Plaintiff-appellant’s complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in

relation to Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil Code. These provisions of the
law state thus:

"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."

"Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."

"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations off [sic]
another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in

life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition."

The Comment of Tolentino on what constitute an abuse of rights under

Article 19 of the New Civil Code is pertinent:
"Test of Abuse of Right. – Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts
which, although not unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an
abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or
injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act
cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle
does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause
damage to another, because they violate the concept of social solidarity
which considers law as rational and just. x x x."

The question, therefore, is whether defendant-appellant intended to

prejudice or injure plaintiff-appellant when he did the acts as embodied in
his affidavit.

We rule in the affirmative. Defendant-appellant’s participation in the

invasion of plaintiff-appellant’s diplomatic residence and his act of ordering
an employee to take photographs of what was inside the diplomatic
residence without the consent of the plaintiff-appellant were clearly done to
prejudice the latter. Moreover, we find that defendant- appellant was not
driven by legitimate reasons when he did the questioned acts. As pointed
out by the court a quo, defendant-appellant made sure that the Kenyan
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Filipino community in Kenya knew about
the alleged illegal items in plaintiff-appellant’s diplomatic residence.

xxxx

Basic is the rule that trial courts are given the discretion to determine the
amount of damages, and the appellate court can modify or change the
amount awarded only when it is inordinate. x x x We reduce the amount of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation from P150,000.00 to P75,000.00
considering that the instant suit is merely for damages.

With regard to plaintiff-appellant’s contention that his prayer for "other

reliefs which are just and equitable", consisting of his remuneration,
salaries and allowances which should have been paid to him in Nairobi if it
were not for his illegal recall to Manila, the same must likewise fail. First of
all, it is not within our powers to determine whether or not plaintiff-
appellant’s recall to Manila following the two raids was illegal or not.
Second, the "other reliefs" prayed for by the plaintiff- appellant are in the
nature of actual or compensatory damages which must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork as to the amount of damages, but must depend
upon competent proof and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. Here,
plaintiff-appellant failed to present proof of his salary and allowances. x x x.
15 (Citations omitted and italics ours)

The Resolution16 issued by the CA on May 20, 2008 denied the respective
motions for reconsideration filed by Laviña and Nestor.

Hence, Nestor filed before us the instant Petition for Review on

Certiorari17 anchored on the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT NESTOR’S PARTICIPATION IN THE RAID

CONDUCTED ON LAVIÑA’S RESIDENCE WAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS TO WARRANT THE AWARD OF MORAL,
EXEMPLARY AND NOMINAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN
THE LATTER’S FAVOR.

II. WHETHER OR NOT NESTOR’S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD HAVE

BEEN GRANTED CONSIDERING A CLEAR SHOWING THAT LAVIÑA’S
SUIT WAS GROUNDLESS.

The Arguments in Support of the Petition

Nestor reiterates that his admission of having caused the taking of

photographs in Laviña’s residence was subject to the qualification that he
did so sans malice or bad faith. Padalhin insists that he did nothing
unlawful. He merely intended to verify the complaints of some embassy
personnel against Laviña, with the end in mind of protecting and upholding
the image of the Philippine diplomatic corps in Kenya. He may have
committed a lapse in the exercise of his discretion, but he never meant to
cause Laviña harm, damage or embarrassment.

Nestor avers that Laviña kept grudges against him based on a mistaken
sentiment that the former intended to oust the latter from his post. This,
however, did not justify Laviña’s filing of a suit for damages against Nestor.

Laviña’s Contentions

In his Comment,18 Laviña seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on both
procedural and substantive grounds. He alleges that the verification and
certification of non-forum-shopping attached to the petition was signed not
by Spouses Padalhin but by their son, Norman Padalhin (Norman). Such
being the case, it is as if the said verification and certification was not
signed at all, hence, legally inexistent, rendering the petition defective.
Besides, even if the Special Power of Attorney19 (SPA) signed by Nestor
were to be considered as the source of Norman’s authority to sign the said
verification and certification of non-forum-shopping, still, the instrument is
wanting as Annie, a co-petitioner in the case at bar, had no participation in
its execution.

Laviña likewise emphasizes that since factual and not legal issues are
raised, resort to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous.

In challenging the substantial merits of the instant petition, Laviña reiterates

the arguments he proferred in the proceedings below. He also made
affirmative references to the portions of rulings of both the RTC and the CA,
relative to the binding effect of the affidavits submitted by some of the
defendants either with the DFA or the RTC, to render all of them liable for
damages for their participation in the conduct of the supposed raids.

Our Disquisition

The instant petition is procedurally flawed.

We deem it proper to first resolve the procedural issues raised by Laviña

relative to the (a) alleged defective verification and certification of non-
forum shopping attached to the instant petition, and (b) the circumstance
that factual and not legal issues are presented before us, hence, beyond
the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or

rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party

shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by

mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Italics ours)

Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to

expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.20 Time and
again, this Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and
certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules of Court.21 Verification is
required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have
been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely
speculative.22 The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner
cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing
by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the
current petition.23
The circumstances surrounding the case at bar do not qualify to exempt
compliance with the rules and justify our exercise of leniency. The
verification and certification of non-forum shopping24 attached to the instant
petition was not signed personally by the petitioners themselves. Even if we
were to admit as valid the SPA executed in Norman’s favor allowing him to
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the
instant petition, still, his authority is wanting. Petitioner Annie did not
participate in the execution of the said SPA. In the pleadings filed with us,
there is nary an explanation regarding the foregoing omissions. The
petitioner spouses took procedural rules for granted and simply assumed
that the Court will accord them leniency. It bears stressing that procedural
rules are crafted towards the orderly administration of justice and they
cannot be haphazardly ignored at the convenience of the party litigants.

Laviña also seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of
being supposedly anchored on factual and not legal issues.

The case of Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank25 is emphatic on

what issues can be resolved in a petition for review on certiorari filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that

the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly
set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.

x x x The substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to

moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees is a factual issue
which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari.26 (Citation
omitted and italics ours)

In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent
to subject to review the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the CA.
Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of clear and
1âwphi1

substantial evidence warranting the award of damages and attorney’s fees

in Laviña’s favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the
Spouses Padalhin’s counterclaims on the supposed showing that the
complaint filed by Laviña before the RTC was groundless. It bears
stressing that we are not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now
raised before us are factual and not legal in character, hence, beyond the
contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Even if we were to overlook the


aforecited procedural defects of the

instant petition, still, the reliefs

prayed for by the petitioner spouses

cannot be granted.

As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor
himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's
residence without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that
he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts
negate his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in
his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation.
However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New
Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he
cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to
justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and attorney's fees in
Lavina's favor is proper.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is

DENIED. The Decision dated February 14, 2008 and Resolution dated May
20, 2008 by the Court of Appeals in C A-G.R. CV No. 81810 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Chairperson
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes
1Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices
Andres H. Reyes, Jr. (now Presiding Justice or the CA) and Jose C.
Mendoza (now a member of this Court); rollo. pp. 35-48.
2 Rollo, pp. 50-51.
3 Penned by Judge Marietta A. Legaspi; id. at 54-81.
4 Assistant and driver in the Philippine Embassy in Nairobi.
5 Personal driver of Padalhin.
6 Laviña’s gardener.
7 Household helper in Laviña’s residence.
8 Likewise a household helper in Laviña’s residence.
9 Rollo, pp. 54–81.
10 Id. at 76-79.
11 Finance Officer in the Philippine Embassy in Nairobi.

A Kenyan national hired locally to work in the Philippine Embassy in

12

Nairobi.
13 Administrative Officer in the Philippine Embassy in Nairobi.
14 Rollo, pp. 35-48.
15 Id. at 42-48.
16 Id. at 50-51.
17 Id. at 9-33.
18 Id. at 93-110.
19 Id. at 83.

Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Company, G.R. No.

20

179488, April 23, 2012.

21 Clavecilla v. Quitain, 518 Phil. 53, 62 (2006).
22 Id.
23Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 154704, June 1,
2011, 650 SCRA 35, 46, citing Athena Computers, Inc. and Joselito R.
Jimenez v. Wesnu A. Reyes, G.R. No. 156905, September 5, 2007, 532
SCRA 343, 350.
24 Rollo, p. 32.
25 Supra note 23.
26 Id. at 48-49.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military

Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts
on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners, 

vs.

THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
(PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC
MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
(CRAB),Respondents.

x-----------------------x

FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P.

CUDIA, and on her own behalf,Petitioner-Intervenor.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal

commitment to uphold what is morally and ethically righteous at the most
critical and trying times, and at the most challenging circumstances. When
a cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and right as against his
security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his
honor and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character
does not think twice and chooses the fore. This is the essence of and. the
Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing truth and righteousness even if
it may mean the surrender of one's basic rights and privileges.1

The Procedural Antecedents

Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for
himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia
(Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for extremely urgent
temporary restraining order (TRO).2

In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for
TRO and instead, required respondents to file their comment on the
petition.3

On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her
son Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching
thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014,
the Court granted the motion and resolved to await respondents' comment
on the petition.5

A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014,

recommending the admission of the petition-in-intervention and adopting it
as an integral part of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014, petitioner-intervenor
filed a manifestation with motion for leave to admit the Final Investigation
Report of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25,
2014.7 The Report8 was relative to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by
the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves
and in behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC)
members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for violation of
Cadet lCL Cudia's rights to due process, education, and privacy of
communication. Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion
for leave to adopt the submission of the CHR Report.10 The manifestation
was granted and the motion was noted by the Court in its Resolution dated
July 7, 2014.

After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed their
Consolidated Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a motion, petitioner-
intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by petitioners.13 Submitted
as Annex "A" of the Reply was a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May
22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and
granted the same on August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.

Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the

case for early resolution,15 which the Court noted in a Resolution dated
August 11, 2014 and October 3, 2014.16
 The Facts

Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA,
the country's premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in
Baguio City. He belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron
of his class. As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter
collectively called "petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he was
supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the
Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be
commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.

On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1
CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research
(OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI
Room. Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group,
the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H),
while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m.
(1505H-1605H).

Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period
class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia
because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x.
"17 Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela
Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18

On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical

Officers. They were logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical
Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days later,
Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR.

In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia

reasoned out that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed
a bit late by our instructor Sir."19

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang),

the CTO of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits
and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet lCL Cudia clarified with Maj.
Hindang his alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of the
punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who
responded that she never dismissed her class late, and the protocol to
dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled. When he
expressed his intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the
punishment, he was · advised to put the request in writing. Hence, that
same day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia addressed his Request for Reconsideration of
Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical Officer
(STO), asserting:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th

period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412,
started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next
class without any intention of being late Sir.20

A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on
the request of Cadet 1 CL Cudia and to indicate if there were other cadets
belonging to the same section who were also late.

On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander
pointing out that, based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not
dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed.
Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know of the denial of his
request only on January 24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.

Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was
informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation of the
Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:

Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal,
stating that his 4th period class ended at l 500H that made him late in the
succeeding class.22

Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet

1 CL Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet lCL
Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindang's conversations with their
instructors and classmates as well as his statement in the request for
reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then verbally applied for and was
granted an extension of time to answer the charge against him because Dr.
Costales, who could shed light on the matter, was on emergency leave.

On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL Cudia,
conveying:
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a
report dated november. When maj hindang ask me, no time referens.
(04:25:11 P.M.)

All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last
december. Whc i told, i wud presume they wil finish early bee its grp work.
(04:29:21 P.M.)23

The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales,
who reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not in the same time
reference when the latter asked her.

Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor

Report. He averred:

Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the
first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my
instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for
some query with regards (sic) to the deductions of our previous LE. Our
instructor gladly answered our question. She then told me that she will give
the copy of our section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5
office, and then she came out of the room and gave me a copy of the
grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately went to our 5ti
period class which is ENG412.

With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:

1. How could this be lying?

2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to that
honor report)?

3. What are his assumptions?

I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be

reopened and carefully reviewed for I did not violate the honor code/
system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I
intend to take undue advantage?) and for the following reasons:
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized given
the fact that no face-to-face personal conversation with Ms. Costales was
conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the issue at hand.

2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.

3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for reconsideration of

meted punishment) further supports my explanation in my delinquency
report.

4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS" covers not just a

lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her students, especially that in our
case some cadets asked for queries, and I am given instruction by which
(sic) were directly related to our CLASS. Her transaction and
communication with our other classmates may have already ended but
ours extended for a little bit.

I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my instruction to

wait, and the other cadets still have business with me, it is reasonable
enough for him to say that "Our class was dismissed a bit late" (dealing
with matter of seconds or a minute particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and
30 seconds)

And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on time (1500H).

(signed)

M COSTALES

w/ attached certification

5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and did
not attempt to conceal anything that happened or I did.

6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk

Company[,] and I had a conversation with regards (sic) to the same matter
for which he can give important points of my case.

7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for Ms.
Costales. 24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The
Foxtrot Company was designated as the investigating team and was
composed of Cadet 1 CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL
Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL
Poncardas as members.25 Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary
Investigation Report recommending that the case be formalized.

The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. The

Presiding Officer was Cadet 1 CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9)
voting members were Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL Bryan Sonny S.
Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL
ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Carifio,
Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as
recorders tasked to document the entire proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A.
Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus 11.27 Those who observed the
trial were Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino,
Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL
Umaguing.28

The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted
until early morning the next day. Cadet lCL Cudia was informed of the
charge against him, as to which he pleaded "Not Guilty." Among those who
testified were Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL Arcangel
and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness stand
along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath
via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting members
followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast
their votes through secret balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot
sheets together with their written justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of
a guilty verdict. Cadet lCL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) was
the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order ofHC Chairman Cadet 1 CL
Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber
adjoining the court room for further deliberation. After several minutes, they
went out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet
1 CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring hours, was then informed
of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He
was immediately placed in the PMA Holding Center until the resolution of
his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to
the HC Chairman, the full text of which stated:

WRITTEN APPEAL

14 NOVEMBER 2013

This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class",
my explanation on this delinquency report when I received it, is that "Our
class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly from 4th period
class ... etc". Knowing the fact that in my delinquency report, it is stated that
ENG412 classes started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical
enough for I (sic) to interpret it as "I came 1502H during that class". This is
the explanation that came into my mind that time. (I just cannot recall the
exact words I used in explaining that delinquency report, but what I want to
say is that I have no intention to be late). In my statements, I convey my
message as "since I was not the only one left in that class, and the
instructor is with us, I used the term "CLASS", I used the word
"DISMISSED" because I was under instruction (to wait for her to give the
section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The other cadets (lCL
MIRANDA, lCL ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with her that
made me decide to use the word "CLASS", while the others who don't have
queries and business with her (ex: lCL NARCISO and 1 CL DIAZ) were
also around.

Note:

The four named cadets were also reported late.

Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)

(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)

It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger in the place of
instruction after the section has been dismissed. EXCEPT when told or
allowed to do so by the instructor or by any competent authority for official
purposes. "

The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang
(indicating the end of class hour, 1500H). I waited for her for about 45
seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made me to decide to write "a
little bit late" in my explanation. Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but due to
official purpose (instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and the conflict in
academic schedule (to which I am not in control of the circumstances, 4th
PD class 1330H-1500H and 5th PD class 1500H-1 600H), and since Ms.
Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used the word "CLASS".

19 December 2013

I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and

13 Touring hours. Not because I don't want to serve punishment, but
because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and believing that
my reason is justifiable and valid, that is why I approached our tactical
officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask why it was awarded that day.

In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and

he even added that they have a protocol to dismiss the class, 15 minutes or
10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:

Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th
period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412,
started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next
class without any intention of being late Sir.

These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency

report, in here, I specified the conflict in the schedule and again, I have no
intention to be late. After explaining it further with these statements, my
tactical officer said that since I was reported in a written form, I should
make an appeal in a written form. Thinking that he already understood what
I want to say, I immediately made an appeal that day stating the words that
I used in having conversation with him.29

Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014,
wherein Dr. Costales attested:

1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with

Cadet CUDIA in making query about their latest grades in OR432 and/or
results of UEl outside the ACADS office. The following facts may explain
their queries on 14 November 2013:

a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.

b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are informed
during Thursday, either in class or posted grades in the bulletin board
(grades released was [sic J based on the previous LEs: latest LE before
UE was Decision Trees).

c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to (sic)
other cadets have not taken the UE. Cadets were allowed to verify scores
but not to look at the papers.

d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet

NARCISO and ARCANGEL verified grades. The two cadets said that they
verified something with me after the OR432 class and they were with Cadet
CUD IA. That the statements of the three (3) cadets are all the same and
consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.

2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the
specific time that I dismissed the class. To this date, I [cannot] really recall
an account that is more than two (2) months earlier. According to my
records, there was a lecture followed by an LE during (sic) on 14 November
2013. To determine the time of my dismissal, maybe it can be verified with
the other members of class I was handling on that said date.30

Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day,
January · 24, as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial based on the
arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the
written appeal was not acted upon until the filing of the petition-in-
intervention.32

From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the

Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an informal review to check
the findings of the HC. During the course of the investigation, Prof. Berong
was said to have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that
classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet lCL
Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412, verified before the
Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO that the class started not
earlier than scheduled.

Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal

Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for review. The next
day, the SJA found the report to be legally in order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the
Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and recommended to
Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation
from the PMA of Cadet lCL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of the
Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On
the same date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA
Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence
without pay and allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval
of his separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from future appointment
and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any
entrance requirements to the PMA. 33

Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to

dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia.

On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of
the Commandant of Cadets requesting for reinstatement by the PMA of his
status as a cadet.34

Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the sister of Cadet 1 CL

Cudia, posted his plight in her Face book account. The day after, the
Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen.
Lopez), the new PMA Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of
the HC.35 Copies of which were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and
other concerned military officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was
directed to review Cadet lCL Cudia's case. The latter, in turn, referred the
matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).

On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to
Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a
reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding the
intervention of the military leadership.

Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was
issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia by not
talking to him and by separating him from all activities/functions of the
cadets. It is said that any violation shall be a "Class 1" offense entailing 45
demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours confinement. Cadet 1 CL Cudia
was not given a copy of the order and learned about it only from the media.
36 According to an alleged news report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes

Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1

CL Cudia. Among his offenses were: breach of confidentiality by putting
documents in the social media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of
initiative to resign, and smearing the name of the PMA.37

On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional
time, until March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on the ground that his intended
witnesses are in on-the-job training ( OJT).38 As additional evidence to
support his appeal, he also requested for copies of the Minutes of the HC
proceedings, relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video
footages and recordings of the HC hearings.

The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Baguio City.

The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter
of appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014; (b) directive from
the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and ( c) guidance from Maj. Gen.
Lopez.

On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen.
Costales, Jr.), the CRAB Chairman, informed Cadet lCL Cudia that,
pending approval of the latter's request for extension, the CRAB would
continue to review the case and submit its recommendations based on
whatever evidence and testimonies received, and that it could not favorably
consider his request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and
video footages and recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the
appropriate nor the authorized body to take action thereon.39Subsequently,
upon verbal advice, Cadet 1 CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez
reiterating his request.40

Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members
and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet lCL
Cudia, particularly his rights to due process, education, and privacy of
communication.41

On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for

additional time, until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal and submit
evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel
T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for immediate directive to the PMA to
expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests.42
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class,
the following events transpired:

On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public
Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand, the CRAB
submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia.44

On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the
denial of Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests for extension of time to file an Appeal
Memorandum in view of the ample time already given, and to be furnished
with a copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality and
presumption of regularity of the HC proceedings.45Cadet 1CL Cudia,
through PAO, then filed an Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB.

On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno

Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the same day,
Special Orders No. 48 was issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and PMA
senior officers to conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL
Cudia's Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry was not just to find
out whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but also to
investigate possible involvement of other cadets and members of the
command related to the incident and to establish specific violation of policy
or regulations that had been violated by other cadets and members of the
HC.49

On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a
dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez. On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came
out with its preliminary findings, which recommended the following:

a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8
Guilty - 1 Not guilty vote;

b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt Cudia
as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;

c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-
fledge graduating cadet and allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March
2014;
d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of
Cudia's Case.50

On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with
Pres. Aquino and Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary
Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended that they put in writing
their appeal, requests, and other concerns. According to respondents, the
parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia would not join the graduation but it
was without prejudice to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the
AFP Chief of Staff. The President then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the
reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the
group conducting the review.

Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner Renato S.
Cudia received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP
Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP
Chief of Staff, affirming the CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal.
It held:

After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the action of the
PMA CRAB in denying the appeal for reinvestigation is legally in order.
There was enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and the
proprietary (sic) of the punishment imposed. Also, your son was afforded
sufficient time to file his appeal from the date he was informed of the final
verdict on January 21, 2014, when the decision of the Honor Committee
was read to him in person, until the time the PMA CRAB conducted its
review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at the
Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the Academy's
policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no violation of his right to due
process considering that the procedure undertaken by the Honor
Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy. Thus, the
previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your
son, subject Cadet guilty of "Lying" and recommending his separation from
the Academy is sustained.

In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for
lack of merit.51 Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued
its Final Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation
board tasked to probe the case submitted its final report to the President.
53 Pursuant to the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a
Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of
Staff to submit the complete records of the case for purposes of DND
review and recommendation for disposition by the President.54

Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with
respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and recommending
as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human

Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA Honor
Committee and .. certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the
rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process,
education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good life.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to

indorse to competent authorities for their immediate appropriate action on
the following recommendations:

1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-Not
Guilty" verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being null and void; to
uphold and respect the "8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty" voting result and make an
official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor of Cadet Cudia;

2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands rest
the ends of justice and fate of Cadet Cudia, to:

2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the

Philippine Military Academy;

2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree of
Bachelors of Science; and

2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript 'of his
academic records for his BS degree, without conditions therein as to his
status as a PMA cadet.

3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in

pursuing administrative, criminal and civil suits against the officers and
members of the Honor Committee named hereunder, for violation of the
Honor Code and System and the Procedure in Formal Investigation,
dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot, tampering the true result of
the voting, perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of substantive part of
the formal trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the interest of justice
and Cadet Cudia's fundamental rights to dignity, non-discrimination and
due process, which led to the infringement of his right to education and
even transgressing his right to a good life.

3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ

3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.

3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO

3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)

3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)

4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent authorities
should investigate and file appropriate charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P.
GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of Cadet Cudia and/or
failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the protection of the right to privacy
of Cudia who was then billeted at the PMA Holding Center;

5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities
should investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and
ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a competent Tactical Officer and
a good father of his cadets, in this case, to Cadet Cudia; for failure to
respect exhaustion of administrative remedies;

6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to immediately cause
the comprehensive review of all rules of procedures, regulations, policies,
including the so-called practices in the implementation of the Honor Code;
and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of procedures and relevant
regulations which are human-rights based and consistent with the
Constitution and other applicable laws;

7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law

defining and penalizing ostracism and discrimination, which is apparently
being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in this jurisdiction;

8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority, the

passage of an anti-ostracism and/or anti-discrimination law; and

9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure
respect and protection of the rights of those who testified for the cause of
justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.

RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent

authorities on the foregoing CHR recommendations.

Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted

service to the complainants (the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia; and
Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA
Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense,
His Excellency The President of the Philippines, The Public Attorneys'
Office.

SO RESOLVED.55

On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the
AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The letter, which was addressed to the
Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
stated in whole:

This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26
March 2014 appealing for a reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of your son, Cadet
1 CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.

After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision
of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office has found no
substantial basis to disturb the findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet
Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no competent evidence to support
the claim that the decision of the Honor Committee members was initially at
8 "Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty" vote. The lone affidavit of an officer,
based on his purported conversation with one Honor Committee member,
lacks personal knowledge on the deliberations of the said Committee and is
hearsay at best.

Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights

cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet Cudia's due process rights were
violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary in nature, such
recommendations are anchored on a finding that there was an 8-1 vote
which, as discussed above, is not supported by competent evidence.

In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has been guided by the
precept that military law is regarded to be in a class of its own, "applicable
only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed
organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of
civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US
83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the findings of the AFP Chief,
particularly his conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the
proceedings that ensued, as carrying great weight.

Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the

findings of the AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56

The Issues

To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:

I.

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR

COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET
FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER
DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT:

A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case,

Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was deprived of his right to have access
to evidence which would have proven his defense, would have totally
belied the charge against him, and more importantly, would have shown the
irregularity in the Honor Committee's hearing and rendition of decision

B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the
decisions arrived at by the Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy

C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia nothing but a sham trial

D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy violated their own rules and principles as
embodied in the Honor Code

E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy, in deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudia's case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so as to
defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the unquestionable fact that the
former should yield to the latter.

II

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR

COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY
VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE

III

WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION

INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND
RESPECT57

On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition,

respondents presented the issues below:

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

I.

THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE

INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF
2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT
EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.

II.

THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL

WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.

III.

MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT

THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. IV. IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE
JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON
CADET CUDIA'S APPEAL.

V.

WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST

EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR
PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY MATTERS.

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

VI.

CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED

CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.

VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT
TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT
DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE
ACADEMY.

VIII.

CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS.

The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets

despite the absence of statutory authority.

Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a

guilty cadet.

Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing
untruthful statements in the explanation for his tardiness.

The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the
Honor Committee.

The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly

accorded to Cadet Cudia.

The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by

incorporating executive session/chambering, was adopted to further
strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor Committee. Cadet Lagura
voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure from the other voting
members of the Honor Committee.

Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.

The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the
Honorable Court, and are, at best, recommendatory.

Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was
dismissed from the PMA.58

The Ruling of the Court

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus

Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia be included in the list of graduating cadets and for him to
take part in the commencement exercises was already rendered moot and
academic when the graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class
took place on March 16, 2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper
since it does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus petition could not be
availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a student to continue
studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a right. In this
case, there is a clear failure on petitioners' part to establish that the PMA
has the, ministerial duty to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list, much less
award him with academic honors and commission him to the Philippine
Navy. Similar to the case of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise its
discretionary power on who may be admitted to study pursuant to its
academic freedom.

In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1 CL

Cudia to participate in the PMA 2014 commencement exercises could no
longer be had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They
add that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to act in a
particular manner when there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that
the certiorari aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is
within the province of the Court to determine whether a branch of the
government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
thereof.

We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for

mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial
act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or
corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no
choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed
to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or
when to perform the duty.61

In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also, after due notice and
hearing, it is prayed of the Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to:

1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, including inclusion in the yearbook;

2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement
exercises if he completed all the requirements for his baccalaureate
degree;

3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he
deserves, and the commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign;

4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its
records of the proceedings taken against Cadet Cudia, including the video
footage and audio recordings of the deliberations and voting, for the
purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent review of the case of
Cadet Cudia;

5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all the records
without requiring Cadet Cudia to submit new evidence if it was physically
impossible to do so;

6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the certification signed by
Dr. Costales, the new evidence consisting of the affidavit of a military officer
declaring under oath that the cadet who voted "not guilty" revealed to this
officer that this cadet was coerced into changing his vote, and other new
evidence if there is any;

7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is
allowed to participate actively in the proceedings as well as in the cross-
examinations during the exercise of the right to confront witnesses against
him; and

8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB
to allow Cadet Cudia a representation of a counsel.62

Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:

A. xxx

B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:

a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the 8
Guilty -1 Not Guilty vote;

b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce Cadet
Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor
Committee;

c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-
fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma and awards.63

Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of
graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the
commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic
when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014
without including Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.

