G.R. No. L-40527 June 30, 1976 Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the case against him.
ost jurisdiction over the case against him. (pp. 19-20,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HERMOGENES MARIANO and HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch V, respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Nathanael P. Pano, Jr., Solicitor Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Provincial P.C.
Kliachko and Assistant Provincial Fiscal C. G. Perfecto for petitioner.
Eustaquio Evangelista for respondent Hermogenes Mariano.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J:
This petition for certiorari postulates a ruling on the question of
whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods valued
at not more than six thousand pesos and allegedly committed by a
civilian. 1
On December 18, 1974, the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
filed an Information (Criminal Case No. SM-649) accusing private
respondent herein Hermogenes Mariano of estafa alleged to have
been committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from May 11 and June 8,
1971, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Hermogenes Mariano, being then
appointed as Liaison Officer by the then incumbent Municipal
Mayor, Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf of the
municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and authorized to
receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for
the use and benefit of said municipality, received from the said
USAID/NEC the following items, to wit:
150 ft. electric cable valued
at $15 or P100.50
525 ft. cable power valued at
$577-50 or P3,859.35
250 ft. electric cable at
$125.00 or P837.50
with a total value of $717.50 or P4,797.35, involving the duty of
making delivery of said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but the
said accused Hermogenes Mariano once in possession of the said
items and far from complying with his aforesaid obligation and in
spite of repeated demands, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit,
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and
benefit the said items valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35, belonging to
the said USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner
in the said sum of $717,50 or P4,797.35. (pp. rollo).
On February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his counsel Filed
a motion to quash the Information on the following grounds:
1. That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense
charged or of the person of the defendant;
2. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
3. That it contains averments which , if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification. (p. 19, rollo)
In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were
the subject matter of the Information against him were the same
items for which Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco of San Jose del
Monte, province of Bulacan, was indicted before a Military
Commission under a charge of malversation of public property, and
for which Mayor Nolasco had been found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment at hard labor for ten (10) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months with perpetual
disqualification plus a fine of P19,646.15 (see pp. 23-24, rollo), and
that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already been
decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of
Ibid)
On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the
motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning as
follows:
Considering that the Military Commission had already taken
cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco
involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court, the case involving the subject properties had already
been heard and decided by a competent tribunal, the Military
Commission, and as such this Court is without jurisdiction to pass
upon anew the same subject matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo, emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Judge did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the
motion to quash.
The people now seeks a review of the aforesaid Order and presents
the sole issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court over
the estafa case filed against respondent Mariano.
"Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. 2 The
word "jurisdiction" is derived from two Latin words "juris" and
"dico" — "I speak by the law" — which means fundamentally the
power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to
entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. 3 Bouvier's
own definition of the term "jurisdiction" has found judicial
acceptance, to wit: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to pronounce
a sentence of the law in a case or issue before him, acquired
through due process of law;" it is "the authority by which judicial
officers take cognizance of and decide cases." 4
In Herrera vs. Barretto, September 10, 1913, 25 Phil. 245, 251, this
Court, in the words of Justice Moreland, invoking American
jurisprudence, defined "jurisdiction" simply as the authority to hear
and determine a cause the right to act in a case. "Jurisdiction" has
also been aptly described as the right to put the wheels of justice in
notion and to proceed to the final determination of a cause upon
the pleadings and evidence. 5
"Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a
particular offense and impose the punishment for it. 6
The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is
derived exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum.
Thus, the question of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First
Instance over the case filed before it is to be resolved on the basis
of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. That,
We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it is
provided:
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have
original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months,or a fine of more than two
hundred pesos, (emphasis supplied)
The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is
penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 7 By
reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months
imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the
accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he
claims in his Order is that his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction
with the military commission and because the latter tribunal was
the first to take cognizance of the subject matter, respondent court
lost jurisdiction over it .That statement of respondent court
is incorrect.
In People vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through then Justice
now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, categorically reiterated the
settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 8 In
the case at bar, it is rightly contended by the Solicitor General that
at the time Criminal Case No. SM-649 was filed with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, that was December 18, 1974, the law in
force vesting jurisdiction upon said court was the Judiciary Act of
1948, the particular provision of which was not affected one way
or the other by any Presidential issuances under Martial Law.
General Order No. 49 dated October 4, 1974, which repeals General
Order No. 12 and the latter's amendments and related General
Orders inconsistent with the former, redefines the jurisdiction of
military tribunals over certain offense, and estafa and malversation
are not among those enumerated therein. 9 In other words the
Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime
of estafa. 9*
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost
jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with
the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before
the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate
and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in
one is different from the accused in the other. But more
fundamental is the fact that We do not have here a situation
involving two tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a
particular crime so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal
which first takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction
thereof exclusive of the other. 10 The Military Commission as stated
earlier is without power or authority to hear and determine the
particular offense charged against respondent Mariano, hence,
there is no concurrent jurisdiction between it and respondent court
to speak of. Estafa as described in the Information filed in Criminal
Case No. SM-649 falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil
courts.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Order dated March 14, 1975,
is set aside and respondent Judge is directed to proceed with the
trial of Criminal Case No. SM- 649 without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159659 October 12, 2006
RUBEN S. SIA and JOSEPHINE SIA, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and TERESITA LEE, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
petitioners urge this Court to nullify and set aside the April 25, 2003
Decision,1 and the July 29, 2003 Resolution,2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 68057.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27 with three counts3 of
violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957,
otherwise known as The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree.
On October 15, 2001, the petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion
to Quash alleging that (1) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; and (2) the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City
has no authority to file the informations.
On October 18, 2001, the trial court denied the motion holding that
it had jurisdiction over the case. It also scheduled an arraignment
on October 29, 2001. On October 23, 2001, the petitioners filed a
Motion to Resolve the Other Ground Raised in the Motion to
Quash, i.e., whether the city prosecutor had the authority to file
the informations. On October 24, 2001, the trial court denied the
motion stating that the city prosecutor was authorized to file the
informations. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied. Arraignment was then reset to November 21, 2001.
Petitioners' Motion for Postponement of their arraignment was
also denied. On November 21, 2001, the trial court appointed a
counsel de oficio for petitioner Ruben S. Sia and proceeded with
the arraignment.
Before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.4 The petitioners claimed that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged and the city
prosecutor had no authority to file the informations; that only the
enforcement officers under Executive Order No. 715 are authorized
to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to subdivisions.
Moreover, they asserted that petitioner Ruben S. Sia was denied
his right to counsel when the trial court forced him to enter a plea
with only a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED and the assailed orders AFFIRMED in toto. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court for the
following reasons: (1) the informations stated that petitioners
violated Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 by failing to register with the
Register of Deeds of Naga City, the Contracts to Sell they executed
in favor of respondent Teresita Lee over several subdivision lots she
purchased; (2) the acts complained of were within the trial court's
territorial jurisdiction; and (3) the penalty provided by law for the
violation, i.e., imprisonment of not more than ten years, is within
the trial court's jurisdiction. Similarly, the appellate court sustained
the city prosecutor's authority to file the informations conformably
with Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.7 Finally, it ruled that
the trial court did not transgress petitioner Ruben S. Sia's right to
counsel since the preference in the choice of counsel expressed in
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution8 does not necessarily
mean that such choice by a person under investigation is exclusive
as to preclude other equally competent and independent lawyers
from handling the defense.
Hence, this petition. The petitioners enumerate the grounds of
their appeal, as follows:
[a] x x x the alleged act or omission complained of and charged in
the questioned Informations [do not] constitute a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 otherwise known as the Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree[.]
[b] x x x the City Prosecutors have [no] power or authority to
institute and prosecute the present case for alleged violation of the
provisions of P.D. 957 even without a prior determination thereof
by the Enforcement Officers of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)[.]
[c] x x x the herein petitioner Ruben Sia was deprived of his
[c]onstitutional right to due process and to counsel considering
that he was assisted only by a counsel de oficio during his
arraignment despite his insistence to be assisted by their newly
hired counsel de parte[.]9
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) Did the charges in the
informations constitute violations of P.D. No. 957? (2) Does the City
Prosecutors' Office of Naga City have authority to file the
informations? and (3) Was petitioner Ruben S. Sia deprived of his
right to counsel when only a counsel de oficio assisted him during
his arraignment?
After considering the submission of the parties, we find the present
petition without merit.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that P.D. No. 957 is
applicable only to residential subdivision and condominium
projects and not to commercial subdivision projects as in this case,
and that the property involved had been classified commercial and
industrial in City Ordinance No. 93-04110 and Resolution No. 93-
26111 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City. Furthermore,
petitioners add, the documents required to be registered with the
Register of Deeds under Section 17 of P.D. No. 957, refer to lands
that have been converted into a subdivision project for residential
purposes.
Respondent Lee maintains that petitioners' Development Permit
(DP No. 92-0415) showed that the project was classified as
socialized housing while the Zoning Administrator's Certification
dated May 14, 1992, indicated that the project was situated in a
residential zone in accordance with the Zoning Ordinance of Naga
City. Thus, petitioners' subdivision is residential. She also asserts
that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 957, the registration of the
subdivision plan by the owner of a parcel of land who caused its
conversion into a subdivision is different from the subsequent
registration of the contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar
instruments required by the same provision. Hence, according to
respondent, the petitioners are required to register the Contracts
to Sell in her favor.
Pertinent here is Section 2 of P.D. No. 957, that defines a
subdivision project as "a tract or a parcel of land registered under
Act No. 496 which is partitioned primarily for residential purposes
into individual lots with or without improvements thereon, and
offered to the public for sale, in cash or in installment terms. It shall
include all residential, commercial, industrial and recreational
areas, as well as open spaces and other community and public
areas in the project."
Observe that the provision does not confine the meaning of
"subdivision project" to parcels of land classified as residential,
contrary to what petitioners restrictively propose. A subdivision
project also includes parcels of land classified as commercial.
Indeed, the crucial requirement is that the subdivision project is
partitioned primarily for residential purposes, even if it is situated
in a commercial district.
In this case, the subdivision project was intended primarily for
residential purposes. No less than petitioners' Development Permit
showed that the project was for socialized housing. Although the
location of the subdivision was classified as a commercial district,
the subdivision project continued to be for residential purposes
and was not removed from the ambit of P.D. No. 957.
We have examined Sections 4 and 17 of P.D. No. 957, and found
petitioners' interpretation thereof, flawed. We quote these
sections for clarity:
SEC. 4. Registration of Projects. - The registered owner of a parcel
of land who wishes to convert the same into a subdivision project
shall submit his subdivision plan to the Authority which shall act
upon and approve the same, upon a finding that the plan complies
with the Subdivision Standards and Regulations enforceable at the
time the plan is submitted. The same procedure shall be followed
in the case of a plan for a condominium project except that, in
addition, said Authority shall act upon and approve the plan with
respect to the building or buildings included in the condominium
project in accordance with the National Building Code (R.A. No.
6541).
The subdivision plan, as so approved, shall then be submitted to
the Director of Lands for approval in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Section 44 of the Land Registration Act (Act
No. 496, as amended by R.A. No. 440): Provided, that in case of
complex subdivision plans, court approval shall no longer be
required. The condominium plan as likewise so approved, shall be
submitted to the Register of Deeds of the province or city in which
the property lies and the same shall be acted upon subject to the
conditions and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
Section 4 of the Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726).
xxxx
SEC. 17. Registration. - All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other
similar instruments relative to the sale or conveyance of the
subdivision lots and condominium units, whether or not the
purchase price is paid in full, shall be registered by the seller in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
property is situated.
Whenever a subdivision plan duly approved in accordance with
Section 4 hereof, together with the corresponding owner's
duplicate certificate of title, is presented to the Register of Deeds
for registration, the Register of Deeds shall register the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as
amended: Provided, however, that if there is a street, passageway
or required open space delineated on a complex subdivision plan
hereafter approved and as defined in this Decree, the Register of
Deeds shall annotate on the new certificate of title covering the
street, passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect
that except by way of donation in favor of a city or municipality, no
portion of any street, passageway, or open space so delineated on
the plan shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered
owner without the requisite approval as provided under Section 22
of this Decree.
Simply stated, P.D. No. 957 provides that when a registered owner
of a parcel of land wishes to convert the same into a subdivision
project, he must register the subdivision plan with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (Section 4). Should he decide
to sell the lots therein, he must also register the subdivision project
with the HLURB and the subdivision plan with the Register of Deeds
(Section 17, paragraph 2). Thereafter, a registration certificate is
issued to the subdivision owner and he may then apply for a License
to Sell the lots in the subdivision project. Whenever a lot is
subsequently sold, the subdivision owner is required to register the
contract to sell, deed of sale and/or other similar instrument with
the Register of Deeds (Section 17, paragraph 1).
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners are required to
register the Contracts to Sell in favor of respondent Lee, and their
failure to do so is a violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957.
On the second issue, does the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City
have authority to file the informations?
Section 3 of E.O. No. 71 provides that:
SEC. 3. – Without prejudice to the Board's overall monitoring,
enforcement and visitorial powers, local chief executives shall
designate appropriate local officials who meet or possess the
qualifications, standards and criteria set by the HLURB as
enforcement officers who shall have full power to monitor,
investigate and enforce compliance with these provisions of
national laws and standards whose implementation have been
devolved to the local government in accordance with this Order.
Relative to the remaining provisions of the said laws, said officials
shall, upon request of local chief executive concerned, be
authorized by the Board to initiate preliminary monitoring and
investigative activities, and issue initial notices to enforce
compliance with the Board's mandates, orders and decisions. In all
such cases, the enforcement officer shall endorse the records of
the case, together with his actions thereon to the Board for its final
disposition and further enforcement actions.
In the exercise of his responsibilities under this Order, the said
enforcement officer shall be under the functional supervision of
HLURB, which shall promulgate standard operating procedures,
policy guidelines and instructions for the guidance of said officials
and call their attention to effect such remedial measures as may be
necessary. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the enforcement officers of local government units shall
only have full power to monitor, investigate and enforce
compliance with the provisions of national laws and standards
whose implementation have been devolved to the local
government in accordance with E.O. No. 71. Section 1 outlines
which functions have been devolved:
(a) Approval of preliminary as well as final subdivision schemes and
development plans of all subdivisions, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other purposes of the public and private sectors,
in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957 as amended and
its implementing standards, rules and regulations concerning
approval of subdivision plans;
(b) Approval of preliminary and final subdivision schemes and
development plans of all economic and socialized housing projects
as well as individual or group building and occupancy permits
covered by BP 220 and its implementing standards, rules and
regulations;
(c) Evaluation and resolution of opposition against the issuance of
development permits for any of the said projects, in accordance
with the said laws and the Rules of Procedure promulgated by
HLURB incident thereto;
(d) Monitoring the nature and progress of land development of
projects it has approved, as well as housing construction in the case
of house and lot packages, to ensure their faithfulness to the
approved plans and specifications thereof, and, imposition of
appropriate measures to enforce compliance therewith.
In the exercise of such responsibilities, the city or municipality
concerned shall be guided by the work program approved by the
Board upon evaluation of the developers' financial, technical and
administrative capabilities;
Moreover, the city or municipality concerned may call on the Board
for assistance in the imposition of administrative sanctions and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in the institution of the criminal
proceedings against violators;
(e) Assessment and collection of fees incident to the foregoing.
Noteworthy, the prosecution for the violation of Section 17 of P.D.
No. 957 is not included in the foregoing functions. Hence, it follows
logically that it remained with the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga
City.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend on
the defenses made by the defendant in his Answer or Motion to
Dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant.12 The informations rest
the cause of action on the petitioners' failure to register the
Contracts to Sell in accordance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 957. The
penalty imposable is a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand
Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years.13Once
again, clearly, the offense charged is well within the jurisdiction of
the trial court.
On the third issue, was Ruben S. Sia denied his right to counsel
when the trial court forced him to enter a plea with only a
counsel de oficio?
We agree with herein respondent Lee when she said that
petitioners were given ample time by the trial court to get a counsel
of their choice, but did not. Through the course of the proceedings,
the petitioners filed several motions. In its Orders dated November
21, 2001,14 the trial court noted that although the informations
were filed on August 7, 2000, the petitioners have not yet been
arraigned as of that day. The delay could no longer be
countenanced.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution assuring an accused
of counsel of his choice pertains specifically to a person under
investigation. Even if we were to extend the choice of a counsel to
an accused in a criminal prosecution, the matter of the accused
getting a lawyer of his preference cannot be so absolute and
arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to
the predilection of the accused.15 In Amion v. Chiongson this Court
stated:
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of
a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude
other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling
his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a
custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused
who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not
available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have
been contemplated by the framers of the charter.16
In our view, petitioners' dilatory tactics should no longer be allowed
to trump the progress of the judicial process.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 68057 dated
April 25, 2003 and July 29, 2003, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174584 January 20, 2010
VICTORIA P. CABRAL, Petitioner,
vs.
JACINTO UY, MICHAEL UY, MARILYN O. UY, RICHARD O. UY, REY
IGNACIO DIAZ, JOSE PO and JUANITO MALTO, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the power of courts to hear criminal violations of
the law that protects subdivision buyers against developers selling
lots before they are issued licenses to sell and the effect of the
subsequent issuance of such licenses to sales that land developers
make before the issuance of their licenses.
The Facts and the Case
Respondent Jacinto Uy (Uy) is the chairman of Moldex Realty, Inc.
(Moldex); the other respondents are its officers and directors. Uy
entered into a joint venture agreement with Quintin Bernardo for
the inclusion into Moldex’s residential subdivision project in
Bulacan of two parcels of land, totaling 20,954 square meters, that
Bernardo held under two emancipation patents.1
On June 21, 2001 Moldex applied for a license to sell subdivision
lots in the project mentioned with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)2 but the latter denied the application for
failure to comply with the requirements.3
On July 2, 2002 petitioner Victoria P. Cabral filed a criminal
complaint4 against respondents Uy, et al. for violation of Section 5
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 957, alleging that she was the
registered owner of the lots subject of Bernardo’s emancipation
patents. She said that prior to the transaction between Bernardo
and respondent Uy, the latter offered to acquire the lots from her
but she refused because of the pending case for cancellation of the
patents that she filed against Bernardo with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
On April 28, 2003 the public prosecutor’s office filed a criminal
information before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City5 in
Criminal Case Q-03-116823 against respondent Uy and the other
Moldex officers, namely, respondents Michael Uy, Marilyn O. Uy,
Richard O. Uy, Rey Ignacio Diaz, Jose Po, and Juanito Malto for
selling subdivision lots to a certain Josefa C. Yanga without a license
from the HLURB.6
Subsequently, however, or on September 17, 2003 the HLURB
issued Moldex the license to sell that it needed.7
Respondents Uy, et al. filed a motion to quash the information and
motion for judicial determination of probable cause8 claiming that
the office of the prosecutor and the trial court had no jurisdiction
over violations of P.D. 957, such jurisdiction being with the HLURB
alone and, granting that they could take cognizance of the case,
respondents Uy, et al. could not be held criminally liable because
the HLURB subsequently issued them a license to sell.9
On May 20, 2004 the trial court denied the motions of respondents
Uy, et al.10 On June 15, 2005 it also denied their motion for
reconsideration,11 prompting them to appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 90468, which court granted their prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.12 On June 2, 2006
the latter court rendered a decision,13 upholding the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the subject case but ordaining its dismissal, given
that the subsequent issuance of a license to sell extinguished
respondents Uy, et al.’s criminal liability. Petitioner Cabral filed a
motion for reconsideration but the appeals court denied14 it,
hence, this petition.
Required to comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
General joined the petitioner in asking this Court to reverse the
CA’s decision.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case15 are:
1. Whether or not the office of the public prosecutor and the trial
court have jurisdiction over criminal actions for violation of P.D.
957; and
2. Whether or not HLURB’s subsequent issuance to Moldex of a
license to sell extinguished respondents Uy, et al.’s criminal liability
for selling subdivision lots prior to the issuance of such license.
The Court’s Rulings
First. Conformably with what this Court ruled in Sia v. People,16 the
CA correctly upheld the public prosecutor’s authority to file the
criminal information for violation of P.D. 957 and the trial court’s
power to hear and adjudicate the action, the penalty being a
₱20,000.00 fine and imprisonment of not exceeding 10 years or
both such fine and imprisonment. This penalty brings the offense
within the jurisdiction of that court.
Second. P.D. 957 has been enacted to regulate for the public good
the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums. Its Section 5
prohibits such sale without the prior issuance of an HLURB
license17 and punishes those who engage in such selling.18 The
crime is regarded as malum prohibitum since P.D. 957 is a special
law designed to protect the welfare of society and ensure the
carrying on of the purposes of civil life.19 It is the commission of that
act as defined by law, not its character or effect that determines
whether or not its provision has been violated. Malice or criminal
intent is immaterial in such crime.20 In crimes that are mala
prohibita, the forbidden acts might not be inherently immoral. Still
they are punished because the law says they are forbidden. With
these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been
violated.211avvphi1
Since the Information in this case sufficiently alleged that Moldex
sold a subdivision lot when it did not yet have a license to do so,
the crime was done. Assuming the allegations to be true, the
subsequent issuance of the license and the invocation of good faith
cannot reach back to erase the offense and extinguish respondents
Uy, et al.’s criminal liability.
In ruling that respondents’ criminal liability has been extinguished,
the CA relied on Co Chien v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,
Inc.22 But Co Chien is a case for refund of down payment and
nullification of the contract of sale between the buyer and the
developer whose license was issued only after the execution of the
contract. This Court refused to void the transaction in the case
because the absence of the license was not in itself sufficient to
invalidate the contract. And while there was no fraud on the part
of the developer, the HLURB directed it to pay an administrative
fine of ₱20,000.00 for selling the lot without the necessary license.
This only shows that the subsequent issuance of a license, as in this
case, will not extinguish the liability of the developer for violation
of Section 5 of P.D. 957.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the June 2, 2006 Decision and the August 22, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 90468. The Court
REINSTATES the May 20, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-03-116823, which denied
respondents’ omnibus motion to quash and motion for judicial
determination of probable cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168380 February 8, 2007
MANUEL V. BAVIERA, Petitioner,
vs.
ESPERANZA PAGLINAWAN, in her capacity as Department of
Justice State Prosecutor; LEAH C. TANODRA-ARMAMENTO, In her
capacity as Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Chairwoman of
Task Force on Business Scam; JOVENCITO R. ZUNO, in his capacity
as Department of Justice Chief State Prosecutor; STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, PAUL SIMON MORRIS, AJAY KANWAL,
SRIDHAR RAMAN, MARIVEL GONZALES, CHONA REYES, MARIA
ELLEN VICTOR, and ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, Respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 170602 February 8, 2007
MANUEL V. BAVIERA, Petitioner,
vs.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, BRYAN K. SANDERSON, THE RIGHT
HONORABLE LORD STEWARTBY, EVAN MERVYN DAVIES,
MICHAEL BERNARD DENOMA, CHRISTOPHER AVEDIS KELJIK,
RICHARD HENRY MEDDINGS, KAI NARGOLWALA, PETER
ALEXANDER SANDS, RONNIE CHI CHUNG CHAN, SIR CK CHOW,
BARRY CLARE, HO KWON PING, RUDOLPH HAROLD PETER
ARKHAM, DAVID GEORGE MOIR, HIGH EDWARD NORTON, SIR
RALPH HARRY ROBINS, ANTHONY WILLIAM PAUL STENHAM
(Standard Chartered Bank Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and
Members of the Board), SHERAZAM MAZARI (Group Regional
Head for Consumer Banking), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, AJAY
KANWAL, SRIDHAR RAMAN, MARIVEL GONZALES, CHONA REYES,
ELLEN VICTOR, RAMONA H. BERNAD, DOMINGO CARBONELL, JR.,
and ZENAIDA IGLESIAS (Standard Chartered Bank-Philippines
Branch Heads/Officers), Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
873281 and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.2
The common factual antecedents of these cases as shown by the
records are:
Manuel Baviera, petitioner in these cases, was the former head of
the HR Service Delivery and Industrial Relations of Standard
Chartered Bank-Philippines (SCB), one of herein respondents. SCB
is a foreign banking corporation duly licensed to engage in banking,
trust, and other fiduciary business in the Philippines. Pursuant to
Resolution No. 1142 dated December 3, 1992 of the Monetary
Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the conduct of SCB’s
business in this jurisdiction is subject to the following conditions:
1. At the end of a one-year period from the date the SCB starts its
trust functions, at least 25% of its trust accounts must be for the
account of non-residents of the Philippines and that actual foreign
exchange had been remitted into the Philippines to fund such
accounts or that the establishment of such accounts had reduced
the indebtedness of residents (individuals or corporations or
government agencies) of the Philippines to non-residents. At the
end of the second year, the above ratio shall be 50%, which ratio
must be observed continuously thereafter;
2. The trust operations of SCB shall be subject to all existing laws,
rules and regulations applicable to trust services, particularly the
creation of a Trust Committee; and
3. The bank shall inform the appropriate supervising and examining
department of the BSP at the start of its operations.
Apparently, SCB did not comply with the above conditions. Instead,
as early as 1996, it acted as a stock broker, soliciting from local
residents foreign securities called "GLOBAL THIRD PARTY MUTUAL
FUNDS" (GTPMF), denominated in US dollars. These securities were
not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
These were then remitted outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB-
Singapore.
SCB’s counsel, Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc and Delos
Angeles Law Office, advised the bank to proceed with the selling of
the foreign securities although unregistered with the SEC, under
the guise of a "custodianship agreement;" and should it be
questioned, it shall invoke Section 723 of the General Banking Act
(Republic Act No.337).4 In sum, SCB was able to sell GTPMF
securities worth around ₱6 billion to some 645 investors.
However, SCB’s operations did not remain unchallenged. On July
18, 1997, the Investment Capital Association of the Philippines
(ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint alleging that SCB violated the
Revised Securities Act,5particularly the provision prohibiting the
selling of securities without prior registration with the SEC; and that
its actions are potentially damaging to the local mutual fund
industry.
In its answer, SCB denied offering and selling securities, contending
that it has been performing a "purely informational function"
without solicitations for any of its investment outlets abroad; that
it has a trust license and the services it renders under the
"Custodianship Agreement" for offshore investments are
authorized by Section 726 of the General Banking Act; that its
clients were the ones who took the initiative to invest in securities;
and it has been acting merely as an agent or "passive order taker"
for them.
On September 2, 1997, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order
against SCB, holding that its services violated Sections 4(a)7 and
198 of the Revised Securities Act.
Meantime, the SEC indorsed ICAP’s complaint and its supporting
documents to the BSP.
On October 31, 1997, the SEC informed the Secretary of Finance
that it withdrew GTPMF securities from the market and that it will
not sell the same without the necessary clearances from the
regulatory authorities.
Meanwhile, on August 17, 1998, the BSP directed SCB not to
include investments in global mutual funds issued abroad in its
trust investments portfolio without prior registration with the SEC.
On August 31, 1998, SCB sent a letter to the BSP confirming that it
will withdraw third-party fund products which could be directly
purchased by investors.
However, notwithstanding its commitment and the BSP directive,
SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF securities in this country.
This prompted petitioner to enter into an Investment Trust
Agreement with SCB wherein he purchased US$8,000.00 worth of
securities upon the bank’s promise of 40% return on his investment
and a guarantee that his money is safe. After six (6) months,
however, petitioner learned that the value of his investment went
down to US$7,000.00. He tried to withdraw his investment but was
persuaded by Antonette de los Reyes of SCB to hold on to it for
another six (6) months in view of the possibility that the market
would pick up.
Meanwhile, on November 27, 2000, the BSP found that SCB failed
to comply with its directive of August 17, 1998. Consequently, it
was fined in the amount of ₱30,000.00.
The trend in the securities market, however, was bearish and the
worth of petitioner’s investment went down further to only
US$3,000.00.
On October 26, 2001, petitioner learned from Marivel Gonzales,
head of the SCB Legal and Compliance Department, that the latter
had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF securities. Petitioner
then filed with the BSP a letter-complaint demanding
compensation for his lost investment. But SCB denied his demand
on the ground that his investment is "regular."
On July 15, 2003, petitioner filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), represented herein by its prosecutors, public respondents, a
complaint charging the above-named officers and members of the
SCB Board of Directors and other SCB officials, private respondents,
with syndicated estafa, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1059.
For their part, private respondents filed the following as counter-
charges against petitioner: (1) blackmail and extortion, docketed as
I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; and blackmail and perjury, docketed as I.S.
No. 2003-1278.
On September 29, 2003, petitioner also filed a complaint for
perjury against private respondents Paul Simon Morris and Marivel
Gonzales, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.
On December 4, 2003, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order
against SCB restraining it from further offering, soliciting, or
otherwise selling its securities to the public until these have been
registered with the SEC.
Subsequently, the SEC and SCB reached an amicable
settlement.1awphi1.net
On January 20, 2004, the SEC lifted its Cease and Desist Order and
approved the ₱7 million settlement offered by SCB. Thereupon,
SCB made a commitment not to offer or sell securities without prior
compliance with the requirements of the SEC.
On February 7, 2004, petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for
violation of Section 8.19 of the Securities Regulation Code against
private respondents, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-229.
On February 23, 2004, the DOJ rendered its Joint
Resolution10 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for syndicated estafa
in I.S. No. 2003-1059; private respondents’ complaint for blackmail
and extortion in I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; private respondents’
complaint for blackmail and perjury in I.S. No. 2003-1278; and
petitioner’s complaint for perjury against private respondents
Morris and Gonzales in I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.
Meanwhile, in a Resolution11 dated April 4, 2004, the DOJ dismissed
petitioner’s complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229 (violation of Securities
Regulation Code), holding that it should have been filed with the
SEC.
Petitioner’s motions to dismiss his complaints were denied by the
DOJ. Thus, he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85078. He alleged that the
DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his complaint for syndicated
estafa.
He also filed with the Court of Appeals a separate petition for
certiorari assailing the DOJ Resolution dismissing I.S. No. 2004-229
for violation of the Securities Regulation Code. This petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87328. Petitioner claimed that the DOJ
acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in holding that the complaint should have been filed
with the SEC.
On January 7, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
dismissing the petition.1avvphi1.net It sustained the ruling of the
DOJ that the case should have been filed initially with the SEC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a
Resolution dated May 27, 2005.
Meanwhile, on February 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered
its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078 (involving petitioner’s charges
and respondents’ counter charges) dismissing the petition on the
ground that the purpose of a petition for certiorari is not to
evaluate and weigh the parties’ evidence but to determine whether
the assailed Resolution of the DOJ was issued with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Again, petitioner
moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution of
November 22, 2005.
Hence, the instant petitions for review on certiorari.
For our resolution is the fundamental issue of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s complaint in I.S. 2004-
229 for violation of Securities Regulation Code and his complaint in
I.S. No. 2003-1059 for syndicated estafa.
G.R. No 168380
Re: I.S. No. 2004-229
For violation of the Securities Regulation Code
Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides:
SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses.–
53. 1. The Commission may, in its discretion, make such
investigation as it deems necessary to determine whether any
person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Code,
any rule, regulation or order thereunder, or any rule of an
Exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency, other
self-regulatory organization, and may require or permit any person
to file with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as
the Commission shall determine, as to all facts and circumstances
concerning the matter to be investigated. The Commission may
publish information concerning any such violations and to
investigate any fact, condition, practice or matter which it may
deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Code, in the prescribing of rules and regulations
thereunder, or in securing information to serve as a basis for
recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which
this Code relates: Provided, however, That any person requested or
subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in any investigation
shall simultaneously be notified in writing of the purpose of such
investigation: Provided, further, That all criminal complaints for
violations of this Code and the implementing rules and
regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be
referred to the Department of Justice for preliminary
investigation and prosecution before the proper court: Provided,
furthermore, That in instances where the law allows independent
civil or criminal proceedings of violations arising from the act, the
Commission shall take appropriate action to implement the
same: Provided, finally; That the investigation, prosecution, and
trial of such cases shall be given priority.
The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a
criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered by
the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds
that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the
DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing
procedural requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is
a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized
knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.12 The Securities
Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly
vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the
Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed
with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC
shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation
and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed
a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal complaint
directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be
ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
G.R. No. 170602
Re: I.S. No. 2003-1059 for
Syndicated Estafa
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides that all criminal actions, commenced by either
a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor. This mandate is
founded on the theory that a crime is a breach of the security and
peace of the people at large, an outrage against the very
sovereignty of the State. It follows that a representative of the In Suarez previously cited, this Court made it clear that a public
State shall direct and control the prosecution of the offense.13 This prosecutor’s duty is two-fold. On one hand, he is bound by his oath
representative of the State is the public prosecutor, whom this of office to prosecute persons where the complainant’s evidence is
Court described in the old case of Suarez v. Platon,14 as: ample and sufficient to show prima facie guilt of a crime. Yet, on
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but the other hand, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution.22
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, the petition for review against private respondents and in
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very concluding that the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of discretion
definite sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffers. On petitioner’s complaint for violation of the Securities Regulation
Concomitant with his authority and power to control the Code, suffice it to state that, as aptly declared by the Court of
prosecution of criminal offenses, the public prosecutor is vested Appeals, he should have filed it with the SEC, not the DOJ. Again,
with the discretionary power to determine whether a prima there is no indication here that in dismissing petitioner’s complaint,
facie case exists or not.15 This is done through a preliminary the DOJ acted capriciously or arbitrarily.
investigation designed to secure the respondent from hasty, WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions and AFFIRM the assailed
malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87328 and in
is essentially an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.
committed; and (b) whether there is probable cause that the Costs against petitioner.
accused is guilty thereof.16 In Pontejos v. Office of the SO ORDERED.
Ombudsman,17probable cause is defined as such facts and
circumstances that would engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It is the public prosecutor
who determines during the preliminary investigation whether
probable cause exists. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss
the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound
discretion of the prosecutor.
Given this latitude and authority granted by law to the investigating
prosecutor, the rule in this jurisdiction is that courts will not
interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations or in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding
information against an offender.18 Courts are not empowered to
substitute their own judgment for that of the executive
branch.19 Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute
or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a
public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a
complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to
warrant the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor’s
findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to
review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have
been made with grave abuse of discretion.20
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.21
In determining whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of
discretion, it is expedient to know if the findings of factof herein
public prosecutors were reached in an arbitrary or despotic
manner.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s evidence is insufficient
to establish probable cause for syndicated estafa. There is no
showing from the record that private respondents herein did
induce petitioner by false representations to invest in the GTPMF
securities. Nor did they act as a syndicate to misappropriate his
money for their own benefit. Rather, they invested it in accordance
with his written instructions. That he lost his investment is not their
fault since it was highly speculative.
Records show that public respondents examined petitioner’s
evidence with care, well aware of their duty to prevent material
damage to his constitutional right to liberty and fair play.
G.R. No. 154557 February 13, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 12th DIVISION, RICO LIPAO,
and RICKSON LIPAO, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Where a court acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction
continues to the final conclusion of the case. Such jurisdiction is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such dispute in
another court or tribunal unless the statute provides for
retroactivity.1
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to nullify
the June 13, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 17275 which set aside the July 25, 1994 Judgment3 of the
Surigao City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 and dismissed
Criminal Case No. 551 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rico
Lipao and Rickson Lipao for violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 705,4 as amended by Executive Order No. (EO)
277.5
On February 24, 1992, private respondents Rico and Rickson Lipao
were indicted for and pleaded not guilty to violation of Sec. 68 of
PD 705, as amended by EO 277. The Information in Criminal Case
No. 551 reads:
That on or about the 21st day of October 1991 in Cagdianao, Surigao
del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao without legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess without license
eight (8) pieces of round timbers and 160 bundles of firewood with
a market value of P3,100.00, said forest products not covered with
legal transport document, and willfully and unlawfully load these
forest products in the pumpboat "Rickjoy" owned by Rico Lipao,
nor the accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao holders of a license
issued by the DENR, to the prejudice of the government in the sum
of P3,100.00.
Contrary to law. The offense is punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
provided under Section 68 of PD No. 705.6
The offense charged is punishable under Art. 309 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Art. 309. Penalties.—Any person guilty of theft shall be punished
by:
xxxx
2. The penalty of prisiόn correccional in its medium and maximum
period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
Prisiόn correccional in its medium period is imprisonment from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months while prisiόn
correccional in its maximum period is imprisonment from 4 years,
2 months and 1 day to 6 years.
Parenthetically, during the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551
and before the RTC rendered its Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA)
76917 took effect on April 15, 1994 or 15 days after its publication
on March 30, 1994. RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal
Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in
criminal cases to cover all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six years irrespective of the amount of fine and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including civil penalties arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.
Before the amendments of RA 7691, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provided that the
MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than PhP 4,000,
or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value, or amount thereof.
On July 25, 1994, the RTC rendered its Judgment, finding private
respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao both guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum; and each to pay one-half of the costs.
The posts and firewood in question, or the proceeds thereof if sold
at public auction are hereby forfeited in favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED.8
Private respondents seasonably interposed their appeal before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17275. They argued that private
respondent Rickson was subjected to an illegal search and seizure
of the round posts and firewood which cannot be used as evidence
against him. They insisted that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) personnel together with some Philippine
National Police personnel who stopped private respondent Rickson
did not have a search warrant. They also opined that the "plain
sight" or "open review" doctrine is inapplicable as the posts and
firewood are not incriminatory, more so as firewood is available
and sold in public markets without the requirement of any permit
from the DENR.
Moreover, private respondents argued that the prosecution failed
to prove their lack of license to possess timber. They contended
that since private respondent Rico is merely the owner of the
pumpboat and was not present when the posts and firewood were
seized, he could never be held liable for illegal possession of timber
as he was never in possession of the round posts. Relying on People
v. Macagaling,9 private respondents asserted that constructive
possession of forest products is no longer the rule in successfully
prosecuting offenses for violation of the Forestry Code.
On June 13, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting
the appeal of private respondents and dismissing the case before it
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. The decretal portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the Decision appealed from is SET
ASIDE. The instant criminal case is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.10
In sustaining the appeal of private respondents, the CA did not rule
on the assigned errors or on the merits of the case. It anchored its
dismissal of the criminal case on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC
to hear and decide it.
Thus, People of the Philippines filed the instant petition, raising the
sole assignment of error that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARBITRARILY AND WHIMSICALLY
DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
ON THE GROUND THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN VIEW OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691
WHICH BECAME EFFECTIVE ON APRIL 15, 1994.11
Petitioner People posits that the passage of RA 7691 did not ipso
facto take jurisdiction away from the RTC to hear and decide the
instant criminal case instituted prior to the passage of said law
expanding the jurisdiction of the MTCs.
On the other hand, in their Comment and Memorandum, private
respondents do not meet head on the sole issue raised by
petitioner on jurisdiction but instead argue that the instant petition
should have been outrightly dismissed on the grounds of
noncompliance with the
requirements for a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
and the requisites for a valid verification. Private respondents
asseverate that the instant petition cannot be entertained as no
motion for reconsideration has been filed before the CA, which is a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to petitioner and an
indispensable and jurisdictional requirement for the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, relying on Labudahon v. NLRC.12 Moreover,
they contend that an action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the
wrong remedy as the dismissal by the CA on lack of jurisdiction did
not constitute double jeopardy and, thus, an appeal through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper
remedy. They maintain that the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), while undoubtedly the counsel for the State and its
agencies, cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to execute in its
name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office,
which in the instant case is the DENR.
The arguments of private respondents are unmeritorious.
On the issue of the propriety of the resort to a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition under Rule 45, we
find that Rule 65 is the proper remedy. The CA ruled that the RTC
was ousted of its jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of RA
7691. While the defense of lack of jurisdiction was never raised by
private respondents before the RTC and the CA, the CA
nevertheless proceeded to acquit private respondents based on
the new law. It is quite glaring from Sec. 7 of RA 7691 that said law
has limited retroactivity only to civil cases. As such, the CA indeed
committed grave abuse of discretion as it acted in an arbitrary and
patently erroneous exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, the use of Rule 65 is proper.
On other procedural issues, we also find for petitioner. First, we
reiterate our holding in Santiago and City Warden of the Manila
City Jail that the signature by the Solicitor General on the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition
before the CA or with this
Court is substantial compliance of the requirement under Sec.
4,13 Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that the
OSG is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, more so
in a criminal case where the People or the State is the real party-in-
interest and is the aggrieved party.
Second, while it is true that petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision which normally is a
ground for dismissal for being premature14 and to accord
respondent CA opportunity to correct itself,15yet the rule admits of
exceptions, such as where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless,16 and where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government.17
In the instant case, these exceptions are present; thus, the
propriety of the instant petition. The assailed CA Decision rendered
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction clearly bespeaks that any
motion for reconsideration is useless. For one, the issue of lack of
jurisdiction was never raised by private respondents in their Brief
for the Accused-Appellants,18 but was considered motu proprio by
the CA. For another, the issues and errors raised by private
respondents were not considered and much less touched upon by
the CA in its assailed Decision.
But of more importance, as this Court held in Vivo v. Cloribel,19 a
motion for reconsideration is not necessary before a petition for
certiorari can be filed when the respondent court took almost eight
years to the day to resolve private respondents’ appeal. It is not
only the accused who has a right to a speedy disposition of his case,
but the prosecution or the State representing the People also has
and must be accorded the same right. Thus, any further delay
would prejudice the interest of the Government to prosecute and
bring closure to a criminal case filed way back in early 1992.
On the main issue of whether the RTC retained jurisdiction over the
criminal case, we agree with petitioner. The passage of RA 7691 did
not ipso facto relieve the RTC of the jurisdiction to hear and decide
the criminal case against private respondents.
This issue has been laid to rest in People v. Velasco, where this
Court emphatically held:
As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to divest the
Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over appellant’s case, we rule in
the negative. It has been consistently held as a general rule that
the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The
exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or
is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to
actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing
the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be
applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a
statute.
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions
apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial
stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it
be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases
pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity. Thus, the general rule enunciated above is the
controlling doctrine in the case at bar. At the time the case against
the appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on
July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
offense charged, inasmuch as Section 39 of R.A. 6425 (the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 prior to the amendments introduced
by R.A. 7659 and R.A. 7691), provided that:
Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. - The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Court, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have
concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces
where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said
courts shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders
are under sixteen years of age.
xxxx
It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested
concurrent jurisdiction upon the said courts regardless of the
imposable penalty. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC)
over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law
then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information
was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the
action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691
reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application
of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in
nature.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court categorically reiterated the above ruling in the 2003 case
of Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals,21 in the 2004 case of Alonto v.
People,22 and in the 2005 case of Lee v. Court of Appeals.23
Thus, where private respondents had been charged with illegal
logging punishable under Articles 30924 and 31025of the Revised
Penal Code with imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
nine (9) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction at the inception of the
criminal case. Since jurisdiction over the criminal case attached
upon the filing of the information, then the RTC is empowered and
mandated to try and decide said case notwithstanding a
subsequent change in the jurisdiction over criminal cases of the
same nature under a new statute. The rule is settled that
jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it can do to
exercise that jurisdiction unless the law provides otherwise.26
While jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage of the
proceedings, private respondents did not bother to raise the issue
of jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. In addition, private
respondents did not lift a finger to reinforce the CA decision relying
on lack of jurisdiction as ground for the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 551 in their submissions before this Court. Indeed, it appears
that even respondents are not convinced of the correctness of the
CA ruling on the issue of jurisdiction.
Lastly, the CA committed reversible error in making use of the
values adduced during the hearing to determine jurisdiction. It is
basic that the jurisdiction of a court is determined both by the law
in force at the time of the commencement of the action and by the
allegations in the Complaint or Information.
Thus, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction when it heard and decided
Criminal Case No. 551. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the
RTC was divested of jurisdiction by reason of the enactment of RA
7691.
However, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, we
remand the case to the CA to resolve the appeal in CA-G.R. CR No.
17275 on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 13, 2002
CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The CA is directed to resolve the appeal of private
respondents on the merits and with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO
PLAZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, 2005
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse and set
aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated
July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts follow.
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case,
with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or
The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the
cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of
Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00) . The Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer,
being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash
advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount
of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine
Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is
duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law,
with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of ₱33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to
the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April
7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an
Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its
comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss
on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
Resolution6on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court.
The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby
ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its
filing in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal
jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees
enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by
Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying
a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are
charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the
felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to
office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayan’s
appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that the Inding case did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as
amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either
a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A.
8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of
R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in
relation to public office.
In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza
argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is
apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined
first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the
rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the
Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction
only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public
official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the
accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of
those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of
P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A.
3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies
other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that
a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and
higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction
over him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the
affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante9 is a case with
uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in
the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were
both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that,
respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One
Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (₱71,095.00) while respondent Plaza
failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos
(₱33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this
Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a
background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,
promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11,
1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
shall remain at all times accountable to the people.11
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23,
1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975
approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to
P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by
R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which
took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in
the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on
or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed
on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier
mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the
time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception contained
in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides
that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause
of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions
states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense: x x x.14
Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under
Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by
public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved
where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what
applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25,
2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as
amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade
"27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan
to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch
occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that
they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same
law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial
governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of
the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher;
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that
other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office
also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of
the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an
offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it was
ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1)
of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and
which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this
Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v.
Sandiganbayan and Amante,17 that the Inding case did not
categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of
the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606,
as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is
either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was
charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this
Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses
involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b)
where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to
the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows
that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other
offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other
offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to
those that are committed in relation to the public official or
employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense
charged in the information is intimately connected with the office
and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in
the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime
and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the
aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an
offense committed in relation" to his office.18 Thus, in the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,19 where the crime involved
was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include
the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the
accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position
or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public
officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x
x Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public
official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained
allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of
his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan
when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article
282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G.
Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill
Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a
privilege speech critical of petitioner’s administration. Clearly,
based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately
connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This
was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997
resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public
hearing" and that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by
complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech.
It was his response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If
he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered
by whatever private complainant might have said during said
privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case.1avvphi1
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of
the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation of
The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense
was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under
Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the
intention of the law had been to extend the application of the
exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could
assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to
distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one
hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said
reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In
the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public
office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves,
while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is
enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in
relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding
the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in
relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court
elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense committed
in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid
down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception
to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108
Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that
an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the
accused’s office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such
that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x."
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion,
said that "although public office is not an element of the crime of
murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show
that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the
accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit
the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held
their aforesaid offices. x x x"21
(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials
involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those
public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those
specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,22 unless it
is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who
are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics
supplied.)24
With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case
of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,25 the issue as to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is
hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1693 August 21, 2002
OSCAR M. POSO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE H. MIJARES, RTC-Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar
and FLOR SERIO, OIC Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of
Court, respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME that respondent Judge Jose H. Mijares,
RTC-Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar, is hailed to Court to defend
his integrity and competence. Previously, for dismissing a petition
for mandamus even long after a final and executory judgment
thereon had been rendered based on a compromise agreement
executed by the parties, and his open admission of negligence and
lack of care in attending to incidents brought before him for
adjudication, this Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. We meted him a fine of P5,000.00 with stern warning that
repetition of the same or similar infractions complained of would
be dealt with more severely.1Obviously, by then, particularly after
our stern warning intended to be taken seriously and committed to
both heart and memory, he should have been more solicitous in his
task to steer clear of blunders, especially their repetitions, and to
satisfy claims in a manner which, although late in coming, he could
have rightfully and lawfully done.
Unfortunately, except for the inclusion of respondent Flor Serio,
OIC Clerk of Court, RTC, Northern Samar, the instant complaint for
administrative sanctions against Judge Mijares for allegedly
railroading the criminal case against a self-confessed killer and
admitting him to probation, which unduly obviated the accused’s
otherwise definite date with prison, reflects the same
incompetence earlier established on his part. Worse, the complaint
demonstrates his apparent incorrigibility as exhibited by
documents on record showing res ipsa loquitur, a sinister pattern
of bad faith to favor the accused therein with a mere slap on the
wrist and to foist fraud upon this Court. While the rules excuse
honest errors of discretion as acceptable professional hazards, a
defense ardently raised by respondent Judge, the series of his
unbelievable mistakes in the application of basic legal principles on
probation and criminal penalties together with his clear attempt at
deception ought to be exposed, and punished, despite his
pretensions of uprightness and sincerity.
The instant administrative case stemmed from the proceedings in
Crim. Case No. 2477 for murder, "People v. Virgilio de Guia," where
the victim, a certain Lito M. Galupo, was a relative of complainant
Oscar M. Poso. On 6 February 1995 the criminal case was raffled to
RTC-Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar,2 presided over by respondent
Judge Jose H. Mijares in an acting capacity by detail from his regular
station at RTC-Br. 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte.3 On 16 October
1995 the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Accordingly, the case was set for pre-trial and trial on 10
November 1995 but the proceedings were reset to 27 November
1995.4
On 27 November 1995, in the course of the pre-trial conference in
Crim. Case No. 2477,5 the accused withdrew his plea of not
guilty6 and pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide.7 This
was done with the open consent of handling Public Prosecutor
Napoleon C. Lagrimas and the private offended parties therein
including complainant Oscar Poso.8 Parenthetically, it is surprising
for respondent Judge to testify that even before he assumed over
RTC-Br. 21 in an acting capacity in 1994, the Information in Crim.
Case No. 2477 had already been amended to homicide by crudely
crossing out the original caption of murder and writing the
amended charge by hand when the same Information was filed
only in 1995 and other relevant proceedings therein took place not
later than the same year.9On the same day and occasion of the pre-
trial conference and without receiving evidence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, respondent Judge promulgated the
judgment or "Sentence," finding the accused guilty of
homicide.10 Curiously, Judge Mijares made allowance for three (3)
mitigating circumstances, i.e., plea of guilty, voluntary surrender
and intoxication, and accordingly sentenced the accused to four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim at
P40,000.00.11
Subsequent events in Crim. Case No. 2477 however complicated
the otherwise uneventful conviction of the accused. To begin with,
there was dispute as to whether the accused truly moved for
reconsideration of the penalty imposed on him by respondent
Judge Mijares. Complainant averred that respondent Judge had
acted upon an unsigned motion which the accused did not even file
with RTC-Br. 21. To prove his point he offered a two (2)-page
unsigned document entitled "Motion for Reconsideration" bearing
no date of receipt by RTC-Br. 21.12 On the other hand, respondent
Judge presented a different motion for reconsideration which was
stamped received by RTC-Br. 21 with due notice to Public
Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas together with the Branch Clerk of
Court,13 as well as the trial court’s notice of hearing of the motion
duly addressed to and received by the Public Prosecutor and the
Public Attorney’s Office.14 Judge Mijares further asserted that the
motion was actually heard on 28 December 1995 with both the
prosecution and the defense in attendance. There is however no
question that the prayer in the motion for reconsideration,
whether the copy held by complainant Poso or respondent Judge’s
record on file, was invariably for the reduction of the penalty
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum, to only two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and not to any
penalty below this.
Judge Mijares granted the motion for reconsideration in
a Resolution dated 10 January 1996. Unfortunately however two
(2) versions of the same Resolution, one being the alleged draft
version, and the other, a final copy thereof, although both were
penned by respondent Judge, surfaced and found circulation but
each imposing different maximum terms of the indeterminate
sentence. Complainant submitted a copy of the Resolution, Exh.
"D," reducing the penalty from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
In contrast, the Resolution dated 10 January 1996 proffered by
respondent Judge, Exh. "6," for no apparent reason, deviated from
the motion for reconsideration, oddly pegged both the minimum
and the maximum ranges of the indeterminate sentence at prision
correccional in violation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
ludicrously decreased the penalty to only two (2) years four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum. It is at once
apparent from the two (2) resolutions that respondent Judge
erased the words "and one (1) day of prision mayor" in the
dispositive portion of complainant’s copy thereof15and replaced
them with "of prision correccional" as appearing in Judge Mijares’
version of Resolution dated 10 January 1996.16 Respondent Judge
admitted that complainant’s copy was actually only a draft of
his Resolution dated 10 January 1996 which in its final form was
allegedly the document in the judge’s custody.17
On 11 January 1996, taking his cue from the reduced penalty in
Crim. Case No. 2477 and on the very day that the accused filed his
application for probation and release on recognizance, even before
respondent Judge could act upon the application for probation, he
ordered the provisional discharge of the accused from detention
upon the recognizance of OIC Clerk of Court Flor Serio without
hearing the prosecution or giving any opportunity for the private
complainants to object.18 It was only the next day, or on 12 January
1996, that Judge Mijares ordered the Probation Officer to initiate
and conclude the necessary case study and investigation on the
application for probation. On 3 July 1996, upon the favorable
recommendation of the Probation Officer, respondent Judge
placed the accused on probation without objection from Public
Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas in a hearing called for this
purpose.19
On 1 February 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman referred to this
Court the Complaint-Affidavit of Oscar M. Poso concerning the turn
of events in Crim. Case No. 2477 and charging respondent Judge
Mijares with Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment, Issuing
Unjust Interlocutory Orders, Concealment of Documents and
Commission of Acts punishable under Sec. 3, pars. (e) and (f) of RA
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and respondent OIC Clerk of Court Flor Serio with
conspiracy to commit the foregoing acts and concealment of
documents.
Specifically, complainant alleged that respondent judge unjustly
and to the prejudice of the People of the Philippines and the private
complainants committed the following acts in the course of the
criminal case: (a) convicted the accused of homicide, after he had
pleaded guilty to this lesser offense, when the charge was for
murder of which he should have been convicted; (b) acted
favorably on 10 January 1996 on an unsigned Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the accused for the reduction of the prison
term imposed on him, i.e., from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum,to two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, without
notice to the handling Public Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas; (c)
unjustly released the accused on 11 January 1996 on the
recognizance of OIC Clerk of Court, respondent Flor Serio, without
notice and hearing; (d) gave due course to the application of the
accused for probation in his Order of 12 January 1996 without
hearing and in violation of Sec. 9 of the Probation Law which
provides that the benefits of the law do not extend to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six (6) years; and, (e) barred the issuance of certified copies of
relevant documents in Crim. Case No. 2477 requested by
complainant for purposes of his appeal, in conspiracy with the OIC
Clerk of Court Flor Serio. Complainant contended that respondent
Judge violated Sec. 3, pars. (e) and (f), RA 3019, punishing the acts
of causing any undue injury to any party including the government
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference as well as neglecting or refusing, after due request and
without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on
any matter pending for the purpose of discriminating against any
interested party.
With respect to respondent Flor Serio, complainant alleged that the
latter unjustly refused, in violation of Sec. 3, par. (f), RA 3019, to
furnish him with certified copies of the following documents
relative to Crim. Case No. 2477 which were requested for purposes
of perfecting an appeal, to wit: (a) Information; (b) Pre-Trial
Conference Order; (c) Sentence promulgated on 27 November 1995
finding the accused guilty of homicide after he pleaded guilty to this
lesser offense; (d) Resolution dated 10 January 1996 acting on
accused’s Motion for Reconsideration praying for reduction of his
penalty; and, (e) Order dated 12 January 1996 acting upon the
application for probation despite the absence of notice and hearing
and the appropriate penalty exceeding six (6) years.
On 11 April 2001 respondent Judge filed his Comment denying the
charges against him, particularly, that he granted probation to one
clearly disqualified under the Probation Law. As proof thereof,
respondent attached to his Comment the allegedly genuine copy of
the accused’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 12 December
199520 and the supposedly authentic copy of his Resolution dated
10 January 199621 wherein he reduced the penalty imposed upon
the accused from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum, to only two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum. He disclaimed the
due execution of complainant’s copy of Resolution dated 10
January 1996, and refuted the allegation of complainant that the
penalty he imposed upon the accused was six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum which would have otherwise
disqualified the accused from probation. Respondent Judge also
averred that the prosecution and the defense were duly notified of
the hearing of the motion for reconsideration and were actually
present thereat before he issued the assailed resolution.
In a Letter-Comment dated 6 April 2001 respondent Flor Serio
denied that she had refused to issue certified copies of the
documents requested by complainant Poso for the sole reason that
as the OIC Clerk of Court of the RTC of Northern Samar she had no
custody of the requested documents which were allegedly still in
the possession of the Clerk of Court for Branch 21 where Crim. Case
No. 2477 was pending.
In a Reply-Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 complainant branded as
falsified respondent Judge’s copy of Resolution dated 10 January
1996; prayed that Judge Mijares be preventively suspended
pending resolution of this case to prevent further falsification of
the records in Crim. Case No. 2477; and, insisted that respondent
Judge acted upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
accused without notice to handling Prosecutor Lagrimas, a fact
allegedly admitted by the prosecutor himself in his Counter-
Affidavit22 filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that the
records in Crim. Case No. 2477 were in the custody of OIC Clerk of
Court Flor Serio at the time the request for certified true copies
thereof was made.
On 22 August 2001, confronted with two (2) conflicting versions of
the pivotal Resolution dated 10 January 1996, and the apparent
mishandling of Crim. Case No. 2477, we referred the instant case
to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals for an
exhaustive investigation, report and recommendation. On 25
October 2001 Justice Cruz summoned the complainant and his
adversaries, Judge Mijares and OIC Clerk of Court Serio, for pre-trial
conference. Evidence for the parties was received in several
hearings held for this purpose.23 Thereafter complainant Poso and
respondent Judge submitted their respective Memoranda while
respondent Serio opted to file a Manifestation adopting in toto the
arguments and evidence of her co-respondent.
On 14 May 2002 Justice Cruz submitted to this Court his Report and
Recommendation of even date. His report called attention to the
reprehensible actuations of respondent Judge when he reduced
the penalty to ridiculous terms so as to qualify the accused for
probation; hastily ordered the discharge of the accused from jail on
recognizance without the benefit of notice and hearing afforded
the prosecution and the aggrieved parties, and even before he
could order the Probation Officer to conduct the requisite post-
sentence investigation on the accused in violation of the Probation
Law; illegally admitted the accused to probation despite the
appropriate maximum penalty for homicide exceeding six (6) years
which he should have been sentenced to serve; and, ignorantly
awarded civil indemnity of P40,000.00 to the heirs of the victim of
homicide when the amount should have been P50,000.00.
Justice Cruz found him guilty of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA
3019 or, at the very least, gross ignorance of the law to the
prejudice of the prosecution and the private offended parties in
Crim. Case No. 2477. He however recommended the dismissal of
the charges for Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment and
Issuing Unjust Interlocutory Orders since the questioned judgment
and orders had not been found in appropriate proceedings to be
unjust or unfair. Also recommended for dismissal was the count
for Concealment of Documents on the ground that there was no
factual basis for tasking Judge Mijares with custody of the
requested documents. For the same reason, the investigating
Justice recommended the dismissal of the complaint as against OIC
Clerk of Court Flor Serio. The appropriate penalty for the culpable
acts of respondent Judge, according to Justice Cruz, was suspension
from office for four (4) months without pay with warning that
repetition of the same or similar offenses would be penalized more
severely.
We find the investigation and report of Justice Cruz to be well-
taken, but the penalty he recommends appears to be
disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses. As has been
painstakingly observed, respondent Judge Mijares had been sternly
warned in Dadap-Malinao v. Mijares24 that repetition of his
mistakes, more so aggravations thereof, would be dealt with more
severely. Apparently the warning did not work and hence we see
no reason in employing it again for purposes of this disciplinary
case. Clearly, public interest in an adept and honest judiciary
dictates that notice of future harsher penalties should not be
followed by another forewarning of the same kind, ad
infinitum, but by discipline through appropriate penalties. This
understanding should leave no doubt that, unless completely
absolved of the charges, respondent Judge faces a grimmer
sentence than the four (4) -month suspension and warning
recommended by Justice Cruz.
First. We are not convinced that the two (2) copies of the 10
January 1996 Resolution penned by respondent Judge consist of
the draft and the final versions thereof. The fact that complainant
received a signed copy of the Resolution, Exh. "D," in the ordinary
course of court proceedings only shows that Exh. "D" was the
official and final determination of the motion for reduction of
penalty sought by the accused in Crim. Case No. 2477. Quite
obviously, in offering Exh. "6" as the supposedly final version of
the Resolution dated 10 January 1996; respondent Judge is vainly
attempting to justify the subsequent erroneous grant of probation
to the same accused since the penalty imposed under Exh. "D"
absolutely disqualifies him from probation. Exhibit "6" is clearly an
afterthought meant by Judge Mijares to deceive this Court into
excusing him from his patently flawed decision to allow probation
and to practice fraud in the fair and accurate disposition of the
instant administrative case.
His lack of candor and outright dishonesty are not without recorded
precedent. In his previous administrative case, Dadap-Malinao v.
Mijares,25 he already tried to mislead this Court into believing that
his assailed order therein actually dismissed a mere motion and not
the main petition itself, which would have been irregular, by
passing the blame upon his hapless typist for supposedly keying in
the word "petition" instead of "motion," and by issuing another
order two (2) years later still claiming that he did not dismiss the
petition in question. Significantly, in our review of the record, we
eventually found out that the object of his order was indeed to
dismiss the petition and not the supposedly insignificant motion,
and that his alleged honest error was in reality a cover up to escape
the disciplinary consequences of his foiled attempt to dismiss the
petition in flagrant violation of established precedents.
Second. Even if we are to believe as true the allegation of
respondent Judge that Exh. "D" was merely a draft of Exh. "6" and
proceed from this theory, his degenerate professional character
would nonetheless be unmistakable. For, whether by design or out
of sheer negligence, his inefficiency allowed the circulation of a
mere draft of his 10 January 1996 Resolution in Crim. Case No.
2477, as he would himself admit, which pegged the maximum term
of the indefinite sentence to more than six (6) years, when it was
his intention to lower further the penalty imposed therein as he in
fact did in the allegedly official copy of the 10 January
1996 Resolution.
The ineptitude and incompetence of Judge Mijares and his sloven
management of court records are, to say the least, deplorable. As
shown by complainant Poso’s possession of Exh. "D," the
premature publication of a distinct version of the Resolution has no
doubt compromised the sanctity and confidentiality of the
judgment process to the detriment of every effort to promote trust
and confidence in the decisions of judges. Verily, an unrestricted
glance into undeveloped and tentative opinions of a judge, as he
weighs the arguments of concerned parties, dangerously opens
avenues to pressure him to rule one way or the other and, falsely
or not, invites cynical attention to his shifts of opinions while
judgment is being purposely perfected as ostensible badges of
partiality and impropriety. Consequently, while a judge may have
just stated an exploratory ruling in the case, it becomes difficult for
him to backtrack and change his opinion in the final decision
without losing his credibility and never recovering it in the eyes of
a distrustful litigant and the wary public.
As did happen in the instant case, the divergent penalties in the
draft and final 10 January 1996 Resolutions caused complainant
Poso to believe that he and his relatives, who were the private
offended parties in Crim. Case No. 2477, got the raw end of the
deal. Their suspicion was bolstered no end by the grant of
probation to the accused, an exercise of judicial discretion
emanating precisely from the questioned Resolution. The error of
respondent Judge, more accurately his misconduct, veritably
flaunted Rule 3.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting
judges from making public comments on any pending or impending
case when he allowed the public, i.e., complainant Poso, access to
a draft version of his 10 January 1996 Resolution. Unfortunately his
flip-flopping dispositions ruined every opportunity to appear
credible and to project an image of probity.
As administrators of courts, judges should adopt a fail-safe system
of confidential records management which is ever ready to fend off
unhampered scavenging of a judge’s ideas and assessments from
the glare and gore of publicity and pressure by interested
parties.26 Not least of all this mechanism is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making by those tasked to exercise
judicial power. In the present case, the indiscriminate availability of
even a draft resolution indicates no less than gross inexcusable
negligence on the part of respondent Judge and a violation of Rule
3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directing judges to perform
administrative responsibilities diligently and to maintain
professional competence assiduously in court management.
Third. But contrary to the allegations of complainant Poso,
respondent Judge Mijares did not err when he convicted the
accused in Crim. Case No. 2477 of homicide and not of the original
charge of murder. The conviction was the result of plea bargaining
whereby the accused pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide with the admitted consent of both handling Public
Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas and the private offended parties
including herein complainant.
There was also no error in respondent Judge’s action to disregard
in the computation of the imposable penalty the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation alleged in
the Information in Crim. Case No. 2477. Simply because the
accused pleaded guilty does not necessarily imply his wholesale
admission of the presence of aggravating circumstances. This is
especially true in the instant case where the plea of guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide was preceded by a plea of not guilty to
murder, thus indicating the intention of the accused to deny the
existence of evident premeditation and treachery.27 At any rate, as
we have held in People v. Latupan,28 qualifying and aggravating
circumstances, which are taken into consideration for the purpose
of increasing the degree of penalty to be imposed, must be proved
with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged and
cannot be considered as being integrated with the plea of guilty.
Fourth. In his "Sentence," despite the correct initial assessment
made by respondent Judge, he however egregiously credited the
accused with three (3) mitigating circumstances, i.e., plea of guilty,
voluntary surrender and intoxication, without receiving evidence to
warrant the action.29 While respondent Judge could have plausibly
appreciated the plea of guilty of the accused as a mitigating
circumstance, since the guilty plea was entered and the sentence
immediately promulgated without any prosecution evidence
having been offered,30 we cannot say this of his treatment of the
other mitigating circumstances which violates basic legal principles.
It is elementary that voluntary surrender and intoxication cannot
be admitted without evidence of factual requisites.31For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, effort must be made to present
evidence showing the interest of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges
his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and
expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture.32 In
intoxication, it is necessary that the accused present proof of
having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the
commission of the crime sufficient to produce the effect of
obfuscating reason.33 At the same time, he must prove that he is
not a habitual drinker and that he did not take the alcoholic drink
purposely to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.34
We need not belabor jurisprudence to accommodate respondent
Judge’s argument which in effect posits that not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanctions. So we have ruled and
acted consistently, for to decide otherwise would be nothing short
of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of
rendering infallible judgments.
However, in the present case, the rule shielding honest errors of
opinion from punishment does not apply. Admittedly judges
cannot be held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in
good faith but this defense has been all too frequently cited to the
point of staleness. In truth, good faith in situations of fallible
discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and
the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond
permissible margins of error.35
In the case at bar, Judge Mijares was faced with the plain task of
comprehending mitigating circumstances, a topic in freshman
criminal law. For a judge of respondent Judge’s stature and
experience of twenty-three (23) years of service in the judiciary, to
still err thereon must quite obviously be ignorance of the law or
even a subterfuge for an unworthy and corrupt purpose. While it
may be true that the handling public prosecutor did not object to
his appreciation of the mitigating circumstances, respondent Judge
was no less excused from his judicial duty to observe the law he
was bound to know and sworn to uphold. A judge owes it to himself
and his office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness
his legal know-how correctly and justly. Anything less than that, as
respondent Judge exhibited in Crim. Case No. 2477, is constitutive
of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law, perhaps, grave
misconduct.
Fifth. While we do not give credence to complainant’s accusation
that Judge Mijares acted upon an unsigned motion for
reconsideration and that he granted the same without notice and
hearing to the prosecution, for the documents on record
indubitably prove otherwise, we find several glaring irregularities
in the rendition of the 10 January 1996 Resolution. To begin with,
there was confusion as to which version of the Resolution, Exh. "6"
or Exh. "D," was authentic, a matter made worse not only by the
public’s improvident access to a draft version of the Resolution, if
respondent’s account were true, but also the deception foisted
upon this Court in the form of the devious Exh. "6." Equally
lamentable and incriminating is the penalty appearing in the
allegedly official and final copy of the 10 January
1996 Resolution granting the motion for reduction of penalty in
Crim. Case No. 2477.
The Resolution speaks for its own monstrosity: "two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum." Evidently, this
penalty upon which the accused applied for and was granted
probation is contrary to the mandate of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. If only to illustrate the rudimentary character of this
principle and its obvious misapplication, we quote from a freshman
criminal law textbook-
If the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense (Sec. 1, Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No.
4225). The court cannot put the minimum penalty in the same
period and the same degree as the maximum penalty, because the
minimum penalty "shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense" (underscoring
supplied).36
Moreover, the penalty fixed by respondent Judge does not conform
to the sentence which the accused sought in his motion for
reduction of penalty from four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, to two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and not to
a prison term below this as was ordered by respondent Judge.
While a judge as a rule is not barred from granting relief other than
or even more beneficial than the relief prayed for, the disposition
must be consistent with law and equity. This certainly is not the
situation here. In violating the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
grant a relief more favorable to the accused than what the accused
himself asked for and ostensibly in preparation for other legal
maneuvers, i.e., probation to assure his unfettered pass from
detention, respondent Judge indubitably acted with grave abuse of
discretion and caused undue injury to complainant Poso and the
other private offended parties.
The grievous exercise of discretion by respondent judge constitutes
desecration of his sacred oath to do impartial justice to every one
and an infringement of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizing the criminal act of causing any
undue injury to any party including the government or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
His manifest partiality in granting the precipitate discharge of the
accused from jail is notoriously remarkable. No doubt the elements
of the offense are present in the instant case: (1) the respondent is
a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former; (2) the public officer committed the prohibited acts in the
performance of his official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions; (3) he caused undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party; and, (4) the public officer acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence.37
Sixth. On 11 January 1996, with undue and irresponsible haste,
respondent Judge allowed the accused in Crim. Case No. 2477 the
privilege of temporary liberty under the recognizance of
respondent Flor Serio even before he could act on the application
for probation and without the benefit of notice and hearing for
both the prosecution and the private complainants. His
unwarranted eagerness to free the accused from jail is even more
manifest from the fact that the application for probation was filed
also on the same day that he directed the release of the accused on
recognizance. Under the Probation Law, i.e., P.D. 968 as amended
by P.D. 1990, respondent Judge could have authorized the
temporary liberty of the accused only while "[p]ending submission
of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition."38 This
was evidently contravened for it was only on 12 January 1996 that
Judge Mijares instructed the Probation Officer to initiate and
conduct the necessary case study and investigation on the
application for probation.
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e.,
order to conduct case study prior to action on application for
release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore
the interim character of the provisional liberty envisioned under
the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an
applicant for probation is effective no longer than the period for
awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the
resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than
sixty (60) days to finish the case study and report and a maximum
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to
resolve the application for probation.39 By allowing the temporary
liberty of the accused even before the order to submit the case
study and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended
the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment of the
prosecution and the private complainants.
