C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Espanol, Jr.

, 533 SCRA 424 , September 14, 2007

Labor Law; Labor Code, Judgment; Appeals; A judgment debtor who acquiesces of and voluntarily
complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.

Same; Same; Illegal Recruitment; Definition of Recruitment and Placement; The conduct of preparatory
interviews is a recruitment activity.—Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement
as: any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether
for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the
basis of this definition—and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray—the conduct of preparatory
interviews is a recruitment activity.

Same; Same; Same; It is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that
renders the recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.—The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment
during the interviews is of no moment. From the language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may
be “for profit or not.” Notably, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of
payment, that renders the recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.

Same; Appeals; Due Process; The essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity afforded a
party to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of its defense; What is vital is not the
opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness, but an opportunity to be heard.—The claim of denial
of due process on the part of C.F. Sharp must also be rejected. The essence of due process lies in the
reasonable opportunity afforded a party to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of its
defense. What is vital is not the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness, but an opportunity to
be heard. In this case, C.F. Sharp was given ample opportunity to be heard, to adduce evidence in
support of its version of the material occurrences, and to controvert Rizal’s allegation and the Inspection
Report. It submitted its position paper with supporting affidavits and documents, and additionally
pleaded its causes on appeal before the Secretary of Labor. Under the circumstances, a claim of denial
of due process on C.F. Sharp’s part is completely unavailing.

Same; Same; Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the labor officials’ findings rest.—C.F. Sharp would have us re-evaluate the factual
veracity and probative value of the evidence submitted in the proceedings a quo. C.F. Sharp may well be
reminded that it is not our function to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the evidence adduced by
the parties. Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases
does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officials’
findings rest. Hence, where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are
affirmed by, the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this Court. It is
only when the findings of the labor agencies and the appellate court are in conflict that this Court will
review the records to determine which findings should be upheld as being more in conformity with the
evidentiary facts. Where the CA affirms the labor agencies on review and there is no showing
whatsoever that said findings are patently erroneous, this Court is bound by the said findings. [C.F.
Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Espanol, Jr., 533 SCRA 424(2007)]

More Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC, and Homicillada

More Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Homicillada
307 SCRA 189, GR No. 124927, May 18, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner hired private respondent Homicillada as an oiler on board the vessel MV Rhine and he
boarded the vessel at Port Sete, France on February 5, 1994. When the vessel was anchored in Brazil,
Homicillada was tasked to clean the main engine, and the first and second cylinders of the air trunk,
which he did four consecutive days. As he went about his work, he experienced pain on his left leg which
began to swell thereafter. The ship doctor said Homicillada should be allowed to rest for five days, but
the Captain still required him to work. On April 27, 1994, he was repatriated to the Philippines and
underwent a series of physical examinations. The ACT-scan image of Homicillada’s lower back revealed a
“slipped-disc,” so the diagnostic center suggested laminectomy and dissection on his lower back to
alleviate his pain. However, petitioner disregarded the recommendation and proposed instead a pelvic
traction treatment, a less costly procedure, which did not improve Homicillada’s condition. Homicillada
filed a compliant to the POEA for disability and medical benefits as well as for payment of his two
months basic salary which petitioners had withheld.

The POEA sustained Homicillada and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Homicillada
US$1,642.30 or 14.93% of US$11,000.00. Appealing to the NLRC, Homicillada insisted that he was
entitled to more than the amount decreed by the POEA, while petitioners asserted that his sickness was
not work-connected and was in fact already in existence prior to his deployment abroad. The NLRC
increased the disability award to US$7,465.00 based on POEA Memorandum Circular No.5, upgrading
the basis for disability allowance to US$50,000.00. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence, this petition which states that the NLRC completely ignored a “Receipt and Release”
purportedly signed by Homicillada receiving P15,750.00 from petitioners while the case was pending in
POEA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to disability benefits

COURT RULING:

Being more inclined to believe the findings of the POEA, which are supported by substantial evidence,
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is
entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled.

Requisites for a valid quitclaim: (a) There was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (b) The
consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and, (c) The contract is not contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the
time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated the worker’s
condition.

ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer,
with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation
leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.

Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only
two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:
On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is
not tenable.

The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a
business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble
end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

PERT/CPM v. Vinuya, G.R. No. 197528, Sept. 5, 2012

FACTS:
Respondents were contracted by the agency for deployment to work as aluminumfabricator/installer in
Modern Metal in Dubai, UAE. The contract was for 2 years, approved by POEA,providing 9 working hours
a day, a salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food allowance, free andsuitable housing, free
transportation, free laundry, free medical and dental services. However, in Dubai,Modern Metals gave
them appointment letters with terms different from those they signed in thePhilippines
–
increasing their employment terms, reducing salaries, allowances, and benefits. Theworking conditions
were also not as promised. They complained to their agency but to no avail. Due tounbearable living and
working condition, they resigned from their job and indicated personal/familyproblems as their reasons.
(except for Era who mentioned real reason). On March 15, 2008, respondentsfile a complaint for illegal
dismissal against PERT CPM. They agency alleged that they were not illegallydismissed because they
resigned voluntarily. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that theyvoluntarily resigned.
Respondents appealed to NLRC which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter. NLRCpointed out that
signing of different contract in Dubai is illegal. NLRC ordered the payment of agency topay the salary,
placement fee, and exemplary damages to respondents. Petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration
which was denied by NLRC, but modified their judgment adjusting the awards,
particularly their salaries, in light of court’s ruling in Serrano striking down the clause in Sec 10, par 5, RA
8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and
questioned the applicability of Serrano ruling. This was denied. CA upheld NLRC’s decision.

ISSUE:
W/N RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010, restoring the subject clause in Sec 10 of RA8042
being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively
HELD:
No. Amendment introduced by RA 10022 cant be given retroactive application because it
willresult in an impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of Serrano ruling
The SC held that the Serrano ruling can be given retroactive application asresolved in Yap vs.
Thenamaris Ship’s Management in the interest of equity and that the Serranoruling is an exemption to
the doctrine of operative fact.Moreover, the SC held that the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022
cannot be given retroactiveeffect not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity of the
law, but because theretroactive application will result in an impairment of right that had accrued to the
respondents byvirtue of the Serrano Ruling. The SC reiterated that all statutes are to be construed as
havingonly a prospective application, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
themretrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily implied from the language used.

General Milling Corporation vs. Torres

G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991

FACTS:
Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant and assistant
coach. He possessed an alien employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged employee by the
Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. GMC requested that Cone’s
employment permit be changed to a full-fledged coach, which was contested by The Basketball Coaches
Association of the Philippines. Alleging that GMC failed to show that there is no competent person in the
Philippines to do the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment permit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien
Employment Permit?
HELD:
The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment
Permit. GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has no legal basis. Under
Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an
employment permit from the Department of labor. GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by
the statutory requirement of an employment permit.

The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the services
of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the application to
perform the services for which an alien is desired.”

AL O. EYANA, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC.(PTCI) et.al.,

Respondents.G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015Topic: Total and Permanent Disability for SeafarersFacts:
PTCI, for and on behalf of its foreign principal, Celebrity Cruises, Inc.(CCI), hired Eyana as a utility
cleaner on board whose tasks were predominantlymanual i n nature (i.e. lifting, carrying,
loading, transporting and arrangingfood supplies, and floor cleaning). On August 2, 2006, Eyana felt
a sudden painin his back and was confined in a hospital in Oslo, Norway from August 4 to
16,2006. On August 17, 2007, he was medically repatriated to the Philippines andreferred to
Dr. Natalio G. Alegre II (Dr. Alegre) for treatment by PTCI. Dr. Alegrenoted that Eyana was (a)
suffering from severe low back pains, (b) experiencingnumbness and weakness in his right
lower leg, and (c) having difficulty bendingand sitting thus advised to undergo physical therapy
thrice a week. As a result ofthe Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan of Eyana’s lumbosacral
spine, epiduralsteroid injection to decrease the pain and swelling, and the continuation of
physicaltherapy was administered. On January 20, 2007, the last consultation of Eyana,