With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his
diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the
same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of
academic freedom, which We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it
to say at this point that these matters are within the ambit of or
encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the
province of the Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA,
grant awards, and commission officers in the military service are
discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-
Chief. Borrowing the words of Garcia:
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued.
Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,
what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather
than a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy
the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65

Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed

against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise
of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative
duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.67

The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by
petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the
absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus
petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to
control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to
do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.68

The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed

since, as argued by petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via
petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.

Factual nature of the issues

According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require

the Court to make findings of fact because it sets forth several factual
disputes which include, among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in
, his ENG412 class and his explanation thereto, the circumstances that
transpired in the investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings
before the HC, and the allegation that Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to
change his vote during the executive session/"chambering."

In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal

issues. Rather than determining which between the two conflicting versions
of the parties is true, the case allegedly centers on the application,
appreciation, and interpretation of a person's rights to due process, to
education, and to property; the interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and
Honor System; and the conclusion on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case involves questions of
fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed
questions of fact and law. Petitioners are correct.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination
of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not
the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.69 The petition
does not exclusively present factual matters for the Court to decide. As
pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more importance is the
determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to
education, and to property in the context of the Honor Code and the Honor
System, and, if in the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even
respondents themselves raise substantive grounds that We have to
resolve. In support of their contention that the Court must exercise careful
restraint and should refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in
legitimate military matters, they argue that Cadet 1 CL Cudia has
necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his
entry into the PMA, and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom
authorizing the imposition of disciplinary measures and punishment as it
deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues,
aside from being purely legal being purely legal questions, are of first
impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical
ruling.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the
petition pending President Aquino’s resolution of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal.
They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative
process. While Cadet 1 CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of his
guilty verdict at the Academy level - the determination by the SJA of
whether the HC acted according to the established procedures of the
Honor System, the assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of the
procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the
PMA Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of the guilty
cadet, and the appellate review proceedings before the CRAB - he still
appealed to the President, who has the utmost latitude in making decisions
affecting the military. It is contended that the President's power over the
persons and actions of the members of the armed forces is recognized in
B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171 of
Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense
Act''). As such, the President could still overturn the decision of the PMA. In
respondents' view, the filing of this petition while the case is pending
resolution of the President is an irresponsible defiance, if not a personal
affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of justice should shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed.

From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President

Aquino effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They claim that
his family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC
recommendation from the APP officials and the President, but was in vain.
The circumstances prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation
rites, which was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL
Cudia's family the night before, foreclose the possibility that the challenged
findings would still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist that the·
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute based on the
Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.

We rule for petitioners.

In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened

injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. The
rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
that "courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the
matter complained of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to act
and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum."74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States,75 which was cited by
respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a
decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies
within the military before appealing to the court, the doctrine being
designed both to preserve the balance between military and civilian
authorities and to conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party
may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:

1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction;

4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency

concerned;

5. when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter

ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;

7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be

unreasonable;

8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
and

11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial

intervention.76

Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of

Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due
course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that during the pendency of this
case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President finally
issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the
CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars any objection
to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Court's interference within military affairs

Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v.
Councilman78 to support their contention that judicial intervention would
pose substantial threat to military discipline and that there should be a
deferential review of military statutes and regulations since political
branches have particular expertise and competence in assessing military
needs. Likewise, in Orloff v. Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was
allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that the military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian. According to respondents, the U.S. courts' respect to the military
recognizes that constitutional rights may apply differently in the military
context than in civilian society as a whole. Such military deference is
exercised either by refusing to apply due process and equal protection
doctrines in military cases or applying them but with leniency.

In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial

review in cases attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest latitude of
deference to military affairs. Such respect is exercised by the court where
the issues to be resolved entail a substantial consideration of legitimate
governmental interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
case to prosper will set an institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a
Pandora's box of other challenges against the specialized system of
discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMA's mandate to train
cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and
procedure necessarily must impose h different standard of conduct
compared with civilian institutions.

Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State's
check-and-balance machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch of the government or any of its
officials acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of,
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that
judicial non-interference in military affairs is not deemed as absolute even
in the U.S. They cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by
respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on
account of issues posed concerning due process and violations of
constitutional rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court,
petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial power to determine
whether the APP and the members of the court martial acted with grave
abuse o.f discretion in their military investigation.

Petitioners' contentions are tenable.

Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the

government, not the courts, with superintendence and control over the
military because the courts generally lack the competence and expertise
necessary to evaluate military decisions and they are ill-equipped to
determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule
that the facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S. cases cited by
respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S. case of Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which
similarly involved cadets who were separated from the United States
Military Academy due to Honor Code violations. Following Wasson v.
Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the power of
the district courts to review procedures used at the service academies in
the separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it recognized
the "constitutional permissibility of the military to set and enforce
uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics," it said that the courts
"have expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for
review of military determinations." Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was
opined that it has been well settled that federal courts have jurisdiction
"where there is a substantial claim that prescribed military procedures
violates one's constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually
made major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by
expressly providing, among others; for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme
Court of decisions by the military's highest appellate authority.89

Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still

formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the
courts of justice includes not only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.90 Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.91

The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the
Due Process Clause, be considered a governmental activity. As ruled in
Andrews:

The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation
process at the Academy has been sufficiently formalized, and is sufficiently
interdependent, so as to bring that committee's activities within the
definition of governmental activity for the purposes of our review. While the
Academy has long had the informal practice of referring all alleged
violations to the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship between that
committee and the separation process has to a degree been formalized. x x
x

Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the

Honor Committee under its own procedures provides that a single "not
guilty" vote by a member ends the matter, while a "guilty" finding confronts
a cadet with the hard choice of either resigning or electing to go before a
Board of Officers. An adverse finding there results not only in formal
separation from the Academy but also in a damaging record that will follow
the cadet through life. Accordingly, we conclude that the Cadet Honor
Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is clearly part of the process
whereby a cadet can ultimately be adjudged to have violated the Cadet
Honor Code and be separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of
the committee's procedures and determinations on the separation process
is sufficiently intertwined with the formal governmental activity which may
follow as to bring it properly under judicial review92

No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present
Constitution declares it as a matter of principle that civilian authority is, at
all times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent with the republican system
of checks and balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by
necessary implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining,
in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive
action.94
 SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties

Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not

the same as that of a civilian because the former' s rights have already
been recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and necessity. They
claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De
Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights of persons in
the military service may be curtailed by the rules of military discipline in
order to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling the duties required to be
discharged under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military student
aspiring to a commissioned post in the military service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
voluntarily gave up certain civil and political rights which the rest of the
civilian population enjoys. The deliberate surrender of certain freedoms on
his part is embodied in the cadets' Honor Code Handbook. It is noted that
at the beginning of their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, along
with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by the
Honor Code and the Honor System.

To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights,

including the right to due process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the
provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,96 Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of Ethics,
Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military
professionalism, and, in general, military culture. They maintain that the
HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and in bad faith misapplied the Honor
Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's case
considering that these should not be implemented at the expense of human
rights, due process, and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, they can never overpower or defy the 1987
Constitution since the former should yield to the latter. Petitioners stress
that the statement that "a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil
rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented"
simply pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they
are men or women of integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain
vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the
context of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of
the right to due process but, at most, refers to the cadets' rights to privacy
and to remain silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.

Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to

subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the
educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than
a student at a civilian public school.99 In fact, the Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training environment,
the Cadet Corps is a society which has its own norms. Each member binds
himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be part
of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties
for the good of the group."100

It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which

were adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the military
academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests
(life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within
the bounds of procedural due process is a must.101For that reason, the PMA
is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due process
clause must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe
sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or
she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of probably

being forever denied that career.103

The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not
specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military
academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition
that sought to annul the directive from then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress
without her consent. We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military
discipline for their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On
the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction imposed
on petitioner since the conditions for his "house arrest" (particularly, that he
may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during
the period of his detention) are justified by the requirements of military
discipline. In these two cases, the constitutional rights to information,
transparency in matters of public concern, and to free speech - not to due
process clause - were restricted to better serve the greater military
purpose. Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the
HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a
cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code violation is not among
those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the
Honor Code and the Honor System do not state that a guilty cadet is
automatically terminated or dismissed from service. To them, the Honor
Code and Honor System are "gentleman's agreement" that cannot take
precedence over public interest - in the defense of the nation and in view of
the taxpayer's money spent for each cadet. Petitioners contend that, based
on the Civil Code, all written or verbal agreements are null and void if they
violate the law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and public safety.

In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary

measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar
needs of the Academy. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA
has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is
deemed reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said law
grants to the President the authority of terminating a cadet's appointment,
such power may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may
exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.

Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA

has the inherent right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and
regulations that it may deem necessary for the maintenance of school
discipline, which is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational institution of the
AFP in accordance with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections
58 and 59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292
("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that enjoys
academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it
was held that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill
and impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo, Jr. v.
Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong,110 the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to
expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor expected from its
students who are to form part of the AFP.

For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the

Honor Code as basis of the HC' s decision to recommend his dismissal
from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for
four years, he knew or should have been fully aware of the standards of
discipline imposed on all cadets and the corresponding penalty for failing to
abide by these standards.

In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo,
academic freedom is not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant
disregard of the right to due process and the 1987 Constitution. Although
schools have the prerogative to choose what to teach, how to teach, and
who to teach, the same does not go so far as to deprive a student of the
right to graduate when there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the
same since, in such a case, the right to graduate becomes a vested right
which takes precedence over the limited and restricted right of the
educational institution.

While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of

respondents are more in line with the facts of this case. We have ruled that
the school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Once admitted, a
student's enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for the entire
period he or she is expected to complete it.111 An institution of learning has
an obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course
they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued with public interest because
of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to
the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over a educational
institutions.113

The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. "[It] has
consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind -it
gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school
undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students
agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe
its rules and regulations."114

Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of

universities and institutions of higher learning,115has been enshrined in our
Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court espoused the
concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,117 which enumerated "the four essential
freedoms" of a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4)
who may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution has the power to
adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the college.119 It can decide
for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from
outside coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public
welfare which would call for some restraint.120 Indeed, "academic freedom
has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that
assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling
precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the
Civil Code, that every 'person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."'121

The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their

academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival."122 As a Bohemian
proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water."
Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power
assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this regard, the Court
has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions,
which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate
disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
125 this Court elucidated:

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the
third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot
function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational

institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of
an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational
environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally
necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a

necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline
the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally,
the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its
students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism,

foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of
national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the
rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values,
develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and
promote vocational efficiency.

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the
school to carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop
into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more

evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom
to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to
determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose
lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation
privileges.126

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even

after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. In University
of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,127 We upheld the
university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a
student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her
dissertation. Thus:

Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall
be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The
1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the
academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court
in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is
a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a
wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If
such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot
study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor
and distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was
obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the
honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does
not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court of Appeals
held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in
question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case
began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation
ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations
conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have
been allowed to graduate.

Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher

learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again
from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,
"is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body
of the University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon
the recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the
conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents
is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw
what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of
higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree
it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more
objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon
an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The
pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be
empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself
from serious threats to its integrity.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their
education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue
its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see
to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.128

It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to

develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values,
ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the
total man.129Essentially, education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one
which inculcates duty and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to
education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school.131 Every citizen has a right to select a profession or,
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements.132 The PMA is not different. As the primary training
and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations,
which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.

The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral
principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the
guiding spirit behind each cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility to
maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in the
PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members
of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called "Long
Gray Line."

Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets'
character development. It defines the desirable values they must possess
to remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential
in a military organization; and it makes them professional military soldiers.
133 As it is for character building, it should not only be kept within the society

of cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of
applying it outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.134

The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of
achieving the cadets' character development and as ways by which the
Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct.135 Upon
the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an
institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character,
unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.136 To
emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is characterized
as "correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic and
punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept full
responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the
service above self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates. "137Procedural
safeguards in a student disciplinary case

Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more

appropriate in determining the minimum standards for the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. Similarly, with the
guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
accorded due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA
fell short in observing the important safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v.
CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set the minimum standards to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman did not entirely do away with the
due process requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely stated
that the minimum requirements in the Guzman case are more apropos.

Respondents rightly argued.

Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it

held that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the
requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropos since it
specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman
is the authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases
was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio De
San Juan De Letran.142

In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must
be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process, to wit:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.143

We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary

cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar
to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice;144 that
the proceedings may be summary;145 that cross-examination is not an
essential part of the investigation or hearing;146and that the required proof in
a student disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither
proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only
substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."147
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of
fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.148 As held in De La Salle
University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:149

Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to
which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential
to due process - it is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy
and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.
"To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in
court - one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity
to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.150

The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative

proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet's honor violation need not be
clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that – The
Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and assessing
misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal precedents in cases
involving Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code
dare not look into these precedents for loopholes to justify questionable
acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own advantage.

The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in
a substantive way. Technical and procedural misgivings of the legal
systems may avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the Code for
the reason that it can be used to make unlawful attempt to get into the truth
of matters especially when a cadet can be compelled to surrender some
civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be
implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP becomes
a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are bound by the
existing norms that are logically applied through the Code and System in
order to realize the Academy's mission to produce leaders of character -
men of integrity and honor.151

One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:

2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state's Justice
System but it does not demean its Spirit by reducing the Code to a
systematic list of externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations and
loopholes arise through legalism and its technicalities, the objective of
building the character of the cadets becomes futile. While, generally, Public
Law penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to examine both
the action and the intention.152

Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue

judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy. It has
been said that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its
primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion
arise, and that over-proceduralizing military determinations necessarily
gives soldiers less time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet
investigations and complex due process hearing could sacrifice simplicity,
practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for several days or
weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with legal and
procedural' points, and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are
irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the
dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive delays
cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow
cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good
balance should, therefore, be struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and
efficiency.154 Considering that the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia is one of first
impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the
particular issue of a dismissed cadet's right to due process, it is necessary
for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for some guidance. Notably, our armed
forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code
produced a salutary effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.
155 Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code and

practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.

We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that "due
process" is a flexible concept, requiring consideration in each case of a
variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.156 Hagopian opined:
In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental
action adversely affecting private interests may properly be taken, it must
be recognized that due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of
thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any given set of facts. On the contrary,
it is a flexible concept which depends upon the balancing of various factors,
including the nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the
extent to which the proceeding is adversarial in character, the severity and
consequences of any action that might be taken, the burden that would be
imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full panoply of trial-type
procedures, and the existence of other overriding interests, such as the
necessity for prompt action in the conduct of crucial military operations. The
full context must therefore be considered in each case.157 (Emphasis
supplied)

Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum

standards of due process required in the dismissal of a cadet. Thus:

[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may

not proceed arbitrarily but must observe due process of law. x x x
Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due process
of law precludes the dogmatic application of specific rules developed in one
context to entirely distinct forms of government action. "For, though 'due
process of law' generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled
course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not universally true." x x x
Thus, to determine in any given case what procedures due process
requires, the court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the
private interest affected and of the government interest involved, taking
account of history and the precise circumstances surrounding the case at
hand.

While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the
subject matter before it may validly affect private interests, in particularly
vital and sensitive areas of government concern such as national security
and military affairs, the private interest must yield to a greater degree to the
governmental. x x x Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within the
discretion of the appropriate government officials than the selection,
training, discipline and dismissal of the future officers of the military and
Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and morale in these
young men who will be required to bear weighty responsibility in the face of
adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national
importance scarcely within the competence of the judiciary. And it cannot
be doubted that because of these factors historically the military has been
permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary procedures than the
civilian authorities.

We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of
a Cadet from the Merchant Marine Academy that he be given a fair hearing
at which he is apprised of the charges against him and permitted a
defense. x x x For the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments of a fair
hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be apprised of the
specific charges against him. He must be given an adequate opportunity to
present his defense both from the point of view of time and the use of
witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest, however, that the Cadet
must be given this opportunity both when demerits are awarded and when
dismissal is considered. The hearing may be procedurally informal and
need not be adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)

In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are
equally controlling in cases where cadets were separated from the military
academy for violation of the Honor Code. Following the two previous cases,
it was ruled that in order to be proper and immune from constitutional
infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the
academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges
against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her
defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and
other evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far from
what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz
v. Philippine School of Business Administration160 and De La Salle
University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.161

In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation

followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He
was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his
options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The
preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and
submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.
When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/
hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to
enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the
witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the '
Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at
the Academy level - from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of
the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the
CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to
appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.

It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise

gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective
jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily
accorded respect if not finality by the Court, unless such findings are not
supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where
the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors
are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, We find no
reason to deviate from the general rule. The grounds therefor are
discussed below seriatim:

As to the right to be represented by a counsel –

For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia

the right to be represented by a counsel who could actively participate in
the proceedings like in the cross-examination of the witnesses against him
before the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is because while the CRAB
allowed him to be represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only
made an observer without any right to intervene and demand respect of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights.163 According to them, he was not sufficiently
given the opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked if he
would like to have one. He was only properly represented when it was
already nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the
PAO. Petitioners assert that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring
student has the right to answer the charges against him or her with the
assistance of counsel, if desired.

On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v.

The Auditor General165 in asserting that the right to a counsel is not
imperative in administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings.
Also, based on Cadet lCL Cudia's academic standing, he is said to be
obviously not untutored to fully understand his rights and express himself.
Moreover, the confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his
right to be represented by a counsel. In any event, respondents claim that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsel's advice in
preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.

Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is guaranteed the right
to have his counsel not just in assisting him in the preparation for the
investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully
in said hearings. The Court disagrees.

Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987

Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to
be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is
not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,166 the
Court held that "a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body
to furnish the person being investigated with counsel." Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel
because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.

More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:

The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all

of the other aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in
nature, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the
government does not proceed through counsel, where the individual
concerned is mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x
x should enable him to develop the facts adequately through available
sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are
fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to
representation by counsel, as a function of due process, in military
academy disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated by
the policy of "treading lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard
for the power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own
affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process" and the
courts' views that disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in nature and
should be kept informal, and that literate and educated cadets should be
able to defend themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance
of informality in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the
cadet be accorded the right to representation by counsel before the
Academic Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the training
and education needed to understand his rights and express himself, the
cadet should be capable of doing so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer
v. Lehman,171 the issue was not access to counsel but the opportunity to
have counsel, instead of oneself, examine and cross-examine witnesses,
make objections, and argue the case during the hearing. Disposing of the
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by
the argument that an individual of a midshipman's presumed intelligence,
selected because he is expected to be able to care for himself and others,
often under difficult circumstances, and who has full awareness of what he
is facing, with counsel's advice, was deprived of due process by being
required to present his defense in person at an investigatory hearing.

In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1
CL Cudia was given the option or was able to seek legal advice prior to
and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he was assisted by a
counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB reviewed and
reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due process is already
satisfied since, at the very least, the counsel aided him in the drafting and
filing of the Appeal Memorandum and even acted as an observer who had
no right to actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the
cross-examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the
offense committed by Cadet 1 CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the
hearings before the HC and the CRAB were investigative and not
adversarial; and that Cadet lCL Cudia's excellent-academic standing puts
him in the best position to look after his own vested interest in the
Academy.

As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –

Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014
letter Cadet lCL Cudia's request for documents, footages, and recordings
relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence negating the regularity of the
HC trial and supporting his defense have been surely overlooked by the
CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet 1
CL Cudia was deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily be
unearthed from the video and other records of the HC investigation.
Respondents did not deny their existence but they refused to present them
for the parties and the Court to peruse. In particular, they note that the
Minutes of the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation
Report dated January 20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB but were not
furnished to petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no way to confirm the
truth of the alleged statements therein. In their view, failure to furnish these
documents could only mean that it would be adverse if produced pursuant
to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172

For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality of records,

petitioners contend that it is the ministerial duty of the HC to submit to the
CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its records of the
proceedings, including video footages of the deliberations and voting. They
likewise argue that PMA' s refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet
1 CL Cudia under the guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication
of the Honor Code, which merely provides: "A cadet who becomes part of
any investigation is subject to the existing regulations pertaining to rules of
confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to the creed of secrecy. Nothing
shall be disclosed without proper guidance from those with authority" (IV.
The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This provision,
they say, does not deprive Cadet 1 CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies
and examine relevant documents pertaining to his case.

Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and

recordings relevant to the HC hearings are favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
cause, and, consequently, to rule that respondents' refusal to produce and
have them examined is tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural
due process. They are mistaken.

In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents,

witness testimony, or oral or written presentation of facts submitted at the
hearing that would support Cadet 1 CL Cudia's defense. The Court may
require that an administrative record be supplemented, but only "where
there is a 'strong showing or bad faith or improper behavior' on the part of
the agency,"173 both of which are not present here. Petitioners have not
specifically indicated the nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and the
reason for withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that Cadet 1
CL Cudia's guilty verdict would be overturned with the production and
examination of such documents, footages, and recordings. As will be
further shown in the discussions below, the requested matters, even if
denied, would not relieve Cadet 1 CL Cudia's predicament. If at all, such
denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not seriously
prejudiced thereby.

As to the ostracism in the PMA –

To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence

because Special Order No. 1 issued on February 21, 2014, which directed
the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him without any opportunity, to
secure statements of his own witnesses. He could not have access to or
approach the cadets who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1
voting result. It is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because the Honor Code
unequivocally announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing the
cruel method of ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA will not have to
resort to other humiliating means and shall only have the option to make
known among its alumni the names of those who have not sincerely felt
remorse for violating the Honor Code."

On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-in-
intervention attached a full text copy of the alleged Special Order No. 1. In
any case, attributing its issuance to PMA is improper and misplaced
because of petitioners' admission that ostracism has been absolutely
dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity consistent with the trend in
International Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum.
Assuming that said Order was issued, respondents contend that it purely
originated from the cadets themselves, the sole purpose of which was to
give a strong voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they did not
tolerate Cadet 1 CL Cudia's honor violation and breach of confindentiality of
the HC proceedings.

More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely

that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was ostracized by his fellow cadets. They manifest
that as early as January 22, 2014, he was already transferred to the
Holding Center. The practice of billeting an accused cadet at the Holding
Center is provided for in the Honor Code Handbook. Although within the
PMA compound, the Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have
any business to conduct therein. The cadets could not also ostracize him
during mess times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia opted to take his meals at the
Holding Center. The circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1
was issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was ostracized in
common areas accessible to other cadets. He remained in the Holding
Center until March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to
his claim, guests were also free to visit him in the Holding Center.

However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia suffered from ostracism

in the PMA. The practice was somehow recognized by respondents in their
Consolidated Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news
report. The CHR likewise confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May
22, 2014. For them, it does not matter where the ostracism order originated
from because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came from the
cadets themselves. There was a tacit approval of an illegal act. If not, those
cadets responsible for ostracism would have been charged by the PMA
officials. Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not choose to take
his meals at the Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave the place.
Petitioners opine that placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is
inconsistent with his or her presumed innocence and certainly gives the
implication of ostracism.

We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-

inintervention attached a full text copy or even a pertinent portion of the
alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence and contents are of doubtful veracity.
Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never be granted in this case.

The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an

admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol during the CHR hearing that, upon
consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy
Board, they issued an ostracism order against Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While
not something new in a military academy,175 ostracism's continued existence
in the modem times should no longer be countenanced. There are those
who argue that the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of private
interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render
illusory the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty
by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies the
accused cadet's protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or
her behalf and to be presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a
proper proceeding.

As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the
same. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook provides that, in
case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor Code
and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the disposition
of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be
billeted at the HTG Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of
"Boarders Ward" is to quarter those cadets who are undergoing separation
actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered , therein until
final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the segregation
of cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary authority of
Academy officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to
decisions made by Army authorities, 'orderly government requires us to
tread lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power
and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within
the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178 the "administrative segregation" was held to be a reasonable
exercise of military discipline and could not be considered an invasion of
the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.

Late and vague decisions –

It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge
against him and the decisions arrived at by the HC, the CRAB, and the
PMA. No written decision was furnished to him, and if any, the information
was unjustly belated and the justifications for the decisions were vague. He
had to constantly seek clarification and queries just to be apprised of what
he was confronted with.

Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1
CL Cudia immediately inquired as to the grounds therefor, but Cadet 1 CL
Mogol answered that it is confidential since he would still appeal the same.
By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia that the
CRAB already forwarded their recommendation for his dismissal to the
General Headquarters sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he
received no decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or in writing.
The PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no written
decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from the
Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when
the Cudia family received the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it
fell short in laying down with specificity the factual and legal bases used by
the CRAB and even by the Office of the Adjutant General. There remains
no proof that the CRAB and the PMA considered the evidence presented
by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed
by the CRAB, whether the same is substantial, and whether the new
evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account.

In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice of orally

declaring the HC finding, not putting it in a written document so as to
protect the integrity of the erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the
HC proceedings pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver that a
copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to
Cadet 1 CL Cudia because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence,
were the ones who were given a copy thereof.

Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a

constitutional mandate stating that "[no] decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based,"179 such provision does not apply in Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and
content of a decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code
and Honor System Handbook also has no written rule on the matter. Even if
the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point
consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are
necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the reviewing body,
assuring that it went through the processes of legal reasoning. He was not
left in the dark as to how it was reached and he knows exactly the reasons
why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.

As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –

Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1,

only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the power to
appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no
authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of
a cadet. It also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of
the HC as a basis for recommending the cadet's dismissal. In the case of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC's
finding of guilt in terminating his military service.

Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de nova

of all records without requiring Cadet 1 CL Cudia to submit new evidence if
it is physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds, respondents
cannot claim that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC
recommendation and heard Cadet lCL Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the
letter from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its report dated
March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings and recommendations
of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal filed by the
subject Cadet." However, the Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was
dated March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report was submitted
to the AFP General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was only
on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a Fact-Finding Board/
Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do the same things
twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB never
undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its
report, and the Final Investigation Report was drafted merely as an
afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by
petitioners so as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the
CRAB investigation and review.

Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper

assessment of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict
against Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of the
PMA did not merely rely on the findings of the HC, noting that there was
also a separate investigation conducted by the HTG from January 25 to
February 7, 2014. Likewise, contrary to the contention of petitioners that
the CRAB continued with the review of the case despite the absence of
necessary documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the case and
even conducted another investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body. For respondents, petitioners failed to discharge
the burden of proof in showing bad faith on the part of the PMA. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary and considering further that petitioners'
allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good faith on the part of
the PMA' s higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore, prevail.