Furthermore, it is apparent that respondent Judge ordered the
release of the accused even before he could assess that the latter
was not a "disqualified offender" under Sec. 9 of the Probation
Law, i.e., "sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than six years," which he could have otherwise done had he
ordered the release only after he had instructed the
accomplishment of the case study. Putting the discharge of the
accused on hold would have allowed Judge Mijares more time to
pass upon the request for provisional liberty. In addition, the
unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the
prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due
process. Contrary to the argument of respondent Judge, the
prosecution along with the private complainants has every right to
be heard on the application of the accused for temporary liberty
upon recognizance. To stress, probation is a mere privilege and
discretionary upon the court, to be exercised primarily for justice
and public interest and merely incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.40 Certainly, if respondent Judge’s discretion is to be
exercised soundly, as he should have done, he had no better
witnesses to hear than the prosecution and the private
complainants who, having definitely greater stakes than others in
the untimely liberty of the accused, could have disproved the
propriety of his provisional discharge of the accused for being
disadvantageous to society.
More than anything else, respondent-Judge has shown either utter
disregard for or total ignorance of the basic provisions of
the Probation Law. It need not be underscored that one of his basic
obligations is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it
to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality
punishable under Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019.41
Seventh. Respondent Judge abused the mandate of his office when
he granted probation to the accused in Crim. Case No. 2477.
Obviously, the accused was a "disqualified offender" under Sec. 9
of the Probation Law, since under the undisputed facts of the case
the imposable maximum term of imprisonment upon him is more
than six (6) years.42 The penalty for homicide, the crime to which
the accused confessed guilt, is reclusion temporal.43 Even if
respondent Judge were correct in appreciating three (3) mitigating
circumstances, i.e., plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and
intoxication, the imposable maximum prison term would
nonetheless be prision mayor which carries a period of
incarceration ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years.44
There is no merit in respondent Judge’s view, citing Del Rosario v.
Rosero45 and BP 76 amending the Probation Law,46 that a
conviction for six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor did not
have the effect of disqualifying the accused from probation. Due
diligence should have elicited the indispensable information
that Del Rosario had been superceded and that BP 76 had been
modified in relevant parts. In Amandy v. People,47 wherein the
accused was sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, we held
that PD 1990 had amended BP 76 so as to disqualify offenders
sentenced to more than six (6) years as maximum term of
imprisonment.48 Clearly, as the facts demonstrate, respondent
Judge wrongly granted probation to an ineligible applicant in a
manner embarrassing to his vocation as judge of a court of justice.
Eighth. We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that
no evidence adequately proves the charge that OIC Clerk of Court
Flor Serio conspired with respondent Judge to cause any undue
injury to complainant and the other private offended parties in
Crim. Case No. 2477 or to give the accused therein the unwarranted
benefit of probation, it being clear from the evidence that only
Judge Mijares perpetrated the act. Neither did they refuse to issue
certified true copies of relevant documents in Crim. Case No. 2477
since it was established that the custody of the requested
documents was not with respondents so that they could not have
refused the request. Something more had to be presented than
complainant’s loose statements.1âwphi1 However, we do not
agree with the other conclusion in the report that the offense of
Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Issuing Unjust
Interlocutory Orders has not been established since, according to
Justice Cruz, the basic fact of injustice must still be determined a
priori by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding, thus
implying that the present administrative case is not suited for this
purpose.
We stress that the instant proceeding is itself an appropriate
process to assail the injustice caused by respondent Judge’s orders
and to penalize him for it. In De Vera v. Pelayo49 we said that a
decision or order may be pronounced "unjust" in the same
administrative proceeding where a judge is taken to task for
promulgating an allegedly unjust judgment or order. Particularly, to
prove the transgression in the administrative proceeding, it must
be established that the respondent rendered judgment or decision
without basis in law and/or evidence and in a manner actuated by
hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive.50 Stated
otherwise, if in rendering judgment the judge fully knew or could
not but have known that the same is unjust in the sense aforesaid
then he must have acted maliciously. Bad faith in the sense of a
dishonest purpose, not the error, bad judgment or negligence per
se, is the cause for liability as well as the ground for penalty.
It is crystal clear that the assailed orders of respondent Judge are
contrary to law and are motivated by premeditated efforts to cause
injustice. To recall, by his own admission, he lowered the penalty
imposed upon the accused in Crim. Case No. 2477 to absurd limits
and later authorized his pass from jail, first provisionally then
permanently, to the prejudice of the prosecution and the private
offended parties. Downgrading the penalty to a range lower than
the prison term prescribed by law enabled the accused to elude
incarceration and apply for probation as he in fact did. In so
deciding, respondent Judge trifled with express provisions of our
penal laws. Not only did he display gross ignorance of the law, he
also capriciously tinkered with established legal precepts.
The protestations of respondent Judge that the error committed
can only be an honest error of judgment precluding administrative
sanction are errant and insipid. In the first place, he ought to have
known that his authority to fix penalties in accordance with his
actual findings is circumscribed by law. More than that, a visible
thread of partiality for the accused runs through the entire
proceedings, particularly during the last stages. Truly, the severity
of the divergence between his hurried, although calculated, actions
and the indubitable principles as well as precedents governing
criminal penalties suggests no other conclusion than that he
deliberately wanted to set the accused free regardless of the
dictates of conscience and the imperatives of law.
Res ipsa loquitur. The questioned actuations of respondent Judge
and the attendant circumstances brook no explanation consistent
with good faith or lack of malice and must be counted as
constitutive of serious misconduct. On the face of the assailed
orders, there was an inexplicable series of grave errors bereft of
any redeeming feature and signifying an unjust decision. Indeed,
when the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the
judge is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds, or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority. This is the case here. Moreover, the absence of
credible explanation from respondent Judge to disprove or
otherwise mitigate the strong inference of malicious design
unfortunately exacerbates the situation. When asked to explain, he
was unable to give any rational justification for his actions even as
his explanations, off-tangent as they were, only reinforced the
depths of the injustice he had created. It is therefore our finding
that he perpetrated the offense of Knowingly Issuing Unjust
Orders.
Ninth. It will not do, however, to dispose of the controversy by
simply declaring the administrative culpability of respondent Judge
upon a matter literally dealing with life and death. To maintain
the status quo in Crim. Case No. 2477 would surely leave hanging
or in suspended animation the underlying issue of justice not only
in the instant proceeding but in the criminal action as well.
Clearly, we cannot stop short of annulling the tainted proceedings
in Crim. Case No. 2477 and in the process enshrine an appearance
of doing justice only by halves. Marred by what is obviously a
miscarriage of judicial ethics, the proceedings beginning with the
issuance of the controversial 10 January 1996 Resolution are
patently void and therefore produce no legal effects whatsoever.
From the lowering of the penalty to qualify the accused for
probation, the authorization for temporary liberty on recognizance,
and finally the grant of probation, the orders of respondent Judge
arising from these proceedings do not compel respectability and
finality to constitute res judicata or even double jeopardy.
A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due
process does not exist in legal contemplation and cannot be
considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a
void judgment has no legality from its inception.51 It may be
attacked directly or collaterally and set aside as in the instant case.
To be sure, it has been said that probation is not a sentence but is
in effect a suspended sentence or an interlocutory judgment,52 for
which reason, it cannot be argued that courts are barred from
correcting manifest injustice in the improvident and corrupt grant
of probation. At any rate, and without tinge of doubt, bare
technical adherence to the letter of the law and jurisprudence
should not excuse our obligation in settings attended by unusual
circumstances to rectify evident iniquity.
We recognize the general rule that this Court does not review a trial
court’s decision in an administrative proceeding since its main
concern therein is to determine the ethical responsibilities of
judicial conduct.53 Nonetheless, in the instant case, it is our
considered opinion that the salutary principle is not controlling.
Under clear considerations before us, the situation calls for the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction to the end that we render
complete justice to all affected parties. As we have said, "Equity as
the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts, of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity
regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form,
the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously
expressed by different courts."54Indeed, a court of equity which has
taken jurisdiction and cognizance of a cause for any purpose will
ordinarily retain jurisdiction for all purposes and award relief so as
to accomplish full justice between the party litigants, prevent
future litigation and make performance of the court’s decree
perfectly safe to those who may be compelled to obey it.55
In this regard, we instruct RTC-Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar, in
Crim. Case No. 2477 to call the case once again taking stock of our
pronouncements in the instant case. The trial court shall order the
arrest of accused Virgilio de Guia to restore the status quo
ante prior to his release on recognizance. It shall forthwith hear the
accused and the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing
the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as the case may be.
The trial court shall then promulgate judgment paying particular
attention to the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and the plea of guilty of the accused to homicide. From
thereon, let justice take its proper course.
Faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-
litigant is assured that the occupants of the bench are rich in moral
fiber and strong in their grasp of legal principles. Unfortunately,
respondent Judge failed to exhibit these qualities in both his
discharge of sworn duties and his manner of defending himself
before this Court in the instant proceedings. The brazen flaunting
of our disciplining authority through the fraudulent imposition of
the doctored 10 January 1996 Resolution along with the persistent
and deliberate heedlessness of key precedents and elementary
legal precepts is palpable from his actions. Having been judge for
twenty-three (23) years, he should have appreciated by now that
no position in government service exacts greater demand on
honesty and integrity upon the individual than a seat in the
judiciary. He should have taken this lesson to heart if not for the
fact of his status as judge then for the consideration that a previous
administrative case had once been decided against him.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent JUDGE JOSE H. MIJARES,
detailed to RTC-Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar, with permanent
station at RTC-Br. 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, guilty Gross
Dishonesty for foisting upon this Court a fraudulent copy of his 10
January 1996 Resolution, or otherwise, of Gross Inexcusable
Negligence for allowing a draft of his 10 January 1996 Resolution to
circulate freely and unhampered, in violation of the rule of strict
confidentiality, and of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Knowingly
Issuing Unjust Orders and Commission of Acts punishable
under Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, as a result of his
actions in Crim. Case No. 2477 entitled, "People v. Virgilio de
Guia" for lowering the penalty upon the accused to absurd limits in
order that the latter may avail of, as he was indeed granted,
temporary liberty on recognizance and thereafter probation.
Consequently, JUDGE JOSE H. MIJARES is ordered DISMISSED from
the service effective immediately with prejudice to re-employment
in any branch or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of
all his retirement benefits, except the value of his earned leave
credits which he shall be paid in full. He is further ordered
to IMMEDIATELY CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the
functions of the office from which he is removed. Moreover, RTC-
Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar, in connection with Crim. Case No.
2477, is directed to ORDER THE ARREST of accused Virgilio de Guia
in order to restore the status quo ante prior to his release on
recognizance. Forthwith the trial court shall CALL A HEARING for
the sole purpose of affording the accused and the prosecution an
opportunity to present evidence proving mitigating or aggravating
circumstances as the case may be. The trial court shall then RE-
PROMULGATE JUDGMENT in Crim. Case No. 2477 paying particular
attention to the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and the plea of guilty of the accused to homicide.
The Administrative Complaint against respondent Judge
for concealment of documents,and against respondent Flor Serio,
OIC Clerk of Court, RTC, Northern Samar, for concealment of
documents and conspiracy to commit the foregoing acts is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173956 August 6, 2008
FRISCO F. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assails the February 6, 2006 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 27808 granting the prosecution’s Manifestation
with Motion for Additional Marking of Documentary Exhibits and
the June 21, 2006 Resolution2 denying the motions for
reconsideration separately filed by petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner Frisco F. San Juan, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Public Estates Authority (PEA), together with 26 other accused,
composed of PEA Board of Directors, PEA Officers, Officers of the
Commission on Audit and the contractor of Central Boulevard
Project (now the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard),
Jesusito D. Legaspi, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 30193 in an Information
which reads:
That in or about the period from April 1999 to August 2002, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused public officials of the Public Estates
Authority (PEA), namely: CARLOS P. DOBLE, former General
Manager (with Salary Grade 30) and ex-oficio member of the PEA
Board, BENJAMIN V. CARIÑO, PEA General Manager (with Salary
Grade 30) and ex-oficio member of the Board, and other
responsible public officials of PEA, namely: FRISCO FRANCISCO SAN
JUAN, former Chairman of the Board, CARMELITA DE LEON-CHAN,
DANIEL T. DAYAN, SALVADOR P. MALBAROSA, LEO V. PADILLA and
ELPIDIO G. DAMASO, all former members of the Board, ERNEST
FREDERICK O. VILLAREAL, Chairman of the Board, and JOEMARI D.
GEROCHI, ANGELITO M. VILLANUEVA, MARTIN S. SANCIEGO, JR.,
and RODOLFO T. TUAZON, all Board members, JAIME R. MILLAN,
Assistant General Manager, MANUEL R. BERIÑA, JR., Deputy
General Manager for Operations & Technical Services and
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee responsible for the bidding and
award of the construction contract for the President Diosdado
Macapagal Boulevard Project, THERON VICTOR V. LACSON, Deputy
General Manager for Finance, Legal and Administration and
member of the Ad Hoc Committee, BERNARDO T. VIRAY, Manager
for Technical Services Department and member of the Ad Hoc
Committee, RAPHAEL POCHOLO A. ZORILLA, Project Management
Officer, ERNESTO L. ENRIQUEZ, Senior Corporate Attorney and
member of the Ad Hoc Committee, and CRISTINA AMPOSTA-
MORTEL, Department Manager, Legal Department, and other
responsible public officials of the Commission on Audit (COA),
namely: MANUELA E. DELA PAZ, State Auditor V, ARTURO S. LAYUG,
State Auditor V and Chief of the Technical Services Audit Division A,
Technical Services Office, BENILDA E. MENDOZA, Supervising
Technical Audit Specialist, EPIFANIO L. PUREZA, Assistant Chief of
the Technical Services Audit Division A, JOSE G. CAPISTRANO,
Technical Audit Specialist II, and MA. CECILIA A. DELA RAMA,
Technical Audit Specialist I, all of whom were public officials during
the times material to the subject offense, while said public officials
were occupying their respective positions as just stated, acting in
such capacity and committing the subject offense in relation to
office and while in the performance of their functions and duties,
with manifest partiality and evident bad faith (or at the very least,
gross inexcusable negligence), conspiring and confederating with
accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI, a private contractor doing business
under the name of J.D. Legaspi Construction, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI,
through the commission of numerous illegal related acts all
pertaining to the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard Project,
such as (but not limited to) the bidding out of the said project and
illegally awarding the same to accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI’s J.D.
Legaspi Construction and approving the award of the project to, as
well as the Construction Agreement with, J.D. Legaspi Construction
despite the lack of compliance with the mandatory requirements
and procedure for bidding, even if no funds are yet available to
finance the project, without the requisite certificate of availability
of funds and without complying with the mandatory conditions
imposed by the Office of the President of the approval thereof, per
Memorandum dated 29 January 2000 from the Office of the
Executive Secretary, Malacañang, and approving/allowing several
improper variation/change orders and overruns to be implemented
without the requisite presidential approval and the appropriate
funds, recognizing, affirming and causing the implementation of
the just-mentioned void contract, allowing and paying or causing
the allowance and payment of several claims of accused JESUSITO
D. LEGASPI for initial contract price, contract price adjustment,
variation orders, overruns and other claims even when the same
were clearly improper, illegal and without the requisite presidential
approval, thereby paving the way for accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI
to claim and receive undue payments from the Government
totaling millions of pesos in improper overprice, thereby causing
undue injury and grave damage to the government in the aggregate
amount of at least FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY AND
39/100 PESOS (P532,926,420.39), more or less, constituting the
total illegal overprice paid to accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI for the
subject Project.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned on January 21, 2005, petitioner and his co-accused
pleaded "not guilty."
The People, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), filed its pre-trial brief with proposed Exhibits A to HHHH
dated March 16, 2005. Petitioner filed his pre-trial brief on June 23,
2005.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order,5 the
pertinent portions of which state:
The Prosecution reserves the right to present additional
documentary evidence, although this reservation was objected to
by the accused on the ground that it violates their constitutional
right.6
xxxx
Accused Frisco F. San Juan reserves the right to present additional
documentary evidence.7
xxxx
This Pre-Trial Order shall bind the parties, limit the issues and
control the course of the trial, unless modified by the Court to
prevent manifest injustice.
SO ORDERED.8
On November 10, 2005, trial commenced with the OSP presenting
Karen Villamil as its first witness, without prejudice to the signing
of the Pre-Trial Order by the parties.
At the scheduled hearing on January 24, 2006, instead of
proceeding with the presentation of its evidence, the OSP filed a
manifestation with motion for additional marking of documentary
exhibits.9
Petitioner filed an Opposition10 alleging that the motion fails to
comply with the three (3) day notice rule, thus, it is fatally defective
which must be dismissed outright; that the prosecution’s attempt
to introduce additional evidence after Pre-Trial has been
completed, without petitioner having been confronted by such
evidence, violates petitioner’s fundamental rights under the
Constitution; that petitioner’s right to due process has been
violated by the presentation of the prosecution’s "additional
evidence" when such pieces of evidence ought to have been
presented during the pre-trial of the case; that the prosecution
failed to show "good cause" in order for the "additional evidence"
to be accepted, since only those pieces of evidence which are
identified and marked are allowed by the court.
On February 6, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the herein assailed
Resolution11 granting the motion of the OSP, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
Acting on the Prosecution’s Manifestation with Motion for
Additional Marking of Documentary Exhibits dated January 23,
2006, with the comments and/or oppositions thereto separately
filed by accused: (1) Layug, (2) de Leon-Chan, (3) Pureza and
Capistrano, (4) Legaspi, (5) Padilla, (6) Beriña, Millan, Viray and
Zorilla, (7) San Juan, and (8)Amposta-Mortel, the Court resolves to
GRANT the aforementioned motion but only insofar as to allow
additional marking of documentary exhibits which have been
sufficiently described in the said motion, over the objection of the
defense, in order to give the Prosecution the opportunity to fully
present its case, and considering that the Pre-Trial Order has not
been signed by the parties. The defense may register their
objections to the documentary exhibits at the time that the same
are introduced in evidence. As prayed for, the prosecution may
present the additional documents enumerated in its aforesaid
motion for marking, and the same shall be included in its list of
exhibits in the Amended Pre-Trial Order to be issued by the Court.12
Petitioner and his co-accused filed separate motions for
reconsideration but were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its June
21, 2006 Resolution,13 the pertinent portions of which state:
While it is true that pre-trial has already been terminated, records
show that, before the Pre-Trial Order dated November 7, 2005 was
issued, the Court made clear to all the parties, considering the
numerous documentary evidence sought to be marked and
presented by the parties, that the said Order was "without
prejudice to the comment [on the Pre-Trial Order] of the
prosecution and the accused;" that is, the Court may still accept any
modification of the said Order from both the prosecution and the
accused. Upon request of the parties, the Court gave the
prosecution and the accused a period of time "to file a formal
manifestation with respect to some changes they would like to
propose in the Pre-Trial Order" notwithstanding the
commencement of the trial.14
xxxx
Apparent from the foregoing is the fact that while the pre-trial has
effectively been terminated, the Court gave both the prosecution
and the accused the opportunity to submit comments to the Pre-
Trial Order or to modify their submissions or in some instances,
even to withdraw the stipulations they made during the pre-trial.
The Court’s position is consistent with the exercise of its discretion
to decide how best to dispense justice in accordance with the
circumstances of the proceedings before it. The decision to grant
the prosecution’s motion for additional marking of documentary
exhibits is another exercise of this judicial prerogative, which
prerogative was made known to the parties in the Pre-Trial Order
dated November 7, 2005, when the Court stated that such was
subject to modification "in order to prevent manifest injustice."
The guidelines on the conduct of the pre-trial, including A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC, were prescribed by the Honorable Supreme Court to
"abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases
and decongest court dockets." The Court does not mean to
disregard or ignore these guidelines but the Court is compelled to
take into consideration, in the interest of substantial justice, the
various submissions of both the prosecution and the accused
mentioned above in connection with the agreements reached by
the parties that they be allowed to submit their comments on the
pre-trial order, even while the trial had begun so as not to delay the
proceedings.
 the defense, in order to give the Prosecution the opportunity to fully present its case, and considering that
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motions for
Reconsideration of the accused-movants are hereby DENIED for the Pre-Trial Order has not been signed by the parties. The defense may register their objections to the
documentary exhibits at the time that the same are introduced in evidence. x x x22
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15 In its Resolution dated June 21, 2006, the Sandiganbayan also held
Hence, this petition. that:
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the Sandiganbayan While it is true that pre-trial has already been terminated, records
gravely abused its discretion when it granted OSP’s motion for show that, before the Pre-Trial Order dated November 7, 2005 was
additional marking of exhibits; and (2) whether the admission of issued, the Court made clear to all the parties, considering the
the "additional evidence" constitutes a violation of petitioner’s numerous documentary evidence sought to be marked and
constitutional right to due process. presented by the parties, that the said Order was "without
The petition lacks merit. prejudice to the comment [on the Pre-Trial Order] of the
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, reads: prosecution and the accused;" that is, the Court may still accept any
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court modification of the said Order from both the prosecution and the
may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, accused. Upon request of the parties, the Court gave the
every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. prosecution and the accused a period of time "to file a formal
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the manifestation with respect to some changes they would like to
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its propose in the Pre-Trial Order" notwithstanding the
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of commencement of the trial.23
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter Thus, petitioner can still file his objections to the documentary
notice. evidence during trial on the merits of the case.
While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the Finally, there is no basis to petitioner’s contention that the
requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if additional pieces of documentary evidence were "surprise
filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, however, this Court has evidence" because during the filing of their respective pre-trial
likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in briefs, both parties have made reservations to present additional
a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be documentary and testimonial evidence, as may be necessary in the
disregarded in order to resolve the case.16 Besides, in the exercise course of the trial;24 such reservations were incorporated in the
of its equity jurisdiction, the court may disregard procedural lapses, Pre-Trial Order.
so that a case may be resolved on its merits based on the evidence WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The
presented by the parties.17 Moreover, under the above-cited Rule, February 6, 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
the Court is granted the authority to set the hearing on shorter No. 27808 granting OSP’s Manifestation with Motion for Additional
notice upon showing of good cause. Marking of Documentary Exhibits, and the June 21, 2006 Resolution
In the instant case, petitioner was served with the Manifestation denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
with Motion for Additional Marking of Documentary Exhibits on SO ORDERED.
January 24, 2006, or two days prior to the scheduled hearing date
on January 26, 2006.18 Although the three-day notice rule was not
complied with, the Sandiganbayan allowed the motion based on
good cause, i.e., that the markings of the additional documentary
evidence at this period was due to the sheer volume of the
supporting documents to the disbursement vouchers and the fact
that such supporting documents were only recently completed and
secured.19
This Court allows a liberal construction of this rule where the
interest of substantial justice will be served and where the
resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court,20 as in the instant case. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan correctly held that:
Apparent from the foregoing is the fact that while the pre-trial has
effectively been terminated, the Court gave both the prosecution
and the accused the opportunity to submit comments to the Pre-
Trial Order or to modify their submissions or in some instances,
even to withdraw the stipulations they made during the pre-
trial. The Court’s position is consistent with the exercise of its
discretion to decide how best to dispense justice in accordance
with the circumstances of the proceedings before it. The decision
to grant the prosecution’s motion for additional marking of
documentary exhibits is another exercise of this judicial
prerogative, which prerogative was made known to the parties in
the Pre-Trial Order dated November 7, 2005, when the Court
stated that such was subject to modification "in order to prevent
manifest injustice.21 (Emphasis supplied)
There is likewise no merit to petitioner’s contention that his right
to due process was violated when the OSP’s motion was granted.
In its Resolution of February 6, 2006, the Sandiganbayan declared,
thus:
T]he Court resolves to GRANT the aforementioned motion but only insofar as to allow additional marking
of documentary exhibits which have been sufficiently described in the said motion, over the objection of
G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006
RENNIE DECLARADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Roxas
City, and FRANK BANSALES, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the portion of the
Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 14,
in Criminal Case No. C-1419-10-2002, suspending the sentence of
respondent Frank Bansales and ordering his commitment to the
Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva
Valencia, Guimaras.
Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a student at the
Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz. At
around 9:45 a.m. on July 25, 2002, Yvonne Declarador was stabbed
to death. After conducting the autopsy on the cadaver, Rural Health
Physician Pilar Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem Certificate
indicating that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds on different
parts of the body. 2
On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank Bansales with
murder was filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor with the
Family Court. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about 9:45 o’clock in the morning of July 25, 2002, inside
a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High School in President
Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused armed with a knife and with intent
to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said knife [his] teacher, one
YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the
latter multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body
which caused the immediate death of the said Yvonne Declarador.
The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength considering that the attack was made by the
accused using a long knife which the latter carried along with him
from his house to the school against his lady teacher who was
unarmed and defenseless at that time and by inflicting upon the
latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds resulting to her death. 3
In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence presented, the
RTC rendered judgment on May 20, 2003 finding Bansales guilty of
murder. However, the court suspended the sentence of the
accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the evidence
presented by the prosecution, the court finds CICL Frank Bansales
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder being
charged. Being a minor, 17 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense charged, he is entitled to a special
mitigating circumstance of minority, and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) month of reclusion temporal
and to pay the heirs of Yvonne Declarador, a civil indemnity of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) for moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos
(P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorney’s fee of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and unearned income of One
Million Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos and Seventy
Centavos (P1,370,000.70).
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his
teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug National High School of
President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in case of
insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed
inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and
during school hours.
Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is
suspended and the Child in conflict with the law (CICL), Frank
Bansales is ordered committed to the Regional Rehabilitation
Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors, the DSWD Capiz Provincial
Office, Roxas City, the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth, Concordia,
Guimaras, the accused and his counsel, Atty. Ramcez John
Honrado.
SO ORDERED. 4
On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference for 10:00
a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the Public Prosecutor, the Social Welfare
Officer of the court, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for Youth, considering that the accused
would turn 18 on June 3, 2003. 5
Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
that portion of the decision of the trial court’s decision suspending
the sentence of the accused and committing him to the
rehabilitation center.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit of a
suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted
of an offense punishable by death, 6 reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v.
Ondo, 7 petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged with
murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is
disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.
In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no standing to
file the petition, considering that the offense charged is a public
crime brought in the name of the People of the Philippines; only
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a
petition in court assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the
service of his sentence. He further avers that Section 32 of A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an automatic suspension of
sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth
center; hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in suspending
the sentence of the accused.
In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to
file the petition.
The OSG, for its part, posits that respondent’s sentence cannot be
suspended since he was charged with a capital offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. It insists that the entitlement of a
juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the
sentence actually imposed by the trial court but upon the
imposable penalty for the crime charged as provided for by law.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether petitioner
has standing to file the petition; (2) whether petitioner violated the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition with this Court;
and (3) whether respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering
the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his
commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.
The petition is granted.
On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the surviving
spouse of the deceased and the offended party, he has sufficient
personality to file the instant special civil action for certiorari. 8 This
is in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the
Rules of Court in order to promote their object. 9 Moreover, the
OSG has filed its comment on the petition and has joined the
petitioner in his plea for the nullification of the assailed portion of
the RTC decision.
On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on
certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC should be filed
in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 10 A direct
invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of
certiorari may be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. 11 This is an established policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon this Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. 12
However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that considering
the nature and importance of the issues raised and in the interest
of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court may take
cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before
it. 14 Moreover, this Court has suspended its own rules and
excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
interests of justice so require.
In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as
it does a juvenile and the application of the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the
qualifying circumstance of either evident premeditation or abuse
of superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable
penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court
found him guilty of murder.
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful
Offender. – If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings,
the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the
acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable
penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the
court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that
the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will
be served thereby, may suspend all further proceedings and
commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution
operated by the government or any other responsible person until
he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter
period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports
and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or the government training institution or responsible
person under whose care he has been committed.
Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for
suspension of his sentence, the court may require the Department
of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the
court a social case study report over the offender and his family.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision
by the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or government training institution as the court may
designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender
who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions
or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or
life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the
Military Tribunals.
The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where, except for
those under paragraph 3, Section 32 of the law, the sentence of the
accused is automatically suspended:
Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders.
– The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by
the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for
disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social
worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or
guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of
the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation
and welfare of the juvenile: care, guidance, and supervision orders;
Drug and alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling and
similar activities; Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center
of the DSWD or other centers for juvenile in conflict with the law
authorized by the Secretary of DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD
shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law
with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the
Family Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family
Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the
presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian,
and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in
conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence,
or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of
promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or over.
Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is
disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.
"Punishable" is defined as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to
punishment; liable to be punished; may be punished; liable to
punishment." 15 The word "punishable" does not mean "must be
punished," but "liable to be punished" as specified. 16 In U.S. v.
Villalon, 17the Court defined punishable as "deserving of, or liable
for, punishment." Thus, the term refers to the possible, not to the
actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and
not which is imposed.
The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and
the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by
the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the
possible one which determines the disqualification of a
juvenile. 18 Despite the disqualification of Bansales, respondent
Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence
meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on
May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who
is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission
of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended
by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be
enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other
disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from
Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of
Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime
the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are
disqualified from having their sentences suspended.
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and
construed together because enactments of the same legislature on
the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system;
later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is
supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject
and to have enacted the new act with reference thereto. 19Statutes
in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose
of an expressed national policy. 20
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Order of the respondent Judge suspending the sentence of
respondent Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed,
with modifications, an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding
herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape3 committed against
AAA,4 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However,
the CA modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the
death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to
₱75,000.00, and awarding ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
aside from the ₱50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996
against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years,
AAA’s father filed a complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against
herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the
evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay
upgraded the charge to rape.6 The Information7 dated September
5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6
years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with
the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA;
her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the
Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense
presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied
committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk
of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision9 finding
the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the
penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the
Notice of Appeal filed by the accused- appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief11 on July 15, 2004,
while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
its Appellee’s Brief12 on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,13 modifying
the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court
in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated
September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court," the
case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the
CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14,
2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with modification
the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We
quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The
accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty
of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1)
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and (3) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court
for review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty
Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for
further review.14
In our Resolution15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties
to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs.
Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief16 on April 7, 2006.
Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental
brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the
following assignment of errors:
I Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and [her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE
OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the
Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her
[cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling
Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to
the backyard of Saling Crisologo’s house. She agreed. Unknown to
appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s] shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he
ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her
and inserted his penis into [AAA’s] private organ. Appellant made
an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt
severe pain inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an
intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA’s cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away
from them, witnessed appellant’s dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA’s
cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA’s] mother, her
aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA’s] mother
answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still
very young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered
[AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA’s cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of
Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however,
was gone. [AAA’s cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what
appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her
cousin] did not ask her any further question and just accompanied
her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to
her because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when
her mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her
private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA’s
cousin] came to their house and told [AAA’s] mother again that
appellant had earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of
[AAA]. [AAA’s mother], however did not say anything. At that time,
[AAA’s] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan,
Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr.
Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr.
Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing
the result of [AAA]’s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had
already resigned as rural health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as
a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-
legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]’s medical findings are as
follows: "negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars,
perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal
admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for
introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in layman’s language,
that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there is a
complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have
been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous
exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or
penis.17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the
defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doña
knows [AAA’s] parents, because sometimes they go to their house
looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA]
herself. His father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his
mother worked as an agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa,
Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture,
his mother would bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas
and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in
1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is
from barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Doña
Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in
Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an agriculturist while his
father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he
was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when
they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was
out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school at
Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 o’clock
in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he would
usually play basketball at the basketball court near the church in
Doña Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her
mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking
care of his mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was
most surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows
Saling Crisologo and the latter’s place which is more than half
kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier,
grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000
was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder under Criminal
Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the docile cooperation of
[AAA’s] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and
instigated [AAA’s] rape charge against him to make the case for
Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He was
incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2)
months later while he already in detention, the rape case
supposedly committed in 1996 was filed against him in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn
about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime
on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally got
angry when he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such
thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have
the child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from
his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered
dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA’s] mother, is also
related to his father, [AAA mother’s] father, being a second cousin
of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by
his father to the AAA’s family as the motive for the latter to file the
rape case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case
No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for
Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of
said rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally
offer the marked exhibits relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting
him, as the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following
grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA and her cousin were
inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the
date and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a
four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only reason why
they filed the said case was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a
conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by said
Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine
Camu on May 7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the same
Salvacion Bobier helped AAA’s father in filing the said case for rape.
Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove
that he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve his end.
Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr. Joana
Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar
which means that there was no showing of any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the
inconsistencies between AAA’s and her cousin’s testimonies as
follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time
of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing
before accused-appellant invited her to the back of the house of a
certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw accused-
appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the
latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAA’s testimony that
when accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-
down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA
after telling the latter’s mother what accused-appellant had done
to AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after
putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and
(4) the cousin testified that other children were playing at the time
of the incident, but AAA testified that there were only four of them
who were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters,
do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the
positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact
even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove
that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such
inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no
person with perfect faculties or senses.19 The alleged
inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn the
findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution
witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who
sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward
narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant
evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident
happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her
cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively.
This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age
and their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the
most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and
inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses,
who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom.
Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for
inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA’s inability to recall the exact
date when the incident in 1996 was committed. Failure to recall the
exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false
testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes
are inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the
credibility of the victim as a witness.21 In People v. Purazo,22 We
ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is
carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early
as 1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other
fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged,
conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime,
even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise
time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of
some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears
that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the
date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period
of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of
the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred
does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The
reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was
raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime
is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long
as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near
to the actual date when the offense was committed an information
is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes
were committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime
in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime in November
1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and
"on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient
compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAA’s declaration that the rape incident took place on
December 15, 1996 was explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date
December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily
chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she was
subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month
and date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor
[AAA’s] sworn statement mention the month and date but only the
year.24
Likewise, witnesses’ credibility is not affected by the delay in the
filing of the case against accused-appellant. Neither does the delay
bolster accused-appellant’s claim that the only reason why this
case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a
conviction of this same accused-appellant in the case of murder
filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae
Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does
not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit.
It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her
aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of
having been sexually abused. In People v. Coloma25 we even
considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by
the victim’s father as understandable and not enough to render
incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the
absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a
mere concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing
of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the
failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this case was
sufficiently justified by the complainant’s father in the latter’s
testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got
angry when your wife told you that something happened to Hazel
way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until
June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which
reason that during that time we had no money yet to use in filing
the case, so we waited. When we were able to save enough
amounts, we filed the case.26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for
rape because there is no proof that he employed force, threats or
intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is
below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is
whether "carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force,
intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an
element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of
absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of
twelve.27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the
conclusion quoted as follows: "negative for introital bulvar
laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there
was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently
ruled that the presence of lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ
is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does
not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable
in a prosecution for rape.28 What is important is that AAA’s
testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to
convict the accused.
Accused-appellant’s defense of denial was properly rejected. Time
and time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest
of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and
unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party and
other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive identification,
absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants’ defense of
denial and alibi.29 The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-
appellant that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation
of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the
trial court aptly reached the following conclusion:
…True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA’s family file the
instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s]
parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they have
come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that
what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which
the latter had continually ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been
stressed often enough that the testimony of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for a
girl of complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to
herself and her family had she not been truly subjected to the
painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender
years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly
impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not
true.30 Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of
tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation
of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest
desire to have their daughter’s transgressor punished
accordingly.31 Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith
and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to be
imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659,32 was the governing law at the time the accused-
appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the
penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child
below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was
five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged
in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of
her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16,
1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty
imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that
the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of
the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on
March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which
means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial
court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and
date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove
the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not
certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he
reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact,
in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on
the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a
minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However,
for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death
is still the penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper
imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages
provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically,
Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages
to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The
issue now is whether the award of damages should be reduced in
view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the
offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the
convicted offender is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the term "indemnification," which is included in the civil
liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. – Indemnification for
consequential damages shall include not only those caused the
injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third
person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor36 ratiocinated as
follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of
₱50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the nature of moral
damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza
that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in
civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder,
the latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed
by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for
rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in
the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like
considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should
follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if
the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the
present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of not less than ₱75,000.00. This is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and
the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are
likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court of
Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are
in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence
as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering
or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S.
815).38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the
nature of actual and compensatory damages for the injury caused
to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral
damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority
of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no
bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim and
her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending
this case. Here, the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at
the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the
benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date of
the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his
minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering
of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground
to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages
in the case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature
of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was the
same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario,39 a case
decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of
damages. At that time, the damages amounted to ₱75,000.00 for
civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the
public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree,
because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the
ruling in People v. Salome40 and People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty
provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome
explained the basis for increasing the amount of said civil damages
as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the
Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with
any of the attending qualifying circumstances that require the
imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall ₱75,000.00 … Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded
without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is
assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to
such an award. However, the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages should also be increased to ₱75,000 pursuant to
current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous
offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently,
the civil indemnity for the victim is still ₱75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court,
following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following
amounts; ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the
crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty; ₱75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the
victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling
her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x
x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant
because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in
People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty
attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that
the award of ₱75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of
the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil
indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which
would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil
Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of
right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are:
(1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to them
has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3)
the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the
compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral
damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the
exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of ₱75,000.00 each as civil indemnity
and moral damages should be maintained. It is also proper and
appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise
increased to the amount of ₱30,000.00 based on the latest
jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the
CA correctly awarded ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the
award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to
₱75,000.0044 and that of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is
likewise increased to ₱30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New
Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA
decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005,
respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of
accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as
he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with
Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and
Youth Welfare Code46 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.47 Accused-appellant is
now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at
the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. – Persons who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission
of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of
this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the
Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the
age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With
more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is
necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply
to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already
18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the
offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who
is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission
of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age
or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile
in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature
of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law,
unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and
Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended
sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if,
among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle
of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish.49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital
offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law
who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the
automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations50 on Senate Bill No.
1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the
pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is
charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense,
and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of
Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare,
best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a
primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the
intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the
same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child
reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures
imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been
fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years
of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the
judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40
to the suspension of sentence is now moot and
academic.51 However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which
provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps
and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may,
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not
affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be
enforced in accordance with law.52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of ₱75,000.00
and ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages,
respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of
₱75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED
to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with
Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131445 May 27, 2004
AMADO G. PEREZ (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS WIDOW
GUILLERMA T. PEREZ, MARIO S. FRANCISCO, RAFAEL P. ARGAME,
MIRASOL V. MENDOZA,GLORIA S. GONZALVO AND MARIA FE V.
BOMBASE, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, MAYOR IGNACIO R. BUNYE,
CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, ROGELIO P. MADRIAGA, RECTO
CORONADO, TEODORA A. DIANG, TOMAS M. OSIAS, REYNALDO
CAMILON AND BENJAMIN BULOS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the November
13, 1997 resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No.
45127, dismissing petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its
September 9, 1997 resolution2which in turn dismissed, for lack of
jurisdiction, petitioners’ petition for certiorari and mandamus. The
petition questioned the Office of the Ombudsman’s April 11, 1997
dismissal of their criminal complaint against Mayor Ignacio R.
Bunye.
Petitioners, members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM),
instituted two complaints at the Office of the Ombudsman
(docketed as OMB-0-89-0983 and OMB-0-89-1007) against several
respondents, one of whom was then Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye, for
violation of RA 3019 (also known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act"). Respondents allegedly destroyed the doors of the
KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the Take-Over Order
of the KBMBPM management dated October 28, 1998 issued by
then Agriculture Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez.
In disposing of said complaints on April 11, 1997, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution (hereinafter, "Ombudsman
resolution")3 excluding respondent Bunye from the criminal
indictment. The petitioners assailed the exclusion in the CA on
September 1, 1997 through an original petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The CA, however, dismissed it for
lack of jurisdiction supposedly in accordance with Section 27 of RA
6770 (also known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989"). Citing Yabut
vs. Ombudsman,4 Alba vs. Nitorreda,,,,,,,5 and Angchangco
vs.Ombudsman,6 the CA likewise denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
The CA was correct in dismissing the petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
It is the nature of the case that determines the proper remedy to
be filed and the appellate court where such remedy should be filed
by a party aggrieved by the decisions or orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman. If it is an administrative case, appeal should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.7 If it is
a criminal case, the proper remedy is to file with the Supreme Court
an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65.8
We find that, although the CA was correct in dismissing the petition
for certiorari, it erroneously invoked as ratio decidendi Section 27
of RA 67709 which applies in administrative cases only, not criminal
cases,10 such as the graft and corruption charge at bar. In our en
banc decision in Fabian vs. Desierto,11 which is still controlling, we
held that Section 27 applies only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. Nevertheless, we declared
Section 27 unconstitutional for expanding the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and consent. We thus held
that all appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
As the present controversy pertained to a criminal case, the
petitioners were correct in availing of the remedy of petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 but they erred in filing it in the Court of
Appeals. The procedure set out in Kuizon vs.
Ombudsman12 and Mendoza-Arce vs.
Ombudsman,13 requiring that petitions for certiorari questioning
the Ombudsman’s orders or decisions in criminal cases should be
filed in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals, is still the
prevailing rule.14
But even if the petition for certiorari had been filed in this Court,
we would have dismissed it just the same. First, petitioners should
have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman
resolution as it was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, not filing a petition for certiorari directly in
the Supreme Court. Second, the Office of the Ombudsman did not
act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
Ombudsman resolution.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In other
words, the exercise of power is in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.15
In this case, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Office of the Ombudsman in dismissing the complaint against
respondent Bunye upon the factual finding that:
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed no evidence is shown in the record that respondent Mayor
Bunye specifically participated in the violent implementation of
Secretary Dominguez’ Order of October 28, 1988. It was not shown
with certainty by complainant that the alleged presence of
respondent Mayor Bunye at the scene of the incident was an active
participation thereof by the latter.
On the other hand, if the alleged presence of the respondent Mayor
Bunye at the scene were really true, such would not be improper
because of the provision of Article 87, par. 2 (VI) of the Local
[G]overnment Code which states:
"x x x call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to
restore disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to
apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires,
and the municipal police force are inadequate to cope with the
situation or the violators." (underlining supplied)
Anent the alleged letter dated August 8, 1988 of respondent Mayor
Bunye, the same seems only a request for the suspension of
complainant. He did not take it upon himself to issue any
suspension of complainant. At that point in time, the respondent
Mayor Bunye reasonably believed that the Order of Secretary
Dominguez was valid. Besides, the facts and the evidence on record
do not show any interest personal or otherwise on the part of
respondent Mayor Bunye in the implementation of Secretary
Dominguez’ Order. Accordingly, the exclusion of respondent Mayor
Bunye from the criminal charge and the dismissal of the complaint
against him are in order.
Furthermore, if at the instance of complaint, respondents (sic)
Secretary Dominguez whose Order dated October 28, 1988 was
questioned by the complainant and Atty. Rogelio Madriaga, who
allegedly orchestrated the implementation of the said Order were
dropped from the complaint, how can respondent Bunye be liable
for the same act, if as alleged, he was merely standing in front of
the KBS Building, New Muntinlupa Market?
It will be noted that at the time of the alleged implementation of
the Order on October 29, 1988 and the take-over of the
Management and operation of the KBMBPM cooperative,
respondent Bunye apparently believed that the said Order of
Secretary Dominguez was valid.
Considering the earlier approval of the Honorable Ombudsman on
the memorandum of then SPO III, now Director Wendell E.
Barreras-Sulit as reiterated in the memorandum of the Honorable
Assistant to the Ombudsman re: the exclusion of respondent Bunye
from criminal indictment, undersigned respectfully concurs with
the same.
xxx xxx x x x.16
We have consistently refrained from interfering with the
investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent
any compelling reason.17 This policy is based on constitutional,
statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the
Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman
with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers,
virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in
order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper
influence.18 Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof
of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case
is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to
order an acquittal.19 Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional
judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such
findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of
discretion.20 Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much
the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will
have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 183652 February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION,
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-
1211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana,
Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the
prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private
respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola werecharged,
together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for
allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at
Alson’s Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with
an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at
about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in
having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused
MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels,
entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.5
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian
John Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high
school graduation ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon
party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then
asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage
Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an
election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the
plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be
attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together
with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one
Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim
invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a walking
distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the Alson’s Palace,
they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and
Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to
a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco
with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that
they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which
the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the
drinks – two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged
themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were
being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi)
and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to
drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the
session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was
AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then
that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and
she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s
lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove
her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and
simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at
her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already
sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They helped
her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say, "Hubuga
na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She
likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned
on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and
Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining
liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank
directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her
down the stairs, and then she was asleep again. When she regained
consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola
Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been
there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up
again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw
Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and
having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist
when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and
Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her.
At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his
penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop.
Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she
fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She
was all alone. Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself
with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half
of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor.
There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed
a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her
father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she told
them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They
brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter,
they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA
in the morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal
laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the
posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the
presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According
to the defense witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto,
Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemeno’s house.
Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted
by Montesco at Alson’s Palace, owned by the latter’s family. When
they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to
leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about
11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson’s Palace
but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but
the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz,
Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador
Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several persons were in the room
at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda,
Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the
drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego,
Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan.
Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and
instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session,
AAA rested on Oporto’s lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo
on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch, she
remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then approached AAA to
kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand
AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other
again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises
Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his
cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight.
Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alson’s Palace
to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and
there they saw AAA lying on Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go home
because her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the
eye, just shook her head, and said, "I just stay here." Alquizola and
Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they
went to Alson’s Palace again,and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each
other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck.
Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume
drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she
refused and instead instructed them to take her to the Alquizola
Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and
Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When they
arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to
sleep here for the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4
where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two
beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on
the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached
her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily
raised her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her
brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her
buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her underwear down.
Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana,
on the other hand, placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had
intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and
went back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep. When he left,
Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room.
When AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace me because I
have a problem." Alquizola thus started kissing AAA’s breasts.
Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and
performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed
positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA.
During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name.
Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the
carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At
3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson’s Palace to sleep. At around 6:00
a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house.
They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left
and went home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back
before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he
arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz,
Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion
perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 for and by way of
civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to
suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as
maximum; to pay AAA the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
and another amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and
the court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum; to pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages
and another sum of ₱30,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen
Roda, Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of
said charge; and e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to them and
deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the
requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26
March 2004 and detained since then up to the present. Accused
Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and
detained since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto
who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was
ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte
on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his
provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this
court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from
the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without
prejudice on the prosecution to prosecute the case against accused
Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the
case to the CA. On June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the
assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling and,
consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion
of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on
appeal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA,
JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private
respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more
credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware
of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse.
She never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for help,
and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court
further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of
an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression
that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The
CA also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her
when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more
consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just
had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition
for Certiorari9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which
reversed private respondents’ conviction and ardently contending
that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The private respondents present the following arguments in their
Comment dated November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE
ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED. IV. THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on
April 1, 2009. It assigns the following errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF
ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR
HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant
to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings.
Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving
substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and
no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules
should be liberally construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is
the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation
or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from
their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or
when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on sheer
technicalities.14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant
in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the
accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the
decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a
denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null
and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy.17
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action,
the Court said in People v. Santiago:18
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is
the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that
of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended
party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that
the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19 Private
respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the
State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This
is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested
in the OSG.20
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the
instance of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private
respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to
bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution.
She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case
precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as
held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained the private
offended party’s right in a criminal case to file a special civil action
for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal
and ruled that the Solicitor General’s intervention was not
necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper
since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People
of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in
its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal
actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor.23
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for
the sake of argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for
certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy, still,
it must be dismissed for petitioner’s failure to previously file a
motion for reconsideration. True, a motion for reconsideration is a
condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its
purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is
not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.24
Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises
the same questions as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private respondents.
There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any
further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the
petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as will soon
be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due
process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be
shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with
grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecution’s
right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a
sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and
establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its authority
such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice.25
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave
abuse of judicial discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as
well as the trial court’s findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line,
and sinker, the private respondents’ narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act
of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act
of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus
effecting an injustice.27
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the
burden of proving that the respondent appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on
the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that
of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the
facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of
both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was
simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the
accused, especially that of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and
Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the case before it. The
appellate court merely echoed the private respondents’
testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that
transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemeno’s
house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As
a result, it presented the private respondents’ account and
allegations as though these were the established facts of the case,
which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must
consider the entire evidence presented, regardless of the party
who offered the same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of one
party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate
one party’s cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes
particularly significant in this case because the parties tendered
contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but
the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus,
the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and
outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse
of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due
process.33
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the
observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy findings to justify
its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious
during the whole ordeal. The fact that she never showed any
physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought
against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that
the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at
the time of the assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was
accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made
AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still
forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA,
but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the
time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however,
readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because
she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her
testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication,
thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.35 The appellate
court never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should
deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any
credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim
is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that
when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where
her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of
the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to
establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony
itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful
to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough
and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the
prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her
harrowing experience.37
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who
violated her. She tried to resist, but because of the presence of
alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAA’s
testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the
truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the
lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and
straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony.38 Thus:
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
xxxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went
asleep, when did you regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine
inside the bottle of Emperador Brandy.
xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the
remaining contained (sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they
insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were
carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold
Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?
A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I
was awakened by the flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were
awakened that (sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light,
what happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto
was on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he
sexually abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that
the witness is crying.
xxxx
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on
top of you, who else was there inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?
A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
A: I could not remember, sir.
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened?
A: I went asleep again, sir.
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw
Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found
Raymund Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when
you said that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you
saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation
of the defense. It noted that their account of the events was
seemingly unusual and incredible.40 Besides, the defense of
consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have
been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never
mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court
only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the
witness stand, catching the court by surprise.41 More importantly,
it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims
that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was
consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him,
such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs
convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence
that the intercourse was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the
burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every
element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible
for its commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction
must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that
logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during
the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow
one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the
party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient
to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in
litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual
congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos,
and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual
relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having
admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now
shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence.45
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge
of AAA but unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required
of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the
lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then
approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and
brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA’s lower garments
and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in
between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her.46 On the other
hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with
AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing AAA’s shirt and
brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he
removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her
buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA,
according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and took
out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards,
Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After
a few minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again
had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some
time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter,
he made love with AAA for the third and last time.47 Despite said
shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently
prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAA’s part
amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA
had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not
simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and
therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the
sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was
showy and exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up
to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a
rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the attending
circumstances.49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to
observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate
court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.50 Matters of
credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a
better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight
and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have
personally appeared before him.51 The appellate courts are far
detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely
solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of
credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court
acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the
trial court whose findings must be given due deference.52 Since the
CA and the private respondents failed to show any palpable error,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial
court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed
conclusive and binding.53
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining
physician found old hymenal laceration on AAA’s private organ. The
lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present
when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that
AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta,
when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the
insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed
that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering
the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted
from her previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed
to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for
organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was
a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just
graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar
case,54 the Court held: x x x Indeed, no woman would have
consented to have sexual intercourse with two men — or three,
according to Antonio Gallardo — in the presence of each other,
unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one.
Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that
Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so
characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the
simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could
not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute
to them the commission of the crime charged.55
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and be
subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not
true.56 And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a
young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually
committed. Even a complainant who was a woman of loose morals
could still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim
of rape. The victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial where,
as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or
was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the
private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence
of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent.57 A
freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if
the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape
cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips
of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is
enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the
hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not
indispensable to a conviction for rape.58 Neither does AAA’s
mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove
anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind when
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people
react differently."59 Different people react differently to a given
type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the frustration
and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been
defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that
when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled
by improper motive in making the accusation against the accused,
her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence.61 So if AAA in
fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to
immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept
it to herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not
caught in the act of making love with any of the private
respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship
with any of them of which her family disapproved.63 She never
became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to
save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private
respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent
any circumstance indicating the contrary, she brought the charge
against the private respondents simply because she was, in fact,
violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the
case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private
respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice for her
honor that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to
ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the
logic and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her
complaint,65 contrary to common human experience, and in utter
disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of
rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the
conspiracy because his participation in the crime was
uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his
participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit
the crime of rape.68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in
ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a
mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant
to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing
evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an
offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in
concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct
of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to
the commission of the offense.70
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to
Gregorio's and Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on
material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying
weapons during the mauling and whether they participated in the
mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they
did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not
necessary.1âwphi1 In this case, the rule is not applicable because
conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven.
Their exact participation in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis
Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower
courts that there was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished
the victim based on the testimony of the private complainant that
Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and
that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and
fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held
liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the
three of them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping
the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his
tacit and spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her
towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to
prevent the commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As
such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of
the crime.73
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s
participation in the crime is not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of
the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could
be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside
the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana
sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts
of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts,
and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy
among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA.
Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them,
Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is
true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when
he appealed from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the
whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a
single Information, it, however, actually charged the accused of
several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must
charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.76 The
rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the
charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his
defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more
charges which might confuse him in his defense.77 Non-compliance
with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint
or information under Rule117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before
he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80 The
accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity
of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are
deemed to have waived their right to question the same. Also,
where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are
merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the
same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak
of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against them because the Information, in
fact, stated that they "took turns in having carnal knowledge
against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations
made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that
AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according
to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana
positioned himself in between her legs and had intercourse with
her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails
to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape,
or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the
three of them during the commission of each of the four violations.
Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape
committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he
inserted his sexual organ into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot
convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the
same was not included in the Information. This is, however,
without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual
assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by
two or more persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of
an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each
count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper
imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the
penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible
penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the
range of prision mayor(the penalty next lower in degree to
reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the
range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there
being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall
impose the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each
count of rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87which
extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a
child,88 and provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:89
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps
and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may,
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the
foregoing provision should be taken into consideration by the judge
in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have
already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper
treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 shall
likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from
committing the same bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Court hereby renders judgment:
a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in each case;
b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four ( 4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, in each case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four ( 4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA,
jointly and severally, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is
REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Let the
records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the
execution of judgment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96356 June 27, 1991
NONILLON A. BAGALIHOG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GIL P. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of Br. 45, RTC of
Masbate; and MAJOR JULITO ROXAS,respondents.
Jolly T. Fernandez for petitioner.
Antonio Llacer for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
We are asked once again to rule on the validity of a search and
seizure as tested by the requirements of the Bill of Rights and to
balance the demands of an orderly society with the imperatives of
individual liberty.
On March 17, 1989, Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly
after disembarking at the Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of
the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day, the petitioner's
house, which was near the airport, was searched with his consent
to see if the killers had sought refuge there. The search proved
fruitless.
Two days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine
Constabulary seized the petitioner's motorcycle and took it to the
PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant. The
motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the
vehicles used by the killers.
After investigation, the petitioner and several others were charged
with multiple murder and frustrated murder for the killing of
Espinosa and three of his bodyguards and the wounding of another
person.
On June 21, 1989, the petitioner filed a complaint against Capt.
Roxas for the recovery of the motorcycle with an application for a
writ of replevin, plus damages in the total amount of
P55,000.001 This was docketed as Civil Case No. 3878 in Branch 48
of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate.
On November 7, 1989, the petitioner filed an urgent manifestation
for the deposit of the motorcycle with the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate, on the ground that PC soldiers
were using the vehicle without authority. The motion was granted
on November 10, 1989, by Judge Ricardo Butalid.
Judge Butalid later inhibited himself and Civil Case No. 3878 was
transferred to Branch 45, presided by Judge Gil Fernandez. In the
criminal cases, a change of venue was ordered by this Court from
Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to Branch 56 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
On October 12, 1990, Judge Fernandez dismissed Civil Case No.
3878, in an order holding in part as follows:
The question to be resolved is whether Replevin is proper to
recover the possession of said motorcycle.
It is admitted that the motorcycle in question, now in the
possession of the Clerk of Court of Masbate, is to be used as
evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 5811-5814, now pending trial before
Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. This
Court opined that it has no jurisdiction to release evidence
impounded or surrendered to the PC-CIS Task Force Espinosa.
Property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the
law and cannot be replevied until such custody is ended. (77 C.J.S.
28.)
Granting as claimed by plaintiff that said motorcycle was illegally
seized, he can raise the issue when presented during the trial.
The proper Court to order its release, the motorcycle in question,
is the Presiding Judge of Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
Reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner now asks this
Court to reverse the said order.
His contention is that the motorcycle was invalidly seized and that
therefore he has a right to its return.1awp++i1 The proper remedy
for this purpose is his complaint for recovery and the issuance of a
writ of replevin as authorized by the Rules of Court. In refusing to
grant him relief and dismissing the case instead on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court committed reversible
error that he prays this Court will correct.
In his comment, the private respondent admits the absence of a
search warrant when the motorcycle was seized but stresses that
the crime perpetrated is a heinous offense. Espinosa was a man of
consequence. The motorcycle in question is an extremely mobile
vehicle and can be easily dismantled or hidden, and the unique
situation existing at that time required him to place it in the custody
of the PC-CIS Task Force Espinosa without first securing a search
warrant. In doing so, he merely complied with the orders of his
superior to preserve the vehicle for use as evidence in the criminal
cases.
We share Captain Roxas's concern for the apprehension of the
killers but cannot agree with his methods. While recognizing the
need for the punishment of crime, we must remind him that in our
system of criminal justice, the end does not justify the means. For
all his strong conviction about the guilt of the petitioner, the private
respondent must still abide by the Constitution and observe the
requirements of the Bill of Rights. Article III, Section 2, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was
already recognized even during the days of the absolute
monarchies, when the king could do no wrong. On this right, Cooley
wrote: "Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the King, but the
humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him
and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the
kingly prerogatives."2
The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent
but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The mere fact that
in the private respondent's view the crime involved is "heinous"
and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not authorize
disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior
orders" condone the omission for they could not in any case be
superior to the Constitution.
We do not find that the importance of the motorcycle in the
prosecution of the criminal cases excused its seizure without a
warrant. The authorities had enough time to comply with the
required procedure but they did not do so, preferring the
unconstitutional shortcut. The crime was committed on March 17,
1989, and the motorcycle was seized only on March 19, 1989, or
two days later. During that period, the private respondent had all
the opportunity to apply for a search warrant and establish
probable cause in accordance with the Bill of Rights and the Rules
of Court. He did not.
The following observation in Alih v. Castro3 is an appropriate
reminder:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid
because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners
were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before
making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the
premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly
processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all
the menace of a military invasion.
xxx xxx xxx
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant
from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in
Zamboanga City, they instead simply barged into the beleaguered
premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot
just force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a
superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel
is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient rule,
revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.
The mere mobility of the motorcycle did not make the search
warrant redundant for it is not denied that the vehicle remained
with the petitioner until it was forcibly taken from him. The fear
that it would be dismantled or hidden was mere speculation that
was not borne out by the facts. The extraordinary events cited in
People v. Court of First Instance of Rizal4 are not present in the case
now before us. The necessity for the immediate seizure of the
motorcycle without the prior obtention of a warrant has not been
established.
The private respondent himself emphasizes that the petitioner had
promised in the morning of March 19, 1989, to present the
motorcycle in case it was needed during the investigation of the
killings.5 There was no reason to fear that it would be concealed by
the petitioner, who presumably was under police surveillance at
the time as one of the suspected killers. He could not have had that
much opportunity to hide the vehicle even if he wanted to.
The private respondent maintains that by the petitioner's promise,
he effectively waived the right to a search warrant and so can no
longer complain that the motorcycle had been invalidly seized.
There was no such waiver. The petitioner merely agreed to
cooperate with the investigators and to produce the vehicle when
needed, but he did not agree to have it impounded. The record
shows that he expressed reservations when this was suggested and
said he needed the motorcycle for his official duties as a member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and in his private business.6 At
any rate, it has been shown that he was unwilling to surrender it at
the time it was taken without warrant, and that made the taking
unlawful.
In Roan v. Gonzales,7 the Court said:
It is true that are certain instances when a search when a search
may be taken validly made without warrant and articles may be
taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless
search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the
person being arrested is frisked for weapons he may otherwise be
able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be
inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband
and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels
and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of
the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing
the state's jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be
searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also
been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if
they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon
them inadvertently.
The case at bar does not come under any of the above specified
exceptions. The warrantless seizure of the motorcycle was
unquestionably violative of "the right to be let alone" by the
authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution. The vehicle cannot
even be detained on the ground that it is a prohibited article the
mere possession of which is unlawful.
In dismissing Civil Case No. 3878, the respondent judge said he had
no jurisdiction over the motorcycle because it was in custodia
legis and only the judge trying the criminal cases against the
petitioner and his co-accused could order its release. He cited the
general doctrine that:
Property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the
law and cannot be replevied, until such custody is ended.8
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot
be replevied. But the rule applies only where the property
is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against
warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions.
Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia
legis.9 As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar10 "A thing is in custodia
legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the
official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ." Only when property is lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and
not otherwise.11
The circumstance that Judge Fernandez ordered the motorcycle to
be deposited with the clerk of court on motion of the petitioner did
not place the vehicle in custodia legis. The respondent judge had
no authority over it because it had not been lawfully seized nor had
it been voluntarily surrendered to the court by the petitioner. The
private respondent observed in his comment that "it is only when
the exhibits are offered in evidence and admitted by the court that
they are submitted to the custody of the Court, and, before that,
"they are usually in the possession of the prosecution." Even he
agrees therefore that the motorcycle is not in custodia legis.
At that, the vehicle in the case at bar is not admissible as an exhibit
even if offered as such because it is "the fruit of the poisonous
tree." Under Article III, Sec. 3(2) "any evidence obtained in
violation" of the rule against unreasonable searches and seizure
"shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Our finding is that the action to recover the motorcycle in the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate will not constitute interference
with the processes of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and that,
consequently, the complaint should not have been dismissed by
the respondent judge.
The Judiciary is as anxious as the rest of the government that crime
be prevented and, if committed, redressed.1âwphi1There is no
question that the person who violates the law deserves to be
punished to the full extent that the attendant circumstances will
allow. But the prosecution of the suspected criminal cannot be
done with high-handedness or prejudgment, in disregard of the
very laws we are supposed to uphold. Zeal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors.
WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge dated October 12,
1990, is SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 3878 is REINSTATED for
further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169596 March 28, 2007
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and PEDRO
BALUBAL, Respondents
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review is the Court of Appeals’
Decision1 dated September 6, 2005 dismissing for lack of merit the
appeal of petitioner Superlines Transportation Company, Inc.
(petitioner), docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61144.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing
public transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its buses,
while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit
lane, swerved and crashed into the radio room of respondent
Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).
The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCC’s toll
way patrol, Sofronio Salvanera, and respondent Pedro Balubal
(Balubal), then head of traffic control and security department of
the South Luzon tollway.2 The bus3was thereafter turned over to
the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own investigation of
the incident. Because of lack of adequate space, the bus was, on
request of traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera (Lopera), towed by
the PNCC patrol to its compound where it was stored.4
Subsequently, petitioner made several requests for PNCC to
release the bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same, despite
petitioner’s undertaking to repair the damaged radio room.
Respondent Balubal instead demanded the sum of ₱40,000.00, or
a collateral with the same value, representing respondent PNCC’s
estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the damaged radio room.
By petitioner’s estimate, however, the damage amounted to
₱10,000.00 only.5
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property
(replevin) with damages6 against respondents PNCC and Balubal
with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, praying as
follows:
xxxx
2. after trial on the issues, judgment be rendered –
a) adjudging that plaintiff has the right to the possession of subject
personal property and awarding the material possession of said
property to plaintiff as the sole and absolute owner thereof;
b) ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the
following:
(1) the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized income as of
the date of the filing of the instant complaint and, thereafter, the
sum of P7,500.00 daily until subject passenger bus shall have been
delivered to and in actual material possession of plaintiff;
(2) the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
(3) the sum of P20,000.00 as litis expenses; and
(4) the cost of suit.7
In view of its inability to put up the bond for the issuance of a writ
of replevin, petitioner opted to forego the same and just wait for
the court’s final judgment.
In respondents’ Answer8 to the complaint, they claimed that they
merely towed the bus to the PNCC compound for safekeeping
pursuant to an order from the police authorities; that respondent
Balubal did not release the bus to petitioner in the absence of an
order from the police authorities; that petitioner, in claiming the
bus, failed to present the certificate of registration and official
receipt of payment to establish ownership thereof; and that the
bus subject of the complaint was not the same bus involved in the
December 13, 1990 accident.
By way of Counterclaim, respondents prayed for the award of
₱40,326.54 in actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in exemplary damages,
and ₱130,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
By Decision of December 9, 1997, the trial court dismissed
petitioner’s complaint. On respondents’ Counterclaim, it ordered
petitioner to pay respondent PNCC the amount of ₱40,320.00
representing actual damages to the radio room.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals9 which held that the
storage of the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the nature
of a deposit, hence, custody or authority over it remained with
Lopera who ordered its safekeeping; and that Lopera acted as
respondent PNCC’s agent, hence, absent any instruction from him,
respondent PNCC may not release the bus.
The appellate court thus concluded that the case should have been
brought against the police authorities instead of respondents.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the petition,
the Court resolves to dispose first the procedural issues raised by
respondents in their Comment.10
Respondents contend that the petition raises only questions of fact
and suffers from a procedural defect in that it failed to include
"such material portions of the record as would support the
petition" as required under Section 4, Rule 4511 of the Rules of
Court, hence, it should be dismissed outright.
Contrary to respondents’ contention, the petition raises questions
of law foremost of which is whether the owner of a personal
property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary
and recover damages for illegal distraint.
In any event, while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts
and does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, a number of exceptions have
nevertheless been recognized by the Court. These exceptions are
enumerated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals:12
It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power
of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the
findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court.
However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule,
to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion. x x x (Italics in original; underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
As will be discussed below, number 11 of the foregoing
enumeration applies in the present case.
Respecting the second procedural issue, as a rule, the failure of a
petitioner to comply with any of the requirements under Section 4,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition constitutes
sufficient ground for its dismissal.13
In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses
may be disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its merits. As
held in Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan:14
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has
consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits,
after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes
and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better
served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends.
Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the
resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and
rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The facts and circumstances attendant to the case dictate that, in
the interest of substantial justice, this Court resolves it on the
merits.
On to the substantive issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals15 discusses
the term replevin as follows:
The term replevin is popularly understood as "the return to or
recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully
taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the
matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action;" "the
writ by or the common-law action in which goods and chattels are
replevied," i.e., taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin;" and to
replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to
take possession of goods or chattels under a replevin order.
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as "a form of action which
lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have been
taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of
which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the
property therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his
giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title,
or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority
states that the term, "to replevy" means " to re-deliver goods which
have been distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving
pledges in an action of replevin." The term therefore may refer
either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which
possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and
retained during the pendency of the action. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show
that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of
the object sought to be recovered,16 and that the defendant, who
is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the
same.17
Petitioner’s ownership of the bus being admitted by
respondents,18 consideration of whether respondents have been
wrongfully detaining it is in order.
Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus
was towed by respondents on the request of Lopera.19 It was thus
not distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to
law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment,
or otherwise placed under custodia legis.
In upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, the Court of
Appeals held that while "there is no law authorizing the
impounding of a vehicle involved in an accident by the police
authorities, x x x neither is there a law making the impounding of
vehicles involved in accidents illegal." It added that "the Supreme
Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on
the matter."20 The appellate court is mistaken.
The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures.
Thus, Section 2, Article III provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Underscoring
supplied)
The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s
request, were unquestionably violative of "the right to be let alone"
by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.21
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo 22 to
justify the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents by police
authorities is misplaced. The Victory Liner case was an
administrative case against a trial court judge. This Court explicitly
declined to rule on the legality of such an order:
In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to
determine the issue of the legality of respondent’s order requiring
VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI
should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly
to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. x x x
xxxx
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon
directly from us through an administrative case would be to
countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and
of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade
compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a
property petition, including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we
shall shun from passing upon that issue in this
case.23 (Underscoring supplied)
This Court’s statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a "clear-cut
policy" refers to the practice, rightly or wrongly, of trial court judges
of issuing orders for the impounding of vehicles involved in
accidents. It has no application to the instant case which involves
the seizure and distraint implemented by respondents upon a
verbal order by Lopera without the benefit or color of legality
afforded by a court process, writ or order.
That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally
charged for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property
in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence does not affect
the outcome of this case.24As explained in Bagalihog v. Fernandez:25
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot
be replevied. But the rule applies only where the property
is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against
warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions.
Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia
legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, 26 "A thing is in custodia
legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the
official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ." Only when property is lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and
not otherwise. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the
original; citations omitted)
Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in light
of the foregoing discussion, thus in order.
As for petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds that it cannot
pass upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other
police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of
the bus. The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over
the bus to respondents for safekeeping, a contract of deposit27 was
perfected between them and respondents.
Petitioner’s failure to implead indispensable parties is not, of
course, fatal to its cause of action, misjoinder or non-joinder of
parties not being a ground for its dismissal.28 Domingo v.
Scheer29 elucidates:
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321 March 10, 2004
VICTORY LINER, INC., represented by JOHNNY T. HERNANDEZ,
President, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
For our resolution is the verified complaint of Victory Liner, Inc.
(VLI) against respondent Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo, then
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Orani,
Bataan, and Acting Presiding Judge of the MCTC of Dinalupihan-
Hermosa, Bataan, for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority, oppression, and inaction on a pending motion.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate No. CWF-
935 was cruising along the National Highway of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista
Morales. Marciana died the following day. VLI shouldered all the
funeral and burial expenses of Marciana. Subsequently, on 6 March
2000, VLI and the heirs of the victim entered into an
Agreement/Undertaking.1 On 14 March 2000, after payment by VLI
of the claims, Faustina M. Antonio, the authorized and designated
representative of the heirs of the victim, executed a Release of
Claim2 and an Affidavit of Desistance3 in favor of VLI and the driver
Reino de la Cruz.
However, earlier or on 3 March 2000, two of Marciana’s sons
Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, who were also
signatories to the Agreement/Undertaking, executed
a Pinagsamang Salaysay4 against Reino de la Cruz. On the strength
of that document, a criminal complaint was filed with the MCTC of
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10512.
After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000, respondent
Judge Bellosillo ordered the immediate issuance of a warrant of
arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50,000 to be posted
in cash. He further directed the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, to immediately impound the bus involved in the accident,
which could be released only upon the posting of a cash bond in
the amount of P50,000.6
On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and
Motion7 manifesting that it was depositing to the court under
protest a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of its bus. After
making the deposit, VLI’s counsel presented the receipt issued by
the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Dinalupihan, to the Chief of Police of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, who then released the bus.