We agree with respondents.

The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited
role of investigating and determining whether or not the alleged offender
has actually violated the Honor Code.181 It is given the responsibility of
administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its task is entirely
investigative, examining in the first instance a suspected violation. As a
means of encouraging self-discipline, without ceding to it any authority to
make final adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the function of
identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the HC
does not have the authority to order the separation of a cadet from the
Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely recommendatory and
have no binding effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an
indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the PMA-
CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even opined that due
process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor Committee level
because it is only a "charging body whose decisions had no effect other
than to initiate de nova proceedings before a Board of Officers."184

Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due process
clause and that irregularities in its proceedings were in fact committed, still,
We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not required that procedural due
process be afforded at every stage of developing disciplinary action. What
is required is that an adequate hearing be held before the final act of
dismissing a cadet from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets, and the PMA
Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate investigation was
also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members
and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate
investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held hearings on March
12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it
"unusual" that the CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that
it never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out
with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture that deserves scant
consideration.

As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –

According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The

people behind Cadet ICL Cudia's charge, investigation, and conviction
were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive and who took
advantage of the situation. Cadet 1 CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC
member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the Navy cadet
1 CL, was part of the team which conducted the preliminary investigation.
Also, Cadet I CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1 CL
Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving with
and tutoring his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions to a
retake exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he
was a non-voting member, he was in a position of influence and authority.
Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1 CL Cudia to resort to the
procedure for the removal of HC members.186

Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given
to Cadet I CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel. During one of her visits
to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to convince
his son to resign and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who
later became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee: "Your
brother, he lied!" The CRAB conferences were merely used to formalize his
dismissal and the PMA never really intended to hear his side. For
petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA's clear resolve to dismiss him
no matter what.

For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that Maj.
Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty
to be a good father of cadets when he "paved the road to [Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's] sham trial by the Honor Committee" is an unfounded accusation.
They note that when Maj. Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
he revoked the penalty awarded because of his explanation. However, all
revocations of awarded penalties are subject to the review of the STO.
Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the established
procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to
investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness.
Respondents add that bad faith cannot likewise be imputed against Maj.
Hindang by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO
of Cadets 1 CL Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for their next
class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not admit his being
late and effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr.
Costales.
As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in bad faith
and determined to destroy [Cadet 1 CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own"
because the former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in
November 2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is
groundless as there is failure to note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-
voting member of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a
possible honor violation since he is the HC Chairman and nothing less is
expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives of the
HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by
secret ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1
CL Cu'dia believed that there was bias against him, he should have
resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in
the Honor Code Handbook.

Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part

of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1 CL Cudia from graduating because the
Academy does not stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the
contrary, in view of his academic standing, the separation militates against
PMA' s mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.

The Court differs with petitioners.

Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some

showing of actual bias, petitioners' allegations do not hold water. The mere
imputation of ill-motive without proof is speculative at best. Kolesa teaches
us that to sustain the challenge, specific evidence must be presented to
overcome

a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators;

and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring investigative and
adjudicative powers on the same individual poses such a risk of actual bias
or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be implemented.187

Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be
awarded, he is not an adversary of the cadet but an educator who shares
an identity of interest with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to time
as a future leader.188 When the occasion calls for it, cadets may be
questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A
particular point or issue may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning his being late in class is proper, since there is
evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have occurred and
there is reasonable cause to believe that he was involved in the breach of
regulations.189

For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the
non-toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e., "We do not tolerate those
who violate the Code." Cadets are reminded that they are charged with a
tremendous duty far more superior to their personal feeling or friendship.
190 They must learn to help others by guiding them to accept the truth and

do what is right, rather than tolerating actions against truth and justice.
191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically honorable; they

cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of their peers,

seniors, or subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol exactly did,
although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note that
even the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that
interpretation of one's honor is generally subjective.193

Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL'

Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to grind
against Cadet 1 CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter what, the
latter's downfall, their nefarious conduct would still be insignificant. This is
so since the HC (both the preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB,
and the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence,
the claim that the proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce
because the three personalities participated therein is tantamount to
implying the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the competence,
independence, and integrity of the other members who constituted the
majority. Again, in the absence of specifics and substantial evidence, the
Court cannot easily give credence to this baseless insinuation.

As to the HC executive session/chambering –

Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the

case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia because two voting rounds took place. After the
result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL Mogol ordered the voting
members to go to a room without the cadet recorders. Therein, the lone
dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura, was asked to explain his "not guilty" vote.
Pressured to change his vote, he was made to cast a new one finding
Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was discarded and replaced.
There was no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was
mentioned in the HC formal report.

The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014

was submitted by petitioners since he purportedly recalled Cadet 1 CL
Lagura telling him that he was pressured to change his "not guilty" vote
after the voting members were "chambered." In the sworn statement,
Commander Tabuada said:

1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I [cannot]
remember exactly the date but sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of
January 2014, I was in my office filling up forms for the renewal of my
passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had business with my staff;

2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags, halika muna dito," and
he approached me and I let him sit down on the chair in front of my table. I
told and asked him, "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah ... ano ha ang nangyari?
Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied, "Talagang NOT GUILTY ang
vote ko sa kanya sir", and I asked him, "Oh, bakit naging guilty di ha pag
may isang nag NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied "Chinamber ako sir,
bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-pressure din ako
sir kaya binago ko, sir." So, I told him, "Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa
naman" and he replied "oo nga sir". After that conversation, I let him go.194

It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed

voting manipulation since, under the rules, it is required to have a
unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing
in the procedure that permits the HC Chairman to order the "chambering"
of a member who voted contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to
reconsider in order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order
from the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the HC procedure or
approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No.
1. The HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own rules and principles
as embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the
established procedures, the second deliberation should be considered null
and void.

Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves

a substantive right which cannot be unceremoniously changed without a
corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook. In their view, "chambering" totally defeats the purpose of voting
by secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very essence and philosophy
behind the provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure that the
voting member is free to vote what is in his or her heart and mind and that
no one can pressure or persuade another to change his or her vote. They
suggest that if one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is
obviously guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the
HC through the vote of non-confidence as provided for in the Honor Code.
195 Anent the above arguments, respondents contend that a distinction must

be made between the concepts of the Honor Code and the Honor System.
According to them, the former sets the standard for a cadet's, minimum
ethical and moral behavior and does not change, while the latter is a set of
rules for the conduct of the observance and implementation of the· Honor
Code and may undergo necessary adjustments as may be warranted by
the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more responsive to the
moral training and character development of the cadets. The HC may
provide guidelines when the Honor System can be used to supplement
regulations. This being so, the voting process is continuously subject to
change.

Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict

automatically acquits a cadet from the charge of Honor violation. The voting
members only write either "guilty" or "not guilty" in the voting sheets without
stating their name or their justification. However, this situation drew
criticisms since there were instances where a reported cadet already
admitted his honor violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a
sympathetic voting member.

In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that

should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically sanction a
jury type of discussion called "executive session" or "chambering," which is
intended to elicit the explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This
prevents the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing over
the manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has been adopted
and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 since their first
year in the Academy. The allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are,
therefore, negated by the fact that such practice was in place and applied
to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia.

It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests

solely on the personal conviction of the dissenter/s, without any compulsion
from the other voting members. There can also be no pressuring to change
one's vote to speak of since a vote may only be considered as final when
the Presiding Officer has affixed his signature.

To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise the

argument that the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet
1 CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made under oath, he
submitted to the Board/Body an affidavit explaining that:

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of

Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty
for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside the
Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about
to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B T ABU ADA PN, our Head
Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him
and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At
first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor
Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin
lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi." Then I answered: "Ako yung
isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta
muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga
nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty.
Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from
Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo
nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino."196

Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on

March 12, 2014, which he submitted before the CHR wherein he attested to
the following:

3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor

Code violation committed by Cadet Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member,
we are the one who assess or investigate the case whether the reported
Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.

4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT GUILTY" among the nine
(9) voting members of the Honor Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for
Lying.
5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after the proceedings
and before the presiding Officer told the members to vote, I was confused
of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the
investigation to make my decision but for me it is not yet enough to give my
verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote "NOT GUILTY" with a
reservation in my mind that we will still be discussing our verdicts if we will
arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be enlightened
with the other's justifications.

6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that the vote
is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By way of practice and as I predicted, we
were told to go inside the anteroom for executive meeting and to discuss
our respective justifications. I have been a member for two (2) years and
the voting committee will always go for executive meeting whenever it will
meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.

7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that
enlightened my confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up sign and asked
for another sheet of voting paper. I then changed my vote from "NOT
GUILTY" to "GUILTY" and the voting members of the Honor Committee
came up with the final vote of nine (9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes for
not guilty.

9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was
GUILTY of LYING. After that, all persons inside the courtroom went back to
barracks.

10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt

Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng
boto? ., I answered: "Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo."
They also asked who were inside the Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt
Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt
Jocson talked to me.

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of

Naval Warfare to asked (sic) permission if it is possible not to attend the
Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside
the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about
to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head
Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him
and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At
first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor
Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin
lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I answered: "Ako yung
isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung} Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta
muna kami sa Chamher. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga
nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty.
Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from
Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. " He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said:
"Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino. "197

Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1 CL
Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was made to explain in the presence of other
HC members, who were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance of
intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the records of the HC
proceedings, which were not presented assuming they actually exist, could
have been the best way to ensure that he was free to express his views,
reject the opinion of the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was
pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his affidavit
why he initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia "not guilty" and what made him
change his mind. His use of general statements like he "was confused of
the case " and "saw things that enlightened my confusions " could hardly
suffice to establish why he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the
admission of ·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he was
the only one who was given another ballot sheet while in the chamber and
that he accomplished it in the barracks which he only submitted the
following day. However, as the CHR found, the announcement of the 9-0
vote was done immediately after the HC came out from the chamber and
before Cadet 1 CL Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.

We rule for respondents.

As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely

provides:

After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the

Board will call for the members to vote whether the accused is GUILTY or
NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides that a cadet
is found guilty of violating the Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of
conducting "executive session" or "chambering" is not at all prohibited. The
HC is given leeway on the voting procedures in' actual cases taking into
account the exigency of the times. What is important is that, in the end,
there must be a unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of
violating the Honor Code.

Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written procedure,
199 We still rule that there is nothing inherently wrong with the practice of

"chambering" considering that the presence of intimidation or force cannot

automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and
the freedom to vote based on what is in the heart and mind of the voting
member is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final voting was
conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before the CRAB:

13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights
regarding the case at hand. The other members, on the other hand, would
be given the chance to explain their votes as well as their insights to the
dissenting voter. The decision to change the vote of the dissenting voter
rests solely on his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted not to
change his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded
respect by the Honor Committee.200

It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere

allegation is definitely not evidence. It must be substantiated and proved
1âwphi1

because a person is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong and that

official duty has been regularly performed.201

The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should settle the
issue. Before the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he
consistently denied that he was pressured by the other voting members of
the HC. His representation must be accepted as it is regardless of whether
he has satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the
one who was "chambered," he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case
of doubt, We have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura observed the
Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet must be his or her own
Final' Authority in honor; that he or she should not let other cadets dictate
on him or her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any
person can have confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will
be fair and just in dealing with him; that his actions, words and ways are
sincere and true.203
As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not putting on
record the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura's bringing of his ballot
sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer
dwell on the same for being harmless procedural errors that do not
materially affect the validity of the HC proceedings.

Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements

Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there
is no clear time reference as to when was the actual dismissal or what was
the exact time of dismissal - whether it should be the dismissal inside the
room or the dismissal after the section grade was given by Dr. Costales -in
the minds of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators
and voting members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of
dismissal was usually five minutes before the class was set to end and the
protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not observed. When
Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
perverted the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not
state what was the true time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the
truth he was relying on was 5 or 15 minutes before the scheduled end of
class.

It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask Dr.
Costales a query such that his business was already finished as soon as
she gave an answer. However, a new business was initiated by Dr.
Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL Cudia must stay and wait for the section
grade. At that point in time, he was no longer in control of the
circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr. Costales never categorically
stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She recognized the confusion. Her
text messages to him clarified his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted
during its investigation that she could not exactly recall what happened in
her class on November 14, 2013.

Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that

ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
obviously not late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was late
two (2) minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived
3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m.
Thus, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the
view that what appears to have caused confusion in the minds of
respondents is just a matter of semantics; that the entire incident was a
product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them to insinuate that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used incorrect language to hide the truth.
Citing Merriam Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue that "dismiss" means
to permit or cause to leave, while "class" refers to a body of students
meeting regularly to study the same subject. According to them, these two
words do not have definite and precise meanings but are generic terms.
Other than the words "class" and "dismiss" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
which may actually be used in their generic sense, there is nothing
deceiving about what he said. Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong
or not correct, but it is not false or not true.

For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently truthful and
with no intent to deceive or mislead. He did not manipulate any fact and
was truthful of his explanation. His .. statements were clear and
unambiguous but were given a narrow-minded interpretation. Even the
Honor Code acknowledges that "[e]xperience demonstrates that human
communication is imperfect at best, and some actions are often
misinterpreted."

Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of records

reflects not only his outstanding academic performance but proves his
good conduct during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-
average grades in Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct
I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far from the truth.

On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that

Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in the military parlance,
is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by
making untruthful statements in his written explanation. Respondents want
Us to consider the following:

First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal
investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a class is dismissed as long as the
instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson
examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they have answered
their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14
November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood
up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx"
Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he was already
considered dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended
at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H) or "a bit late."

Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his

tardiness. After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and
attend his next class. However, he initiated a conversation with Dr.
Costales regarding their grades. He was not under instruction by Dr.
Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.

Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/

Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified her statements in her written
explanation. She explained that the "instruction to wait" is a response to
Cadet Cudia' s request and that it was not her initiated instruction. Clearly,
there was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet Cudia and the other
cadets to stay. On the contrary, it was them who wanted to meet with the
instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia's explanation, his subsequent
class, ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the
informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC,
Professor Berong confirmed that her English class started as scheduled
(3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the
acting class marcher of ENG412 also testified that their class started as
scheduled (3 :05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204

Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL Cudia

had no intention to mislead or deceive but merely used wrong and unfitting
words in his explanations. For them, considering his academic standing, it
is highly improbable that he used incorrect language to justify his mistake.
Respondents' arguments are tenable.

The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact.

Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot
pass upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. Moreover, We
reiterate the long standing rule that factual findings of administrative
tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this
case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the
findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported
by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the procedure
which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed;
or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest. With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present in this
case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.

For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.

As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of
the Philippines (CCAFP) states: "We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal,
nor tolerate among us those who do. "

The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets violate the
Honor Code by lying if they make an oral or written statement which is
contrary to what is true or use doubtful information with the intent to
deceive or mislead.205 It is expected that every cadet's word is accepted
without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and
that the cadets must answer directly, completely and truthfully even though
the answer may result in punitive action under the CCPB and CCAFPR.206

To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1

CL Cudia justified that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We were
dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir." Subsequently, in his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he reasoned out as
follows:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th

period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412,
started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next
class without any intention of being late Sir.207

In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.

Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been

defined in one U.S. case as follows:

A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by
cleverly wording what he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial
truth. When he knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he
is quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of
lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of
directly and completely telling the cause of his being late in the ENG412
class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts,
thereby, telling a half-truth.

The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an
honor violation are:

1. The act and/or omission, and

2. The intent pertinent to it.

Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent
to commit or omit the act itself.209

The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally

are:

1. Do I intend to deceive?

2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?

If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the

honorable thing.210

Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must
ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore, can only be proved by
unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.211 In this
case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia's intent to deceive is manifested from the very act
of capitalizing on the use of the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of
the matter is that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of
an educational institution, does not correspond to what Cadet 1 CL Cudia is
trying to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not generic and have
definite and precise meaning.

By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda,

Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute a "class." The Court cannot agree
that such term includes "every transaction and communication a teacher
does with her students." Clearly, it does not take too much intelligence to
conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia should have been accurate by pinpointing
who were with him when he was late in the next class. His deceptive
explanation is made more obvious when compared with what Cadets 1 CL
Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which was: "We
approached our instructor after our class."212

Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14,

2013 was five or fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled end of class.
Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet 1
CL Cudia, consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/
Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was already dismissed when he
passed his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also
declared that she merely responded to his request to see the results of the
UE 1 and that she had reservations on the phrases "under my instruction"
and "dismissed a bit late" used in his letter of explanation to the HC. In
addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view before the CHR that the act of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia of inquiring about his grade outside their classroom after
he submitted his LE paper is not part of the class time because the
consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214 Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1
CL Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section grade, still, this does
not acquit him. Given such situation, a responsible cadet who is fully aware
of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely decline the
invitation and immediately go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet
1 CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he already lost control over the
circumstances.

It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose words

which led to confusion in the minds of respondents and eventually
commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics and
a product of plain and simple inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and
presentation of untruthful explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.

Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his
Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic
performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his four-
year stay in the PMA,215 it does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of
the offense charged. It is enough to say that "evidence that one did or did
not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
did not do the same or similar thing at another time."216 While the TOR may
be received to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student, it
does not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of
committing a specific Honor Code violation.

Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment

Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of

the guilty cadet from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed
Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet
Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a
recommendation for a cadet's dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The
same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code
does not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no
difference between a little lie and a huge falsehood. Respondents
emphasize that the Honor Code has always been considered as an
absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured themselves ever
since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek to assure
that only those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and
honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally
permissible for the military "to set and enforce uncommonly high standards
of conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.

On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached

the Honor Code, the offense warrants his or her dismissal since such a
policy may be the only means to maintain and uphold the spirit of integrity
in the military.217 They maintain though that in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case
there is no need to distinguish between a "little lie" and a "huge falsehood"
since he did not lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue
advantage, the penalty imposed on him is considered as unjust and cruel.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of dismissal is
not commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors and
what he allegedly committed does not amount to an academic deficiency or
an intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic rules and
regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty imposed must be
proportionate to the offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable to
the facts of the case. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of his right to
education, the only means by which he may have a secure life and future.

Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and
his acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate
penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to
resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by
contract, risked this when he entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in
Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is
nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of
due process. It quoted the disposition of the district court, thus:

The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding
that he has violated the Honor Code is known to all cadets even prior to the
beginning of their careers there. The finding of a Code violation by
hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the part of the offender. While
separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence of a cadet's
transgression, it is not an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a
reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men who have suffered
ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of admonitions
or lesser penalties for single violations might be more compassionate --or
even more effective in achieving the intended result --is quite immaterial to
the question of whether the harsher penalty violates due process.220

Nature of the CHR Findings

Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's
recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a constitutional body mandated
by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights, and to conduct investigative monitoring of
economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of
society. Further, it was contended that the results of CHR's investigation
and recommendations are so persuasive that this Court, on several
occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural
Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,
222 gave its findings serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the

Court to hear what an independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to

say on the case.

In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human

Rights223 ruled that the CHR is merely a recommendatory body that is not
empowered to arrive at a conclusive determination of any controversy.

We are in accord with respondents.

The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely
recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is
that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.224 As
held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights225and a number of
subsequent cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of
justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate claims
on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to
investigate is not the same as adjudication:

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of

adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

xxxx

[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts
of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these
terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or

delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct
an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to
find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up
step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as
"(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx x an inquiry, judicial or
otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,

arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy x x x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
1âwphi1

sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or

decree, or to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment. "226

All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in
accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The
dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him
of a future. Cliche though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the
"be-all and end-all" of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may
still continue to pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering
the stigma attached to his or her dismissal. For one, as suggested by
respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the
enlistment and reenlistment in the APP Regular Force, provides under
Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall be given to, among others, the ex-
PMA or PAFFFS cadets.227 If the positions open does not appeal to his
interest for being way below the rank he could have achieved as a PMA
graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble
profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials, competence, and
potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that choice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class
Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Chief Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On leave
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL

Clerk of Court

OCC-En Banc

Supreme Court

Footnotes
* On leave.
** No part.
1The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 7 (Rollo,
p. 156).
2 Rollo, pp. 3-31.
3 Id. at 48.
4 Id. at 49-117.
5 Id. at 204.
6 Id. at209-213.
7 Id at 222-235.
8 Id. at 236-266.
9 Maj. Gracilla is the Intelligence and Operations Officer of the PMA.
Allegedly, on February 25, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia saw a recording device
taped at the wall and covered by a blanket in an adjacent room where he
was staying at while in the PMA Holding Center (Rollo, pp. 257-258,
261-262, 477).
10 Rollo, pp. 273-277.
11 Id. at 204-213, 217-221, 267-272.
12 Id. at 282-337.
13 Id. at 383-452, 522-525.
14 Id. at 453-497.
15 Id. at 509-519.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 32, 150, 366.
18 Id. at 338.
19 Id. at 150.
20 Id. at 34, 139.
21The Honor Committee is a body of cadets who are entrusted by the Cadet
Corps to preserve the sanctity of the Honor Code and conduct the
procedural aspect of the Honor System. It is composed of representatives
from the first, the second and the third classes in each company, the
Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and the Cadet First Captain, who is an Ex-
Officio member (The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series
2011, p. 29 [Rollo, p. 167]).
22 Rollo, pp. 35, 63, 120-121, 140, 247, 285.
23 Id. at 136.
24 Id. at 35-36, 140-141.
25In the CHR's Final Investigation Report, those who acted as members of
the preliminary investigation team were Cadet lCL Hasigan, lCL Raguindin,
lCL Dag-uman, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and Cdt Laturnas
(Rollo, p. 253).
26Rollo, p. 458. However, in the CHR's Final Investigation Report as well as
the Final Investigation Report of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body,
Cadet lCL Bianchiheimer L. Edra was named as one of the voting members
instead of Cadet lCL Jeanelyn P. Cabrido or Cadet lCL Shu-Aydan G.
Aydan (Rollo, pp. 254, 339).
27 Rollo, pp. 254, 458.
28 Id. at 242, 470-471.
29 Id. at 32-33, 137-138.
30 Id. at 37, 142, 149.
31 Id. at 340.
32 Id at. 68.
33 Id. at 143, 172, 199.
34 Id. at 143-144.
35 Id. at 145-146, 202-203.
36 Id. at 11, 70.
37 Id. at 40.
38 Id. at 132.
39 Id. at 179.
40 Id. at 133-135.
41 Id at. 462.
42 Id. at 181-182.
43 Id. at 183-185.
44 Id. at 340.
45 Id. at 152.
46 Id at 118-131.
47 Id. at 186.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigation

48

Body were BGen.

Andre M. Costales and Capt. Allan Ferdinand V. Cusi, respectively. The

members were Col. Archimedes V. Viaje, Col. Monico S. Batie, Maj. Ma.
Victoria Asther R. Excelise, Maj. Raul V. Verceles, Maj. Xerxes A. Trinidad,
Maj. Charles V. Calucag (Secretary), Maj. Lope A. Domingo, Jr., Maj. Agnes
Lynette A. Flores, Cpt. Charity G. Fuentespina, Cpt. Dhylyne Enchon B.
Espejo (Legal Officer Adviser), Cpt. Almira C. Jabagat, and 2Lt. Marlon B.
Nido.
49 Rollo, p. 359.
50 Id. at 191.
51 Id. at 200-201.
52 Id. at 338-358.
53 Id. at 289.
54 Id. at 360.
55 Id. at 495-497. (Emphasis in the original)
56 Id. at 499-500.
57 Id. at 79-81.
58 Id. at 290-292.
59 160-A Phil. 929 (1975).
60 G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994, 230 SCRA 761.
61 Buena v. Benito, G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014.
62 Rollo, p. 27.
63 Id. at 110-111, 446-447.
64University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No.
110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 356.
65Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,
supra note 59, at 942.
66University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, supra note
64, at 361-362.

See Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., G.R. No. 103142,
67

November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591, 597.

68 University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 771.
69 Morales v. The Board of Regents of the UP, 487 Phil. 449, 464 (2004).
70 530 Phil. 398 (2006).
71SEC. 31. The President is authorized to appoint to the Military Academy
annually, subject to such physical and examinations as he may prescribe,
the number of examinations, cadets necessary to maintain the Cadet Corps
at a strength of not to exceed three hundred and fifty. Cadets shall be
selected from among qualified candidates as hereinafter provided.
Candidates for admission shall be single, in good physical condition, not
less than seventeen nor more twenty-two years of age, and shall be
nominated by the Members of the National Assembly, each of whom may
nominate any number of candidates. The President shall appoint from
among those who pass the physical and mental examinations with the
highest ratings the number or numbers necessary to fill the existing
vacancies: Provided, That a quota of three members of the Cadet Corps
shall be allotted to each Assembly district: Provided, further, That in case
no candidates from a given Assembly district attain the required minimum
ratings, a second examination shall be given during the same year to
nominees from that district. If on the second examination no candidate shall
attain the required minimum rating, the vacancies in the district quota shall
be filled by the President from successful candidates at large.

The pay and allowances of students at the Military Academy shall be fixed
by the President. Any student who shall, after entrance to the Academy and
before completion of the prescribed course of training, be found to be
physically unfit for military duty by reason of injury or disease incident to the
service, shall be retired with the rank of cadet and shall be entitled to the
retired pay and allowances of a third lieutenant of the Regular Force.

Upon satisfactory completion of the course of instruction at the Military

Academy candidates shall be commissioned third lieutenants in the
Regular or Reserve Forces with relative rank in the order of final general
standing! as determined by the Faculty Board and Commandant of the
Academy, and approved by the Chief of Staff.
72 439 Phil. 875 (2002).
73 491 Phil. 520 (2005).

Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 485 Phil.

74

446, 454-455 (2004).

75 420 F. Supp. 698 (1976).
76 Supra note 61.
77 801 F.2d 462 (1986).
78 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
79 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
80 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
81 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
82 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
83 G.R. No. 92606, July 26, 1991, 199 SCRA 663.
84See Major Richard D. Rosen, Thinking About Due Process, the Army
Lawyer, March, 1988 (1988 Army Law. 3), citing U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, els.
13-15; art. II,§ 2, el. l; Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1973);
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953); and Warren, The Bill of Rights
and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 187 (1962).
85509 F.2d 898 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari
(423 U.S. 873, 96 S. Ct. 142, 46 L. Ed. 2d 105, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2844
[1975]).
86 382 F.2d 807 (1967).
87 470 F.2d 201 (1972).
88 534 F. Supp. 590 (1982).

36 Cap. U.L. Rev. 635, citing DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY

89

CRIMINAL JUSTICE:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1-6(C) (6th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006).

Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181. August 19, 2014, citing Araullo v.
90

209287, July 1, 2014.

91 Morales v. The Board of Regents of the UP, supra note 69.
92 Supra note 85, at 20-22.
93 CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. II Sec. 3.

Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, citing Planas v. Gil, 67
94

Phil. 62, 73-74 (1939).

95 250 Phil. 270 (1988).
96Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The
Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the
State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of
the national territory.