On 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent’s court a petition8 to
declare null and void the order directing it to post bond for the
release of its bus. This petition was, however, dismissed for
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction.
On that same day also, respondent Judge Bellosillo issued an order
directing the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and his
deputies and investigators to explain in writing why they should not
be held in contempt of court for, and be administratively charged
with, having released without a court order the Victory Liner bus
involved in Criminal Case No. 10512. Thus, the bus was re-
impounded by the police authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Subsequently, on 18 April 2000, respondent Judge acted on VLI’s
Manifestation and Motion dated 30 March 2000 and issued an
order9 for the release of the bus.
On 23 June 2000, VLI filed a verified complaint10 with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) claiming that the respondent (a) is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law in impounding its bus and
requiring it to post a cash bond for the release of the bus; (b)
gravely abused his authority when it revoked the surety bond of
one of VLI’s driver Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373; (c)
knowingly rendered an unjust and oppressive order when he
increased the bond to P350,000 and required that it be posted in
cash; (d) gravely abused his authority when he ordered the police
authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to file a case against Reino de la
Cruz; and (e) is guilty of inaction or dereliction of duty in failing to
resolve, despite the lapse of two months, VLI’s petition for the
nullification of the order requiring the posting of a cash bond for
the release of the bus involved in the accident. Later, VLI filed with
the Office of the Chief Justice a verified supplemental complaint
against the respondent, which was forthwith indorsed to the OCA.
In his comment,11 respondent Judge Bellosillo explains that in the
exercise of his sound discretion and in the greater interest of justice
and fair play, he required a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of
the police-impounded vehicle to answer for damages by way of
subsidiary liability in case of accused’s insolvency. The requirement
of a bond for the release of impounded vehicles involved in reckless
imprudence cases is practiced not only by him but by other judges
throughout the country.
As for his order for the re-impounding of the Victory Liner bus,
respondent Judge claims that it was just under the circumstances
considering that its prior release was illegal. The payment of cash
bond for the release of the impounded vehicle was made by the VLI
when respondent Judge was at his official station in the MCTC of
Orani-Samal, Bataan. Thus, in his absence, no order could have
been issued for the release of the impounded vehicle. If ever said
vehicle had to be re-impounded, it was the fault of VLI’s counsel, as
he was the one who misled the police authorities into believing that
with the payment of the bond, the bus could already be released.
The respondent justifies the substitution of the surety bond of
accused Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373 with a cash bond
on the strength of the prayer of the prosecutor that the bond be
posted in cash in view of the gravity of the offense. The Rules of
Court leave to the discretion of trial judges the question of whether
a bail should be posted in the form of a corporate surety bond,
property bond, cash deposit, or personal recognizance. Having
found that Serrano’s surety bond, which was not even attached to
the information but merely noted on the third page thereof, was in
a minimal amount and had expired already, he required a cash
bond. He increased the bond after considering that Serrano was a
fugitive from justice.
Respondent Judge Bellosillo denies that he ordered the police
authorities of Dinalupihan to file the criminal case against Reino de
la Cruz. He points to (a) the Pinagsamang Salaysay dated 3 March
2000 of Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, which was the
basis for the filing of the criminal complaint by the police
investigator and; (b) the fact that said criminal complaint filed by
the police investigator was duly approved by the Chief of Police.
Thus, with these circumstances, it could not be said that he
compelled the police authorities into filing the criminal case.
As to the charge of dereliction of duty for failure to act on the
petition for the nullification of the order requiring a bond for the
release of VLI’s bus, respondent Judge avers that the same is
baseless. Contrary to VLI’s contention, he acted on that petition as
early as 10 April 2000, which was the date set by VLI’s counsel for
the hearing of such petition.12 VLI’s counsel did not appear on that
date and refused to accept or receive notices of hearing and court
orders from court personnel.
In his Report and Recommendation, retired Justice Narciso T.
Atienza, the OCA Consultant to whom this case was referred by the
Court, submits that Judge Bellosillo’s resignation, which was
accepted by the Court En Banceffective 27 March 2002, does not
render moot and academic the instant administrative complaint.
He finds that the respondent Judge erred in ordering the
impounding of the Victory Liner bus and in requiring a cash bond of
P50,000 for its release; in fixing an excessive bail bond for Reino de
la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512; and in increasing the bail bond
of Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373 unconscionably from
P60,000 to P350,000. He then recommends that the respondent
Judge be penalized with a fine of P20,000. But for lack of evidence,
he exonerates respondent Judge from complainant’s charge that
he compelled the police authorities into filing the criminal case
against De la Cruz. As to respondent’s alleged inaction on VLI’s
petition to declare null and void the order requiring a bond for the
release of the subject bus, Justice Atienza finds that the said
petition was resolved on 10 April 2000, right on the day it was
submitted for resolution. Likewise, he disregards the additional
charges in the supplemental complaint, there being no showing
that the respondent received a copy thereof.
Justice Atienza also notes that in A.M. No. 00-1293, promulgated
on 5 July 2000, respondent Judge was reprimanded for issuing a
policy action and an order beyond the scope of his authority; and
in MTJ No. 00-1308, promulgated on 16 December 2002,
respondent Judge was found guilty of undue delay in rendering a
decision and was ordered to pay a fine of P11,000 to be taken from
his retirement benefits. He further notes the pending
administrative cases against respondent Judge: (1) OCA IPI No. 96-
232-MTJ for conduct unbecoming a judge; (2) OCA IPI No. 98-533-
MTJ for ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and gross
misconduct; (3) OCA IPI No. 96-203-MTJ for issuing an unjust
interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law; (4) A.M. No. 99-
1222 for violation of the constitutional rights to information and to
speedy trial; and (5) undocketed cases for unprofessional and ill-
mannered conduct, refusing to receive documents, and illegal
possession of firearms.
Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo does not
render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The
jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency of this
case. The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent
official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule
would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications.13
We agree with Justice Atienza in exonerating the respondent from
the charges of inaction on a pending motion and of compelling the
police authorities to file a criminal case against De la Cruz. We,
however, hesitate to hold the respondent administratively
accountable for gross ignorance of the law in ordering (1) the
impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular accident and
(2) the posting of a P50,000 bond for the release of the vehicle,
both of which were found by OCA Consultant Atienza to be
erroneous.
Notably, in its Motion to Resolve, VLI submits that this case
presents a good occasion for us to resolve, among other issues,
"the legality of the imposition by trial judges on bus operators to
post bail bond for their impounded vehicles in accident cases, in
addition to the bail bond required for the provisional liberty of
accused-drivers." According to VLI, our ruling on this matter would
guide trial court judges nationwide in accident cases so that bus
operators and their personnel would not be at the mercy of judges
like the respondent in this case, who during his incumbency had
been requiring vehicle owners involved in accidents to post cash
bonds for the release of impounded vehicles.
In Lacadin v. Mangino,14 the respondent Judge therein was sought
to be administratively liable for extending the lifetime of a search
warrant issued by him. We held that even if he may have
committed an error of judgment or an abuse of discretion for such
act, he cannot be punished administratively therefor in the absence
of proof that he was motivated by ignominy or ill-will. Moreover,
we ruled that the administrative case is not the right forum to
determine whether the life of a search warrant may be extended
by the court upon proper motion filed before the expiration of the
10-day period.
Worth noting also is the case of Cañas v. Castigador.15 In that case,
an Isuzu trailer truck involved in a vehicular mishap was ordered
impounded in an Order of 11 September 1996 of the trial court
where the criminal case against its driver was pending. That order
was addressed to the Chief of Police of General Trias, Cavite, or any
officer of the law. In an earlier order of 14 August 1996, the vehicle
owner was required to surrender the truck to the court.
Subsequently, on motion of the prosecutor, the trial court declared
the vehicle owner guilty of indirect contempt for continued
defiance of the 11 September 1996 Order. However, upon the
vehicle owner’s petition, we found respondent’s order holding the
petitioner therein guilty of indirect contempt to be highly improper
for several reasons. But we did not pass upon the issue of the
legality of the impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular
accident. We did not declare the order for the impounding of the
vehicle to be illegal or unauthorized. If it were so, it could have been
one of the several reasons for admonishing the respondent Judge
therein.
In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to
determine the issue of the legality of respondent’s order requiring
VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI
should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly
to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. There is after
all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said in Santiago v.
Vasquez,16 the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the
hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking a ruling directly
from us must be put to a halt.17
It must be recalled that on 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent
judge’s court a Petition to Declare Order Directing Victory Liner,
Inc., to Post Bond for the Release of the Bus Null and Void.18 In that
petition, VLI submitted that there is no legal basis for the order
directing the impounding of the bus and the posting by the bus
owner of a cash bond for its release, and hence that order is void ab
initio.19 However, despite notice, VLI’s counsel Atty. Reynaldo R.
Romero did not appear on 10 April 2000, the schedule20 for the
hearing of that petition as set by him.21 The respondent thereupon
issued an order22 dismissing the petition outright on grounds of
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction, and ordering that a copy
of the said order be furnished VLI’s counsel at his given address.
However, VLI’s counsel reportedly refused to accept or receive
from court personnel notices of hearing and court orders. And,
according to respondent Judge, he (VLI’s counsel) never appeared
and continued not to appear before the respondent for reasons
known only to him.23 VLI cannot, therefore, resurrect that issue
directly before us, and much less through a mere verified
administrative complaint or motion to resolve.
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon
directly from us through an administrative case would be to
countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and
of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade
compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a proper
petition, including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall
shun from passing upon that issue in this case.
In any event, the absence of a ruling in Cañas v. Castigador on the
legality of the impounding of vehicles involved in an accident, as
well as the foregoing statements of VLI in its Motion to Resolve,
implies that there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter.
They would, therefore, negate a finding of gross ignorance of the
law or grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent Judge.
Moreover, even assuming that the acts of the respondent in
ordering the impounding and subsequent re-impounding of the
subject vehicle and in requiring the posting of a cash bond for its
release were erroneous, as found by OCA Consultant Atienza, such
are errors of judgment that cannot be the subject of a disciplinary
action absent proof of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or bad
faith.24 A judge may not be held administratively liable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would
be to render a judicial office unbearable, for no one called upon to
try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in rendering a judgment. For a judge to be
held administratively liable for ignorance of the law, it is necessary
that the law be sufficiently basic that all that the judge must do is
to simply apply it;25 or that the error must be gross or patent,
deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith.26
We, however, find respondent administratively liable for imposing
excessive cash bail bonds on accused Reino de la Cruz in Criminal
Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373.
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody
the right to bail except those charged with offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.27 Section
9, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended,28 provides that in fixing the amount of bail, the judge
must primarily consider the following factors:
a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
c) Penalty for the offense charged;
d) Character and reputation of the accused;
e) Age and health of the accused;
f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;
g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
h) Forfeiture of the bonds;
i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.
The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at all times. It
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when
required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this
purpose. Excessive bail shall not be required.29 In implementing this
mandate, the accused’s financial capability should particularly be
considered. What is reasonable to a wealthy person may not be so
to a man charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists,
it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive.30
Moreover, under the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, bail
shall be P30,000 regardless of the number of deaths. 31
De la Cruz and Serrano were both charged with the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Although permanently
employed as drivers of VLI, it could not be said that each was
capable of posting a cash bail bond of P50,000 and P350,000,
respectively. In fixing such amounts, the respondent apparently did
not take into account the gravity of the offense charged and the
financial capability of the accused. He thereby willfully disregarded
the guidelines under Section 9, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, and the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of
the DOJ. In effect, he violated the constitutional right of the
accused to bail, as well as the prohibition against excessive bail,
making the right, in the words of Justice Jackson, "a teasing illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper’s will."32
The bail fixed by the respondent is all the more excessive because
it was in the form of cash. The posting of a cash bond would entail
a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its
procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the
accused as to have the effect of altogether denying the accused’s
constitutional right to bail. On the other hand, a surety bond may
be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small
premium. A surety or property bond does not require an actual
financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property
owner. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or
the expectancy of the price at which the property can be sold is
placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production of the
body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to
conviction or acquittal.33
While cash bail is authorized under our rules, the option to deposit
cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused,34 as
can be gleaned from the language of Section 14, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,35 which read:
SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail. – The accused or any person acting
in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of
internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the
amount of bail fixed by the court or recommended by the
prosecutor who investigated or filed the case, and upon submission
of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of Section 2 hereof, the
accused shall be discharged from custody….
The respondent judge, therefore, grossly erred in converting
Serrano’s surety bond to cash bond and in demanding that De la
Cruz post a cash bond to obtain their provisional liberty.36
It bears repeating that judges should exhibit more than cursory
acquaintance with the basic legal norms and precepts, as well as
with statutes and procedural rules. As advocates of justice and
visible representations of the law, they are expected to keep
abreast with the law and jurisprudence, and be proficient in the
application and interpretation thereof. When the law or rule is
basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything less
than that is gross ignorance of the law.37
In light of our current jurisprudence,38 the respondent should be
fined in the amount of P10,000 for his act of imposing on accused
De la Cruz and Serrano an excessive bail to be posted in cash in
violation of pertinent rules and guidelines, as well as the
constitutional right of the accused to bail and the proscription
against excessive bail.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law and oppression in
imposing excessive cash bail bonds on Reino de la Cruz in Criminal
Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373,
respondent Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo is hereby ORDERED to pay
a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) to be taken from his
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
For petitioner to pursue its claim for damages then, it or the trial
court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable
parties ─ Lopera and any other responsible police officers.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
The prayer of petitioner, Superlines Transportation Company, Inc.,
for recovery of possession of personal property is GRANTED.
The records of the case are REMANDED to the court of origin, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, which is
DIRECTED to REINSTATE petitioner’s complaint to its docket if
petitioner is still interested to pursue its claim for damages and to
act in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction
of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for
review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on
August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as
charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned,
among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision,
considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial
and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he
was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack
of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s
decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified
the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and
filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute
laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioner’s appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely,
does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case,
which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor,
amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult
to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per
hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly
crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to
warrant his conviction for the crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the
place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that
the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no
evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the
prosecution during the trial of this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the
petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally
correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and,
more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does
not contain an allegation to that effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness
Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road
resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not
enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this case, at the
time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land
Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended by Republic
Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except
in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment
for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and
try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs).
Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General
acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that
the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the
petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial
went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating
therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.
The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of
a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for
the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein,
the principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis
estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and
the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has
been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act
on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La
Santa15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. &
Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed,
where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court
may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79;
Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it
is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an
objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived
by the parties. x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of
jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case
was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction,
for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-
863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was
heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that
the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here,
the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties,
has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void,
or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character
directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently
indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such
case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in
the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the
jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion
quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the
court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former
jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-
389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the
ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped
subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous
jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18
But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not
sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee
therein, made the following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been
rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this
Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was
enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29,
1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was
never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was
handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they
must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said
enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the
case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual
real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the
jurisdictional amount of this Court (over ₱200,000). Our minute
resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas
Compaña de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is
applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the
Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter’s
jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered
as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed
the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a
contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of
appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of
Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of
attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be
barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for
the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active
participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of
estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot
be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting
a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37
S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659).
And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not
right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans
et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor
Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307,
Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of
the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as
well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on
its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting.22
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in
Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve
the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the
principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we
pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule
rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling
in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that
the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that
rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel
by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been
raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen
(15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a
plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined
in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the
plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the court’s
jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein,
we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded
supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer
volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as
foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As
such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule
presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant
case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by
asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped
from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an
adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the
jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the
amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so
only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower
court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held
in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages
of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred
petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction.
Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended
complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower
court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed
its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that
petitioner raised the question of the lower court’s lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of
jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September
1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private
respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles)
failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and
therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s
jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the
duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private
respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings
by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the
trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the
reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus
foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own
actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction
may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages
of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579
[1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442
[1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for
decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank
of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur
Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics
ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia
Times Corporation v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of
jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the
doctrines of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in
Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule.
Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified
that:
Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s
dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown
trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of
jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after
trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has
been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart
dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in
which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred
from questioning a court’s jurisdiction after being invoked to
secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches
prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the
first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul
everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however,
the exception rather than the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may
be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in
which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In
such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling
in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that
the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The
reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by
the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in
the answer.30
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack
of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by
presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the
doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction
may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial.
Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best
characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction
did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings
had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was
defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.32
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again
emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the
Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark
doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of
jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the
rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of
jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to
that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have
been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for
the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15
years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several
stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court
of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not
present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the
receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing
the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in
initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s
directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt
and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be
considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so
as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is
the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead
to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule
enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in
Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always
been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the
court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from
thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since
such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any
advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in
no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the
appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches"
unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading
laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to
loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other
causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the
patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or
less 15 years.37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant
case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a
forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only
from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The
doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be
strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel
may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of
injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction
over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court
provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts
or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No
laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want
of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and
Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-
judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to
any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law,
and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject
matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by,
any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the
cause of action. x x x
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by
the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in
his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined
by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties
but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of
the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence,
susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.43
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve
the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the
Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi,
Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We
are tasked to resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised
by petitioner, We impleaded the People of the Philippines as party
respondents herein in a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p.
41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with
his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their
backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-
shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty
(20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the
course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar
bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal
exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate
occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents
appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file
a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless
Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was
consequently filed, which narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15
years of age and acting with discernment, did then and there,
without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid
accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner,
an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt
operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and
imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the
body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused his
untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said
information on the following grounds:
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE
WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9,
Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with
respect to the first and third grounds relied upon. However, the
resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall
have been presented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising
two (2) issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED
WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE,
AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE
BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing
of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is
evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article
12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent."
It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes
'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs.
Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the
allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement
that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor
between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in
saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation
in the information that the accused acted with discernment and
willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in
a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an
inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to
allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception.
(Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages
of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265
of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and
intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor
General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the
purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to
such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a
person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a
means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the
other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term
discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case
of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption
from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over
nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity
to understand the difference between right and wrong . . .
(Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and
"discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are
products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers
to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to the moral
significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person
may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the
consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the
same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect,
therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above
nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then
he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time
recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and
"discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12
of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the
accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a
licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because ... the
infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and
below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other
hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not
absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without
criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it
could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature
and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with
discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence"
as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of
discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the
aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore
be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for
they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes
discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing
an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3)
elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of
action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such
felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element,
hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen
years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a
negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be
criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the
effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age
but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under
Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said Article would reveal
such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without
any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent"
and "discernment" used under the law, he cites the case of People
vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the
qualifying sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which
reads:
That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation
in the information that she. . ."with the intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . .
." into a deep place of the Peñaranda River and as a consequence
thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and
there.' This allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew what
would be the consequence of her unlawful act of pushing her victim
into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis
supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the
words "intent" and "discernment." What We meant was that the
combined effect of the words used in the information is to express
a knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or
rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly contend that
since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it in
effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the Idea of
the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the
latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by
the petitioner that the case against him should have first been
brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his
entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance
due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the
penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto
menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is
not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense
and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil.
263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and
People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The same principle applies in
construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a
fine exceeding P 200.00; ... (emphasis supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee
that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore
consider the penalty provided for by law or ordinance as
distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases
after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal
liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We
therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the
penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter
should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect
criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has
not been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As
intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and
categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order
effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED
to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. L-46896 January 15, 1940
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant-appealed,
vs.
PAUL SAN JUAN and MONTEROSA, accused-appellant.
D. Matias E. Vergara on behalf of the appellant.
The Attorney General Mr. Ozaeta and the Assistant Attorney
General Mr. Torres on behalf of the Government.
VILLA-REAL, J .:
The defendant Pablo San Juan and Monterosa was in the Municipal
Court of Manila of the crime of theft of five (5) bags of rice valued
at P32. Prosecuted, he was sentenced to suffer a principal penalty
of 6 months of major arrest and to compensate the offender in the
said sum of P32. He was also sentenced to suffer an additional
penalty of seven years, four months and one day in prison for being
a habitual criminal, and to pay the costs. Having appealed to the
Manila Court of First Instance, he was found guilty of the crime of
which he was accused and sentenced to the same penalty. Before
this Court, in elevation, it raises the following alleged errors as
committed by the Court, quo in its aforementioned judgment,
namely:
1. That the penalty imposed upon the accused-appellant for the
crime of theft alleged in the information should have been at most,
major arrest in its medium degree that if from two months and one
day to four months;
2. That the additional penalty of seven years, four months and one
day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency imposed by the
Municipal Court and as affirmed by the Court of First Instance of
Manila is illegal.
It is intended by the appellant that, not having proved that in the
commission of the crime there has been any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the penalty of major arrest in its
entirety, provided for in article 39, case 5, of the Revised Criminal
Code, or be one month and one day to six months of major arrest,
it must be imposed in its middle degree or two months and one day
to four months of major arrest, instead of the maximum degree of
the mentioned penalty, which has imposed the Lower court. Since
the accused and appellant is a habitual offender, which
presupposes recidivism that is an aggravating circumstance
modifying criminal responsibility, the concurrence of said
circumstance must be appreciated, so the repeated penalty
provided by law must be imposed to the maximum extent. Not
having attended any mitigating circumstance that compensates,
the main penalty imposed by the sentencing Court, which is the
subject of this appeal, is adjusted to law.
Also, by the appellant, in his second statement of alleged error, that
the additional penalty of seven years, four months and one day of
major prison, imposed by the Municipal Court of Manila for being
said defendant and habitual criminal appellant, is contrary to the
law. , since said Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to
impose such additional penalty. In the case of the People of the
Philippines against Liberato del Mundo, R. G. No. 46531, this Court
in a sentence promulgated on October 18, 1939, said the following:
We have declared in the case of "The People of the Philippines
against Jesus Acha y Rivera" (RG No. 46714) that the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court of Manila, in cases of theft, is determined, not
by penalty, but by the amount of the stolen and, when it does not
exceed P200, said Court has jurisdiction whatever the penalty
indicated for the crime.
According to this last sentence, the fact that the accused and
appellant is a habitual offender, a condition that pays him an
additional penalty, does not disqualify the Municipal Court of
Manila to hear of a cause in which such condition is alleged,
provided when the crime of which he is accused is theft and the
value of the stolen thing does not exceed P200.
It is also intended by the accused and appellant that his
participation in the commission of the crime of theft, which he had
been accused for the second time and for which he had been
convicted, was not in the concept of cars but simply as a cover-up,
and, consequently , such a second conviction cannot, with the
conviction in the present case, integrate the concept of habitual
crime. In the case of the People of the Philippine Islands against
Manuel Abuyen and Elais (52 Jur. Fil., 749), this Court declared that
"... The provisions of Law No. 3397 on habitual crime are applicable
to the crimes therein. listed, foreseen and punished by the Criminal
Code not only in degree of consummation but also in that of
frustrated and attempted. "
For the above considerations, and finding no error in the appealed
judgment, we confirm it in all its parts with the costs to the
appellant. That's how it is ordered.
G.R. No. L-65192 April 27, 1988
RODOLFO DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. FELIX L. MOYA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II
of the Court of First Instance of Davao, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Rolando C. Rama for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Involving as it does a purely legal question, the present petition for
certiorari and mandamus was certified to this Court by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30,
1983.
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence and
Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other
PC men, received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi,
Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and
apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal
cockfighting. In compliance with said mission order, Dela Cruz and
company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in
flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said
operators resisted arrest. The soldiers left the place but they
brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the
crime, such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal
cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the
soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters, catching up with
them on the Tagum-Mati National Highway. Fighting ensued and in
the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.
On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Davao, in an information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
40080.
While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and
1822-A were promulgated by the President of the Philippines on
January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes
committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine
Constabulary in performance of their duties.
Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed
in relation to the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the
Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the
military authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The
motion was denied. Hence, the present petition.
At issue is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Criminal Case No. 40080.
One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that
the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then
the entire proceedings are null and void.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. [Silvestre v.
Military Commission, L-48366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10; People
v. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 (1952); Rilloraza v. Arciaga, 128 Phil. 799
(1967), 21 SCRA 717.] And once jurisdiction is vested in the court,
it is retained up to the end of the litigation. [Pamintuan v. Tiglao,
53 Phil. 1, (1929); Phil. Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v.
CIR, 93 Phil. 747 (1953); Tuvera v. De Guzman, 121 Phil. 706
(1965),13 SCRA 729; Rilloraza v. Arciaga, supra: Rizal Surety and
Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., 123 Phil. 766 (1966),16
SCRA908).
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On
such date, by virtue of General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977,
published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28, pages 6373-1 to
6373-3. (July 11, 1977), military tribunals created under General
Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses
committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or which
arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their
official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining
whether an offense was committed while in the performance of
official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in
the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the
Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive
unless modified or revoked by the President. . . " (Section 1.) As no
amendatory law was ever published in the Official Gazette between
the time G.R. No. 59 was published until the information in Criminal
Case No. 40080 was filed on August 2,1979, then said General
Order No. 59 remained in force on said date.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, petitioner Dela Cruz was a
member of the Philippine Constabulary, and that the shooting of
the deceased Cabilto was committed while petitioner was
executing the Mission Order.
But what is the significance of the proviso regarding the certificate
to be issued by the Secretary of National Defense?
The proviso merely states that the certificate issued by the
Secretary of National Defense is conclusive for the purpose of
determining whether an offense was committed while in the
performance of official duty, or arose out of an act or omission
done in the performance of official duty. It does not in any way
preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an
offense is duty-connected. Nor does it make the certificate a
condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or
military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed by
members of the AFP.
In the instant case, even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of
National Defense was presented in court, the record contains a
copy of Mission Order No. 7, signed by a certain Lieutenant Huerta,
directing Dela Cruz, among others, to proceed to Barangay Pangi,
Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao to verify and apprehend persons
reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the
prosecution presented in court likewise shows that Cabilto was
shot while petitioner was executing the mission order. These
undisputed facts compel this Court to declare that respondent
court was without jurisdiction to try the case against petitioner
Dela Cruz.
The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information
was filed, Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822 and 1822-A which vest in
the courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by
members of the AFP in the performance of their duties were not
yet in effect, the same having been promulgated only in 1981.
Truly, PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to the case at bar.
However, General Order No. 59 cited above applies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The in Criminal Case No.
4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing
of another action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for appropriate action.
Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19568 March 31, 1964
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE L. CHUPECO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Gonzales Orense for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in
its Crim. Case No. 14786) to the Court of Appeals, but which the
latter court, pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, had certified the Supreme Court as a case in which the
jurisdiction of an inferior court is in issue.
The accused-appellant, Jose L. Chupeco, was charged on 2 February
1951 before the Court of First Instance of Manila under the
following information:
That on or about the 28th day of November, 1947, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused being the owner of, and,
having previously on the 24th day of July, 1946, executed a Chattel
Mortgage on the following properties:
An open shed under construction to be used sawmill building,
containing an area of 350 sq. m. more or less, located at Sitio
Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan.1äwphï1.ñët
SAWMILL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT:
One "Wheland" Circular sawmill No. 3 complete with carriage and
w/60" inserted circular saw (new);
One Gray Marine Full Diesel Engine 225 H.P. Serial No. 13835,
Engine No. C-17040;
One RD-14 Tractor with Bulldozer, motor No. 6719028;
One D-6 Caterpilar tractor motor 626-134;
One Clitract International Caterpilar Motor No. 2398-D;
One Air compressor (Aray type);
One complete set of welding instruments (local made);
One Lathe machine — F.E. Reed Co. Length 8' swing 8";
One planer for iron and steel — F. E. Reed & Co.;
One tracing machine and one vise (local made);
TRANSPORTATION UNITS:
One Chevrolet truck Model 1941 Motor No. KR-214658 — 1946
Plate No. 9794;
One International Baby truck Model 1938 Motor No. ND-13-6470;
One G.M.C. Army truck 6 x 6 Motor No. 70485739-Plate No. 10239;
One Willy's jeep Motor No. DP 2977-Plate No. 1512.
located at sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan in favor of the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, whose capital, assets, accounts,
contracts and choses in action were subsequently transferred to
the herein complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation an
institution created and operating pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 85, with principal office at the City of Manila,
Philippines, to secure a loan of P20,000.00, from said Agricultural
and Industrial Bank, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (on the aforesaid date of 28th day of November, 1947,
with intent to defraud the said Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
pledge and incumber, or cause to be pledged and incumbered the
same personal properties to one Mateo B. Pinile without having
fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term thereof and
without the consent of the mortgagee bank written on the back of
the mortgage, and, thereafter) knowingly transfer and remove, or
cause to be transferred and removed the said properties to the
municipality of Subic, Zambales, also without the written consent
of the mortgagee bank, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in the sum of P15,935.80,
Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the
aforesaid mortgage.
The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the
ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court
had no jurisdiction. Upon denial of the motion, the accused was
arraigned, and he entered a plea of not guilty. After the case was
partly tried, the defense counsel and the fiscal entered into an However, there is nothing in the evidence to show that the
agreement to have the information amended to the effect that the properties listed in Exhibit "D" and in the information are the same
charge be only for removal of properties mortgaged, eliminating properties listed in Exhibit "E". The descriptions are materially
the portion referring to pledging already pledged property. The different.
information, however, remained un-amended. The accused then An assential element common to the two acts punished under
filed a motion to dismiss involving the agreement, but the court Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed
denied it, and ordered that the case be tried on the charge "of or repledged, as the case may be should be the same or identical
having pledged property which had been previously pledged or property that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal or
mortgaged". After trial, the court found the accused guilty of the repledging. Therefore, even if the Court of First Instance of Manila
said offense, and imposed a penalty of two months and one day had jurisdiction over the case, the accused cannot be found guilty
of arresto mayor. on the evidence on record of the crime for which he stands
Not satisfied, the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of indicted.
Appeals, but the said court certified the case to the Supreme Court, FOR THE FOREGOING REASON, the appealed decision is hereby
as formerly stated. reversed, and another one entered acquitting the accused Jose L.
The accused attacks the jurisdiction of the trial court on the Chupeco. No pronouncement as to costs.
strength of the agreement with the fiscal to discard the charge of
repledging or remembering the chattels already mortgaged to the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank thus leaving in force only the
accusation of having transferred the encumbered property from
Bataan to Zambales without the consent of the mortgagee. It is
argued that since the place where the chattels were, as well as the
site to which they were moved, are both outside of Manila, the
courts of the latter acquired no jurisdiction to try the case, because
the offense was not committed within the Manila territory.
We find this stand without merit. The original terms of the charge
averred (and it is not disputed) the crime of repledging already
encumbered property without the creditor's consent, and one of
the essential ingredients of the offense (the execution of the first
mortgage) having been alleged, to have taken place in Manila, the
court of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction over the
offense under the Rules of Court (People vs. Mission, 48 O.G., 1331;
Rule 110, section 9). It is well-established that once vested, the
jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation
(McClain vs. Kansas City Bridge Co., 83 SW 2d, 132; Shankle vs.
Ingram, 45 S.E. 578; Walton vs. Mardeville Dowling & Co., 5 NW
776), which in this case amounted to no more than an avowal by
the prosecution that it could not establish the other elements of
the offense.
Furthermore, the court actually rejected the defense motion to
dismiss, and directed that the cue be tried on the original charge of
repledging property already encumbered. The accused obeyed that
directive, and by so doing it renounced the claim that the
information had been so amended as to discard that particular
averment.
But the fatal error in the decision appealed from is its disregard of
the fact that the evidence fails to show that the properties
mortgaged to the bank are the same one encumbered afterwards
to Mateo Pinili. In fact, the Office of the Solicitor General
recommends the acquittal of the accused on this very ground Brief,
pp. 10-11).
There is no question that the herein accused execute in the City of
Manila a Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit "D", on the properties located
in Bataan and listed in the in formation in favor of the Agricultural
and Industrial Bank on 24 July 1946, and that the accused pledged
or encumbered in the City of Manila, on 28 November 1947 the
properties listed in Exhibit "E", which are as follows:
One (1) sawmill with gray marine engine 125 H.P. circular law and
all appurtenances, implements and parts, also building, camarin
and housing improvements under Tax No. 1260-V for 1947,
assessed at P8,000.00 paid under O.R. No. 59318, dated May 14,
1947, Dinalupihan, Bataan;
One (1) bulldozer H.D.-14, with dozer, Make: Allis-Chalmers, Eng.
No. 3251541;
Two (2) cargo trucks (6 x 6), Eng. No. 220314218-Reg. No. 17094
and Eng. No. 220359225-Reg. No. 17093.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.
OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution
denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint
Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2)
Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and
REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated
July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of
the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to
ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private
respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio,
PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal
Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok
Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection
program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo
Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2
Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the
RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to
two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was
appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9
October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27
April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto
P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the
persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the
sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or
quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint
Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion
cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime,
petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint
Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner
Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and
Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor
Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration
of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge
Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint
Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was
denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer
for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the
Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21
September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to
grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly
after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for
murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took
note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532
dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining
order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for
adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately
and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said
motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it
of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of
the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision,
but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to
this Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred
in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16,
2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered
36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and
reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred
in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and
36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering
the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against
herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No.
36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of
Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines,
and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest
against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein
having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of
law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals
with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit
his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the
person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory
process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the
court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the
court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-
764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in
the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his
petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial
relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of
their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete
preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash
warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing
that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in
applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can
act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such
jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired
Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to
first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss
the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case
even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case
was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause
without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court
of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the
issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the
Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301
SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal
of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person
was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion,
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his
pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the
law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought
by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One
can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment
to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after
his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and
liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court
of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that
case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not
yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our
pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of
the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to
invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have
diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he
indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before
considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it
concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking
an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In
Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to
secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to
one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of law.’" The rationale
behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents
resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could
just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing
the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings
seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and
the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of
the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely
for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads
to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases,
motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for
dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first
two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person
of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant
of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of
the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general
rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the
custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point,
where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons
under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases
involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an
information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition
for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion
to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of
Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent
judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the
criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests
against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused
in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to
transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before
the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the
law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the
warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in
the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can
afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to
answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty.
On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to
persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a
person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest
who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his
determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the
motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally
examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official
functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is
quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any
time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of
the accused can be taken against him in the determination of
probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free,
it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom
before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the
hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due
process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking
and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition
for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts
engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager
of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he
quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice,
and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due
to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the
criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another
case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners,
petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution
before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that)
and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but
proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable
to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to
comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners
just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the
assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But
even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition
for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to
quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot
assail as premature the filing of the information in court against
them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the
adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice.
Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same
ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the
warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution.
Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to
the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2,
Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query
or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court,
through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention
of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the
Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case,
including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the
prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that
Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the
arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order
itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable
cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and
not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No
presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it
expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s
certification.28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains
no such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s
certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor,
the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable
cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement
under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting
documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C.
Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and
Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation
on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive
part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing
to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of
SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was
given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau
of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself
untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in
exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information;
and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a "politically
charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against
each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and
former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR
Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found
no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge
Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility
of a witness is not within the province of the determination of
probable cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in
Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more
than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds
over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should
be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is
not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in
another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground,
among other things, that there was a petition for review of the
assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s
resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal
cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo
Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn
statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the mastermind and
with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators,
the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the
five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a
"narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision
acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said
Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond
doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and
perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable
value." This Court agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what
use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case
No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in
these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted
to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda
dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the
two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et
al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect
disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that
case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed
against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right
to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2
Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of
this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the
basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for
the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on
reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not
happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case
relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even
the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at
bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in
Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony
of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of
reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary,
if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on
the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability
of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such probability
of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the
informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of
a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further
proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the
informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was
able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order,
such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court’s
resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild
suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court
of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued
by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue
apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners,
it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a
personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance
of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of
the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter
of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not
be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this
case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to
the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the
25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the
warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared
the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the
declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry
with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest
had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are
henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of
new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable
cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The
records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the
Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both
the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the
records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the
prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v.
Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not
rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to
overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable
cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court
of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524,
alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final
and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of
Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those
Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the
private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully
enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the
following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by
private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge
Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523
AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint
Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon
the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the
Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided
the case because we referred the same to them in our 19
November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October
2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.
Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however,
respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to
Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001
dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001,
we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the
previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public
Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order
within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In
claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in
issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had
ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14
November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as
to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12
November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a
bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the
bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in
contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and
abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which
require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of
respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and
for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be
construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14
November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy
cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and
it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for
certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that
the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are
enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge
Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1
Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18
December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and
raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this
connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of
the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect
the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within
ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle
the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten
(10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed
to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith
warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel
T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4
August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009
MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR,
and SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO
MARTIN, P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD
RAMOS ASIS, PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE
PAZ, and PO2 ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 4 February
2004 Decision2 and 25 June 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76345. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Maca-Angcos Alawiya
y Abdul, Isagani Abdul y Siacor, and Sarah Langco y Angli.
The Facts
On 18 September 2001, petitioners executed sworn
statements4 before the General Assignment Section of the Western
Police District in United Nations Avenue, Manila, charging accused
P/C Insp. Michael Angelo Bernardo Martin, P/Insp. Allanjing Estrada
Medina, PO3 Arnold Ramos Asis, PO2 Pedro Santos Gutierrez, PO2
Ignacio De Paz and PO2 Antonio Sebastian Berida, Jr., who were all
policemen assigned at that time at the Northern Police District,
with kidnapping for ransom.
The sworn-statements of petitioners commonly alleged that at
about 10:00 in the morning of 11 September 2001, while
petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle along United Nations
Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from behind;
that when they went out of their vehicle to assess the damage,
several armed men alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked guns at,
blindfolded, and forced them to ride in the Toyota Sedan; that they
were brought to an office where ₱10,000,000 and two vehicles
were demanded from them in exchange for their freedom; that,
after haggling, the amount was reduced to ₱700,000 plus the two
vehicles; that the money and vehicles were delivered in the late
evening of 11 September 2001; that they were released in the early
morning of 12 September 2001 in Quiapo after they handed the
Deed of Sale and registration papers of the two vehicles.
After the initial investigation by the Western Police District, the
case was reported to the Philippine National Police Intelligence
Group in Camp Crame, where a lateral coordination was made with
the Philippine National Police-National Capital Regional Police
Office Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (PNP-NCR-
RID) for the identification, arrest and filing of appropriate charges
against the accused. After its own investigation, the PNP-NCR-RID
recommended that accused be charged with violation of Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code,5 as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.
State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco),
who conducted the preliminary investigation, issued a
Resolution6 dated 14 January 2002, recommending that the
accused be indicted for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The
Resolution was endorsed for approval by Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano and approved by Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño.
On 24 January 2002, State Prosecutor Velasco filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41,7 an Information for
Kidnapping for Ransom against the accused with no bail
recommended. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
02198832, reads as follows:
That on September 11, 2001 at about 10:00 AM along United
Nations Avenue, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named Accused, who are all police
officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and grouping themselves together, did then and there by
force and intimidation, and by the use of high-powered firearms,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive
MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and ZARAH LANGCO of
their liberty against their will for the purpose of extorting ransom
as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for their
release amounting to TEN MILLION PESOS (PHP10,000,000.00)
which amount was later reduced to SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
(PHP700,000.00) plus two vehicles consisting of TOYOTA FX and
MITSUBISHI ADVENTURE to the damage and prejudice of MACA-
ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL and SARAH LANGCO in said
amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to them under
the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On 28 January 2002, the trial court, upon motion by the
prosecution, issued a Hold Departure Order against the
accused.9 On even date, the trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest
against all the accused.10
Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed a petition for
review of the Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco with the Office
of the Secretary of Justice.
On 18 February 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the
Information on the ground that "the officer who filed the
Information has no authority do so."11
In an Order12 dated 27 February 2002, the trial court denied the
motion to quash on the ground that under the ruling in People v.
Mapalao,13 an accused who is at large is not entitled to bail or other
relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction and power of
the Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA
6770),14 as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, are not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the
regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of the Department of
Justice to investigate, file the information and prosecute the case
could no longer be questioned.
In a Resolution15 promulgated on 24 September 2002, then
Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez reversed the ruling of State
Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to cause the withdrawal
or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for ransom. The
Secretary of Justice ruled that there was no prior approval by the
Office of the Ombudsman before the Information for kidnapping
was filed with the trial court. He also found that the incident
complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, not kidnapping
for ransom.
On 11 October 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by then Secretary of Justice
Simeon A. Datumanong in a Resolution promulgated on 17
February 2003.16
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
seeking the nullification of the Secretary of Justice’s ruling for
having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision of 4 February 2004
dismissing the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in a Resolution of 25
June 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the Secretary of
Justice that the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust
operation, contrary to the finding of State Prosecutor Velasco, that
it was a kidnapping for ransom.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the accused’s documentary
evidence which supported their claim that the incident was a
botched buy-bust operation. The Court of Appeals specifically
noted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Cesar Landayan (Landayan),
who was driving a taxi at the time of the incident and was
apprehended together with petitioners. The Sinumpaang
Salaysay categorically stated that he and petitioners were released
from accused’s custody at about 12:50 in the afternoon of the same
day, 11 September 2001. Thus, Cesar’s statement refuted the
complaint of petitioners that they were freed only in the morning
of 12 September 2001 after a pay-off of ₱700,000 in casino chips
and two vehicles. The Court of Appeals stressed that
Landayan’s Sinumpaang Salaysay was given on 14 September
2001, prior to petitioners’ complaint for kidnapping for ransom
which was filed on 18 September 2001 before the Western Police
District. Having been executed prior to the filing of the complaint
for kidnapping for ransom by petitioners, Cesar’s Sinumpaaang
Salaysay could not be discredited as a cover-up evidence.
The Court of Appeals upheld the Secretary of Justice’s ruling that
prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military was
needed for the filing of the Information before the RTC, pursuant
to OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001.17 The Court of Appeals
further sustained the finding that there were sufficient evidence
that the offense charged against accused was committed in relation
to their office and that the accused were all acting in the discharge
of their functions as policemen.
The Issues
The issues in this case are:
1. Whether the prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for
the Military is required for the investigation and prosecution of the
instant case against the accused;
2. Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution
of State Prosecutor Velasco amounted to an "executive acquittal;"
3. Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion
to quash the information) from the trial court when they had not
been arrested yet; and
4. Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom.
The Ruling of this Court
On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and
prosecution of the case against the accused policemen
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which is representing the
Secretary of Justice, agrees with petitioners that prior approval by
the Ombudsman is not required for the investigation and
prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen.
The OSG correctly cites the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice,18 where the
Court held that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but
is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. In
view of the foregoing, both the Court of Appeals and the Secretary
of Justice clearly erred in ruling that prior approval by the
Ombudsman is required for the investigation and prosecution of
the criminal case against the accused policemen.
On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice
of the resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco
Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to
review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information
has already been filed in court.19 In Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals,20 reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court
clarified that nothing in Crespo v. Mogul22 forecloses the power or
authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already
having been filed in court.23 The nature of the power of control of
the Secretary of Justice over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma
v. Court of Appeals24 in this wise:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,
exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
their rulings. (Emphasis supplied) regulation;
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the Secretary of Justice’s f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
reversal of the Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco did not g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
amount to "executive acquittal" because the Secretary of Justice h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
was simply exercising his power to review, which included the i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust
power to reverse the ruling of the State Prosecutor. However, once for vengeance;
a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and
case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; [and]
discretion of the court.25 Trial judges are not bound by the k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to
Secretary of Justice’s reversal of the prosecutor’s resolution finding prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.
probable cause. Trial judges are required to make their own There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of
assessment of the existence of probable cause, separately and the recognized exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the
independently of the evaluation by the Secretary of Justice.26 information is filed with the trial court, any disposition of the
On the motion to quash the information information rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial
when the accused had not been arrested yet court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
People v. Mapalao,27 as correctly argued by the OSG, does not existence of probable cause and it may either agree or disagree
squarely apply to the present case. In that case, one of the accused, with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The trial court
Rex Magumnang, after arraignment and during the trial, escaped is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
from detention and had not been apprehended since then. Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of
Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and Justice amounts to an abdication of the trial court’s duty and
thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated. The Court jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause.35
held that since the accused remained at large, Considering that the Information has already been filed with the
he should not be afforded the right to appeal from the judgment of trial court, then the trial court, upon filing of the appropriate
conviction unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the motion by the prosecutor, should be given the opportunity to
court or is otherwise arrested. While at large, the accused cannot perform its duty of evaluating, independently of the Resolution of
seek relief from the court as he is deemed to have waived the same the Secretary of Justice recommending the withdrawal of the
and he has no standing in court.28 In Mapalao, the accused escaped Information against the accused, the merits of the case and assess
while the trial of the case was on-going, whereas here, the accused whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial for
have not been served the warrant of arrest and have not been kidnapping for ransom.36
arraigned. Therefore, Mapalao is definitely not on all fours with the WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court,
present case.lavvphil.net Branch 41, Manila, to independently evaluate or assess the merits
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to of the case to determine whether probable cause exists to hold the
quash29 which requires that the accused should be under the accused for trial.
custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the SO ORDERED.
ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to
do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of
reliefs other than an application for bail.30 However, while the
accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on
the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person.31
At any rate, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack
of authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered
because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsman’s power to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies
of the government.
On the existence or non-existence of probable cause
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with
this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of
whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may
be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction.32However, in the following exceptional cases, this
Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of
probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary
investigation.33
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
G.R. No. 199113
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the
Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for
certiorari filed by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed
the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for
redetermination of probable cause.
The factual antecedents:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a
Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in
2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in
Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a
residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know
that the portion where they built their house is public land and part
of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In
the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own
land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S.
No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate
General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the
property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the
subject property was titled land and they have the right and
authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the
institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private
respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued
its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for
violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of
the corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the
said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s
MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was
void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by
petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of
the elements of the crime of falsification of public document
suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding
the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a
third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently,
an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before
the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was
issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before
his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination
of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the
law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion,
holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who
became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost
their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the
governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the
crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted
to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that
petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC
ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the
foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He
argued that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation
and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic
to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-
acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease
of public land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a
petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction
over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-
determination of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant
of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the
legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been
naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under
R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been
lost on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that
the act of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has
not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent
oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his
citizenship status and not his criminal act which was long
consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate
petitioner is not left without any remedy or recourse because he
can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a
Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial,
and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification,
the lower court has disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner
is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same
status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction "deemed not to
have lost" it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through
the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine
citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence
in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a
warrant for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the
lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his wife
and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest
against him before the same is implemented, which is tantamount
to a denial of due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s
argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without
merit.1âwphi1 It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on
Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine
citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be
applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake
of argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it
will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that
he had not alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied
for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the
declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino.
Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public document, it
is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third
person be present. As to petitioner’s defense of good faith, such
remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved
in a full- blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner),
the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief
from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-
determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have
submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary
appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower
court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal
evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their respective
pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be
indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the
MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of
probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase
"under the conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to
in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are
those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of
a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, "re-
acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
"Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law
intentionally employed the terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to
describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the
law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they
shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship
may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing
away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also
provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine
citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the
oath of allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition
and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that
interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred
because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of
innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a
seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been
understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply
dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his
query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be
governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18,
2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query
of Representative Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under
Section 3 of the Senate version, "Any provision of law on the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall
retain their Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost
their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the
effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the
effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their
citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino
citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to have
reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that
natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American citizens after
the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost
their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer
natural born citizens because they have just reacquired their
citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is
precisely retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply
to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63.Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we
can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure
amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their
citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine
citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship
applying to future instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is
very important for certain government positions, ‘no, because
natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s
one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation,
Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for
those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the
future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen
prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category
of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who
lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As
the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his
Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the
time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having
already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that
considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3,
the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all
cases after the new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225
without any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of
reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more
favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in
relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private
individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial
documents. The elements of falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among
those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated
act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
finding probable cause for falsification of public document under
Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re-
determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to
his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs other than an application for
bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash
warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when
he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person
was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion,
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his
pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other
reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application
therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished
either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as
when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not
be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the
law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of
the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it
concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking
an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of
the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person.Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances,
an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his
motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly
erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order,
the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro
in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6287 December 1, 1911
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the Insular Government,
et al., defendants-appellants.
W. A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan, for appellant.
Antonio Constantino, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion of
the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the controversy.
The question for our consideration and decision is the power and
authority of a Court of First Instance of one province to take
cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the
condemnation of real estate located in another province.
In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for the
condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his
complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the
complaint that the plaintiff is authorized by law to construct a
railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and
it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of
such line that this action is brought. The land sought to be
condemned is 69,910 square meters in area. The complaint states
that before beginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be
made a thorough search in the office of the registry of property and
of the tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located
and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations the
plaintiff alleged that the lands in question were located in the
Province of Tarlac. The defendants in one action all of the different
owners of or persons otherwise interested in the 69,910 square
meters of land to be condemned. After filing and duly serving the
complaint the plaintiff, pursuant to law and pending final
determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the
lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the
same in operation. During the progress of the action a commission
to appraise the value of the lands was duly appointed, which, after
taking oral testimony, amounting to 140 typewritten pages when
transcribed, and after much labor and prolonged consideration,
made a report consisting of about 55 typewritten pages, resolving
the question submitted to it. On the coming in of this report the
court, by order entered the 27th of September, 1909, set the 11th
day of October following for the hearing thereon.
On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be made
to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been
ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned
was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province
of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and,
after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon
the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said
judgment of dismissal.
The decision of the learned trial court was based entirely upon the
proposition, already referred to, that in condemnation
proceedings, and in all other proceedings affecting title to land, the
Court of First Instance of a given province has no jurisdiction, power
or authority where the land is located in another province, and that
no such power, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by the
parties.
Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission
confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of First Instance of these Islands
with respect to real estate in the following words:1awphi1.net
SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. — The jurisdiction
of Courts of First Instance shall be of two kinds:
1. Original; and
2. Appellate.
SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall
have original jurisdiction: .
xxx xxx xxx
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost,
or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into, and detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act
conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.
It is apparent from the wording of these sections that it was the
intention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of First
Instance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over
the subject matters mentioned in connection therewith. Such
jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no
suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. Nor do the
provisions of sections 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52 at all militate against
the universality of that jurisdiction. Those provisions simply
arrange for the convenient and effective transaction of business in
the courts and do not relate to their power, authority, or
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. While it is
provided in these sections that a particular court shall hold its
sessions in any other province (except under certain specified
conditions), the assertions is nevertheless true that the jurisdiction
of a particular court is in no wise and in no sense limited; and it is
nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a Court of First
Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not
under certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in
another province or of an action relating to real estate located
outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the
time be assigned.
Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Other
provide for the procedure by which that power or authority is
projected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers of
the Court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the
procedure by which such powers are put into action. The one is the
thing itself; the other is the vehicle by which the thing is transferred
from the court to the parties. The whole purpose and object of
procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be
devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and
perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations
set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the
most perfect opportunity for the powers of the courts to transmute
themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before
it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility
in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient
objection which can be urged against procedure to-day is that it so
restricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that the
part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is
many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of
procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was
created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed
as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it
is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the
court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the
character of the one and takes on that of the other the
administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory
and lays itself open to grave criticism.
The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair and
convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between
them as a result. While a fair hearing is as essential as the
substantive power of the court to administer justice in the
premises, and while the one is the natural result o the other, it is
different in its nature and relates to a different thing. The power or
authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed
before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter
or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in
which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain
cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to
exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean
that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that
he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment
may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential
to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between
person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the
subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court
over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be
removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but
the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of
the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on
the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or
any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be
conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an
objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has
attached.
In the light of these observations, we proceed to a consideration of
those provisions of the law which the plaintiff claims are decisive
of his contention that a Court of First Instance of one province has
no jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action by a railroad
company to condemn lands located in another province. The
plaintiff relies for the success of its cause upon section 377 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and upon the special laws relating to the
condemnation of lands railroad corporations. We take up first the
section of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to.
The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once
raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely
a matter of method, of convenience to the parties litigant. If their
interests are best subserved by bringing in the Court Instance of the
city of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos
Norte, there is no controlling reason why such a course should not
be followed. The matter is, under the law, entirely within the
control of either party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If
such selection is not in accordance with section 377, the defendant
may make timely objection and, as a result, the venue is changed
to meet the requirements of the law. It is true that this court has
more than once held than an agreement to submit a controversy
to a court which, under the procedural law, has not been selected
as the appropriate court, generally speaking, to hear such
controversy, can not be enforced. This means simply that either
party to such a contract may ignore it at pleasure. The law will not
compel the fulfillment of an agreement which deprives one of the
parties to it of the right to present his cause to that court which the
law designates as the most appropriate. But the principle asserted
in the cases which hold thus is no authority for the proposition that
two persons having a controversy which they desire to have
decided by a competent tribunal may not, by appropriate
procedure, submit it t any court having jurisdiction in the premises.
In the one case the relation is contractual to be enforced over the
objection of one of the contracting parties. In the other relation is
not contractual because not between the parties; but, rather,
between the parties and the court. In the one case it is a contract
to be enforced; in the other, a condition to be met.
This being so, we say again, even though it be repetition, that after
jurisdiction over real property in the Islands has been conferred so
generally and fully by Act No. 136, it is not to
be presumed or construed that the legislature intended
to modify or restrict that jurisdiction when it came to frame a Code
of Civil Procedure the object of which is to make that jurisdiction
effective. Such modification or restriction should be held only by
virtue of the clearest and most express provisions.
The wording of that section should be carefully examined. It reads
as follows:
SEC. 377. Venue of actions. — Actions to confirm title to real estate,
or to secure a partition of real estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove
doubts from the title to real estate, or to obtain possession of real
estate, or to recover damages for injuries to real estate, or to
establish any interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions
for the condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be brought
in the province were the lands, or some part thereof, is situated;
actions against executors, administrators, and guardians touching
the performance of their official duties, and actions for account and
settlement by them, and actions for the distribution of the estates
of deceased persons among the heirs and distributes, and actions
for the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the province in
which the will was admitted to probate, or letters of administration
were granted, or the guardian was appointed. And all actions not
herein otherwise provided for may be brought in any province
where the defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside
or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff, except in cases
were other special provision is made in this Code. In case neither
the plaintiff nor the defendant resides within the Philippine Islands
and the action is brought to seize or obtain title to property of the
defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to
seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the
Philippine Islands, the action shall be brought in the province where
the property which the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to
is situated or is found: Provided, that in an action for the
foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon
the defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in accordance
with law, the action must be brought in the province where the
land lies. And in all cases process may issue from the court in which
an action or special proceeding is pending, to be enforced in any
province to bring in defendants and to enforce all orders and
decrees of the court. The failure of a defendant to object t the
venue of the action at the time of entering his appearance in the
action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the
place or tribunal in which the action is brought, except in the
actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of this section relating
to real estate, and actions against executors, administrators, and
guardians, and for the distribution of estates and payment of
legacies.
Leaving out of discussion for the moment actions and proceedings
affecting estates of deceased persons, they resting upon a different
footing being governed by special laws, it is to be observed that the
section contains no express inhibition against the court. It provides
simply that certain actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in
the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." The
prohibition here is clearly directed against the one who begins the
action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is
commenced, has nothing to do with either. The plaintiff does both.
Only when that is done does the section begin to operate
effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is nor a
limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the
plaintiff. It is not to take something from the court but to grant
something to the defendant. Its wording clearly deprives the court
of nothing which it had, but gives the defendant, as against the
plaintiff, certain rights which he did not have. It establishes a
relation not between the court and the subject ,after, but between
the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to
trial. It touches convenience, not substance. It simply gives to
defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial
take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his
witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial. If it
had been the intention of the law-makers by section 377 to put a
limitation to the jurisdiction of the court, how easy it would have
been to say so squarely. "No Court of First Instance shall have or
take jurisdiction of an action touching title to or interest in real
property lying wholly in a province other than that in which such
court is authorized to hold sessions," or a similar provision, would
have been sufficient. This would have been clearly a limitation on
the court rather than the party. There would have been no room
for doubt. The legislature, however, did not do so. It, rather, chose
to use language which imposes a limitation on the rights of the
plaintiff.
In saying this we do not desire to force
construction.1awphil.net Courts should give to language its plain
meaning, leaving the legislature to take care of the consequences.
The Philippine Commission having, in fullest phrase, given the
Courts of First Instance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in
the Islands by Act No. 136, we are of the opinion that the
jurisdiction ought not to be held to be withdrawn except by virtue
of an Act equally express, or so clearly inconsistent as to amount to
the same thing. The fact that section 377 is not such Act, that it is
found in code of Procedure rather than in the substantive law, that
it deals with the relative procedural rights of parties rather than the
power of the court, that it relates to the place rather than to
the thing, that it composes the whole of a chapter headed simply
"Venue," lead us to hold that the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
had full jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action at the time
when it was dismissed.
That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is
indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual
course of practice — that is, by the process of the court — but also
by consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted
itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. (Ayers vs. Watson,
113 U.S., 594; Fisher vs.Shropshire, 147 U.S., 133.) The defendants
are now in this court asking that the action be not dismissed but
continued. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of
maintaining that very jurisdiction over them.
Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. It is clearly
guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the
land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts. It alleged in its
complaint:
4. That, according to the information secured after a minute
investigation in the offices of the land registry and of the land-tax
record of the municipalities within whose jurisdiction lie all the
parcels composing the tract of land in question, the owners and
occupants of the same, with their names as they appear on the
plan, are as follows.
At the time it commenced the action it was possessed of every fact
which a complete knowledge of the location of the lands sought to
be condemned required. It had the map of its entire line from
Paniqui to Tayug, showing theprovinces and the various
municipalities through which it runs. Not only that: Before
beginning its action it had to know the name of every necessary
defendant, the land he owned, and the extent of that portion to be
condemned. The investigation required to ascertain these facts
would of necessity force into plaintiff's mind the knowledge
required to bring the action in the proper court. That the plaintiff
at the time it commenced this action did not know in what province
its proposed stations and terminals were is difficult to believe. That
it did not know in what province the land lay which it was about to
make the subject of so important a proceeding is still more difficult
to believe. In spite of all this, however, it deliberately laid the venue
in a province where no part of the land lay, took possession of the
land in controversy, constructed its line, switches, and stations, and
after nearly two years of litigation, accompanied with great trouble
to the court and trouble and expense to the parties, calmly asks the
dismissal of the case for the reason that it did not know where its
own railroad was located. Under such circumstances a dismissal of
the action over the objection of the defendants ought not to be
permitted expect upon absolute necessity and then only on
payment of the costs and expenses of the defendants and of the
actin. (Ayers vs. Watson and Fisher vs.Shropshire, supra.)
There is no equitable ground, then, upon which the plaintiff may
claim that it has not yielded itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Nor, as we have seen, is there a legal ground. As we have already
said, the plaintiff, having brought the action, of necessity submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the court. It took advantage of the
situation it itself created to take possession of the lands described
in the complaint, construct its lines, switches, stations, yards and
terminals, and to carry the cause through two years of expensive
litigation. It now attempts to make all this go for naught alleging its
own negligence as a reason for such attempt. (Ayers vs. Watson
and Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)
While the latter part of section 377 provides that "the failure of a
defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of
entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on
his part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action
is brought," except, a month other things, in actions affecting real
estate, we apprehend that it was not intended that a
defendant can not waive such objection in such excepted cases.
Nor we do believe that such provision is controlling in this case. In
the first place, the application is restricted to "the time of entering
his appearance in the action." It might well have been in the mind
of the lawmakers that, at the time of entering his appearance in the
action, the defendant would not ordinarily be fully informed of all
the facts of the case, at least not sufficiently to warrant his being
held to a waiver of important rights; whereas, later in the cause, as
when he files his answer or goes to trial, being fully informed, he
might justly be held to have waived his right to make such
objection. for this reason it might well be that the Legislature
purposely refrained from extending the time for his protection
beyond the "time of entering his appearance in the action."
Moreover, there is, in said clause, no prohibition against
an express waiver of his rights by the defendant. The general rule
of law is that a person may renounce any right which the law gives
unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right
conferred is of such a nature that its renunciation would be against
public policy. This right of renunciation is so thoroughly
established, and was at the time of the enactment of the Code of
Civil Procedure, that its exercise by a defendant in relation to the
venue of the action will not be held to have been abridged by
section 377 without very clear provision therein to that effect.
There is no part of that section clear enough to warrant such a
holding. Even though the terms of said section were much clearer
than they are in this respect, we should still hold, if they were much
short of express, that the right of renunciation is not abridged,
founding ourselves not only upon the principles already laid down
but also upon the proposition of general law embodied in section
294 of the code of Civil Procedure which provides that:
When a statute or instrument is equally susceptible of two
interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against
it, the former is to be adopted.itc-alf
Moreover, it should be noted that this prohibition, if it be such,
against waiver refers exclusively to the defendant. The plaintiff is
given no rights respecting it. Yet it is the plaintiff who is here calling
for the application of the provision even against the declared will
of the person who is expressly named as the sole beneficiary. We
will not by interpretation extend this provision so as to contravene
the principles of natural rights. We will not construed it so as to
included in its terms nor named as its beneficiary. But even if the
plaintiff were entitled to invoke the aid of the provision he is
estopped from so doing. (Wanzer vs. Howland, 10 Wis., 7;
Babcock vs. Farewell, 146 Ill. App., 307; White vs. Conn. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 4 Dill (U.S.), 183; Shuttle vs. Thompson, 15 Wall., 159;
Beecher vs. Mill Co., 45 Mich., 103; Tomb vs. Rochester R. R. Co., 18
Barb., 585; Ferguson vs. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.), 230;
State vs.Mitchell, 31 Ohio State, 592; Counterman vs. Dublin, 38
Ohio State, 515; McCarthy vs. Lavasche, 89 Ill., 270;
Ricketts vs. Spraker, 77 Ind., 371; Strosser vs. City of Fort Wayne,
100 Ind., 443). Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
Conclusive presumptions. — The following presumptions or
deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from
particular facts, are deemed conclusive:
1. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he can not, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to
falsity it.
(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. Rep., 67; 69; Municipality of
Oas vs. Roa, 7 Phil. Rep., 20, 22; Trinidad vs. Ricafort et al., 7 Phil.
Rep., 449, 453; Macke et al vs. Camps, 7 Phil. Rep., 553, 555.)
The fact is, there are very few rights which may not be renounced,
expressly or impliedly. (Christenson vs.Charleton, 34 Atl., 226, 227,
69 Vt., 91; Donahue vs. Windsor County Ins. Co., 56 Vt., 91;
Donahaue vs. Windsor Ins. co., 33 Atl., 902, 904, 66 Conn., 21, 40;
Fitzpatrick vs. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 56 Conn., 116, 134,
17 Atl., 411, 7 Am. St. Rep., 288; Lewis vs. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
44 Conn., 72, 91; State vs. Hartley, 52 Atl., 615, 617, 75 Conn., 104;
First Nat. Bank vs. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45 Conn., 22, 44;
Johnson vs. Schar, 70 N.W., 838, 839, 9 S. D., 536; Corey vs. Bolton,
63 N.Y., Supp., 915, 917, 31 Misc. Rep., 138; Mason's Supply
Co. vs. Jones, 68 N. Y. Supp., 806, 809, 58 App. Div., 231; Monroe
Waterworks Co. vs. City of Monroe, 85 N.W., 685, 688, 100 Wis.,
11; Fraser vs. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 N.W., 476, 481, 114 Wis., 510;
Cedar Rapids Water Co. vs. Cedat Rapids, 90 N.W., 746, 749, 117
Iowa, 250; Kennedy vs. Roberts, 75 N.W., 363, 366, 105 Iowa, 521;
Shaw vs. Spencer, 100 Mass., 382, 395, 97 Am. Dec., 107, 1 Am.
Rep., 115; West vs. Platt, 127 Mass., 367, 367, 372;
Fulkerson vs. Lynn, 64 Mo. App., 649, 653; Michigan Savings & Loan
Ass'n. vs. Missouri, K & T. Trust Co., 73 Mo. App., 161, 165;
Perin vs. Parker, 18 N. E., 747, 748, 126 Ill., 201, 2 L.R.A., 336, 9 Am.
St. Rep., 571; Keller vs. Robinson & Co., 38 N. E., 1072, 1075, 152
Ull. 458; Star Brewery Co. vs. Primas, 45 N.E., 145, 148, 163 Ill., 652;
United Firemen's Ins. Co. vs. Thomas (U.S.), 82 Fed., 406, 408, 27
C.C. A., 42, 47 L.R.A., 450; Rice vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (U.S.), 103
Fed., 427, 43 C.C.A., 270; Sidway vs. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co.
(U.S.), 116 Fed., 381, 395; able vs. United States Life Ins. Co. (U.S.),
111 Fed., 19, 31, 49 C.C.A., 216L Peninsular Land Transp., etc.,
Co. vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va., 666, 676, 14 S.E., 237;
Dey vs. Martin, 78 Va., 1, 7; Liverpool & L.& G. Ins. Co. vs. T.M.
Richardson Lumber Co., 69 Pac., 938, 951, 11 Okl., 585;
Livesey vs. Omaha Hotel, 5 Neb., 50, 69; Cutler vs. Roberts, 7 Nebr.,
4, 14, 29 Am. Rep., 371; Warren vs. Crane, 50 Mich., 300, 301, 15
N.W., 465; Portland & R.R. Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Oreg., 587, 592, 32
Pac., 688, 689; First Nat. Bank vs. Maxwell, 55 Pac., 980, 982, 123
Cal., 360, 69 Am. St. Rep., 64; Robinson vs. Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
Co., 38 Atl., 320, 322, 90 Me., 385; Reed vs. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 61 Pac., 21, 21 Utah, 295; Dale vs. Continental Ins. Co., 31 S.W.,
266, 269, 95 Tenn., 38; Supreme Lodge K.P. vs.Quinn, 29 South.,
826, 829, 95 Tenn., 38; Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South.,
826, 827, 78 Miss., 525; Bucklen vs. Johnson, 49 N.E., 612, 617, 19
Ind. App., 406.)
We have delayed until this moment the citation of authorities
relative to the proposition that venue is not jurisdictional as to
subject matter and that defendant's rights in respect thereto are
such that they may be waived, expressly or by implication, for the
reason that we desired that the principles which rule the case
should first be discussed and presented in the abstract form. In the
case of First National Bank of Charlotte vs. Morgan (132 U.S., 141),
it was held that the exemption of national banks from suits in State
courts in counties other than the county or city in which the
association was located was a personal privilege which could be
waived was located was a personal privilege which could be waived
by appearing in such brought in another county, but in a court of
the same dignity, and making a defense without claiming the
immunity granted by Congress. the court said:
This exemption of national banking associations from suits in State
courts, established elsewhere than in the county or city in which
such associations were located, was, we do not doubt, prescribed
for the convenience of those institutions, and prevent interruption
in their business that might result from their books being sent to
distant counties in obedience to process from State courts. (First
Nat. Bank of Bethel vs. National Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall., 383,
394; Croker vs. Marine Nat. Bank, 101 Mass., 240.) But, without
indulging in conjecture as to the object of the exemption in
question, it is sufficient that it was granted by Congress, and, if it
had been claimed by the defendant when appearing in the superior
court of Cleveland County, must have been recognized. The
defendant did not, however, choose to claim immunity from suit in
that court. It made defense upon the merits, and, having been
unsuccessful, prosecuted a writ of error to the supreme court of
the State, and in the latter tribunal, for the first time, claimed the
immunity granted to it by Congress. This was too late. Considering
the object as well as the words of the statute authorizing suit
against a national banking association to be brought in the proper
State court of the county where it is located, we are of opinion that
its exemption from suits in other courts of the same State was a
personal privilege that it would waive, and, which, in this case, the
defendant did waive, and, which, in this case, the defendant did
waive, by appearing and making defense without claiming the
immunity granted by Congress. No reason can be suggested why
one court of a State, rather than another, both being of the same
dignity, should take cognizance of a suit against a national bank,
except the convenience of the bank. And this consideration
supports the view that the exemption of a national bank from suit
in any State court except one of the county or city in which it is
located is a personal privilege, which it could claim or not, as it
deemed necessary.
In the case of Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369), the court said:
The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be
sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is
rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a
defendant, and it is one which he may waive. If the citizenship of
the parties is sufficient, a defendant may consent to be sued
anywhere he pleases, and certainly jurisdiction will not be ousted
because he has consented. Here, the defendant companies have
provided that they can be found in a district other than that in
which they reside, if a particular mode of proceeding is adopted,
and they have been so found. In our opinion, therefore, the circuit
court has jurisdiction of the causes, and should proceed to hear and
decide them.
In the case of St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. vs.
McBride (141 U.S., 127), the court used the following language:
The first part of section 1 of the Act of 1887, as amended in 1888,
gives, generally, to the circuit courts of the United States
jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different States
where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of two thousand
dollars exclusive of interest and costs. Such a controversy was
presented in this complaint. It was therefore a controversy of which
the circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction. Assume
that it is true as defendant alleges, that this is not a case in which
jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the controversy is
between citizens of different States, but that it comes within the
scope of that other clause, which provides that "no civil sit shall be
brought before either of said courts, against any person, by any
original process or proceeding, in any other district than that
whereof he is inhabitant," still the right to insist upon suit only in
the one district is a personal privilege which he may waive, and he
does waive it by pleading to the merits. In Ex parte Schollenberger
(96 U.S., 369, 378), Chief Justice Waite said: "The Act of Congress
prescribing the place where a person may be sued is not one
affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the
nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is
one which he may waive." The Judiciary Act of 1789 (sec. 11, Stat.,
79), besides giving general jurisdiction to circuit courts over suits
between citizens of different States, further provided, generally,
that no civil suit should be brought before either of said courts,
against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process,
in any other district than that of which he was an inhabitant, or in
which he should be found. In the case of Toland vs. Sprague (12
Pet., 300, 330), it appeared that the defendant was not an
inhabitant of the State in which the suit was brought, nor found
therein. In that case the court observed: "It appears that the party
appeared and pleaded to issue. Now, if the case were one of the
want of jurisdiction in the court, it would not, according to well-
established principles, be competent for the parties by any acts of
theirs to give it. But that is not the case. The court had jurisdiction
over the parties and the matter in dispute; the objection was that
the party defendant, not being an inhabitant of Pennsylvania, nor
found therein, personal privilege or exemption, which it was
competent for the party to waive. The cases of Pollard vs. Dwight (4
Cranch., 421) and Barry vs. Foyles (1 Pt., 311) are decisive to show
that, after appearance and plea, the case stands as if the suit were
brought that exemption from liability to process and that in case of
foreign attachment, too, is a personal privilege, which may be
waived, and that appearing and pleading will produce that waiver."
In (14 Wal., 282), the jurisdiction of the circuit court over a
controversy between citizens of different States was sustained in a
case removed from the State court, although it was conceded that
the suit could not have been commenced in the first instance in the
circuit court. See also Claflin vs. Commonwealth Ins. Co. (110 U.S.,
81 [28:76].) Without multiplying authorities on this question, it is
obvious that the party who in the first instance appears and pleads
to the merits waives any right to challenge thereafter the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the suit has been
brought in the wrong district. (Charlotte Nat. Bank vs. Morgan, 132
U.S., 141; Fitzgerald E. M. Const. Co. vs. Fitzergerald, 137 U.S., 98.)
In the case of the Interior Construction and Improvement Co. vs.
Gibney (160 U.S., 217), the court held as follows:
The circuit courts of the United States are thus vested with general
jurisdiction of civil actions, involving the requisite pecuniary value,
between citizens of different States. Diversity of citizenship is a
condition of jurisdiction, and, when that does not appear upon the
record, the court, of its own motion, will order the action to be
dismissed. But The provision as to the particular district in which
the action shall be brought does not touch the general jurisdiction
of the court over such a cause between such parties; but affects
only the proceedings taken to bring the defendant within such
jurisdiction, and is matter of personal privilege, which the
defendant may insist upon, or may waive, at his election; and the
defendant's right to object that an action within the general
jurisdiction of the court is brought in the wrong district, is waived
by entering a general appearance, without taking the objection.
(Gracie vs. Palmer, 8 Wheat, 699; Toland vs. Sprague, 12 Pet., 300,
330; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S., 369, 378; St. Louis & S. F. R.
Co. vs. McBride, 141 U.S., 127; Southern Pacific Co. vs. Dento, 146
U.S., 202, 206; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. vs. Saunders, 151 U.S.,
105; Central Trust Co. vs. McGeorge, 151 U.S., 129; Southern
Express Co. vs. Todd, 12 U.S. app., 351.)
In the case of Central Trust Co. vs. McGeorge (151 U.S., 129), the
court disposed of the case as follows:
The court below, in holding that it did not have jurisdiction of the
cause, and in dismissing the bill of complaint for the reason, acted
in view of that clause of the Act of March 3, 1887, as amended in
August, 1888, which provides that "no suit shall be brought in the
circuit courts of the United States against any person, by any
original process or proceeding, in any other district than that
whereof he is an inhabitant;" and, undoubtedly, if the defendant
company, which was sued in another district than that in which it
had its domicile, had, by a proper plea or motion, sought to avail
itself of the statutory exemption, the action of the court would
have been right.
But the defendant company did not choose to plead that provision
of the statute, but entered a general appearance, and joined with
the complainant in its prayer for the appointment of a receiver, and
thus was brought within the ruling of this court, so frequently
made, that the exemption from being such out of the district of its
domicile is a personal privilege which may be waive and which is
waived by pleading to the merits.
(Improvement Co. vs. Gibney, 16 Sup. Ct., 272, 160 U.S., 217; 40 L.
ed., 401; Walker vs. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 C. C. A., 421, 56 Fed., 76,
5 U.S. App., 423; Von Auw. vs. Chicago Toy & Fancy Goods Co., 69
Fed., 448 McBride vs.Grand de Tour Plow Co., 40 Fed., 162;
Black vs. Thorne, Fed. Cas. No. 1, 495 (10 Blatchf., 66, 5 Fish. Pat.
Cas., 550); Norris vs. Atlas Steamship Co., 37 Fed., 279; Hoover &
Allen Co. vs. Columbia Straw Paper Co., 68 Fed., 945;
Blackburn vs. Railroad Co., Fed., Fed., Cas. No. 1, 467 (2 Flip., 525);
Vermont Farm Mach. Co. vs. Gibson, 50 Fed., 423.)
In the case of Security Loan and Trust Co. vs. Kauffman (108 Cal.,
214), the court said:
The constitution, Article VI, section 5, declares that, "All actions for
the enforcement of liens" shall be commenced in the county in
which the real estate or some portion thereof is situated; and at
the time this action was "commenced" the property was situate
within the boundaries of San Diego. The constitution does not,
however, require property is situated, and the statutory provision
in section 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that actions 'for the
foreclosure of liens and mortgages on real property' must be tried
in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part
thereof, is situated, "subject to the power of the court to change
the place of trial," shows that "the place of trial" is not an element
going to the jurisdiction of the court, but is a matter of legislative
regulation. The provision for the transfer of certain actions to the
superior court of the county of Riverside, which is contained in
section 12 of the act providing for the organization of that county,
shows the extent of this regulation which the legislature deemed
necessary, and implies that only the actions there designated were
to be transferred for trial.
In the case of Chouteau vs. Allen (70 Mo., 290), the court held as
follows:
The statutory provision in respect to personal actions is more
emphatic, requiring that "suits instituted by summons, shall, except
as otherwise provided by law, be brought: First, when the
defendant is a resident of the State, either in the county within
which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the
plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found," and yet it was
held in reference to this statute in the case of Hembree vs.
Campbell (8 Mo., 572), that though the suit was brought in the
county in which the plaintiff resided, and service had upon the
defendant in the county of his residence, unless a plea in
abatement to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant, was interposed in the first instance, the objection on
the score of lack of jurisdiction could not subsequently be
successfully raised. And this, upon the generally recognized ground
that the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
and that the defendant's plea to the merits acknowledged
jurisdiction over his person, and precluded objection on account of
absence of regularity in the instituting of the action. So also,
in Ulrici vs. Papin (11 Mo.., 42), where the then existing statute
required "suits in equity concerning real estate, or whereby the
same may be affected, shall be brought in the county within which
such real estate or greater part thereof is situate," and by demurrer
to the bill it was objected that the suit was not brought in the
proper county in conformity with the statutory provision, Judge
Scott remarked: "That it does not clearly appear where the greater
part of the lands lie. This objection, if tenable, should have been
raised by a plea to the jurisdiction." And the same learned judge
remarks, in Hembree vs. Campbell, supra, "No principle is better
established than that a plea in bar is a waiver of all dilatory matter
of defense. That the matter of abatement was apparent upon the
writ can make no difference. Such matters are and should be
pleaded." And pleas to the jurisdiction are as necessary in local as
in transitory actions. (1 Tidd. Prac., 630.)
It is not meant to convey the idea that the mere failure to plead to
the jurisdiction of the court would have the effect to confer
jurisdiction where none existed before; for it is well settled that
even consent of parties can not confer jurisdiction.
(Stone vs. Corbett, 20 Mo., 350.) But all circuit courts have a
general jurisdiction over the foreclosure of mortgages.
In the case of Armendiaz vs. Stillman (54 Texas, 623), the court
disposed of the question involved in the following words:
In our opinion, however, these common law rules respecting local
and transitory actions have no more to do in determining with us
where a suit can be brought and maintained, than the like rules in
respect to the form and names of actions; but this is solely
regulated by and dependent upon the proper construction of the
constitution and statutes of the State. In the first, it is emphatically
declared in the bill of rights as a fundamental principle of
government, "All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law." Now a party may not have an
action in rem for or concerning land in foreign jurisdiction, because
redress can not be given or had by such proceeding in due course
of law; but personal damages may be given for such injury and
enforced by due process of law within the State. "And it would
seem if the State failed to give to one of its citizens a remedy
against others for injuries of this kind, it would fail in the pledge
made in the constitution as plainly as if the injury had been in a
foreign jurisdiction to one's goods or person."
There is, as Judge Marshall himself says, no difference in principle
in giving redress for injuries to land in the jurisdiction where the
defendant is found, which may not be equally applicable in other
cases. He says, speaking of the fiction upon which transitory actions
are sustained, where the cause of action occurred out of the
jurisdiction where they are brought: "They have" (i. e., the courts),
"without legislative aid, applied this fiction to all personal torts,
wherever the wrong may have been committed, and to all
contracts wherever executed. To this general rule contracts
respecting lands from no exception. It is admitted that on a
contract respecting lands, an action is sustainable wherever the
defendant may be found. Yet in such case every difficulty may occur
that present itself in an action of trespass. An investigation of title
may become necessary, a question of boundary may arise, and a
survey may be essential to the full merits of the case. Yet these
difficulties have not prevailed against the jurisdiction of the court.
They are countervailed by the opposing consideration, that if the
action be disallowed, the injured party may have a clear right
without a remedy in a case where a person who has done the
wrong, and who ought to make the compensation, is within the
power of the court. That this consideration loses its influence
where the action pursues anything not in the reach of the court is
inevitably necessary, but for the loss of its influence, where the
remedy is against the person, and is within the power of the court,
I have not yet discovered a reason, other than a technical one,
which can satisfy my judgment.'
In the case of De La Vega vs. Keague (64 Texas, 205), the court said:
Our statutes in force at the time the reconvention was filed
provided that suits for the recovery of land should be brought in
the county where the land or a part thereof is situated. This is one
of the exceptions to the general rule requiring suits to be brought
in the county of the defendant's residence. This requirement is not
a matter that affects the jurisdiction of the district courts over the
subject matter of controversies about the title or possession of
lands. Every district court in the State has cognizance of such suits;
the requirement as to the county in which the suit may be brought
is a mere personal privilege granted to the parties, which may be
waived like any other privilege of this character. (Ryan vs. Jackson,
11 Tex., 391; Morris vs. Runnells, 12 Tex., 176.) A judgment
rendered by the district court of Galveston County, when the
parties had submitted to the jurisdiction, would settle the title to
land in McLennan County as effectually as if rendered in its own
district curt. Jurisdiction of causes may be obtained by defendants
in counties other than those in which the statute requires them to
be brought, in other ways than by express consent or by failure to
claim the personal privilege accorded by law. A suit upon a monied
demand, brought in the county of a defendant's residence by a
resident of another county, may be met with a counter demand
against the plaintiff, and a recovery may be had upon the counter
demand, though if suit had been originally commenced upon it, the
county of the plaintiff's residence would have had exclusive
jurisdiction. And so with other cases that might be supposed. A
plaintiff calling a defendant into court for the purpose of obtaining
relief against him invites him to set up all defenses which may
defeat the cause of action sued on, or any other appropriate and
germane to the subject matter of the suit, which should be settled
between the parties before a proper adjudication of the merits of
the cause can be obtained. He grants him the privilege of setting up
all such counterclaims and cross actions as he holds against the
plaintiff which may legally be pleaded in such a suit.
This is particularly the case in our State, where a multiplicity of suit
is abhorred, and a leading object is to settle all disputes between
the parties pertinent to the cause of action in the same suit. The
question of the original right to bring the cross action in the county
where the suit is pending can not be raised; otherwise this design
would, in a large number of cases, be defeated, and the various
matters which could well be settled in the cause might have to seek
a number of different counties, and be asserted in a number of
different suits, before the controversy between the parties could
be settled. The plaintiff must be considered as waiving any privilege
to plead to the jurisdiction in such cross actions, and as consenting
that the defendant may assert in the suit any demands which he
could plead were it commenced in the county where such demands
were properly usable. The question then is, La Vega have set up the
matters pleaded in his answer in reconvention had the land sought
to be partitioned been situated in Galveston County? This question
must be determined by the solution of another, viz, can a
defendant to a partition suit who claims through the title under
which the partition is sought set up a superior title to the whole
land? "It is doubtless true that, in a partition suit, a court of equity
will not entertain any controversy as to the legal title, whether it
arises between the part owners as to their respective interests, or
by reason of a claim set up by one or more of them to the entire
land by title superior to the one under which the partition is asked
to be decreed. In our State, where there is no distinction between
law and equity in the determination of causes, an action to settle
disputed titles, whether legal or equitable, may be combined with
one to partition the land between the plaintiff and defendant.
Hence there can be no objection to determining any questions as
to title between the coowners in a partition suit in our State, and
the strict rules of chancery do not prevail.
In the case of Kipp vs. Cook (46 Minn., 535), the court made use of
the following language:
1. The appellant contends that the district court for the county of
Sibley, and of the eighth judicial district, was without jurisdiction,
and could not properly determine the rights or interests of either
litigant to lands located in Sherburne County, which is in the
seventh judicial district; but this question was passed upon many
years since, in the case of Gill vs. Bradley (21 Minn., 15), wherein it
was held that, although the proper place for the trial of an action
to recover real property, or for the determination, in any form, of
a right or interest therein, was, by virtue of an existing statute —
now found as Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, par. 47 — in the county wherein
the lands were situated, the district court of the county designated
in the complaint had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and had
power to before the time for answering expired, in accordance with
the express provisions of another section — now section 51 — of
the same chapter, and the place of trial had actually been changed
by order of the court or by consent of parties.
In the case of the west Point Iron Co. vs. Reymert (45 N.Y., 703), the
court said:
The action was tried in the county of Dutches, and by the court
without a jury, without objection on the part of the defendants. If
the trial should have been in Putnam, and by a jury, it was for the
defendants to assert their rights at the trial; and by not them
claiming them, they waived them, and must be regarded as having
assented to the place and mode of trial.
We transcribe the following from decisions of the supreme court of
Spain:
Considering, further, that Pedrosa, instead of immediately
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court and asking for a change of
venue, sued for recovery of title, thereby submitting himself to the
jurisdiction of the court of first instance, which reserved its decision
thereon until plaintiff had presented the petition in due form.
(Judgment of May 30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)
Considering that although other proceedings were had in the first
court (Salvador de Granada) and in the courts of first instance of
Sagrario and Guerra of said city subsequent to the death of the
count, the truth of the matter is that his daughter, the countess,
the only party now claiming relief, not only had the proceedings
taken in the first of said courts dismissed but asked the court of first
instance of Castilla de la Nueva to accept, and the court accepted,
her express submission to its jurisdiction:
Considering that far from objecting, as she might have objected, to
the jurisdiction of the court, the countess acknowledged such
jurisdiction as did the other coheirs when thru asked the court to
proceed with the testamentary proceedings, thus creating a
jurisdictional situation perfectly in harmony with the respective
claims of the parties and so binding upon them that they are now
absolutely estopped from denying its importance or legal force.
(Judgment of May 30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)
He who by his own acts submits himself to the jurisdiction of a court
shall not thereafter be permitted to question such jurisdiction.
(Judgment of December 30, 1893, 29 Civ. Jur., 64.)
According to article 305 (of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) the
plaintiff shall be presumed to have tacitly submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by the mere act of filing his complaint
therein, and in the case of the defendant where the latter after
appearing in the action takes any step therein other than to object
to such jurisdiction. (Judgment of September 21, 1878, 40 Civ. Jur.,
232.)
Plaintiff and defendant are presumed to have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, the former by the mere
act of filing his complaint therein and the latter by his answering
the same and taking any step other than demurring to such
jurisdiction as provided in articles 56 to 58 of the Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil. (Judgment of July 27, 1883, 52 Civ. Jur., 511.)
In order that a tacit submission based upon the mere act filing the
complaint may be valid the court must be one of ordinary
jurisdiction as provided in article 4 of the Ley de Ebjuiciamiento
Civil. (Judgment of August 27, 1864, 10 Civ. Jur., 14.)
The following language is taken from The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of
England (vol. 1, p. 50):
The old distinction between 'local' and 'transitory' actions, though
of far less importance than it was before the passing of the
judicature acts, must still be borne in mind in connection with
actions relating to land situate outside the local jurisdiction of our
courts. 'Transitory' actions were those in which the facts in issue
between the parties had no necessary connection with a particular
locality, e.g., contract, etc.; whilst "local" actions were those in
which there was such a connection, e.g., disputes as to the title to,
or trespasses to, land.
One importance of this distinction lay in the fact that in the case of
local actions the plaintiff was bound to lay the venue truly, i.e., in
the county (originally in the actual hundred) in which the land in
question lay. In the case, however of a transitory action, he might
lay it wherever he pleased, subject to the power of the court to
alter it in a proper case. Local venues have now been abolished,
and, therefore, so far as actions relating to land in England are
concerned, the distinction may be disregarded.
It is, however, important from another point of view, viz, that of
jurisdiction as distinct from procedure. In the case of real actions
relating to land in the colonies or foreign countries the English
relating courts had, even before the judicature acts, no jurisdiction;
and, therefore, the removal by those acts of a difficulty of
procedure — viz, the rule as to local venue — which might have
stood in the way, if they had and wished to exercise jurisdiction, did
not in any way confer jurisdiction in such cases. The lack of
jurisdiction still exists, and our courts refuse to adjudicate upon
claims of title to foreign land in proceedings founded on an alleged
invasion of the proprietary rights attached thereto, and to award
damages founded on that adjudication; in other words, an action
for trespass to, or for recovery of, foreign land can not be
maintained in England, at any rate if the defendant chooses to put
in issue the ownership of such land.
There is no decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
in conflict with the principles laid down in this opinion. In the case
of Serrano vs. Chanco (5 Phil. Rep., 431), the matter before the
court was the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the
actions and proceedings relating to the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons. The determination of that question required the
consideration of section 602 of the code of Civil Procedure rather
than section 377 of that code. The argument of the court touching
the last-named section, is inapplicable to the case at bar and would
not affect it if it were. The reference to the jurisdiction of the court
made in that argument based on section 377 was unnecessary to a
decision of the case.
The case of Molina vs. De la Riva (6 Phil. Rep., 12), presented simply
the question whether or not an agreement between parties to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a particular court to the
exclusion of the court provided by law as the appropriate court in
the premises could be enforced. As we have before intimated, it
touched no question involved in the litigation at bar.
In the case of Molina vs. De la Riva (7 Phil. Rep., 302), the action
was one to foreclose a mortgage upon a real and personal property.
In discussing the matter before it the court said:
The demurrer was also based upon the ground that this was an
action to foreclose a mortgage and by the provisions of sections
254 and 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure it should have been
brought in the Province of Albay where the property was situated.
The action is clearly an action to foreclose a mortgage, lien, or
incumbrance upon property, but it will be noticed that section 254
relates only to mortgages on real estate. This contract covered both
real and personal property, and while, perhaps, an action could not
be maintained in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
foreclosure of the alleged mortgage upon the real estate situated
in Albay, yet so far as the personal property was concerned, we
know of no law which would deprive that court of jurisdiction.
As will readily be observed, the court in the remarks above quoted
was not discussing or deciding the question whether or not an
action could be maintained in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila to foreclose a mortgage on real estate located in Albay;
but, rather, whether or not an action could be maintained in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgate
on personal property located in the Province of Albay. The remark
of the court that perhaps the former action could not be
maintained was not intended to be decisive and was not thought
at the time to be an indication of what the decision of the court
might be if that precise case were presented to it with full argument
and citation of authorities.
The case of Castano vs. Lobingier (9 Phil. Rep., 310), involved the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to issue a writ of
prohibition against a justice of the peace holding his court outside
the province in which the Court of First Instance was sitting at the
time of issuing the writ. The determination of the question
presented different considerations and different provisions of law
from those which rule the decision of the case at bar.
We, therefore, hold that the terms of section 377 providing that
actions affecting real property shall be brought in the province
where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located,
do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the
land itself but relate simply to the personal rights of parties as to
the place of trial.
We come, now, to a consideration of the special laws relating to
the condemnation of land by railroad companies upon which also
plaintiff relies. Of those laws only one is of importance in the
decision of this case. That is Act No. 1258. In it are found these
provisions:
SECTION 1. In addition to the method of procedure authorized for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain by sections two
hundred and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three, inclusive, of
Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing
a Code of Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," the procedure in this Act provided may be
adopted whenever a railroad corporation seeks to appropriate land
for the construction, extension, or operation of its railroad line.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Whenever a railroad corporation is authorized by its charter,
or by general law, to exercise the power of eminent domain in the
city of Manila or in any province, and has not obtained by
agreement with the owners thereof the lands necessary for its
purposes as authorized by law, it may in its complaint, which in
each case shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila if the land is situated in the city of Manila, or in the Court
of First Instance of the province where the lands is situated, join as
defendants all persons owing or claiming to own, or occupying, any
of the lands sought to be condemned, or any interest therein,
within the city or province, respectively, showing, so far as
practicable, the interest of each defendant and stating with
certainty the right of condemnation, and describing the property
sought to be condemned. Process requiring the defendants to
appear in answer to the complaint shall be served upon all
occupants of the lands sought to be condemned, and upon the
owners and all persons claiming interest therein, so far as known.
If the title to ant lands sought to be condemned appears to be in
the Insular Government, although the lands are occupied by private
individuals, or if it is uncertain whether the title is in the Insular
Government or in private individuals, or if the title is otherwise so
obscure or doubtful that the company can not with accuracy or
certainty specify who are the real owners, averment may be made
by the company in its complaint to that effect. Process shall be
served upon resident and no residents in the same manner as
provided therefor in Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, and
the rights of minors and persons of unsound mind shall be
safeguarded in the manner in such cases provided in said Act. The
court may order additional and special notice in any case where
such additional or special notice is, in its opinion, required.
SEC. 4. Commissioners appointed in pursuance of such complaint,
in accordance with section two hundred and forty-three of Act
Numbered One hundred ad ninety, shall have jurisdiction over all
the lands included in the complaint, situated within the city of
Manila or within the province, as the case may be, and shall be
governed in the performance of their duties by the provisions of
sections two hundred and forty-four and two hundred and forty-
five, and the action of the court upon the report of the
commissioners shall be governed by section two hundred and
forty-six of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to in these
sections are, so far as material here, the following:
SEC. 241. How the right of eminent domain may be exercised. —
The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or
department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or
public or private corporation having by law the right to condemn
private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the
manner hereinafter prescribed.
SEC. 242. The complaint. — The complaint in condemnation
proceedings shall state with certainty the right of condemnation,
and describe the property sought to be condemned, showing the
interest of each defendant separately.
SEC. 243. Appointment of Commissioners. — If the defendant
concede that the right of condemnation exists on the part of the
plaintiff, or if, upon trial, the court finds that such right exists, the
court shall appoint three judicious and disinterested landowners of
the province in which the land to be condemned, or some portion
of the same, is situated, to be commissioners to hear the parties
and view the premises, and assess damages to be paid for the
condemnation, and to report their proceedings in full to the court,
and shall issue a commission under the seal of the court to the
commissioners authorizing the performance of the duties herein
prescribed.
We are of the opinion that what we have said in the discussion of
the effect of section 377 relative to the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance over lands is applicable generally to the sections of law
just quoted. The provisions regarding the place and method of trial
are procedural. They touched not the authority of the court over
the land but, rather, the powers which it may exercise over
the parties. They relate not to the jurisdictional power of the court
over the subject matter but to the place where that jurisdiction is
to be exercised. In other words, the jurisdiction is assured,
whatever the place of its exercise. The jurisdiction is the thing; the
place of exercise its incident.
These special laws contain nothing which in any way indicates an
intention of the legislature to alter the nature or extent of the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance granted by Act No. 136. As
we said in discussing the provisions of section 277 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, we can not hold that jurisdiction to be limited
unless by express provision or clear intendment.
We have thus far drawn an analogy between section 377 of the
code of Civil Procedure and section 3 of Act No. 1258, asserting that
neither the one nor the other was intended to restrict, much less
deprive, the Courts of First Instance of the jurisdiction over lands in
the Philippine Islands conferred upon them by Act No. 136. We
have extended that analogy to include the proposition that the
question of venue as presented in the Acts mentioned does not
relate to jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, it simply
granting to the defendant certain rights and privileges as against
the plaintiff relative to the place of trial, which rights and privileges
he might waive expressly or by implication. We do not, however,
extend that analogy further. On reading and comparing section 377
of the Code of Civil Procedure with section 3 of Act No. 1258. both
of which are hearing set forth, a difference is at once apparent in
the wording of the provisions relating to the place of trial. Section
277 stipulates that all actions affecting real estate "shall be brought
in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated."
Section 3 of Act No. 1258 provides that in an action brought by a
railroad corporation to condemn land for its uses the plaintiff "may
in its complaint, which in each case shall be instituted . . . in the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is situated,
join as defendants all persons owning, etc . . . land within the city
or province . . ." Section 1 of that Act, as we have already seen, says
that: "In addition to the method of procedure authorized for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by sections two hundred
and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three" of the Code of Civil
Procedure, "the procedure in this Act may be adopted whenever a
railroad corporation seeks to appropriate land . . . ."
From these provisions we note, first, that the
procedure expressly made applicable to actions for the
condemnation of land by railroad corporations is not that
contained in section 377 but that found in sections 241 to 253 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 377 is nowhere expressly
mentioned in Act No. 1258 nor is it anywhere touched or referred
to by implication. The procedure embodied in that Act to
consummate the purposes of its creation is complete of itself,
rendered so either by provisions contained in the Act itself,
rendered so either by provisions contained in the Act itself or by
reference to specific sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which
by such reference are made a part thereof.
In the second place, we observe that, so far as venue is concerned,
Act No. 1258 and section 377 are quite different in their wording.
While the latter provides that the actions of which it treats shall be
commenced in the province where the land, or some part thereof,
lies, Act No. 1258, section 3, stipulates that the actions embraced
in its terms shall be brought only in the province where the land
lies. This does not mean, of course, that if a single parcel of land
under the same ownership, lying party in one province and partly
in another, is the subject of condemnation proceedings begun by a
railroad corporation, a separate action must be commenced in
each province. Nor does it mean that the aid of section 377 is
required to obviate such necessity. The situation would be met and
solved by the general principles of law and application of which to
every situation is an inherent or implied power of every court. Such,
for example, are the prohibition against multiplicity of actions, the
rules against division of actions into parts, and the general principle
that jurisdiction over a subject matter singly owned will not be
divided among different courts, the one in which the action is first
brought having exclusive jurisdiction of the whole. The provisions
of these two laws, section 377 and Act No. 1258, differ in the
manner indicated because they refer to subjects requiring
inherently different treatment, so different, in fact, as to be in some
respects quite opposite. While it is true that section 377 speaks of
action for the condemnation of real estate, nevertheless it was
intended to cover simply the ordinary action affecting title to or that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of
interest in real estate, where the land involved is comparatively crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the
speaking, compact together. Its provisions were not intended to very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime. As a
meet a situation presented by an action to condemn lands result it has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and in
extending contiguously from one end of the country to the other. constitutions, that the venue of a criminal action must be laid in the
Act No. 1258 is a special law, enacted for a particular purpose, and place where the crime was committed. While the laws here do not
to meet a particular exigency. The conditions found in an action for specifically and in terms require it, we believe it is the established
the condemnation of real estate by a railroad company might and custom and the uniform holding that criminal prosecutions must be
generally would be so different that the application of the brought and conducted, except in cases especially provided by law,
provisions of section 377 permitting the venue to be laid in any in the province where the crime is committed.
province where any part of the land lies would work a very great For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and the
hardship to many defendants in such an action. To hold that a cause remanded to the trial court with direction to proceed with
railroad company desiring to build a line from Ilocos Norte to the action according to law. So ordered.
Batangas, through substantially the whole of the Island of Luzon,
might lay the venue in Batangas, it being a province in which a part
of the land described in the complaint was located, would be to
require all the parties defendant in Ilocos Norte and intervening
provinces, with their witnesses, to go to Batangas, with all the
inconvenience and expense which the journey would entail, and
submit the valuation of their lands into only to the Court of First
Instance of Batangas but to a commission appointed in that
province. The hardship to such defendants under such a holding is
so manifest that we are of the opinion that it was not intended that
section 377 of the code of Civil Procedure should apply to actions
for condemnation. Under the provisions of that section, the
defendant has no right to ask for a change of venue if the land
involved in the litigation, or any part thereof, is located in the
province where the court sits before which the action has been
commenced. When, therefore, an action such as is detailed above
is begun by a railroad company in Batangas against persons whose
lands lie in Ilocos Norte, there being also involved lands lying in
Batangas, such defendants would have no right under section 377,
if it were applicable, to demand that the trial as to their lands take
place in the Province of Ilocos Norte. We do not believe that this
was intended. We believe, rather, that under the provisions of the
special laws relating to the condemnation of real estate by railroad
companies, the defendants in the various provinces through which
the line runs may compel, if they wish, a separate action to be
commenced in each province in order that they may have a fair and
convenient trial not only before the court but also before
commissioner of their province who are not only before
commissioners of their province who are not only conveniently at
hand, but who are best able to judge of the weight of testimony
relative to the value of land in that province.
We, therefore, hold that section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to condemn
lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or
implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province
selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands
lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one
defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or
his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not
objecting would continue in the province where originally begun. It
would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered
continued before the court of the appropriate province or
provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect
the decision in the case before us for the reason that the
defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a
change thereof. They have not only expressly submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that
that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to
remove it.
The principles which we have herein laid down we do not apply to
criminal cases. They seem to rest on a different footing. There the
people of the state is a party. The interests of the public require
G.R. No. L-7802 January 16, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES JAYME, defendant-appellant.
P.E. del Rosario and Jose A. Clarin, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record in this case fully sustains the findings of the
trial judge, and establishes the guilt of the defendant and appellant
of the crime with which he was charged and of which he was
convicted in the court below, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The contention of counsel that in the prosecution of these
proceedings against the accused he had been placed "twice in
jeopardy" may be dismissed without extended discussion. It
appears that on a former occasion, this accused was brought to trial
and convicted in the court below on an information filed by the
provincial fiscal, charging the identical offense of which he was
convicted in this case; that in that case, this court, on appeal,
dismissed the information and all the proceedings had in the court
below, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, it appearing that the proceedings had
not been instituted on a complaint filed by the offended party of
her proper legal representative as required under the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 1773. (U.S. Andres Jayme, 20 Phil. Rep., 626.)
In support of our position in that case we cited and reaffirmed the
doctrine laid down in the United States vs.Castañares (18 Phil Rep.,
210); United States vs. Narvas (14 Phil. Rep., 410); United
States vs. De la Santa (9 Phil. Rep., 22); wherein we discussed the
nature and effect of the provisions of the first section of Act No.
1773.
In the case of United States vs. De la Santa, supra, we said:
It is to be observed, however, that under the provisions of the
above-cited article 448 of the Penal Code, jurisdiction over the
crime of seduction is expressly denied the trial court unless such
jurisdiction be conferred by one of certain persons specified in the
law; in this case, as we have seen, by the offended person herself.
The objection in this case is not, strictly speaking, to the sufficiency
of the complaint, but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court
over the crime with which the accused was charged. It has been
frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is
fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings,
either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p.
189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the
subject matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss
the proceeding ex mero motu. (Wakefield vs. Goudy, 4 Ill., 133; 190
Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it
is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an
objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be waived
by the parties. Hence, the accused in a criminal case cannot, by
express waiver or otherwise, confer jurisdiction on a court over an
offense as to which such jurisdiction has not been conferred upon
such court by law. (Harkness vs. Hyde, 98 U.S., 476;
Nazro vs. Cragin, 3 Dill (U.S.), 474; Baker vs. Chisholm, 3 Tex., 57;
Gamber vs. Holben, 5 Mich., 331; Gilliland vs. Admrs. of Sellers, 2
Ohio St., 223; 82 Wis., 64; Fleischman vs. Walker, 91 Ill., 318.)
In the case of United States vs. Castañares, supra, we said:
The objection in this case, however, goes directly to the jurisdiction
of the court. Jurisdiction over the crime of injuria is expressly
denied to the court in these Islands by the above-cited provisions
of section 1 of Act No. 1773, unless such jurisdiction is conferred by
the filing of a complaint by the aggrieved party, his parents,
grandparents, or guardian. In the case of the United
States vs. Narvas (14 Phil. Rep., 410), we held that
the complaint referred to t in this section is a sworn written
statement as defined in section 4 of General Orders, No. 58. The
information upon which these proceedings were instituted was not
such a complaint, and there can be doubt, therefore, that the court
below was without jurisdiction to proceed upon that information.
A conviction or acquittal before a court having no jurisdiction is, of
course, like all the proceedings in the case, absolutely void, and
therefore no bar to subsequent indictment and trial in a court
which has jurisdiction of the offense. (Kepner vs. U.S., 195 U.S.,
100, 129; Commonwealth vs. Peters, 12 Met., 387; 2 Hawk. P.C., c.
35, sec. 3; 1 Bishop's Crim. Law, sec. 1028.)
Citing as authority our decision in the case of United
States vs. Fideldia (22 Phil. Rep., 372), counsel contends that since
the offended person in this case was shown to have been over 18
years of age at the time when the alleged offense was committed,
he should not have been convicted of the crime of seduction.
Article 443 defines the crime of seduction as follows:
The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under twenty-three years
of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, servant,
domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who in any capacity
shall have charged of the education of the woman seduced, or shall
have her under his care, shall be punished by prision correccional in
its minimum and medium degrees.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall have
carnal knowledge of his sister or descendant, even though she be
over twenty-three years of age.
Any other person who by means of deceit shall accomplish the
seduction of a woman over twelve and under twenty-three years
of age shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed for any other act of lewdness
committed by the same persons and under the same
circumstances.
But counsel contends that the age limitation fixed in his article
should be held to have been modified in like manner as in the case
of United States vs. Fideldia, supra, where we held that the age
limitation set forth in article 446 defining "abduction" had been
modified. We cannot agree with this contention.
Article 446 of the Penal Code is as follows:
The abduction of a virgin over twelve and under twenty-three years
of age, committed with her consent, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium degrees.
In the case of the United States vs. Fideldia we said that the
reduction of the age at which a woman may leave her home and
marry without the consent of her father or other legal guardian
from 23 years to 18 years, draws with it a like reduction from 23
years to 18 years in the limit prescribed in article 446 of the Penal
Code under which a woman may be abducted with her own
consent.
But the reasons assigned for the reduction of the age limit in the
case of the abduction of a woman with her own consent, as defined
in article 446, are in no wise applicable in cases of seduction as
defined in article 443.
As has been frequently pointed out, the gravamen of the offense
of the abduction of a woman with her own consent, who is still
under the control of her parents or guardians is "the alarm and
perturbance to the parents and family" of the abducted person,
and the infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. But
cases of seduction, the gravamen of the offense is the wrong done
the young woman who is seduced. It would be going far to hold that
the reduction of the age at which a woman may leave her home
and marry without the consent of her father or other legal
guardian, carries with it, by necessary implication, a declaration
that the seducer of a woman between the ages of 18 and 23 is not
liable to conviction and punishment for the crime of seduction. In
the case relied upon by appellant, United States vs. Fideldia, supra,
we pointed out that notwithstanding our conclusion that the
accused could not be convicted of the crime of abduction, as
defined in article 446 of the Code, it appearing that the young
woman in that case was over 19 years of age at the time he was
charged with abducting her, nevertheless it might be "that he was
guilty of seduction or some other allied offense." We see no reason
for modifying the view expressed then, and we hold that the
provisions of article 443 of the Penal Code are in no wise modified
by the provisions of existing law touching the age at which a woman
may marry without the consent of her parents or guardian.
The judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing the
defendant and appellant should be and is hereby affirmed, with the
costs of his instance against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 143647 November 11, 2005
YUSUKE FUKUZUME,* Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,** Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with
modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No.
95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay private
complainant the sum of ₱424,000.00; and the CA Resolution dated
June 16, 2000 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.2
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in
buying and selling aluminum scrap wires.3Sometime in July 1991,
Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,4 who was the vice-
president of Manila Electric Company, went to the house of herein
accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in
Parañaque.5 Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter
that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa)
and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.6 Fukuzume
confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong
to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR).7 Believing Fukuzume’s representation to
be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from
Fukuzume.8 The initial agreed purchase price was ₱200,000.00.9 Yu
gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which eventually
totaled ₱290,000.00, broken down as follows: ₱50,000.00, given on
July 12, 1991; ₱20,000.00, given on July 22, 1991; ₱50,000.00, given
on October 14, 1991; and, ₱170,000.00, given on October 18,
1991.10 Fukuzume admitted that he received the same from Yu and
that he still owes him the amount of ₱290,000.00.11 To support his
claim that the aluminum scrap wires being sold are indeed owned
by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and that
Furukawa’s authorized representatives are allowed to withdraw
and dispose of said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two
certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991
purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by
the name of R. Y. Rodriguez.12 At the time that Fukuzume gave Yu
the second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him
that it shall be given as gifts to some of the people in NAPOCOR. Yu
gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two
checks, one for ₱100,000.00 and the other for
₱34,000.00.13 However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were
dishonored on the ground that the account from which the checks
should have been drawn is already closed.14 Subsequently, Yu
called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks
bounced.15 Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one
or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable
him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR.16 On
January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date, signed
by the Director of the Overseas Operation and Power Transmission
Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of
excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in their
depots in Tanay and Bulacan.17 Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to
accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap
wires from the NAPOCOR compound.18 When Yu arrived at the
NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was
nowhere to be found.19 Hence, Yu proceeded to show the
documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the
people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter
issued by Furukawa dated January 17, 1992.20 NAPOCOR also
refused to acknowledge the certifications dated December 17,
1991 and December 27, 1991 claiming that these are spurious as
the person who signed these documents is no longer connected
with NAPOCOR as of December 1991.21Unable to get the aluminum
scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume
and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid
him.22 Fukuzume promised to return Yu’s money.23 When
Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking, Yu sent him a
demand letter asking for the refund of ₱424,000.00 plus loss of
profits.24Subsequently, Yu filed a complaint with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).25
In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of
Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17,
1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y
Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the
duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the
Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor
materials not being used by Napocor and Furukawa, the accused
knowing full well that those representations were false and were
only made to induce and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said
materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and
delivered the total amount of ₱424,000.00 but the accused once in
possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to
deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant,
with intent of gain, unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied
and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and
despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y
Ng in the aforementioned amount of ₱424,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.26
Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not
guilty.27 Trial ensued.
In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found
Fukuzume guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court
hereby finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the maximum
penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years. With respect to his
civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant the
amount of ₱424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.28
Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal
with the CA.
On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the
findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty
imposed, thus:
… although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty
of imprisonment for twenty (20) years, it failed to determine the
minimum penalty for the offense committed (prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period but imposed in the maximum period), hence, the penalty is
modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as the minimum, to not more than twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.29
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the
aforementioned modification in the prison term of appellant, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.30
Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following
grounds:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE
TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED
PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION
OF THE FRAUD.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED
AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP,
THEREBY EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THEREOF, IF ANY.31
We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling
that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled:
The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws,
in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place (Rule 110, Sec. 15, Rules of Court). Although the false
representation and verbal contract of sale of the aluminum scrap
wires took place at appellant’s residence in Parañaque, appellant
and private complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial
payment of ₱50,000.00 for said transaction was made at the Hotel
Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an
element of the crime – that the offended party was induced to part
with his money because of the false pretense – occurred within the
jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the instant
case.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with
the NBI on April 19, 199432 and the affidavit of Fukuzume which was
subscribed on July 20, 1994.33
With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented
in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein
that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount of ₱50,000.00
at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with
Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct
examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of
₱50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed
that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque. Yu testified thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the
accused in this case, Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came
to know the accused?
A I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.
Q And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you
know?
A Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap
wires.
ATTY. N. SERING
Your Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not
responsive to the question.
COURT
Please wait until the answer is completed.
Q Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?
A He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A That was in 1991, sir.
COURT
When?
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Your Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his
memorandum.
A July 12, 1991, sir.
Q And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?
A We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some
amount of money.
Q Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the
accused in this case the amount of money?
A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents
to that effect.
Q Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took
place at the house of Mr. Fukuzume on that particular date?
A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I
am going to give money in payment of the aluminum scrap wires
coming from Furukawa Eletric Company.
Q How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to
the accused?
A Our first agreement was for ₱200,000.
Q Where is that aluminum scrap located?
A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of
the National Power Corporation but according to Mr. Fukuzume it
belongs to Furukawa Electric Company.
Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the
accused the amount of ₱50,000?
ATTY. N. SERING
Objection, Your Honor.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
The complainant testified he gave ₱50,000. I am asking how much
the complainant gave to the accused on that particular date.
A On July 12, I gave him ₱50,000 on that date.
Q Not ₱200,000?
A No, sir.34
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between
the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony
commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex
parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being
almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.35
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-
examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to
Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the
subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction.36 Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals,37 we held
in the fairly recent case of Macasaet vs. People38 that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that
the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must
keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take
jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment.40
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was
filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with
estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part
with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.41
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been
committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement
executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no
other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s
sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated
elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed,
the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 on July 12,
1991, ₱20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, ₱50,000.00 on October 14, 1991
and ₱170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither
was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove
that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires
and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were
given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony
of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had
been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu
went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the
intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter
pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is
authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false
pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum
scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of
₱50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated
differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was
consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter’s house in
Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires,
Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself
alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an unspecified
date, he received ₱50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel
in Makati. However, we cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason
that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation
and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is settled that
the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by
a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case
in the RTC.42 In People vs. Crispin,43 this Court held that the fact that
the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary
investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because
the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of
the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced
as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take
judicial notice of the same.44 Since neither prosecution nor defense
presented in evidence Fukuzume’s affidavit, the same may not be
considered part of the records, much less evidence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to
prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or
that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the
said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting
Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice,
however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of
competent jurisdiction.
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume
raised the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on
the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at
any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.45 Moreover, jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon
the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since
such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and
form prescribed by law.46 While an exception to this rule was
recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam
vs. Sibonghanoy,47wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the
court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be
barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in
said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the
general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.
Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction
to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary to
consider the other issues raised in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21888
are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-
083 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154473 April 24, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 155573 April 24, 2009
PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R.
No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 20021 and the June 23,
20022 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No.
155573 challenging the June 25, 20023 and the September 18,
20024 Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109406.
The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different
factual settings, thus:
G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then
Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a
speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses
in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the
Philippines-Diliman Campus, Quezon City.5 The speech was
subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the
Manila Bulletin.6
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by
the respondent when he stated in his speech that
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing
a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have
been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isn’t
even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no
contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink
us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the
government that it offends common sense to say that it would be
worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.7
filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-
Complaint8 for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent
questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City (OCP-QC).9 Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor
filed an Information10 for libel against the respondent, docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 102.
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and
Consolidation,11 contending that Judge Jaime N. Salazar of Branch
102 could not impartially preside over the case because his
appointment to the judiciary was made possible through the
recommendation of respondent’s father-in-law. Petitioner further
moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel
case [Criminal Case No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R.
No. 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC.
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his
part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted
before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can
be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that
should investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.12
On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged
Order13 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407 and considering
as moot and academic petitioner’s motion to inhibit. While the RTC
found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer
because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled
that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering
that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to
his office—he delivered the speech in his official capacity as
COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had
jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling
that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.14
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure
questions of law, the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari15 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION
TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL
IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS
OFFICE;" AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.16
G.R. No. 155573
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC
Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk
show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide
on the ANC-23 channel. The television show’s episode that day was
entitled "COMELEC Wars."17 In that episode, the following
conversation transpired:
Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being
used for a "PR" campaign against you? Is that what you are saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [it’s] not COMELEC funds, [it’s] Photokina
funds. You know, admittedly, according to [c]hargé d’[a]ffaires of
the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is what’s
been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent
in excess of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] that’s about
120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldn’t tell me,
you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think it’s pretty
obvious.18
Petitioner considered respondent’s statement as defamatory, and,
through its authorized representative, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit19 for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the
jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.20 The City Prosecutor, however,
consequently instituted Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 by filing
the corresponding Information21 with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 101.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising
similar arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his
person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal
prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the
Sandiganbayan.22
On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed
Order23 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the
further assailed September 18, 2002 Order,24 denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.25
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably
filed before this Court, on pure questions of law, another Petition
for Review on Certiorari26 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN
THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT "IN RELATION TO HIS
OFFICE"; AND
II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION
THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN
RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF
DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.27
Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same
issues and the same parties, the Court, upon the recommendation
of the Clerk of Court,28 consolidated the cases.29
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of
all other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their
pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of
respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the
conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately
determine which court—the RTC or the Sandiganbayan—has
jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes
that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost
concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to
identify, is whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel
cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the
RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have
concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to
still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.30 Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC),31 as amended by Republic Act No.
4363,32 is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of
written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now,
the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense
xxx.33 [Underscoring and italics ours.]1avvphi1.zw+
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v.
Endaya,34 acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said
provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first
instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically
designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its
meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory
provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required
is application. What the law ordains must then be followed.35
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written
defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,36where the Court
further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even
if the libelous act is committed "by similar means,"37 and despite
the fact that the phrase "by similar means" is not repeated in the
latter portion of Article 360.38 In these cases, and in those that
followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement
that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot
be exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,39 we
explained at length that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is]
lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R.
No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v.
Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised.
In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts
which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon
elevation of the matter to us, respondent judge’s orders were
nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Court’s
Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18,
1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking
cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548,
which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition."
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving
the matter:
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error
committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The
contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of
jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is
punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four
years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which
imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Court’s
jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however,
excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261,
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that
Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases,
hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior
courts cannot be applied to libel cases."
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public
respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case
for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged
dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction
of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a
later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the
RPC, a law of a special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively
with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail
over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such
as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later
enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing
law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in
case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter
must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction
conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over
that granted by a general law on the MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no
manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If
there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly
so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as
possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature.
A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an
implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial
conflict should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing
a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy
exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws, in brief,
must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the
jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition
barring Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain
cases over which they have been priorly granted special and
exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was
categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec.
32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA
7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996,
this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence
settled the matter with finality:
"RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING,
ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER
HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.
xxxx
C
"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION
OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS." (Underscoring supplied)40
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v.
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,41Manzano, and
analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the
law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil
actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all
other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the
jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence
of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the
RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations
in writing or by similar means.42The grant to the Sandiganbayan43 of
jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office,
similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not
divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written
defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed
in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section
4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249,44 cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even
simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC.45
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the
RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties
to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent
committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as
former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the
case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court,
therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-
109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective
Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that, the
Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues
raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-
109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction
of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for
review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on
August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as
charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned,
among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision,
considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial
and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he
was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack
of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s
decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified
the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and
filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute
laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioner’s appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely,
does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case,
which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor,
amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult
to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per
hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly
crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to
warrant his conviction for the crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the
place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that
the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no
evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the
prosecution during the trial of this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the
petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally
correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and,
more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does
not contain an allegation to that effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness
Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road
resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not
enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this case, at the
time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land
Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended by Republic
Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except
in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment
for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and
try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs).
Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General
acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that
the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the
petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial
went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating
therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.
The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of
a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for
the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein,
the principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis
estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and
the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has
been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act
on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La
Santa15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. &
Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed,
where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court
may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79;
Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it
is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an
objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived
by the parties. x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of
jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case
was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction,
for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-
863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was
heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that
the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here,
the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties,
has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void,
or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character
directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently
indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such
case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in
the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the
jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion
quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the
court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former
jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-
389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the
ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped
subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous
jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18
But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not
sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee
therein, made the following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been
rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this
Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was
enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29,
1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was
never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was
handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they
must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said
enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the
case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual
real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the
jurisdictional amount of this Court (over ₱200,000). Our minute
resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas
Compaña de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is
applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the
Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter’s
jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered
as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed
the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a
contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of
appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of
Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of
attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be
barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for
the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active
participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of
estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot
be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting
a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37
S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659).
And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not
right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans
et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor
Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307,
Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of
the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as
well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on
its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting.22
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in
Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve
the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the
principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we
pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule
rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling
in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that
the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that
rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel
by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been
raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen
(15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a
plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined
in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the
plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the court’s
jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein,
we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded
supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer
volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as
foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As
such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule
presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant
case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by
asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped
from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an
adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the
jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the
amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so
only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower
court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held
in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages
of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred
petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction.
Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended
complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower
court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed
its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that
petitioner raised the question of the lower court’s lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of
jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September
1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private
respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles)
failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and
therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s
jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the
duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private
respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings
by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the
trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the
reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus
foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own
actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction
may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages
of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579
[1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442
[1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for
decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank
of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur
Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics
ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia
Times Corporation v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of
jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the
doctrines of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in
Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule.
Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified
that:
Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s
dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown
trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of
jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after
trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has
been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart
dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in
which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred
from questioning a court’s jurisdiction after being invoked to
secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches
prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the
first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul
everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however,
the exception rather than the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may
be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in
which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In
such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling
in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that
the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The
reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by
the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in
the answer.30
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack
of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by
presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the
doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction
may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial.
Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best
characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction
did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings
had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was
defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.32
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again
emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the
Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark
doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of
jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the
rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of
jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to
that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have
been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for
the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15
years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several
stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court
of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not
present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the
receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing
the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in
initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s
directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt
and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be
considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so
as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is
the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead
to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule
enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in
Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always
been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the
court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from
thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since
such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any
advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in
no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the
appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches"
unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading
laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to
loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other
causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the
patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or
less 15 years.37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant
case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a
forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only
from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The
doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be
strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel
may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of
injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction
over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court
provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts
or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No
laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want
of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and
Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-
judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to
any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law,
and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject
matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by,
any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the
cause of action. x x x
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by
the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in
his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined
by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties
but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of
the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence,
susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.43
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve
the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171208 September 7, 2007
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Br. 129, Caloocan City, and MA. LEONISA
GENOVIA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court involves jurisdiction over an election offense punishable
under the Omnibus Election Code by "imprisonment of not less
than one year but not more than six years."
On the directive of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc,1 its Law Department filed an Information against respondent
Ma. Leonisa Genovia, for violation of Section 261 (z) (3) of the
Omnibus Election Code which penalizes
"Any person who votes in substitution for another whether with or
without the latter’s knowledge and/or consent." (Underscoring
supplied)
The accusatory portion of the Information, dated July 26, 2005,
which was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73774, reads:
That on or about July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, in the City of Caloocan, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully and
unlawfully, cast her vote in substitution of another person by
misrepresenting herself to be Emely Genovia and voted in
substitution of said Emely Genovia, a registered voter in Precinct
No. 779-A, Barangay 60, Caloocan City.2
Under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, violation of any
election offense is punishable as follows:
SECTION 264. Penalties. – Any person found guilty of any election
offense under this Code shall be punished with imprisonment of
not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not
be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be
sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be
sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after the prison
term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be
sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos, which
shall be imposed upon such party after criminal action has been
instituted in which their corresponding officials have been found
guilty. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
By Order of September 21, 2005,3 Branch 129 of the Caloocan RTC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, it citing Section 32(2) of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980) reading:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except
in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine regardless of other imposable accessory penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, or value amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The COMELEC moved to reconsider the trial court’s dismissal
order,4 inviting attention to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code which reads:
SECTION 268. Jurisdiction of courts. – The regional trial court shall
have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except
those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote
which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will
lie as in other criminal cases. (Underscoring supplied)
By a one sentence Order of November 15, 2005,5 the trial court
denied the COMELEC’s motion for "lack of merit."
Hence, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 64,6 the
COMELEC contending that the dismissal order is contrary to Section
268 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC argues that under the above-quoted provision of
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, all criminal cases for
violation of the Code, except those relating to failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts, fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial
courts.7
The petition is meritorious.
From the above-quoted provision of Section 32 of BP Blg. 129,
jurisdiction of first-level courts – the metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts – does not
cover criminal cases which, by specific provision of law, fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts (and of the
Sandiganbayan).8
As correctly argued by the COMELEC, Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code specifically provides, regional trial courts have
exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the Code "except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote."
It bears emphasis that Congress has the plenary power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdictions of various courts. Hence,
it may, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by a specific court. Section 268
of Omnibus Election Code is one such and must thus be construed
as an exception to BP Blg. 129, the general law on jurisdiction of
courts.9
In fine, while BP Blg. 129 lodges in municipal trial courts,
metropolitan trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts
jurisdiction over criminal cases carrying a penalty of imprisonment
of less than one year but not exceeding six years, following Section
268 of the Omnibus Election Code, any criminal action or
proceeding which bears the same penalty, with the exception of
the therein mentioned two cases, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of regional trial courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of
respondent Judge Thelma Canlas Trinided-Pe Aguirre, in Criminal
Case No. C-73774 are SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is DIRECTED to
reinstate the case to the court docket and to conduct appropriate
proceedings thereon with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666 September 5, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1761-MTJ)
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA
CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for "gross
ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect
of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie2 M. Uy (Uy)
and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Erwin3 B.
Javellana (Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La
Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their
complaint:
First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several
occasions as examples: (a) In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People
v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a warrant
of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) In Crim. Case No. 04-075,
entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge
Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance
with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was
a prohibited pleading; (c) Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge
Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the
same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of
therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence;
and (d) In Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for
Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary
examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for
arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein
complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the
material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a
ground for dismissal of said case.Second, Judge Javellana gave the
impression that he was a co-agent in a surety company with a
certain Leilani "Lani" Manunag (Manunag). Judge Javellana had
conveyed to the public on several occasions that Manunag was in a
special position to influence him in granting provisional liberty to
the accused.4 In different cases, Judge Javellana (a) instructed the
wife of an accused to file the Motion to Reduce Bond prepared by
the PAO with Manunag, leading the wife to believe that Manunag
was a court personnel, hence, said Motion was never filed with the
MTC and, instead of the cash bond the accused intended to post,
the accused was released on a surety bond issued by Manunag’s
company for which the accused still had to pay premium;5 (b)
reduced the bail from ₱ 40,000.00 to ₱ 30,000.00, consistent with
the reduced bail amount Manunag instructed the representative of
the accused to seek, not to ₱ 10,000.00 as prayed for by the PAO in
the Motion for Reduction of Bail or to ₱ 20,000.00 as recommended
by the Chief of Police;6 (c) did not warn Manunag against getting
involved in court processes as she was engaged in surety insurance
and did not even question a counter-affidavit of an accused
prepared by "Lani;"7 (d) instructed the relatives of the accused to
go to Manunag who knew how to "process" an affidavit of
desistance, and when said relatives did approach Manunag, the
latter charged them fees;8 (e) did not set the Motion to Reduce Bail
for hearing but granted the same because it was filed by "the
intimate friend of judge who is an agent of surety" and took
cognizance of the amount of premium for the surety bond in
determining the amount of bail;9 (f) denied the Motion to Extend
Time to File Counter-Affidavit for violation of the three-day notice
rule, but granted the Motion to Reduce Bail facilitated by Manunag
even when it was filed in violation of the same rule;10 and (g) issued
warrants of arrest under questionable circumstances, more
particularly described in the immediately succeeding paragraph, in
which cases, the bail bonds of the accused were facilitated by
Manunag.
Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest without
propounding searching questions to the complainants and their
witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under
immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana issued warrants of
arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered
or when a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights
of the accused as stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled
People v. Bautista,11 for preliminary investigation even when the
accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation
without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and to
have a counsel.
Fifth, Judge Javellana was habitually tardy. The subpoena in Civil
Case No. 05-001, entitled Villanueva v. Regalado,12 only stated that
the hearing would be "in the morning," without indicating the time.
Judge Javellana failed to arrive for the pre-trial of the case set in
the morning of April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana was still a no-show
when the pre-trial was reset in the morning of April 15, 2005 and
May 3, 2005. Finally, anticipating Judge Javellana’s tardiness, the
pre-trial was rescheduled at 1:30 in the afternoon of another date.
Sixth, Judge Javellana whimsically or inconsistently implemented
laws and rules depending on stature of the parties, persons
accompanying the parties, lawyers of the parties, and his personal
relations with the parties/lawyers. Judge Javellana, in several
cases,13 denied or refused to receive Motions for Extension of Time
to File Counter-Affidavits signed only by the accused, yet in other
cases,14 granted such motions. In another case,15Judge Javellana
denied the Motion to Extend Time to File Counter-Affidavit for
violation of the three-day notice rule, but granted the Motion to
Reduce Bail, which was in violation of the same rule. Judge
Javellana’s inconsistent and irregular ruling could be due to the fact
that the former motion was filed by Public Attorney Bascug, with
whom Judge Javellana had an axe to grind, while the latter motion
was facilitated by Manunag.
Seventh, Judge Javellana also adopted the mantra that the
"litigants are made for the courts" instead of "courts for the
litigants." In Crim. Case No. 03-104, entitled People v. Fermin, the
accused, assisted by Public Attorney Uy, pleaded guilty to the crime
of attempted homicide. The accused filed a Petition/Application for
Probation, prepared by the PAO but signed only by the accused.
Judge Javellana refused to accept said Petition/Application and
required the father of the accused to return the
Petition/Application all the way from the MTC in La Castellana to
the PAO in La Carlota, despite the great distance between these
two cities. The PAO already adopted the practice of preparing the
motions for extension of time to file counter-affidavit, motions for
release of minor, or applications for probation, but letting the
accused themselves or their parents (in case the accused were
minors) sign the motions/applications, thus, enabling the PAO to
serve as many clients as possible despite the lack of lawyers. Such
practice is not prohibited considering that under Rule 138, Section
34 of the Rules of Court, a party may conduct his litigation in a
municipal court "in person, with an aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for the purpose or with aid of an attorney."16
Eighth, Judge Javellana did not observe the proper procedure in
airing his complaints against public attorneys. Judge Javellana
rebuked the public attorneys in the Orders he issued. In one such
Order,17 Judge Javellana misleadingly stated that Public Attorney
Uy "has already expressed her desire not to attend today’s
hearing," when Public Attorney Uy actually waived her personal
appearance at said hearing as she had to attend the hearing of a
criminal case at the MTC of Pontevedra. In another Order,18 Judge
Javellana reported, prior to confirmation, that the PAO lawyer
refused to prepare the motion for extension of time to file counter-
affidavit, thus, prompting the accused to hire a special counsel.
Additionally, Judge Javellana improperly filed his complaints
against the public attorneys appearing before his court with the
Department of Justice or the District Public Attorney (DPA) of
Bacolod City, instead of the appropriate authorities, namely, the
DPA of La Carlota City or the PAO Regional Director. Moreover,
Judge Javellana had required Public Attorney Bascug to explain why
she allowed the accused in Crim. Case No. 03-090, entitled People
v. Earnshaw, to sign the Motion for Extension of Time to File
Counter-Affidavits, even when she was the one who prepared said
Motion. Judge Javellana did not verify first whether it was indeed
Public Attorney Bascug who prepared the Motion in question, thus,
violating her right to due process. Also, Judge Javellana was already
encroaching upon the domain of the PAO. It is the concern of the
PAO and not the court "as to how the Public Attorney’s Office will
be managed, specifically, what policies to use in the acceptance of
cases brought to its Office, how one could avail of its legal services,
at what point in time one is considered a client of said Office x x x
."19
Lastly, to support their complaint, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug
attached a hand-written note20 relating the observations of an
anonymous member of Judge Javellana’s staff, viz:
Page One
1. Honorable Judge reports to duty at past 11:00 A.M. and hurriedly
conducts preliminary investigations or preliminary examinations
after making party litigants wait from 8:00 A.M. until 11:00 A.M.
There had been occasions when litigants became impatient for
waiting for several hours for the Judge’s arrival and would leave the
court. Judge then would forego the examination.
2. Judge spends more time conversing in cafeterias than stay in the
court. Litigants who are in a hurry to go home would bring the
affidavits to the cafeteria for Judge’s signature.
3. Most of the time, in Court, in front of litigants as audience and
even while solemnizing civil marriage Judge would keep repeating
these remarks:
I am a criminal lawyer.
I did not come from the DAR or the COMELEC.
I am an intelligent Judge.
I am the counsel of the famous Gargar-Lumangyao and Spider
Hunter cases and I have caused the execution of Col. Torres.
I am not under the Mayor or the Chief of Police.
and other remarks as if he is the only intelligent, credible and
qualified judge in the whole world.
4. Judge tolerates the negligence of duty of his court utility worker.
Said utility worker never reports to open or close the court; he
never cleans the courtroom; most of the time he stays in his
Karaoke bar which is some few meters away from the MTC of La
Castellana. As a matter of fact the MTC of La Castellana is the
dirtiest of all the courtrooms in the whole province.
Page Two
5. Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter Affidavit in CC 03-
090-Pp. vs. Efraim Earnshaw made by Atty. Bascug was denied by
Judge on the ground that it was the accused who signed the Motion
and Atty. Bascug was ordered to explain. Other motions had been
denied for not meeting the 3-day rule but others were granted.
6. Motion to Reduce Bail received by court on January 7, 2004 was
not set for hearing but was ordered granted because it was filed by
the intimate friend of the judge who is an agent of Surety. This did
not meet the 3-day rule CC 03-108 Pp. vs. Lowell Panaguiton for
"Homicide."
Page Three
1. Criminal Case No. 03-102- Julius Villanueva "Frustrated
Homicide" Urgent Motion to Stay Transfer to Provincial Jail - Filed
1/21/2004 was not heard but order was issued January 21, 2004
also.
2. Criminal Case No. 03-090- Efraim Earnshaw "Less Serious
Physical Injuries" January 26, 2004 - Scheduled for arraignment but
upon order of Judge on affidavit of Desistance of Melanie Pabon
and Motion to Dismiss was filed and case dismissed.
3. Deonaldo Lopez Case - Motion for Extension of Time to File
Counter Affidavit dated 10-3-02 was signed by accused namely
Deonaldo Lopez, Jojo Balansag, Junnel Jorge, and Bernie Bello -
granted by judge.21
Based on the foregoing, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug prayed
that Judge Javellana be removed from the MTC of La Castellana.
In his Comment22 on the complaint against him, Judge Javellana
discounted the allegations of Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug as
"baseless, untruthful, intrigues, malicious and a harassment
tending to intimidate him," and countered as follows:
First, Judge Javellana asserted that he was not grossly ignorant of
the rules of procedure and explained his actions in particular cases:
(a) In People v. Cornelio, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest
for the two accused charged with Malicious Mischief in the exercise
of his judicial discretion, and the necessity of holding the accused
in detention became evident when it was revealed during trial that
the same accused were wanted for Attempted Homicide in Crim.
Case No. 04-096; (b) In People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana
insisted that referral of the dispute (involving an alleged Trespass
to Dwelling) to the Lupong Tagapamayapa was not a jurisdictional
requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on said ground was a
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure; (c) Still in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana
refused to dismiss outright the complaint as prayed for by Public
Attorney Uy as the Judge had to accord due process to the
complainant in said case; and (d) In People v. Lopez, et al. another
case for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana reiterated that a
motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure and added that he could not dismiss the
case outright since the prosecution has not yet fully presented its
evidence.
Second, Judge Javellana denied acting as the co-agent of Manunag.
Manunag was an Authorized Surety Bond Agent of Commonwealth
Insurance and Surety Bond Company, a bonding company duly
accredited by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The
relationship between Judge Javellana and Manunag was "purely on
official business." That Manunag influenced Judge Javellana in
fixing the amount of bail in several cases was a malicious and
deliberate lie, based on mere speculation and suspicion. Judge
Javellana had consistently granted the reduction of the amount of
bail to only 75%, and not as low as 25%, of the amount stated in
Department Circular No. 89 dated August 29, 2000 of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Judge Javellana even chided Public
Attorneys Uy and Bascug that as officers of the court, said public
attorneys were duty bound not to demand outrageous reduction
of bail. In addition, Judge Javellana could not warn Manunag to stay
away from "the processes (sic) premises in the Court" because
"everybody are allowed to attend Court proceedings unless
otherwise the attendance of the public is prohibited."23 Judge
Javellana likewise stated that he could not interfere with the
processing of surety insurance and bond for such was a private
matter between the insurance and bonding company and its
authorized agents. Referring to case records, Judge Javellana
pointed out that he only granted the motions to reduce bail that
complied with the three-day notice rule.
Third, Judge Javellana claimed to have conducted preliminary
examination, asking the complainants and their witnesses
searching questions, before issuing warrants of arrest. According to
Judge Javellana, he would sign the official form of the warrant of
arrest right after the preliminary examination. In some cases, Judge
Javellana was not aware that the accused had already voluntarily
surrendered or was already taken into custody by virtue of a
warrantless arrest because police officers did not timely inform the
court of such fact.
Fourth, Judge Javellana did not violate the constitutional rights of
the accused in People v. Bautista. Judge Javellana argued that while
a judge can ask clarificatory questions during the preliminary
investigation, a preliminary investigation is mandatory only when
the law imposes the penalty of imprisonment of at least four years,
two months, and one day. Judge Javellana further averred that he
always advised litigants to secure the services of a counsel or that
of a public attorney from the PAO. However, even when the public
attorney failed or refused to appear before the court, Judge
Javellana still proceeded with his clarificatory questions since there
was yet no full blown trial for which the accused already needed
the services of a competent lawyer.
Fifth, Judge Javellana explained his failure to arrive for the pre-trial
in Villanueva v. Regalado scheduled on April 14, 2005. Judge
Javellana averred that he had been suffering from diabetes, as
evinced by his medical records from the Supreme Court Health and
Welfare Plan, and on said date, his blood sugar rose to 300, which
caused him to be lethargic, weak, and drowsy.
Sixth, Judge Javellana repudiated the allegation that he applied the
law and ruled whimsically and inconsistently. Judge Javellana
asserted that he "applied the law and the rules according to what
he believes is fair, just and equitable in the exercise of his judicial
discretion."24 Judge Javellana never favored Manunag and in all
criminal cases involving homicide, he had granted the reduction of
bail to ₱ 30,000.00 (75% of the recommended bail of ₱ 40,000.00).
Seventh, Judge Javellana admitted not accepting petitions,
applications, and motions prepared by the PAO but signed only by
the accused, asseverating that public attorneys should affix their
signatures and state their Roll of Attorneys number in every
pleading they file in court. Judge Javellana asked that "if all courts
admits (sic) any pleading filed by any litigant then what will happen
to the practice of law?"25
Eighth, Judge Javellana emphasized that government lawyers, such
as Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug, are paid with people’s money,
so they should be sincere and dedicated to their work and,
whenever possible, go the extra mile to serve poor litigants. Thus,
Judge Javellana reported Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug to higher
PAO officials to guide said public attorneys and not to interfere with
the performance of their functions.
And ninth, Judge Javellana identified the member of his staff who
wrote the note containing more allegations against him as Mr. Ray
D. Pineda (Pineda), Process Server. Judge Javellana described
Pineda as "very abnormal, eccentric and queer in his relationship
with his fellow staff as shown by his quarrelsome attitude and fond
of inciting litigants to criticize the Clerk of Court and other
personnel and most of all his loyalty to the Official of the
Municipality rather than to this Court x x x."26 Judge Javellana
clarified that he often mentioned the Gargar-Lumangyao
Kidnapping with Double Murder Case and the Spider Hunters
Multiple Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder Case not to boast
but to relay the impression that he meant business as Presiding
Judge. These cases were dubbed as the "Case of the Century" by
then Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City (who later became Deputy Court
Administrator) because the same involved big time personalities.
Judge Javellana mentioned the said cases even when solemnizing
marriages because he would then be reading the Holy Scriptures
and he had to highlight that he survived the trials and threats to his
life because of the Holy Bible. Judge Javellana also did not have a
Court Aide who owned a Karaoke Bar whose negligence the judge
was tolerating. Pineda was just "jealous" because he was not
designated by Judge Javellana as Acting Docket Clerk in lieu of Mr.
Vee Caballero who was already on terminal leave prior to
retirement. Judge Javellana further narrated that he had
reprimanded Pineda several times, even in open court. In one of
these instances, it was because Pineda submitted a falsified
information sheet to the Supreme Court Personnel Division, stating
therein that he had never been charged with a criminal offense,
when in truth, he was previously charged with "Physical Injury."
Judge Javellana advised Pineda to rectify the latter’s records by
executing an affidavit to be submitted to the Supreme Court
Personnel Division, but Pineda did not heed the same.
In the end, Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him
were baseless and malicious; and the acts being complained of
involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the
proper subject of an administrative complaint. Judge Javellana
hinted about a conspiracy between the Municipal Mayor, on one
hand, and Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug, on the other. The
Municipal Mayor was purportedly angry at Judge Javellana because
the latter caused the arrest of and heard the cases against the
former’s supporters and employees; while Public Attorney Bascug
was suffering from a "Losing Litigant’s Syndrome" and "Prosecution
Complex," and was influencing Public Attorney Uy, a neophyte
lawyer.
Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant
complaint against him.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report27 dated
January 2, 2006, found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of
the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule;
and (2) gross misconduct when he got involved in business relations
with Manunag, implemented the law inconsistently, and
mentioned his accomplishments for publicity. The OCA thus
recommended that:
1. The instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter; and
2. Judge Edwin B. Javellana, MTC, La Castellana, Negros Occidental
be SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for
three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.28
In a Resolution29 dated February 5, 2007, the Court re-docketed the
complaint as a regular administrative matter and required parties
to manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings filed.
On separate dates,30 the parties manifested their willingness to
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings already filed.
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except for
the penalty imposed.
I Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in
Gross Ignorance of the Law
The Revised Rule of Summary Procedure shall govern the following
criminal cases:
SECTION 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern the summary procedure
in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
the following cases falling within their jurisdiction.
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or
a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (₱ 1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise,
or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does
not exceed ten thousand pesos (₱ 10,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
The cases People v. Cornelio31 and People v. Lopez, et al.32 pending
before Judge Javellana were both for malicious mischief.
The crime of malicious mischief is committed by any person who
deliberately causes damage to the property of another through
means not constituting arson.33 There are special cases of malicious
mischief which are specifically covered by Article 328 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides:
ART. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. – Any person who
shall cause damage to obstruct the performance of public
functions, or using any poisonous or corrosive substance; or
spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who causes
damage to the property of the National Museum or National
Library, or to any archive or registry, waterworks, road,
promenade, or any other thing used in common by the public, shall
be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor, if such value does not exceed the above-
mentioned amount but is over 200 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos.
(Emphasis ours.)
All other cases of malicious mischief shall be governed by Article
329 of the same Code, which reads:
ART. 329. Other mischiefs. – The mischiefs not included in the next
preceding article shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
value is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does
not exceed 200 pesos or cannot be estimated. (Emphasis ours.)