Dated December 17, 1938, otherwise known as the "Manual for Courts-
97

Martial, Armed Forces of the Philippines."

98 Dated January 28, 1985 (Amending Chapter XXIV Section 105 thru 109).
99 See Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87.
100The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 4 (Rollo,
p. 155).

Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85. See also Roberts v. Knowlton, 377
101

F. Supp. 1381 (1974); Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710 (1975);

TUily v. Orr, Secretary of the Air Force, 608 F. Supp. 1222 (1985); Cody v.
Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1031 (1983); Crowley v. United States Merchant Marine
Academy, 985 F. Supp. 292 (1997); and Lebrun v. England, 212 F. Supp.
2d 5 (2002).
102 Lightsey v. King, 567 F. Supp. 645 (1983).
103 See Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (1972).
104Section 3. (2) They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love
of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national
heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral
character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking,
broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.

Sec. 30. There shall be established a military training school to be

105

named the Philippine Military Academy, for the training of selected

candidates for permanent commission in the Regular Force. The student
body in the Military Academy shall be known as the Cadet Corps of the
Army of the Philippines.
106SECTION 58. Organization.-(1) The Philippine Military Academy is the
primary training and educational institution of the AFP. It shall be the
primary source of regular officers of the Standing Force.

(2) The Academy shall be organized as prescribed by the Secretary of

National Defense, upon recommendation of the Chief of Staff, AFP.

(3) The student body of the Academy shall be known as the Cadet Corps of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) and shall have such strength
as the Secretary of National Defense shall determine upon the
recommendation of the Chief of Staff, aml within the strength limited by the
annual Appropriation Act.

(4) There shall be an Academic Board organized by the Chief of Staff,

which shall be composed of not more than fifteen (15) members selected
from the officers of the Academy upon recommendation of the
Superintendent. The Board shall, in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Chief of Staff, have the power to confer
baccalaureate degrees upon the cadets who satisfactorily complete the
approved course of study.

SECTION 59. Functions.-The Academy shall prepare the candidates for

commission in the regular force of the AFP and shall instruct, train and
develop cadets so that each graduate shall possess the character, the
broad and basic military skills and the education essential to the successful
pursuit of a progressive military career.
107Section 5. (2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of
higher learning.
108 401 Phil. 431 (2000).
109 Supra note 67.
110 G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993, 222 SCRA 644.

Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, supra note

111

74, at 459, citing Non v. Dames II, 264 Phil. 98, 121 (1990). See also Phil.
School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84698,
February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 729, 733 and Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help
College of Rizal, Inc., supra note 67, at 596.

Magtibayv. Garcia, G.R. No. L-28971, January 28. 1983, 120 SCRA 370,
112

374; Licup v. University of San Carlos (USC), G.R. No. 85839, October 19,
1989, 178 SCRA 637; Non v. Dames II, supra at 123; San Sebastian
College v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 414, 427 (1991); University of San
Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 775; and Regino v.
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, supra note 74, at 461.

Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, supra note

113

74, at 459, citing Non v. Dames II, supra note 111, at 120. See also Phil.
School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, supra note 111, at
733, and Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., supra note 67,
at 596.

Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, supra note

114

74, at 459-460, citing Phil. School of Business Administration v. Court of

Appeals, supra note 111, at 733; and University of San Agustin, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 775.

University of the Phil. Booed of Regents v. Court of Appeal, 372 Phil.

115

287, 306 (1999).

116D e La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 330, 361
(2007), citing Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at
660. See also University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,
supra.
117 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
118See also the subsequent cases of Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong, supra note 110, at 660; Mirriam College Foundation, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 108, at 456; Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges
of Science and Technology, supra note 74, at 464; and De La Salle
University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 116, at 359.
119 Guzman v. National University, 226 Phil. 596, 603-604 (1986).
120See Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, supra note 59, at 943; Tangonan v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157,
June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, 257; Alcuaz v. Philippine School of
Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 23 (1988); University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21,
1993, 227 SCRA 342, 360; Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 108, at 455-456: Morales v. The Board of Regents of
the UP, 487 Phil. 449, 474 (2004); De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 116, at 359; Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) of St.
Mathew Christian Academy v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No.
176518, March 2, 2010, 614 SCRA 41, 54; and Mercado v. AMA Computer
College-Paranaque City, Inc., G.R. No. 183572, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA.
 Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., supra note 67, at
121

595-596
122De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 116, at 363,
citing Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 663-664.

University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No.

123

110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 360.

Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran, G.R. No. 169391, October 10,

124

2012, 683 SCRA 358, 372.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note I 08, at

125

456-457. ,
126 Supra note 108.
127 Supra note 115.

University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, supra note

128

115, at 306-308. (Citations omitted)

129De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 116, at 362,
citing Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 664 ..
130 Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 664.
131 Id.
132 CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XIV Sec. 5 (3).
133The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 5 (Rollo,
p. 155).
134 Id.

See Ringgold v. United States, supra note 75 and John H. Beasley, The
135

USMA Honor System -A Due Process Hybrid, 118 Mil. L. Rev. 187 198).
136See John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System -A Due Process Hybrid,
id.
137 See Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87.
138 Supra note 119.
139 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
140 Supra note 111.
141 Supra note 110, at 656.
142 Supra note 124, at 374.
143Guzman v. National University, supra note 119, at 603-604. See also
Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 21
(1988) and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 116,
at 357.
144Guzman v. National University, supra note 119, at 603; Alcuaz v.
Philippine School of Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 21 (1988); and
Atenea, de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 658-659.
145Guzman v. National University, supra note 119, at 603; Alcuaz v.
Philippine School of Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 21 (1988);
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 124, at 658; and Gov.
Colegio De San Juan De Letran, supra note 124, at 375.
146Guzman v. National University, supra note 119, at 603; Alcuaz v.
Philippine School of Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 21 (1988);
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 658; and
University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, supra note
115.

See University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R.

147

No. 110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 359 and De La Salle
University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 330, 361 (2007).

John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System – A Due Process Hybrid,

148

supra note 135.

149 Supra note 116.
 De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. 357-358. (Citations
150

omitted). See also University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of

Appeals, supra note 115, at 304-305.

The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, pp. 6-7
151

(Rollo, p. 156).
152 Id. at 21 (Id.).

Richard D. Rosen, Thinking About Due Process, Army Law. 3 (March,

153

1988).

See John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System – A Due Process Hybrid,
154

supra note 135.

Claro C. Gloria, Philippine Military law, p. 9 (1973), Capitol Publishing

155

House, Inc. Q.C.

See Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87; Wimmer v. Lehman, 705 F.2d
156

1402 (1983); Cody v. Scott, supra note 101; and Lebrun v. England, supra
note 101.
157 Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87.
158 Wasson v. Trowbridge, supra note 86, at 811-812.

Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85. See also Kolesa v. Lehman, supra
159

note 88; Crowley v. United States Merchant Marine Academy, .supra note
101; and Lebrun v. England, supra note 101.
160 Supra note 120, at 21.
161 Supra note 116, at 357.
162Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration, supra note 120,
at 24.
163 Rollo, p. 18.
164 346 Phil. 807 (1997).
165 247 Phil. 1 ( 1988).
 414 Phil. 590, 599 (2001 ); See also Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v.
166

Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 611.

Wasson v. Trowbridge, supra note 86 at 812. See also Kolesa v.

167

Lehman, supra note 88, and Wimmer v. Lehman, supra note 156.

See Wasson v. Trowbridge, supra note 86; Andrews v. Knowlton, supra

168

note 85; Birdwell v. Schlesinger, supra note 101; Kolesa v. Lehman, supra
note 88; Wimmer v. Lehman, supra note 156; Cody v. Scott, supra note
101; Rustad v. United States Air Force, 718 F.2d 348 (1983); Tully v. Orr,
Secretary of the Air Force, supra note 101; and Crowley v. United States
Merchant Marine Academy, supra note 101.
169 Crowley v. United States Merchant Marine Academy, supra note 101.
170 470 F.2d 201 (1972). See also Cody v. Scott, supra note 101.
171 Supra note 156.
172Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:

xxxx

(e)That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;

xxxx
173 See Stainback v. Secretary of the Navy, 520 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2007).
174 Rollo, p. 466.
175In his article "The USMA Honor System -A Due Process Hybrid" (118 Mil.
L. Rev. 187), Major John H. Beasley wrote on the experience of a cadet in
the U.S. military academy, thus:

[A] cadet found not guilty by the board of officers or superintendent was
returned to the Corps, but was usually "cut" or "silenced," meaning that he
was treated as if he did not exist. The "silenced" cadet lived in a separate
room, ate alone at a table in the Cadet mess, was not spoken to by any
other cadet except for official purposes, and was otherwise completely
ignored. The "silence" was not something new, but had originated long
before the formalization of the Honor Committee in the early 1920's. The
Academy and even some honor committees attempted to do away with the
"silence," but all attempts were unsuccessful. The 1928 honor chairman
was quite blunt in his statement to the Corps that "This action [the silence]
established a wrongful precedent. This, in a few words, means that you
have no right to "silence." There is no such thing as "silence." Forget about
it." Just how vigorously the Academy attempted to do away with the
"silence" is a matter of speculation. The cadets were told by Academy
officials that they had no authority to punish, yet the practice of the
"silence" continued. Most "silenced" cadets could not endure the
punishment and resigned after a short period. A cadet who was silenced in
1971, however, remained at the Academy until his graduation and
commissioning in 1973. This much-celebrated case of Cadet Pelosi stirred
public demand for an end to the "silence." During this controversy, the
official Academy position was in support of the "silence," an unusual stand
considering the completely unsanctioned nature of the punishment.
Nonetheless, the Corps itself voted to end the punishment of the "silence"
in 1973 and the issue was finally laid to rest.

See John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System - A Due Process Hybrid,
176

118 Mil. L. Rev. 187, (1987).

The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 28

177

(Rollo, p. 167).
178 Supra note 101.
179 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 14.

Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the

180

Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service

Cooperative, Against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
and Hon. Fiorito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals, A.M.
OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 465, 469.

The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 23

181

(Rollo, p. 164).
182 See Ringgold v. United States, supra note 75.
183 See Roberts v. Knowlton, supra note 101.

See Ringgold v. United States, supra note 75, citing Andrews v.

184

Knowlton, supra note 85.

See Birdwell v. Schlesinger supra note 101, citing Andrews v. Knowlton,

185

supra note 85.

186Any cadet who loses confidence from any Honor Committee member
may address the matter to the Honor Committee Chairman. The Chairman
then calls for a deliberation of the case and submits the said representative
to a loss of confidence vote of at least 2/3 of the Honor Committee
representative seated en banc (Sec The Honoc Code and Honor System
Handbook, Se<i" 2011, p. 34 [Rollo, p. 170]).
187 Kolesa v. Lehman, supra note 88 at 594.

See Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87, at 210, citing Menechino v.

188

Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (1970).

See The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p.
189

12-13 (Rollo, p. 159).

The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 19

190

(Rollo, p. 162).
191 Id. at 20 (Id. at 163).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 7 (Id. at 156).
194 Rollo, pp. 45, 147, 151.
195The Honor Committee may withdraw its confidence from any Honor
Committee member and officer by: (I) at least 2/3 vote of all its members;
(2) voluntary resignation of the member; or (3) turned back/discharged
disposition. (See The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series
2011, p. 34 [Rollo, p. 170]).
196 Rollo, pp. 326-327, 342.
197 Rollo, pp. 361-362.

The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 25

198

(Rollo, p. 165).

During the CHR hearing, the "Procedure During Formal Investigation,"

199

which was said to be a supplement to the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook, was presented and considered. It provides as follows:

"DELIBERATION

Here, the Committee engages in an open and thorough discussion of the

merits and demerits of the case. The presiding officer then aligns the
different circumstances, mitigating and aggravating and once again present
the evidences to the voting members for examination. After which, the
Presiding Officer will ask the Voting Members if all of them are ready
satisfied and are ready to vote. Just one member (not) ready to vote will
postpone the voting and continue the deliberation until all doubts are
cleared."

Further,

"Voting is done by secret ballots. After deliberation, the blank ballot sheets
are distributed to each of the voting members who then signify his vote by
writing 'Guilty' or 'Not Guilty' and justify why he write the said vote. The
Presiding Officer counts the ballots and announces the result to the
Committee." (Rollo, pp. 485-486)
200 Rollo, pp. 344-345.
201 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (a) and (m).
202The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 4 (Rollo,
p. 155).
203 Id. at 5 (Id. at 155).
204 Rollo, pp. 315-316.
205The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 9 (Rollo,
p. 157).
206 Id. at 9, 12 (Id. at 157, 159).
207 Rollo, pp. 34, 139.
208 Birdwell v. Schlesinger, supra note 101, at 714.

The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 24

209

(Rollo, p. 165).
210 Id. at 22 (Id. at 164).

Feeder Int'l. Line, Pte., ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 1143, 1152-1153
211

(1991).
212 Rollo, p. 472.
213 Id. at 353,356,465.
214 Id. at 465.

Cadet I CL Cudia obtained the following fi11al grades in his subjects on

215

Conduct: Conduct I - 97; Conduct II - 97; Conduct III - 100; Conduct IV –

100; Conduct V - 100; Conduct VI - 100; Conduct VII – 100; Conduct VIII -
99; Conduct IX – 100; Conduct X - 99 and Conduct XI -96 (Rollo, pp.
197-199).
216 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 3d.
217 Rollo, p. 424.
218 See Cody v. Scott, supra note 101, at 1035.

Cited in the subsequent case of Ringgold v. United States, supra note

219

175, at 703.

Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85, at 908, citing White v. Knowlton,

220

361 F. Supp. 445, 449.

221 400 Phil. 904 (2000).
222 G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32
223 G.R. No.100150, January 5, 1994, 229 SCRA 117.
224 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIII, Sec. 18 (l).
225 G .R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SC RA 483.

Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. 7hc Phil. Cement Manufacturers Corp.,

226

478 Phil. 85 (2004); and

Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R.

No. 101476, April 14, 1972, 208 SCRA 125.
226 Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, supra note 222, at 495-496.
227 Rollo, pp. 367-375.
 REQUISITES FOR RECOVER OF DAMAGES

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, 


vs.

CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.


Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia
Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as
next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants,
children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the
defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages
resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to
compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children
begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three
the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon
hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a
decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural
child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month,
with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both
parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part
of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the
decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia
was of the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the
prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in
his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber
shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial
attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of
the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber shop.
Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations
resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor
at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in
February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to
the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:

Saturday, 1:30 p. m.


February 14, 1931

Rev. FATHER,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to
it.

CESAR SYQUIA

The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of
his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on
this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in
the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in
good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.")
might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at
the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made
by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera
to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the
mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was
cared for during confinement.

When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her
mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila,
where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all
household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by
Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and,
when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant
decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that should
here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the
defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused
the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr.,
as was at first planned.

The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to
the padre, quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the
defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of
paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil
Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the
acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of
jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that
it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem
here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not different from
that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already
born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of
identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral
evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description

used in the writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child
now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well
founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are
not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived
which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be
presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end
given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity
as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any
doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H,
and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as
the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then
carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good
appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J)
written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged
her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the
sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment
contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made
in a single document or may be made in more than one document, of
indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point
we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting
together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the
admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in
another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the
note to the padre and the other letters suffice to connect that admission
with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no
requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any
particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be
indubitable.

The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial
court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case
should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2
of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in
our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we
may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the
defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must
be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second
point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied
a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the
defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia
became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's
head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must
be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the
period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to
concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and
child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word
"continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean
that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not
be of an intermittent character while it continues.

What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's
appeal. With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion
that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff,
Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is
not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain
such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby,
Pacita Loanco.

Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to

the amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael
Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions
change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order
as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.

The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So

ordered.

Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the

defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia has expressly acknowledged his
paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and
secondly, that said child has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural son of said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, justified
by his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.

The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.

Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-

appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as follows:
 Sabado, 1.30 p. m. — 14 febrero, 1931

Rev. PADRE:

La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se

de a la criatura.

(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA

Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-

appellant Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-appellee Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the
birth of the child contain the following expressions:

Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el
de junior tambien no lo manches. A cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y
por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."

Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."

Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y
come tu mucho. ... ."

Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."

Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in
the following cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his

paternity, is in existence.

Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said
article, says:

Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca

de si es posible admitir por otro medio la prueba de la paternidad natural.
Entendemos que no, porquel el articulo es terminante y la intencion de la
ley mas terminante aun. Se establecio en la base 5.a que "no se admitira investigacion
de la paternidad sino en los casos de delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que conste su voluntad
indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion de
estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.
No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al
reconocimiento de un hijo natural, aunque solo se limite a pedir alimentos,
si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho por escrito,
en la posesion constante de estado de hijo natural o en sentencia firme
recaida en causa por de delito violacin, estupro o rapto. El escrito y la
sentencia habran de acompañarse a la demandada, y no puede admitirse
otra prueba que la conducente a justificar que el escrito es
indubitadamente del padre que en el reconozca su paternidad, o la relativa
a los actos directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que demuestren la
posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de estos dos hechos
podran utilizarse todos los medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Civil, debiendo el juez rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija
a la investigacion de la paternidad.

xxx xxx xxx

En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase

presente que no basta hacerlo por incidencia; es indespensable que se
consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del padre,
de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con este fin,
como se ordena an la base 5.a antes citada, de las aprobadas por la Ley de 11 de mayo de 1888; de
suerte que el escrito, aunque contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objecto
el reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que
incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una
persona el titulo y tratamiento de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso decidiran los un modo
suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira de base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la posesion
contante del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo, y con arreglo a su numero 2.º

Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity
(Borres and Barza vs. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil., 643; Donado vs.
Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are
those established in article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of
which is that the father may be compelled to acknowledge his paternity,
"When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly
acknowledge his paternity." The writing that is required by said provision
must be complete in itself and by itself, and must contain all the statements
that are necessary to constitute a full and clear acknowledgment by a
father of his paternity of a child, in order that it may serve as a basis for
compelling him to acknowledge said child should be afterwards deny his
paternity. If several writings put together, each not being complete in itself,
should be necessary in order to obtain a full and complete expression of
acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, the general
prohibition to investigate paternity would be violated.
By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and
the others to the herein plaintiff-appellee, Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader
cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June", which the
defendant- appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to the
priest is his, nor who is the "junior" that he recommends to said Antonia L.
de Jesus to take good care of, as there is nothing in anyone of said letters
from which it may be inferred that Antonia L. de Jesus was enciente at the
time, that the "junior" was the being she was carrying in her womb, and that
it was the "creature that is coming in June." To connect all these facts it
was necessary to prove that Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with
Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such relations the woman became
pregnant, and that she gave birth to a boy in June 1931. All this certainly
constitutes an investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child
outside of the documents, which is prohibited by law.

Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J,

Exhibit C is insufficient to constitute a "indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia,
in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael
Loanco," as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.

As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article

135 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in
the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of
a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father
himself or that of his family.

The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits
C, F, G, H, and J and the following facts, as found by the lower court in its
decision:

Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el

demandado Cesar Syquia llamo a su comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano
Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en la Ciudad de
Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto llevo a la
demandante Antonia L. de Jesus acompañado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital
San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de 1931
asistida por dicho Dr. Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento
Exhibit E.

Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado

estuvo viviendo con este y con la demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la
casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila, entregando a dicha
demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del consumo de
gas y luz electrica, habiendo firmado el contrato para el suministro del
fluido electrico en dicha casa.

Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of

showing that Ismael Loanco has enjoyed the continuous possession of the
status of a natural child, because being of prior date to the birth of said
child they can not be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing
possession of the status of natural child, as no human being can enjoy
such possession until he be born with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights
(Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738; Granados vs. Leynes, G.R. No. 31224,
promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).

It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be
given to the child Ismael when it was baptized, so that the name of its
mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.

The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the
testimony of the witnesses during the trial, are not sufficient to constitute
the uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural
child of said Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:

In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:

. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don

Telesforo, we find that he visited the mother of the plaintiff; that he paid
money for her support; that he paid money for the support of the plaintiff;
that he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son; that the plaintiff
called him "Papa," and that Don Telesforo answered to this designation;
that when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he kissed his hand; that Don
Telesforo wrote letters to him; that he paid his fees for instruction in school,
and secured him a position in a commercial house.

xxx xxx xxx

All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff
possesses continuously the status of a natural child. They may have a
tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child, but that it
is not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the child as his.
By the express terms of article 135 that recognition must appear either in
writing, made by the father, or it must appear in acts which show that the
son has possessed continuously the status of a natural child. No
recognition by the father of the child which comes short of the requirements
of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must appear that it was the intention
of the father to recognize the child as to give him that status, and that the
acts performed by him were done with that intention.

Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain says:

En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la

posesion de estado de hijo natural se requiere que los actos sean de tal
naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la paternidad, la
voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en las relaciones
sociales y de la vida, y esto no accidentalmente, sino continuedamente,
porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo valor que el
reconocimiento expreso. lawphil.net

En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que

estima que el hecho de que dos nodrizas criaron a otros tantos niños,
sufragando el gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa de la
demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los mismos el
mayor cuidado; el de que subvenia a las necesidades de la madre y de los
seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se llamaba como el
padre; y el de que los porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que
el finado visitaba a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha familia que tenia y era
tenido en el concepto publico como padre de los menores, no son
suficientes para fundar la declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal
confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o
convencimiento en que una persona este de su paternidad con relacion a
hijos naturales, con los que demuestren su proposito de poner a estos
hijos en la posesion de tal estado.

It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the
herein defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia cannot be compelled to
acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there
exists not an indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges
his paternity of said child, and because the said child has not enjoyed the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the said 

defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as
required by article 135 of the Civil Code.

The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the

complaint dismissed.

Avanceña, C.J. and Imperial, J., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA,

SR., PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners, 

vs.

HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION), EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed
PEREZ, respondents.

Romulo A. Deles for petitioner.

Jose Valmayor for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

A joint decision was rendered in CAR Case Nos. 827, 828 and 829 of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations stationed in San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental) because the six plaintiffs who are the petitioners at bar all
alleged that they are share tenants of the defendants; that the defendants
diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of
their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and prejudice: and that
they were told by the defendants' overseer to vacate their respective areas
for they could not plant palay any longer due to lack of water. They prayed
that they be declared as leasehold tenants and that the defendants be
ordered to pay attorney's fees and different kinds of damages.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as follows:

WHEREFORE, coherent with the foregoing, this Court, in judgment,

hereby:

1) Declares all the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases to be maintained as

agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings;
2) Prohibits defendants from closing and/or disrupting the free flow of water
supplying plaintiffs' landholdings;

3) Declares the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 23, 1982

to be permanent;

4) Orders plaintiffs to seek the assistance of the Ministry of Agrarian

Reforms in the fixing of their lease rentals;

5) Orders the defendants to pay all the six plaintiffs in the above-entitled
cases individually moral and exemplary damages in the sum of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, each;

6) Orders the defendants to pay the attorney's fees in the amount of

P5,000.00; and

7) Dismiss all other claims and counterclaims of the parties for lack of merit
(Rollo, pp. 28-29.)

The defendants appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which in turn

rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, deleting the award of

moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against
appellants. (Rollo, pp. 37-38.)

In this petition, the prayer is for the reinstatement of the moral and
exemplary damages and the attorney's fees which had been awarded by
the trial court on the ground that the Intermediate Appellate Court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in eliminating them.

In awarding damages and attorney's fees, the trial court said:

This Court has likewise noted the manifestation submitted by plaintiffs on

June 3, 1982 wherein they have attached photographs of their dried-up
landholdings and wilted palay crops. The allegations in this pleading and
the accompanying pictures were never rebutted by the defendants.

In view of this circumstances, this Court holds the opinion that between the
period of the inspection by the PC Team on February 24, 1982 and June
13, 1982 when plaintiffs' manifestation was filed, there has been complete
closure of water supplying plaintiffs' landholdings which resulted to the
drying up of the same that greatly hampered the healthy growth of the
palay crop. This Court does not believe that the disruption of the water
supply which led to the very poor harvest is due to the fault/negligence of
the plaintiffs.

Under the law, the landowner has an obligation to keep the tenant in the
peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. A disturbance of
possession, such as the act complained of, is violative of the law.

The Honorable Court of Appeals, thru Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, in

June 23, 1982, promulgated a decision in the case of Buenaventura
Garcia, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Eduardo Jalandoni, Salud Garcia and
Chester Garcia, defendant-appellees, which ruling is relevant to the above-
entitled cases when the said Honorable Court state:

The law forbids the use of tenants like balls on a pool table, whacked and
volleyed and pocketed at the whim and caprice of the player, or their
positions placed on the auction block like slaves to be sold to the highest
bidder. Such a calamitous situation erode wholehearted dedication to the
soil; it is destructive of the system itself, as such an attitude takes away the
freedom the emancipated tenants won under the aegis of the New
Republic.

The plaintiff-appellant is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00

and exemplary damages in the further sum of P5,000.00 to be paid by
defendant Eduardo Jalandoni. Let this be a warning to those who flout the
lofty purpose of the agrarian reform program.

Plaintiffs have all their legal rights to protect their interests under the law in
filing these cases, for what the defendants have done to them, and as such
they are entitled attorney's fees. (Rollo, pp. 27-28.)

Upon the other hand, in deleting the questioned award the Intermediate
Appellate Court said:

However, We are not inclined to sustain the award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees. There is no evidence showing that, in
dealing with plaintiffs, defendants acted fraudulently or in bad faith. There is
no showing either that attorney's fees are recoverable under Art: 2208, Civil
Code. (Rollo, P. 37.)

Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs (now petitioners) are entitled to a
measure of moral damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the
award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same code
and the latter stipulates that: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

It appears that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots
in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated
the plaintiffs' rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified
diversion of the water.

The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the

defendants acted in an oppressive manner. (See Art. 2232. Civil Code.)

It follows from the foregoing that the petitioners are also entitled to
attorney's fees but the size of the fees as well as the damages is subject to
the sound discretion of the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the decision under review is

modified and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to the following to be paid by
the defendants jointly and severally:

Moral damages — P1,000.00

Exemplarly damages — 500.00

Attorney's fees — 1,000.00


P2,500.00

The costs shall be assessed against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman) Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Cuevas JJ.,

concur.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD dIVISION

G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988

JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner, 


vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA
DELMO (as private respondents), respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas College liable for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.

The facts are not disputed.

An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some

students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo
as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of
the club to some of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims that
the said act of extending loans was against school rules and regulations.
Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo
informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club
and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the
school.

Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied
it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of
Public Schools.

The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966
which provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal
officers of this Office disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the
treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student
organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution and By-
Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to
disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and other
humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with said resolution and as
treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers and
members of the Club upon proper application duly approved by the majority
of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon receiving the report
from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that Office
conducted an investigation on the matter and having been convinced of the
guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and members of the Club, that
Office rendered the order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's
order or decision, it is contended that approval by that Office of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its effectivity and
validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the Club had no
valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence, Resolution No.
2 which was passed based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without any
force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to
some officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal (sic),
hence, she and the other students involved are deemed guilty of
misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other hand, Raclito
Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and
Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its
Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that
pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the
members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which resolution
became the basis for the extension on of loans to some officers and
members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its Constitution
and By-Laws has been approved by the superintendent because the
adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the Club
that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the
Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to office on
October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise
allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.

After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by
the Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the
officers and members thereof by dropping them from membership therein.
However, this Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good
faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers
and members of the Student partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing
the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in need of financial
assistance and other humanitarian purposes had been approved by the
Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given
in his capacity as adviser of the Club and extension of the Superintendent's
personality. Aside from misleading the officers and members of the Club,
Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the Superintendent for approval
despite his assurance to the Club president that he would do so. With this
finding of negligence on the part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in
the performance of his duties as such, this Office considers as too severe
and unwarranted that portion of the questioned order stating that Violeta
Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation from this school
or any organization in this school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a
consistent full scholar of the school and she alone has maintained her
scholarship. The decision in question would, therefore, set at naught all her
sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors in this year's
commencement exercises.

In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby
directs that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club
members or officers involved in this case, be not deprived of any award,
citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto.
(Rollo, pp. 28-30)

On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the
Director and all the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner
received a telegram stating the following:

"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"

The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner
allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision
back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the
decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.

The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director
order him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in
turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent
the decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof..

On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another
telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors
due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the
program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a
plain student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum
Laude.

To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the
Director for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because he believed
that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director
denied the petitioner's request.

On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school
to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum
Laude."

On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag
action for damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the
action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and
Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only
heirs.

The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in
favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:

Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith.

Per investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino
of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the defendant who
inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In
fact the Club was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
(Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not approve of the constitution and by-laws
of the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and allow the Club to
sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was through his own act that
the students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the defendants
tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club
Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting as an extension
of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that,
although, he kaew as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino,
Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id
information to . He told the Court that he knew that the letter of Director
Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but
she (sic) says that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit
"L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb.
5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be true that he
has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L," because said letter
consisted of only three pages, and the portion which directed that Miss
Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if
otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How
did he know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.

Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias
and prejudice. When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and
aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus, although,
as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss Delino by
Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is
eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966,
Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the
Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the decision,
since he said he mailed back the decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night
letter on April 29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter that he
had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the record. Why a night
letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the case,
because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination of the
telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary
telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if the
defendant could not furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss
Delmo, he should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and
citation in the commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr.
Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is
home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his decision to
deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by Director
Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that
she did not deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized
supplied). Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant
received hours before the commencement executory on May 3-4,1966, he
did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony that he
would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only
his embarrassment and not that of r Bernardino whose order was being
flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by bim And certainly, not the least of
Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho bad faith
and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been
challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of

contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of
it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o and instead, chose to feign
ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).

The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and
P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal
damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and
P2,000.00 attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the
New Civil Code.

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should
be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a
painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty
and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed
in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA
440, 448):

There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering,

mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or
omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission
to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to
furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was
nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could
have done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966
and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he
undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages.
Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr.
Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the
decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the
attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its
decision, to wit:

Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of
the decision, he could have used his discretion and plain common sense by
informing her about it or he could have directed the inclusion of Miss
Delmo's honor in the printed commencement program or announced it
during the commencement exercises.

Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino

hours before the commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed
his superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss Delmo with a lame
excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and
in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.

Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico
Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in
his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment and humiliation.

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection

and due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the
scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his
superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his
personal capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)

Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In

the same case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at
p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et
al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).

However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo

damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity,
separately from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as sole
heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar
as moral damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of

the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in
the preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.]

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, Petitioner, v. ROMEO A. JADER, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student
into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when
such is not the case? This is the issue in the instant petition for review premised on
the following undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals (CA), 1 to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants’ College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In
the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the
regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete
grade (Exhibits ‘2’, also Exhibit ‘H’). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth
year law student (Exhibit ‘A’) and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the
removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits
‘H-2’, also Exhibit ‘2’) which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May
30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5).
(Exhibits ‘H-4’, also Exhibits ‘2-L’, ‘2-N’). chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red

"In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to
deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate.
The plaintiff’s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for
the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the
following annotation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"JADER ROMEO A.

Def. Conflict of Laws - x-1-87-88, Practice Court I - Inc., 1-87-88. C-1 to submit
transcript with S.O. (Exhibits ‘3’, ‘3-C-1’, ‘3-C-2’)." cralaw virtua1aw library

"The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of

Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared
as one of the candidates. (Exhibits ‘B’, ‘B-6’, ‘B-6-A’). At the foot of the list of the
names of the candidates there appeared however the following annotation: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘This is a tentative list. Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as
approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit ‘B-7-A’).

"The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E.,
Recto Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name
was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in
placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was
thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the
Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the occasion (Exhibits ‘C’ to ‘C-6’, ‘D-3’
to ‘D-11’).

"He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and
relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were
pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits ‘D’ to ‘D-1’).

"He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of
absence without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988
(Exhibit ‘G’) and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University
(Exhibits ‘F’ to ‘F-2’). Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class
and was not able to take the bar examination." 2

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered

moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations arising from the latter’s negligence. He prayed for an award of moral
and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it
never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor
of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal
rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

Defendant’s counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 3

which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with
modification. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court’s Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum
adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay
plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral
damages. Costs against Defendant-Appellee.

SO ORDERED. 4

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to
this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that
it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his own
negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal
exam. chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red

The petition lacks merit.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of

education is entered into between said institution and the student. The professors,
teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school’s commitment under the contract.
Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-
bound to deal with the former’s agents, such as the professors with respect to the
status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or
students from sharing with each other such information. The Court takes judicial
notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor
directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of
the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and
every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included
among those who will graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a
formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is
the educational institution’s way of announcing to the whole world that the students
included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate
ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent
to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of
any problem involving the latter’s grades and performance and also most
importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal

examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for
the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith
must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party
in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an
honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though
the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information
or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. 5 It is the school
that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its
professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to
the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise
control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its
affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their
compliance with the school’s rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is
the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the
professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students’
standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control
over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury. 6

The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic
program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and
student services. 7 He must see to it that his own professors and teachers,
regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the
rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the
rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student’s grade, is not
only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.

Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university

which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its
students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code which states: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.

ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. chanrobles.com.ph:red

Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. 8 In civilized society, men must be
able to assume that others will do them no intended injury – that others will
commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral
sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general
course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is
justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. 9 Schools and professors
cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the
latter, the former are useless.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic

status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious
indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be
affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. 10 Want of care to
the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of
the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.
11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance
of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that
respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because
a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the
submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner’s liability arose from its
failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in
misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the
course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent court: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee

University had been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice
Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not
inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree
nor did they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation.
Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant
failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant’s name in the "tentative"
list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the deliberation and
which became the basis for the commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson
reasons out that plaintiff-appellant’s name was allowed to remain in the tentative
list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to
remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean
Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff-appellant Jader could have done
something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not exert
any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I." 12

Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence
that led to the delayed relay of information to Respondent. When one of two
innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear
it. 13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there
is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. 14 If mere fault or negligence in
one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. 15

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for
the latter’s actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded
moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ findings that
respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could
not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law
student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his
affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered
untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review
classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed
humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not
verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before
preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations
does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also
prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and the costs of the
suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

Endnotes:

1. Court of Appeals (CA) Decision promulgated October 10, 1997 penned by Justice
Barcelona, with Justices Mabutas, Jr. and Aquino, concurring, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp.
12-13.

2. A check with the Attorney’s List in the Court shows that private respondent is not
a member of the Philippine Bar. (http.//www.supremecourt.gov.ph)

3. Decision of Regional Trial Court (RTC-Manila Branch IX) dated September 4, 1990
penned by Judge Edilberto Sandoval, pp. 8-9; RTC Records, pp. 192-193; Rollo, pp.
8-9.

4. CA Decision, p. 24; Rollo, p. 31.

5. Tolentino, New Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, (1960 ed.) citing Wood v.
Conrad, 2, S.B. 83, 50 N.W. 95.

6. Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co. (Minn) 344 NW2d 856. See also Jackson v. H.H.
Robertson Co., 118 Ariz 29, 574 P2d 82; Cummins v. West Linn, 21 Or. App 643,
536 P2d 455.

7. Hawes and Hawes, "The Concise Dictionary of Education," p. 62, 1982 ed. cited
in Sarmiento, Manual, p. 164.

8. PNB v. CA, 83 SCRA 237 (1978) cited in Sea Commercial Company v. CA, G.R.
No. 122823, November 25, 1999.
9. Dean Roscoe Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law.

10. Texas Pacific & Oil Co. v. Robertson, 125 Tex 4, 79 SW2d 830, 98 ALR 262.

11. See Helms v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., (CA5 Tex) 202 F2d 421 cert de 346
US 858, 98 L ed 372, 74 S Ct 74; Otto Kuehne Preserving Co. v. Allen (CA8 Mo)
148 F 166; See also Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala 514, 9 So 722; Richmond &
P.R. Co. v. Vance, 93 Ala 144, 9 So 574.

12. CA Decision, pp. 222-23; Rollo, pp. 29-30.

13. Ohio Farmers, Ins. Co. v. Norman, (App) 122 Ariz 330, 594 P2d 1026.

14. Sea Commercial Company v. CA, G.R. No. 122823, November 25, 1999.

15. Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., Vol. I, p. 61.

 PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133179 March 27, 2008

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, 


vs.

LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., and
PRODUCERS BANK, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

To ingratiate themselves to their valued depositors, some banks at times

bend over backwards that they unwittingly expose themselves to great
risks.

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse the
Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision promulgated on March 18, 19981 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 46290 entitled Lim Sio Wan v. Allied Banking Corporation, et
al. The CA Decision modified the Decision dated November 15, 19932 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 in Makati City rendered in Civil
Case No. 6757.

The Facts

The facts as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA are as follows:

On November 14, 1983, respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with petitioner
Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) at its Quintin Paredes Branch in Manila
a money market placement of PhP 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days to
mature on December 15, 1983,3 as evidenced by Provisional Receipt No.
1356 dated November 14, 1983.4
On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up
Cristina So, an officer of Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate
Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement, to issue a manager’s check
representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to one
Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the check.5 Lim Sio Wan
described the appearance of Santos so that So could easily identify her.6

Later, Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a
manager’s check to be issued.7 The bank issued Manager’s Check No.
035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49, representing the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s
money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee.8 The
check was cross-checked "For Payee’s Account Only" and given to Santos.
9

Thereafter, the manager’s check was deposited in the account of Filipinas

Cement Corporation (FCC) at respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank),10 with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser.11

Earlier, on September 21, 1983, FCC had deposited a money market

placement for PhP 2 million with respondent Producers Bank. Santos was
the money market trader assigned to handle FCC’s account.12 Such deposit
is evidenced by Official Receipt No. 31756813 and a Letter dated
September 21, 1983 of Santos addressed to Angie Lazo of FCC,
acknowledging receipt of the placement.14 The placement matured on
October 25, 1983 and was rolled-over until December 5, 1983 as
evidenced by a Letter dated October 25, 1983.15 When the placement
matured, FCC demanded the payment of the proceeds of the placement.
16 On December 5, 1983, the same date that So received the phone call

instructing her to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s placement, the manager’s

check in the name of Lim Sio Wan was deposited in the account of FCC,
purportedly representing the proceeds of FCC’s money market placement
with Producers Bank.17 In other words, the Allied check was deposited with
Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Bank’s payment of its
obligation to FCC.

To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the

Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations,
Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads: "All prior
endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed."18
The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Upon the presentment of
the check, Allied funded the check even without checking the authenticity of
Lim Sio Wan’s purported indorsement. Thus, the amount on the face of the
check was credited to the account of FCC.19

On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money
market placement to mature on January 9, 1984.20

On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date of the first money market
placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it.21 She was then
informed that the placement had been pre-terminated upon her
instructions. She denied giving any instructions and receiving the proceeds
thereof. She desisted from further complaints when she was assured by the
bank’s manager that her money would be recovered.22

When Lim Sio Wan’s second placement matured on January 9, 1984, So

called Lim Sio Wan to ask for the latter’s instructions on the second
placement. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll-over the placement for
another 30 days.23On January 24, 1984, Lim Sio Wan, realizing that the
promise that her money would be recovered would not materialize, sent a
demand letter to Allied asking for the payment of the first placement.
24 Allied refused to pay Lim Sio Wan, claiming that the latter had authorized

the pre-termination of the placement and its subsequent release to Santos.

25

Consequently, Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC a Complaint dated February
13, 198426 docketed as Civil Case No. 6757 against Allied to recover the
proceeds of her first money market placement. Sometime in February
1984, she withdrew her second placement from Allied.

Allied filed a third party complaint27 against Metrobank and Santos. In turn,
Metrobank filed a fourth party complaint28 against FCC. FCC for its part
filed a fifth party complaint29 against Producers Bank. Summonses were
duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was no longer
connected with Producers Bank.30

On May 15, 1984, or more than six (6) months after funding the check,
Allied informed Metrobank that the signature on the check was forged.
31 Thus, Metrobank withheld the amount represented by the check from

FCC. Later on, Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC after the
latter executed an Undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it
was made to reimburse the amount.32

Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include Metrobank

as a party-defendant, along with Allied.33The RTC admitted the amended
complaint despite the opposition of Metrobank.34 Consequently, Allied’s
third party complaint against Metrobank was converted into a cross-claim
and the latter’s fourth party complaint against FCC was converted into a
third party complaint.35

After trial, the RTC issued its Decision, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering defendant Allied Banking Corporation to pay plaintiff the

amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16,
1984 until fully paid;

2. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of

P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;

3. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of

P173,792.20 by way of attorney’s fees; and,

4. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay the costs of suit.

Defendant Allied Bank’s cross-claim against defendant Metrobank is

DISMISSED.

Likewise defendant Metrobank’s third-party complaint as against Filipinas

Cement Corporation is DISMISSED.

Filipinas Cement Corporation’s fourth-party complaint against Producer’s

Bank is also DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.36

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

Allied appealed to the CA, which in turn issued the assailed Decision on
March 18, 1998, modifying the RTC Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing defendant-
appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent and
defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of
the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16,
1984 until fully paid. The moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit
adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking
Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
in the same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.37

Hence, Allied filed the instant petition.

The Issues

Allied raises the following issues for our consideration:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Lim Sio Wan did not
authorize [Allied] to pre-terminate the initial placement and to deliver the
check to Deborah Santos.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in absolving Producers Bank of any

liability for the reimbursement of amount adjudged demandable.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding [Allied] liable to the extent
of 60% of amount adjudged demandable in clear disregard to the ultimate
liability of Metrobank as guarantor of all endorsement on the check, it being
the collecting bank.38

The petition is partly meritorious.

A Question of Fact

Allied questions the finding of both the trial and appellate courts that Allied
was not authorized to release the proceeds of Lim Sio Wan’s money
market placement to Santos. Allied clearly raises a question of fact. When
the CA affirms the findings of fact of the RTC, the factual findings of both
courts are binding on this Court.39
We also agree with the CA when it said that it could not disturb the trial
court’s findings on the credibility of witness So inasmuch as it was the trial
court that heard the witness and had the opportunity to observe closely her
deportment and manner of testifying. Unless the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value, which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case,40 we find it best to defer to the trial court on matters
pertaining to credibility of witnesses.

Additionally, this Court has held that the matter of negligence is also a
factual question.41 Thus, the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, that the
respective parties were negligent in the exercise of their obligations is also
conclusive upon this Court.

The Liability of the Parties

As to the liability of the parties, we find that Allied is liable to Lim Sio Wan.
Fundamental and familiar is the doctrine that the relationship between a
bank and a client is one of debtor-creditor.

Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible
thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an
equal amount of the same kind and quality.

Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and
similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple
loan.

Thus, we have ruled in a line of cases that a bank deposit is in the nature of
a simple loan or mutuum.42 More succinctly, in Citibank, N.A. (Formerly
First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, this Court ruled that a money
market placement is a simple loan or mutuum.43 Further, we defined a
money market in Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, as follows:

[A] money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term

credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers
do not deal directly with each other but through a middle man or dealer in
open market. In a money market transaction, the investor is a lender who
loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer.
In the case at bar, the money market transaction between the petitioner
and the private respondent is in the nature of a loan.44

Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement, is
entitled to payment upon her request, or upon maturity of the placement, or
until the bank is released from its obligation as debtor. Until any such event,
the obligation of Allied to Lim Sio Wan remains unextinguished.

Art. 1231 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when obligations are
considered extinguished, thus:

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;

(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;

(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;

(5) By compensation;

(6) By novation.

Other causes of extinguishment of obligations, such as annulment,

rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, and prescription, are
governed elsewhere in this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that Lim Sio Wan
did not authorize the release of her money market placement to Santos and
the bank had been negligent in so doing, there is no question that the
obligation of Allied to pay Lim Sio Wan had not been extinguished. Art.
1240 of the Code states that "payment shall be made to the person in
whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in
interest, or any person authorized to receive it." As commented by Arturo
Tolentino:

Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the
obligation as to the creditor, if there is no fault or negligence which can be
imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted in utmost good faith and
by mistake as to the person of his creditor, or through error induced by the
fraud of a third person, the payment to one who is not in fact his creditor, or
authorized to receive such payment, is void, except as provided in Article
1241. Such payment does not prejudice the creditor, and accrual of interest
is not suspended by it.45 (Emphasis supplied.)

Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio Wan’s money market
placement, the bank still has an obligation to pay her at six percent (6%)
interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment thereof.

We cannot, however, say outright that Allied is solely liable to Lim Sio Wan.

Allied claims that Metrobank is the proximate cause of the loss of Lim Sio
Wan’s money. It points out that Metrobank guaranteed all prior
indorsements inscribed on the manager’s check, and without Metrobank’s
guarantee, the present controversy would never have occurred. According
to Allied:

Failure on the part of the collecting bank to ensure that the proceeds of the
check is paid to the proper party is, aside from being an efficient
intervening cause, also the last negligent act, x x x contributory to the injury
caused in the present case, which thereby leads to the conclusion that it is
the collecting bank, Metrobank that is the proximate cause of the alleged
loss of the plaintiff in the instant case.46

We are not persuaded.

Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the result would not have occurred."47 Thus, there is an
efficient supervening event if the event breaks the sequence leading from
the cause to the ultimate result. To determine the proximate cause of a
controversy, the question that needs to be asked is: If the event did not
happen, would the injury have resulted? If the answer is NO, then the event
is the proximate cause.

In the instant case, Allied avers that even if it had not issued the check
payment, the money represented by the check would still be lost because
of Metrobank’s negligence in indorsing the check without verifying the
genuineness of the indorsement thereon.
Section 66 in relation to Sec. 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
provides:

Section 66. Liability of general indorser.—Every indorser who indorses

without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course;

a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the
next preceding section; and

b) That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and

subsisting;

And in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted

or paid, or both, as the case may be according to its tenor, and that if it be
dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he
will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser
who may be compelled to pay it.

Section 65. Warranty where negotiation by delivery, so forth.—Every

person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement,
warrants:

a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;

b) That he has a good title of it;

c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract;

d) That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of
the instrument or render it valueless.

But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor
of no holder other than the immediate transferee.

The provisions of subdivision (c) of this section do not apply to persons

negotiating public or corporation securities, other than bills and notes.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The warranty "that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it
purports to be" covers all the defects in the instrument affecting the validity
thereof, including a forged indorsement. Thus, the last indorser will be
liable for the amount indicated in the negotiable instrument even if a
previous indorsement was forged. We held in a line of cases that "a
collecting bank which indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and
presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including
the forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should be held liable
therefor."48

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions. One such exception is

when the issuance of the check itself was attended with negligence. Thus,
in the cases cited above where the collecting bank is generally held liable,
in two of the cases where the checks were negligently issued, this Court
held the institution issuing the check just as liable as or more liable than the
collecting bank.

In isolated cases where the checks were deposited in an account other

than that of the payees on the strength of forged indorsements, we held the
collecting bank solely liable for the whole amount of the checks involved for
having indorsed the same. In Republic Bank v. Ebrada,49 the check was
properly issued by the Bureau of Treasury. While in Banco de Oro Savings
and Mortgage Bank (Banco de Oro) v. Equitable Banking Corporation,
50 Banco de Oro admittedly issued the checks in the name of the correct

payees. And in Traders Royal Bank v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.,51 the
checks were issued at the request of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. from
Traders Royal Bank. 1avvphi1

However, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, we said that

the drawee bank is liable for 60% of the amount on the face of the
negotiable instrument and the collecting bank is liable for 40%. We also
noted the relative negligence exhibited by two banks, to wit:

Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their

employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an
impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was the
gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the
fraud and the subsequent loss. While it is true that petitioner BPI’s
negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, respondent
CBC’s negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in
encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances,
we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent
CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the
courts. (See Phoenix Construction Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Courts,
148 SCRA 353 [1987]).

Considering the comparative negligence of the two (2) banks, we rule that
the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the loss of
P2,413,215.16 and the costs of the arbitration proceeding in the amount of
P7,250.00 and the cost of litigation on a 60-40 ratio.52

Similarly, we ruled in Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals that the issuing

institution and the collecting bank should equally share the liability for the
loss of amount represented by the checks concerned due to the negligence
of both parties:

The Court finds as reasonable, the proportionate sharing of fifty percent-

fifty percent (50%-50%). Due to the negligence of the Province of Tarlac in
releasing the checks to an unauthorized person (Fausto Pangilinan), in
allowing the retired hospital cashier to receive the checks for the payee
hospital for a period close to three years and in not properly ascertaining
why the retired hospital cashier was collecting checks for the payee
hospital in addition to the hospital’s real cashier, respondent Province
contributed to the loss amounting to P203,300.00 and shall be liable to the
PNB for fifty (50%) percent thereof. In effect, the Province of Tarlac can
only recover fifty percent (50%) of P203,300.00 from PNB.

The collecting bank, Associated Bank, shall be liable to PNB for fifty (50%)
percent of P203,300.00. It is liable on its warranties as indorser of the
checks which were deposited by Fausto Pangilinan, having guaranteed the
genuineness of all prior indorsements, including that of the chief of the
payee hospital, Dr. Adena Canlas. Associated Bank was also remiss in its
duty to ascertain the genuineness of the payee’s indorsement.53

A reading of the facts of the two immediately preceding cases would reveal
that the reason why the bank or institution which issued the check was held
partially liable for the amount of the check was because of the negligence
of these parties which resulted in the issuance of the checks.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly found Allied negligent in issuing
the manager’s check and in transmitting it to Santos without even a written
authorization.54 In fact, Allied did not even ask for the certificate evidencing
the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her residence or
office to confirm her instructions. Both actions could have prevented the
whole fraudulent transaction from unfolding. Allied’s negligence must be
considered as the proximate cause of the resulting loss.

To reiterate, had Allied exercised the diligence due from a financial

institution, the check would not have been issued and no loss of funds
would have resulted. In fact, there would have been no issuance of
indorsement had there been no check in the first place.

The liability of Allied, however, is concurrent with that of Metrobank as the

last indorser of the check. When Metrobank indorsed the check in
compliance with the PCHC Rules and Regulations55 without verifying the
authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement and when it accepted the check
despite the fact that it was cross-checked payable to payee’s account only,
56 its negligent and cavalier indorsement contributed to the easier release of

Lim Sio Wan’s money and perpetuation of the fraud. Given the relative
participation of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both banks cannot
be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of the liabilities of
Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be upheld.

FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in the

forgery of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement, can raise the real defense of forgery
as against both banks.57

As to Producers Bank, Allied Bank’s argument that Producers Bank must

be held liable as employer of Santos under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is
erroneous. Art. 2180 pertains to the vicarious liability of an employer for
quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does
not apply to civil liability arising from delict.

One also cannot apply the principle of subsidiary liability in Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code in the instant case. Such liability on the part of the
employer for the civil aspect of the criminal act of the employee is based on
the conviction of the employee for a crime. Here, there has been no
conviction for any crime.

As to the claim that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Producers
Bank, the same is correct. Allied correctly claims in its petition that
Producers Bank should reimburse Allied for whatever judgment that may be
rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the Civil Code, which provides:
"Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him."
1avvphi1

The above provision of law was clarified in Reyes v. Lim, where we ruled
that "[t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to
the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."58

In Tamio v. Ticson, we further clarified the principle of unjust enrichment,

thus: "Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another."59

In the instant case, Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in Allied Bank
was pre-terminated and withdrawn without her consent. Moreover, the
proceeds of the placement were deposited in Producers Bank’s account in
Metrobank without any justification. In other words, there is no reason that
the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans’ placement should be deposited in FCC’s
account purportedly as payment for FCC’s money market placement and
interest in Producers Bank. With such payment, Producers Bank’s
lavvphil

indebtedness to FCC was extinguished, thereby benefitting the former.

Clearly, Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio
Wan. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, Producers Bank
should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts the two latter
banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan.

It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be
considered as having been unjustly enriched. It must be remembered that
FCC’s money market placement with Producers Bank was already due and
demandable; thus, Producers Bank’s payment thereof was justified. FCC
was entitled to such payment. As earlier stated, the fact that the
indorsement on the check was forged cannot be raised against FCC which
was not a part in any stage of the negotiation of the check. FCC was not
unjustly enriched.

From the facts of the instant case, we see that Santos could be the
architect of the entire controversy. Unfortunately, since summons had not
been served on Santos, the courts have not acquired jurisdiction over her.
60 We, therefore, cannot ascribe to her liability in the instant case.
Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the
amount of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit which Allied and Metrobank are adjudged
to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 18, 1998 CA

Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 and the November 15, 1993 RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 6757 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Thus, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED, the fallo of which is reproduced, as

follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is

MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing defendant-
appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent and
defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of
the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16,
1984 until fully paid. The moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit
adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking
Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
in the same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Additionally and by way of MODIFICATION, Producers Bank is hereby

ordered to pay Allied and Metrobank the aforementioned amounts. The
liabilities of the parties are concurrent and independent of each other.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson
 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO*

Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Additional member as per Special Order No. 494 dated March 3, 2008.
1 Rollo, pp. 52-72. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro
(Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez,
Jr. and Rodrigo V. Cosico.
2 Id. at 73-81.
3 Records, p. 1294. TSN, February 27, 1991, p. 5.
4 Exhibit "A," Exhibits Folder, p. 3.
5 Records, pp. 1294-1295. TSN, February 27, 1991, pp. 5-6.
6 Id. at 1295.
7 Id. at 1296.
8 Id. at 1297.
9 Exhibit "K," "3-Allied," Exhibits Folder.
10 Records, p. 1164. TSN, December 12, 1986, p. 30.
11 Id. at 1165a.
12 Id. at 1237.
13 Id. at 171.
14 Id. at 169.
15 Id. at 172.
16 Id. at 1306. TSN, August 3, 1992, p. 4.
17 Id. at 1308.
18 Exhibit "3-B," Exhibits Folder, p. 1.
19 Records, pp. 1308-1309. TSN, August 3, 1992, pp. 6-7.
20 Id. at 1169. TSN, December 12, 1986, p. 41.
21 Id. at 1165. Id. at 33.
22 Id. at 1170. Id. at 43.
23 Id. at 1300. TSN, February 27, 1991, p. 11.
24 Exhibit "F," Exhibits Folder, p. 7.
25 Records, p. 1171a. TSN, December 12, 1986, p. 46.
26 Id. at 1-6.
27 Id. at 16-25.
28 Id. at 121-139
29 Id. at 146-172.
30 Id. at 40.
31 Rollo, p. 216.
32 Id. at 217.
33 Records, pp. 262-269.
34 Id. at 293.
35 Id. at 295-296.
36 Supra note 2, at 80-81.
37 Supra note 1, at 71.
38 Rollo, pp. 28-29.
39Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109197, 21 June 2001, 359 SCRA 262,
269.
40 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

Pacific Airways v. Tonda, G.R. No. 138478, November 26, 2002, 392
41

SCRA 625, 629.