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and
People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of
malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the
Revised Penal Code, then Article 329 of the same Code should be
applied. If the amounts of the alleged damage to property in People
v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al., ₱ 6,000.0034 and ₱
3,000.00,35 respectively, are proven, the appropriate penalty for
the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six
(6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
People v. Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that "the court shall
not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear
whenever required." Judge Javellana never claimed that the
accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the
accused was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being
tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable
and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio,
pending before Judge Javellana’s court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is
for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case
No. 04-096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases
involved the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made
applicable to the other.
In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary
investigation even when it was not required or justified.36
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under
said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be
commenced in the following manner:
SEC. 11. How commenced. – The filing of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and
in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de
oficio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number
of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court’s
files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days
from date of filing, the case may be dismissed.
SEC. 12. Duty of Court. –
(a) If commenced by complaint. – On the basis of the complaint and
the affidavits and other evidence accompanying the same, the
court may dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis
or merit and order the release of the accused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. – When the case is commenced
by information, or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding
paragraph, the court shall issue an order which, together with
copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the
prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-
affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence
in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or
prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order.
The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after
receipt of the counter-affidavits of the defense.
SEC. 13. Arraignment and trial. – Should the court, upon a
consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits
submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the
accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise,
the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be
immediately arraigned and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall
forthwith be sentenced.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only
requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the
filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously
established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious
mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to
conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We
stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely
adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of
litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.37
Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct
proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the
resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said
Rule.
We further agree with the OCA that Judge Javellana committed a
blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused
in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a
prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously
referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure read:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon
for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with.
This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused
was arrested without a warrant.
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following
pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or
information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section.
(Emphases ours.)
We see no ambiguity in the aforequoted provisions. A case which
has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa
shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an
exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellana’s
argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional
requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste,
et al. was not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion
to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have
allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit without
prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure has been in effect since
November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of
civil and criminal cases pending before Judge Javellana’s court.
Judge Javellana cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same.
Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and
anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of
the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware
of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.38
In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles,39 we called the attention of Judge
Tresvalles to Section 2 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
which states that a "patently erroneous determination to avoid the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is a ground
for disciplinary action." We went on further to interpret said
provision as follows:
Although the said provision states that "patently erroneous
determination to avoid the application of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action," the
provision cannot be read as applicable only where the failure to
apply the rule is deliberate or malicious. Otherwise, the policy of
the law to provide for the expeditious and summary disposition of
cases covered by it could easily be frustrated. Hence, requiring
judges to make the determination of the applicability of the rule on
summary procedure upon the filing of the case is the only guaranty
that the policy of the law will be fully realized. x x x.40 (Emphasis
ours.)
Resultantly, Judge Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of
deliberate or malicious intent as a defense. His repeated failure to
apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases so obviously
covered by the same is detrimental to the expedient and efficient
administration of justice, for which we hold him administratively
liable.
As for Judge Javellana’s refusal to dismiss People v. Lopez, et al. and
People v. Celeste, et al., however, we exonerate him of the
administrative charges for the same. Judge Javellana is correct that
the appreciation of evidence is already within his judicial
discretion.41 Any alleged error he might have committed in this
regard is the proper subject of an appeal but not an administrative
complaint. We remind Judge Javellana though to adhere closely to
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in hearing and resolving
said cases.
II
Gross Misconduct
Judges are enjoined by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary42 to act and behave, in and out of court, in a
manner befitting their office, to wit:
Canon
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
xxxx
Canon
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial
office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor,
bias or prejudice.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and
out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public,
the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and
of the judiciary.
xxxx
Canon
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
xxxx
SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of
their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit
others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position
improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.
xxxx
SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or
accept, any gift, bequest, loan favor in relation to anything done or
to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or
functions.
xxxx
Canon
EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential
to the due performance of the judicial office.
xxxx
SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties,
by words or by conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any
person or group on irrelevant grounds.
xxxx
SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties,
by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any
person or group on irrelevant grounds.
SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation
on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of
such duties.
xxxx
Canon 6
2 COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due
performance of judicial office.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
3 require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.
Judge Javellana had violated the aforequoted canons/standards in
several instances.
Judge Javellana did not admit having a business relationship with
Manunag, contrary to the finding of the OCA. What Judge Javellana
stated in his Comment was that his relationship with Manunag was
"purely on official business," since Manunag was a duly authorized
agent of a credited bonding company. Nonetheless, Judge
Javellana, by referring the accused who appeared before his court
directly to Manunag for processing of the bail bond of said accused,
gave the impression that he favored Manunag and Manunag’s
4 bonding company, as well as the reasonable suspicion that he
benefitted financially from such referrals. Judge Javellana should
remember that he must not only avoid impropriety, but the
"appearance of impropriety" as well.
Moreover, Judge Javellana was conspicuously inconsistent in
Granting43 or denying44 motions for extension of time to file
pleadings which were signed only by the accused. Judge Javellana
reasoned in his Comment that the PAO lawyers who prepared the
motions should have signed the same as counsels for the accused,
but this only explained Judge Javellana’s denial of said motions. It
did not address why, in other cases, Judge Javellana had granted
similar motions signed only by the accused. Without any
satisfactory basis for the difference in his ruling on these motions,
Judge Javellana had acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the PAO
lawyers.
Judge Javellana himself admitted that he often mentioned his
previous accomplishments as counsel in big and controversial
cases, claiming that he only did so to impress upon the parties that
he meant business and that he relied greatly upon God to survive
the trials and threats to his life. We are not persuaded.
The previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically warned the
judges against seeking publicity for personal vainglory.45 Vainglory,
in its ordinary meaning, refers to an individual’s excessive or
ostentatious pride especially in one’s own achievements.46 Even no
5 longer explicitly stated in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges
are still proscribed from engaging in self-promotion and indulging
their vanity and pride by Canons 1 (on Integrity) and 2 (on
Propriety) of the New Code.
We have previously strongly reminded judges in that:
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no WHEREFORE, Judge Erwin B. Javellana is found GUILTY of gross
uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for personal ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from
vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, office without salary and other benefits for a period of three (3)
is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a months and one (1) day with a STERN WARNING that the repetition
lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his records with
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." this Court.
This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the SO ORDERED.
exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by
acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly
put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers
are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any
undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their
qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited
from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not
actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.47
Judge Javellana’s actuations as described above run counter to the
mandate that judges behave at all times in such a manner as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.48 We cannot stress enough that "judges are the visible
representations of law and justice. They ought to be embodiments
of competence, integrity and independence. In particular,
municipal judges are frontline officers in the administration of
justice. It is therefore essential that they live up to the high
standards demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct."49
For his violations of the New Code of Professional Conduct, Judge
Javellana committed gross misconduct. We have defined gross
misconduct as a "transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer."50
There is no sufficient evidence to hold Judge Javellana
administratively liable for the other charges against him contained
in the complaint. Yet, we call Judge Javellana’s attention to several
matters pointed out by the OCA, that if left unchecked, may again
result in another administrative complaint against the judge: (1)
notices of hearing issued by Judge Javellana’s court must state the
specific time, date, and place51 ; (2) in case Judge Javellana is unable
to attend a hearing for any reason, he must inform his Clerk of
Court as soon as possible so that the latter can already cancel the
hearing and spare the parties, counsels, and witnesses from
waiting52 ; and (3) he must take care in ascertaining the facts and
according due process to the parties concerned before levying
charges of incompetence or indifference against the PAO lawyers
appearing before his court.53
III
Penalty
Gross ignorance of the law54 and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct55 are classified as serious
charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and penalized under Rule 140, Section 11(a) of the same Rules by:
1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3) A fine of more than ₱ 20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱ 40,000.00
The OCA recommended that Judge Javellana be suspended without
salary and benefits for three months.1ªvvph!1 Given the gravity
and number of violations committed by Judge Javellana, we deem
it appropriate to impose suspension without salary and benefits for
a period of three months and one day.
G.R. No.148420 December 15, 2005
ANDREA TAN, CLARITA LLAMAS, VICTOR ESPINA and LUISA
ESPINA, Petitioners,
vs.
BAUSCH & LOMB, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review1 are the decision2 and
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals which set aside the December
22, 1998 order4 of Judge Genis Balbuena of Branch 21, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City and ordered the transfer of Criminal
Case No. CBU-45890 to Branch 9, RTC, Cebu City.
The antecedents follow.
On April 8, 1997, an information5 for violation of paragraph 1,
Article 189 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed before
Branch 21, RTC, Cebu City against petitioners Andrea Tan, Clarita
Llamas, Victor Espina and Luisa Espina of Best Buy Mart, Inc. The
information read:
That on or about June 27, 1996 and sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, abovementioned accused, conspiring and
mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously distribute and sell counterfeit RAY BAN sunglasses
bearing the appearance and trademark of RAY BAN in the aforesaid
store wherein they have direct control, supervision and
management thereby inducing the public to believe that these
goods offered by them are those of RAY BAN to the damage and
prejudice of BAUSCH AND LOMB, INC., the exclusive owner and
user of trademark RAY BAN on sunglasses.7
On January 21, 1998, respondent filed a motion to transfer the case
to Branch 9, RTC, Cebu City. Administrative Order No. 113-958 (A.O.
No. 113-95) designated the said branch as the special court in
Region VII to handle violations of intellectual property rights.
On March 2, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to quash9 the
information on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged against them. The penalty10 provided by the RPC
for the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC).
On March 6, 1998, respondent filed an opposition to the motion to
quash,11 explaining that BP 129 had already transferred the
exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide violations of intellectual
property rights from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC and that the
Supreme Court had also issued Administrative Order No. 104-96
(A.O. No. 104-96)12deleting and withdrawing the designation of
several branches of the MTC and MTCC as special intellectual
property courts.
On December 22, 1998, the court a quo denied respondent’s
motion to transfer the case and granted petitioners’ motion to
quash. It ruled:
Accused [wa]s charged for violation of Art. 189 of Revised Penal
Code the penalty for which is prision correccionalin its minimum
period or a fine ranging from ₱500.00 to ₱2,000.00, or both. Hence,
within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan and municipal trial
courts (Sec. 32(2), B.P. Blg. 129, as amended).
Administrative Orders Nos. 113-95 and 104-96, cited by plaintiff,
cannot prevail over the express provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended, jurisdiction of courts being a matter of
substantive law.
If this Court has no jurisdiction over the case, the same is true with
Branch 9 of the same court, Therefore, the motion to transfer the
case to the latter should fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to transfer
is denied, while the motion to quash is granted. The case is
thus dismissed.
SO ORDERED.13
Respondent received the order on January 21, 1999 but filed
neither an appeal nor a motion for reconsideration. Rather, it filed
a petition for certiorari14 in the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999
or one (1) day beyond the period allowed in Section 4, Rule 6515 of
the Rules of Court.
Respondent’s procedural lapses notwithstanding, the appellate
court gave due course to the petition and set aside the trial court
order:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED.
The assailed Order of December 22, 1998 is VACATED and another
is entered ordering the transfer of Crim. Case No. CBU-45890 to
Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, and directing the
public respondent to accordingly transmit the records thereof.
SO ORDERED.16
Hence, the present petition for review, centered on the following
issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING
THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT THAT IS FRAUGHT WITH FATAL
INFIRMITIES.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
CORRECT RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION UNDER ARTICLE 189 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.17
There is no merit in the petition.
As to the first assigned error, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari
because respondent failed to appeal or file a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order granting the motion to
quash. Worse, respondent filed the petition in the appellate court
one day after the reglementary period expired.
Needless to state, the acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well
as the grant of due course thereto is, in
general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.18
Besides, the provisions of the Rules of Court, which are technical
rules, may be relaxed in certain exceptional situations.19 Where a
rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute
for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
it is within our power to suspend the rules or exempt a particular
case from its operation.20
Under certain special circumstances,21 a petition for certiorari may
be given due course notwithstanding that no motion for
reconsideration was filed in the lower court. The exception applies
in this case since the order of the trial court was, as will be
discussed later, a patent nullity.
Likewise, the one-day delay in the filing of the petition may be
excused on the basis of equity to afford respondent the chance to
prove the merits of the complaint.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,22 we held:
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance may be relaxed. In
other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result
in absurdity and manifest injustice or where the merit of a party’s
cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance
with certain formal requirements, procedural rules should
definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property
on mere technicalities.
Hence, the only relevant issue left for our resolution is whether or
not the jurisdiction over the crime allegedly committed by
petitioners is vested on the RTC.
Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution empowers the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. The limitations to this rule-making power
are the following: the rules must (a) provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases; (b) be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and (c) not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.23 As long as these limits are
met, the argument used by petitioners that the Supreme Court,
through A.O. Nos. 113-95 and 104-96, transgressed on Congress’
sole power to legislate, cannot be sustained.
A.O. No. 113-95 designated special intellectual property courts to
promote the efficient administration of justice and to ensure the
speedy disposition of intellectual property cases.
A.O. No. 104-96,24 on the other hand, was issued pursuant to
Section 23 of BP 12925 which transferred the jurisdiction over such
crimes from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC and which furthermore
gave the Supreme Court the authority to designate certain
branches of the RTC to exclusively handle special cases in the
interest of the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Accordingly, the RTC was vested with the exclusive and original
jurisdiction to try and decide intellectual property cases.
The transfer of jurisdiction from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC did
not in any way affect the substantive rights of petitioners. The
administrative orders did not change the definition or scope of the
crime of unfair competition with which petitioners were charged.
Both administrative orders therefore have the force and effect of
law, having been validly issued by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its constitutional rule-making power. The trial court,
being a subordinate court, should have followed the mandate of
the later A.O. 104-96 which vested jurisdiction over the instant case
on the RTC. Thus, the appellate court correctly found that the court
a quo committed grave abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, the order of the trial court was a patent nullity. In
resolving the pending incidents of the motion to transfer and
motion to quash, the trial court should not have allowed
petitioners to collaterally attack the validity of A.O. Nos. 113-95 and
104-96. We have ruled time and again that the constitutionality or
validity of laws, orders, or such other rules with the force of law
cannot be attacked collaterally. There is a legal presumption of
validity of these laws and rules. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a
direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands.26The
trial court’s order was consequently null and void.
The transfer of this case to Branch 9, RTC, Cebu City, however, is no
longer possible. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC27consolidated the
intellectual property courts and commercial SEC courts in one RTC
branch in a particular locality to streamline the court structure and
to promote expediency. The RTC branch so designated will try and
decide cases involving violations of intellectual property rights, and
cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is now called a special commercial court. In Region
VII, the designated special commercial court is Branch 11, RTC,
Cebu City. The transfer of this case to that court is therefore
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals decision dated October 20,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Criminal
Case No. CBU-45890 shall be transferred to Branch 11, RTC, Cebu
City. Let the records of the case be transmitted thereto and the
case tried and decided with dispatch.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 160054-55 July 21, 2004
MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003
Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which
denied petitioner’s – (1) motion to quash the information; and (2)
motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order denying his
motion to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also questioned its
August 5, 2003 Order2 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two
informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in
relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic
Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the dates and places of
commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the
registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said
informations read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng
Corporation located at Robinson’s Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas
Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR
products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories
and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable
imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using
trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion,
mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the
damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter,
user and owner of the following internationally: "CATERPILLAR",
"CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN", "CAT AND DESIGN", "WALKING
MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN."
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment
and other proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged
prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair
competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the
pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable
cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order
dated August 9, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend
arraignment and other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the
informations and motion for reconsideration of the order denying
motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the offense charged. He contended that since under
Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty4 of imprisonment for
unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional
Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied
petitioner’s twin motions.6 A motion for reconsideration thereof
was likewise denied on August 5, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are – (1) Which court has
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual
property rights? (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his
discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the ground
of – (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency
of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding
of probable cause for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January
1, 1998, the criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description
or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine
ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. – Independent of the civil and administrative
sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from
two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00),
shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing
any of the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section
168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of
Origin and False Description or Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions
(including criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167,
168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with
appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus –
SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. – All actions under Sections 150,
155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall be brought before the proper courts
with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. (Emphasis
supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27
of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark Law) which provides that
jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair
competition, false designation of origin and false description or
representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) –
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. – All actions under
this Chapter [V – Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair
Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and False
Description or Representation], hereof shall be brought before the
Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was
expressly repealed by R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of R.A.
No. 8293, reads –
SEC. 239. Repeals. – 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent
herewith, more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as
amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and
189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49,
including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby
repealed. (Emphasis added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No.
166 in its entirety, otherwise, it would not have used the phrases
"parts of Acts" and "inconsistent herewith;" and it would have
simply stated "Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No.
166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal
Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No.
285, as amended are hereby repealed." It would have removed all
doubts that said specific laws had been rendered without force and
effect. The use of the phrases "parts of Acts"and "inconsistent
herewith" only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions
which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A.
No. 8293.6 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and
in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293
intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property
rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly
stated so under Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case
of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must
prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial
Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal
Trial Courts.7
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special
laws8 conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property
rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail
over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.9 Hence, jurisdiction over
the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged
with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is
imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine
ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases
involving violations of intellectual property rights under R.A. No.
8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19,
2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual
Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a
Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual
Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in
specific Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial
Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,10 invoked by petitioner
finds no application in the present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we
state that Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by R.A. No. 8293.
Neither did we make a categorical ruling therein that jurisdiction
over cases for violation of intellectual property rights is lodged with
the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark in Mirpuri on the
repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder
to the enactment of the present Intellectual Property Code and
cannot thus be construed as a jurisdictional pronouncement in
cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim
that there was a prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for
the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained the denial
of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons,
however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in his
petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent
portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other.11 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting
unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is
fraud.12 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446,
which as admitted13 by private respondent also relate to unfair
competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides –
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper
party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases –
xxxxxxxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is
pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the
President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent
Judge abused his discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His
pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not show the
date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice.14 Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his
motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus failed
to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a
suspension of his arraignment and that the questioned orders are
contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who
alleges must prove his allegations.
In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that
petitioner has not established that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion. So also, his failure to attach documents
relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal of the petition,
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance
with requirements. — The petition shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise
statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the
case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof
of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy
intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.
xxxxxxxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in her capacity as Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M.
LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G.
ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II,
ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL C. MENESES, ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR
TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON,
ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY
NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO
G CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G
LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of
suspected members of the Kuratong Bale/eng Gang, is once again
before this Court this time questioning, among other things, the
trial qmrt's determination of the absence of probable cause and its
dismissal of the criminal actions.1
The Facts and the Case
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the
Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then
headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic
Management Command ([TMC] led by then Police Senior
Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal Investigation
Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo M.
Acop ), and National Capital Region Command (headed by then
Police Chief Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang2 along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City.
Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal
Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary
execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who were
slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs absolved all the police officers involved, including
respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop,
Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II,
and 28 others (collectively, the respondents).3 On review, however,
the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed
charges of murder against the police officers involved before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the
cases of respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities were
downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson pleaded
not guilty.
Upon respondents’ motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
transfer of their cases to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank
of Chief Superintendent or higher. Pending the resolution of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration of the
transfer order, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) 8249 that
expanded the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" to apply to all
pending cases where trial had not begun. As a result of this new
law, the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong
Baleleng murder cases.
Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in
G.R. 1280964 but this Court upheld its validity. Nonetheless, the
Court ordered the transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of
Quezon City since the amended informations contained no
allegations that respondents committed the offenses charged in
relation to, or in the discharge of, their official functions as required
by R.A. 8249.
Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by
Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., could arraign respondents in the re-
docketed Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2 Delos
Reyes and the other prosecution witnesses recanted their
affidavits. Some of the victims’ heirs also executed affidavits of
desistance. These prompted the respondents to file separate
motions for the determination of probable cause before the
issuance of warrants of arrests.
On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional
dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused
for trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution
witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.
Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R.
Mendoza sought to revive the cases against respondents by
requesting the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another
preliminary investigation in their cases on the strength of the
affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos. In
response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez constituted a
panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested investigation.
Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson
and his co-accused filed a petition for prohibition with application
for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Manila in Civil Case 01-100933. In an Order dated
June 5, 2001, that court denied the plea for temporary restraining
order. Thus, on June 6, 2001 the panel of prosecutors found
probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-accused liable as
principals for 11 counts of murder, resulting in the filing of separate
informations against them in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, now presided over by
respondent Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC of Manila’s
order which allowed the renewed preliminary investigation of the
murder charges against him and his co-accused. Lacson also filed
with the RTC of Quezon City a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause. But on June 13, 2001 he sought the suspension of
the proceedings in that court.
In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the RTC of Quezon City from issuing warrants of arrest or
conducting any proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12
before it. On August 24, 2001 the CA rendered a Decision, granting
Lacson’s petition on the ground of double jeopardy since, although
the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89 was provisional,
such dismissal became permanent two years after when they were
not revived.
Upon the prosecution’s appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453,5 the
Court ruled that, based on the record, Lacson failed to prove
compliance with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 governing
provisional dismissals. The records showed that the prosecution
did not file a motion for provisional dismissal and, for his part,
respondent Lacson had merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause. Nowhere did he agree to some
proposal for a provisional dismissal of the cases. Furthermore, the
heirs of the victims had no notice of any motion for such provisional
dismissal.
The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and
directed the RTC of Quezon City to try the cases with dispatch. On
motion for reconsideration by respondent Lacson, the Court
ordered the re-raffle of the criminal cases to a heinous crimes
court. Upon re-raffle, however, the cases still went to Branch 81,
which as already stated was now presided over by Judge Yadao.
On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted
birth certificates showing that they were minors. Apparently
reacting to this, the prosecution amended the informations to
show such minority and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma.
Natividad M. Dizon to recall the assignment of the cases to Branch
81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for recall was
denied.
On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion
before Branch 81, praying for the re-raffle of Criminal Cases 01-
101102 to12 to the family courts in view of the changes in the two
informations. On October 24, 2003 the prosecution also filed its
consolidated comment ex-abundanti cautela on the motions to
determine probable cause.
On November 12, 20036 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the
prosecution’s motion for re-raffle to a family court on the ground
that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. She also
granted the motions for determination of probable cause and
dismissed the cases against the respondents since the affidavits of
the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with those they
submitted in the preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman
for the crime of robbery.
On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion to
recuse or disqualify Judge Yadao and for reconsideration of her
order. It also filed an administrative complaint against her for
dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service,
manifest partiality, and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment.7 On January 14, 2004, the prosecution filed an urgent
supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification with motion
for cancellation of the hearing on motion for reconsideration.
On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the
motion to recuse her, prompting the prosecution to appeal from
that order. Further, on January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao issued
another order, denying the prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003 that
dismissed the action against the respondents. In response, the
prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the same. Finally, on
January 26, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the
prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of its January 16, 2004
Order not only for lack of merit but also for having become moot
and academic.
On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti
cautela the notices of appeal that it filed in the cases. Subsequently,
on March 3, 2004 it filed the present special civil action of
certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The prosecution presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her
discretion in allowing Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-
raffled to other than among the RTC of Quezon City’s family courts.
2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she took cognizance of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to
the prosecution’s view that such cases fell under the jurisdiction of
family courts.
3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she did not inhibit and disqualify herself from taking cognizance of
the cases.
4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable
cause and barred the presentation of additional evidence in
support of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.
5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when
she adopted certain policies concerning the conduct of hearings in
her court.
The Court’s Rulings
Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents’
contention that the prosecution’s resort to special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Since the trial court dismissed
the criminal actions against respondents, the prosecution’s remedy
was to appeal to the CA from that order of dismissal.
Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action
is an appeal.8 Here, the prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal
from such an order issued in the subject cases. But it reconsidered
its action and withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not
an effective, speedy, and adequate remedy.9 In other words, the
prosecution’s move was not a case of forgotten remedy but a
conscious resort to another based on a belief that respondent
Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various
orders and that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-
encompassing remedy for the prosecution. The Court is not
prepared to say that the remedy is altogether implausible as to
throw out the petition outright.
Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed
its action directly with this Court, ignoring the principle of judicial
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the
RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such
concurrence does not give the People the unrestricted freedom of
choice of forum.10 In any case, the immense public interest in these
cases, the considerable length of time that has passed since the
crime took place, and the numerous times these cases have come
before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such procedural
lapse.
1. Raffle of the Cases
The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive
Judge gravely abused her discretion when she placed Criminal
Cases 01-101102 to 12 under a separate category which did not
restrict their raffle to the city’s special criminal and family courts in
accordance with SC Administrative Order 36-96. Further, the
prosecution points out that she violated Administrative Order 19-
98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out of the raffle. The
presiding judges of these two branches, both heinous crimes courts
eligible to receive cases by raffle, had just been appointed to the
CA.
The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of
the raffle of the subject cases. The raffle maintained a separate list
for criminal and civil cases. Criminal cases cognizable by special
criminal courts were separately listed. Criminal Cases 01-101102 to
12 were given a separate heading, "Re-Raffle," but there was
nothing irregular in this since it merely indicated that the cases
were not being raffled for the first time.
The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102
from raffle since these branches remained without regularly
appointed judges. Although the pairing judges of these branches
had authority to act on incidental, interlocutory, and urgent
matters, this did not mean that such branches should already be
included in the raffle of cases.
Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raffle
yet it did not then object to the manner by which it was conducted.
The prosecution raised the question only when it filed this petition,
a clear afterthought.
2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts
The prosecution points out that, although this Court’s October 7,
2003 Resolution directed a re-raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes
court, the prosecution in the meantime amended the informations
to reflect the fact that two of the murder victims were minors. For
this reason, the Executive Judge should have raffled the cases to a
family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 8369.
The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A.
8369, that vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A.
7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a
minor. Thus:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below
eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age,
or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found
guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil
liability which the respondent may have incurred. (Emphasis
supplied)
Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks
to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason, when
the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able
to relax the rule. In several cases,11 for instance, the Court has held
that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in
hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.
Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted
the murder cases moved to a family court, are dead. As
respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder
cases that require the special attention and protection of a family
court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in those cases during
trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents who
had become the real private offended parties.
3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse
of discretion in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the cases
against the respondents.
The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first,
in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
states:
Rule 3.12. – A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases
include among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
xxxx
(e) the judge knows the judge’s spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or
any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall
indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3
provide for the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary
inhibition.
The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since he
is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would
unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases. The
mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment is not enough
ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome
the presumption that the judge will perform his duties according to
law without fear or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge
based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the
judge’s rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.12
Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have
inhibited herself for improperly submitting to a public interview on
the day following her dismissal of the criminal cases against the
respondents. But the Court finds nothing basically reprehensible in
such interview. Judge Yadao’s dismissal of the multiple murder
cases aroused natural public interest and stirred the media into
frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply accommodated,
not sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the basis of
her order. There is no allegation that she gave out false
information. To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of
making public disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior
to her order dismissing such cases.
The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao’s
statement that a very close relative stood to be promoted if she
was to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondents. But this
statement merely shows that she cannot be dissuaded by some
relative who is close to her. How can this constitute bias? Besides,
there is no evidence that the close relative she referred to was her
spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for
disqualification.
Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its
motion for reconsideration when she said in her comment to the
administrative complaint against her that such motion was merely
the prosecution’s stubborn insistence on the existence of probable
cause against the respondents. The comment could of course not
be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely
already issued an order holding that the complainant’s evidence
failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. And
there is nothing wrong about characterizing a motion for
reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who
filed it. Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as wholly
unjustified at the time she filed her comment.
4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her
discretion when she set the motions for determination of probable
cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and
allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The
prosecution stresses that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court Judge Yadao’s duty was to determine probable cause for the
purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis of the
investigating prosecutor’s resolution as well as the informations
and their supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to
the existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the
investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to support
the finding of probable cause within five days from notice.
Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao
dug up and adopted the Ombudsman’s findings when the latter
conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in
1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that
earlier preliminary investigation when such documents are proper
for presentation during the trial of the cases. The prosecution
added that the affidavits of P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos and SPO1
Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the prior inconsistent
affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman.
The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when
determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests,
to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.13
But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried
to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that
they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the
purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits,
to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and
related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and
were part of the records. Besides, she received no new evidence
from the respondents.14
The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and
documents along with the criminal informations to enable Judge
Yadao to determine the presence of probable cause against the
respondents:
1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu’s affidavit of March 24, 200115 in which he
said that on May 17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR Command
Head, ordered him to form two teams that would go after
suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the
Superville Subdivision in Parañaque City. Yu headed the assault
team while Marlon Sapla headed the perimeter defense. After the
police team apprehended eight men inside the safe house, it
turned them over to their investigating unit. The following day, Yu
just learned that the men and three others were killed in a shoot-
out with the police in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos’ affidavit of March 24, 200116 in which
he said that he was part of the perimeter defense during the
Superville operation. After the assault team apprehended eight
male suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two vans. Ramos
then went to the office of respondent Zubia, TMC Head, where he
saw respondents Lacson, Acop, Laureles, Villacorte and other
police officers.
According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be
brought to Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-
out and that this action had been cleared with higher authorities,
to which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of approval. Before
Ramos left the meeting, Lacson supposedly told him, "baka may
mabuhay pa diyan." Ramos then boarded an L-300 van with his
men and four male suspects. In the early morning of May 18, 1995,
they executed the plan and gunned down the suspects. A few
minutes later, P/S Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men arrived and
claimed responsibility for the incident.
3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes’ affidavit of April 24, 200117 in which he
corroborated Ramos’ statements. Medes said that he belonged to
the same team that arrested the eight male suspects. He drove the
L-300 van in going to Commonwealth Avenue where the suspects
were killed.
4. Mario C. Enad’s affidavit of August 8, 199518 in which he claimed
having served as TMC civilian agent. At around noon of May 17,
1995, he went to Superville Subdivision together with respondents
Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the car
and observe what went on in the house under surveillance. Later
that night, other police officers arrived and apprehended the men
in the house. Enad went in and saw six men lying on the floor while
the others were handcuffed. Enad and his companions left Sucat in
the early morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but
was awaken by gunshots. He saw Dumlao and other police officers
fire their guns at the L-300 van containing the apprehended
suspects.
5. SPO2 Noel P. Seno’s affidavit of May 31, 200119 in which he
corroborated what Ramos said. Seno claimed that he was part of
the advance party in Superville Subdivision and was also in
Commonwealth Avenue when the suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed.
6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31,
199520 which narrated the events that took place on May 17 and
18, 1995. This report was submitted by Lacson, Zubia, Acop and
Canson.
7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports21 which stated that the suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates.
The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and
reports, taken together with the other documents of record, fail to
establish probable cause against the respondents.
First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the
testimony of Ramos, corroborated by those of Medes, Enad, and
Seno, who supposedly heard the commanders of the various units
plan the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members
somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City and actually
execute such plan. Yu’s testimony is limited to the capture of the
gang members and goes no further. He did not see them killed.
Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and
Seno, the prosecution’s own evidence—the PNP ABRITG’s After
Operations Report of May 31, 1995—shows that these men took
no part in the operations against the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
members. The report included a comprehensive list of police
personnel from Task Force Habagat (Lacson), Traffic Management
Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command (Acop), and
National Capital Region Command (Canson) who were involved.
The names of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that list.
Notably, only Yu’s name, among the new set of witnesses, was on
that list. Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for
commendations and promotions, any omitted name would hardly
have gone unchallenged.
Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant
evidence against the respondents, submitted in the course of the
preliminary investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted in a related robbery charge against the police officers
involved a counter-affidavit. He claimed in that counter-affidavit
that he was neither in Superville Subdivision nor Commonwealth
Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng operations since he was in
Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on May 18.22 Notably,
Medes claimed in a joint counter-affidavit that he was on duty at
the TMC headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.23
Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture
and giving credence to Ramos and Medes’ statements, dismissed
the robbery case. More, it excluded Ramos from the group of
officers that it charged with the murder of the suspected members
of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. Under the circumstances, the Court
cannot be less skeptical than Judge Yadao was in doubting the
sudden reversal after six years of testimony of these witnesses.
Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as
he narrated, his role was limited to cornering and arresting the
suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at their safe house in
Superville Subdivision. After his team turned the suspects over to
an investigating unit, he no longer knew what happened to them.
Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang members tested negative for gunpowder
nitrates. But this finding cannot have any legal significance for the
purpose of the preliminary investigation of the murder cases
against the respondents absent sufficient proof that they probably
took part in gunning those gang members down.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal
action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of
prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial
Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint of information.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three
options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable
cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and
(3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause.24
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above
is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here:
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
against the respondents.
It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that
the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five days from notice. But that is not the case here.
Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno,
nothing is left in the record that presents some doubtful probability
that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP Director
Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years
after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the
belief that the police could produce new witnesses in the five days
required of the prosecution by the rules.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the
crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.25
5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only
one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all the
offended parties but allowed each of the counsels representing the
individual respondents to be heard during the proceedings before
it. She also unjustifiably prohibited the prosecution’s use of tape
recorders.
But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court
ample inherent and administrative powers to effectively control
the conduct of its proceedings. Thus:
Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. — Every court shall have power:
xxxx
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or
persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its
authority;
xxxx
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining
thereto;
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;
xxxx
There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing
only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address
the court during the hearing for determination of probable cause
but permitting counsels representing the individual accused to do
so. A criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor.26 The burden of establishing probable
cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon the private
prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients’ damages
claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a
common position on the issue of probable cause. On the other
hand, each of the accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are
personal to him.
As for the prohibition against the prosecution’s private recording
of the proceedings, courts usually disallows such recordings
because they create an unnecessary distraction and if allowed,
could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or reporter having some
interest in the proceeding to insist on being given the same
privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official
recording of the proceedings by the court’s stenographer has been
insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge
Yadao’s policy against such extraneous recordings.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the
following assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12:
1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for
re-raffle, granted the motions for determination of probable cause,
and dismissed the criminal cases;
2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of
the respondents for the immediate resolution of the three pending
incidents before the court;
3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to
recuse and the urgent supplemental motion for compulsory
disqualification;
4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003; and
5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the January 16, 2004 Order.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated
June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein
respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this
Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by
the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a
certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of
R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was
then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile)
in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile,
he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of
the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was
charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his
office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which
Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession
Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law),
specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the
assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the
event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and
(c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which
terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within
which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the
accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his
alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in
this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that
the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a
motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution
also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the
Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts
adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile,
the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any
official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent
portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated
April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused
in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public
official was already deceased long before this case was filed in
court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the
Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this
case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I should have been charged.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING
THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING
THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT
GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY
POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private
persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be
indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy
of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or
which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case
involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition
is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public
officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior
to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary
Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the Information
and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no
longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for
violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or
that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability.
His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis
of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such
private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a
public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person
must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer.
If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an
indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a
conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement
is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are
jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said,
written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or
furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said,
done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference
whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time
of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not
prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this
Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person
cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or
intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one
person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal
or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge
for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the
Information filed against respondent, which is deemed
hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also
incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy
of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public
officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer
would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with
such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v.
Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles governing
conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is
instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law
specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and
sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not
an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a
crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as
long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance
of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not
outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a
felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a
conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the
liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto
opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere
act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically
prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital
importance, when considered together with the other evidence of
record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime
and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission
of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two
or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to
the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that
no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more
persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible
for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement
or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held
that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each
(conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x.
The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and
intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the
act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired
and confederated in the commission of the felony proved,
collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of
the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could
be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be
proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the
conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation
to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense,
but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that
once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in
furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This
rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring
nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in
consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their
evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal
enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be
found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the
absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves
evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against
respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during
trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove
its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in
his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was
likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late
Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by
allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which
is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present
case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the
SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash
the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over
the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB
Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute
resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition
finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution
became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now
argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be
applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that
prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted
bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with
petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail
and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction
over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused
in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent
court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid
the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must
raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the
very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint
or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives
the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily
appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do
so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must
be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said
jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the
defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over
the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called
for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may
not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special
appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person
prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation.
In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the
prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the
instant case involves a contract entered into by public officers
representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special
criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public
officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the
instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally,
under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have
been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan.
However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be
done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not
follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule
otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case
would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on
other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters
which are mere incidents in the main case and the main case has
already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the
case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution
of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's
right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion
to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan
is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130872 March 25, 1999
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, father and son, were
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of thirteen (13) counts of estafa
through falsification of public documents. 1 They now seek a review
of their conviction as they insist on their innocence.
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa
Cruz, Marinduque, while his son, his co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz,
was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of
Barangay Bagong Silang, Municipality of Santa Cruz, and
concurrently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing
the Federation of Kabataang Barangays.
In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red 2 won as
KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Parenthetically,
Lenlie Lecaroz, did not run as candidate in this electoral exercise as
he was no longer qualified for the position after having already
passed the age limit fixed by law.
Sometime in November 1985 Red was appointed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa
Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. Imee Marcos-
Manotoc, then the National Chairperson of the organization, sent
a telegram to Red confirming his appointment and advising him
further that copies of his appointment papers would be sent to him
in due time through the KB Regional Office. 3Red received the
telegram on 2 January 1986 and showed it immediately to Mayor
Francisco M. Lecaroz.
On 7 January 1986, armed with the telegram and intent on
assuming the position of sectoral representative of the KBs to the
SB, Red attended the meeting of the Sanggunian upon the
invitation of one of its members, Kagawad Rogato Lumawig. In that
meeting, Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz informed Red that he could
not yet sit as member of the municipal council until his
appointment had been cleared by the Governor of Marinduque.
Nonetheless, the telegram was included in the agenda as one of the
subjects discussed in the meeting.
Red finally received his appointment papers sometime in January
1986. 4 But it was only on 23 April 1986, when then President
Corazon C. Aquino was already in power, 5 that he forwarded these
documents to Mayor Lecaroz. This notwithstanding, Red was still
not allowed by the mayor to sit as sectoral representative in the
Sanggunian.
Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different
dates the payment to Lenlie Lecaroz of twenty-six (26) sets of
payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas covering the period 16
January 1986 to 30 January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll
for 1-15 January 1986 and then authorized someone else to sign all
the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim the
corresponding salaries in his behalf.
On 25 October 1989, or three (3) years and nine (9) months from
the date he received his appointment papers from President
Marcos, Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino
Administration a confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral
Representative to the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz.
Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several
criminal complaints against Mayor Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie
Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him
assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After
preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through
falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1)
Information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor Lecaroz alone.
On 7 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding
the two (2) accused guilty on all counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents and sentenced each of them to —
a) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a
minimum of FIVE (5) YEARS, ELEVEN (11) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional to a maximum of TEN (10) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor FOR EACH OF THE ABOVE CASES;
b) a fine in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) FOR
EACH OF THE ABOVE CASES or a total of SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P65,000); and
c) perpetual special disqualification from public office in
accordance with Art. 214 of the Revised Penal Code.
. . . (and) to pay jointly and severally the amount of TWENTY-THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS (P23,675), the
amount unlawfully obtained, to the Municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque in restitution.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since Red was elected president of
the KB and took his oath of office sometime in 1985 before then
Assemblywoman Carmencita O. Reyes his assumption of the KB
presidency upon the expiration of the term of accused Lenlie
Lecaroz was valid. Conversely, the accused Lenlie Lecaroz ceased to
be a member of the KB on the last Sunday of November 1985 and,
as such, was no longer the legitimate representative of the youth
sector in the municipal council of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque.
In convicting both accused on the falsification charges, the
Sandiganbayan elucidated —
. . . . when, therefore, accused MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ
entered the name of his son, the accused LENLIE LECAROZ, in the
payroll of the municipality of Sta. Cruz for the payroll period
starting January 15, 1986, reinstating accused LENLIE LECAROZ to
his position in the Sangguniang Bayan, he was deliberately stating
a falsity when he certified that LENLIE LECAROZ was a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan. The fact is that even accused LENLIE
LECAROZ himself no longer attended the sessions of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz, and starting with the payroll for
January 16 to 31, 1986, did not personally pick up his salaries
anymore.
The accused MAYOR's acts would fall under Art. 171, par. 4, of The
Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary public who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts: . . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, falsification of public documents has been committed by
accused MAYOR LECAROZ.
Likewise from these acts of falsification, his son, accused LENLIE
LECAROZ, was able to draw salaries from the municipality to which
he was not entitled for services he had admittedly not rendered.
This constitutes Estafa . . . . the deceit being the falsification made,
and the prejudice being that caused to the municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque for having paid salaries to LENLIE LECAROZ who was
not entitled thereto.
Conspiracy was alleged in the Informations herein, and the Court
found the allegation sufficiently substantiated by the evidence
presented.
There is no justifiable reason why accused MAYOR LECAROZ should
have reinstated his son LENLIE in the municipal payrolls from
January 16, 1986 to January 31, 1987, yet he did so. He could not
have had any other purpose than to enable his son LENLIE to draw
salaries thereby. This conclusion inescapable considering that the
very purpose of a payroll is precisely that — to authorize the
payment of salaries. And LENLIE LECAROZ did his part by actually
drawing the salaries during the periods covered, albeit through
another person whom he had authorized.
By the facts proven, there was conspiricy in the commission of
Estafa between father and son.
However, with respect to the charge of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of
RA No. 3019, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Francisco
Lecaroz. It found that Red was neither authorized to sit as member
of the SB because he was not properly appointed thereto nor had
he shown to the mayor sufficient basis for his alleged right to a seat
in the municipal council. On this basis, the court a quo concluded
that Mayor Lecaroz was legally justified in not allowing Red to
assume the position of Kagawad.
On 1 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
reconsideration of its decision filed by the accused. This prompted
herein petitioners to elevate their cause to us charging that the
Sandiganbayan erred:
First, in holding that Red had validly and effectively assumed the
office of KB Federation President by virtue of his oath taken before
then Assembly woman Carmencita Reyes on 27 September 1985,
and in concluding that the tenure of accused Lenlie Lecaroz as
president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB
representative to the SB had accordingly expired;
Second, assuming arguendo that the term of office of the accused
Lenlie Lecaroz as youth representative to the SB had expired, in
holding that accused Lenlie Lecaroz could no longer occupy the
office, even in a holdover capacity, despite the vacancy therein;
Third, granting arguendo that the tenure of the accused Lenlie
Lecaroz as federation president had expired, in holding that by
reason thereof accused Lenlie Lecaroz became legally disqualified
from continuing in office as KB Sectoral Representative to the SB
even in a holdover capacity;
Fourth, in not holding that under Sec. 2 of the Freedom
Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of the pertinent
Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative
circulars, accused Lenlie Lecaroz was legally entitled and even
mandated to continue in office in a holdover capacity;
Fifth, in holding that the accused had committed the crime of
falsification within the contemplation of Art. 171 of The Revised
Penal Code, and in not holding that the crime of estafa of which
they, had been convicted required criminal intent and malice as
essential elements;
Sixth, assuming arguendo that the accused Lenlie Lecaroz was not
legally entitled to hold over, still the trial court erred in not holding
— considering the difficult legal questions involved — that the
accused acted in good faith and committed merely an error of
judgment, without malice and criminal intent; and,
Seventh, in convicting the accused for crimes committed in a
manner different from that alleged in the Information under which
the accused were arraigned and tried.
The petition is meritorious. The basic propositions upon which the
Sandiganbayan premised its conviction of the accused are: (a)
although Jowil Red was duly elected KB Chairman he could not
validly assume a seat in the Sanggunian as KB sectoral
representative for failure to show a valid appointment; and, (b)
Lenlie Lecaroz who was the incumbent KB representative could not
hold over after his term expired because pertinent laws do not
provide for holdover.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the
terms of office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and
of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1
of the KB Constitution respectively provide —
Sec. 7. Term of office. — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local
elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term
of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of
March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the
association of barangay councils and the president of the federation
of kabataan barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous
with their tenure as president fo their respective association and
federation.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall
continue to hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or
such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and
assumed office in accordance with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral
representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated
copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of
office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to
continue as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since
his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected
this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1
quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying
that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there
can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover
when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. 6 It is
usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a
fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until
their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this
provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the
expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified
to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his
successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the
term fixed by law. 7
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a
Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the
expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does,
not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an
express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is
appointed or chosen and has qualified. 8 The legislative intent of
not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied
in the legislative enactment, 9 otherwise it is reasonable to assume
that the law-making body favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, 10 and courts
generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative
intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an
executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time,
wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise
its functions. 11This is founded on obvious considerations of public
policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to
prevent public convenience from suffering because of a
vacancy 12 and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government
functions. 13
The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office
before Assembly woman Reyes in 1985 Red validly assumed the
presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie
Lecaroz. It should be noted however that under the provisions of
the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI
thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not
authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA
No. 673314 on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a
newspaper of general circulation that, members of both Houses of
Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority
to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of
office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang
Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid
and amounted to no oath at all.
To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public
office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. 15 Only
when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that
his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete.
Until then, he has none at all. And for as long as he has not
qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus
clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post,
petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to the
Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect
a de jure officer, 16 or at least a de facto officer 17 entitled to receive
the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the position.
As such, he could not be considered an intruder and liable for
encroachment of public office. 18
On the issue of criminal liability of petitioners, clearly the offenses
of which petitioners were convicted, i.e., estafa through
falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4, of The
Revised Penal Code, are intentional felonies for which liability
attaches only when it is shown that the malefactors acted with
criminal intent or malice. 19 If what is proven is mere judgmental
error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or
criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him. Was criminal
intent then demonstrated to justify petitioners' conviction? It does
not so appear in the case at bar.
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to
exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime
when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or
mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer
from felonious responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in
the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is
equivalent to a criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of
malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and
imprudence. 20 In the instant case, there are clear manifestations
of good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of petitioners.
First. When Jowil Red showed up at the meeting of the Sanggunian
on 7 January 1986, what he presented to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz
was a mere telegram purportedly sent by Imee Marcos-Manotoc
informing him of his supposed appointment to the SB, together
with a photocopy of a "Mass Appointment." Without authenticated
copies of the appointment papers, Red had no right to assume
office as KB representative to the Sanggunian, and petitioner
Mayor Lecaroz had every right to withhold recognition, as he did,
of Red as a member of the Sanggunian.
Second. It appears from the records that although Red received his
appointment papers signed by President Marcos in January 1986,
he forwarded the same to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz only on 23 April
1986 during which time President Marcos had already been
deposed and President Aquino had already taken over the helm of
government. On 25 March 1986 the Freedom Constitution came
into being providing in Sec. 2 of Art. III thereof that —
Sec. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the
1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise, provided
by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation of their
successors if such appointment is made within a period of one (1)
year from February 26, 1986. (emphasis supplied).
Duty bound to observe the constitutional mandate, petitioner
Francisco Lecaroz through the provincial governor forwarded the
papers of Jowil Red to then Minister of Interior and Local
Government Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., requesting advice on the
validity of the appointment signed by former President Marcos.
The response was the issuance of MILG Provincial Memorandum-
Circular No. 86-02 21 and Memorandum-Circular No. 86-
17 22 stating that —
PROVINCIAL MEMORANDUM-CIRCULAR NO. 86-02
2. That newly elected KB Federation Presidents, without their
respective authenticated appointments from the president,
cannot, in any way, represent their associations in any sangguniang
bayan/sangguniang panlalawigan, as the case may be, although
they are still considered presidents of their federations by virtue of
the July 1985 elections.
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 86-17
It is informed, however, that until replaced by the Office of the
President or by this Ministry the appointive members of the various
Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall continue to hold office and to receive
compensation due them under existing laws, rules and regulations.
The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the
implementing MILG Circulars virtually confirmed the right of
incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and maintain their
positions until duly replaced either by the President herself or by
the Interior Ministry. Explicit therein was the caveat that newly
elected KB Federation Presidents could not assume the right to
represent their respective associations in any Sanggunian unless
their appointments were authenticated by then President Aquino
herself. Truly, prudence impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the
necessary steps to verify the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the
Sanggunian.
Third. Petitioners presented six (6) certified copies of opinions of
the Secretaries of Justice of Presidents Macapagal, Marcos and
Aquino concerning the doctrine of holdover. These consistently
expressed the view espoused by the executive branch for more
than thirty (30) years that the mere fixing of the term of office in a
statute without an express prohibition against holdover is not
indicative of a legislative intent to prohibit it, in light of the legal
principle that just as nature abhors a vacuum so does the law abhor
a vacancy in the government. 23 Reliance by petitioners on these
opinions, as, well as on the pertinent directives of the then Ministry
of Interior and Local Government, provided them with an
unassailable status of good faith in holding over and acting on such
basis; and,
Fourth. It is difficult to accept that a person, particularly one who is
highly regarded and respected in the community, would
deliberately blemish his good name, and worse, involve his own son
in a misconduct for a measly sum of P23,675.00, such as this case
before us. As aptly deduced by Justice Del Rosario. 24
If I were to commit a crime, would I involve my son in it? And if I
were a town mayor, would I ruin my name for the measly sum of
P1,894.00 a month? My natural instinct as a father to protect my
own son and the desire, basic in every man, to preserve one's honor
and reputation would suggest a resounding NO to both questions.
But the prosecution ventured to prove in these thirteen cases that
precisely because they were father and son and despite the
relatively small amount involved, accused Mayor Francisco Lecaroz
conspired with Lenlie Lecaroz to falsify several municipal payrolls
for the purpose of swindling their own town of the amount of
P1,894,00 a month, and the majority has found them guilty. I find
disconhfort with this verdict basically for the reason that there was
no criminal intent on their part to falsify any document or to
swindle the government.
The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of
law may be the basis of good faith. 25 In Cabungcal v. Cordova 26 we
affirmed the doctrine that an erroneous interpretation of the
meaning of the provisions of an ordinance by a city mayor does not
amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to
damages against that official. We reiterated this principle
in Mabutol v. Pascual 27 which held that public officials may not be
liable for damages in the discharge of their official functions absent
any bad faith. Sanders v. Veridiano II 28 expanded the concept by
declaring that under the law on public officers, acts done in the
performance of official duty are protected by the presumption of
good faith.
In ascribing malice and bad faith to petitioner Mayor Lecaroz, the
Sandiganbayan cited two (2) circumstances which purportedly
indicated criminal intent. It pointed out that the name of accused
Lenlie Lecaroz was not in the municipal payroll for the
first quincena of 1986 which meant that his term had finally ended,
and that the reinstatement of Lenlie Lecaroz by Mayor Francisco
Lecaroz in the payroll periods from 15 January 1986 and thereafter
for the next twelve and a half (12-1/2) months was for no other
purpose than to enable him to draw salaries from the
municipality. 29 There is however no evidence, documentary or
otherwise, that Mayor Francisco Lecaroz himself caused the name
of Lenlie Lecaroz to be dropped from the payroll for the
first quincena of January 1986. On the contrary, it is significant that
while Lenlie Lecaroz' name did not appear in the payroll for the
first quincena of January 1986, yet, in the payroll for the
next quincena accused Lenlie Lecaroz was paid for both the first
and second quincenas, and not merely for the second half of the
month which would have been the case if he was actually
"dropped" from the payroll for the first fifteen (15) days and then
"reinstated" in the succeeding payroll period, as held by the court a
quo.
From all indications, it is possible that the omission was due to the
inadequate documentation of Red's appointment to and
assumption of office, or the result of a mere clerical error which
was later rectified in the succeeding payroll. This however cannot
be confirmed by the evidence at hand. But since a doubt is now
created about the import of such omission, the principle of
equipoise should properly apply. This rule demands that all
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not a crime
should be resolved in favor of the accused. If the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 30
Petitioners have been convicted for falsification of public
documents through an untruthful narration of facts under Art. 171,
par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code. For the offense to be established,
the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a
document statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the
facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
The first and third elements of the offense have not been
established in this case. In approving the payment of salaries to
Lenlie Lecaroz, Mayor Francisco Lecaroz signed uniformly-worded
certifications thus —
I hereby certify on my official oath that the above payroll is correct,
and that the services above stated have been duly rendered.
Payment for such services is also hereby approved from the
appropriations indicated.
When Mayor Lecaroz certified to the correctness of the payroll, he
was making not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law
expressing his belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding over as
member of the Sanggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments
attached to the position. This is an opinion undoubtedly involving a
legal matter, and any "misrepresentation" of this kind cannot
constitute the crime of false pretenses. 31 In People v. Yanza 32 we
ruled —
Now then, considering that when defendant certified she was
eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law
which turned out to be inexact or erroneous — not entirely
groundless — we are all of the opinion that she may not be
declared guilty of falsification, specially because the law which she
has allegedly violated (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, in connection
with other provisions), punishes the making of untruthful
statements in a narration of facts — emphasis on facts . . . .
Unfortunately, she made a mistake of judgment; but she could not
be held thereby to have intentionally made a false statement of fact
in violation of Art. 171 above-mentioned.
The third element requiring that the narration of facts be
absolutely false is not even adequately satisfied as the belief of
Mayor Francisco Lecaroz that Lenlie Lecaroz was a holdover
member of the Sanggunian was not entirely bereft of basis,
anchored as it was on the universally accepted doctrine of
holdover. La mera inexactitude no es bastante para integrar este
delito. 33 If the statements are not altogether false, there being
some colorable truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed
not to have been committed.
Finally, contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan, we hold that
conspiracy was not proved in this case. The court a quo used as
indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified
the payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son Lenlie
Lecaroz and that as a consequence thereof the latter collected his
salaries. These are not legally acceptable indicia, for they are the
very same acts alleged in the Information as constituting the crime
of estafa through falsification. They cannot qualify as proof of
complicity or unity of criminal intent. Conspiracy must be
established separately from the crime itself and must meet the
same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may
be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, all taken together however, the
evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of
criminal design. 34
Perhaps subliminally aware of the paucity of evidence to support it,
and if only to buttress its finding of conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan
stressed that the two accused are father and son. Granting that this
is not even ad hominem, we are unaware of any presumption in law
that a conspiracy exists simply because the conspirators are father
and son or related by blood.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of 7
October 1994 and Resolution of 1 October 1997 of the
Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ are ACQUITTED of all
the thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public
documents (Crim. Cases Nos. 13904-13916). The bail bonds posted
for their provisional liberty are cancelled and released. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO
MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-
intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249
— an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against
them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties'
pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed
to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an
organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of
bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG
was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police
District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de
Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by
petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member
of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995
was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators
headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved
from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly
involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said
incident was a legitimate police operation.1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-
six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.
The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for
the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among
those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for
murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,3 the
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration
of the Ombudsman's action.4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March
1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations5before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an
accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
other. One of the accused6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend that
the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the "principal accused" are government
officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has
the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of
at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on
May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman
and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting,9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of
Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution,
and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing
of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
229910 and No. 109411 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as
well as Senate Bill No. 84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought,
among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused"
in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A.
No. 824913 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated
a Resolution14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated
May 8, 1996."
On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to
its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou
concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his
concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic
Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on
February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new
law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting,
as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are
PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M.
Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all
these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been issued — this
court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote
of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these
cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said
law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the
authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the
situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan
by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-
dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident
involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the
exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan
law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was
again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's
cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced,
as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no
longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post
factolegislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused
in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
"innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands
rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby
violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of
statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add
that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have
merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it
the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute
intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong
Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.18 They further
argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their
right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no
longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which
they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme
Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed
separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both
the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties to file
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from
notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether
the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused
therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of
Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the
People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the
invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden,
we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present
case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be
known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations,
in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution
under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No.
148621 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws
on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D.
No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D. No.
1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No.
8249.27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade
"27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with
Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as
the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated
and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court,
the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employee, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2
of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606,
as amended) is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade
"27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as
presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying
the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
on appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular
court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than
grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which
trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the
proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word
"principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-
quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It
is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein
are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over
the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under
the amended information has the rank of Superintendent28 or
higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through
the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People
before the Supreme Court except in certain cases,29 contends that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to
fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is
a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the
law on bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued
in 1986 (sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official
or employee32holding any of the positions enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in
relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being
charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII
of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional
offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.
This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4,
R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or
felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided
it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions.
Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not
make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused
public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice
or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored
the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law33 because its
enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were
presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness.34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the
questioned provisions. The classification between those pending
cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not
yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the
approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences.36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not
yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to
define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional
limitations,37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of
that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is
why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that
Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those
similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public
officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all
cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors'
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just
happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected
by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun
are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the
new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance
is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a
Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya38 for their
participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it
is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments
against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee
headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the
legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected
from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the
deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D.
1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A.
8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated,
considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives,
and was separately approved by the Senate and House of
Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly
had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same
would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise
valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative
hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter
before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the
head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The
Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before
it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases
constitutes an ex post facto law41 for they are deprived of their
right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the
two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A.
7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post factolaw is one —
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such
action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant.43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences,
alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty.45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal
laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those
acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations;47 or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide dor their punishment.48 R.A 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its
mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared
by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e.
one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying
laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.49 Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged
as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-
tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted
by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
has already been rejected by the court several times50 considering
that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature
that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for
in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of
procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not
partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a
penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition.52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence
or the mode of trial.53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may
be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time
of their passage.54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal
to the Supreme Court to review questions of law.55 On the removal
of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the
power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has
been convincing overcome.56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-
one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed
on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to
"expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill
must only have one subject expressed in the title57is satisfied if the
title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects
related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve.58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here
sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A.
8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and
all the provisions of the law are germane to that general
subject.59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title
of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject
amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we
shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which
has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute.
The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or
informations,61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at
the trial.62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and
intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section
4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to
have jurisdiction over it.63 This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution
which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
over criminal cases committed by the public officers and
employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled
corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by
law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense
of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the
accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have
been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense charged
and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations."66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations,
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as
constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the
statute defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes
the charge is the actual recital of the facts."67The real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the
accused with such a descretion of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions
of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must
be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts
that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case,
we find the amended informations for murder against herein
petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to
show the intimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
informations71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the
Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO,
CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO,
SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT.
JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2
LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime
of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court,
the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN
T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP.
RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of
their public and official positions as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged
in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and
using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous
death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE
M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP.
CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP.
GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD,
PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to
office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the
crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing
that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila
on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named
principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to
thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts
that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was
intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police
officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that
the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein
petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts,
the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that
the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by,
among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests
made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn
of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is
no indication in the amended information that the victim was one would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid accused's official duties and the commission of the offense
and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately relation to public office.
preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that
the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge
Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore,
Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.
office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997
accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan
essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057
Sandiganbayan. (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said
particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the cases.1âwphi1.nêt
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, SO ORDERED.
sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the
amended information that the offense was committed by the
accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual
avernment that would show the close intimacy between the
offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of
evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended
information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of
regular policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and
provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then
established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . .
. supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed
entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding
investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain
person without due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by
said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his
co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied
in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the
office of the accused because it was perpetreated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official
functions and would not have been committed had they not held
their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection
between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562
and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused
arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in
the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that
the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of
P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims,
and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these
allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by
the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that
the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not appear
in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not
what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is
controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that
G.R. No. 144261-62 May 9, 2001
PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D.,
RODOLFO I. SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B. MORADA, MARIO M.
MATINING, and ROMMEL M. LUARCA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
raises the issue of the propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by
the Sandiganbayan1 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 both
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa
M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario Matining and
Rommel Luarca" wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction
of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined
and penalized under P.D. No. 1829. The grounds for petitioners'
Motion to Quash the Informations against them are that only
petitioner Prudente D. Soller occupied a position classified as Grade
27 and higher and because the offenses charged were not
committed by him in violation of his office as Municipal Mayor of
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.1âwphi1.nêt
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a
municipal guard, was shot and killed along the national highway at
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with
petitioner Soller's son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to
a medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente
Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is
the Municipal Health Officer. The incident was reported to and
investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was
conducted on the same night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner
Dr. Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo
Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural
Health Midwife.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed
against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the
Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to
mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by
(a) altering his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in
police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he
had only one; and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there
was no blackening around his wound when in truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the
cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and claimed, among others that Jerry
Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it was
there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting,
that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely
requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal
Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the
procedure involved sawing which required male strength, and that
Mrs. Macabael's consent was obtained before the autopsy. The
two (2) police officers denied having planted three (3) shells at the
place where the shooting took place.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an
Information for Obstruction of Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and
two (2) Informations2 were filed with the Sandiganbayan which
were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two
(2) informations respectively read as follows:
"Criminal Case No. 25521
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER,
PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA,
RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the
offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of
Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1,
Paragraph b of P.D. 1829, committed as follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at
the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all
public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health
Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively,
all of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally alter
and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of JERRY
MACABAEL with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and
availability as evidence in the investigation of criminal case for
murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein
respondents.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"Criminal Case No. 25522
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER,
PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA,
RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the
offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of
Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1,
Paragraph b of P.D. 1829, committed as follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at
the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all
public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal health
Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively,
all of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminal give
false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police
report to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agency, from
apprehending the offender by reporting that there are several
gunshot wounds in the body of the victim, JERRY MACABAEL and
that there is no tattooing (blackening) around the wound of the
said victim when in truth and in fact, there is only one gunshot
wound and there is tattooing (blackening) around the wound which
would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son
of the herein respondents spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; this
motion was opposed by respondent People. In its assailed Order
dated April 14, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners'
Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the
performance of the duties of at least one (1) of the accused public
officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with
that official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
entire case and over all the co-accused. The Order stated that "the
accused is the Mayor of the municipality where the alleged incident
took place and, therefore, any attempt to deviate or to present
false evidence in connection with a criminal offense committed in
his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also in
which the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable
before this Court."
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the
premise that it is not among the functions of the mayor to conduct
autopsies so that any misdeed, if indeed there was any, could not
be an offense which would put him under the jurisdiction of the
court. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the Sandiganbyan
ruling that:
"The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very
clearly that he is the primary executive and, therefore, necessarily
the primary peace officer of the municipality, for which reason, any
action on his part which deviates from that function is an office-
related offense. In this particular instance, the accused is charged
for having cooperated or co-participated with another public
official of lower rank in the same municipality in the supposed
falsification of the results of an autopsy. Additionally, even if the
functions of an autopsy were totally unrelated to any of the
administrative or executive functions over which the mayor may
have supervision and, more specially, control, the fact of the matter
is that the jurisdiction of the Court covers not only the offenses
committed by the officials of Grade Level 27 or higher as the
principal accused but even where such officials are also accused
together with some other public officials who may be at a level
below Grade Level 27 in connection with the performance of their
duties.
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who
occupies a position at Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife,
the Municipal Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level
24, so that, necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking
officer elevates the entire case to this Court primarily because
somebody over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is
accused together with the lower ranking officer."3
Hence, this petition alleging that-
"RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL
CASES NOS. 25521 and 25522."4
Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners claim that for an
offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
offense must have been committed by the officials enunciated in
paragraph (a) "in relation to their office", i.e. it should be intimately
connected with the office of the offender, and should have been
perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his
official functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in
the information. Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal
cases, the Informations do not contain factual averments showing
that they committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e.,
the acts charged are intimately connected with their respective
offices and were perpetrated by them while they were in the
performance of their duties and functions.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, posits that even if the offense charged
was not committed by the accused while in the performance of his
official functions, the same could still be considered done in
relation to his office if the acts were committed in line of duty.
Respondent's position is that an offense may be considered
committed in relation to office if it arose from misuse or abuse of
public office or from non-performance of an official duty or
function; thus the offense of falsifying autopsy and police reports
is office-related considering that among the duties and functions of
the municipal mayor in the exercise of general supervision and
control over all programs, projects, services and activities of the
municipal government, is that he shall ensure that all executive
officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge
their duties and functions. The fact that the informations do not
allege that the acts charged were committed by petitioner
Prudente Soller while he was in the performance of his official
functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as the conclusion of law
that his acts are in violation of his duties as municipal mayor could
necessarily be deduced from the informations.
Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in
the Information were fatally defective in view of the absence of any
specific allegation that would indicate that the crimes charged
were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the
performance of their official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction
or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired
into.5 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly
from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the
commencement of the action.6
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations
on May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners with the offense of
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b
of P.D. 1829. The applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D.
No. 1606 as last amended by the Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606 as amended provides insofar as pertinent:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crime committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their jurisdictions as provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
amended.
xxx xxx xxx"
In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,7 this Court held that the Municipal
Mayor, who occupies Salary Grade 27 in the hierarchy of positions
in the government under Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of
Occupational Services. Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may
be considered as committed "in relation to their office" as this
phrase is employed in the above-quoted Section 4.
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,8 this Court has interpreted the
requirement that an offense be committed in relation to the office
to mean that "the offense cannot exist without the office "or" that
the office must be a constituent element of the crime" as defined
and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised
Penal Code (referring to the crimes committed by the public
officers). People vs. Montejo9 enunciated the principle that the
offense must be intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though
improper or irregular of his official functions. The Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Concepcion said that although public office is
not an element of the crime of murder in (the) abstract, the facts
in a particular case may show that -
"xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the
accused's) respective offices and was perpetrated while they were
in the performance though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed (the accused) had no personal motive to commit
the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held
their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown obeyed his instructions because he was their superior Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the
officer, as Mayor of Basilan City."10 charges were intimately connected with the discharge of the
The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs. official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in
Montejo were reiterated in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,11Republic vs. the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function
Asuncion,12 and Cunanan vs. Arceo.13 The case of Republic vs. of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
Asuncion categorically pronounced that the fact that offense was WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders
committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
information: No costs.
"That the public officers or employees committed the crime in SO ORDERED.
relation to their office, must, however, be alleged in the
information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case
under Section 4 (a) (2). This allegation is necessary because of the
unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of
the information."14
For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase
"committed in violation to public office" appears in the
information; what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is the specific factual allegation in the information
that would indicate close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged
in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation
to public office.15
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521
and 25522 quoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had
committed the offenses charged in relation to their offices. Neither
are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate
relation/connection between the commission of the offense
charged and the discharge of official functions of the offenders, i.e.
that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenders was committed in relation to the office of
petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is included in the
enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although
the petitioners were described as being "all public officers, then
being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I,
Sanitary Inspector and Midwife", there was no allegation that the
offense of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the
victim with intent to impair the veracity, authenticity and
availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for
murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated
information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the
law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the
offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance
of official function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1829 may
be committed by any person whether a public officer or a private
citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the
offense. Moreover, the Information in Criminal Case No. 25522
states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy
report "would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller,
the son of herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa
Soller". Thus there is a categorical indication that the petitioners
spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the offenses and
they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did
not respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal
Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal
Mayor as enumerated in Section 444 of the Local Government Code
will readily show that the preparation of police and autopsy reports
and the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation
of criminal cases are not among such duties and functions, and the
broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis
for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor
fall under his functions as Municipal Mayor.16 What is obvious is
that petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of the
alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal reasons
rather than official duty.
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4,
1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is
the submission of public respondents that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final
and executory, its execution enters the
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be
construed as trenching on that sphere of
executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining
order . . . creates dangerous precedent as
there will never be an end to litigation
because there is always a possibility that
Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively
on the death penalty bill. To be certain,
whatever question may now be raised on the
Death Penalty Law before the present
Congress within the 6-month period given by
this Honorable Court had in all probability
been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex
futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks
forward while the judge looks at the past, . .
. the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has
transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain
circumstances/supervening events
transpired to the effect that the repeal or
modification of the law imposing death
penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of
President Estrada that he will
veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman
Golez, et al., that they are against
the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's
resolution to repeal the law only
bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled
"Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to
reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided
for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the
House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President
to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the
death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one
hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay
order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does
not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives;
(2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was
reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address
incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's
jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital
punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress
convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed
before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions
concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where
the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review
of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this
case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177
(Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations
was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside
of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of
Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has
no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact
that the interest of the State is properly represented by the
Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public
respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar
and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner.
Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final
judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle
that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as
there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the
Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is
appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the
Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds
are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in
the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to
declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as
unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section
17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to
provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by
the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual
confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined
from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the
aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended,
revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the
Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this
Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the
Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in
compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary
Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has
caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations
as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the
Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated:
(1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177
are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and
implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations
to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear
that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to
the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason
synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all
its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the
court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and
its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the
purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when
the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has
become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can
render the execution unjust or impossible.5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been
rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as
early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case
of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions,
which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal
cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for
reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its
jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review
the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event
that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty
in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having
then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the
execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under
the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no
power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying
out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,
which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted
as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested.
There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle
that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory
nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1)
By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court;
and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle
of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute
terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the
need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the
court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution
has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the
(court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution
. . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that
ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to
investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the
question arises as to whom the application for postponing the
execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under
investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the
investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial
power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the
inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose,
Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or
by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or
rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained
temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events
in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.1âwphi1.nêt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public
respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the
execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of
the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our
courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final
decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court
promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of
judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that
courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to
control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions.
Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in
civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should
be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this
Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose
that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously
vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was
granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for
it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may
appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of
its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of
1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in
the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71%
in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . .
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can
revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of
these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is
the case with the law in question." 12The venerable jurist further
ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and
the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the
1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power
of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered,
or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further
strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of
the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of
the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this
Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its
decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since
time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail
the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the
implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated,
our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The
records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8,
1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the
jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A.
Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified
true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998
bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo
Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents
thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to
the public when requested." The relevant portions of the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation
however, herein respondent is submitting the instant
Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-
disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of
vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers,
as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that
recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and
(b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his
power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections
pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative
Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the
Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing
to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are
faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information
about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the
President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
"without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the
President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a
sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937])
in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such
clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of
the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the
applicable statute as when the date at execution set by the
President would be earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about
the date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates
Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may beprovided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies
"the rules by means of which the right to information may be
enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167
[1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right
therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of
the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with
the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it
cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be
prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III,
Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En
Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535
[1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of
execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty.
Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to
due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor
General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose
petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more
jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court
granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the
counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998.
There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents
and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost
its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does
not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that
the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public
respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by
final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the
interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision
is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the
President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot
be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate
courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As
observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due
process of law will prevent the government from executing the
death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of
the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same —
the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In
the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time
amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can
the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute
final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do
not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United
States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the
power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality
has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power
of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents
therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right
to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches
of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution
of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been
grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by
vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance
of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked
several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January
4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had
either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of
the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino
Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the
petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been
concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly
declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3)
Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment,
and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35)
other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in
its traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18,
1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to
a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on
petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5)
hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed
at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving
whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to
repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or
not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the
Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as
mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's
allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely
publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial
notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less
than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on
capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is
therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death
Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No.