42Integrated Realty Corp. v. Philippine National Bank, No. L-60705, June
28, 1989, 174 SCRA 295, 309; Serrano v. Central Bank of the Philippines,
No. L-30511, February 14, 1980, 96 SCRA 96, 102; and Central Bank of
the Philippines v. Morfe, No. L-38427, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 114, 119.
43 G.R. No. 156132, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 378, 466.
44 G.R. No. 123031, October 12, 1999, 316 SCRA 488, 497.
454 A.M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines 285 (1995).
46 Rollo, p. 41.
47 A.B. Decano, Notes on Torts and Damages 43 (1996).
48Traders Royal Bank v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc., G.R. No. 138510,
October 10, 2002, 390 SCRA 608, 617; Associated Bank v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107382, January 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 620, 633; Bank of
the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102383, November 26,
1992, 216 SCRA 51, 63; Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v.
Equitable Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 74917, January 20, 1988, 157
SCRA 188, 198; Republic Bank v. Ebrada, No. L-40796, July 31, 1975, 65
SCRA 680, 687-688.
49 Supra.
50 Supra.
51 Supra.
52 Supra note 48, at 77.
53 Supra note 48, at 640.
54 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
55 Sec. 17 of the PCHC Rules and Regulations provides:

Sec. 17.—Bank Guarantee. All checks cleared through the PCHC shall
bear the guarantee affixed thereto by the Presenting Bank/Branch which
shall read as follows:

Cleared thru the Philippine Clearing House Corporation all prior

endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed NAME OF BANK/
BRANCH BRSTN (Date of Clearing).

Checks to which said guarantee has not been affixed shall, nevertheless,
be deemed guaranteed by the Presenting Bank as to all prior endorsement
and/or lack of endorsement.

Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89802, May 7, 1992, 208
56

SCRA 465, 469.

57 Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 23.
58 G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003, 408 SCRA 560, 570.
59 G.R. No. 154895, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 44, 53.
60 Supra note 30.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 149984 November 28, 2008

SPOUSES ROLANDO M. ZOSA and LUISA Y. ZOSA,petitioners, 


vs.

HON. SANTIAGO ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67, CHINATRUST (PHILS.) COMMERCIAL
BANK CORPORATION, NOTARY PUBLIC JAIME P. PORTUGAL, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR PASIG CITY, and CHAILEASE FINANCE
CORPORATION,respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 154991 November 28, 2008

SPOUSES ROLANDO M. ZOSA and LUISA Y. ZOSA,petitioners, 


vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO ESTRELLA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67,
CHINATRUST (PHILS.) COMMERCIAL BANK CORPORATION, NOTARY
PUBLIC JAIME P. PORTUGAL FOR PASIG CITY, and CHAILEASE FINANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

The controversy between the parties started in August 1999 when respondent
Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank Corporation (Chinatrust) demanded from
the petitioners the payment of their outstanding loan
totaling P89,426,732.29,1 and, on account of the latter’s failure to pay, extra-
judicially foreclosed the mortgaged real property and its improvements under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18718.2 To keep the respondent notary public
from carrying out the public auction sale of the subject property, petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 67620 for injunction, specific performance, and
damages, with prayer for the issuance of an injunctive relief, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 67.3
In its September 28, 1999 Resolution,4 the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) preventing the respondents from selling the property. It
later issued a writ of preliminary injunction on October 15, 1999.5

Several months after respondent Chinatrust filed its December 9, 1999 Answer,
6 the trial court, on motion of the respondent, dismissed the complaint, on June

26, 2000, for petitioners’ failure to prosecute.7 Thereafter, it issued the August 21,
2000 Clarificatory Order8 stating that, with the dismissal of the case, the writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued had been automatically dissolved. The trial
court, in its November 23, 2000 Omnibus Order,9 further denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioners, on December 4, 2000, filed a Notice of

Appeal10 questioning the June 26, 2000 Order,11 the August 21, 2000 Clarificatory
Order,12 and the November 23, 2000 Omnibus Order13 of the RTC. Their appeal
was consequently docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69892 with the Court of Appeals
(CA).

On January 28, 2001, petitioners also filed with the CA, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus assailing the same Orders14 of the trial court. This was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62915.15

Later, the appellate court, in the assailed June 22, 2001 Decision,16 dismissed for
lack of merit the petition for extraordinary writ in CA-G.R. SP No. 62915.17 It also
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in the further challenged
September 5, 2001 Resolution.18

In the meantime, on August 30, 2001, respondent Chailease Finance

Corporation, the highest bidder in the auction sale, registered in its name the
subject property.19

Subsequently, on May 16, 2002, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69892, rendered the
challenged Resolution20 dismissing petitioners’ appeal for forum shopping and for
the absence in the appellants’ brief of page references to the record as required
in Section 13(c) and (d) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.21 The appellate court,
on August 23, 2002, in the further assailed Resolution,22 denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.

Rejected repeatedly by the appellate court, petitioners instituted two petitions for
review on certiorari before us: (1) G.R. No. 149984 questioning the June 22,
2001 Decision23 and the September 5, 2001 Resolution24 in CA-G.R. SP No.
62915; and (2) G.R. No. 154991 assailing the May 16, 2002 Resolution25 and the
August 23, 2002 Resolution26 in CA-G.R. CV No. 69892. On December 2, 2002,
we resolved to consolidate the two petitions.27
The petitions are denied. The present controversy is on all fours with Young v.
Sy,28 in which we ruled that the successive filing of a notice of appeal and a
petition for certiorari both to assail the trial court’s dismissal order for non-suit
constitutes forum shopping. Thus,

Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.

There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res
judicata.

Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition

for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner
commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the
CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this
Court by way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis
pendentia are present between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth
Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the same facts and
refer to the same subject matter–the RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No.
SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking
the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues
professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the
judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.

xxxx

The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot
hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that the
ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others, she cannot post
facto validate this circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had
not been speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65.
This practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits in
multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a
"precautionary measure" for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a
favorable decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping
seeks to put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the
grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the
rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions.
Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent
tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable
result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres strictly to
the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the
dismissal of the case.

Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari and the petition for
review (G.R. No. 157745) filed with this Court must be denied for lack of merit.29

We also made the same ruling in Candido v. Camacho,30 when the respondent
therein assailed identical court orders through both an appeal and a petition for
an extraordinary writ.31

Here, petitioners questioned the June 26, 2000 Order,32 the August 21, 2000
Clarificatory Order,33 and the November 23, 2000 Omnibus Order34 of the RTC
via ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 69892) and through a petition
for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 62915) in different divisions of the same court. The
actions were filed with a month’s interval from each one. Certainly, petitioners
were seeking to obtain the same relief in two different divisions with the end in
view of endorsing whichever proceeding would yield favorable consequences.
35 T h u s , following settled jurisprudence, both the appeal and
the certiorari petitions should be dismissed.36

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions for review

on certiorari are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO


Associate Justice Associate Justice
 RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 154991), p. 77.
2 Id. at 78.
3 Id. at 49.
4 Id. at 81-83.
5 Id. at 85-86.
6 Id. at 87-92.
7 Rollo (G.R. No. 149984), p. 186.
8 Id. at 187.
9 Id. at 188-189.
10 Id. at 169, 221.
11 Supra note 7.
12 Supra note 8.
13 Supra note 9.
14 Supra notes 7 to 9.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 149984), pp. 166 and 223.

Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, with Associate Justices

16

Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (now Presiding Justice of the appellate court) and
Sergio L. Pestaño, concurring; id. at 19-25.
17 The dispositive portion of the June 22, 2001 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED

DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

Consequently, the assailed Orders dated June 26, 2000, August 21, 2000 and
November 23, 2000 of the respondent judge in Civil Case No. 67620, entitled
"Spouses Rolando M. Zosa and Luisa Zosa v. ChinaTrust (Phils.) Commercial
Bank Corporation and Notary Public Jaime Portugal for Pasig City," are all
hereby AFFIRMED and REITERATED.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. (Id. at 24.)

18 Id. at 30.
19 Rollo (G.R. No. 154991), p. 108.

Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justices

20

Candido V. Rivera and Sergio L. Pestaño, concurring, id. at 35.

21 The pertinent portions of the May 16, 2002 Resolution reads:

Upon consideration of the defendants-appellees’ Motion, we agree that the

plaintiffs-appellants’ appeal is dismissible under Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the absence on the appellants’ brief of page
references to the record as required in Sec. 13, par. (c) and (d), Rule 44.
More importantly, the plaintiffs-appellants are obviously guilty of forum shopping,
it appearing that the issues in this appeal have already been raised in the related
case numbered CA-G.R. SP No. 62915 which has already been decided by this
Court through its former Twelfth Division on June 22, 2001.

WHEREFORE, let this appeal case be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. (Id.)
22 Id. at 47.
23 Supra note 16.
24 Supra note 18.
25 Supra note 20.
26 Supra note 22.
27 Rollo (G.R. No. 154991), p. 156.
28 G.R. Nos. 157745 and 157955, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 151.
29 Id. at 166-169.
30 424 Phil. 291 (2002).
31See however Argel v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 867 (1999), in which the
Court did not find forum shopping in the successive filing of an ordinary appeal
and a petition for extraordinary writ to question the same order of the trial court.
The Court, nonetheless, noted in Argel that the two remedies involve dissimilar
issues and that the appellate court was apprised of the existence of the other.
Thus, in GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc., 426 Phil. 111, 125 (2002),
the Court, citing Argel, declared that "there is no forum shopping where, for
instance, the special civil action for certiorari and the appeal brought by a
party do not involve the same issue." (Underscoring supplied.)
32 Supra note 7.
33 Supra note 8.
34 Supra note 9.
35See Top Rate Construction & Gen. Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development
Corporation, 457 Phil. 740, 764 (2003); Quinsay v. Court of Appeals, 393 Phil.
838, 842 (2000).
36 Candido v. Camacho, supra note 30, at 301.
 INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS/RULE 111, RULES OF THE COURT

G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GERRY
LIPATA Y ORTIZA, Appellant.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GERRY LIPATA Y

ORTIZA, Appellant.


DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 31 May 2011
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA affirmed the
Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found appellant Gerry Lipata
y Ortiza (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered
appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno).4

The Facts

Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring, confederating with two (2) other persons whose true
names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of one RONALDO CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him
repeatedly with bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on 26 October 2005, and trial on the
merits ensued.

The CA summarized the parties' evidence as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Prosecution['s] Evidence

Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that on

September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was in her house located in [sic] Lot
34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She was about to
leave the house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his brother Larry
Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly stabbing him. She
was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from the incident. Shocked at
what she had just witnessed, she shouted for help and pleaded the assailants to
stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her account, she recalled that the
assailants, including appellant, used a tres cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of
glass of Red Horse [bottle]. At one point, the victim managed to take the knife
away from appellant and brandished the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the
victim fell on the ground. Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other
assailants left the scene. Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed
the victim to a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw appellant
together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab] her father to death in front of
their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work on September 1,
2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the house of her aunt
Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away from their house, to ask
for malunggay leaves. Upon coming home from her aunt's house, the victim was
attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the victim to run away. Thinking that his
assailants were no longer around, the victim proceeded to their [sic] house but then
the Lipatas stabbed him to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8)
meters away from the scene. She further testified that she had no knowledge of
any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her father's death brought her
pain and sadness and anger against the perpetrators of her father's killing.

The Defense['s] Evidence

The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself. According
to appellant, he was resting in his house in Sipna Compound, Brgy. Bagong
Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when two
children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called him and told him to
help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to his brother and upon
arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He instantaneously assisted his
brother but the victim continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground.
Thereafter, appellant managed to grab the knife from the victim and stab the
victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the crime] because he was wounded.
Appellant's sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to the Amang Medical
Center for treatment of his stab wound where he was apprehended by police
officers.6 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The RTC's Ruling

The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of defense of
a relative, he hypothetically admitted the commission of the crime. Hence, the
burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the
defense failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression on the
part of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to the life of appellant or of
his brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata brothers (appellant, Larry, and
Rudy)7 employed treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when
they attacked Cueno after Cueno left the house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered
17 stab wounds on his trunk from the Lipata brothers. The existence of multiple
stab wounds on the trunk of the unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with appellant's
theory of defense of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the prosecution failed
to show conclusive proof of evident premeditation.

The dispositive portion of the RTC's decision reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court here[b]y

renders judgment finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to forty (40) years.

The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following
amounts:

(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused;

(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the heirs of
Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12% interest per annum computed from
6 September 2005 until fully paid;

(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional anguish suffered
by the heirs arising from the death of Rolando Cueno; and

(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.

The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive imprisonment,
subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

SO ORDERED.8 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal9 on 6
April 2010. The RTC granted appellant's notice in an Order10 dated 19 April 2010.
 The CA's Ruling

The CA dismissed appellant's appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA
agreed with the RTC's ruling that appellant's claim of defense of a relative must fail.
There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his brother
Larry. There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was
outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The requirement of lack of
provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple stab wounds that
Cueno sustained.

The CA disagreed with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to establish
treachery. The CA pointed out that Cueno was not forewarned of any impending
threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-law's house to
gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand, were readily
armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken piece of glass from a Red Horse
bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers' attack made it impossible for Cueno to
retaliate.

The CA also disagreed with appellant's contention that there was no abuse of
superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all armed with bladed weapons
when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused to stop
stabbing Cueno until they saw him unconscious.

The dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby

DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court convicting appellant of the
crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The PAO filed a notice of appeal12 on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011. The CA
ordered the immediate elevation of the records to this Court in its 30 June 2011
Resolution.13

Appellant's Death Prior to Final Judgment

This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted the records forwarded by
the CA and required the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the confinement
of appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed this Court that
there is no record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a Resolution dated 10
September 2012,15 this Court required the Quezon City Jail Warden to transfer
appellant to the New Bilibid Prison and to report compliance within ten days from
notice. The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012,16 informed
this Court that appellant passed away on 13 February 2011. The former Quezon
City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC about appellant's demise in a letter dated 23
February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter were photocopies of
appellant's death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon
City Jail Warden's letter.17 In a Resolution dated 7 January 2013,18 this Court noted
the 22 October 2012 letter from the Quezon City Jail Warden, and required the
parties to submit their supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so
desire.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March

2013,19 which stated that it had already exhaustively argued the relevant issues in
its appellee's brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a supplemental brief on 26
March 2013.20

In view of appellant's death prior to the promulgation of the CA's decision, this
Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013 which ordered the PAO "(1) to
SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as
party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within ten (10) days
from receipt of this Resolution."21

The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased
Appellant on 29 November 2013.22 According to the Public Attorney's Office-Special
and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased appellant have not
communicated with it since the case was assigned to its office on 29 September
2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who was
appellant's next of kin per official records. Despite receipt of the letter, the relatives
of appellant still failed to communicate with the PAO.

In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based
solely on the act complained of, i.e. murder, the same does not survive the death of
the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling [People v. Jaime
Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People v. Rogelio
Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239], the death of the
latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon.

10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the
legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not arise.23 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO] shall
continue as the legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for
purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case."24

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, we declare that because of appellant's death prior to the

promulgation of the CA's decision, there is no further need to determine appellant's
criminal liability. Appellant's death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal
liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;

xxxx
What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant's death with regard to
his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,25 reconciled the differing
doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that "[u]pon death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal."26

We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable]
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation.
The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced."27 cralawred

We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If

the act or omission complained of arises from quasi-delict or, by provision of law,
results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28 On the other hand, if the act or omission
complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against
the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29

We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes

his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."




2. Coirollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the

death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

3.
4. b) Contracts
5.
6. c) Quasi-contracts
 7.
8. d) x x x
9.
10. e) Quasi-delicts


11. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing
a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.




12. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
deprivation of right by prescription.30(Emphases supplied)


The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for
the effect of the death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of
the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions.

 CASES

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, 


vs.

HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. 


Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,

the question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit
for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against
petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first
spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial
question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge
Relova answered in the negative. We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27,
1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense,
of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then
lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally
dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action
was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided
plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her
marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use
of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and
because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner
as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-
party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his
marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on
the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled
him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the
Peace of Makati, Rizal.

Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the

hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the
validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent
Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then
came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was
likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13,
1964.

In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge

was required to answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction
being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of
the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was
an amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the
inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court
admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.

Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that

year where the statement of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the
qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the
first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and
affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the
marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean
that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer
stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and
void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to
the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that
"parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs
the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ." 2

This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in

authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue
was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before
hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According
to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of
the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be
determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be
prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is,
therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the
second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the
criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for
petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which
he contracted "must first be declared valid." Its validity having been
questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case
"before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."

To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v.

Mendoza. As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have
4

heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial
question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the
court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. . . .
These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for
annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence,
petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged
in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the
action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of
petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."

The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the

petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two
marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable.
Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed
an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was
sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first
spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed
in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity
of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge

in the probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought
almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have
been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense
based on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as
well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge
abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the
hearing as sought by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of

preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With costs. 1äwphï1.ñët

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,

Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Special and Affirmative Defenses, Answer, par. 1.
2 Idem, citing 3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 275.
3 L-15315, August 26, 1960.
4 L-14534, February 28, 1962.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111244 December 15, 1997

ARTURO ALANO, petitioner, 


vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A.
LANZANAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO
CARLOS, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28150 which affirmed in toto the
order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 372 denying petitioner's
motion for the suspension of proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Alano" as well as his motion
for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa. The
information3 alleges:

That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Roberto S. Carlos in the following manner, to wit: the said accused,
pretending to be still the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,172
square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had
previously sold the same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00, sold
the aforesaid property for the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy for
P87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful
ownership/possession of the said parcel of land, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid amount of
P30,000.00, Philippine currency.

Contrary to law.

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that
there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being
tried in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch 68.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and entitled "Roberto Carlos
and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et. al.," concerns the nullity of the
sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned Civil
Case, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking
the annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land made by the
petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was
previously sold to them. In his answer, petitioner contends that he never
sold the property to the private respondents and that his signature
appearing in the deed of absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery,
hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent. At this juncture, it is
worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, five years
before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.

On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion as well as
a subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals seeking the nullification of the assailed order.

On July 26, 1993,4 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the petition, the same is hereby

DISMISSED, with cost against petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

The only issue in this petition is whether the pendency of Civil Case No.
55103, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute
sale in favor of private respondent was a forgery, such that there was no
second sale covering the said parcel of land. Otherwise stated, if the Court
in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale to herein private respondent
was null and void, due to the forgery of petitioner's signature in the first
deed of sale, it follows that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.

While at first blush there seems to be merit in petitioner's claim, we are

compelled to affirm the Court of Appeal's findings.

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a

civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action
is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal action.5 In other words, if both civil and criminal cases have
similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in
the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exists, provided the other
element or characteristic is satisfied.6

On the basis of the foregoing and a perusal of the facts obtaining in the
case at bar, the disposition of the issue raised need not unduly detain us.
We have already ruled that a criminal action for estafa (for alleged double
sale of property) is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the
alleged deed of sale and the defense of the alleged vendor is the forgery of
his signature in the deed.7

Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved, the Court of

Appeals still affirmed the Order of the trial court denying petitioner's motion
for the suspension of the proceeding on the ground that petitioner, in the
stipulation of facts, had already admitted during the pre-trial order dated
October 5, 1990 of the criminal case the validity of his signature in the first
deed of sale between him and the private respondent, as well as his
subsequent acknowledgment of his signature in twenty-three (23) cash
vouchers evidencing the payments made by the private respondent.
8 Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of Appeals that petitioner even

wrote to the private respondent offering to refund whatever sum the latter
had paid.9

In this regard, the pre-trial provision on criminal procedure found in Rule

118 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subject. . . . The pre-trial conference shall
consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining

(b) Stipulation of facts

From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the

parties in a criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial
admissions, hence, binding upon the parties10 and by virtue of which the
prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the
defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement
contained in the exhibit.11

Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to

an admission by the petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present
evidence on his behalf. While it is true that the right to present evidence is
guaranteed under the Constitution,12 this right may be waived expressly or
impliedly.13

Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is

only a procedural matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the
prior acts of the accused. After all, the doctrine of waiver is made solely for
the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and
without detriment to the community at large.14

Accordingly, petitioner's admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-

trial of the criminal amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil
case. Hence, we have no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.15 Furthermore, it must be
emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner himself. As
such, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a
pre-trial hearing applies.16

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court

of Appeals dated July 26, 1993 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez and concurred in by

Justice Manuel C. Herrera and Bernardo P. Pardo.

2 Per Judge Angelina Gutierrez.

3 Rollo, p. 30.

4 Id., pp. 96-101.

5 Flordelis v. Castillo, 58 SCRA 301 (1974); Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441
(1988).

6 Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 2 SCRA 178 (1961).

7 Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980).

8 Pre-trial Order, Rollo, pp. 134-140.

9 Decision, Rollo, p. 101.

10 People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25 (1996).

11 People v. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 (1969).

12 Sec. 14, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution.

13 People v. Dichose, 96 SCRA 957 (1980).

14 People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991).

15 Article 6, Civil Code.

16 Afable, et al., v. Ruiz, et al., 56 O.G. 3767; Permanent Concrete

Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, 26 SCRA 339 (1969); Munasque v. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 533 (1985).
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the
RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, Respondents.

BUENA, J.:

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999
issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo
Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the
pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner
against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on

June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao,
Quezon City. 1

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four 


children, 2 petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch
87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-97-30192. 3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged
that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. 4 Charmaine subsequently filed a
criminal complaint for concubinage 5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office
of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable
cause and ordered the filing of an Information 6 against them. The case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.

On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant

for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden
Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order 7 dated August
31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial
was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.

In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the

concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and
December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. 8 In an Order 9 dated January 28, 1999,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said
Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999,
denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.

Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting

decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the
criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare
the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal
case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that
his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits
that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage
can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules
on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by
reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments
submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that,
accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he
was never before a married man.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two

conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. 11

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is

not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.

Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said
provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis
for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said
Decision read:

. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might

well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other
than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as
well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and
the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence
needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence
of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These
needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void.

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner
need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than
proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the

charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice
it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato

vs. Luna 14 where this Court held that:

. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the
criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists
for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 Amended Complaint, Annex "E," Petition, Rollo, p. 61.

2 Annex "E," Rollo, p. 61.

3 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.

4 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.

5 Petition, Annex "F," Rollo, pp. 69-70.

6 Petition, Annex "H," Rollo, pp. 80-81.

7 Petition, Annex "I," Rollo, pp. 82-83.

8 Petition, Annex "J," Rollo, pp. 84-100.

9 Petition, Annex "A," Rollo, pp. 33-39.

10 Petition, Annex "C," Rollo, pp. 52-54.

11 Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25 [1997].

12 226 SCRA 572 [1993].

13 22 SCRA 731 [1968].

14 160 SCRA 441 [1988].

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, 


vs.

ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one

Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled,
nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage
with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a
third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's
complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent
on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to
the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that

respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the
alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no
longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of

a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3 It is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must
appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal
action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately

related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.6 Its two
essential elements are:7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence

of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case.
A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested
its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
charge through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration
of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this
is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage.8 Whether or not the first marriage was
void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it
not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.9
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his
cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage
and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license
- and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is
void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As
succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:10

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its

nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A
party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void
for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her
marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage
license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they
had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years.11 The issue in this case is limited to
the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to
resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state
that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides
that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."12 [] Hence, parties should not be
permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same
must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is,

the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the
courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts
a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a
case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.15 This ruling applies here by
analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be

successfully invoked as an excuse.16The contracting of a marriage knowing
that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and
every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain
the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage,
why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in
order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his
own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his
evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the
second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a
matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it
should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be
used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal
action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for
bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that
he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only
after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a
potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his
criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done. 1awphi1

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be
said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage
will also be void.19 The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married
man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to
use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29,

1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 29-30.
2 Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 23.
3Fortich-Celdran v. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502 (1967); Zapanta v. Montessa;
114 Phil. 428 (1962); Merced v.Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960); See also
People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357 (1954) cited in Dichaves v. Judge Apalit, AM-
MTJ-00-1274, June 8, 2000.
4Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992); Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441
(1988); Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 (1988); Mendiola v. Macadaeg,
1 SCRA 593 (1961); Aleria v. Mendoza, 83 Phil. 427 (1949);
Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837 (1920)
5Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980); Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 2 SCRA
178 (1961) citing De Leon v.Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202 (1940)
6 Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992)
7Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The
two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. (See also Prado v. People, 218 Phil.
571)
8 Niñal v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.
9People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935). The elements of bigamy are: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a
subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first. The exception to prosecution
for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family Code and by P.D.
1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, which provides that penal laws relative to the crime of bigamy
"shall not apply to a person married xxx under Muslim Law" where the
requirements set therein are met. See also Sulu Islamic
Association v. Malik, 226 SCRA 193 (1993); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155
(1960)
10 22 SCRA 731, 735 (1968)
11 Civil Code, Article 76.
12 Civil Code, Article 220.
13 Landicho v. Relova, supra.
14 Supra.
15 Beltran v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000.
16 Civil Code, Article 3.
17 Revised Penal Code, Article 350.
18 People v. Dungao, 56 Phil. 805 (1931)
19 Apiag v. Judge Cantero, 268 SCRA 47, 61 (1997)
20 Wiegel v. Hon. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986)
21 People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357, 360 (1954)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000.]

ARTHUR TE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA

CHOA, Respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision
of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.
23971 1 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178 2 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in Civil rites
on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although
they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth
to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. 3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting,
petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella). 4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June

1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information
charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City on August 9, 1990. 5 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-90-14409. 6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for
the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was
forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by
another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 7

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional

Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella
for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they
committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each
other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was
already married to private Respondent. With respect to petitioner, private
respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his
marriage contract with Santella that he was still single. 8

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed
a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court
judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during
the hearings of said case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated

November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because the
prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused. 9
The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. 10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petitioner for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C.
Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel;
(2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for
reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3)
disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges
promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only
"prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board),
where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was
pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of
the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case
for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. 12
When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991, 13
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending
that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution
of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case
pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the
administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-
incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an
overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the
suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the
pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same
respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178. 14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same
set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed
decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of
the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that
the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled
that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question was in accord with law. 15 The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his
failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the
prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of
bigamy. 16

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the
administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held
that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is
administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case. 17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court
of Appeals but the same was denied. 18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND

THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN

ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING

THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF. 19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of
suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering
license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue
of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and
rules. 20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. 21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a
criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case
for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not
pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for
bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt
in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted. 23 Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to
private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab
initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling
in People v. Mendoza 24 and People v. Aragon 25 cited by petitioner that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio
has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code,
which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a
marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. 26 In Landicho v. Relova, 27 we held that: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. 28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial
question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for
bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage
was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
chanrobles virtual law library

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of
the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the
concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have
previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrative and the other is civil. 29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and
Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the
administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the
existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same
facts as the administrative case: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an

administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered
professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be
filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter
case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and
shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts
or quasi-judicial body.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the
PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage
contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral
conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private
respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the
benefit of marriage. 30 The existence of these other charges justified the
continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board. chanrobles.com.ph : red

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial
court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing
that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second
marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of
marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the
signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the
requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the
original copy of the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented,
that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no
witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him
ever took place. 31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. 32 In this case, the
Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution
established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the
same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil
action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. 33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against
petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by

denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case
against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable
for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the
RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an
evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or
not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. 35 The RTC’s
observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the
prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that
petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents
evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. 36 Said declaration by
the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was
precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order
that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve
the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case
No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and
bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he
would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the
proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be
denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second,
when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident
and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely
trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate
to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to
file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and
declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile
attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified
the grant of his motion to inhibit.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against
Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had
prejudged the case. 37 In People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 38 this
Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for
the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule
is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not
among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge
Peralejo. Said provision of law states: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any

case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.cralaw : red

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding
the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying
petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of
said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. 40 The
instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against
petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As
discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and
jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that
petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he
suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement
was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the
case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the
judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly. 41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Arthur Te, Petitioner, v. Hon. Cesar C. Peralejo as Judge, RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and People of the Philippines, Respondents.

2. Arthur Te, Petitioner, v. Board of Civil Engineering, Professional Regulation

Commission and Liliana Choa Te, Respondents.

3. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994, Rollo, p. 29.

4. Ibid.

5. Id., at 29-30.
6. Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 1.

7. Rollo, pp. 29-30.

8. Id., at 30.

9. Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 37.

10. Id., at 33.

11. Id., at 6-10.

12. These cases were: (1) Arthur Te, v. Liliana Choa-Te, Civil Case No. 90-6265 for
Annulment of Marriage, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106; and (2)
People of the Philippines v. Arthur Te, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 for Bigamy,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98.

13. Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, p. 15.

14. Records CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 6-10.

15. Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 33-34, 36.

16. Id., at 35.

17. Id., at 36.

18. Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 1996, Id., at 103.

19. Petition, Id., at 18-24.

20. Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438, 463 (1985).

21. Librado v. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303, 309-310 (1982).

22. Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25, 33 (1997) citing Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342 (1995).

23. The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) the offender has been
legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved; (3) the offender
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. (REYES, LUIS B. THE REVISED
PENAL CODE ANNOTATED, VOL. 2, Thirteenth Edition, p. 828.)

24. 95 Phil. 843 (1954).

25. 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

26. Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000; Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No.
138509, July 31, 2000; Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986).

27. 22 SCRA 731 (1968).

28. Id., at 734, Citing 3 VIADA, PENAL CODE 275.

29. Ocampo v. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, 271 (1974).

30. Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 18-19.

31. Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-23.

32. People v. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).

33. People v. Cruz, 144 SCRA 677, 681 (1986).

34. Section 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court.

35. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No.
26178, Rollo, pp. 35-36.

36. People v. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8445; Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra note 20 at 450.

37. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No.
26178, Rollo, p. 33.

38. 309 SCRA 705 (1999).

39. Id., at 709-710.

40. Associacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,

Inc., 88 SCRA 294.

41. Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.

 FIRST DIVISION

G. R. No. 124498. October 5, 2001

EDDIE B. SABANDAL, Petitioner, v. HON. FELIPE S. TONGCO, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 42, and PHILIPPINES
TODAY, Respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:
The Case

The case is a petition to suspend the criminal proceedings in the Regional

Trial Court, Manila, Branch 42, 1 where petitioner Eddie B. Sabandal is
charged with eleven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. 2
The Facts

On February 18, 1989, Eddie B. Sabandal entered into a memorandum of

agreement on dealership with respondent Philippines Today, Inc. for the
distribution of the newspaper Philippines Today, (now Philippine Star) in
Bacolod City and in designated towns in Negros Occidental. 3
cräläwvirtualibräry

Under the agreement, petitioner shall pay for an equivalent amount of one
month of deliveries in advance within the first seven days of the succeeding
month. Petitioners allowable percentage of return shall be 10% and be
entitled to a rebate of P0.15 per copy sold.

After execution of the agreement, respondent Philippines Today, Inc. made

regular deliveries of the agreed copies of the newspaper to petitioner.

In order to make partial payments for the deliveries, on December 18, 1990
to April 15, 1991, petitioner issued to respondent several checks amounting
to ninety thousand (P90,000.00) pesos.
When respondent presented petitioners checks to the drawee banks for
payment, the bank dishonored the checks for insufficiency of funds and/or
account closed. Consequently, respondent made oral and written demands
for petitioner to make good the checks. However, petitioner failed to pay
despite demands.

In December 1992, on the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent

Philippines Today, Inc., assistant city prosecutor of Manila Jacinto A. de los
Reyes, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila eleven informations for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner. 4 cräläwvirtualibräry

Three years later, or on October 11, 1995, petitioner filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Negros Occidental at Himamaylan, a complaint against
Philippines Today, Inc. for specific performance, recovery of overpayment
and damages.5 cräläwvirtualibräry

On October 11, 1995, petitioner also filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 42, a motion to suspend trial in the criminal cases against
him based on a prejudicial question. 6 cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 27, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners motion to suspend
trial based on a prejudicial question. 7 cräläwvirtualibräry

On December 20, 1995, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the denial. 8 cräläwvirtualibräry

On January 9, 1996, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. 9
cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this petition. 10

The Issue

The issue raised is whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the

suspension of the trial of the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against petitioner until after the resolution of the civil action for
specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and damages.
The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed. 11 cräläwvirtualibräry
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 12 cräläwvirtualibräry

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause

the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the
civil, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal. 13 cräläwvirtualibräry

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial
question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is
satisfied. 14It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 15 If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of
the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question. 16 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. 17 cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 is whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The
issue in the civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages
is whether complainant Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines
Today, Inc. If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is shown to have
overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the
bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an
offense. 18
cräläwvirtualibräry

The lower court, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of a civil
action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages did not pose a
prejudicial question in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22.

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the
filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal
cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the
criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.

Petitioners claim of overpayment to respondent may be raised as a defense

during the trial of the cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
charged against him. The civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the filing of the criminal action. 19 Hence, petitioner may
invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action. 20
The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.
The Court directs the Regional Trial Court, Manila to proceed with the trial of
the criminal cases against petitioner with all judicious dispatch in accordance
with the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. 21 cräläwvirtualibräry

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., (on official leave).

Endnotes:

1 In Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113446-56, Judge Felipe S. Tongco, presiding.

2 Otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
3 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, p. 34.
4 Petition, Annexes B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, Rollo, pp. 35-45.
5 Peittion, Annex M, Rollo, pp. 46-52.
6 Petition, Annex N, Rollo, pp. 54-56.
7 Petition, Annex P, Rollo, pp. 61-62.
8 Petition, Annex Q, Rollo, pp. 63-73.
9 Petition, Annex R, Rollo, p. 74.
10Filed on April 24, 1996, Rollo, pp. 17-32. On June 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the
petition (Rollo, pp. 176-177). The case was considered submitted for decision upon the filing of
petitioners memorandum on October 12, 1999 (Rollo, pp. 271-280).
11Rule 111, Section 5, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; Dichaves v. Apalit, 333 SCRA 54, 57 [2000];
Ching v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16, 27 [2000].
12Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 [1988]; Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 [1988]; Ras v. Rasul,
100 SCRA 125, 127 [1980].
13 Prado v. People, 218 Phil. 573, 577 [1984].
14Alano v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 549, 553 [1997], citing Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 112 Phil. 105
[1961].
15Te v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000; Beltran v. People, 334 SCRA 106,
111 [2000].
16 Isip v. Gonzales, 148-A Phil. 212 [1971].
17 Rojas v. People, 156 Phil. 224, 229 [1974].
18 Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 [1986].
19Rule 111, Section 1, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 621,
632 [1997]; Manuel v. Alfeche, Jr., 328 Phil. 832, 840-841 [1996].
20First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co, 336 SCRA 551, 559 [2000]; Javier v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 605 [1989].
21 R. A. No. 8493.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995

ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners, 


vs.

HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and
SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY
TIGOL, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent

Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, at
Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners oral motion for the suspension of their
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: "People of the
Philippines v. Isabelo Apa; Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan," as well as
their motion for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772

otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. The information alleges:

That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapulapu City, Philippines

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [herein petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan],
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, without
the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her
real property, Lot No. 3635-B of Opon Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 13250, situated in Agus Lapulapu City, whereon they
constructed their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita
Tigol, which acts of the said accused have deprived the latter of the use of
a portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice because despite
repeated demands the said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and
refuse to vacate the premises above-mentioned.

Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground

that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case
being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus
Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership of
Lot No. 3635-B.1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of
TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question
among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno
and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three
years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed
against them.

On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and
proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their
plea (not guilty) to the charge.

On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but

their motion was denied by the court in its order dated September 21, 1993.
Hence, this petition.

The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot No.
3635-B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
against petitioners.

We hold that it is.

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and

separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its
resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To
justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
2 Rule 111, §5 provides:

Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements

of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of

land not belonging to them but to private respondent and against the
latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the
knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied
or took possession of a portion of "her property" by building their houses
thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land to her damage
and prejudice.

Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the
Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-
L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution,
therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners
criminal liability for squatting.

In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case
rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and her
husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in common by the
spouses and the petitioners as inheritance from their parents Filomeno and
Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the decision in that case
is not yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point is
that whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of ownership,
such resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners
in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of the lot in
question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are as
much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are the private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family.3

Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land can be
ejected from his property since the only issue in such a case is the right to
its physical possession. Consequently, they contend, he can also be
prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law.

The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a
piece of land can be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his
property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in
the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent.
Rather private respondent claims the right to possession based on her
claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the
question in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the
meantime be suspended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered

to SUSPEND the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the
question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved with
finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the civil
case is decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. Otherwise he
should dismiss the criminal case.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 This is the lot on which it is alleged in the criminal case petitioners

constructed their houses against the will of the complainant Rosita Tigol
and in violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.

2 Librodo v. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303 (1982); Donate v. Luna, 160
SCRA 441 (1988).

3 CIV. CODE, Art. 486.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960

ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, 


vs.

HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, ETC. ET AL., respondents.

Pedro A. Bandoquillo for petitioner.


Fulvio Pelaez for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge
presiding the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V.
Diez, from proceeding further in the Criminal Case No. V-6520, entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Abundio Merced until after final termination of
Civil Case No. R-5387, for the annulment of the marriage of petitioner
Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also pending in same court.

The record disclose the following proceedings in the court a quo: On

January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his
second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as Civil
Case No. R-5387. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar
and her relatives forced, threatened and intimated him into signing an
affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as
husband and wife for over five years, which is not true; that this affidavit
was used by defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional character,
without the need for marriage license; that he was again forced, threatened
and intimated by defendant and her relatives into entering the marriage
with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A. Conde;
that immediately after the celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant
and never lived with her; that the defendant wrote him on October 29,
1957, admitting that he was forced into the marriage and asking him to go
to Cebu to have the marriage annulled, but he refused to go for fear he
may be forced into living with the defendant. Merced prays for annulment of
the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2,000. On March 3,
1958, Elizabeth Ceasar filed her answer to the complaint. In her answer,
she denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as
affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's
previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan; that sometime in July, 1957, plaintiff
asked her mother to intercede on their behalf to secure her father's consent
to their marriage as plaintiff could not concentrate on his studies without
marrying Elizabeth, but that her mother advised him to finish his studies
first; that sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that plaintiff was
engaged to marry Eufrocina Tan, but plaintiff, upon being confronted with
such discovery, showed her a letter which he wrote breaking off his
engagement with Tan. As a counterclaim defendant asks P50,000 as moral
damages for the deceit, fraud and insidious machinations committed upon
her by plaintiff.

On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R-5387 defendant
Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff
Abundio Merced with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu. On April 7, 1958
the Assistant City Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. V-6520, charging Merced
with bigamy for the second marriage. The information reads.

The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of Cebu accuses Abundio Merced

of the crime of bigamy, committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 1957, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Abundio Merced, being previously united in lawful marriage with
Eufrocina Tan, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved
did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously contract a second
marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar.

Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. (Annex "2".)

Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in

abeyance until final termination of Civil Case No. R- 5387. Reason alleged
for the motion is that the Civil Action involves facts which if proved will
determine the innocence of the accused. After an opposition thereto was
filed by the assistant provincial fiscal, the court granted the motion.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal, the order was
set aside and another entered denying the motion of accused for
suspension of the criminal proceedings, which last order is the one sough
herein to be annulled. The court held in its last order that inasmuch as by
virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Mendoza, 95 Phil., 50 Off. Gaz. [10], 4767, judicial declaration of nullity of a
second and bigamous marriage is not necessary, there is no need in this
case to decide the nullity of the second marriage, or to determine and
declare the existence of the grounds for annulling the same, but that said
grounds should be used as a defense in the criminal action. A motion to
reconsider the second order of the court having been denied, petition
herein was filed.

When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was filed, the petitioner
secured from this Court a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent
judge from proceeding further in the criminal case.

Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the
second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.

The definition and the elements of a prejudicial question have been set
forth by us as follows:

Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which (question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another Tribunal
(Cuestion prejudicial, es 3o 3 la que surge en un pleito o causa cuya
resolucion sean antecedente logico de la cuestion-objeto del pleito o causa
y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o
jurisdiccion. — Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 228). The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is its first
element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal; this is the second element. In an action for bigamy for example, if
the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to
decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity
must be first decided before the action for bigamy can proceed, hence, the
validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People vs. Aragon, 94
Phil., 357; 50 Off. Gaz., No. 10, 4863).

In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second
and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid
marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. This was the
ruling of this Court in People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil., 246, where we said:
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for
the subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged
to have been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former
marriage with Hassan being undissolved, can not be considered as such,
according to Mohameddan rites, there is no justification to hold her guilty of
the crime charged in the information. (People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246).

One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent

thereto of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given.
Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void.
(Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the
question of invalidity can not ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for
bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second
marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the
criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the
elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a
decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all
the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the
second marriage, which must be determined before hand in the civil action,
before the criminal action can proceed. We have a situation where the
issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must be
determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be
prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is,
therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of the validity of
the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede
the criminal action for bigamy.

Spanish jurisprudence, from which the principle of prejudicial question has

been taken, requires that the essential element determinative of the
criminal action must be cognizable by another court. This requirement of a
different court is demanded in Spanish jurisprudence because Spanish
courts are divided according to their jurisdictions, some courts being
exclusively of civil jurisdiction, others of criminal jurisdiction. In the
Philippines, where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal
jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there
is only one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to
be litigated. But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over
the civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court
distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy.

Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of the marriage in the
civil action for annulment is a prejudicial question, insofar as the criminal
action for bigamy is concerned, is supported by Mr. Justice Moran in his
dissenting opinion in De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207 thus:

La regla general es que cuando hay una cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre
un mismo delito u ofensa, la segunda debe verse antes que la primera, por
la razon de que las formas de un juicio criminal son las mas a proposito
para la averiguacion de un delito, y no las de un juicio civil. Esta regla
tiene, sin embargo, una excepcion, y es la que se refiere a una cueston
civil prejudicial. Una cuestion civil es de caracter prejudicial y debe
resolverse antes que una cuestion criminal, cuando versa sonbre un hecho
distinto y separado del delito, pero tan intimamente ligado a el que
determina la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado. Por ejemplo, una accion
criminal por bigamia.

The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs. Mabanag also sustains
the theory that when a civil action is pending in court, in which a validity of
a document claimed to be false and fictitious is in issue, the fiscal may not
prosecute the person who allegedly executed the false document because
the issue of the validity of the instrument is sub judice and the prosecuting
officer should be ordered to suspend the criminal action until the prejudicial
question has been finally determined. Thus the Court said"

Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del Fiscal y su deber perseguir

los delitos no deben ser controlados ni coartados por los tribunales; pero
no hay duda que esa facultad puede ser regulada para que no se abuse de
ella. Cuando un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal se desvia de la ley y
entorpece la recta administracion de justicia procesando a una persona por
hechos constituvos de delito que se encuentran sub-judice y de los cuales
se propone una cuestion prejudicial administrativa, es deber de los
tribunales llamarle la atencion y obligarle que suspenda toda accion
criminal hasta que la cuestion prejudicial administrativa se haya decidido
finalmente. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207.)

The case of People vs. Mendoza, supra, upon which the trial court and the
respondents rely, presents a different sets of facts from the case at bar. So
is the ruling therein as contained in the syllabus. In the case of People vs.
Mendoza, Mendoza was charged with and convicted of bigamy for a
marriage with one Carmencita Panlilio, contracted in August, 1949.
Mendoza was married for the first time in 1946 with Josefa de Asis; then
married for the second time with Olga Lema; and then married for the third
time to Panlilio in 1949. On February 2, 1943, Josefa de Asis died. The
court citing the provisions of Article 29 of the marriage law, held that the
second marriage of the appellant Mendoza with Lema was operation of law
null and void, because at the time of the second marriage in 1941,
appellant's former wife Josefa de Asis was still living. This marriage of
appellant with Lema being null and void at the time the appellant contracted
the said marriage, the impediment of the second marriage did not exist.
Hence the appellant was acquitted of bigamy for the 1949 marriage
because his previous marriage with Lema in 1941, by operation of law, was
void ab initio.

In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage which she contracted for the second time with
Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been
questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be decided before the
prosecution for bigamy can proceed.

For the foregoing considerations, the petition for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order of the court
denying the petition of the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from
prosecuting the case for bigamy, criminal case no. V-6520, entitled
People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby set aside and the preliminary
injunction issued by this court to that effect is hereby made permanent. So
Ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,

Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, 


vs.

HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.

Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is
whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in
view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the
ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979,
the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor
filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No.
43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was
filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private

respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner
contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil
Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private
respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner
Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner
was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the
defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without
a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's
consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or
second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and
deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock
for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed
by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage
license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554,
petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case
contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his
second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question
which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can
proceed.

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to
suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy.
Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case
of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in
the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.

A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel

citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid
down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a
much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.

The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an
order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case,

the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in a criminal case.5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It

must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative
of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent
Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should
have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only
sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for
anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the
case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said
case states that:

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by
the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions"
are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the
case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be
shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that
was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his
act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of
his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is
markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not
the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats
and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first
spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first
marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact
would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much
less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as
sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his
consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats,
force and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la
Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to
the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is
markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela
Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second
marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was
also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as
contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private
respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint
for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage
was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already
rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null
and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the
civil case.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner

Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for
annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and
intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage
was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for
conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to

evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to
petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living
with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than
five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that
his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is
belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an
affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their
marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was
private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat
it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979,
or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second
marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the
marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent
until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that
Leonilo Donato was already previously married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the
respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue
that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before
proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of

denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 22 SCRA 731.

2 68 SCRA 1.

3 People va. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Isip vs. Gonzales, 39 SCRA 255; Rojas
vs. People, 57 SCRA 243.

4 Libra va. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303.

5 Ibid.

6 22 SCRA 73.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 159218 - March 30, 2004]

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,

v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo,
Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of
bigamy.

The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa
Arceño at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa
left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she
learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left
their conjugal home.

After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with
Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador
contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Biñas before Judge
Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.3

On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against

Narcisa.4 On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against
Salvador and Zenaida.5

Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955

before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four
children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that
there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried
on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.

On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of
bigamy and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum.
Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court, as follows:
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the

penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the
mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner is now before us on Petition for Review .

First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the
bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been
1989.

Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information.
9

The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in
the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained
in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of
which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must
be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the
specific crimes.10

The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed

of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he
contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while his first
marriage was subsisting.

The information against petitioner alleges: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the

Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally married to
complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has not been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10,
1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about
and sometime in the month of January, 1995," was an obvious typographical
error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner contracted a
subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989.
Petitioners submission, therefore, that the information was defective is
untenable.

The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment

of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no
objection appears to have been raised.12 It should be remembered that
bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur two
of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
possesses all the requisites for validity.13 All of these have been sufficiently
established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to
object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only
raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida,

which had the effect of absolving him of criminal liability.

In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant

when he entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not
established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the
offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is
committed against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public offense
which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even
by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.14

Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity

of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy
case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment
case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.16

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.17

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to

Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted.18

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case,
even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage
was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor
for bigamy. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion
of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.
The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a
mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be taken
from prision mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term should be taken
from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,

and Azcuna, JJ.

Concurring Opinion

CARPIO, J.:

I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-

Santiago finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of bigamy.

The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967,

Abunado married Narcisa Arceno. While his marriage with Arceno
remained unannulled, Abunado married Zenaida Biñas on 10 January
1989. Subsequently, on 29 October 1999, Abunado obtained from
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Arceno. On 18 May 2001, the Regional Trial
Court of San Mateo, Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of
bigamy.

The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Biñas

on 10 January 1989 constitutes the crime of bigamy under Article
3491 of the Revised Penal Code. More precisely, the issue turns on
whether Abunados first marriage to Arceno was still subsisting at
the time Abunado married Biñas.

Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage
on the ground of nullity of the first marriage, one must first secure a
final judgment declaring the first marriage void. Article 40 of the
Family Code provides: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked

for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second
marriage of Abunado on 10 January 1989.

Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage

on the ground of nullity of the previous marriage without first
securing a judicial annulment of the previous marriage. If
subsequently the previous marriage were judicially declared void,
the subsequent marriage would not be deemed bigamous. The
nullity of the previous marriage could even be judicially declared in
the criminal case for bigamy,2 although the person remarrying
"assume(d) the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy"3 should the
court uphold the validity of the first marriage. Article 40 of the
Family Code has changed this.

Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of

the previous marriage before he is freed from the marital bond or
vinculum of the previous marriage. If he fails to secure a judicial
declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage, then the
second marriage becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in Domingo
v. Court of Appeals4 in explaining Article 40 of the Family Code:
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a

marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that
his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial

declaration of nullity of his previous marriage, he is liable for
bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the
previous marriage to subsist for purposes of remarriage, unless the
previous marriage is judicially declared void by final judgment. Thus,
if the marital vinculum of the previous marriage subsists because of
the absence of judicial declaration of its nullity, the second marriage
is contracted during the existence of the first marriage resulting in
the crime of bigamy.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a

previous marriage that is void ab initio subsists only for purposes of
remarriage. For purposes other than remarriage, marriages that are
void ab initio, such as those falling under Articles 35 and 36 of the
Family Code, are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity.
As the Court held in Cariño v. Cariño:5

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

Cariño, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself,

contradicts the statement in her present ponencia that "under the
law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding." I believe the
ruling in Cariño is correct and should not be disturbed. As Justice
Jose C. Vitug explained in his recent textbook on Civil Law (Volume
I) :
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant.

Void marriages, like void contracts, are inexistent from the very
beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family Code
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
before a subsequent marriage is contracted; x x x.6 (Emphasis
supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso

facto void without need of any judicial declaration of nullity. The
only recognized exception7 under existing law is Article 40 of the
Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for
purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of
nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.

Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the

previous marriage suffers from nullity while the second marriage
does not. Under Article 40, what requires a judicial declaration of
nullity is the previous marriage, not the subsequent marriage.
Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the first marriage does
not suffer from any defect while the second is void.

Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of the
crime of bigamy.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice


Endnotes:

1Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by

Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Danilo B. Pine.

2 Exhibit "C", Records, p. 68.

3 Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.

4 Records, p. 202.

5 Records, p. 1.

6 Penned by Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez; Rollo, pp. 33-42.

7 Rollo, p. 53.

8 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).

9 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Sec. 6.

10 Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 144785, 11 September 2003.

11 Rollo, p. 30; underscoring ours.

12 People v. Villamor, G.R. No. 124441, 7 October 1998, 297 SCRA 262, 270.
13Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747,
752-753.

14 Rollo, p. 51.

15 Annex "1", Records, p. 208

16Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA
327, 335.

17 Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122, 133.

18 Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.

19 Supra.

20 Garcia v. People, supra.

21 Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.

CARPIO

1 Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: "Bigamy- The
penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2 People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033
(1957).

3 Landicho v. Relova, et al., 130 Phil. 745 (1968).

4 G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

5 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127.

6 Civil Law, Persons and Family Relations, Vol. I, (2003 Ed.)

7 See also note 4.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, 


vs.

CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August

26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 253 in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated
October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.

The Facts

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S.

Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P.
Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S.
Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case
was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a
criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with
the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,

instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated
August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the
RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No.
LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the
MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging
that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or
intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In
other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a
prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases

in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend
Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there
is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon
which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue
from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2)
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of
a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case
having preceded the civil case.

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:

Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification
of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the
instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The
belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the
correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action
may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111,
Revised Rules of Court).8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13,
2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26,
2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial
question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed
civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal
proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by
private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their
initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil
action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the
issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11

The Court’s Ruling

This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme

Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a
prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements

of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a
prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran
v. People,13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however,

became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule
111, which applies here and now provides:

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial

question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create
a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be
established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal
case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation
wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending
criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code
which provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules
of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be
in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a
prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the
institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal
action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in
the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter
considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the
criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in
phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative
intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally
had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted
to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in
relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the
insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is
no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:

Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition

on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion
for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case
No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, reads:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for

suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial

question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that

which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision
before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which
said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior
to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was
filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160
filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should
be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or
every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.17 1 a vv p h i l

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly

conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must
be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize
both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec.
7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative
interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be
interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be
filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court
conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil
Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the
criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may
be filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for

suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation

of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all
the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case
indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to
suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a
prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the
criminal proceedings.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving

a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a
criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In
resolving the case, we said:

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that

the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal
cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the
criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as
an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the
criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly
withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil
case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that
private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building
for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the
rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed
more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction
agreement.

Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the

cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere
afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And
as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions
cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not 


Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal
action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify
the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as

provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus,
such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction

agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of
consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would
become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal
prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP

22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or
for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to

support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for
valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus,
this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding
the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for
violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the

issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding
such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes
in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and
bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the
framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check
malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that
the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which
were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success
of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.

Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a

check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the
same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in
turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to
the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor
of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in

blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the
proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable
consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-
existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when
the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24,
1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista
starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed,
petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship
with Bautista or Unlad.

At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of
issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of
the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would
not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The
fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which
were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is
subject of prosecution under BP 22. lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant
case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are
inapplicable to the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC,
Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and
March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in
Las Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 88-90. Penned by Judge Salvador V. Timbang.
2 Id. at 65-67.
3 Id. at 75-76.
4 Id. at 23-27.
5 Id. at 28-41.
6 Id. at 42-45.
7 Id. at 46-48.
8 Id. at 67.
9 Id. at 75-76.
10 Id. at 90.
11 Id. at 11.
12Carlos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109887, February 10, 1997, 268
SCRA 25, 33; Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 17,
1995, 249 SCRA 342, 351; Apa v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 112381, March 30,
1995, 242 SCRA 509, 512; Yap v. Paras, G.R. No.101236, January 30,
1994, 205 SCRA 625, 629; Umali v. IAC, G.R. No. 63198, June 21, 1990,
186 SCRA 680, 685.
13 G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.
14 R.E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 97 (4th ed., 1998).
15 G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509.
16 R.E. Agpalo, supra note 14, at 269-270.
17Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No.
150135, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 81, 98; Valencia v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666, 680-81; Bañares v.
Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 49; Cabada v.
Alunan III, G.R. No. 119645, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 838, 848;
Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 211;
Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September 30, 1992, 214
SCRA 378, 392.
18 G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001, 366 SCRA 567.
19 Id. at 572.
20Mejia v. People, G.R. No. 149937, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 209,
213-214.
21Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 451,
461; Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA
336, 341; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105461, November 11,
1993, 227 SCRA 723, 726-727, citing People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954,
October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 84-85 and Que v. People, Nos.
L-75217-18, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 161, 165.
22 Supra note 20, at 214-215.
23 G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455.
24 Id. at 474-475.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, 


vs.

MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private

respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223
(RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the

Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-
trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the

proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of
a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal
case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that
the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The
RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be
tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in
question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend

Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is,
for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,

5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of

preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court
of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the
RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide,
the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime
of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled
that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all
that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of
the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of
Appeals’ decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted


Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial

question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing
of the criminal action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide
was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25
October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The
RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial
on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No.
04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No.
04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
 Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that
would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
10 A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical

antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.11

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or
homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar
or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further,
the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392
is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at
the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent. 1avvphi1

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of

Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration
of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned
x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
"[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the
Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned."19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice
 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**


Associate Justice

ATTE STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*Designated additional member per Special Order No. 886 dated 1
September 2010.
** Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 September 2010.
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Rollo, pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong
with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucenito N. Tagle,
concurring.
3 Id. at 50-51. Penned by Presiding Judge Ramon A. Cruz.
4 Id. at 51.
5 Id. at 53.
6 Dated 1 December 2000.
7 Rollo, p. 54.
8 Id. at 56.
9 Id. at 61-65.
10 Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 773.

Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 150329-30, 11 September 2007, 532

11

SCRA 574, 577-578.

12 People v. Dalag, 450 Phil. 304 (2003).
13 Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
14 Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
15 Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
16 See Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
17 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
18 Id. at 744. Italicization in the original.
19 Id. at 742.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010

MYRNA P. ANTONE, Petitioner, 


vs.

LEO R. BERONILLA, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeking to nullify and set aside the issuances of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a) the Resolution1 dated 29 April 2008
dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which assailed the trial
court’s Orders2 dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 in
Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution3 dated
18 July 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration of the first resolution.

The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of
Bigamy were rendered incomplete after herein respondent presented
documents to prove a fact, which the court believed would negate the
allegation in the Information that there was a first valid marriage. The
evidence presented showed that respondent later obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first union following the celebration of a
subsequent marriage.

The Antecedents

On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-

Complaint4 for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in
1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a
second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding
Information5 before the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled to Branch 115.

Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved
to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.6 He informed the court that his marriage with
petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007;7 that the decision became final and
executory on 15 May 200[7];8 and that such decree has already been
registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007.9 He argued
that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first
valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the
crime of bigamy.10

In its comment/opposition to the motion,11 the prosecution, through herein

petitioner, maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all
the essential requisites of bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the
marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978 has not yet
been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16 February
1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the
court declared the first marriage null and void on 27 April 2007.12 The
prosecution also invoked the rulings of the Supreme Court holding that a
motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information, and that facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which
may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.13

After a hearing on the motion,14 the court quashed the Information.

15 Applying Morigo v. People,16 it ruled:

Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla

was actually never legally married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone,
the first element appears to be missing. Furthermore, the statement in the
definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage must at least be
annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx [I]n a
similar case, [the Supreme Court] had the occasion to state:

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." xxx The existence
and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime
of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. xxx17

The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the

said Order18 on the ground, among others, that the facts and the attending
circumstances in Morigo are not on all fours with the case at bar. It likewise
pointed out that, in Mercado v. Tan,19 this Court has already settled that "(a)
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense."20

In its Order of 6 December 2007,21 the court denied the motion for
reconsideration stating that Mercado has already been superseded by
Morigo.

In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment22 before the Regional
Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity of the
proceedings in the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil
Case No. B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March 2008, the court set
aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of petitioner with
respondent null and void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil
Case No. B-1290) to file her "answer to the complaint."23 On 21 July 2008,
the court DISMISSED the petition for nullity of marriage for failure of herein
respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial brief.
24 Respondent, however, challenged the orders issued by the court before

the Court of Appeals.25 The matter is still pending resolution thereat.26

Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

filed on 26 March 2008 before the Court of Appeals,27 herein petitioner
alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her motion for
reconsideration.

In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition stating that:
The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the
following reasons:

1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the
allegations in the petition are based on authentic records.

2. Since the petition assails the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal
information for bigamy filed against private respondent Leo Beronilla, the
petition, if at all warranted, should be filed in behalf of the People of the
Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor General, being its statutory counsel
in all appealed criminal cases.

3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the

subject criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial court’s
finding that the first essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid
marriage contracted by private respondent is wanting. There is no clear
showing in the petition that the dismissal was tainted with arbitrariness
which violated petitioner’s right to due process. Notably, petitioner filed her
comment/opposition to private respondent’s motion to quash before the trial
court issued its Order dated September 20, 2007 dismissing the
information. Hence, if there is no denial of due process, there can be no
grave abuse of discretion that would merit the application of the exception
to the double jeopardy rule. 28

On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondent’s Motion for

Reconsideration of the aforequoted Resolution for lack of merit. 29

Hence, this petition.30

Our Ruling

We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the
defect in the pleading and the question of legal standing to bring the action.

The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which

lacks a proper verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading.31

This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the

rule in order that the ends of justice may be served.32 The defect being
merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may
nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or even act on the
pleading "if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict compliance
with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx
may be served."33 At any rate, a pleading is required to be verified only to
ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were true
and correct and not based on mere speculations.34

There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) which has the authority to represent the government in a judicial
proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The Administrative Code
specifically defined its powers and functions to read, among others:

Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. xxx It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.35

As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:

(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies

and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the
Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the
courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with
respect to such cases.36

Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,37 we held that the summary dismissal of an

action in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, when not initiated by
the Solicitor General, is in order.38 Not even the appearance of the
conformity of the public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would suffice
because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to represent
the People of the Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court.39
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions
even when the respective interests of the government were not properly
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.

In Labaro v. Panay,40 this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following
manner:

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by

any order or ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not
the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us.
41 xxx

Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or
the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition
on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the
petition, as we had done before in some cases.42 In light of its Comment,
we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant
petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform

Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.,43 without requiring the Office of the Solicitor
General to file a comment on the petition, this Court determined the merits
of the case involving a novel issue on the nature and scope of jurisdiction
of the Cooperative Development Authority to settle cooperative disputes as
well as the battle between two (2) factions concerning the management of
the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that
inevitably threatens the very existence of one of the country’s major
cooperatives."44

And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the
instant petition even absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After
all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone."45 To borrow the words of then Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a criminal
case pending with the trial court was sought:

[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our
democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who [come
or are brought to court] are afforded a fair opportunity to present their
side[s]. xxx The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court,
and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.46
 II

We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is
in violation of the respondent’s right against double jeopardy on the theory
that he has already been practically acquitted when the trial court quashed
the Information.

Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites
must concur:

(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in

form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to
the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.47

The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a)
respondent has not yet entered his plea to the charge when he filed the
Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the case was dismissed not
merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance.48

We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the
accused on account of an order sustaining a motion to quash.49 More
specifically, the granting of a motion to quash anchored on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense."50 Thus:

It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint
against petitioner was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court – that the facts charged in the complaint do not
constitute an offense. If this is so then the dismissal of said complaint will
not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, for it is provided
in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an order sustaining the motion to quash
is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion
was based on the grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h)
of this rule [now substantially reproduced in Section 3, Subsections (g) and
(i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx.51

III
We now determine the merit of the petition ˗ did the trial court act without or
in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained
respondent’s motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those
alleged in the information?

Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information and any
evidence contrary thereto can only be presented as a matter of defense
during trial.

Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.

We define a motion to quash an Information as ˗

the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint

or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.52

This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the

Information,"53 for which reason, the court cannot consider allegations
contrary to those appearing on the face of the information.54

As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:55

It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact

necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to
dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be properly
sustained. The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this
ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish
the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, a reading of the information will

disclose that the essential elements of the offense charged are sufficiently
alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the very outset,
in a preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-blown trial.
The issues require a fuller examination. Given the circumstances of this
case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of
the proceedings and to dismiss the informations on the basis only of the
petitioner’s evidence, such as [this].56
As in the recent case of Los Baños v. Pedro,57 where we found no merit in
respondent’s allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because "the Information duly charged a specific offense and provide[d] the
details on how the offense was committed,"58 we see no apparent defect in
the allegations in the Information in the case at bar. Clearly, the facts
alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a
lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in
force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the accused has
all the essential requisites for validity.59

sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime

of Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder
enumerated:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.60

The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage
of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2)
such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered
with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence
that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information ˗ that
a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted
a subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all
because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash
even after taking into consideration the established exceptions to the rule
earlier recognized by this Court, among others: (1) when the new
allegations are admitted by the prosecution;61 (2) when the Rules so permit,
such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability and double
jeopardy;62 and (3) when facts have been established by evidence
presented by both parties which destroyed the prima facie truth of the
allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
and "it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts
and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be
weak even to support possible conviction xxx."63

For of what significance would the document showing the belated

dissolution of the first marriage offer? Would it serve to prevent the
impracticability of proceeding with the trial in accordance with People v.
dela Rosa thereby warranting the non-observance of the settled rule that a
motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information? We quote:

[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that

the allegations of the information do not charge an offense, facts have been
brought out by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima
facietruth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical
admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the ground of the motion to
quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said
facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown
to be weak even to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to
what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on
her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court,
as well as of the prosecution.64 (Emphasis supplied.)

We find that there is none.

With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared
the first marriage void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the rulings65 in
People v. Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based
on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need for a
judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid;66 and (b)
a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that
there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders
the elements of bigamy incomplete.67

Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family
Code, which was promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in
1987, a few years before respondent’s subsequent marriage was
celebrated in 1991.

The specific provision, which reads:

ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such marriage void.

was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,68 where this Court settled the

"conflicting" jurisprudence on "the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision
expressly requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and
examining a long line of cases,69 this Court, concluded, in essence, that
under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime
had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that
a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy.70

Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado.

Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the Order dated 6 December 2007 of the
trial court, which maintained that Morigo has already superseded Mercado.
In fact, in Morigo, this Court clearly distinguished the two (2) cases from
one another, and explained:

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado
v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. xxx

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized xxx. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed
by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete
merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.71

The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces

the position of this Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family
Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:72

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground

of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, xxx
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
1avvphil.zw+

children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the

marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. xxx.73 (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses

Noel and Amelia Serafico,74 this Court pronounced:

In a catena of cases,75 the Court has consistently held that a judicial

declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible
and immoral. xxx

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between

petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent
marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the
facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.
Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by
the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the
established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are
matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of
evidence.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when, in so quashing the Information in Criminal Case No.
07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not
alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts
not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional
circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December

2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City as well as the
Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals
are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD**

Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1Per Special Order No. 916 dated 24 November 2010, Associate Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro is designated as Acting Working
Chairperson.

Per Special Order No. 917 dated 24 November 2010, Associate Justice
Roberto A. Abad is designated as Additional Member.

Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate

Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring. Rollo,
pp. 29-31.
2 Both issued by Judge Francisco G. Mendiola. Records, pp. 50-52 and 63.
3 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
4 Records, pp. 11-14.
5 Id. at 1-2.
6 Id. at 31-36.
7 Id. at 32.
8 Id. at 32-33.
9 Id. at 34.
10 CA rollo, p. 34.
11 Id. at 33-41.
12 Id. at 37-38.
13 Id. at 35.
14 Records, p. 48.
15 Id. at 52.
16 G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004, 422 SCRA 376.
17 Records, pp. 51-52 citing Morigo v. People, id.
18 Records, pp. 55-61.
19 G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
20 Records, p. 59 citing Mercado v. Tan, id.
21 Records, p. 63.
22 Rollo, p. 21.
23 Id. at 64.
24 Id. at 109.
25 Id. at 126.
26 Id. at 123-126.
27 CA rollo, pp. 2-52.
28 Id. at 55-56.
29 Id. at 116.
30 Rollo, pp. 9-64.

Sec. 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10 dated 1

31

May 2000.
32Hon. Eduardo Nonato Joson, in his capacity as the Governor of the
Province of Nueva Ecija v. Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, et al.,
G.R. No. 131255, 20 May 1998 citing, among others, Oshita v. Republic,
L-21180, 31 March 1967, 19 SCRA 700,703.
33 Id.
34Id.; Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus V. Quitain, G. R.
No. 135042, 23 September 1999, 373 SCRA 773, 786.
35Sec. 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987.
36Sec. 35(8), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987.
37 No. L-61997, 15 November 1982, 370 SCRA 370.
38 Id. at 373.
39Galangco v. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, 8 September 2009, 598 SCRA 637,
643.
40 G.R. No. 129567, 4 December 1998, 299 SCRA 714.
41 Id. at 720 citing Tan v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306, 313 [1976].
42Id. at 721 citing the following cases: People v. Montesa, Jr., 248 SCRA
641, 644-645 [1993], further citing Republic v. Partisala, 118 SCRA 370
[1982]; City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina, 166 SCRA 614 [1988]; People v.
Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 [1989]; People v. Calo, 186 SCRA 620 [1990];
and People v. Nano, 205 SCRA 155 [1992].
43 G.R. No. 137489, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 552.
44 Id. at 568.
45Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 139, 162 citing
the following cases: Dimatulac v. Villon, 358 Phil. 328, 366; 297 SCRA 679,
714 (1998); People v. Subida, G.R. No. 145945, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA
125, 137.
46 Tan v. People, id. at 162-163.
47Javier v. Sandiganbayan, First Division, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, 11
September 2009, 599 SCRA 324, 343-344 citing Cabo v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 169509, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 264.
48 Milo v. Salanga, No. L-37007, 20 July 1987, 152 SCRA 113, 122.
49Id. at 121-122 citing the following: Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court;
now Section 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; Andres v.
Cacdac, Jr., 113 SCRA 216.
50People v. Consulta, No. L-41251, 31 March 1976, 70 SCRA 277,
280-281.
51 Id. quoting Secs. 2(f) and 2(h), now substantially reproduced in Secs.
3(g) and 3(i) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: (g) That the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (i) That the accused
has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
52Javier v. Sandiganbayan, First Division, supra note 47 citing Ariel Los
Baños, et al. v. Joel Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, 22 April 2009, 586 SCRA
303.
53Milo v. Salanga, supra note 48 at 121 citing People v. Lim Hoa, 103 Phil.
1169 and Regalado, Remedial Law Compen[dium], 1085 ed., Vol. 2, p.
684.
54 Milo v. Salanga, supra note 48 at 121.
55 G.R. No. 83754, 18 February 1991, 194 SCRA 145.

Id. at 150 citing U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245 and People v. de la Rosa,
56

No. L-34112, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA 190.

57 G.R. No. 173588, 22 April 2009, 586 SCRA 303.
58 Id. at 321.
59 Records, p. 1.
60Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004, 423
SCRA 272, 279 citing Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book
Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907.
61 People v. Navarro, Nos. L-1 and L-2, 75 Phil. 516, 518-519 [1945].
62Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119063, 27 January 1997, 266
SCRA 678, 691.
63 People v. de la Rosa, supra note 56 at 199-200.
64 Id.
65Rollo, p. 145 citing Morigo v. People, supra note 16 and People v.
Mendoza, L-5877, 95 Phil. 845.
66 Rollo, p. 145 citing People v. Mendoza, id.
67 Morigo v. People, supra note 16 at 383-384.
68 Supra note 19.
69 Supra note 19 at 128-133 citing, among others, the following: Wiegel v.
Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499, 19 August 1986, per Paras, J.; Domingo v.
Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 17 September 1993, per Romero, J,
citing Sempio-Diy, Handbook of the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988,
p. 46; and Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6, 3 July 1992, per curiam.
70 Supra note 19 at 124.
71 Supra note 16 at 384.
72 G.R. 150758, 18 February 2004, 423 SCRA 272.
73 Id. at 284.
74 A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010.
75Id. citing Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004, 422
SCRA 376; Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17,
1993, 226 SCRA 572; Terre v. Terre, A.C. No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211
SCRA 7; Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, No. L-53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA
499; Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, No.
L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315; Gomez v. Lipana, No. L-23214,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 614.
 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER, 


vs.

SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B.
ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N.
SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN,
ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V.
AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought

by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a
ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The
administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the
criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

Antecedents

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic

corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993
and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by
Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation
receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque,

containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of
₱106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three separate
deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and
second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs
covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square
meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and
for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of ₱39,122,627.00, were
not delivered to San Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs
for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty.
Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network
Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.4

BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on

August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree
No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),
6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.

In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7 respondent

directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’
assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim was not
legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to
sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF
Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds
of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized;
(c) the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes
was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to
suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the
receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-
judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed
company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the
pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas
of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.

On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend

proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes’
receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes
opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC
terminated BF Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San
Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’
comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought
suspension of proceedings due to the intervening termination of the
receivership.9

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution,
10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of

Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by
or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him;
that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957
exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there
existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal
action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was
first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior
resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to
be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual
signatories in the three deeds of sale.

On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’
motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000, holding that BF
Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of
the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the
legality of Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal liability would
attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB
directing it to deliver the titles.11

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to
the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal
on October 15, 2001, holding:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason

to disturb the ruling of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established
jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor
concerned.

There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD
957, there is still pending with the Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board
(HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific performance where the HLURB
is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales
transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty.
Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.

As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72,
the Supreme Court had ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving real estate business and practices under PD 957. This
is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines
versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres
Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.

The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the
validity of the transactions involving the lands in question with specific
reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said
transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for
non-delivery of the subject land titles. In other words, complainant cannot
invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall
have ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots
in question.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for

reconsideration.13

Ruling of the CA

Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the

CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that
respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their
appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes
with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties
submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No.
REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial question that called for the
suspension of the criminal action for violation of Presidential Decree No.
957.

In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP

No. 73008,14 the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and
ruling as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on
prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited

by the respondents. In this case, an issue in an administrative case was
considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which,
consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination
of the administrative proceedings.

Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court
relaxed the application of the rule on prejudicial question.

In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly
applied the rule on prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein to
put up a bond for just compensation should the demolition of private
respondents’ building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral
suit in another tribunal.

City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action
involving a boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial question which
must be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding of a
plebiscite on the affected areas.

In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the
interest of good order, courts can suspend action in one case pending
determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.

It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of
discretion x x x when he applied the rule on prejudicial question to the
instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale
transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely
intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private respondents, as
officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the
titles of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.

All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB
proceedings is not determinative of the criminal liability of private
respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to
assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject
titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to
pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-delivery of
certificates of title which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over
in the first place. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

prosecutorial arm of the government as represented by herein public
respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public
prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A
public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file
a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown,
and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been
established by the complaining party.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001
and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 15

The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on

January 18, 2005.16

Issues

Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following

for consideration and resolution, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND

REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER’S
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT
RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:

THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO

PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY
SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD
DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27
JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF
HOMES, INC.".

A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL

TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES
CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH
IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO
INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.

IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A

"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE
THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB
CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT
CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.

IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE
TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS OF LAND TO
PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
HLURB’S RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.

NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL

COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE
EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17

It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for

specific performance and damages that San Miguel Properties instituted in
the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter
ruled that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the proceedings until the
SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the
transactions in BF Homes’ behalf, because the final resolution by the SEC
was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the
complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
affirmed the HLURB Arbiter’s decision, holding that although no prejudicial
question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the other
administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases
pending the final outcome of the administrative proceeding in the interest of
good order.18

Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office
of the President (OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in suspending the
proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the HLURB Board’s
ruling, holding thusly:

The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under
Section 25 of the Presidential Decree (PD) 957 – "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers’ Protective."

As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the

authority of the HLURB, as successor agency of the National Housing
Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344,
the real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases "involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots … against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman," the HLURB, in the exercise of its
adjudicatory powers and functions, "must interpret and apply contracts,
determine the rights of the parties under these contracts and award[s]
damages whenever appropriate."

Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for some
forum to decide – if ever one is forthcoming – the issue on the authority of
Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily resolves the basic
complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and the
respective position papers and the evidence of the parties having been
submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual
dispatch, the right and obligation of the parties in line with its own
appreciation of the obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from
Mabubha Textile Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on
the finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions.19

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the
CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631), raising as issues: (a) whether or not the
HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of Atty.
Orendain’s authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel
Properties in BF Homes’ behalf, and rule on the rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB properly
suspended the proceedings until the SEC resolved with finality the matter
regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.

The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631,20 decreeing

that the HLURB, not the SEC, had jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties’
complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and ordered the remand of the
case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case
involved matters within the HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:

[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has
jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision
developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint

because it pertains to matters within the HLURB’s competence and
expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB should not be suspended.

While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded
to the HLURB. This is in recognition of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The fairest and most equitable course to take under the circumstances is to
remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of evidence.21

Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding

the dismissal of San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a
prejudicial question?

The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case

brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend
the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

1.

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an

administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that
the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a
prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case
for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved
is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the
criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind
the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The
essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal

case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could
be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the
prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance
in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section
2524of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action
for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be
instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the
action was exclusive and original.25

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended

because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues
raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related
with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the
former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case.
An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.

An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact

performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or
according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.
26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there

must first be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article
1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones,
in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon
him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of
the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also
seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or

rescission with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the
remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article
1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy
of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s
breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled
the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one,
contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted the
option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific
performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.28

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the
sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number
of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators,
and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to
provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as
well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers and operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles
free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes
the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain
instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in such
instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of
violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.

Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the
HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally
entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal
action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former
must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San
Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because
Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale
due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for
the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the
criminal case.

Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not

conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for
the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in
the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal
case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have
been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the
indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in
the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question
on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.30

2.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case

pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence
at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although
civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation
of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of
these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently
invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies
but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such
agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the
proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of
private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function
exercisable only by the regular courts.31

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play
on matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies
even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the
courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized
skills, and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because
it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be
obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction
of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal
of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters
within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and
determined.32

To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and
will not determine a controversy involving a question within the competence
of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within
the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory
scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral
to the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute.
Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal
competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that
question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential
to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered,
suspension or dismissal of the action is proper.33

3.

Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted

It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum
prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’ directors and
officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the
suspension unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or omission was
malum prohibitum did not do away with the initiative inherent in every court
to avoid an absurd result by means of rendering a reasonable interpretation
and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must
always be given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its
application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing
prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would produce
unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly
raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the criminal
proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the
action for specific performance or the criminal action. It contends that the
1âwphi1

defense of a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case

could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related case.

The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no

distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
ought not to distinguish.36

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February

24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Vice Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, who is on official
trip for the Court to attend the Southeast Asia Regional Judicial Colloquium
on Gender Equality Jurisprudence and the Role of the Judiciary in
Promoting Women’s Access to Justice, in Bangkok, Thailand, per Special
Order No. 1529 dated August 29, 2013.
1 Entitled Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums,
Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof (July 12, 1976).
2 Rollo p. 442.
3 Id. at 137-172.
4 Id. at 61.
5 Id. at 123.
6 Id. at 420-428.
7 Id. at 178-181.
8 Id. at 215-217.
9 Id. at 253.
10 Id. at 247-250.
11 Id. at 272-273.
12 Id. at 95-96.
13 Id. at 98-99.
14 Id. at 13-21; penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador,
with the concurrence of Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (later
Presiding Justice/retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes,
Jr.
15 Id. at 19-20.
16 Id. at 23-25.
17 Id. at 37-38.
18 Id. at 608.
19 Id. at 609-610.
20 Id. at 504-523.
21 Id. at 522.
22People v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA
366, 369.
23 Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.
24 Section 25. Issuance of Title. – The owner or developer shall deliver the
title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee,
except those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry
of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a
mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of
the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or
the corresponding portion thereof within six months from such issuance in
order that the title over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and
delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith.
25 Under Presidential Decree No. 1344 (entitled Empowering the National
Housing Authority to Issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of its
Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957), the National Housing
Authority, the predecessor of the HLURB, was vested with original
jurisdiction, as follows:

Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business practices;

(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and

(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory

obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied)
26 Black’s Law Dictionary.

Ayala Life Assurance, Inc. v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, G.R.

27

No. 163075, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 462, 469.

28Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Orola, G.R. No.
169790, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 578, 585.
29Co Chien v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development Inc., G.R. No. 162090,
January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 570, 577-578.
30Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis. G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747,
752.
31Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, No. L-50444,
August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399, 407.
32Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18,
1990, 184 SCRA 426, 431-432.
33Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Batario, Jr., G.R. No. 92285, March 28,
1994, 231 SCRA 463, 469-470; Saavedra, Jr. v. Department of Justice,
G.R. No. 93173, September 15, 1993, 226 SCRA 438, 442-443;
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, No. L-77663, April
12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556, 567-568; Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v.
Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil 932, 941 (1954).
34 Rollo, p. 49
35Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524, July
29, 2002, 385 SCRA 306, 316.
36 Yu v. Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 421, 428.