8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's
allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to
verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And
verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in
session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush
to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily
restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was
temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional
duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it
sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law
is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was
compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in
not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any
further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at,
stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria
of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty
that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It
was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less
before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its
desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress
is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents,
thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond
doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death
penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. The public pronouncement of President
Estrada that he will veto any law imposing
the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al.,
that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to
repeal the law only bears his signature and
that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No.
629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution
expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any
move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition
of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the
Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust
all means under the law to immediately implement the death
penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman
as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that
extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative
with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments
formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote.
House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House
". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In
addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress
to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous
crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's
TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian
purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ".
. . the question of capital punishment had been the subject of
endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as
men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous
crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and
moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably
blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro
and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their
postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an
exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the
debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that
wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny,
it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan
reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and
particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political
majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice
than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when
we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds
of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage,
especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness.
The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can
pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is
momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents'
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary
Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A.
Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set
anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in
accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of
Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and
some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have
consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of
death sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in
the above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order
("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to
be indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty
law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal
branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that
opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant,
after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby
reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the
imposition of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision
becomes final and executory, nothing else is further done except to
see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would
be to put no end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court
retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final
judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the
Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the
use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence.
In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of
final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions.
Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of
a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it.1 Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be
his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The
pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of
Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions,
which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal
cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for
reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after
its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio
suo, according to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or
review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the
event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a
ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow
from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with
reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always
included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to
provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,
which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted
as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested.
There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle
that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory
nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1)
By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court;
and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle
of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute
terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the
need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the
court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution
has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the
Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended,
if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution,
there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to
order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of
its final judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon,
commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to
repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused
are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally
incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective
spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the
Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his
pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may
be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted
even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the
duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner
becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going
to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General states that as of the moment,
"certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to
the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death
penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet
expect any chance for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the
death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the
Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way
clear to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-
examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as
for the need to have a second look at the conditions sine qua
non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death
penalty. In People vs. Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect,
Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty
law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in
the initial instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of
the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself
has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to
justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital
offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the
fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the
death penalty to offenses theretofore alreadyprovided in the
Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term
'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be
a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the
time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that
which exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the death
penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively
inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most
importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the
'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive
as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great
clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court
from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances
of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would
become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to
exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and
excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended
party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.
The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow
constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to,
stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what
might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result
in undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims
and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards
of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I
will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the
majority who continue to hold the presently structured Republic
Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is
fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition
each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the
legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the
Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be
held bound by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court
has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned
disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the context of the
larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not
repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on
June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any
such repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be
deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of
the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical
essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is
unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the
capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the
Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in
my Dissenting Opinion in various death cases decided by the Court,
as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January
4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent
promulgated on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so
would mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant
portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is
unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate
that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is
likewise unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in
which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law
and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA
8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority
vote, be implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's
Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22,
1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for
the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic
Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is
unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for
Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel,3 this transcendental
issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this
Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
toreclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and
had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986
"Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the
death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty
already imposed" toreclusion perpetua. The provision has both a
prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and
a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the
lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution
did not merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in
fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic
commutation or reduction toreclusion perpetua of any death
penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital
crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws
and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the
framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed,6 "(t)he
majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished
Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the
provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what
he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute
books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames
of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it
a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise,
restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional
mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the
Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no
presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed
the death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized
Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower
courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)9 finds
"compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of
the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of
Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly
limited:
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after
the Constitution became effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or
define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of
determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining
what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making
prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I
emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on
certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on
individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending
certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating
a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the
crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely
made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other
than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or
justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively
for all the offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by
which the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987,
when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is
convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was
accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress
exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More
legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or
jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to
prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not
define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did
Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some
existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable
penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by which
courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I
concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a
paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as
follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which,
by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an
insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime
is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be
"heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It
supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by
which the presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the
crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an
objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity."
Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in
fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be
the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case,
it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the
Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to
prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court
appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating
circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes
which were already punishable with death prior to the effectivity
of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder
and qualified bribery,17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659.
The offenses punished by death under said law were already to
punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA
7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto
Maceda, wryly said: 19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President, and from existing special laws which, before abolition of
the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes
which were already penalized with death prior to the charter's
effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and
positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission
intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these
very same crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III
into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the
intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and
2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent
conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution
but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian
Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as
heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder"
or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable
commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not
just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates
were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available
information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the
Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses
already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe
that the heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses,
the elements of which have an inherent
quality, degree or level of perversity,
depravity or viciousness unheard of until
then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new
element or essential ingredient like
"organized" or "brutal" is added to show
their utter perversity, odiousness or
malevolence; or
3. the means or method by which the crime,
whether new or old, is carried out evinces a
degree or magnitude of extreme violence,
evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to
demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same
manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates
the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness,
the Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling
reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some
attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best
feeble and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every
word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be
ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the
compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot
be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter
because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . .
and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific
reasons" requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred
penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA
7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by
Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling
reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.
Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the
country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished
sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the
justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged
worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is
one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling
reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could
the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a
compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the
Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason
should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and
again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law,
justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty
imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the
Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the
reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would
supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is
he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate
penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when
the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people
ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now,
under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the
offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the
appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have
committed heinous crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications
of "worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect
I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify
the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these
"reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine
National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate
particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but
in fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took
effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the
following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and
Lagman:
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform
us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is
12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the
distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521
in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the
abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18
percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the
statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution
abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished
Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm
it.
MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate
was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of
the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of
robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with
me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from
22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate
of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are
reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was
12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was
11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm
that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the
same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is
misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave
some figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-
related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062,
and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this
report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to
2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased
again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the
drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a
downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from,
1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents
of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an
effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no
statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have
been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship
between the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses
and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory
that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another
proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of
immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his
heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate
can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it
would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress
to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of
its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the
death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should —
like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously
protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly
where the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the
issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one
ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This
primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in
dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but
is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights
provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is
arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual
right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the
unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the
people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than
property for people more than the state, and for life more than
mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the
constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final
and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free
speech. assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most
important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other
rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the
wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the poor,
the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row
Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance
Group 36 highlights this sad fact:
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty,
186 persons 37 have been sentenced to
death. At the end of 1994, there were 24
death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995,
the number rose to 90; an average of seven
(7) convicts per month; double the monthly
average of capital sentences imposed the
 prior year. From January to June 1996, the
number of death penalty convicts reached
72, an average of 12 convicts per month,
almost double the monthly average of
capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately
twenty one percent (21%) earn between
P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%)
earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly.
Those earning above P4,000 monthly are
exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn
between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%)
earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven
percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to
P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to
P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%),
those earning P15,000 and above only one
percent (1%). Approximately thirteen
percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while
approximately two percent (2%) earn
subsistence wages with another five percent
(5%) earning variable income. Approximately
nine percent (9%) do not know how much
they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the
convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the
government-mandated minimum monthly
wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below
the official poverty line set by government.
Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and
P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong
to the middle class; only one (1) earns
P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn
variable income or earn on a percentage or
allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not
know or are unsure of their monthly income.
Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately
twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural
workers or workers in animal husbandry; of
these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof,
are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in
the transport and construction industry,
with thirty one (31) construction workers or
workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting,
welding) while twenty seven (27) are
transport workers (delivery, dispatcher,
mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with
sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen
percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and
service industries, with fourteen (14) sales
workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish,
cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service
workers (butchers, beauticians, security
guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer
programmers, radio technicians) and four (4)
clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and
clerk) About four percent (4%) are
government workers, with six (6) persons
belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP
and even CAFGU). Professionals,
administrative employee and executives
comprise only three percent (3%), nine
percent (9%) are unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their
medium of communication. About forty four
percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak
and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent
(26%), or about one-fourth, speak and
understand Cebuano. The rest speak and
understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo,
Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray.
One (1) convict is a foreign national and
speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%)
graduated from college, about forty seven
percent (47%) finished varying levels of
elementary education with twenty seven
(27) graduating from elementary. About
thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts, finished varying levels of high
school, with more than half of them
graduating from high school. Two (2)
convicts finished vocational education; nine
(9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic
situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated
against the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot
afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where
extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are
required. The best example to shoe the sad plight of the
underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of
constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the
trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance
Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex
and written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still,
judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and
damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed
more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the
minds of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy
nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments,
and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense
prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic
profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in
any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered
or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the
disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and
written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial
proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the
whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it
seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of
people in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of
educational attainment and employment opportunities, are
consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-
than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors
similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more
prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence
and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death
penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to
be more precise, such law may even be said to help improve their
situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent
to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic
differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-
poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they
require and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance
from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State,
so that in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise
above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such
a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to
better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to
any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire
people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution
point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively
inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty,
being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all
hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no
place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our
statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution
right against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right
to life.
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused because such
a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and
tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged.
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should
never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two
concurrent requirements:
a. First, Congress must provide a set of
attendant circumstances which the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt, apart from the elements of the crime
and itself. Congress must explain why and
how these circumstances define or
characterize the crime as "heinous".
b. Second, Congress has also the duty of laying
out clear and specific reasons which arose
after the effectivity of the Constitution
compelling the enactment of the law. It
bears repeating that these requirements are
inseparable. They must both be present in
view of the specific constitutional mandate
— "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." The compelling reason must flow
from the heinous nature of the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and
compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and
not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians,
as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe
in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast
majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public
authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such
prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium
Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated
and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing
the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society .
. . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the
Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people
and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over
and above even the state which man created precisely to protect,
cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital
punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes"
just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very
rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in
enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of
proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death
against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant
partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to
modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by
deleting the words "DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and
substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and
some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have
consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of
death sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in
the above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order
("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to
be indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty
law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal
branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that
opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant,
after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby
reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the
imposition of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision
becomes final and executory, nothing else is further done except to
see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would
be to put no end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court
retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final
judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the
Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the
use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence.
In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of
final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions.
Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of
a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it.1 Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be
his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The
pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of
Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions,
which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal
cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for
reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after
its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio
suo, according to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or
review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the
event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a
ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow
from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with
reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always
included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to
provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,
which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted
as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested.
There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle
that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory
nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1)
By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court;
and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle
of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute
terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial
court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the
need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the
court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution
has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the
Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended,
if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution,
there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to
order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of
its final judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon,
commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to
repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused
are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally
incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective
spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the
Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his
pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may
be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted
even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the
duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner
becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going
to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General states that as of the moment,
"certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to
the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death
penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet
expect any chance for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the
death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the
Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way
clear to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-
examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as
for the need to have a second look at the conditions sine qua
non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death
penalty. In People vs. Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect,
Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty
law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in
the initial instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of
the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself
has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to
justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital
offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the
fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the
death penalty to offenses theretofore alreadyprovided in the
Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term
'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be
a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the
time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that
which exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the death
penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively
inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most
importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the
'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive
as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great
clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court
from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances
of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would
become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to
exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and
excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended
party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.
The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow
constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to,
stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what
might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result
in undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims
and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards
of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I
will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the
majority who continue to hold the presently structured Republic
Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is
fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition
each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the
legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the
Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be
held bound by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court
has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned
disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the context of the
larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not
repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on
June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any
such repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be
deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of
the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical
essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is
unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the
capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the
Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in
my Dissenting Opinion in various death cases decided by the Court,
as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January
4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent
promulgated on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so
would mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant
portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is
unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate
that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is
likewise unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in
which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law
and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA
8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority
vote, be implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's
Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22,
1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for
the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic
Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is
unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for
Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel,3 this transcendental
issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this
Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death.4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
toreclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and
had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986
"Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the
death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty
already imposed" toreclusion perpetua. The provision has both a
prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and
a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the
lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution
did not merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in
fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic
commutation or reduction toreclusion perpetua of any death
penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital
crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws
and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the
framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed,6 "(t)he
majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished
Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the
provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what
he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute
books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames
of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it
a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise,
restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional
mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the
Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no
presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed
the death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized
Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower
courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)9 finds
"compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of
the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of
Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly
limited:
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after
the Constitution became effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or
define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of
determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining
what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making
prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I
emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on
certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on
individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending
certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating
a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the
crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely
made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other
than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or
justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively
for all the offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by
which the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987,
when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is
convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was
accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress
exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More
legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or
jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to
prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not
define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did
Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some
existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable
penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by which
courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I
concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a
paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as
follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which,
by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an
insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime
is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be
"heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It
supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by
which the presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the
crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an
objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity."
Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in
fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be
the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case,
it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the
Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to
prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court
appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating
circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes
which were already punishable with death prior to the effectivity
of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder
and qualified bribery,17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659.
The offenses punished by death under said law were already to
punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA
7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto
Maceda, wryly said: 19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President, and from existing special laws which, before abolition of
the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes
which were already penalized with death prior to the charter's
effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and
positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission
intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these
very same crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III
into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the
intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and
2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent
conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution
but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian
Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as
heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder"
or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable
commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not
just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates
were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available
information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the
Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses
already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe
that the heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses,
the elements of which have an inherent
quality, degree or level of perversity,
depravity or viciousness unheard of until
then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new
element or essential ingredient like
"organized" or "brutal" is added to show
their utter perversity, odiousness or
malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old,
is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence,
evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its
heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same
manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates
the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness,
the Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling
reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some
attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best
feeble and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every
word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be
ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the
compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot
be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter
because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . .
and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific
reasons" requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred
penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA
7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by
Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling
reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.
Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the
country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished
sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the
justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged
worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is
one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling
reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could
the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a
compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the
Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason
should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and
again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law,
justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty
imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the
Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the
reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would
supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is
he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate
penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when
the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people
ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now,
under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the
offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the
appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have
committed heinous crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications
of "worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect
I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify
the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these
"reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine
National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate
particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but
in fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took
effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the
following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and
Lagman:
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform
us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is
12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the
distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521
in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the
abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18
percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the
statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution
abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished
Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm
it.
MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate
was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of
the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of
robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with
me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from
22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate
of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are
reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was
12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was
11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm
that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the
same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is
misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave
some figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-
related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished
— the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the
figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this
report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to
2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased
again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the
drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a
downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from,
1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents
of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an
effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no
statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have
been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship
between the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses
and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory
that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another
proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of
immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his
heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate
can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it
would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress
to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of
its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the
death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should —
like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously
protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly
where the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the
issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one
ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This
primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in
dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but
is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights
provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is
arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual
right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the
unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the
people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than
property for people more than the state, and for life more than
mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the
constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the final
and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free
speech. assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most
important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other
rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the
wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the poor,
the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row
Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance
Group 36 highlights this sad fact:
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty,
186 persons 37 have been sentenced to
death. At the end of 1994, there were 24
death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995,
the number rose to 90; an average of seven
(7) convicts per month; double the monthly
average of capital sentences imposed the
prior year. From January to June 1996, the
number of death penalty convicts reached
72, an average of 12 convicts per month,
almost double the monthly average of
capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately
twenty one percent (21%) earn between
P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%)
earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly.
Those earning above P4,000 monthly are
exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn
between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%)
earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven
percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to
 P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to
P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%),
those earning P15,000 and above only one
percent (1%). Approximately thirteen
percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while
approximately two percent (2%) earn
subsistence wages with another five percent
(5%) earning variable income. Approximately
nine percent (9%) do not know how much
they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the
convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the
government-mandated minimum monthly
wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below
the official poverty line set by government.
Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and
P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong
to the middle class; only one (1) earns
P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn
variable income or earn on a percentage or
allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not
know or are unsure of their monthly income.
Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately
twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural
workers or workers in animal husbandry; of
these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof,
are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in
the transport and construction industry,
with thirty one (31) construction workers or
workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting,
welding) while twenty seven (27) are
transport workers (delivery, dispatcher,
mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with
sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen
percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and
service industries, with fourteen (14) sales
workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish,
cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service
workers (butchers, beauticians, security
guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer
programmers, radio technicians) and four (4)
clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and
clerk) About four percent (4%) are
government workers, with six (6) persons
belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP
and even CAFGU). Professionals,
administrative employee and executives
comprise only three percent (3%), nine
percent (9%) are unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their
medium of communication. About forty four
percent (44%), or slightly less than half speak
and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent
(26%), or about one-fourth, speak and
understand Cebuano. The rest speak and
understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo,
Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray.
One (1) convict is a foreign national and
speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%)
graduated from college, about forty seven
percent (47%) finished varying levels of
elementary education with twenty seven
(27) graduating from elementary. About
thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts, finished varying levels of high
school, with more than half of them
graduating from high school. Two (2)
convicts finished vocational education; nine
(9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic
situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated
against the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot
afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where
extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are
required. The best example to shoe the sad plight of the
underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of
constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the
trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance
Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex
and written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still,
judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and
damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed
more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the
minds of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy
nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments,
and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense
prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic
profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in
any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered
or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the
disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and
written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial
proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the
whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it
seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of
people in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of
educational attainment and employment opportunities, are
consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-
than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors
similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more
prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence
and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death
penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to
be more precise, such law may even be said to help improve their
situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent
to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic
differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-
poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they
require and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance
from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State,
so that in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise
above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such
a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to
better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to
any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire
people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution
point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively
inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty,
being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all
hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no
place in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
 1. The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.
its imposition.
2. The Charter effectively granted a new right: the
constitution right against the death penalty, which is
really a species of the right to life.
3. Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused because such a stature denigrates the
Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to
deny equal justice to the underprivileged.
4. Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside.
5. Congressional power death is severely limited by two
concurrent requirements:
a. First, Congress must provide a set of
attendant circumstances which the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt, apart from the elements of the crime
and itself. Congress must explain why and
how these circumstances define or
characterize the crime as "heinous".
Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific
reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution
compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these
requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view
of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must flow from
the heinous nature of the offense.
1. In every law reviving the capital penalty, the
heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out
for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes
generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians,
as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe
in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast
majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public
authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such
prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium
Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated
and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing
the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society .
. . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the
Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people
and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over
and above even the state which man created precisely to protect,
cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital
punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes"
just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very
rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in
enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of
proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death
against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant
partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to
modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by
deleting the words "DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and
substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH
DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust,
and immemorially acknowledged so to
be[.]"1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on
March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her
capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated
March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of
the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-
C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively
suspending him and several other public officers and employees of
the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and
(b) the Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a
writ of preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive
suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a
supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.
The Facts
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato
L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al),
accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati
Parking Building).13
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special
Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation,
submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if
warranted (1st Special Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's
directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a
complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging
them with six (6) administrative cases17for Grave Misconduct,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public
Documents (OMB Cases).19
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in
anomalous activities attending the following procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project,
committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of
Makati:
Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20
(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of
Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract22 on September 28,
2010,23 without the required publication and the lack of
architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor
in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80
on December 15, 2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19,
2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4)
P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May
3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30
(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for
Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract32 on August
18, 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of
architectural design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor
in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on
October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3)
P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on
February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39
(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of
Award40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design,43 and approved the
release of the funds therefor in the amounts of
P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on December 20,
2012; and
Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46
(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release
of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012
contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building
project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;47 and
(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the
remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture &
Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services
covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P429,011.48.49
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel
of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and
administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special
Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued
separate orders51 for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et
al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the
Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel,
issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order,
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more
than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the
preventive suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that:
(a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1)
the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee
of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the
Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record
negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement
vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds;
and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with
Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be
true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay,
Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records
and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to
the OMB Cases filed against them.55 Consequently, the
Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II
(Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the
same.56
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was
sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon
Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.57
The Proceedings Before the CA
On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of
the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a
TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr.
argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the
Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and
(b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-
election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's
preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of
guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not
participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and
unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide
vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the
condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the
charges against him, his suspension from office would
undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63
On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused
the implementation of the preventive suspension order through
the DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L.
Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the
wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same
on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were
closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati
Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City
Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed
office as Acting Mayor.64
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March
16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding
Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that
day.67Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found
that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the
extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised,
considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the
administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during
his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s
re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively
charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on
Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .70
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did
not state what act was being restrained and that since the
preventive suspension order had already been served and
implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.72
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for
contempt,73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing
Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine
National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the
CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the
administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as
additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and
supplemental petition for contempt75 (petition for contempt) on
March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the
Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and
maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the
preventive suspension order.77
In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the
consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504,
and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition
for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment
thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on
March 30 and 31, 2015.80
The Proceedings Before the Court
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on
March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before
this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which
granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and
the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The
Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ
could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless
there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is
outside the latter's jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is
illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an
impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to
contempt proceedings.84
In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the
CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of
government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said
office issued the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay,
Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have
been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have
weighed heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence
to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order.87 In
this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the
implementation of the preventive suspension order given his clear
and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he
could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges
against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a
condonation of any administrative offenses he may have
committed during his previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for
the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay,
Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable
officer and, hence, cannot be removed from office except by way
of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of
fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal
from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish
contempt.89

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after
the oral arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the
preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay,
Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the
condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it
found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive
suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as
City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising
from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building
project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that,
although there were acts which were apparently committed by
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on
July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of
Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the
condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the
payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that
the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed
before said re-election.97 To this, the CA added that there was no
concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged
payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its
April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine
is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt
is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The
Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by
Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that,
at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed
acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100
On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the
oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file
their respective memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the
Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while
Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the following day.104
Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed
the parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG
to comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten
(10) days from receipt of the notice.
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to
each other's memoranda.106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG
filed its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,107 simply stating that it
was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman
would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its
"institutional position."108 In her Memorandum and Comment to
Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among
others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.109 In
view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.chanrobleslaw
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the
oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to be
resolved in seriatim are as follows:
I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions
for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the
Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy;cralawlawlibrary
II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction
over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453;cralawlawlibrary
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to
issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation
of a preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman;cralawlawlibrary
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on
the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman
to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.chanrobleslaw
I.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a
petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and
2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent
to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be
filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for
the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or
agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by
the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case.110
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the
mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure
of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,]
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower
court or agency, x x x."111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule
requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a
petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for
prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved.113
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted
exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the
authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin
the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the
Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the
constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of
key government institutions - namely, the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence,
involves an issue of transcendental public importance that
demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also
raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the
continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by
a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative
liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and
prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move
for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is
justified.chanrobleslaw
II.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her
Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on
the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-
established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily
determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines
the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is
noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity
by this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly
submitted his opposition through his comment to the
Ombudsman's Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court
perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its
dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or
the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by
any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence
that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against
the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law.
The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against
any court (except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of
injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial
writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or
refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely
a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which
connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains
pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could
only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the
nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies,
with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman
retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office
allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for
the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has
primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public
officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.123
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be
heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the
exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This
paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing
that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings,
is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase
"application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it
does not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this
Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of
law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory
construction to resolve the ambiguity.
"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the
legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it,
and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the
words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then
perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to
ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was
enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was
taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd
where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation,
and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this
construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is
entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression
of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled,
although it is not conclusive."124
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to
change the administrative law principle that before one can go to
court, he must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to
him before he goes and seeks judicial review.
x x x x
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the
Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a
petition for review to a petition for certiorari?

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the
proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of
doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the evidence.
legislative deliberations may be adopted,125 albeit not controlling in
the interpretation of the law.126 Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable
Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari ,
A. The Senate deliberations cited by the the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of
Ombudsman do not pertain to the second discretion on the part of the court, whether to give due course to
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770. the petition or dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr.
President?
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section
14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President
office's decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the following
Senate deliberations:127 Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted
14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of
lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the
from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on consequence, Mr. President.
a petition for review, but on certiorari.
Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of
that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under review? Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the
intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial
Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. review, but should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.
President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman
would be almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the
Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict appeal Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has
procedure. made a distinction between a petition for review and a petition
for certiorari ; because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal
x x x x from any order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by
means of review. But under the Constitution it is now
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the
example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into
respondent, the respondent himself has the right to exhaust the the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into
administrative remedies available to him? the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a
determination of whether the administrative agency acted
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct. without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of
discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment,
Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short Mr. President.
by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?
Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.
Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator
Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him? Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President? x x x x

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority
example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be
there is f no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right the Supreme Court?
to exhaust his administrative remedies first before the
Ombudsman can take the appropriate action? Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of
government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court
to make the final determination.
The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.
Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues
have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change
during the period of Individual Amendments.
xxxx
The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment
inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence]
Hearing none, the same is approved.128
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is,
however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section
14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange
begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word
"review" that comes after the phrase "petition for review" and, in
its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal
from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on
a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange
between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose
of changing the method of review from one of a petition for review
to a petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more
difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording,
from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was approved.
Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the
proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the
text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that
this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not indicate
what specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a
decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the
remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of law.
More so, it was even commented upon during the oral arguments
of this case129 that there was no debate or clarification made on the
current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case,
at least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no
adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the
CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 petition.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these
deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely
Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the
approval of Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the
Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his
comment on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the
Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third
paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any
of the following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the
order, directive or decision;cralawlawlibrary
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial
to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall
be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only
one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported
by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final
and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the
' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally
ambiguous in stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known
that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions
for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However,
it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way
back in 1989130and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of
Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the
appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly
explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the
provision's final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may
appeal by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by
filing with the Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within
fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his
motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the
same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing
fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service
of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
B. Construing the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other
principles of statutory construction can apply to ascertain the
meaning of the provision.
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states
that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law." ;cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the
Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or
finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy"
(subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the
phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded
provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by the
disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or
provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be
understood in a general sense.134 By the same principle, the word
"findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the
disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the
Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the
foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not
explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy
against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45
appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the
Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the
1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
x x x x
Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a
concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of
errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the
allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied with a true
copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve
(12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's
brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the
date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for
reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the
petition.
Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be
distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the
Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission
of the petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the
elevation of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring
to appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The
petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that
defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law
that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not
errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of
fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law,
relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or
new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of
law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the
lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the establishment
of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result
would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject
the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There should then
be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the
appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that
all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are
prohibited, except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court
on pure questions of law.
C. Validity of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely
limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45
appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure
promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final
decisions or orders of lower courts,136 and not against "findings" of
quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress
cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter
the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory
"findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by
confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away
the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in
denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts.
In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also
increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing,
however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in
fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as
above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v.
Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section
27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and
concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of
Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of
"judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court,
or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now
being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office
of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and ruling
in Fabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the
application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act)
and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the
Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A.
No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules
implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence in
violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to
a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court, or other courts authorized by law." We pointedly
said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line
with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under
the provisions of Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the
remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule
45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27,
RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence,143 it is
therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the
above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in
that they "cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of
the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is
clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including
all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman
herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this
issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This procedure, as was
similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on
constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case,
neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule,
as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the
judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges
are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to
overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions
thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority
vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare
that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before
them for judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a
court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter
a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a
court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows
that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly
procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the
court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance
of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its
own jurisdiction in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an
interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule
65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the
Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before
this Court:
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014),
wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65
petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the
Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the
CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule
65."152
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013),
involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorariassailing a final and
unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed
the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it
stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the
concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of
Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts."
Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001),
wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and
unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same
verdict was reached in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That
being said, the Court now examines the objections of the
Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the
assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the preventive
suspension order, incidental to that main case.
III.
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has
been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any
provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive
suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence
under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order
to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise
insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from
injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the
courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as
direct harassment or political pressure would."159
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court
traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the
Ombudsman:
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several
Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for
airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and
misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these
agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the political
independence necessary for the effective performance of their
function as government critic.
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the
Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it
political independence and adequate powers to enforce its
mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand
Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by
PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally
to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative
act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was
reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the Special
Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was
given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding
information, and control the prosecution of these cases.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the
Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973
Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally
guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section
27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service
under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These
provisions read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis
supplied)
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the
office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its
independence:
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of
the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people"
against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to
function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This
constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends
to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard
against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant
to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. -
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress,
and the Judiciary.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the
< Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under
the broad powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No.
6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function
and consistent with the law and the Constitution.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers
include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of
all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key
Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad
powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the
Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and
partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an
"independent" office, x x x.
x x x x
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the
Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency
that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and
statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of
enforcing accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the
other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman
and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally,
they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the
Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be
insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
'independence' would result in the impairment of their core
functions"163;cralawlawlibrary
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in
the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of
restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated
for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative
not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based";164 and
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional
Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of the
1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution
by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service
Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that
the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the
tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the
developments in the past Constitutions geared towards
insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."165
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of
the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or
supervision of the Executive Department:
[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been
consistently intended by the framers to be independent from
executive control or supervision or any form of political influence.
At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not
scarce on how the "independence" granted to these
bodies prevents presidential interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192
SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions,
which have been characterized under the Constitution as
"independent," are not under the control of the President, even if
they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court
declared as unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily
appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the
[Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have
been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court
categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the
independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed
under the discretionary power of the President.
x x x x
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman
certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to
the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political
interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its
existence and proper functioning.166 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770,
which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be
removed from office by the President for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due
process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the
Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President
for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity
of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of
the Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not
considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the
latter enjoys under the Constitution.167
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the
concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office
cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is
made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be
obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for
purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of
government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which
means that those within the ranks of the office can only be
disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the
Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and
pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence
cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals
and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that
it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a
provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order
- clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office
from political harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's
independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending
provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by
her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of
injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself
concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme
Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an
amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record
whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is
no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or,
is it necessary to have a special paragraph for that?
Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President,
that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being
issued.
Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this
being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this
only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from
the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts
should be allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with
even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is supposed
to be issued against the Department of Natural
Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all
over the country.
The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that
effect?
Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.
The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other
than the Supreme Court.
Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the
same is approved.171
Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman,
including interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's
power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may
issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the
exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to
ongoing investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity
of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits
all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of
injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That the
constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this case has not
been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its constitutionality
was properly raised and presented during the course of these
proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly
necessary to the complete disposition of this case.174
In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral
Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the
government."176 The constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as
the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case
of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a
violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another."178 In
particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of
another department's functions."179
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial
power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while
all other lower courts may be established by laws passed by
Congress. Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang
(BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,"
the Court of Appeals,181 the Regional Trial Courts,182 and the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts183were established. Later, through the passage
of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185the Court
of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively
established.
In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat
it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5186 of the same Article:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, '
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to
jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese
ofBacolod v. Commission on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction
was defined as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court
and defines its powers.'"
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the
subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the
aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals,
and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended.
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over
Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is
Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]
Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not
only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts
(under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court
(under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In
view of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be
followed. In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as
follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals.189
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular
case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts
established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a
court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and
decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope
of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly
the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic
phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of
the judiciary.192
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of
the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to
the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly
promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the
framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila
Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court elucidated that "[t]he
power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and
was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does
not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the
manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure,
in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with
the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting
to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not
mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."194
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this
Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced
the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the
1935196 and 1973 Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a
power-sharing scheme with Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the
concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying
in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the
Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more
independent judiciary."199
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
would show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the
Court's rule-making powers should be shared with Congress. There
was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the
advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged^" in the
enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and,
instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be
followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached
wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner
Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with
the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were
approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference
to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies,
the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent
powers."201
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter,
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.
As pronounced in Echegaray:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed
various rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural
remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's
judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining
orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided.
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
both constitute temporary measures availed of during the
pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they
are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the
main action. It is well-settled that the sole objectof a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until
the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when
it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between
the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the
immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury
or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing
can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or
interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely
adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of
the parties.
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the
provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction
is defined under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the
same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile,
under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain
procedural parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs
coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs,
processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired
jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, f processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to
be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable
to the spirit of the said law or rules.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals]
to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that
said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its
appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and
decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over
the acts of the latter:"212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it
the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders
that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to
the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power
to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court
thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction.
For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the
performance of any act which might interfere with the proper
exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before
it.213 (Emphasis supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court
endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should
have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively
within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers
which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess
them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any
abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of
such process.
x x x x cralawlawlibrary
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said
to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to
those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are
such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient
exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity
and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration
of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to
the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to
maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf
of the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the
long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in
the 1936 case of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred
or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred." 215
In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the
principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which
they are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-
making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the
invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court must show
that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific
purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable
the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated
functions."216
In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the
constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from
enjoining the enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol
beverage license pending appeal,218 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held:
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do
that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while
considering the rule making power and the judicial power to be one
and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making
power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a
necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the
administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)
Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of
provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent
power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of
Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally
impermissible:
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the
language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and
once and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained
jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its
constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things
reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case
before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in
order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation,
to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may
grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the
principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular
instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional
realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the
legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview
of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which
this inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or
denied.
This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations
upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the
performance of constitutionally granted and inherently provided
judicial functions, x x x
x x x x
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once
having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental
to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things
reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in the case
before it. . ." This includes the inherent power to issue
injunctions. (Emphases supplied)
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to
provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean
that it could control the appellate judicial proceeding:
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this
appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the
constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once the
administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the
legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate
judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and
have preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied)
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when
Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in
so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO
and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-
making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature,
provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions
of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong
exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely
prescribed the means of implementing an existing right220 since it
only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right
in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a
pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing
an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress,
in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court,
as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition
for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees;223 and
(c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved
legislative enactments exempting government owned and
controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees,
thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on
Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure225 solely
belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. On this score, the Court
described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its]
institutional independence."226
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
under Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory
courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an
abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII
supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are
nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be
preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress
creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for
which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the
rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman
misconceives,227 because it does not define, prescribe, and
apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly
the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were
not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was
created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of
procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every
court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to
the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the
same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in
prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional
allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to
carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily
be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive
relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly,
the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its
judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial
power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be
enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what occurs during
a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over
the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a
court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true
meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our
Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure
should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth
be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever
variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly
promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.
The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General
Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the
foregoing observations:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the
Rules of Court?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Rule 58, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct
me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called
provisional remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta
is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy
you have injunction, x x x.
xxxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5
of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the
Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section 5, Article
VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that
provision?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts..."
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power,
the competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
The Supreme Court, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1
and 2 which we've already been discussed with you by my other
colleagues, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN: JUSTICE LEONEN:

Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of So what's different with the writ of injunction?
Congress, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of
Correct, Your Honor. jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by Congress. In
the absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the JUSTICE LEONEN:
Court, is that not correct? No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words,
when they create a special agrarian court it has all procedures
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: with it but it does not attach particularly to that particular court, is
Correct, Your Honor. that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN: ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...
case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?
JUSTICE LEONEN:
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the
It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor. concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules
of Court, is that not correct?
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct? ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Yes, Your Honor.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist
JUSTICE LEONEN: unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of not correct?
litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not
correct? ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor.
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor. xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)

JUSTICE LEONEN: In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional? instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the
No, Your Honor. several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount
law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
xxxx including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would
then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall
JUSTICE LEONEN. be stricken down for being unconstitutional.230
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to
Dismiss under Rule 16? However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of
powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770,
Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus,
create remedies, x x x. pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the
Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of
JUSTICE LEONEN. procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing
have the power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by
of t particular [s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure... the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: therefor.
That is true.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure
JUSTICE LEONEN (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770)
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the
that not correct? authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay,
Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely
ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred
to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and
which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
case.
IV.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA
gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a
persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its
proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the assailed
injunctive writs.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive
suspension order.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only
a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman
Gervacio,231 the Court explained the distinction, stating that its
purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence
potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in
the prosecution of the case against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction
between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as
penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the
suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends
sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose
of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence
potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in
the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation,
the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty
of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended,
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly
provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty
for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive
measure. (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under
preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty
of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee
charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon
the employee found guilty.232(Emphases
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are
explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence
of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay
in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six
(6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period
of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be
satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first
requirement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him.233ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation
doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would,
however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the
requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the
issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.
The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of
the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v.
CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if
it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the
administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner
[Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can
no longer be administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court,
contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among
others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more
prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on
account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness
of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x
x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.
Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the
issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation
doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that
Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e.,
the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that
the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against
Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati
condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous
activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007
to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were
acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first
term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24,
2013,239 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA -
still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based
on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v.
Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by the
Court although the payments were made after the official's
election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected
pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.242
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to
have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of
defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her
office during the administrative disciplinary
proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was
not precluded from considering the same given that it was material
to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in
conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the
subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was
duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that
although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt
against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453,245it appears that the CA found that the application of the
condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the
implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is
nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case
of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of
the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay,
Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can
no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with
condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory
affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to
determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least
for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the
assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the
condonation doctrine.
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's
express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by
treating the offender as if there had been no offense."246
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of
complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated
upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation
that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial
Board ofNueva Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was therefore decided
under the 1935 Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor
of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was
later re-elected to the same position in 1955. During his second
term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor
filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation of
judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case
No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual
argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against
him since they were committed during his previous term of office,
and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his
second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and
when the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the
controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective
official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him
during his immediately preceding term of office.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the
Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found
that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to
differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in
part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of
whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the
prior misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these
conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule
denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully
subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now
uncovered that there is really no established weight of authority in
the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which,
in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election
denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct
during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral
arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have
abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly
cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature
published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine
is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the
treatment is nuanced:
(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of
removing a public officer from his current term or office for
misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office
is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional
provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see In Re
Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas
statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act
committed during a present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted
or removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to
his election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On
the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal
from office for "acts of commission, omission, or neglect
committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term
of office" (see State v. Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where
the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was
contingent upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office." On
one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal
statute containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in
office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative
language making, the word "office" must be limited to the single
term during which the offense charged against the public officer
occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga
County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state
constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of
removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour
which occurred; prior to the taking of the office
(see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed in
the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an
officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of
certain offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in
office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not
condone or purge the offense (see State ex rel. Billon v.
Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate
Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in
office" to refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire
tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in
enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and
the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy
official could not be removed during one term for misconduct for a
previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257
(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the
public officer was a successor in the same office for which he has
been administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which
is recognized in numerous States as an exception to condonation
doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected
incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather,
regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions
committed in a previous term are grounds for removal because a
re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak
of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v.
Common Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v.
Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263
(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the
continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation
doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the
public officer charged with malversation of public funds was denied
the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
observing that "the large sums of money illegally collected during
the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v.
Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no
necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the
misconduct continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there
was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand of
the county commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm
v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as
nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there remains
a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution
to the country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and
neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."
Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary
conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US
on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis
to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors
relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the
doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the
process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon
as precedents, but as guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the
ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as
espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can
be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine
of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing
doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule
should not operate when there are powerful countervailing
considerations against its application.268 In other words, stare
decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist
to preclude reversal of standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman
correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid,
atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and
devolves along with the society within which it thrives.270 In the
words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can
decide, we can undecide."271
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the
time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935
Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience
of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the
sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability,
calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term
in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate
and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is
especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in
proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal
from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term
for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248,
citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40
S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel.Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d.
237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P.
222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs.
Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other
terms x x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of
previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs.
Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis
supplied)
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to
have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to
elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R.
281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the
people.274 (Emphases supplied)
The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first
applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-
stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the
Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a
criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from
an administrative case in that the former involves the People of the
Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at
large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of the constituency
he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the
President who may pardon a criminal offense.
(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a
case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the
condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan
Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely
supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein
the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the
same is justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court,
condonation prevented the elective official from being "hounded"
by administrative cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new
term, for which he has to defend himself "to the detriment of public
service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative liability
condoned by re-election covered the execution of the contract and
the incidents related therewith.279
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999)
- wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu
City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his
involvement in an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for
Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before the upcoming
elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the
contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the
petitioner's background and character, including his past
misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed a
condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the
Court held that the determinative time element in applying the
condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was
perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered
into during a prior term, acts which were done to implement the
same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate the
application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective
official.
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.;
April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal
innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon.
Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied
even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the
reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged
misconduct occurred four days before the elections,
respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of
the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct
was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period
of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the
wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was
committed prior to the date of reelection.282 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified
that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive
officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to
disenfranchise.
(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -
wherein the Court remarked that it would have been prudent for
the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary restraining
order against the implementation of a preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among
others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia,
Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015
Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs -
would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing
constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for.
What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the
basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still
remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted
from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported
by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to
administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an
elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an
administrative offense committed during a prior term - was
adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because
the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal
norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should
be -dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating
jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our
current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the
continued application of the doctrine of condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is
the supreme law of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that
every statute should be read in light of the
Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a
workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into
account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the
operation of the political branches of government.286
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959.
Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability,
or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision
in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public
office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the
State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military
or civil service."287 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence
on public accountability, and considering the dearth of
jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the
policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting
the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that
originated from select US cases existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing
with public officers underwent a significant change. The new
charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public
officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a
public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People
have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth
in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II
that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public
servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy
on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a
constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the
1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers
to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency
and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Belgica, it was explained that:
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is
an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of
government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a
public trust connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code
under the section of the Civil Service Commission,290 and also, in
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.291
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline,
suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated
in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on
October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local
official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on
any of the r following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence,
or dereliction of duty;cralawlawlibrary
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an
offense punishable by at least prision mayor;cralawlawlibrary
(e) Abuse of authority;cralawlawlibrary
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days,
except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang
barangay;cralawlawlibrary
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or
residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other
laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states
that those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
x x x x
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that
the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain
Penalties. -
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation
of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from
taking the civil service examinations.
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective
local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he
meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however,
that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and
its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that
the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of
re-election:
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.
xxxx
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term
of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets
the qualifications required for the office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine
of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times,
as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved
of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a
prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas
v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the
sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if
executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of
the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation,
cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing ,
reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President
can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she
grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly
less serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the
grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be
invoked against an elective local official to hold him
administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact,
Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first
place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of
removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to
a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar
regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by
US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of
administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or
statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot
be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous
term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not
extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency
occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision against the
re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-
was the justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was
deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under
their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter
to our present Constitution's requirements on public
accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of
condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party
as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full
in the official series, the crux of the disposition was that the
evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at
issue and therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.299Hence,
owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases
can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation
doctrine under our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the
penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to
still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel
Bagshaw v. Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited
in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot
be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term.
However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that
the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by
the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually
supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth
in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the
electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were
not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the
process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to
hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis
to conclude that election automatically implies condonation.
Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If
condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would
perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have
been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May
it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been
shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory
provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it
cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-
electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice
it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or
procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that
the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's
misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that
most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and
concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective
official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the
electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level,
condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge
of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of
an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of
Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official
prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are
reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe
to that theory because condonation, implying as it does
forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge
there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of
which one has no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain
the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from
this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US
rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now
rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it
is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine
that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following
the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the
CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of
the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole
authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons
are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v.
Judicial Bar Council.306
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and,
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent
that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the
actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also
of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.307
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error,
it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon
should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v.
Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof.
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part
of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar
legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive.
The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and
hence, is unconstitutional.310ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly
benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it
is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal
anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a
considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership,
takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved
is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion
arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions
directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all
hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount,
the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject
TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April
6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was
based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and
again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time,
unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the
CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's
preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA
to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman,
on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively
liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, for the present administrative charges against him,
the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As initially
intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary
issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office
of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more
purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the
office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the
mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive
suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its
foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the
condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and
academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."314 All of these
scenarios obtain in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and
defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation
doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As
extensively discussed, the continued application of the
condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of
the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public
office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable
to the people at all times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential
creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to
escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal
intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is
a situation of exceptional character which this Court must
ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a
perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the
multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is
indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly
requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an
in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to
the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench,
the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine
came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view
of its relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently
invoked by elective local officials against the administrative charges
filed against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has
informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December
2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the
Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus,
in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged
misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression,
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond
the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial
powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is
capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the
prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential
creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and
defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening
events that render the subject of discussion moot.chanrobleslaw
V.
With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon,
the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's
Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
139504 is improper and illegal.
The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an
impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for
indirect contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and
the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal from
office.318 However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015
Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to
contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that
notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to
comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay,
Jr.'s contempt petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for
Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her
capacity as the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and
Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the
Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3) days
from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing
a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the
contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable
officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may
still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and
accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication
that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it
would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The
submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the
premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the
issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the
Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision
is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued therefor; (b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but
the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect; (c) The Court of
Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S.
Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening
issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay,
Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts,
docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-
0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-
0063; and
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio
Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON.
JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents
on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted
the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent
from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct
committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A,
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of
the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major
stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District
(FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he
was administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the FMED, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT
with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed
between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their
relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24,
1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for
violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For
purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed
under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or
immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued
a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director
Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera
of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26,
1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by
finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private
respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman
discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate
and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero
who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside
the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and
exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) 1pertinently provides that
— including those rules with respect to the availability or non-
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final
and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the
manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed
by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this
Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of
Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an
alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because
of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the
Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and
the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the
Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure
and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate
with these relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. — . . . No court shall hear any appeal or
application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. — (1) The Office of the Ombudsman
shall promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Administrative investigations
by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its
rules of procedure and consistent with due process. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All previsionary
orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any
of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported
by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days
from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing
constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the
validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the
Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it,
availability of appeal in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition
that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing
the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in
effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable,
her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a
discussion of the differences between a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the
decisions of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act. No.
6770 vis-a-vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As
correctly pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs.
Ombudsman, et al.3 and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al.4 were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al. 5 was commenced by a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People,
et al.,6 Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,7 Olivarez vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,8 and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,9 which were
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba
vs. Nitorreda, et al. 10 was initiated by a pleading unlikely
denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or
Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately
followed by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et
al. 11 which was a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the
case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained,
it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points
raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of
the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis
of a special original action, and whether or not they may be
resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the
answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some
seemingly obiter statements in Yabut and Alba could bear
reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and
lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary
action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial
review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court
was intrigued by the fact, which does not appear to have been
seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a
public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the
offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential
Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications
by the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases
were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18,
1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable
to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case
involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could
eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the
other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is
sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case
management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the
Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible
conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act
No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November
17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The
conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional
grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did
so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the
judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges
are sworn to support its provisions; the courts are not at liberty to
overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions
thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority
vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare
that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before
them for
judgment. 12
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions which are not raised in the pleadings, 13 the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a
court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter
a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a
court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows
that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. 14
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly
procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction
of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which
case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own
motion. 15 The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. 16 The court has a clearly recognized right to determine
its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. 17
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that
the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional
question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on
May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very
allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the "Joint Order (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration)" issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411,
entitled "Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst.
Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City," which absolved
the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct,
among others.
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is
allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No.
6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner
in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted
on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently
providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two
comments thereon took into account or discussed the validity of
the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions
of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall
be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant
ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et
al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the
provisions of its former Circular No. 1-91 and Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, as now substantially reproduced
in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is
invoked and involved in this case, and the foregoing legal
considerations appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity
of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it
necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first
resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate
review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to
SUBMIT their position and arguments on the matter subject of this
resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10)
days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has
complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with
any submission it should have presented. On the other hand,
petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to
this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the
Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a
law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as
provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction
includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution
authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does
not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing
that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under
Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law
of which this Court already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that
by jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has
allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number
of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved
and have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also, the very
provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction
of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final
judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the
quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature
intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial
agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law
creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is
required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system
because they are what are referred to and already provided for, in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private
respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure 19preclude appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court," explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A person desiring
to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth. (Emphasis ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court
which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be
adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain
administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose
was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That
intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed,
was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but,
then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies 20 are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule
43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 21
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply
only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of
the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no
reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a
criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43
even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service
Commission, although the latter is even an independent
constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman
which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions
of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an
objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually
involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those
coming from the Civil Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals
as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the
same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by
Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts.
Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is
limited to jurisdictional questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of
cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may
be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate
jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too
tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of
acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a
matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases
referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein,
and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved,
hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under
discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial
review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid
having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case
can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is
correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of
judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the
instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although
there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the
matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be
raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue
confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional
issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present
case. 22
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on
other grounds, short of passing upon the constitutional question.
We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret
that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be
absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is
final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the
issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere
with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing
a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier
explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly
imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is
precisely under review here because of some statements therein
somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court
on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the
question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot
validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument
has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. 23 was
intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed
under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court. 24
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of
the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements
in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual
settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements
in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on
the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be
undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of
this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's
position paper correctly yields the legislative background of
Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference
Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth
the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was
approved on second reading by the House of
Representatives. 25 The Senate was informed of the approval of the
final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same was
thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17,
1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the
Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the
Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions
of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that
Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor
of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this
Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the
Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and
concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator
Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a
Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and
will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions
through petitions for review, adding that they should be appeals pending at the time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the case at
on certiorari. 27 bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the
There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer
6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent. 28 of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
VI WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and
with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi- any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid
judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43. force and effect.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court
27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered
nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition for review under
power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit
modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional
law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.
consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the SO ORDERED.
exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore
the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those
rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of
this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In
fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural and
what is substantive is frequently a question of great
difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a
rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our
own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court,
for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges,
enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. 31 If the rule takes away a vested right, it is no;
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure. 32
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases
involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover,
relates to procedure only. 33 This is so because it is not the right to
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law.
That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the
appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale
for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy,
which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested
rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate
to the remedy. 34
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating
a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to
transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a
procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider
such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have
still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that
remedy. 35
G.R. Nos. 140619-24 March 9, 2001
BENEDICTO E. KUIZON, JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN AND
ROSALINA T. TOLIBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN and
the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed by incumbent Municipal Mayor of Bato, Leyte, Benedicto E.
Kuizon, Joselito Raniero J. Daan and Rosalina T. Tolibas to set aside
the approval by the respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of
the Memorandum dated May 17, 1999 of Paul Elmer M. Clemente
of the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel, Office of the Ombudsman,
recommending the prosecution of herein petitioners.
The cases subject of this petition emanated from a complaint1 filed
on December 8, 1995 by one Melanio Saporas with the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMB-Visayas) against petitioner
Benedicto Kuizon for Nepotism and Malversation Thru Falsification
of Public Documents in connection with the forging of signatures of
some casual laborers of Bato, Leyte in the payroll slips of the
municipality and the drawing of their salaries on different dates.
The case was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-95-0646.
Attached to Saporas' complaint is the affidavit of one Zacarias
Kuizon who claimed to have been formerly hired by petitioner
Kuizon as a laborer at Bato, Leyte. Petitioner Kuizon allegedly had
already dispensed with the services of Zacarias for the month of
February, 1995 but the latter's signature was forged in the payroll
for the said month and somebody took his salary in the amount of
P890.00 for that period.2
In an Evaluation Report dated December 19, 1995, June L. Iway,
Graft Investigation Officer I of the OMB-Visayas, recommended
that petitioners Rosalina T. Tolibas and Joselito Raniero J. Daan,
Paymaster/Municipal Treasurer and Timekeeper, respectively,
should be included in the complaint as respondents.
In an Order dated December 19, 1995, petitioners were ordered to
file their counter-affidavits. On February 20, 1996, petitioners
submitted their Answer with Special Affirmative
Defenses,3 attaching therewith the counter-affidavits of petitioners
Daan and Tolibas4 as well as the affidavits of several witnesses5 to
rebut the accusations of Saporas and Zacarias Kuizon.
Meanwhile on November 15, 1995, Saporas filed another
complaint against petitioners with the Office of the Ombudsman,
Manila docketed as OMB-2-96-0049. The complaint was referred
to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas in an
Indorsement dated January 29, 1996. On March 21, 1996,
petitioners were required to file their respective counter-affidavits.
On April 22, 1996, petitioner Kuizon, assisted by Atty. Leo-Giron,
filed his counter-affidavit,6 attaching therewith the counter-
affidavits of petitioners Tolibas and Daan. OMB-Visayas granted
petitioners' Motion for Consolidation of Cases and Setting of
Hearing of the two (2) complaints.
On May 28, 1996, complainant Saporas submitted the affidavits of
Ceferino Cedejana7 and Concordio Cedejana8 in support of his
allegations in OMB-2-96-0049. Both Ceferino and Concordio made
virtually similar allegations as those made by Zacarias except the
amounts representing their salaries for the month of February,
1995 which are P2,136.00 and P1,157.00, respectively.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Exclude the Affidavits of Ceferino and
Concordio9 which was denied in an Order dated July 8, 1996. They
filed their supplemental counter-affidavit on July 26, 1996 in
compliance with the order requiring them to do so. On separate
dates, petitioners filed their Joint Position Paper10 and Joint
Supplemental Memorandum.11
On June 20, 1997, OMB-Visayas thru Graft Investigation Officer I
Samuel Malazarte issued a Resolution12 in OMB-VIS-CRIM-95-0646
and OMB-2-96-0049 recommending the filing of the Informations
for Malversation and Falsification of Public/Official Document on
two (2) counts each against all the petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan. GIO Malazarte recommended however the
dismissal of the complaint for nepotism against petitioner Kuizon.
The pertinent portion of the said Resolution states:
"While complainant's witnesses, Zacarias Kuizon, is shown to have
used two different signatures in signing documents, such as those
found on a Joint Affidavit and an Affidavit (Annexes "1" and "2",
respectively, of respondent Mayor's Counter-Affidavit), yet there is
no proof shown that the aforesaid witness has affixed on any other
document a signature similar, if not exactly the same, as the
questioned signature purportedly that of the same witness
appearing on the above-mentioned Time Book and Payroll for the
period February 16 to 28, 1995. It is likewise not shown that
complainants' two other witnesses, Ceferino Cedejana and
Concordio Cedejana, has [sic] signed on any other document
signatures similar, if not the same, as the questioned signature(s)
appearing on the Time Book and payroll for the periods February 1
to 15, 1995 and February 16 to 28, 1995, in the case of Ceferino
Cedejana, and February 1 to 15, 1995, in the case of Concordio
Cedejana. Indeed, a person may use two or more signatures. But in
a case as this, where the complainant, or his witnesses, specifically
denied the particular signatures in question and imputed
authorship of the falsifications thereof against the respondents,
who otherwise claimed that said questioned signatures belong to
the complainant's witnesses, it is incumbent upon the latter to
disprove the denial by solid evidence, such as a finding of a
handwriting examiner/expert — considering that they
(respondents) are in possession of the original documents bearing
the allegedly falsified/forged signatures. No such kind of evidence,
however, was adduced.
The respondents relied heavily for corroboration on the
testimonies of witnesses who, at one time or another, were co-
workers/laborers of complainant's witnesses in the above-
mentioned construction of [a] new Municipal Hall Building of Bato,
Leyte. But owing to a high possibility that said respondents'
witnesses were coaxed, influenced, or pressured into signing the
affidavits and to so testify, considering the circumstances of their
work and place of residence, the undersigned cannot give full
credence to the testimonies of said respondents' witnesses as
against the complainant's witnesses' specific denial of ownership of
the questioned signatures, for the purpose of this preliminary
investigation.
From the claims of respondents Joselito Raniero J. Daan and
Rosalina T. Tolibas that they personally know the aforenamed
complainant's witnesses and had called their names, made them
sign on the payroll[s] in question in their (respondents') presence
and gave them their corresponding salaries, a clear inference can
be drawn that there was collusion or connivance of the aforesaid
respondents which is made more manifest by their respective
certifications on the questioned Time Book and Payrolls for the
periods February 1 to 15, 1995, and February 16 to 28, 1995. And
the respondent Mayor Benedicto E. Kuizon's certification on the
same questioned payrolls and his statement that he knows for a
fact that the complainant's witnesses have actually worked during
the questioned period of February 1995 serve to complete the
conspiracy."13
The Resolution was approved by the respondent Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto on September 5, 1997.
Petitioners learned that four (4) Informations dated June 20, 1997
were filed against them on September 16, 1997 with the
Sandiganbayan14 by the Office of the Ombudsman.15 The cases
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2416716 and 2416917 for
Falsification of Public/Official Document and Criminal Case Nos.
2416818 and 2417019 for Malversation of Public Funds.
On October 22, 1996, Saporas filed with the OMB-Visayas another
Affidavit-Complaint20 for Malversation of Public Funds Thru
Falsification of Public Documents and violation of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against herein petitioners and three others, namely, Municipal
Treasurer Lolita S. Regana, Municipal Accountant Ofelia F. Boroy
and Budget Officer Glafica R. Suico for alleged connivance in
including in the payrolls for the construction of the municipal
building of Bato, Leyte, names of workers whose services were
already terminated, making it appear that they still worked and
received salaries even after their termination from service. The
affidavits of Andres Soso Pague21 and Danilo Cortes22 were
attached to the said complaint which was docketed as OMB-VIS-
CRIM-96-1173 and OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0474.
Only petitioner Daan filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-VIS-CRIM-
96-1173.23 Petitioners Kuizon and Tolibas as well as the three (3)
other respondents therein, namely, Regana, Boroy and Suico filed
an Answer/Counter-Affidavits/Manifestation in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-
047424 as shown in the caption of their pleading. Attached
therewith were the affidavits of petitioners' witnesses Felipe
Cortez25 , Melquiades Jupista, Alberto Gerongco, Noel
Umapas,26 Jhonny Mariño, Ricardo Garao, Savino
Kuizon,27 Domingo Echevarre,28 Alfonso Tabale, Alberto Gerongco,
Romeo Marino, Vicente Marino29 and Marciano Bohol.30
On July 28, 1997, OMB-Visayas thru Graft Investigation Officer I
Venerando Ralph P. Santiago, Jr. issued a Resolution31 in OMB-VIS-
CRIM-96-1173 finding sufficient grounds to hold petitioners for trial
for Malversation of Public Funds and Falsification of Public
Documents. The Resolution reads in part, thus:
"Joselito Rainero (sic) K. (sic) Daan, the lone respondent who filed
his counter-affidavit, claimed that Danilo S. Cortez and Andres S.
Pague, personally signed the payrolls. If these were true, then
Messrs. Cortez and Pague must have worked during those times
indicated in the payrolls when their names appeared. But according
to them they worked only for less than one month, and this
allegation was not controverted by the respondents — even by the
answering respondent. How could they have claimed their salaries
without working for these?
The claim of respondent Daan is even belied by the copies of the
payrolls attached to the complaint. A scrutiny between the
signatures of Danilo S. Cortez and Andres S. Pague in their affidavits
and those in the payrolls reveals a striking difference, especially
that of Danilo S. Cortez in the payrolls for the months of November
and December, 1995 (pp. 22, 24 & 28, record). This dissimilarity of
signatures of Messrs. Cortez and Pague in their affidavits and in the
payrolls is sufficient to form a well founded belief that the latter
documents had been forged and their salaries were maliciously
appropriated by the respondents for their personal use. And the
Forgery and Malversation could only be committed by the persons
who prepared and approved the payrolls, namely: Benedicto E.
Kuizon, Joselito Rainero (sic) K. (sic) Daan and Rosalinda T. Tolibas.
This is not a farfetched conclusion because respondents Kuizon and
Daan certified that the persons whose names appeared in the
payrolls had rendered their services, while respondent Tolibas
certified that he had paid in cash to the persons whose names
appeared on the payrolls, the amount set opposite their names,
they having presented themselves, established their identity and
affixed their signatures or thumb marks on the space provided
therefor.
This Office also finds that the falsification was committed to
conceal the malversation, the payrolls having been used by the
above-named respondents as supporting documents to liquidate
the cash advances they had received for the payment of the salaries
of the workers."32
The Resolution was approved by the respondent Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto on September 19, 1997.
Upon verification, the petitioners learned that two (2)
Informations33 both dated July 28, 1997 were filed against them in
September, 1997 by the Office of the Ombudsman with the
Sandiganbayan.34 The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
24195 for Malversation of Public Funds and 24196 for Falsification
of Public Documents.
Petitioners filed two (2) separate Motions for
Reinvestigation35 both dated October 4, 1997 in Criminal Case Nos.
24167 to 24170 and Criminal Case Nos. 24195 to 24196. Petitioners
likewise filed a Motion for Consolidation of Criminal Case Nos.
24195 and 24196 with the four (4) other cases which was granted
by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in its Order36 dated October
30, 1997.
In an Order dated November 24, 1997,37 the Sandiganbayan
(Fourth Division) granted the two (2) Motions for Reinvestigation
filed by the petitioners. On June 10, 1999, Special Prosecution
Officer II Lemuel M. De Guzman filed a Manifestation38 with the
Sandiganbayan which reads as follows:
"1. In a Memorandum dated August 19, 1998, a certified true copy
of which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as
Annex "A", the undersigned terminated action on the two (2)
Motions for Reconsideration dated October 4, 1997 filed by all the
accused as well as the Counter-Affidavit dated February 7, 1998
filed by accused Benedicto E. Kuizon in the above-captioned cases
and recommended the exclusion of accused Mayor Benedicto E.
Kuizon as party-accused therein and to remand the case to the
regular court for the prosecution of accused Joselito Ramiero (sic)
K. (sic) Daan and Rosalina T. Tolibas.
2. On September 8, 1998, the Honorable Special Prosecutor
Leonardo P. Tamayo required Special Prosecution Officer Norberto
B. Ruiz to take a second look into the undersigned's memorandum.
In another Memorandum dated November 16, 1998, a certified
true copy of which is hereto attached and made [an] integral part
hereof as Annex "B", Prosecutor Ruiz recommended the
affirmation of the previous memorandum, which the Honorable
Special Prosecutor concurred in.
3. On May 7, 1999, before acting on the cases, the Honorable
Ombudsman referred the records thereof to the Office of the Chief
Legal Counsel (OCLC) '(F)or review considering that OSP seeks to
reverse the Ombudsman's findings.'
4. In a Memorandum dated May 17, 1999, a certified true copy of
which is hereto attached and made [an] integral part hereof as
Annex "C", OCLC recommended the continued prosecution of all
the accused 'there being no cogent grounds to warrant a reversal
of the finding of probable cause by OMB-Visayas.' This
memorandum was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on
June 1, 1999 and, accordingly, the undersigned's memorandum
was disapproved with the following marginal note: 'Prosecution of
all the accused shall proceed as recommended by OCLC."'39
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan set the criminal cases for hearing on
August 16, 18 to 20, 1999. Petitioner Daan filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation and to Defer
Arraignment40 dated August 12, 1999. In an Order dated August 16,
1999, the motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan.41 Petitioners
were arraigned on the same date and they all pleaded "not guilty"
to the crimes charged.42 The pre-trial and the trial on the merits
were then set upon agreement of the parties.
On September 6, 1999, petitioners filed a petition before the Court
of Appeals captioned "Benedicto E. Kuizon, et al. vs. Hon. Aniano A.
Desierto, et al." and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54898, assailing
the approval by the respondent Aniano A. Desierto of the
Memorandum of his Legal Counsel which recommended the
continued prosecution of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
issued a temporary restraining order in a Resolution dated
September 17, 1999. On even date, petitioners filed a Motion for
Suspension of Proceedings and/or Postponement with the
Sandiganbayan.
On October 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Resolution43 which states:
"Per the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Teresita G.
Fabian vs. Aniano A. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16,
1998, the jurisdiction of this Court extends only to decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The cases
involved in the instant petition are criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction."44
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed the instant petition based
on the following grounds:
"A. The Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it deprived herein
petitioners of the opportunity to file motions for reconsideration of
the resolutions of the Office of Ombudsman-Visayas (Annexes "G"
and "M" hereof);45
B. The Honorable Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he
approved the Memorandum of Legal Counsel Paul Elmer M.
Clemente (Annex "C", Manifestation of Special Prosecution Officer
Lemuel De Guzman) despite the fact that no reinvestigation was
conducted with respect to herein petitioners Joselito Raniero J.
Daan and Rosalina T. Tolibas;46
C. The Honorable Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he
approved the Memorandum of Legal Counsel Paul Elmer M.
Clemente (Annex "C", Manifestation of Special (sic) Prosecution
Lemuel De Guzman to the Sandiganbayan) reinstating the
prosecution of the criminal cases as against petitioner Benedicto
Kuizon;47 and
D. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, with due respect, also
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in proceeding with the trial of the cases against herein
petitioners."48
On December 1, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order.
We will first dispose of the procedural issues raised by the parties.
Respondent alleges that the petition was filed out of time
considering that more than sixty (60) days had elapsed from the
time respondent Sandiganbayan's Order dated August 16, 1999
denying petitioners' Motion to Defer Arraignment and petitioner
Daan's Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation and to Defer
Arraignment was rendered. The erroneous filing by the petitioners
of their petition with the Court of Appeals did not allegedly toll the
running of the period to file the same with this Court.49 In reply
thereto, petitioners submit that the 60-day period should not be
strictly applied to them considering that they originally filed their
petition with the Court of Appeals within the prescribed period.
They maintain that the Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction
with this Court on special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65
applying the doctrine in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National
Labor Relations Commission.50 Petitioners now raise the issue as to
which court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari under Rule
65 questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases.51
In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court
of Appeals cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto.52The appellate
court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.53 In the
Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section
27 of Republic Act No. 677054 as unconstitutional, we categorically
stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account
where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to
as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a
criminal action.55In fine, we hold that the present petition should
have been filed with this Court.
It follows that the instant petition was filed late. A petition for
certiorari should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.56 The
present petition was filed with this Court only on November 24,
1999 which is more than sixty (60) days from the time petitioners
were notified of the adverse resolutions issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman. The erroneous filing of the petition with the Court of
Appeals did not toll the running of the period.
But even on its merit, the petition cannot succeed. Petitioners
primarily invoke denial of due process. They contend that they
were not accorded the opportunity to file a Motion for
Reconsideration since they were not furnished copies of the
adverse Resolutions issued by the OMB-Visayas prior to their
approval by the respondent Ombudsman Desierto. The Office of
the Ombudsman allegedly railroaded the preliminary investigation
of the cases in violation of Sections 6 and 7 of Administrative Order
No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 09 which provides
that:
"SECTION 6. Notice to parties. — The parties shall be served with a
copy of the resolution as finally approved by the Ombudsman or by
the proper Deputy Ombudsman.
SECTION 7. Motion for Reconsideration. —
(a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or the Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be.
(b) xxx xxx xxx."
Section 6 of the aforequoted provision speaks of two (2) approving
authorities with respect to resolutions issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Hence, the phrase "as finally approved by the
Ombudsman or by the proper Deputy Ombudsman."
As succinctly discussed in the respondent's Comment, it is the
procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman that any Memorandum
and/or Resolution of any criminal case pending before its Office
which involves high ranking officials under R.A. 824957 should have
the approval of the Ombudsman before the same may be released
and considered the official action of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Since petitioner Kuizon falls under the category of high ranking
officials under R.A. 8249 who is charged with conspiracy with the
other two (2) petitioners, the Resolutions dated June 20, 1997 and
July 28, 1997 need the approval of the Honorable
Ombudsman.58 This finds support in Sec. 4 (g), Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 07 which provides:
"SECTION 4. Procedure. — The preliminary investigations of cases
falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional
Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section
3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
provisions:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigation officer shall forward the records of the case together
with his resolution to the designated authorities for their
appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed
without the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the
proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases." (emphasis supplied)
Prescinding from the foregoing discussions, the resolutions which
must be furnished to the petitioners refer to those approved by the
respondent Ombudsman. Respondent alleges that copies of the
challenged Resolutions as approved by the Honorable Ombudsman
on different dates59 were sent to the parties by registered mail on
September 12, 1997 and September 24, 1997,
respectively.60 Petitioners deny having received copies of these
resolutions.
The issue is not of momentous legal significance for non-
compliance with Sections 6 and 7 of Administrative Order No. 7
does not affect the validity of the Informations filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In the case of Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan,61 we held:
"Equally devoid of merit is the alleged non-compliance with
Sections 6 and 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty on the part of the investigating
Prosecutor was not rebutted. Moreover, the failure to furnish the
respondent with a copy of an adverse resolution pursuant to Section
6 which reads:
'SECTION 6. Notice to parties. — The parties shall be served with a
copy of the resolution as finally approved by the Ombudsman or by
the proper Deputy Ombudsman.'
does not affect the validity of an information thereafter filed even
if a copy of the resolution upon which the information is based was
not served upon the respondent. The contention that the provision
is mandatory in order to allow the respondent to avail of the 15-day
period to file a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation is not
persuasive for under Section 7 of the said Rule, such motion may,
nevertheless, be filed and acted upon by the Ombudsman if so
directed by the court where the information was filed. Finally, just
as in the case of lack of or irregularity in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, a party, like the petitioner herein, should
have seasonably questioned the procedural error at any time
before he entered his plea to the charge. His failure to do so
amounted to a waiver or abandonment of what he believed was his
right under Sections 6 and 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman."62 (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further allege that the OMB-Visayas resolved the case
in OMB-CRIM-96-1173 solely on the basis of the complaint of
Saporas and the affidavits of Cortes and Pague. Petitioners'
Answer/Counter-Affidavits/Manifestation were allegedly
ignored.63 The contention is belied by the records of the case.
Petitioners were all required to file their counter-affidavits but only
petitioner Daan complied. Petitioners (except Daan) must perforce
suffer the consequences of their inaction.
Petitioners also claim that their Answer/Counter-
Affidavits/Manifestation was intended for both the administrative
as well as the criminal complaints. The records reveal otherwise.
The docket number in the said pleading's caption which states
"OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0474" indicates that it is for the administrative
case only. The fault lies with the petitioners when they indicated
therein an incomplete docket number. It is their duty to see to it
that all the entries in their pleading including its caption are
accurate. If indeed the petitioners committed an oversight in
placing the wrong or incomplete docket number in their pleading,
they should have filed the proper motion or manifestation to
correct the purported inaccuracies. It is not the obligation of the
Office of the Ombudsman to supply or supplant any deficiency
found in the litigants' pleadings.
The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit evidence in support of one's defense.64 What the law
proscribes is lack of opportunity to be heard.65 The facts show that
preliminary investigations were conducted prior to the filing of the
Informations. Petitioners filed their Answer with Special
Affirmative Defenses in OMB-VIS-CRIM-95-0646. Petitioner Kuizon
filed his Counter-Affidavit together with the attached affidavits of
petitioners Tolibas and Daan in OMB-2-96-0049. When petitioners
learned that four (4) Informations were filed against them, they
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation which the Sandiganbayan
granted. It is clear therefore that petitioners were not deprived of
due process.
We now come to the issue raised by petitioners Daan and Tolibas
that there was no reinvestigation conducted on them. It appears
from the records that the Office of the Special Prosecutor who was
authorized to conduct the reinvestigation of the cases did not
notify petitioners Daan and Tolibas of the proceedings. Only
petitioner Kuizon filed his counter-affidavit which was solely
considered by Special Prosecutor Lemuel de Guzman in his
Memorandum.66 Be that as it may, we rule against the petitioners.
The procedural defect was waived by petitioners when they
entered their plea of "not guilty" to the information. The settled
rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to
have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to
question any irregularity that surrounds it.67 The invalidity or
absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court which may have taken cognizance of the
information nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective.68
The petitioners further asseverate that respondent Desierto
gravely abused his discretion when he simply approved the
recommendation of the Legal Counsel recommending the filing of
information in court despite the clear absence of reasonable
justification.69 We reject petitioners' claim. What is involved is
merely a review and affirmation by the respondent Ombudsman of
the findings made by the investigating prosecutor. He need not
restate the facts and elaborate on the applicable law. In Cruz, Jr. vs.
People,70 we held:
"It may seem that the ratio decidendi of the Ombudsman's order
may be wanting but this is not a case of a total absence of factual
and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented.
What is actually involved here is merely a review of the conclusion
arrived at by the investigating prosecutor as a result of his study
and analysis of the complaint, counter-affidavits, and the evidence
submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation. The
Ombudsman here is not conducting anew another investigation
but is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the
recommendation given by the investigating prosecutor, that is,
whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the
findings of the latter. Verily, it is discretionary upon the
Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the
investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter's report
and recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his
own findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him from acting
one way or the other, x x x"71
In case of conflict in the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the
special prosecutor, it is self-evident that the former's decision shall
prevail since the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the
supervision and control of the Ombudsman.72 The action of the
respondent Ombudsman in disapproving the findings of Special
Prosecutor De Guzman and approving that of Legal Counsel
Clemente does not per se constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners Daan and Tolibas also claim that their evidence
consisting of the affidavit of Pague will show that there is no
probable cause to indict them. The contention lacks merit. We
reiterate the rule of long standing that in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the exercise
by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory
and prosecutory powers.73 His findings of probable cause are
entitled to great respect. The rationale behind the said rule has
been aptly discussed in Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman,74 thus:
"The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions
of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant."75
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners' claim that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding
with the trial of their cases. The Sandiganbayan granted petitioners'
motion for reinvestigation. It correctly denied petitioner Daan's
subsequent Motion for Reinvestigation and to Defer Arraignment
in view of the respondent Ombudsman's final action to proceed
with the prosecution of the cases. Jurisdiction has been acquired
by the Sandiganbayan over the person of the petitioners as they
appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Sandiganbayan is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of the cases at bar with
dispatch. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.
G.R. No. 169098 October 12, 2006
MANUEL BAVIERA, petitioner,
vs.
ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, in his capacity as Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer II; MARY SUSAN S. GUILLERMO, in her
capacity as Director, Preliminary Investigation and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau-B; PELAGIO S. APOSTOL, in his capacity as
Assistant Ombudsman, PAMO; ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his
capacity as Assistant Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices; and MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ (Then)
Undersecretary, Department of Justice, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87472
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by Manuel V. Baviera,
assailing the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-
C-03-0612-J, and the resolution of the CA denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Manuel V. Baviera filed several complaints2 against officers or
directors of the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), Philippine Branch,
including Sridhar Raman, an Indian national who was the Chief
Finance Officer of the bank, as respondents with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ), to wit:
CASE FILED DOCKET NUMBER
BANGKO SENTRAL NG Administrative Received by Supervisi
PILIPINAS Examination Sector, SE
Dept. II
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Administrative CED Case No. 03-2763
COMMISSION
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING Money Laundering Received by Office
COUNCIL Executive Director
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Illegal Dismissal NLRC-NCR Case No.
COMMISSION 07434-2003
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Syndicated Estafa I.S. No. 2003-1059
BUREAU OF INTERNAL Tax Fraud and Non- Received by Commis
REVENUE declaration of Income Office
Baviera claimed that he was a former employee of the bank, and at
the same time, an investor who was victimized by the officers or
directors of SCB, all of whom conspired with one another in
defrauding him as well as the investing public by soliciting funds in
unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities.
On September 18, 2003, Baviera, through counsel, requested the
Secretary of Justice for the issuance of a Hold Departure Order
(HDO) against some of the officers and directors of SCB, including
Raman.3
On September 26, 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong issued an Order4 granting the request of Baviera. He
issued HDO No. 0193. A copy of the order was served on the Bureau
of Immigration (BI) for implementation. On the same day, the BI
issued an Order5 implementing that of the Secretary of Justice.
Meanwhile, Secretary Datumanong went to Vienna, Austria, to
attend a conference. Undersecretary Merceditas Navarro-
Gutierrez was designated as Acting Secretary of the DOJ.6
On September 28, 2003, a Sunday, Raman arrived at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) for his trip to Singapore but
was apprehended by BI agents and NAIA officials based on the HDO
of the Secretary of Justice. However, the next day, September 29,
2003, Raman was able to leave the country via Singapore Airlines-
SQ-71 at an 8:15 a.m. flight. He was to attend a conference in
Singapore and to return to the Philippines on October 2, 2003.
It turned out that Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas N.
Gutierrez had verbally allowed the departure of Raman. On the
same day, Raman, through counsel, wrote Secretary Datumanong
for the lifting of the HDO insofar as his client was
concerned.7 Acting Secretary Gutierrez issued an Order8 allowing
Raman to leave the country. In said Order, she stated that the Chief
State Prosecutor had indicated that he interposed no objection to
the travel of Raman to Singapore.
On October 3, 2003, Baviera filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the
Office of the Ombudsman charging Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas
N. Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a), (e), and (j) of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019, as amended.
The complainant alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that upon
verbal instruction of respondent Gutierrez to the BI agents and
NAIA officials, Raman was allowed to leave the country despite the
HDO issued by Secretary Simeon Datumanong. He averred that the
actuations of respondent Gutierrez were illegal, highly irregular
and questionable for the following reasons:
a) DOJ Sec. Datumanong issued a Hold Departure Order (HDO)
against three foreign nationals, including Raman, on September 26,
2003;
b) Also on September 26, 2003, BID Commissioner Danilo Cueto
issued the necessary order and notification to all airports, seaports
and exit points for the implementation of the aforesaid HDO;
c) Raman went to the NAIA for departure out of the Philippines on
Sunday, September 28, 2003;
d) Raman was stopped by Immigration officials from leaving the
country on Sunday on the strength of the HDO;
e) Usec. Gutierrez admitted having interceded on behalf of the
Indian national, thus allowing him to leave the country for
Singapore at about 8:15 a.m. of Monday, September 29, 2003;
f) Obviously, the appeal of Raman to be allowed to leave the
country was made verbally either by him or thru counsel;
g) There is no written application for temporary stay of the HDO in
respect to Raman’s departure;
h) There is likewise no written order by Usec. Gutierrez allowing
Raman to leave;
i) Usec. Gutierrez claims that she cleared the matter with DOJ Sec.
Datumanong who was in Vienna, Austria;
j) If she did so, then she could have made the consultation only
either by telephone or e-mail
i) If she consulted Sec. Datumanong by telephone, then she must
have gone out of her way to go to the Department of Justice on a
Sunday to use the DOJ telephone;
ii) If she did not go to the DOJ on a Sunday, then she must have
used her own telephone and shouldered the expense to call Sec.
Datumanong on behalf of her beloved Indian national or the latter’s
counsel;
iii) If she cleared the matter with Sec. Datumanong by e-mail, then
the burden is on her to prove that she did so by that means;
k) It is obvious that Usec. Gutierrez went out of her way to
accommodate an Indian national or the latter’s lawyer on a Sunday
(verbally, secretly, and when nobody was looking) to allow the
Indian national to leave the country –despite an existing HDO- thus
giving the Indian national unwarranted, undue preference, benefit
and advantage, to the damage and prejudice of complainant.
l) There are indications that Usec. Gutierrez will also allow the other
Indian national (Ajay Kanwal) to leave for permanent posting
outside the Philippines despite the existing HDO. But that’s another
story. Surely, another criminal charge.9
Baviera further alleged that the verbal special permission granted
to Raman by respondent Gutierrez was illegal as there is no specific
law or DOJ rule allowing the grant of special permission or
exception to an HDO. Worse, the complainant alleged, respondent
Gutierrez made her verbal order on a weekend, on the basis of
allegedly strong representations made by Raman. Respondent
Gutierrez thus displayed arrogance of power and insolence of
office, thereby extending unwarranted preference, benefits and
advantage to Raman.
In her Counter-Affidavit, respondent Gutierrez denied the
allegations against her. She averred that she did not violate any law
or rule, in allowing Raman to leave the country. She merely upheld
his rights to travel as guaranteed under the Constitution.
Moreover, the DOJ may allow persons covered by HDOs to travel
abroad, for a specific purpose and for a specific period of time. She
further averred that:
11. I allowed Mr. Raman to leave the Philippines on September 29,
2003 in my capacity as Acting Secretary, not as Undersecretary as
alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit. An Acting Secretary has the
power and authority to perform all official acts that a Department
Secretary, if personally present, could lawfully do and to exercise
sound discretion under certain circumstances. In the case of an
Acting Secretary of Justice, the authority extends to allowing the
travel of a person subject of an HDO, like Mr. Raman, whose
attendance in an official business abroad was urgent and
necessary. Although I could have lifted the HDO on the ground that
there was no ground for its continued enforcement, I did not do so
in deference to the Secretary who issued it but, instead, allowed
Mr. Raman to travel for a specific purpose and period. Secretary
Datumanong eventually lifted the HDO and, therefore, ratified my
act.
12. An individual subject of an HDO issued by the Department may
be allowed to travel abroad. Even the court that issued an HDO may
authorize the subject person to travel for a specific purpose and for
a certain period. If the person already charged in court may be
authorized to travel, there is more reason to allow the person, like
Mr. Raman, who was still subject of a preliminary investigation by
a prosecutor, to travel abroad. He continues to enjoy the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Thus, his rights under the
law should not be unreasonably curtailed.
13. I allowed Mr. Raman to travel to Singapore because he, as Chief
Finance Officer of Standard Chartered Bank (an international bank
with good reputation), was invited and required to attend the
Wholesale Bank International Accounting Standards Conference
from September 29 to October 2, 2003. The travel was not meant
to have him transferred to another branch of the bank abroad and
frustrate the results of the investigations, which were the cited
reasons for the HDO application. Indeed, he returned to the
Philippines on October 2, 2003.
14. Allowing Mr. Raman to travel abroad under the circumstances
would send a positive message to foreigners engaged in banking
and business activities in the Philippines that the Government
consistently upholds the rule of law and respects human rights,
thereby boosting investors’ confidence in the Philippines.
15. In allowing Mr. Raman to travel abroad, I relied on my oath as
a lawyer and as a government official to support and defend the
Constitution. I also relied on the first Whereas Clause of the above-
mentioned Department Circular No. 17 dated March 19, 1998,
which cites Section 6, Article III of the present Constitution that, in
part, reads: "xxx
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law." Relevantly, in Kant Kwong v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, the Supreme Court En
Banc held:
xxx. The right to travel and to freedom of movement is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a
signatory. The right extends to all residents regardless of
nationality. And "everyone has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the Constitution or by law." (Emphasis ours)10
Respondent Gutierrez requested the Office of the Ombudsman to
dismiss the complaint against her, thus:
(a) There is no basis for the complaint for violation of Section 3(a)
of RA No. 3019, as amended, because I never persuaded, induced
nor influence any public officer to violate the rules and regulations
duly promulgated by competent authority. When I allowed Mr.
Raman to travel, I relied on Department Circular No. 17 (1998),
particularly the first Whereas Clause thereof, recognizing every
person’s right to travel, absent the grounds for impairment of the
right under the Constitution.
(b) The complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 is
baseless. The complainant has not sustained any injury by reason
of the travel order, as Mr. Raman immediately returned to the
Philippines after his official business. I authorized Mr. Raman to
travel in recognition of his right thereto under the Constitution and
existing international human rights law instruments. In so doing, I
did not give him unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in
the discharge of my official functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Indeed, had I
denied him the right, I would be held liable under such provision,
in addition to other liabilities under the Civil Code.
(c) Neither is there any basis for the complaint for violation of
Section 3(j) of RA No. 3019, as amended. I permitted Mr. Raman to
leave the country on September 29, 2003 because he had an
important official business abroad and he was legally entitled to the
right to travel and the grounds mentioned in the Constitution for
the impairment of the right did not exist.
17. The propriety of the travel authority has become moot and
academic with the return of Mr. Raman to the Philippines on
October 2, 2003 and the issuance of the Order dated October 17,
2003 by Justice Secretary Datumanong, lifting the HDO on the
ground that "there is no ground for the continued enforcement of
the HDO."
18. I am executing this Counter-Affidavit to attest to the truth of
the foregoing facts and to belie the incriminating allegations
against me in the Complaint-Affidavit.11
In his Reply-Affidavit, Baviera alleged that:
2. Although it is admitted that the Constitution guarantees the right
to travel of any individual and the DOJ has wide and discretionary
powers in allowing individuals subject of an HDO to travel on
certain occasions, still this does not in any way help in her
defense. The main issue against her is NOT an individual’s
constitutional right to travel nor the wide discretionary powers of
the DOJ to grant special permits to travel to individuals subject of
HDO BUT her abuse of such discretionary powers.
3. When she allowed the Indian National to leave the country on a
mere verbal plea by Raman or his well-connected lawyer on a
Sunday and without a proper Motion for Reconsideration yet being
filed by Raman or his lawyer, she undoubtedly gave the latter
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of
her official duty as Acting Secretary. The undisputable fact, which
respondent herself admitted proudly, was both plea and the Order
were done verbally.
4. It was only much later that her Order dated 29 September 2003
was belatedly released long after Raman had left the country on an
early morning flight to Singapore. It is unmistakable then that her
decision to allow Raman to travel was verbally transacted with
Raman’s well-connected lawyer on a Sunday, 28 September 2003
when Raman was supposed to leave for Singapore but was denied
by Immigration and NAIA officials due to the standing HDO against
him. In short, respondent went out of her way to accommodate a
foreign national by hurriedly allowing the latter to leave without
going through proper procedures. Paragraph V of DOJ Circular No.
17 provides the following procedure in appealing or lifting an HDO,
to wit:
"A copy of the HDO implemented by the Commissioner shall be
sent to the person subject of the order, if his postal address is
known, so that he may, if he so desires, file a MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION with the Secretary. (Underscoring supplied).
5. The Rules cited by respondent herself provide proper procedures
and avenues for the lifting, temporary or otherwise, of an HDO.
Obviously, by swiftly allowing Raman to leave the country on a
mere verbal appeal by his well-connected counsel,
respondent disregarded proper procedures and betrayed her
intentions of giving special treatment to the Indian national.
6. Respondent tried to justify her indiscretion by attaching as Annex
"4" of her Counter-Affidavit a letter from Raman’s lawyer dated 29
September 2003 requesting that Raman be allowed to travel.
Conspicuously, the letter was stamped received by respondent’s
office and allegedly signed and received by her staff on Monday, 29
September 2003 at 6:15 a.m. Obviously, respondent is trying to
cover up her actions, albeit to no avail. Who could possibly believe
that respondent’s office would be open at 6:15 in the morning of a
Monday when the normal office hours is at 8 a.m.? Worse,
assuming arguendo that the letter-request was received at 6
a.m., how come Raman was able to board Singapore Airlines Flight
No. SQ-71 which left at about 8:15 a.m. or barely two (2) hours
upon the receipt of the request?
7. Res Ipsa Loquitor. It is either respondent Gutierrez, Secretary
Datumanong or the Chief State Prosecutor (whom she claimed to
have consulted before giving the order) reports to their offices at 6
a.m. and buckle down to work immediately or that respondent
Gutierrez’s allegations in her defense are all concocted lies. "For
evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances." (Cosep vs. People, 290 SCRA 378).
8. The belated documentation of respondent’s action was further
proven by records showing that the Motion for Reconsideration
and the Supplement thereof were dated 5 October and 7 October
2003, respectively, or six (6) days after Raman was allowed by
respondent to leave the country.
9. Even absent any evidence of belated documentation, still,
respondent cannot deny the fact that she admitted in a hurriedly-
called press conference later on 29 September 2003 before the DOJ
press that she was the one who verbally gave instructions to
immigration and NAIA officials to allow Raman to leave the country.
In her own words, she proudly admitted that she based her order
on "strong representations" made by Raman’s counsel. By such
admission, respondent unwittingly admitted having violated the
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
10. By persuading or influencing Immigration Officials to allow
Raman to leave the country without any motion for
reconsideration or any written motion to that effect as required by
DOJ Circular No. 17, respondent committed Section 3 (a) of RA
3019. And further by doing such act, respondent acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence in giving Raman unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of her official function as Acting
Secretary of the DOJ in violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
11. Even her claims that she has not benefited from her actions
cannot be made as a defense because the provisions of the Anti-
Graft law charged against her do not require as a pre-condition that
the public officer receive (sic) any gift, present, or benefit.
12. Her decision to grant special permission to Raman (which she
proudly admits) is irregular and illegal because there is no specific
law or rules of the DOJ granting special permission or exception to
the HDO.12
On October 5, 2003, the officers and officials of SCB, including
Raman, through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of
HDO No. 0193 and filed a Supplemental to the said motion dated
October 5, 2003 praying that the HDO be lifted. On October 17,
2003, Justice Secretary Simeon Datumanong issued an Order lifting
the HDO and ordered the BI to delete the names of the officials of
the bank, including Raman, from its Watchlist.13
On June 22, 2004, Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer
Rolando Zoleta signed a Resolution recommending that the
criminal complaint against respondent Gutierrez for violation of RA
No. 3019 be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Zoleta’s
findings are as follows:
After a careful evaluation of the facts and pieces of evidence on
record, this Office resolves that:
a) With respect to the charge of violation of Section 3(a) of Republic
Act 3019, there is no evidence, documentary or testimonial, to
show that respondent GUTIERREZ has received material
remuneration as a consideration for her alleged use of influence on
her decision to allow Mr. RAMAN to travel abroad.
It is worthy to note the following Senate deliberations on the
aforementioned provision of Republic Act 3019, to wit:
"Senate deliberations (July 13, 1960)
Senator MARCOS. I see. Now, I come to the second most important
point. Is it true as charged that this bill does not punish influence
peddling which does not result in remuneration, or rather in which
remuneration cannot be proved? I refer to Section 3, subsection
(a), lines 10 to 13 on page 2 of the bill. It is to be noted that this
section reads, as the first corrupt practice or act of a public official:
xxxx xxxxx xxxxx
Now, suppose the influence that is extended to influence another
public official is for the performance of an act that is not a crime
like the issuance of license by the Monetary Board (p. 226)
Senator TOLENTINO. I see. (p. 226)
Senator MARCOS. It is claimed and charged by observers that this
bill is deliberately watered down in order to save influence
peddlers who peddle their influence in the Monetary Board, in the
Reparations Commission, in government banks and the like. I
would like the author to explain the situation. (p. 226)
Senator TELENTINO (SIC). In the first place, I cannot conceive of an
influence peddler who acts gratis. The very term "influence
peddler" implies that there is something being sold, that is, the
influence. So that when we say influence peddler who does not
receive any advantage, that is inconsistency in terms because that
would apply to any congressman, for instance, and precisely it was
made clear during the debates that if a congressman or senator
tries to use influence in the act of another by, let us say, trying to
obtain a license for his constituent, if he does not get paid for that
he does not use any influence. (p. 226)
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
Senator MARCOS. So, it is admitted by the author that the lending
or utilization of influence x x x provided that there is no proof that
he has been given material remuneration is not punished by this
Act. (pp. 226-227)
Senator TOLENTINO. No, the mere fact of having used one’s
influence so long as it is not to induce the commission of a criminal
act would not be punished if there is no consideration. It would not
be graft. (p. 227)
Senator MARCOS. There is no proof of consideration because that
is one thing difficult to prove. (p. 227)
Senator TOLENTINO. If you say there is no proof of consideration,
as far as the bill is concerned, there is no offense. So, so long as
there is no proof of the consideration in the use of the influence,
the offense is not committed under the bill because that would not
be graft.
Senator MARCOS. But we all admit that it is an immoral act for a
public official like the President, the Vice-President, members of
the Senate to unduly influence the members of the Monetary
Board even without remuneration and say, "You better approve
this license, this application of a million dollars of my good friend
and compadre Mr. Cheng Cheng Po" or whatever he may be. But
he does not receive any reward, payment or remuneration for it.
Under the bill, he can get away with this act.
Senator TOLENTINO. If Your Honor considers it in that light, I don’t
think that would constitute graft and I don’t think that would be
included.
Senator MARCOS. But it is immoral.
Senator TOLENTINO. It may be so, but it depends on the
circumstances. But our idea, the main idea of the bill is to punish
graft and corrupt practices. Not every act maybe, that is improper
would fall under the provision of the bill. (p. 227)
Henceforth, following the logic and intention of the sponsor
(Senator TOLENTINO) of the aforecited provision, respondent
GUTIERREZ did not commit a violation of the same as there is no
proof that she received consideration in exchange for her decision
to allow Mr. Raman to travel abroad.
b) As to the charge of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019,
no actual or real damage was suffered by any party, including the
government as Mr. Raman immediately returned to the
Philippines, the truth of which was not rebutted by the herein
complainant in his Reply-Affidavit. Thus, the herein complainant
also did not suffer undue injury as an element required by the law.
By the same token, the essential ingredient of manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence required for the
commission of such offense has not been proven in the instant
case. The respondent has satisfactorily explicated that as Acting
Secretary of Justice, she has the power and authority to perform
such act. In fact, she could have even lifted the Hold Departure
Order since there is no ground for its continued enforcement but
did not do so in deference to Secretary DATUMANONG who
consequently lifted such order. As correctly pointed out by the
respondent, it was as if the Secretary ratified her act of allowing
Mr. RAMAN to travel abroad despite the Hold Departure Order
against the latter and there is no question that she can do or
perform such act being the Acting Secretary at that time.
At any rate, it can not be denied that even the court (or the
Sandiganbayan in the case of IMELDA MARCOS) that requested or
issued a Hold Departure Order on a person already charged in court
allows under certain conditions the accused to travel for a specific
purpose and for a certain period. There is no reason why Mr.
RAMAN, who is just a subject of a preliminary investigation by a
prosecutor, should not be granted the same benefit as he continues
to enjoy not only the constitutional presumption of innocence but
the constitutional right to travel or liberty of abode; and,
c) With regard to the charge of Violation of Section 3(j) of Republic
Act 3019, as above discussed, the respondent, as Acting Secretary
of Justice, is authorized or empowered not only to allow the travel
abroad of Mr. RAMAN under specific conditions but also to order
the lifting of such Hold Departure Order. In the same way,
respondent GUTIERREZ has not granted any privilege or benefit in
favor of any person (or Mr. RAMAN for that matter) not qualified
or not legally entitled to such privilege or benefit when she allowed
the former to travel abroad under specific condition and for certain
period of time as Mr. RAMAN still enjoys the constitutionally
guaranteed right to travel or liberty of abode even if a preliminary
investigation involving him is still pending at the office of the
concerned DOJ Prosecutor.14
The Assistant Ombudsman recommended that the resolution be
approved. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, Orlando C.
Casimiro, who was authorized by the Ombudsman to act on the
recommendation, approved the same.15
Baviera received a copy of the Resolution on July 26, 2004 and filed
a motion for reconsideration of the resolution on August 2, 2004
(July 31, 2004 was a Saturday).16 Acting on the motion, Zoleta
issued a Resolution on August 10, 2003, recommending its denial
for lack of merit. Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro again
approved the recommendation.17 Baviera received a copy of the
resolution on September 14, 2004.
On November 16, 2004, Baviera filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the CA, assailing the
resolutions of the Ombudsman. He relied on the following
arguments:
i CONSIDERATION FOR HER USE OF INFLUENCE ON HER DECISION TO
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN CLEARLY ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT GUTIERREZ
CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 3(a) OF RA 3019
ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTARY
OR TESTIMONIAL, TO SHOW THAT SHE HAS RECEIVED MATERIAL
REMUNERATION AS A CONSIDERATION FOR HER USE OF
INFLUENCE ON HER DECISION TO ALLOW MR. RAMAN TO TRAVEL
ABROAD.
ii
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN CLEARLY ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT GUTIERREZ
CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTIONS 3(e) AND 3(j) OF RA
3019 ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ACTUAL OR REAL
DAMAGE SUFFERED BY ANY PARTY INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT
AND THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE OR
BENEFIT IN FAVOR OF ANY PERSON.
iii
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN CLEARLY ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INSTANT CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT (RA 3019) ALLEGEDLY ON THE GROUND OF
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.18
However, on January 7, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing
the petition on the ground that the proper remedy was to file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, conformably with the ruling of this Court in
Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman.19 Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, insisting that his petition for certiorari in the
CA under Rule 65 was in accordance with the ruling in Fabian v.
Desierto.20 He insisted that the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-
judicial agency of the government, and under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court over a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. He asserted that the filing of his petition for certiorari with
the CA conformed to the established judicial policy of hierarchy of
courts as explained by this Court in People v. Cuaresma.21
On July 20, 2005, CA issued a Resolution denying the motion,
holding that the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto22 is not applicable, as it
applies only in appeals from resolutions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. The remedy of the aggrieved
party from resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is to file
a petition for certiorariin this Court, and not in the CA. The
applicable rule is that enunciated in Enemecio v.
Ombudsman,23 later reiterated in Perez v. Office of the
Ombudsman24 and Estrada v. Desierto.25
On August 18, 2005, Baviera filed with this Court the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the CA
resolutions on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE
THE CLEAR RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE
OF FABIAN VS. DESIERTO, 295 SCRA 470 (SEPTEMBER 16, 1998).
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RESOLVE THE INSTANT PETITION ON THE MERITS AND TO FIND THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO HAVE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT GUTIERREZ CAN NOT BE HELD
LIABLE UNDER SECTION 3(a) OF RA 3019 ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTARY OR TESTIMONIAL, TO
SHOW THAT SHE HAS RECEIVED MATERIAL REMUNERATION AS A
ALLOW MR. RAMAN TO TRAVEL.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RESOLVE THE INSTANT PETITION ON THE MERITS AND TO FIND THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO HAVE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT GUTIERREZ CANNOT BE HELD
LIABLE UNDER SECTIONS 3(e) AND 3(j) OF RA 3019 ALLEGEDLY
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ACTUAL OR REAL DAMAGE SUFFERED BY
ANY PARTY INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT
RESPONDENT DID NOT GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE OR BENEFIT IN
FAVOR OF ANY PERSON.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RESOLVE THE INSTANT PETITION ON THE MERITS AND TO FIND THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO HAVE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION
OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA 3019)
ALLEGEDLY ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.26
Petitioner insists that his petition for certiorari in the CA assailing
the resolutions of the Ombudsman under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is proper, in the light of Fabian v. Desierto.27 Under B.P. No.
129, the CA and the Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari under from resolutions of the Ombudsman
in his investigation of criminal cases.
In her comment on the petition, respondent Gutierrez maintained
that instead of filing his petition in the CA, petitioner should have
filed his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with this Court alleging
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
committed by the respondents Office of the Ombudsman officials.
The other respondents, for their part, insist that the ruling of this
Court in Fabian applies only to resolutions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases and not in criminal cases.
The threshold issues in this case are (1) whether the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner in the CA was the proper remedy to
assail the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman; and (2)
whether respondent officials committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal
complaint of petitioner against respondent Acting Secretary of
Justice Gutierrez for lack of probable cause.
On the first issue, respondent Gutierrez contends that the proper
remedy of petitioner to assail the Resolutions of the Ombudsman
finding no probable cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section
3(a), (e) and (j) was to file a petition for certiorari with this Court,
not with the CA. In 1999, this Court ruled in Tirol, Jr. v. Del
Rosario28 that the remedy of the aggrieved party from a resolution
of the Office of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence
of probable cause in criminal cases was to file a petition 3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion,
for certiorari under Rule 65 in this Court. The Court reiterated its this Court will not interfere with the exercise of the Ombudsman’s
ruling in Kuizon v. Desierto29 and Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario.30 And on discretion, who, based on his own findings and deliberate
February 22, 2006, in Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman,31 the consideration of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds
Court ruled that the remedy to challenge the Resolution of the with it.35
Ombudsman at the conclusion of a preliminary investigation was to WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
file a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65. hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the
In Estrada v. Desierto,32 this Court rejected the contention of Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner therein that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 petitioner.
assailing the Order/Resolution of the OMB in criminal cases should SO ORDERED.
be filed in the CA, conformably with the principle of hierarchy of
courts. In that case, the Court explained:
Petitioner contends that certiorari under Rule 65 should first be
filed with the Court of Appeals as the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
precludes the immediate invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction.
Unfortunately for petitioner, he is flogging a dead horse as this
argument has already been shot down in Kuizon v.
Ombudsmanwhere we decreed –
In dismissing petitioners’ petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court
of Appeals cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate court
correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In
the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically
stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account
where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to
as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a
criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition should
have been filed with this Court.
Kuizon and the subsequent case of Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) drove home the point that the remedy of
aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman
finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative
cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an
original action for certiorari with this Court and not with the Court
of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the
Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of lack of probable cause, as in
this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65
to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals
following our ruling in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman.
As this Court had already resolved said issue of jurisdiction in the
above-cited cases, it is a salutary and necessary judicial practice to
apply the rulings therein to the subject petition. Stare decisis et non
quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled. Undaunted, petitioner now harps on the validity of Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 6770 claiming it to be unconstitutional. The Court
of Appeals, it must be recalled, relied quite heavily on Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 6770 in relation to Fabian v. Desierto in ruling that it
had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed thereat.33
On the merits of the petition, the Court finds that petitioner failed
to establish that the respondent officials committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse
of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s
exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.34
The Court has reviewed the assailed resolutions of the Office of the
Ombudsman, and finds that petitioner likewise failed to establish
probable cause for violation of Sections 3(a), (e) and (j) of RA No.
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO
CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,
namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional
Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito
Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action
for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the
Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe,
Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and
respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among
these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the
respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest
Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the
respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public
respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing
motions as follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in
default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied
as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the
Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was
denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters
that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to
dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on
prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters
that could be determined only after trial.1
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial
court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial
proper.
In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed
petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on
March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998,
the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and
paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal,
holding that it was filed eight days late.5 This was received by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.6
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of
the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably
filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998
since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and
they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.7
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February
12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under
the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for
the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in
the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance
with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the
judgment final and executory.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals
on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,
petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the
appellate court:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES
WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-
36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL
MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL
DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING
AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT
HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR
FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR
NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL
DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST]
ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES
DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL
ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY
PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA
280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE
PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE
FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE
ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.9
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within
which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often
leads to the loss of the right to appeal.10 The period to appeal is
fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as amended,
provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file
a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days
from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment
that dismisses an action.12
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1,
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed
as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which
dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the
denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the
15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when
they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of
which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal ¾ the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or
the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial
court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion
was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his
omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within
15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final
order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial
court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case
of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.14 where we again considered the
order denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as
the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view
that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact
file their notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On
the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998),
petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a
motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR
only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.15 It ruled
that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the
notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules
to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the
order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there
that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period
to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in
similar cases,16 premised on the long-settled doctrine that the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of
occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become
final at some definite time fixed by law.18
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving
upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty
(30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an
appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a
motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been
pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last
day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected
within the day following that in which the party appealing received
notice of the denial of said motion.19 (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously
consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period
to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal21 and enhance the
efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict
observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we
condoned late filing of notices of appeal,22 and only in very
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v.
Municipality of Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an
essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure
should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised
the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the
right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods
which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless,
under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal
may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we
condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong
considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course
to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules.
In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of
the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases
where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always
existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.
Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a
healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws
and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity
for the just and proper disposition of his cause.25
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts.26 It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process,
and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals
to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,27 4328 and WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
45,29 the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court
extensions may consist of 15 days or more. of Appeals for further proceedings.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to No costs.
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court SO ORDERED.
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration. 30
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final
order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of
BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days
to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in
this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which
rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any
error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and
to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as
to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt
of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of
"final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal
within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or
file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five
days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was
well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.34
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso
(Philippines), Inc. v. IAC35 since the Court of Appeals never even
referred to it in its assailed decision.
G.R. No. 142675. July 22, 2005
VICENTE AGOTE Y MATOL, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL F. LORENZO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 43,
Manila and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Vicente Agote y
Matol seeks to annul and set aside the following resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, to wit:
1. Resolution dated September 14, 1999,1 dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order filed by the petitioner against the Honorable
Manuel F. Lorenzo, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 43 for refusing to retroactively apply in his favor Republic
Act No. 82942; and,
2. Resolution dated February 8, 2000,3 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the pleadings on record, the following are the
undisputed factual antecedents:
Petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol was earlier charged before the
sala of respondent judge with Illegal Possession of Firearms under
Presidential Decree No. 18664 and violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 28265 (Gun Ban), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 96-
149820 and 96-149821, respectively, allegedly committed, as
follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149820
That on or about April 27, 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly
have in possession and under his custody and control, One (1) .38
cal. Rev. without serial no. with four (4) live bullets. Without first
having secured from the proper authorities the necessary license
therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149821
That on or about April 27, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) .38 cal. Rev. without serial number, with four (4) live
ammunition/bullets in the chamber, by then and there carrying the
same along V. Mapa Ext. Sta. Mesa, this City, which is a public place
on the aforesaid date which is covered by an election period,
without first securing the written authority from the COMELEC, as
provided for by the COMELEC Resolution No. 2828, in relation to
RA No. 7166 (Gun Ban).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
Thereafter, the two (2) cases were tried jointly.
Eventually, in a decision dated May 18, 1999, the trial court
rendered a judgment of conviction in both cases, separately
sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, in accordance with PD. No. 1866 in Crim. Case No. 96-
149820 (illegal possession of firearm), and to a prison term of one
(1) year in Crim. Case No. 96-149821 (violation of the COMELEC
Resolution on gun ban).
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 82946 was approved
into law.
Pointing out, among others, that the penalty for illegal possession
of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 has already been reduced by the
subsequent enactment of Rep. Act No. 8294, hence, the latter law,
being favorable to him, should be the one applied in determining
his penalty for illegal possession of firearms, petitioner moved for
a reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 decision of the trial court.
In its order dated July 15, 1999,7 however, the trial court denied
petitioner’s motion, saying:
While the law (R.A. 8294) is indeed favorable to the accused and
therefore should be made retroactive we are also guided by Art. 4
of the Civil Code which states that laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided. Republic Act 8294 did not so
provide that it shall have a retroactive effect. The Supreme Court
likewise in the case of Padilla vs. CA declared: ‘The trial court and
the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the
time of the appellant’s commission of the offense for it is a rule that
laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands.
Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order, thereat
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK.
In the herein assailed resolution dated September 14, 1999,8 the
appellate court dismissed petitioner’s recourse on two (2) grounds,
to wit: (a) the remedy of certiorari availed of by petitioner is
improper since he should have appealed from the July 15, 1999
order of the trial court; and (b) lack of jurisdiction, as the issue
involved is a pure question of law cognizable by the Supreme Court.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court in its subsequent resolution of February 8,
2000,9 petitioner is now with us, submitting for resolution the
following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing his petition for certiorari; and (2) whether the courts
below erred in not giving Rep. Act No. 8294 a retroactive
application.
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner never put in issue
the factual findings of the trial court. What he questions is said
court’s legal conclusion that Rep. Act No. 8294 cannot be
retroactively applied to him. Unquestionably, the issue raised is
one purely of law. As we have said in Macawiwili Gold Mining and
Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:10
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any one of them. And the distinction is well-known:
there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts;
there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or the falsehood of the facts alleged.
Considering that "judgments of regional trial courts in the exercise
of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the Court of
Appeals in cases when appellant raises questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law", while"appeals from judgments of the
[same courts] in the exercise of their original jurisdiction must be
brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant
raises only questions of law"11, petitioner should have appealed the
trial court’s ruling to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended,12 pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the
same Rules, viz:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law
are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the remedy of a
petition for review under Rule 45, his right to resort to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 was effectively foreclosed, precisely
because one of the requirements for the availment of the latter
remedy is that "there should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law",13 the remedies of
appeal and certiorari being mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive.14
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what petitioner
should have done was to take an appeal from the trial court’s order
of July 15, 1999 which denied his motion for reconsideration of the
May 18, 1999 judgment of conviction.
Petitioner’s case is worse compounded by the fact that even his
period for appeal had already prescribed when he filed with the
Court of Appeals his certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK.
The Rollo of said case reveals that petitioner received his copy of
the trial court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration
on July 20, 1999. As the same Rollo shows, it was only on August
23, 1999, or after more than fifteen (15) days when petitioner filed
his wrong remedy of certiorari with the appellate court.
Be that as it may, the Court feels that it must squarely address the
issue raised in this case regarding the retroactivity of Rep. Act No.
8294, what with the reality that the provisions thereof are
undoubtedly favorable to petitioner. For this purpose, then, we
shall exercise our prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules
and "hold the bull by its horns", so to speak. After all, the power of
this Court to suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice
requires is not without legal authority or precedent. In Solicitor
General, et. al. vs. The Metropolitan Manila Authority,15 we held:
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural
rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized
in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning ‘pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts.’ In proper cases, procedural
rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial
justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and
formalistic adherence to such rules. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. xxx Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules
and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require.
We shall now proceed to determine whether the provisions of Rep.
Act No. 8294 amending P.D. No. 1866 can be retroactively applied
to this case.
Here, the two (2) crimes for which petitioner was convicted by the
trial court, i.e., (1) illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866
and (2) violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 on gun ban,
were both committed by the petitioner on April 27, 1996. For the
crime of illegal possession of firearms in Crim. Case No. 96-149820,
he was sentenced to suffer a prison term ranging from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to (18)
eighteen years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, in accordance with P.D. No. 1866, Section
1 of which reads:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of
Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis supplied)
When Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997,16 the penalty
for illegal possession of firearms was lowered, depending on the
class of firearm possessed, viz:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
‘SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered
firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of
similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool
or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of
Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is
classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores
bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber
.40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum
and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, petitioner contends that the reduced
penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 should be the one imposed on
him. Significantly, in its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,17 the
Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner, positing
further that the statement made by this Court in People vs.
Jayson18 to the effect that the provisions for a lighter penalty under
Rep. Act No. 8294 does not apply if another crime has been
committed, should not be applied to this case because the proviso
in Section 1 of said law that "no other crime was committed" must
refer only to those crimes committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm and not when the other crime is not related to the use
thereof or where the law violated merely criminalizes the
possession of the same, like in the case of election gun ban, as here.
As early as August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No. 8294 took
effect,19 this Court has pronounced in Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals20 that said law must be given retroactive effect in favor of
those accused under P.D. No. 1866. Since then, this Court had
consistently adhered to the Gonzales ruling.21
For sure, in People vs. Valdez,22 where the accused was charged
with the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated
murder and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under
two separate informations, this Court even took a bolder stance by
applying Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactively so that the accused
therein may not be convicted of the separate crime of illegal
possession of firearms, but refused to apply the same retroactively
so as to aggravate the crime of murder. The Valdez ruling had been
applied in a host of subsequent cases.23
Yet, in other cases,24 although the Court had given Rep. Act No.
8294 retroactive effect so as to prevent the conviction of an
accused of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm when
the said unlicensed firearm was "used" to commit the crime of
murder or homicide, the Court did not appreciate this "use" of such
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance as provided
therein, when the "use" of an unlicensed firearm was not
specifically alleged in the information, as required by the Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on the matter,
the present case takes center stage presenting, this time, another
twist, so to speak. Petitioner, who was charged of illegal possession
of firearms was also charged of another offense: Violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban), but the unlicensed
firearm was not "used" or discharged in this case. The question
then which appears to be of first impression, is whether or not the
unlicensed firearm should be actually "used" and discharged in the
course of committing the other crime in order that Sec. 1, Rep. Act
No. 8294 will apply so that no separate crime of illegal possession
of firearms may be charged.
Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again. In Cupcupin vs.
People,25 the accused was charged and convicted for two (2)
separate crimes of illegal possession of firearms, and illegal
possession of prohibited drugs. In the more recent case of People
vs. Almeida,26 however, although the accused was acquitted of the
separate charge of illegal possession of firearm for lack of evidence,
the Court nevertheless made the following clear pronouncement:
Furthermore, in any event, the Court has ruled in previous cases
that in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, there can
be no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition if there is another crime committed such as, in this
case, that of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed firearm was
merely found lying around, together with the prohibited drugs, and
therefore, was not being "used" in the commission of an offense.
Given this Court’s aforequoted pronouncement in Almeida, can the
accused in the present case still be separately convicted of two (2)
offenses of illegal possession of firearms and violation of gun ban,
more so because as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not
actually "used" or discharged in committing the other offense?
In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam,27 this Court, interpreting the
subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294, applied the basic
principles in criminal law, and categorically held:
xxx A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm
is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
‘other crime’ is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms
becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for
illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple
language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate
offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that ‘no other crime was
committed by the person arrested’. If the intention of the law in
the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it
should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily,
where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.(Emphasis
supplied).
The aforementioned ruling was reiterated and applied in the
subsequent cases of People vs. Garcia,28 where the judgment of
conviction of the accused-appellants for illegal possession of
firearms was set aside there being another crime – kidnapping for
ransom – which they were perpetrating at the same time; People
vs. Bernal,29 where the Court retroactively applied Rep. Act No.
8294 in accused-appellant’s favor because it would mean his
acquittal from the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms; and People vs. Bustamante,30 where, in refusing to
convict the accused-appellant of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms, the Court declared that insofar as it is
favorable to the appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294
should be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant must
be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of firearms.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court cannot but set aside petitioner’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of
firearm since another crime was committed at the same time, i.e.,
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.
Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings considering that it
would mean petitioner’s acquittal of the more serious offense of
illegal possession of firearms which carries a much heavier penalty
than violation of the COMELEC gun-ban resolution. However, as we
have rationalized in Ladjaalam:31
xxx Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession
of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter
offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of
which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose
wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review. Any perception that
the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new
meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of
the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to
applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we
have done so in this case.
The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the
law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law
what is not written therein. While we understand
respondent People’s contention that the "use" of the firearm
seemed to have been the main consideration during the
deliberations of the subject provision of Rep. Act No. 8294, the fact
remains that the word "use" never found its way into the final
version of the bill which eventually became Rep. Act No. 8294. The
Court’s hands are now tied and it cannot supply the perceived
deficiency in the final version without contravening the most basic
principles in the interpretation of penal laws which had always
leaned in favor of the accused. Under our system of government
where powers are allocated to the three (3) great branches, only
the Legislature can remedy such deficiency, if any, by proper
amendment of Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294.
As written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the Court from
convicting petitioner of the separate crime of illegal possession of
firearm despite the fact that, as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm
was not actually "used". For sure, there is, in this case, closer
relation between possession of unlicensed firearm and violation of
the COMELEC gun-ban than the illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm to the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs
in Almeida.
WHEREFORE, Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of
firearms is hereby DISMISSED while the judgment of conviction in
Criminal Case No. 96-149821 for violation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2826 in relation to Rep. Act No. 7166 (Gun Ban), is AFFIRMED.
Since petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed
upon him by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 96-149821, his
immediate release from custody is hereby ORDERED unless
detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013
EFREN S. ALMUETE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a
period of fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within
which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes final.2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the May 4, 2007 Resolution4 and the September 4,
2007 Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
98502.
Factual Antecedents
This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as
G.R. No. 144332 and promulgated on June 10, 2004.
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren
(Lloren) were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, with violation of Section 687 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the
"Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines," as amended by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,8docketed as Criminal Case No.
2672.9
On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioner’s
counsel informed the trial court that petitioner and Lloren were ill
while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The
RTC, however, found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to
promulgate its Decision as scheduled.11 The dispositive portion of
the September 8, 1998 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete,
Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as
amended, they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 18
years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as minimum
period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum period. Costs
against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and
Lloren13 and issued warrants of arrest against them.14
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration,
questioning the validity of the promulgation, the factual and legal
bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty
imposed.15
On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of
merit.16
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49953, with the
CA.17
On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the
case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
GRANTED. On the basis of the evidence on record, accused Efren S.
Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge
against him.
The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the
presence of the accused Ila and Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of
their own choice, after notice and allow them to appeal. Let the
complete records of this case be remanded to the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.18
The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines
to elevate the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No.
144332.
On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal and
reinstated the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision and its October
12, 1998 Order, to wit:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated September 8, 1998 and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion
was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated January 17, 2005.20
On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21
Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for
Reconsideration, which were denied by this Court in its March 28,
2005 and November 9, 2005 Resolutions, respectively.22
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he
could still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court
noted without action his Motion for Clarification in its July 26, 2006
Resolution.24
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Repromulgation25 of the September 8, 1998 Decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order,26 denied the Motion for
Repromulgation.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in
its February 20, 2007 Order.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC,
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari28 with the CA. On May 4,
2007, the CA rendered its Resolution29 which dismissed the Petition
for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration30 was likewise denied by
the CA in its September 4, 2007 Resolution.31
Issues
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner raising the following issues:
1. Whether x x x the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner
Almuete of the charge against him passed the requisite conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether x x x the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC
convicting the petitioner was valid despite the absence of the
petitioner and regardless of petitioner’s intention to be present at
the promulgation of the Decision.
3. Whether x x x the Honorable CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it acquitted petitioner Almuete in a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
4. Whether x x x the judgment of acquittal by the Honorable CA
bars further proceedings and that to do so would constitute a
violation of petitioner’s constitutional right against double
jeopardy.
5. Whether x x x the denial of the RTC of petitioner’s motion for re-
promulgation is in order, the denial being based on an
inappropriate
Administrative Order of this Honorable Supreme Court
(Administrative Order No. 16-93).32
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly
convicted by the RTC because his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.33 He argues that his conviction was based on
circumstantial and hearsay evidence as he was convicted only
because he owns the truck containing the lumber.34 Thus, he
contends that his earlier acquittal by the CA was proper,35 and that
his acquittal can no longer be assailed without violating the
principle of double jeopardy.36
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the promulgation of the
judgment against him since it was made in his absence.37 He insists
that he had a valid reason for not attending the promulgation of
the judgment as he was suffering from stress, anxiety, and some
physiological disturbance, and thus, was advised to rest.38 He also
claims that the RTC’s denial of his Motion for Repromulgation was
not proper.39 Hence, a repromulgation of the judgment should be
made to allow him to avail of his right to appeal.40
Respondent’s Arguments
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, contends that the
issues and arguments raised by petitioner may no longer be
entertained as these have been addressed in People v. Court of
Appeals,41 which is already the "law of the case."42 He likewise
points out that the promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed
under Section 643 of Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,44 and that the denial of petitioner’s Motion for
Repromulgation of the September 8, 1998 Decision is proper as the
same is in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93.45
As to petitioner’s right to appeal, respondent opines that
petitioner’s right has prescribed,46 as the same should have been
filed within 15 days from the time he or his counsel received a copy
of the September 8, 1998 Decision instead of filing a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA.47
However, notwithstanding the finality of petitioner’s conviction,
respondent recommends that the penalty be modified by reducing
the same to six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).48
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The denial of the Motion for
Repromulgation is in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 16-93
Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993,
provides that:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
RE: PROCEDURE AFTER AFFIRMANCE OR MODIFICATION BY
SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS OF JUDGMENTS OF
CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
To ensure uniformity in the procedure to be observed by the trial
courts in criminal cases after their judgments of conviction shall
have been affirmed or modified by the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals, attention is invited to the decisional and statutory
guidelines set out hereunder.
1. The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial
courts in criminal cases, differs from that prescribed for the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals where promulgation is
effected by filing the signed copy of the judgment with the Clerk of
Court who causes true copies thereof to be served upon the
parties. The procedural consequence of this distinction was
reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of Prisons, to wit:
By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51)
in relation to section 17 of Rule 120 (now Section 17 of Rule 124),
a judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days
thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including
a certified copy of the judgment for execution.
In the case of People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil.
764), it was explained that "the certified copy of the judgment is
sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court under
section 9 of rule 53, not for the promulgation or reading thereof to
the defendant, but for the execution of the judgment against him,"
it "not being necessary to promulgate or read it to the defendant,
because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney had
already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8,
as amended, of the same Rules 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule
51)," and that the duty of the court of first instance in respect to
such judgment is merely to see that it is duly executed when in their
nature the intervention of the court of first instance is necessary to
that end.
2. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial
court for "promulgation" of the judgment of the appellate court
should, therefore, be immediately discontinued. It is not only an
unauthorized surplusage entailing unnecessary expense, but it
could also create security problems where the convict was already
under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and the place
of confinement is at some distance from the station of the court.
Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate
court if the convict is under detention, the trial court should issue
forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order so
that the prisoner may be considered remitted or may be
transferred to the corresponding prison facility for confinement
and service of sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial
court shall immediately order the bondsman to surrender the
convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue
the corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall
submit to this Court proof of the execution of judgment within
fifteen (15) days from date of such execution. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts
to appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance
or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction
in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no error on
the part of the RTC in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of
the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision which was reinstated in
People v. Court of Appeals.49
The promulgation of judgment is valid.
Petitioner’s attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the
RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision must likewise fail as this has
already been addressed by this Court in People v. Court of
Appeals.50 As this Court has explained, there was no reason to
postpone the promulgation because petitioner’s absence was
unjustifiable.51 Hence, no abuse of discretion could be attributed to
the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence of
petitioner.52
It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has
attained finality. In fact, an Entry of Judgment was made by this
Court on February 15, 2005.
Petitioner’s right to appeal has prescribed.
As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTC’s September 8,
1998 Decision, we rule in the negative.
In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioner’s
acquittal by the CA as it was made with grave abuse of discretion.
This Court explained that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is
not allowed because "the authority to review perceived errors of
the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion x x x
are correctible only by appeal by writ of error."54 Thus, in filing a
Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner availed of the
wrong remedy. Thus:
In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused,
respondents herein, guilty of the crime charged based on the
evidence on record and the law involved, and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705,
in relation to Articles 304 and 305 of the Revised Penal Code. They
had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law to overturn the
decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision on its merits, and for the nullification of the
promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial court’s denial of
their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to
appeal, by writ of error, from the decision on its merits on
questions of facts and of law. The appeal of the petitioners in due
course was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. In such appeal,
the petitioners could question the findings of facts of the trial court,
its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the penalty
imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case open for review and that the appellate
court can reverse any errors of the trial court, whether assigned or
unassigned, found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing
the decision by writ of error, the respondents filed their petition for
certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the trial court on its
merits. They questioned their conviction and the penalty imposed
on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt for
the crime charged, the evidence against them being merely hearsay
and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged
mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It
behooved the appellate court to have dismissed the petition,
instead of giving it due course and granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial court’s assessment of the evidence on
record, its findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said
findings. The CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was
utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction,
and acquitted respondent Almuete of the crime charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when
it ventured beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto
itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review
perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment
and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by writ of error.
Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent
Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is authorized by
statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and
undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which
the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The
lack of statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case, the CA is authorized
to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.
A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy
for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. It
cannot impair or create rights; nor can any right be based on it.
Thus, respondent Almuete cannot base his claim of double
jeopardy on the appellate court’s decision.55 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioner’s right to appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998
Decision has long prescribed. Consequently, the said Decision is no
longer open to an appeal.
The penalty imposed must be modified.
Nonetheless, we agree with the suggestion of the Office of the
Solicitor General that the penalty imposed by the RTC in its
September 8, 1998 Decision must be modified. Concededly, this
case is an offshoot of G.R. No. 144332 which the Court decided on
June 10, 2004 which found grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CA in acquitting Almuete.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides
that:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished
by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing
stolen exceed[s] the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by
the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen
is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied)
Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the
penalty as prescribed in Article 310 which is two degrees higher
than those specified in Article 309.56 This is erroneous considering
that the penalty prescribed in Article 310 would apply only if the
theft was committed under any the following circumstances: a) by
a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or b) if the
stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is taken
on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of
these circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article
309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is ₱57,012.00. Since
the amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods57 should be imposed in its
maximum period58 plus an additional one (1) year for each
additional ₱10,000 pesos in excess of ₱22,000.00 or three more
years.59 Thus, the correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere
between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is
one degree lower than that prescribed by the law. In this case, the
minimum penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, which is anywhere between two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
This Court is not unaware of the rule that "a final judgment may no
longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration,
amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what
court, be it the highest court of the land, rendered it."60 However,
this Court has suspended the application of this rule based on
certain recognized exceptions, viz:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would
warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory
character and an examination and review by the appellate court of
the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should
be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.61
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life
and liberty of petitioner. If his penalty of imprisonment remains
uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would
be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2
months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of
the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper
imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the
range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision
correccional, while the maximum should only be anywhere
between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13 years
of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we
suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the
court to suspend its own Rules or except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed,
when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice
would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will
not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice."62 Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist
strong compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a miscarriage thereof."63 After all, the Court’s
"primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x."64
Surely, this is not the first time that the Court modified the penalty
imposed notwithstanding the finality of the assailed decision.
In People v. Barro,65 Benigno Barro (Benigno), Joel Florin (Florin)
and Joel Barro (Joel) were charged with murder. After trial, the trial
court convicted them as charged. Only Benigno and Florin filed
their notice of appeal. Joel failed to appeal as he escaped from
confinement. Hence, the trial court’s Decision insofar as Joel is
concerned had become final and executory. In the Court’s Decision
of August 17, 2000, the appeal filed by Benigno and Florin was
found without merit. However, the Court noted that as regards
Joel, the penalty imposed by the trial court was "outside the
range"66 of the penalty prescribed for the offense. Consequently,
the Court modified the penalty imposed on him notwithstanding
that the same had already become final and executory. The Court
ratiocinated that:
Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense, is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. Two degrees lower is prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor medium. Joel Barro escaped from jail, hence, he is
disqualified from the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
He should, therefore, be meted the straight penalty of eight years
which is within the medium period (6 years 1 month and 11 days to
8 years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court erred in
imposing the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months
because it is outside the range of said penalty. The records show
that Joel Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty
imposed on the co-accused who did not appeal was a nullity
because it was never authorized by law, that penalty imposed on
the accused can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty
prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never
become final and executory and it is within the duty and inherent
power of the Court to have it conformable with law.67
In Estrada v. People,68 petitioner was charged with the crime of
estafa. While the trial was pending, petitioner jumped bail.
Understandably, during the promulgation of judgment in 1997,
petitioner was absent. Two years later, or in 1999, petitioner was
arrested. She then moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s
Decision. The same was denied for having been filed out of time.
Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which
was denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case before this Court.
In its Decision dated August 25, 2005, the Court ruled that
petitioner’s trial in absentia was proper; that she was not denied
due process; and that the denial by the trial court of her motion for
reconsideration was proper as the same was filed beyond the
reglementary period. However, the Court noted that the penalty
imposed by the trial court (which is 12 years of prision mayor to 24
years as maximum) on petitioner was erroneous. As computed by
the Court, considering that the amount defrauded is only
₱68,700.00, the proper minimum imposable penalty should only be
within the range of "6 months, and 1 day of prision correccional in
its minimum period and 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional in its medium period"69while the proper maximum
imposable penalty should only be within the range of "10 years, 8
months and 21 days and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum
period."70 Hence, notwithstanding the finality of the trial court’s
Decision, the Court modified the penalty imposed, as the same was
outside the range prescribed by law.
In Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,71 this Court also
modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner notwithstanding
the finality of the trial court’s Decision based on the observation
that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous because
it was outside the range prescribed by law. The Court ruled thus:
However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint
Decision of the trial court that must be rectified in order to avoid
its repetition. The trial court erroneously included an additional
one day on the maximum period of arresto mayor imposed on
petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the range of said
penalty. The duration of arresto mayor is only from one month and
one day to six months. Adding one day to the maximum penalty will
place it within the range of prision correccional.
Moreover, imposing the maximum penalty of imprisonment of four
years, four months and one day of prision correccional is also
incorrect as it is outside the range of the penalty imposable in this
case. x x x
xxxx
The error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to
make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law as it is within the
Court’s duty and inherent power. x x x
xxxx
Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the
penalty imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with the
law and nothing else. It is not tantamount to a reduction in order
to be favorable to the petitioner nor an increase so as to be
prejudicial to him.72
In People v. Gatward73 the Court explicitly stated that by merely
modifying the penalty imposed, it is not reopening the case; neither
is it saying that there was error in judgment. In the same manner,
in this case, we are not reopening G.R. No. 144332, much more
reversing it. Thus:
x x x In the case of U Aung Win, and the same hold true with respect
to Gatward, the penalty inflicted by the court a quo was a nullity
because it was never authorized by law as a valid punishment. The
penalties which consisted of aliquot one-third portions of an
indivisible penalty are self-contradictory in terms and unknown in
penal law. Without intending to sound sardonic or facetious, it was
akin to imposing the indivisible penalties of public censure, or
perpetual absolute or special disqualification, or death in their
minimum or maximum periods.
This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by
inflicting a penalty higher or lower than the one imposable under
the law but with both penalties being legally recognized and
authorized as valid punishments. An erroneous judgment, as thus
understood, is a valid judgment. But a judgment which ordains a
penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of penalties or which
is an impossible version of that in the roster of lawful penalties is
necessarily void, since the error goes into the very essence of the
penalty and does not merely arise from the misapplication thereof.
Corollarily, such a judgment can never become final and
executory.1âwphi1
Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal,
his case was reopened in order that a higher penalty may be
imposed on him. There is here no reopening of the case, as in fact
the judgment is being affirmed but with a correction of the very
substance of the penalty to make it conformable to law, pursuant
to a duty and power inherent in this Court. The penalty has not
been changed since what was decreed by the trial court and is now
being likewise affirmed by this Court is the same penalty of
reclusion perpetua which, unfortunately, was imposed by the
lower court in an elemental form which is non-existent in and not
authorized by law. Just as the penalty has not been reduced in
order to be favorable to the accused, neither has it been increased
so as to be prejudicial to him.
Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by
the imposition upon him of the corrected duration, inherent in the
essence and concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be
serving a void sentence with an illegitimate penalty born out of a
figurative liaison between judicial legislation and unequal
protection of law. He would thus be the victim of an inadvertence
which could result in the nullification, not only of the judgment and
the penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually
have served. Far from violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore,
the remedial and corrective measures interposed by this opinion
protect him against the risk of another trial and review aimed at
determining the correct period of imprisonment.74
Also, it would not be amiss to mention that the Office of the
Solicitor General prayed for the modification of the imposable
penalty.75
Finally, pursuant to Section 11(a),76Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the favorable modification of the penalty
should likewise apply to petitioner's co-accused who failed to
appeal.77
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 4, 2007 and
the September 4, 2007 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 98502 are hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, for reasons
stated above, the September 8, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, docketed as Criminal Case No.
2672, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as the penalty of imprisonment
is concerned. The accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y
Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz are each sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197582 June 29, 2015
JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla
seeks the liberal application of procedural rules to correct the
penalty imposed in the Decision1dated January 14, 2009 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67, in
Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which had already attained
finality in view of petitioner's failure to timely file an appeal.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Petitioner obtained a cash loan . from respondent Matrix Finance
Corporation. As partial payment for her loan, petitioner issued
Philippine Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863 to 0032868. The six
checks have a uniform face value of ₱6,667.00 each.
Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the
drawee bank for payment. However, all the checks were
dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a closed
account.
Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for
the payment of the face value of the dishonored checks culminated
in her indictment for six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (BP 22). The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169
to 321174, and were raffled off to Branch 67, MeTC of Makati.
In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner
criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of the six rubber checks.
For each count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face
value of ₱6,667.00, the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine
amounting to ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil
liability for the six consolidated cases was computed in the total
amount of ₱40,002.00. The fallo of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S.
Sumbilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For each count, she is sentenced to pay
n. fine of ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-
payment. She is likewise ORDERED to indemnify private
complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of
₱40,002.00 plus 12% annual legal interest from September 21,
2002 until full payment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion
for Reconsideration3 before the MeTC. The Motion was denied in
the Order4 dated April 17, 2009 being a pleading barred under the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The MeTC further noted
that the prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner will not suspend the running of the period to perfect an
appeal.
Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also
denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period.
With the denial5 of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
denying her appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari6 under
Rule 65 of the Rules which was docketed as SCA No. 09-1125 and
raffled off to Branch 61, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner, the RTC
dismissed7 the petition for certiorari. The Motion for
Reconsideration8 filed by petitioner met the same fate of
dismissal.9
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a
petition for review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA,
however, ruled that an ordinary appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41
of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy under the circumstances
because the RTC rendered the decision in the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction.11
On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011
Resolution12 of the CA denying her Motion for
Reconsideration,13 petitioner filed a motion for extension of time
to file the instant petition.14
On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on
Certiorari15 within the period of extension granted in our
Resolution16 dated September 7, 2011. She ascribed to the CA a
sole error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON TECHNICALITY AND NOT
EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE DUTY OF GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON
THE SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE A CLEAR PRESENCE OF SUCH VIOLATION OF
LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN HER PETITION WHICH COULD
HAVE MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER COURT.17
Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an
ordinary appeal before the CA. She also fully grasped19 the effects
of her erroneous filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to
challenge the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of six counts of
violation of BP 22. Knowing that her conviction had already
attained finality, petitioner seeks the relaxation of the rules of
procedure so that the alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the
MeTC can be modified to make it in accord with existing law and
jurisprudence.
Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere
statutory privilege can only be exercised in accordance with the
rules, and the lost appeal cannot be resurrected through the
present remedial recourse of a petition for review on certiorari.
The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in
the MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final
and executory, may still be modified.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated
January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 rendered
by the MeTC, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six
counts of violation of BP 22. For every count of violation of BP 22
involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, petitioner was
meted a penalty of fine of PS0,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of non-payment. She assails the penalty for
being out of the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1 of BP
22, and the subsidiary imprisonment to be violative of
Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001, and the holdings
in Vaca v. Court of Appeals.20 Petitioner asserted that the maximum
penalty of fine that can be imposed against her in each count of
violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value of the
dishonored check only or ₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for
each count is thus excessive. She further implied that the
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment contravened Section 20 of
Article III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a
punishment for not paying a debt.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty
days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but
not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in
no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The court may thus impose any of the following alternative
penalties against an accused found criminally liable for violating BP
22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than
one year; or (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount
of the check, and shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00; or (3) both
such fine and imprisonment. The discretion to impose a single
(imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment)
penalty pertains to the court.
If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double
the amount of the face value of the rubber check which in no case
should exceed ₱200,000.00.
Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is
₱6,667.00. Under Section 1 of BP 22, the maximum penalty of fine
that can be imposed on petitioner is only 1!13,334.00, or the
amount double the face value of each check. Indubitably, the MeTC
meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond the maximum
limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. The fine of ₱80,000.00
is more than 11 times the amount of the face value of each check
that was dishonored.
Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00),
the MeTC incorrectly computed the amount of fine using the total
face value of the six checks (₱40,002.00). The same error occurred
in Abarquez v. Court of Appeals,21 where we modified the penalty
of fine imposed in one of the consolidated cases therein (Criminal
Case No. D-8137) to only double the amount of the face value of
the subject check.
Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already
final and executory after petitioner failed to timely file a Notice of
Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of
judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.22 Upon finality
of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify
or alter the same.23
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and
fast rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its
own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when
justice requires it.24 After all, procedural rules were conceived to
aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules
would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice,
the former must yield to the latter,25 as specifically mandated
under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.
Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when
the interest of substantial justice is at stake and where special and
compelling reasons called for such actions.26 In Barnes v. Judge
Padilla,27 we declared as follows:
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by
any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve
substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already
declared to be final.
The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The
Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison28 when the Court corrected the
minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence
imposed on the accused which exceeded the period of the
imposable penalty. The correction was made in the interest of
justice and only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in
accordance with law and nothing else.29
Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and
inherent power of the Court to correct the erroneous penalties
meted on the accused in a final and executory judgments, and
make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law.
The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court
were the reasons anchored upon in Estrada v. People32 in ruling
that it is befitting to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner even
though the notice of appeal was belatedly filed.
In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner
which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law was
duly corrected even if it was already final on the ground of
substantial justice, thus:
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life
and liberty of petitioner.1awp++i1 If his penalty of imprisonment
remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he
would be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years,
2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40
years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the
range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper
imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the
range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision
correccional, while the maximum should only be anywhere
between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13 years
of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we
suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the
court to suspend its own [R]ules or except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed,
when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice
would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will
not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice."
Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong
compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a miscarriage thereof." After all, the Court's "primordial
and most important duty is to render justice x x x."34 All the accused
in Almuete v. People,35 People v. Barro,36Estrada v. People,37 and
Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,38 failed to perfect
their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, but the
Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality
of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty
prescribed by law. There is, thus, no reason to deprive the
petitioner in the present case of the relief afforded the accused in
the cited cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the
defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the
maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the
offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or
excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.39
Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that
prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22. Moreover, since the term of the
subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the fine
or one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum
wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition
of judgment of conviction by the trial court,40 if petitioner is
insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence. Substantial
justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be
accordingly corrected within the maximum limits prescribed under
Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the penalty of fine of ₱80,000.00 meted
on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 for each
count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face value of
each rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00 only.
Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,41 and
Administrative Circular No. 12-200042 that supposedly limited to
fine the imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and without any
subsidiary imprisonment, suffice it to quote the clarifications in
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001:
x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused,
who is found guilty of violating the provisions of B. P Big. 2 2, is
unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering that
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo
Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298
SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No.
130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on
the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B. P Big.
22, without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be
resorted to in case of the accused's inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but
to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in B.P. Big. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility
of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Big. 22. Neither does it defeat
the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of
preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Big. 22
such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should
be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the
Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a
hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that
1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment
as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P Big. 22;
xxxx
3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay
the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised
Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)
In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of
Article III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a
punishment for not paying a debt was already settled in the
negative in Lozano v. Martinez.44Pertinent portions of the Decision
in the Lozano case read:
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt? x x x
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment.1âwphi1 It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed
by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
xxxx
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police
power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.45 (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated
January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.
Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big.
22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND
THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (₱13,334.00) for each count,
and to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation
the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from
September 21, 2002 until full payment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,
vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability
arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and
punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information
charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo
Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on
account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December
26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00 said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin
Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the
collection of the principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil
Case No. 915-00).2 He alleged in his complaint the following:
xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996
in the amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter
that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account
with the Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check
is hereto attached as Annex "A";
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same
was dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant
with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to
his representation that he has an existing account with the said
bank and that the said check was duly funded and will be honored
when presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good
the payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of
demand is hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such demand
defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with
plaintiff’s valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the
plaintiff’s valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the
services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable
attorney’s fees the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus additional amount
of ₱2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in
contracting the obligation upon which this action is brought and
that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this
action which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the
defendant that he has an existing account and sufficient funds to
cover the check when in fact his account was already closed at the
time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action
is one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the
plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ
of preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned
upon the payment of damages should it be finally found out that
the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.3
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of
preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17,
2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.4
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages,5 pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the
pendency of another action between the instant parties for the
same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
X (10) entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon",
docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant
action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as
contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the
instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal complaint
against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in
plaintiff’s hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank
a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the
amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by
defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the
Criminal information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part
hereof as Annex "1".
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the
civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to
dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint is the alleged pendency of another action
between the same parties for the same cause, contending among
others that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon" renders this case
dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111
of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal action, the
civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the
plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the submission of the
plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil action
has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for
violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all
make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is
there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff
as private complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation
of the prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a private
prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the
prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we
respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation
of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after a criminal
action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
however, the defendant overlooks and conveniently failed to
consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action therefore
may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any
reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil action still the
plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff
seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the
plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in
this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in
favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation
of the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to
bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash,
the same may be negotiated by delivery by who ever was the
bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and effective
against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant
regarding the circumstances relative to the issuance of the check it
would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware
that such check was intended only for a definite person and was
not negotiable considering that the said check was payable to
bearer and was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart
from the criminal case without a reservation is a civil action arising
from the criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case
since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of
the plaintiff are created by the negotiable instruments law, even
without any reservation at all this instant action may still be
prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the
application for damages against the bond is totally without any
legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.6
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s
urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s
attachment bond for damages,7 dismissing the complaint of Chan
because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to
GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the application to charge
plaintiff’s bond for damages.
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action,
the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at
least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases
should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of
Money" and the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would
readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the
cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value
of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of ₱336,000.00. In
both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right
to pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there was no
allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no
private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution
evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or
criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of
damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended
party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or
reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party
has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the
said provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles
32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And
this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to
prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or
made a reservation as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the
criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant
herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant
complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right to
institute a separate civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the
herein case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence
falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is
required by the Rules, to wit:
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on
August 14, 2000;
3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor
of the defendant for the damages sustained by the latter by virtue
of the implementation of the writ of attachment;
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost
dispatch to the defendant’s physical possession the vehicle seized
from him on August 16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by
way of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20,
2000,8 viz:
Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere
repetition of his previous submissions, and which submissions this
court have already passed upon; and taking into account the
inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo
case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff
therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action,
the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld
the dismissal of Chan’s complaint, disposing:9
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA) by petition for review,10 challenging the propriety of the
dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad
faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a
manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and
emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case
because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1
(e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision,12 overturning the RTC, viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The
first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought
to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding
penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim
of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through
indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising
from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the
civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is
separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been entered in the criminal action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the
same act or omission, the rule has been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court
pronounced that only the civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred
to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately without a reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining
to independent civil actions which became effective on December
1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for
damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent
Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed
independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing."
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the
instant suit. The complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud
under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent
in the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before
the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for
violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that
the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining
to independent civil action became effective on December 1, 2000,
the same may be given retroactive application and may be made to
apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may be given
retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an
error to adjudge damages in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by
petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for
reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA
erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil
case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the ruling in DMPI
Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez14 stretched the meaning
and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a
simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the
application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.15
In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should
be denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal;
that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent
civil action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the
criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the
amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a
violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge
Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of
the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is
sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22
SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every
crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of
the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the
thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses
(United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The
payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for
which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the
damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party
defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the
offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results
in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so
may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value
of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer
at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value
of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear
from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000,
which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action
shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in
the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be
paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be
required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed
by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.18
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks
to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any
of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing
fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in
effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3,
2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right
of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from,
procedural laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made to apply to
cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that
no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure,20 except that in criminal cases, the changes do not
retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of
evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post factounder the Constitution.21
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by
the violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule
was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect
on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall
henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal
cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or
drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action,
and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed or recognized.22
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions,
the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the
amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in
Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1,
1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against
the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding
filing fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either
in the complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of
such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and
trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in
Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions
as thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained
in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic
Electrix Corporation,23 thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of
the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted
under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for
violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer
needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) x x x
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks
to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged
but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions.1avvphi1
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this
Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for violation of
B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It
also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on
the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are
required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil
action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the
payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule
was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P.
22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because
ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual
damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal
charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid,
the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the
civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition
of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for
criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and
tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is
to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even
prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that
one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of
the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation
of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a
separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of
the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome
and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the
final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to Branch 45, in Pasay City.
recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil SO ORDERED.
Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.24
The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v.
Velez25 to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently
and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted.
DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on
all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP
22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing
check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and
violation of BP 22,26 the procedures for the recovery of the civil
liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and
non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party
may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may
institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI Employees has allowed. In
prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has
adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the
issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated
in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the
check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could
not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court
Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the
civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case
No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis
pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action,
the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely:
(a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the
other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the
existence of the third becomes nil.28
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381
ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are
attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in
Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan
and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal
Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both
alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth
₱336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights
asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which
the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And,
thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar
the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering
twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed
Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its
decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did
not err in affirming the MeTC.
Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and,
accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by
the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision

G.R. No. 149453 April 1, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF
STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS
PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration1 of
the Resolution2 dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application
of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said court.
In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused
were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of
eleven male persons identified as Manuel Montero, a former
Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora,
who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel
Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years
old,3 Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the
Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the
Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th
Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.4
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that
the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 were with the express consent of the respondent as he
himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that
although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to
determine whether the requirements for its application are
attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the
following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express
consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court
after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year period to
revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification
for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether
notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of
respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6)
whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the
relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple
murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within
or beyond the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar
had to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the
order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the
dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from
the date of effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the
cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be
given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said
time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to
penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases
already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from
presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond
the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners
contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-
81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its
application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his
resolution of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the
Court, the petitioners maintain that the respondent did not give his
express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly
admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during
the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said
cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover,
the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the
dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the
petitioners, the respondent’s express consent to the provisional
dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims
of the respondent’s motion and the hearing thereon are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph of the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case
be remanded to the RTC to determine whether private
complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the
respondent’s motion for judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that only the
handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy of the notice of
hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private
prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and
authorized by all the private complainants to represent them at
said hearing. It is their contention that Atty. Valdez merely
identified the purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not
confirm the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the
Court in its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the
respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that
the respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical
motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court
find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims,
through the public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of
said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it was
sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March
22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause because criminal actions are always
prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private
complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention
of the petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable
by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of
prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is
burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph
thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or
the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the
case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new
rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent
of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar
him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal
case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for
an offense necessarily included therein.5
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the
issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution6 without the criminal case having been revived. The
public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline
unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva
voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent
requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.7 Where
the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the
writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional
dismissal of the case.8 The mere inaction or silence of the accused
to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case9 or his failure to
object to a provisional dismissal10 does not amount to express
consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an
express consent to such provisional dismissal.11If a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused,
the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the
new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his
objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived
or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right
of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double
jeopardy12 or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of
limitations.13
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by
the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information
for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein.
There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation.14 However, in a case wherein after the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies
or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses
for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation15 must
be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information
is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside
from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new
criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included
therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge
has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the
criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an
accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the
right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, "the fiscal
is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a
fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to
every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice."16
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and
second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were
present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any
motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For
his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v.
Diokno,17 among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to
conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the
prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the court for its
examination. The respondent contended therein that until after
the trial court shall have personally determined the presence of
probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against the
respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should
be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court,
and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution
to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a
hearing scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or,
if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this
incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.18
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or
otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere
provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the
Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed
by the petitioner and his other co-accused in the said criminal cases
would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the
case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner
are: (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for
the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said,
therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent
of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached
and made integral part hereof as Annex "A."19
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the
respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and
definitely declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the
criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof,
thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was
provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted
at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause
for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon the
presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those
who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion
that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes
of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify
proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express
conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order,
or any statement, which would normally be required by the Court
on pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional
dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor,
had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of
provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward,
and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a
provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang
pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort
which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal
law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of
Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for
a judicial determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is
no probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer
that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and
if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is
respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable
cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be
conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
prosecution to present the private complainants and their
witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the
warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued,
recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Don’t you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court,
precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to
dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a
situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without
dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but
what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither
were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any
motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case
should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my
client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid
as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge
Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any
further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter
further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.20
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court
of Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring
the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records
were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned
to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that
warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the
dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG’s claim.21
The respondent’s admissions made in the course of the
proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on
him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions
absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.22
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule
which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. This the
Court cannot and should not do.23
The Court also agrees with the petitioners’ contention that no
notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was
served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said
hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It
must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests,
the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs
of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion
for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may
be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through
the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public
prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party
or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before
the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such
service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory.
Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim
the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or
object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion
between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right
to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c)
the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release
of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and
kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee
from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the
destruction or loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence
and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the
civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive
disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondent’s motion for a
determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses
may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to
the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed
that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and
set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the
filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a
copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof
were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae
were issued to and received by them, including those who executed
their affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or
Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.24 There is as well
no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs
of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22,
1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private
prosecutor,25 he did so only for some but not all the close kins of
the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita
Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and
Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)26 executed their
respective affidavits of desistance.27 There was no appearance for
the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren
Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the
victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on
the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private
prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondent’s
motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived
of their right to be heard on the respondent’s motion and to
protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate
court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new
rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution,
the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple
murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the
respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of
the victims were notified of the respondent’s motion before the
hearing thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the
State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases
against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right
of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and
diminish the State’s substantive right to prosecute the accused for
multiple murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the
criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new
rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public
prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said cases. When
the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had
one year and three months within which to revive the cases or
refile the Informations. The period for the State to charge
respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit
that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the
new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that the State
had consistently relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that
it would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a
retroactive application of the new rule.28 Petitioners thus pray to
the Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section
8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be
applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State
that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in
question since ‘[t]he State’s witnesses were ready, willing and able
to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on
these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for
them to do so.’29 According to the respondent, penal laws, either
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as
they favor the accused.30 He asserts that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years
thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to
fairly indict him.31 In any event, the State is given the right under
the Court’s assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the
Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right
of double jeopardy to the prejudice of the State because the
prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or
two-year periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from
the prohibition against the revival of a provisionally dismissed case
within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he
claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do
not modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the
Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application
of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has
already been filed against the accused, which filing tolls the running
of the prescriptive period under Article 90.32
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a
statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts
of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute
or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are
considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal
theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment
endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after
witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused
have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.33 The
periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are
essential elements of the offenses covered.34
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin
to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as
an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates
to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.35
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.36 It is but a
limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against
the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused.
Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is
presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right
to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal
becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew
for the same crime or another crime necessarily included
therein.37 He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the
expenses in any new indictments.38 The State may revive a criminal
case beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there
is a justifiable necessity for the delay.39 By the same token, if a
criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the
trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive
periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby
diminished.40 But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is
barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line
under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State
Supreme Court of Illinois held:
… This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have
arrived, the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the
liability of the offender to be punished—to be deprived of his
liberty—shall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of
action which the state had acquired by the offense, but also
remove the flaw which the crime had created in the offender’s title
to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes
barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the
remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right
which such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such
remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very
right which the state has against the offender—the right to punish,
as the only liability which the offender has incurred, and declares
that this right and this liability are at an end. …41
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be
applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law
provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a
crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,42 this Court
held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect
the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application
to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural
statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested right
in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any
other than the existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied
retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve
intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of
the Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of
Houma,43 the United States Supreme Court ruled that where a
decision of the court would produce substantial inequitable results
if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding "the
injustice of hardship" by a holding of nonretroactivity.44 A
construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, and injurious consequences.45 This Court should not
adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces absurd,
unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such interpretation
could be avoided.46 Time and again, this Court has decreed that
statutes are to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved
and the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a statute, the
reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and the statute
should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose.47
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court
designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of
parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or
prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history
of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the
retrospective application will further its operation, the particular
conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the
administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.48 In a per
curiam decision in Stefano v. Woods,49 the United States Supreme
Court catalogued the factors in determining whether a new rule or
doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards."
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar
of two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively
against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has
fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-
bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the
periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in
fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and
those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State
and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time
limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.50 The
petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of
the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to
enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the
rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing
criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused
or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a
specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor.
There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived
or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor
or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of
public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused
despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to
expedite criminal proceedings.51
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay
as it usually operates in his favor,52 especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb
the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.53
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may
impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence
may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim
or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more
difficult.54 The accused may become a fugitive from justice or
commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the
dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is
to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility
that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if
not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him
and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption
of innocence.55 He may also lose his witnesses or their memories
may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish
his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the
entire criminal justice system.56
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise
the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice
system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on
March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the
State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000.
If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would
have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001
within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of
the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand,
if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two
years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within
which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the
intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent
injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive,
injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be
excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the
rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State
could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even
be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases
against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them
within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United
States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin
v. People:57
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced
has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not
avail themselves of it waived their rights ….
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both
the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and
reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would
cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect
the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in
particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine
qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new
rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-
bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank
denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or
two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the
criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid
justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of
the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to
justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States Supreme
Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of
Massachussetts,58 "the concept of fairness must not be strained till
it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true."
In Dimatulac v. Villon,59 this Court emphasized that "the judge’s
action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the
right of the State and offended party to due process of law. This
Court further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not
to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and
the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial
of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice,
for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also
mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to
both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party,
on the other.
In this case, the eleven informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on
June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period.
In the sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of
petitioners meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated
May 28, 2002, is SET ASSIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The
Petition of the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to
forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 with deliberate dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, Panganiban, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, J.J., concur.
Bellosillo, J., see Separate Opinion, concurring.
Puno, J., Please See Disent.
Vitug, J., See Separate (dissenting) Opinion.
Quisumbing, J., In the result; concur with J. Bellosillo's opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., I join the dissents of J. Puno & J. Gutierrez.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., dissent. Please see my dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J., No part.
Separate Opinion, Concurring
BELLOSILLO, J.:
If we make a mistake, we can only pray that their
ghosts will not haunt us for the rest of our days . . .
"Amen!" I say to the clear and concise ponencia of our colleague,
Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr., who touched the issues head on
and resolved them with the calm deliberation of a dedicated jurist.
Let me just add a few more thoughts in the effort to reveal and
rectify the hazards and uncertainties ordinarily concealed by the
glib use of formal illogic.
This case springs from the brutal slaughter of suspected members
of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang on 18 May 1995. Eleven (11)
restless souls - who perished in a shroud of mystery - remain
shackled for more than half a decade by the bondage of popular
apathy and neglect, and condemned to an ignominious fall by their
infamy. Stigmatized and denounced, their demise must have been
hailed by many as the triumph of retributive justice –
x x x x Gifted with the liberty they know not how to use; with a
power and energy they know not how to apply; with a life whose
purpose and aim they comprehend not; they drag through their
useless and convulsed existence. Byron destroys them one after
the other, as if he were the executioner of a sentence decreed in
heaven. They fall unwept, like a withered leaf into the stream of
time x x x x They die, as they have lived, alone; and a popular
malediction hovers round their solitary tombs.1
The dictates of prudence however would counsel us at this time to
reserve judgment on their sins and transgressions. The overriding
consideration is the need to unveil the truth, for truth alone is the
veritable touchstone of justice. The rights of the eleven (11)
victims, as much as those of the respondent and his co-accused,
deserve full recognition and protection. Only then can we say that
we are truly civilized - a breed apart from savages.
But the manner by which the carnage of 18 May 1995 was carried
out sparked a public indignation that prompted the Senate
Committees on Justice and Human Rights, Crimes and National
Defense and Security to conduct a joint investigation on possible
human rights violations involving police officers. The inquiry
focused on the issue of whether the death of the eleven (11)
victims was the result of a "rub-out" or summary killing, or a "shoot-
out" or with exchange of gunfire, between the victims and the
police considering that the principal antagonists were policemen
and civilians. On 21 June 1995 the aforesaid Senate Committees, in
Joint Committee Report No. 1021, found thus -
There is no clarity as to whether the bodies were handcuffed or
hogtied with ropes when they were killed. The evidence,
however, establishes that those who died were defenseless and
that except for Soronda, none of them fired a gun. The forensic
report and testimonies of De los Santos and De la Cruz show that
eleven (11) persons were killed in coldblood while in the custody of
the law enforcers in the early morning of May 18 in Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City (underscoring supplied),
concluded that the killings were done in cold blood and
recommended the filing of the appropriate charges against the
police officers.2
Thereafter multiple murder charges were filed by
the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan against respondent
and twenty-five (25) other police officers, docketed as Crim. Cases
Nos. 23047-23057. On motion of the accused,
the Ombudsman conducted a reinvestigation of the cases resulting
in the filing of Amended Informations, this time charging
respondent, among other officers, as a mere accessory after-the-
fact. Arraignment followed and respondent entered a plea of not
guilty.
Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan contending in the main that the highest ranking
principal accused under the Amended Informations held the
position of Chief Inspector with a salary below that for Grade 27,
for which reason, jurisdiction properly belonged to the Regional
Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan. The issue of jurisdiction
eventually reached the Supreme Court, which ordered the transfer
of the cases to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City not because
the highest ranking principal accused was receiving a salary below
Grade 27 but because the Amended Informations did not show that
the offenses charged were committed in relation to, or in the
discharge of, official functions of the accused.
The criminal cases were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689, and raffled to RTC-Br. 81 then presided over by
Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. Respondent and the other accused filed
separate but identical motions praying for a judicial determination
of probable cause, to hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of
arrest in the meantime, and to dismiss the cases should the court
find no probable cause.
During the hearing on the motions, the seven (7) or eight (8)
victims’ next of kin executed affidavits of desistance while others
recanted their affidavit-complaints. With this development, the
trial court in its Resolution of 29 March 1999 dismissed the cases
for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial, holding that
"there is no more evidence to show that the crime(s) have been
committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof."3
Two (2) years later, or on 29 March 2001, Secretary Hernando B.
Perez of the Department of Justice received a letter from PNP
Director General Leandro R. Mendoza indorsing for preliminary
investigation the sworn affidavits of two (2) new witnesses relative
to the Kuratong Baleleng incident. Secretary Perez constituted a
panel of State Prosecutors to investigate the matter. The panel
issued several subpoenas to all the accused in Crim. Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689, including respondent Lacson, requiring
them to submit their counter-affidavits and to appear at the
preliminary conference.
Consequently, on 28 May 2001, respondent and several of his co-
accused filed a petition for prohibition with application for a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the
RTC-Manila, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and the State
Prosecutors from further conducting a preliminary investigation.
The prohibition case was raffled to RTC-Br. 40, Manila, presided
over by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba. The filing of this petition
notwithstanding, the Panel of State Prosecutors proceeded to issue
a Resolution finding probable cause to hold respondent and his co-
accused for trial, for eleven (11) counts of murder.
Accordingly, Informations were filed before the RTC, Quezon City,
and docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112.
Deviating from the normal procedure, the Executive Judge, Vice-
Executive Judges and Presiding Judges of Quezon City dispensed
with the customary raffle; instead, assigned the cases to Judge Ma.
Theresa L. Yadao of RTC-Br. 81, Quezon City, presumably as the
successor of Judge Agnir in the same branch.
Meanwhile, in the prohibition case before RTC-Br. 40, Manila,
Judge Pasamba denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order thus-
After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and
without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of
the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of
the finding of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court that no probable
cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioner
herein and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with the
Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective
since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any
jurisdiction to try the cases.4
Dissatisfied, respondent elevated the case on a petition for
certiorari to the Court of Appeals which thereafter rendered the
assailed Decision of 24 August 2001 granting the petition, declaring
null and void all the proceedings conducted by the State
Prosecutors, and ordering all the criminal Informations dismissed -
The present controversy, being one involving "provisional
dismissal" and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of
the prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph
of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical
words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. It
should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases x x x
was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2)
years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon City’s
Resolution x x x x5
Hence, the present recourse. The bone of contention, which
crystallizes all the arguments of the parties into a single point of
inquiry, bears upon the nature and effects of a provisional dismissal
which has become permanent after the lapse of the periods
provided in Sec. 8, Rule 117, 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. For facility of reference, the controversial provision of
Sec. 8 quoted hereunder -
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. - A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
x x x of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived (italics supplied).
Assuming that Sec. 8, Rule 117, is available to respondent although
it is my position that it is not, the question that should be asked is:
Does the provisional dismissal of a criminal case which has become
permanent under Sec. 8 effectively foreclose the right of the State
to prosecute an accused? I have taken great pains analyzing the
position of respondent; regretfully, I am unable to agree for my
conscience shivers at its debilitating, crippling if not crushing,
impact upon our criminal justice system.
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Arts. 90
and 91 of The Revised Penal Code, which are quoted hereunder -
Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. - Crimes punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in
twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten
years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor,
which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one
year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe
in six months.
Light offenses shall prescribe in two months
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest
penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules
contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine Archipelago.
Evidently, respondent’s concept of a provisional dismissal that has
become permanent under Sec. 8, Rule 117, emasculates and
renders illusory its very purpose. It effectively obliterates the
different prescriptive periods under Art. 90, which are fixed on the
basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribed for the offense, and
supplants it with a uniform period of one (1) year or two (2) years,
as the case may be. It likewise substantially modifies the manner of
computing the period of prescription in Art. 91 since the reckoning
of the one (1) or two (2)-year prescriptive period under Sec. 8 is
constant and invariable, and without regard to the number of
interruptions. Regardless of the number of times the case against
an accused is provisionally dismissed, the prosecution would
always have a full grace period of two (2) years within which to
revive the case; much unlike Art. 91 wherein the period consumed
prior to the filing of the complaint or information is tacked to the
period consumed after the dismissal of the case for purposes of
determining whether the crime has prescribed.
Interestingly, a dividing line is drawn in the application of Arts. 90
and 91 of The Revised Penal Code, and Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, obviously in an attempt to
lend a delusive semblance of plausibility to its construction of Sec.
8. It is posited that Art. 91 and Sec. 8 operate on "different planes,"
so to speak, the vital distinction being that Sec. 8, Rule 117,
contemplates a situation where a case had already been filed and
was provisionally dismissed.
I do not agree. Article 91 of The Revised Penal Code distinctly
speaks of "prescription x x x shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him." It can readily be seen therefore that the concept of a
provisional dismissal is subsumed in Art. 91 since in a provisional
dismissal, proceedings necessarily terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted. Thus, to construe and apply Sec. 8 in
the manner suggested above would undeniably result in a direct
and irreconcilable conflict with Art. 91.
In a provisional dismissal, the prosecution, the defense and the
offended party, in effect, enter into a tacit agreement for a
temporary cessation of hostilities, i.e., to momentarily hold in
abeyance the prosecution of the accused. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8
prescribes the requirements thereto: (a) consent of the accused,
and (b) notice to the offended party. It must be remembered
however that permanent dismissal of a case is but an offshoot of
its previous provisional dismissal and the subsequent failure to
revive within the time frames set forth in Sec. 8. But does the
permanent dismissal of the case arising from a provisional dismissal
affect the right of the State to prosecute within the periods
provided in Art. 90 of The Revised Penal Code? Certainly not, for the
prescriptive periods prescribed by law cannot be affected directly or
indirectly by any agreement or consent of the parties, much less be
held hostage to any procedural limitations. Verily, in matters of
public crimes which have a direct bearing on public interest, no
agreements or personal arrangements should be brought to bear
upon the penal action.
Courts cannot - by an act of judicial legislation - abridge, amend,
alter, or nullify statutes. We do not sit as councils of revision,
empowered to judicially reform or fashion legislation in accordance
with our own notions of prudent public policy. Certainly, lest we
are prepared to ride roughshod over this prerogative of Congress,
we cannot interfere with the power of the legislature to surrender,
as an act of grace, the right of the State to prosecute and to declare
the offense no longer subject to prosecution after certain periods
of time as expressed in the statute.
Furthermore, the right of the State to prosecute criminals is a
substantive, nay, inherent right. To unduly limit the exercise of such
right for a short period of one (1) or two (2) years through the
expedient of a procedural rule is unconstitutional, considering the
limitation in our fundamental law on the rule-making power of this
Court, that is, its rules must not "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights."6
Another decisive factor which militates heavily against the
foregoing thesis that Art. 91 and Sec. 8 operate on "different
planes," is the fact that the phrase "amounts to an acquittal," which
appeared in the original draft of what is now Sec. 8, Rule 117, was
judiciously rejected by the Supreme Court when it approved the
final draft of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure -
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You know that prior to the wordings at
present of Sec. 8, Rule 117, there was a final committee draft that
said and I quote: "the corresponding order shall state that the
provisional dismissal shall become permanent and amount to an
acquittal one year after the issuance without the case having been
revived." What I am trying to point out is that, as originally worded,
Section 8 expressly stated that the dismissal would amount to an
acquittal. But the final wording eliminated the words "amount to
an acquittal," isn’t it?
ATTY. FORTUN: I would not know that, Your Honor. I have not seen
that revised (interrupted) x x x x
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Well, that is true that those words were
eliminated precisely because we wanted to avoid making
invocation of that rule equivalent to an acquittal. All right,
(interrupted) x x x x7
Had the intention been to confer on Sec. 8 the effect of acquittal,
the Court should have retained the express provision to that effect
in the final draft. Obviously, the conspicuous absence therein of the
phrase "amounts to an acquittal," or its equivalent, forecloses a
speculative approach to the meaning of Sec. 8. Virtually crossed
out, such clause cannot now be incised from the original draft and
grafted into the approved draft of the revised rules, without doing
violence to its intent.
It must be stressed that Sec. 8 is nothing more than a rule of
procedure. As part of the adjective law, it is only a means to an end
- an aid to substantive law - and should accordingly be interpreted
and applied in that concept. It was never meant to modify the
settled provisions of law on the matter of prescription of offenses;
or to unduly curtail the right of the State to bring offenders before
the bar of justice. These matters are best left to the wisdom and
sound judgment of the legislature.
Section 8 is very limited in scope and application. Justice Oscar M.
Herrera, Consultant, Committee on Revision of the Rules, in
his Treatise on Historical Development and Highlights of
Amendments of Rules on Criminal Procedure(Rationale of
Amendments of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure), made the
following commentaries on the import of the provision -
There had been so many instances where the National Bureau of
Investigation or other police agencies have refused to issue
clearances for purposes of employment or travel abroad, to
persons who have pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal
of their cases by the court was merely provisional, notwithstanding
the fact that such provisional dismissals, more often than not, had
been done five or ten years ago. This causes prejudice to the
persons concerned. Accordingly, a rule was provided that the
provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable
by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived.8
Clearly, the feverishly contested provision is purely administrative
or regulatory in character. The policy embodied therein is simply to
grant the accused momentary relief from administrative
restrictions occasioned by the filing of a criminal case against him.
He is freed in the meantime of the dire consequences of his having
been charged with a crime, and temporarily restored to his
immunities as a citizen, solely for purposes of government
clearances. Section 8 imports no intricate nor ornate legal
signification that we need not discern from it a meaning that too
far deviates from what it actually purports to convey.
Indeed, were we to adhere to the thesis equating permanent
dismissal with "finality" and "acquittal," we would be ascribing
meaning to the provision which is not only at war with the demands
of reason but also contrary to the clear intention of the rule. The
disastrous effect of respondent’s interpretation of Sec. 8 upon our
criminal justice system is not difficult to imagine. So construed, it
would afford an accused, endowed with a fertile imagination and
creativeness, a plethora of opportunities to rig his prosecution by
silencing witnesses and suppressing evidence then letting the case
hibernate for a much shorter period of one (1) or two (2) years. To
be sure, our procedural laws could not have intended to sanction
such a result. "A system of procedure," intoned Justice Cardozo, "is
perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments
to justice without the warrant of a clear necessity."9
Respondent conjures up the ingenious hypothesis that although
Sec. 8 of Rule 117 and the "double jeopardy" principle have
different requisites, they are nonetheless cognate rules since Sec.
8 of Rule 117 affords the accused benefits analogous to that
bestowed under the "double jeopardy" principle.10 Implacable and
unyielding is he in the position that a provisional dismissal that
attains the character of permanency produces the effect of a sui
generis acquittal. In this respect, according to him, Sec. 8 of Rule
117 is not in that Sec. 17 (Discharge of Accused to be State Witness)
unique and Sec. 18 unique and Sec. 18 (Discharge of Accused
Operates as Acquittal) of Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure is also invested with the benefits of double
jeopardy when it grants the accused state witness a discharge
tantamount to an acquittal. In both instances, the absence of any
or all of the essential requisites of double jeopardy does not
preclude the discharge of the accused state witness or one whose
case has attained permanent dismissal.
It bears recalling that since Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence on double
jeopardy was swept into the shores of Philippine constitutional and
statutory history, our concept of double jeopardy has faithfully
adhered to the pronouncements first made by Kepner v. United
States11 that "x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court that
former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict
duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict,
and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection is not
x x x against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried
again for the second offense." The fundamental philosophy that
underlies the finality of an acquittal is the recognition of the fact
that the state with its infinite resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual and
expose him to a state of perpetual anxiety and embarrassment as
well as enhancing the possibility that although innocent, he may be
found guilty.
Presently, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit
in its prescription of the requisites for the invocation of double
jeopardy and the resultant effect thereon on acquittals. Section 7,
Rule 117, states-
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information.
Ensconced in the foregoing procedural tenet are the imperatives
for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) before a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted or
convicted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In contrast, provisional dismissal under Sec. 8 of Rule 117 requires
only the twin requirements of consent of the accused and notice to
the offended party. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed
upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his
action in having the case dismissed is a waiver of his constitutional
prerogative of double jeopardy as he, in a manner of speaking,
throws a monkey wrench to the judicial process and prevents the
court from rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
Jurisprudence has emphatically enunciated that double jeopardy
cannot be properly invoked where the case was dismissed with the
express conformity of the accused. This much is given as one of the
requisites of double jeopardy, i.e., where the accused is acquitted
or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. This assent by the accused
to the dismissal is the operative act that precludes the effects of
double jeopardy from setting in, so that despite the permanency of
the dismissal due to the lapse of the periods set forth in Sec. 8 of
Rule 117, the refiling of a case under a new information does not
trample upon this venerable doctrine.
The permanence of the dismissal should not be understood as the
harbinger of final and absolute liberation of the accused from
future prosecution. It merely augurs the demise of the unrevived
cases but it does not prevent the state from exercising the right to
re-prosecute the accused within the prescriptive period provided
in Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code. With more weighty reason can
we not accommodate respondent in his plea to avail of the graces
afforded by the doctrine since the records would show that he has
yet to enter his plea to the charges or that the trial on the merits
has as yet to commence.
Respondent also fires a shot in the dark when he suggests that
there exists no marked difference between revivaland refiling of a
criminal case as in fact, according to him, the two (2) concepts are
synonymous and interchangeable. A survey of jurisprudential
antecedents reveal the distinction between the revival and refiling
of a new information. The authorities are unanimous in their
recognition of the fact that a provisionally dismissed case can be
revived as it does not call for the operation of the rule on double
jeopardy and that cases can also be refiled under a new complaint
or information for the same offense. 12
While I agree however that the filing of Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102
- 01-101112 is NOT a revival of the earlier dismissed cases, I wish to
emphasize, lest I be misconstrued, that the "New Informations" in
the subsequently refiled cases are new not because the respondent
is charged thereunder as a co-principal, instead of as a mere
accessory, or that the number of the accused has been increased
from 26 to 34; rather, the new Informations which are the bases for
the prosecution of the respondent again under the same offense,
are new for the singular reason that they are separate and distinct
from those in the previously dismissed cases. Simply stated, it is not
of consequence whether the allegations in the two (2) sets
of Informations are quintessentially identical or different in form
and substance insofar as concerns the right of the state to
prosecute the respondent anew after the provisional dismissal
became permanent.
A question may be asked: Suppose that the new information is a
verbatim reproduction of the information in the permanently
dismissed case, can we not now say that the newly filed case is a
mere revival of the case previously dismissed? After all, stripped of
semantic finery, their being identical would lead to the impression,
although erroneous, that one is but a revival of the other. On the
surface one may see no apparent difference between the two (2)
sets of Informations, but a subtle yet significant functional
distinction in fact exists. Once a case is permanently dismissed after
the lapse of the prescriptive periods set forth in Sec. 8, the case is
dead and, for all intents and purposes, beyond resuscitation. All the
on-going proceedings and those still to be had, e.g., preliminary
investigation, arraignment, trial, etc., shall cease and be
terminated. In the event however that the accused is prosecuted
anew with the same offense, albeit under an identical information,
the previously terminated proceedings will not be reactivated, the
previous case having been set at rest; instead, new proceedings will
be conducted as if the accused has been charged afresh. To my
mind, the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 8, Rule 117 has in its
favor the soundest policy considerations based no less on the
fundamental objectives of procedural rules.
Incidentally, I find it particularly disturbing that the Informations in
Crim. Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were dismissed by the
trial judge without complying with one of the requirements of the
first paragraph of Sec. 8, i.e., the dismissal must be with notice to
the offended party. There is nothing in the records which would
show that all the offended parties were ever notified that the cases
against respondent and his co-accused would be dismissed. Even if
we proceed on the assumption that the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the offended parties may be considered a substantial
equivalent of notice, still the dismissal appears to be procedurally
infirm since only seven (7) of the offended parties representing
eight (8) of the eleven (11) victims, executed affidavits of
desistance.13 No similar affidavits were submitted for the three (3)
remaining victims.14 Cannot the next of kin of these three (3)
remaining victims, who were not even notified of the provisional
dismissal of the cases, prosecute those responsible for killing them
within the prescriptive period provided in Art. 90 of The Revised
Penal Code? Are they now without any remedy in law if witnesses
belatedly surface, they who cowered in fear at the time because of
the positions of power held by those perceived to be responsible
therefor?
Significantly also, I am at a loss as to why the Court of Appeals
reckoned the two (2)-year period from 29 March 1999 as the date
of issuance of the resolution of dismissal. When Sec. 8 speaks of
"issuance" it should be construed not with reference to the date as
appearing in the resolution of dismissal but on the date it was
actually delivered to the proper person and received by him.
Otherwise, how would the offended parties know that such
resolution was issued as to reckon with the two (2)-year period
after which the provisional dismissal would be considered
permanent?
In the instant case, the records do not clearly identify who the
offended parties are, or whether they were all notified of Judge
Agnir's order of dismissal dated 29 March 1999 as they do not even
appear to have been properly named. In the absence of such
evidence, the reckoning point for computing the two (2)-year
period under Sec. 8 becomes indeterminable. Assuming that Sec. 8
is available to respondent, to which we do not even agree, still
respondent has failed to discharge his burden of proving that the
two (2)-year period has indeed elapsed to make the provisional
dismissal permanent.
These circumstances cast a heavy pall of doubt on whether the
dismissal of the eleven (11) Informations has indeed attained the
status of permanence as to prevent the prosecution from refiling
them. The notice requirement in the first paragraph of Sec. 8 as
well as the notice of the order of dismissal are by no means trivial
formalities; they are meaningful and significant. The offended
parties, seeking justice and vindication for the wrong done, would
naturally be keenly interested in the progress and outcome of the
criminal prosecution. Hence, it is but proper that all of them be
notified of the termination of the cases and given an equal
opportunity to object to the dismissal.
A view has been expressed that respondent’s rights to speedy trial
and to speedy disposition of his cases were violated; this despite
the fact that the right was not invoked by respondent before us.
Accordingly, the twenty-six (26) month delay in the refiling of cases
relative to the Kuratong Baleleng killings is claimed to be vexatious,
capricious and oppressive, and hence sufficient to activate the
protection of the Bill of Rights, specifically, on the rights to speedy
trial and to speedy disposition of his cases. Sections 14 (2) and 16,
Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution respectively provides -
Sec. 14. x x x x (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused x x x shall
enjoy the right x x x to have a speedy, impartial and public trial x x
xx
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
These provisions uphold the time-honored tradition of speedy
justice for, as stated in the oft-repeated dictum, "justice delayed is
justice denied." Their express inclusion in the present Constitution
was in response to the common charge against perennial delays in
the administration of justice which have plagued our judicial
system.15
The right to speedy trial under Sec. 14 and the right to speedy
disposition of cases in Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of the 1987
Constitution, are kindred constitutional norms similar in nature and
legal effects, sharing common operational principles, and subject
to the same test for purposes of determining violations thereof.
Thus, the cornerstone of both rights is to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by requiring tribunals to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial and disposition of cases.
Speedy disposition of cases, like the constitutional guarantee of
speedy trial, is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.16 Verily,
these rights are more indistinct concepts than other constitutional
rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision
when the rights have been denied. We cannot definitely say how
long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift
but deliberate. As a consequence, these rights cannot be quantified
into a specified number of days or months. There is no fixed point
in the proceeding when a party may exercise or be deemed to have
waived these rights. Finally, the amorphous quality of the rights
sometimes lead to the drastic remedy of dismissal of a case when
the rights have been infringed. This is indeed a serious
consequence because it means that an accused who may be guilty
of a grave offense will go scot-free without being tried and held
responsible therefor. Such a remedy is more radical than an
exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial.
At any rate, the framers of the Constitution recognized the right to
speedy disposition of cases distinctly from the right to speedy trial
in criminal cases. It should be noted that Sec. 16 covers all phases
before, during and after trial, and extends protection to all parties
in all types of cases: civil, criminal and administrative. In this
respect, it affords a broader protection than Sec. 14 (2) which
guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial in criminal cases.17
Against this backdrop, I turn to inquire into the parameters of the
right to speedy disposition of cases. Just how broad is its mantle of
protection as applied in criminal cases? When does the right attach
during the criminal process, and when may it be properly asserted
by a party? A criminal prosecution has many stages, and delay may
occur during or between any of them. As applied in the instant case,
it appears that the speedy disposition guarantee of the Bill of
Rights is asserted to include the period of delay from the
provisional dismissal of the case to its revival or refiling since
"respondent is as much entitled to a speedy reinvestigation
and refiling of the provisionally dismissed cases against him."18
Such interpretation, however, does not seem to be in consonance
with the unmistakable language, nor by the obvious intent, of Sec.
16. The provision speaks of "speedy disposition of cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." It clearly and
logically contemplates a situation wherein there exists an
outstanding case, proceeding or some incident upon which the
assertion of the right may be predicated. Evidently, it would be idle,
not to say anomalous, to speak of "speedy disposition of cases" in
the absence of anything to dispose of in the first place.
A review of pertinent jurisprudence attests abundantly to the
indispensable requirement of a "pending case, proceeding or some
incident," as sine qua non before the constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases may be invoked. Thus, in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan19 we held that the long delay of three (3) years in
the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan
was violative of the Constitutional right of speedy disposition of
cases because political motivations played a vital role in activating
and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Similarly
in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan20 involving an inordinate delay in the
conduct of preliminary investigation, we ruled that such unjustified
delay infringes upon the right to speedy disposition of cases.
In Binay v. Sandiganbayan21 we ruled out any violation of
petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases despite a six-year
delay from the filing of the charges in the Office of the Ombudsman
to the time the Informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan. Then
in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.22 we rejected the allegation of
inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation.
Finally, in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan23 we held that the
inordinate delay of six (6) years by the Special Prosecutor
(succeeding the Tanodbayan) in the filing of the initiatory complaint
before he decided to file an Information for the offense with
the Sandiganbayan violated petitioner’s constitutional guaranty to
speedy disposition of the case.
Invariably, the foregoing cases demonstrate that the broad
protective cloak of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases becomes available only in instances where preliminary
proceedings have been initiated, or a case has already been filed or
any other incident pertaining thereto already had. As we succinctly
stated in Binay v. Sandiganbayan24 -
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or unjustifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried (italics
supplied).
It goes without saying therefore that the right to speedy disposition
of cases is unavailing in the absence of any proceedings conducted
before, during, or after, trial. Significantly, there is no precedent,
for indeed there is none, to support the novel conclusion that even
after the dismissal of the cases, an accused may still invoke the
constitutional guarantee.
In the case before us, nothing was left to be done after the issuance
of the 29 March 1999 Order of Judge Agnir dismissing all criminal
charges against respondent relative to the Kuratong
Baleleng incident. During the hiatus following the dismissal of the
criminal charges, no formal proceeding remained outstanding. Not
even court processes were issued to restrain respondent’s liberty
or subject him to any form of public accusation; he was free to go
about his affairs, to practice his profession, and to continue on with
his life. Respondent was legally and constitutionally in the same
posture as though no charges had been made. Hence, it was only
at the time when he was subjected to another pre-indictment
investigation and accused anew that respondent may invoke his
right to speedy disposition of his cases. The delay after the charges
against him were dismissed, like any delay before those charges
were filed, should not be included in reckoning the time and
determining whether he was denied his right to a speedy
disposition of his cases.
The provisional nature of the dismissal of the original criminal cases
is quite immaterial. The fact that the cases were dismissed
conditionally or "without prejudice" to the subsequent filing of new
cases, does not make the order of dismissal any less a disposition
of the cases. Although provisional, it nonetheless terminated all
proceedings against respondent such that there remained in the
meantime no pending case which the court could act upon and
resolve, and which could be made the basis for the application of
the right to speedy disposition of respondent's cases.25
Clearly, we would be reinventing the wheel, so to speak, if we are
to include within the protective shield of the right to speedy
disposition of cases the reinvestigation and refiling of the
provisionally dismissed cases. The matter
of reinvestigation and refiling of cases at some future time are not
by themselves "pending incidents related to the dismissed cases;"
they are mere possibilities or expectancies. The State has no
definite decision yet on whether to really commence a
reinvestigation and refiling of the cases, and only indicates, at the
most, a probable action at some future time. Until such time that
the State decided to exercise these rights, they cannot ripen into a
pending case, proceeding or incident for purposes of the speedy
disposition safeguard.
Certainly, the constitutional pledge mandates merely the swift
resolution or termination of a pending case or proceeding, and not
the initiation or institution of a new case or proceeding. It has no
application to inexistent proceedings but only to those currently
being undertaken. Were we to hold otherwise, we would in effect
be granting to every accused an unbridled license to impose his will
upon the State and demand that he be immediately reinvestigated
and a case filed against him. The determination of whether to file
or when to file a case lies within the sole discretion of the
prosecution depending upon the availability of his evidence and
provided that it is filed within the prescriptive period. As American
Jurisprudence would hold -
It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do
not deviate from "fundamental conceptions of justice" when they
defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe
an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a
prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable
cause. It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no
duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they
are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. To impose such a duty "would have a
deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the
ability of society to protect itself." From the perspective of
potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to commence when
probable cause is established is undesirable because it would
increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed, and
would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but
untried x x x x From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a
requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is
equally unacceptable because it could make obtaining proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful
sources of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited.
And from the standpoint of the courts, such a requirement is
unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be consumed
on cases that prove to be insubstantial, or that involve only some
of the responsible parties or some of the criminal acts.26
To reiterate, respondent’s right to speedy disposition of his criminal
cases attached only at that precise moment the Department of
Justice constituted a panel of prosecutors and conducted a new
preliminary investigation. Even then, the conduct of the
prosecutors cannot be assailed as violative of the speedy
disposition guarantee. As shown by the records, the government
can hardly be accused of foot-dragging for, in fact, they lost no time
in commencing the new preliminary investigation and thereafter
filing the corresponding Informations in court upon the
appearance of new witnesses against respondent and his co-
accused. The expeditious action of the government in the instant
case certainly cannot be viewed with suspicion.
In fairness to petitioners, they cannot be faulted in demonstrating
alacrity in performing their mandate, nor can they be castigated for
the so-called "unusual haste" in reopening the cases against
respondent. No impure motive should be imputed to them other
than the fact that they regularly performed their duty in their
apparent desire to unravel the Kuratong Baleleng mystery.
For the petitioners, this is a classic case of "damn-if-you-do-and-
damn-if-you-don’t" situation. Petitioners are being put to task for
their alleged negligence and delay in reviving the cases, but then
again, they are also being pilloried for persecuting the respondent
because of the supposed "unusual haste" and "uncharacteristic
vigor" in pursuing the criminal cases against him and his co-
accused.
For the reasons stated, I decline to extend to respondent the
protection guaranteed by Sec. 16. Plain common sense dictates
that the provision cannot be applied to situations not
contemplated by it. Verily, we cannot expand the letter and spirit
of the provision and read into it a meaning that is not there.
This does not, of course, mean that respondent is utterly
unprotected in this regard. On the contrary, there are other
constitutional and statutory mechanisms to guard against possible
and actual prejudice to the accused, resulting from the passage of
time. Primarily, the statute of limitations under Art. 90 of The
Revised Penal Code is the principal safeguard against prosecuting
overly stale criminal charges. The statute represents legislative
assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in
administering and receiving justice; it protects not only the accused
from prejudice to his defense, but also balances his interest in
repose against society's interest in the apprehension and
punishment of criminals.27 This statute provides predictability by
specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrefutable presumption
that the rights of an accused to a fair trial would be prejudiced.28
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to
criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the
occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by
criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect
individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when
the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time
and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts
in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary
effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to
investigate suspected criminal activity.29
Moreover, the sweeping command of the Due Process
Clause always protects defendants against fundamentally unfair
treatment by the government in criminal proceedings. Procedural
fairness required by due process decrees the dismissal of an
indictment if it be shown that delay caused substantial prejudice to
the rights of an accused to a fair trial and that the delay was an
intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.
But even if we proceed on the assumption that respondent may
rightfully invoke the speedy disposition clause for the respondent,
still I find that the circumstances of this case fail to measure up to
the criteria set forth under the Balancing Test.
In Caballero v. Alfonso30 we adopted a four-factor Balancing Test to
determine whether an accused has been denied the constitutional
right to speedy disposition of his case, i.e., (a) length of the delay,
(b) reason for the delay, (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert
it, and, (d) prejudice caused by the delay.
With these relevant factors, the otherwise abstract concept of
speedy disposition of cases is provided with at least a modicum of
structure. The Balancing Test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense are considered, prescribes flexible
standards based on practical considerations. It necessarily compels
courts to approach speedy disposition cases on an ad hoc basis. No
single factor in the Balancing Test is definitive because all four (4)
must be weighed against the others in determining whether a
violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases occurred. In
other words, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must
still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But,
because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused,
this process must be carried out in full recognition of the accused’s
interest in the speedy disposition of his case as specifically affirmed
in the Constitution.31
I proceed to consider the four (4) factors in the Balancing Test in
seriatim. The length of delay is to some extent a triggering
mechanism. Until it is shown that the delay has crossed the
threshold dividing ordinary delay from presumptively prejudicial
delay, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that
go into the balance.32Considering the serious nature of the charges
against respondent, and more importantly, the criminal cases
sought to be filed being deeply impressed with public interest,
involving as they do high ranking police officers, I am of the view
that the claimed two (2) years and three (3) months lag between
the provisional dismissal of the first criminal cases on 29 March
1999 and the filing of new Informations on 6 June 2001 sketches
below the bare minimum needed to provoke such an inquiry. At
any rate, I will assume, without conceding, that it is sufficiently long
for purposes of triggering a full analysis under the three (3)
remaining factors.
The banner the litigants seek to capture is the second factor - the
reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here too,
different weights should be assigned to different reasons. For
instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper
the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts
should be weighed less heavily. Finally, a valid reason, such as a
missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.33
I find it hard to accept that in the criminal cases against respondent
the government is on the wrong side of the divide between
acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying the prosecution
of respondent. It simplistically and unrealistically assumes that the
availability of witnesses Yu and Enad prior to 2001 renders the
seeming lethargy of the government unjustifiable. It completely
disregards other considerations affecting the decision of the
government to stay its entire prosecutorial machinery.
The government may delay for a variety of reasons such as to gain
time in which to strengthen and document its case. The
government may also delay, not with the view of ensuring
conviction of the accused, but because the government lacks
sufficient resources to move quickly. The species of governmental
delay that are anathema to the right to speedy disposition of cases
are those which are purposely or negligently employed to harm or
gain impermissible advantage over the accused at the trial. The
reason is that, in such circumstance, the fair administration of
justice is imperiled.
In the present recourse, there is nothing to demonstrate that the
delay in reviving the cases against respondent was deliberately
availed of for an impermissible purpose. It was not explained what
improper tactical advantage was gained or sought by the
government; nor can I discern any such advantage from the
records. To be sure, if as claimed by respondent this whole mess is
nothing more than a pure and simple political vendetta, carried out
by a possè bent on lynching him politically and personally - which I
am not inclined to acknowledge at this stage - the government
could have moved against respondent with deliberate haste, for
delay is not exactly to its best interest.
Neither can we safely conclude that the public prosecutors are
guilty of negligent omission. Insufficiency of evidence is a legitimate
reason for delay. The government is naturally not expected to go
forward with the trial and incur costs unless it is convinced it has an
iron-clad case to make a worthwhile indictment. Verily, it needs
time to gather evidence, track down and collect witnesses, as well
as document its case. As to how much time it needs depends on
such other factors as the availability of witnesses and resources to
enable it to move quickly. In U.S. v. Lovasco34 it was held -
x x x x investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay under taken
by the Government solely "to gain tactical advantage over the
accused," precisely because investigative delay is not so one-sided.
Rather than deviating from elementary standards of "fair play and
decency," a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek
indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should
prosecute and will be able to promptly to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who defer action for
these reasons would subordinate the goal of "orderly expedition"
to that of "mere speed.
In no mean measure, the many constitutional and procedural
safeguards provided an accused can also present obstacles. It is
doubly difficult in this particular case considering the recantation
and disappearance of all available vital witnesses for the
prosecution.
If we were to turn the tables against the respondent, we say that
the unavailability of the witnesses for the prosecution may be
attributed to the conventional tendency of our people never to
antagonize the powerful and the influential. We are not insinuating
that respondent had a hand in the recantation or desistance of the
complainants, or the non-appearance or the shortage of witnesses
for the prosecution; what we are simply saying is that accusing an
individual of respondent's stature naturally engenders fear of
physical harm, real or imagined, and can intimidate even the most
stout-hearted and temerarious individuals. This circumstance
should have been given weight in resolving the present
controversy.
The third factor - the extent to which respondent has asserted his
right to speedy disposition of his case - further weakens his
position. When and how a defendant asserts his right should be
given strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the
accused is being deprived of the right. The more serious the
deprivation, the more likely an accused is to complain. But the
failure to invoke the right will make it difficult for an accused to
prove that he was denied thereof.35
I do not think that the vigor with which respondent defended
himself in the original cases against him, and the vigilance with
which he assailed the filing of the new Informations now subject of
the instant petition, is the equivalent to an assertion of his right to
speedy disposition. The trouble with this observation is that every
accused in a criminal case has the intense desire to seek acquittal,
or at least to see the swift end of the accusation against him. To
this end, it is natural for him to exert every effort within his capacity
to resist prosecution. But is it correct to assume that, in every
instance, the accused in resisting his criminal prosecution is also
asserting his right to speedy disposition?
Respondent’s reliance on Sec. 8, Rule 117, of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which some have said is based on the
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, cannot be
equated with a positive assertion of the right to speedy disposition.
A perusal of the records would reveal that the issue of applicability
of Sec. 8, Rule 117, was raised by respondent for the first time
before the Court of Appeals, in his Second Amended Petition -
undoubtedly a mere afterthought. It was not his original position
before the trial court, which centered on the "lack of valid
‘complaints’ to justify a preliminary investigation of cases which
had long been dismissed." It was not even his initial position in the
early stages of the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Within
the context of the Balancing Test, respondent’s tardy, inexplicit
and vague invocation of this right makes it seriously difficult for him
to prove the denial thereof.
Finally, the fourth factor is prejudice to the accused. Prejudice, of
course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of accused
which the speedy disposition right as well as the speedy trial right
are designed to protect. There are three (3) of such interests: (a) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (b) to minimize anxiety
and concern of the accused; and, (c) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired.36 Of the three (3), the most significant is
the last because the inability of the defendant to adequately
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.37
Needless to say, respondent was never arrested or taken into
custody, or otherwise deprived of his liberty in any manner. These
render the first criterion inapplicable. Thus, the only conceivable
harm to respondent from the lapse of time may arise from anxiety
and the potential prejudice to his ability to defend his case. Even
then, the harm suffered by respondent occasioned by the filing of
the criminal cases against him is too minimal and insubstantial to
tip the scales in his favor.
Concededly, anxiety typically accompanies a criminal charge. But
not every claim of anxiety affords the accused a ground to decry a
violation of the rights to speedy disposition of cases and to speedy
trial. The anxiety must be of such nature and degree that it
becomes oppressive, unnecessary and notoriously
disproportionate to the nature of the criminal charge. To illustrate,
a prosecution for the serious crime of multiple murder naturally
generates greater degree of anxiety, than an indictment for, say,
simple estafa. The anxiety and the tarnished "reputation and image
of respondent who is, after all, presently and newly elected
member of the Senate," does not amount to that degree that
would justify a nullification of the the appropriate and regular steps
that must be taken to assure that while the innocent should go
unpunished, those guilty must expiate for their offense. Verily, they
pale in importance to the gravity of the charges and the paramount
considerations of seeking justice for the victims as well as
redeeming the sullied integrity and reputation of the Philippine
National Police for their alleged involvement in the perpetration of
the ghastly crimes.
We cannot therefore hold, on the facts before us, that the delay in
the reinvestigation and refiling of the criminal cases weighed
sufficiently in support of the view that respondent’s right to speedy
disposition of his cases has been violated. The delay simply does
not justify the severe remedy of dismissing the indictments.
Consistent with the views expressed above, I hold that no
constitutional, statutory and procedural impediments exist against
the subsequent re-indictment of respondent. Although we are
dealing here with alleged members of the notorious Kuratong
Baleleng Gang, against whom society must be protected, we must
bear in mind that they too were human beings with human rights.
Indeed, life is so precious that its loss cannot simply be consigned
to oblivion in so short a time. Withal, the seriousness of the
accusations against respondent and other high-ranking officers of
the PNP goes into the very foundation of our law enforcement
institutions. We must ferret out the truth: Is the Philippine National
Police so contaminated to the core with corrupt and murderous
police officers, worse than the criminal elements they are trained
to exterminate? Let us give the courts a chance to find out - and
more importantly - to absolve respondent and erase any taint in his
name, if innocent. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere.
I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration.
Dissenting Opinion
PUNO, J.:
I stretched to two (2) years after a survey was made of offenses
PRECIS
Our Resolution of May 28, 2002 was the result of a long and
exhaustive, nay, exhausting discussion of the meaning of section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As summed
up in the new ponencia of Mr. Justice Callejo, the Court ruled that
section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case at bar. Nonetheless
evidence has to be adduced by the parties to prove certain facts
which shall determine whether said section can be beneficially
invoked by respondent Lacson. These vital facts, to quote the
new ponencia, are (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the
cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether notices
to the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent
Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir, Jr.; (3) whether there
were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three
(3) other victims; (4) whether the 2-year period to revive the cases
has already lapsed; (5) whether there is any justification for the re-
filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (6) whether the
reckoning date of the 2-year bar shall be from the date of the order
of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of
receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of
effectivity of the new rule; and (7) if the cases were revived only
after the 2-year bar, the State must justify its failure to comply with
the said time-bar. Thus, the case at bar was remanded to the RTC-
Quezon City, Branch 81 to enable the parties to adduce evidence
on these factual issues. On the basis of the evidence to be
presented, the trial court will rule on the applicability of section 8,
Rule 117 to respondent Lacson.
It is noteworthy that except for JJ Melo and Carpio, who inhibited
themselves, the resolution was a unanimous one. The
new ponencia now seeks to reverse the unanimous resolution of
this Court. The Court has four new members and the passage of
time has put a mist on some of the themes and sub-themes
considered in the discussion of section 8, Rule 117. I wish therefore
to restate my humble understanding of section 8, Rule 117, as
chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court that
drafted the said rule.
I start with the statement that the Committee was confronted with
the following problem:
1. A complaint or information has been filed with a court of
competent jurisdiction;
2. The prosecution after a number of settings cannot proceed with
the case for some reasons but usually due to the unavailability of
the complainant or witnesses to testify;
3. The accused is ready to proceed but cannot move to dismiss the
case and invoke his right to speedy trial because the delay of the
prosecution is not yet unreasonable;
4. As a half-way measure and to relieve himself of the heavy burden
of a pending criminal case, the accused agrees to a provisional
dismissal of the complaint or information against him;
5. Under the rules and case-law prior to year 2000, the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case is open-ended. The case can be revived
by the prosecution without any time limit except when it is already
barred by prescription. It is not unusual for the case to be frozen
for an unreasonable length of time. It remains in the docket of the
court and contributes to its clogging. Worse, it hangs like a sword
of Damocles over the head of the accused. It can fall principally
depending on the predilection and prejudice of the prosecutor.
First. It was this undesirable situation that the Committee on
Revision of the Rules of Court addressed when it designed section
8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Court en banc found no difficulty appreciating the rationale of the
new rule for it approved the rule with but a minor amendment. The
amendment lengthened the time within which the prosecution can
revive the provisionally dismissed case in offenses punishable by
more than six (6) years of imprisonment. The time to revive was
punishable by imprisonment of six (6) years or more and a study of
its probable adverse impact on the government campaign against
crimes. In promulgating the new rule, the Court en banc struck a
fine balance between the sovereign right of the State to prosecute
crimes and the inherent right of the accused to be protected from
the unnecessary burdens of criminal litigation. The timeline within
which provisionally dismissed cases can be revived forms the crux
of the delicate balance.
Second. Section 8, Rule 117 is a rule that gives an accused a new
right that is distinct from, among others, the right to speedy trial
and the right against double jeopardy. The resistance to recognize
this new right and the effort to unnecessarily link it with other
rights of the accused are the main causes of its misunderstanding.
Thus, section 8, Rule 117 should not be confused with Rule
1191 which is the rule of procedure that implements the
constitutional right of an accused to speedy trial. The confusion can
obliterate the difference in the time requirements in the two rules.
The right to speedy trial is determined by a flexible time standard.
We resolve claims of denial of the right to speedy
trial by balancing the following factors: (1) the duration of the
delay, (2) the reason thereof, (3) the assertion of the right or failure
to assert it by the accused, and (4) the prejudice caused by such
delay. On the other hand, the timeline that restricts the right of the
State to revive a case in a section 8, Rule 117 situation is inflexible if
it is shown that it has slept on its right without reason. Section 8,
Rule 117 should not also be confused with section 3(i), Rule 117
which is the rule of procedure that protects the constitutional right
of an accused against double jeopardy. Again, the two rules are
distinct, hence, it is not proper to require the element of prior plea
in double jeopardy cases in a section 8, Rule 117 situation. In fine,
section 8, Rule 117 is a new rule that is complete by itself and
should not be construed in light of rules implementing other rights
of an accused.
Third. The provisional dismissal under section 8 of Rule 119
becomes permanent after the lapse of one or two years depending
on the gravity of the offense involved. There can be no hedging on
the meaning of the word permanent for the new rule used the
word without a bit of embroidery. To be emphatic, the lapse of the
one (1) or two (2) years time puts a period to the provisionally
dismissed case and not a mere comma. It is true that during the
deliberations of the Committee, the provision was originally
worded as follows: "The corresponding order shall state that the
provisional dismissal shall become permanent and amount to
acquittal one (1) year after its issuance without the case having
been revived." In the final version of the provision, however, the
phrase "amount to acquittal" was deleted. The deletion was
dictated by the belief that the phrase was a redundancy in light of
the clear and unequivocal import of the word "permanent." The
deletion cannot be distorted to mean that a case permanently
dismissed can still be revived. For if that were the intent, the rule
could have easily stated that the accused whose case has been
permanently dismissed could nevertheless be prosecuted for the
same offense.
Fourth. The permanent dismissal of an unrevived case under
section 8, Rule 117 does not unduly shorten the prescriptive period
of offenses provided for in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
Code. The new rule merely regulates the conduct of the prosecution
of an offense once the case is filed in court. It cannot be doubted
that after a case is filed in court, its conduct by the prosecution can
be regulated by rules of procedure which are within the exclusive
power of this Court to promulgate. More specifically, the new
rule regulates the time when the State must complete
the prosecution of a pending case after its provisional dismissal. It
provides the consequence when the State sleeps on its duty to
revive a provisionally dismissed case. If the State loses the right to
continue the prosecution of an offense already filed in court, it is not
because the rule has amended the prescriptive period of the crime
provided by our substantive law. Rather, it is a simple case where
the State forfeited its right to prosecute by its own inaction, an
inaction that unless justified cannot be allowed to further impair the
rights of an accused.
Fifth. The permanent dismissal under section 8, Rule
117 precludes the prosecution of the accused for the same offense
under a new information. Again, it is true that we have rulings to
the effect that a trial court may, in the interest of justice, dismiss a
case provisionally but without prejudice to reinstating it before the
order of dismissal becomes final or without prejudice to the
subsequent filing of a new information for the same offense. But
note should be taken of the important fact that these rulings were
handed down before section 8, Rule 117 came into being. Section
8, Rule 117 changed the old rule that dismissals which are
provisional in character lack the imprimatur of finality, hence, they
do not bar the revival of the offense charged or the filing of a new
information for the same offense. The old rule was precisely
jettisoned by the Committee and by this Court because of its
unfairness to the accused. Again, I respectfully submit that the new
rule would be useless if it would leave unfettered the discretion of
the prosecutor in reviving the same offense under the fig leaf of a
new information.
Sixth. I do not share the thesis that the re-filing of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 is not a revival of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. There cannot be any dispute on
the meaning of the word revival in section 8, Rule 117. Revival
means reanimating or renewing the case that has become dormant
because of its provisional dismissal. The cases that were
provisionally dismissed for lack of probable cause refer to the
eleven (11) Informations for murder filed against the respondent,
et al., allegedly for the summary execution of some members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang. Without doubt, these are the same
cases re-filed against the respondent after another preliminary
investigation with the principal difference that respondent is now
charged as a principal and no longer as an accessory.
I respectfully submit that the test to determine whether a case can
be revived is not whether a new preliminary investigation has been
conducted by the prosecution. That test, if allowed, would torture
out of context the intent of section 8, Rule 117. The new rule speaks
of "case" and "offenses." It clearly prohibits the revival of the
case against an accused which has been provisionally dismissed for
failure of the State to continue its prosecution without any
justification. I like to underscore that the prohibition against revival
is not a free gift by the State to an accused. The right against revival
is the result of a trade-off of valuable rights for the accused can
exercise it only if he surrenders his right to an early permanent
dismissal of the case against him due to the inability of the State to
prosecute. In so doing, the accused suffers a detriment for he gives
the State one to two years to revive a case which has already been
frozen for failure to prosecute. During this waiting period, the
accused cannot move to dismiss the charge against him while the
State can locate its missing witnesses, secure them if they are
threatened and even gather new evidence. In exchange for this
period of grace given to the State, the rule sets a timeline for the
prosecutors to revive the case against the accused. The timeline is
fixed for the accused has suffered an indubitable detriment and
the trade-off for this detriment is the duty imposed on the
prosecution either to continue or discontinue with the case within
the 1 or 2-year grace period. We cannot allow the undue extension
of this detriment unless the State can show compelling reasons to
justify its failure to prosecute. The open-ended practice under the
old rule which makes provisional dismissal permanently provisional
is precisely the evil sought to be extirpated by section 8, Rule 117.
Seventh, I wish to stress the bigger reason for section 8, Rule 117.
The new rule does enhance the constitutional rights of an accused
to speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case(s) against him but
it is much more than that. More broadly, the new rule was designed
to achieve one of the end-goals of the criminal process - - - to
minimize the burdens of accusation and litigation. This end-goal is
well explained by La Fave and Israel, conceded authorities in
Criminal Procedure, viz:2
"(d) Minimizing the Burdens of Accusation and Litigation. Even
though eventually acquitted, an innocent person charged with a
crime suffers substantial burdens. The accusation casts a doubt on
the person’s reputation that is not easily erased. Frequently, the
public remembers the accusation and still suspects guilt even after
an acquittal. Moreover, even where an acquittal is accepted as fully
vindicating the accused, it hardly remedies other costs suffered in
the course of gaining that verdict. The period spent by the accused
awaiting trial commonly is filled with a substantial degree of
anxiety and insecurity that disrupts the daily flow of his life. That
disruption is, of course, even greater if he is incarcerated pending
trial. The accused also must bear the expense and ordeal of the
litigation process itself."
This end-goal is by no means novel. We have various rules of
criminal procedure to minimize the burdens of litigation. Our rules
on bail, venue, double jeopardy, speedy trial, speedy disposition of
cases, etc., are among them. In fine, we have been promulgating
rules to minimize the burdens of litigation for a long, long time.
Let me also underscore that section 8, Rule 117 was promulgated
in the exercise of the expanded power of this Court to enact rules
of procedure under section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."
This provision3 expanded the rule making power of this Court for
(1) it extended its power not only to cover pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar but also to encompass the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights and legal assistance to the
underprivileged, and (2) it no longer contained the restriction that
said rules "may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa."4 As aforediscussed, section 8, Rule 117 was
designed to diminish the burdens of litigation by fixing a timeline
on provisional dismissal of cases beyond which they cannot be
revived. The regulation of the conduct of a criminal case once filed
in court, including the time within which it must be terminated,
is inherent in judicial power. Section 8, Rule 117 is an exercise of
this power, a power that this Court has exercised without any
question since the 1935 Constitution.
II
The dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his
express consent
This Court did not err when it ruled "that the provisional dismissal
of the case against respondent Lacson bears his express consent."
The records will show that respondent Lacson filed before then
Judge Agnir, Jr. who was to try Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689, a motion for judicial determination of probable cause.
The motion contained the following prayer:
"x x x xxx xxx
(1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to section
2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable
Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
prosecution to present the private complainants and their
witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefore; and
(2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or,
if issued recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this
incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for."5
In ruling that the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson
did not bear his consent, the ponencia states that "x x x
respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause x x x."6 It emphasizes that no motion for provisional
dismissal of the cases was filed. With due respect, the effort to
distinguish the two motions is futile for it is seeking a distinction
when there is no difference. The essence of both motions is the lack
of probable cause of the Informations. If the motions succeed,
there is only one course of action for the judge to take --- to dismiss
the Informations. For all intents and purposes, a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause can be treated as a motion to
dismiss for lack of probable cause. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. prefaced
the resolution of respondent Lacson’s motion in this wise:
"Before the Court are five (5) separate but identical motions filed
thru their respective counsel by the twenty-six (26) accused in the
above numbered cases, praying the Court to (1) make a judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest, (2) to hold in abeyance the issuance of
warrants in the meantime, and (3) to dismiss the cases should the
court find lack of probable cause."
Prescinding from this understanding, then Judge Agnir, Jr. issued
his Resolution dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689, viz:
"As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in
support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd,
with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the
desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence
to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are
probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine above-cited, there
is no more reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose
them to an open and public accusation. It is time to write finis to
these cases and lay to rest the ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995
so that all those involved--- the accused, the prosecution witnesses
and the private complainants alike--- may get on with their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case
of People vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999)
where the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that ‘if the
Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the
public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence,
because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during
the trial’, and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno ‘is an exception to
the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances
are clearly shown to exist.’
This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly
make an exception to the general rule.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable
cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused
or to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the Informations in the above-
numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed."
SO ORDERED." (emphasis supplied)
To justify his ruling, the ponente insists that "respondent did not
pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the
case."7 With due respect, the specific prayer demanded by the
ponente is unnecessary. Under Rule 112, section 6 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge may "immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause." Likewise, the motion for judicial determination of probable
cause prayed for "other equitable reliefs." Similarly, there need not
be any agreement on the provisional character of the dismissal of
the said cases. The cases were dismissed not on the merits but for
lack of probable cause and before the arraignment of respondent
Lacson. Their dismissal was provisional by operation of our rules.
The ponencia then cites certain judicial "admissions" by the
counsel of respondent Lacson to the effect that they did not move
to dismiss the Informations against said respondent nor agree to
their provisional dismissal. Again with due respect, these so called
"admissions" should be taken in their proper context. These
"admissions" were made in the course of the proceedings before
the Court of Appeals. The parties then were arguing that the re-
filing of the cases will violate the rule on double jeopardy.
Naturally, respondent Lacson took the position that his right
against double jeopardy would be violated, hence, he was insisting
that the dismissal of the cases was without his express consent.
Naturally too, the petitioner took the opposite view that the rule
on double jeopardy would not be breached because respondent
consented to their dismissal. If the ponencia will hold respondent
Lacson to his "admission" that he did not consent to the dismissal
of his cases, it should similarly hold petitioner to its "admission"
that respondent consented to the dismissal of the cases against
him. In truth, the evidentiary rule on admission governs the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact and should
not be applied on arguments of parties.The issue in the case at bar
is the nature and effect of a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause- - - i.e., whether or not it can be treated by a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of probable cause. The issue is
basically legal, and should be resolved in accordance with our laws
and not on the basis of the arguments of parties which are often
twisted to serve their peculiar interests.
III
It is not clear whether the offended parties had knowledge of the
dismissal
of their Informations against respondent Lacson
In our resolution under reconsideration, we explained why there is
uncertainty on the factual issue of whether notices were sent to
the offended parties, viz:
"x x x
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with
conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given
before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by
Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of Judge Agnir that the
relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the
hearing. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty.
Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private
complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a
witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their
affidavits of desistance, namely:
a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey
Abalora;
b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;
f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
g. Rolando Siplon
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined
whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the
relatives of the three (3) other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda,
Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show
whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge
thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to
be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet
inexistent at that time.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in
the petition for prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by
respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge
Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said
cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is
whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent
Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not
the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled
by the litigants.
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of
proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against
respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon
City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding
conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a
petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among
others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived
informations for multiple murder against him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule
117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of
Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the
argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple
murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did
not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether
notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir
ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and
company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the
appellate court to the effect that "records show that the
prosecution and the private offended parties were notified of the
hearing x x x." It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the
records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnir’s
finding that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits
of desistance." (emphases supplied)
The ponencia will reverse this ruling on the following ratiocination:
"In the case at bar, even if the respondent’s motion for a
determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses
may be considered for the nonce, as his motion for a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to
the hearing on said motion on May 22, 1999. It must be stressed
that the respondent filed his motion only on May 17, 1999 and set
it for hearing on May 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing
thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of
the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were
separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were
issued to and received by them including those who executed their
affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Piñan,
Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte. There is as well no proof
in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the
victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on May 22, 1999.
Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the
victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita
Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and
Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon) executed their
respective affidavits of desistance. There was no appearance for
the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr. and Meleubren
Sorronda. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the
trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to
notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondent’s motion and
the hearing thereon. The said heirs were thus deprived of their
right to be heard on the respondent’s motion and to protect their
interests." (emphasis supplied)
Again, I beg to disagree. The ponencia cites the records of the cases
to justify its conclusion that notices were not sent to the offended
parties. I cannot be as dogmatic as the ponente. As stated in our
Resolution, section 8, Rule 117 was not yet in existence when then
Judge Agnir, Jr. resolved respondent Lacson’s motion for judicial
determination of probable cause. It is, therefore, unrealistic to look
only at the records of the cases to determine compliance with yet
an inexistent rule. To my mind, what ought to be done is to
determine whether the offended parties had knowledge of
respondent Lacson’s motion for judicial determination of probable
cause. They may have such knowledge despite lack of formal notice
from the court or notice from the public and private prosecutors. It
ought to be beyond argument that such a formal notice is only one
source of knowledge of the offended parties. Moreover, there is
the unresolved question of who are the "offended" parties in the
case at bar. It will be noted that in some of the criminal cases
dismissed by then Judge Agnir, Jr., those who executed affidavits of
desistance were the wives, or the mothers of the victims. Are they
the only "offended" parties or should the other "heirs" be
included? Should all of them be notified? These and other
questions should first be resolved by the trial court, hence, our
resolution to remand.
IV
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
applies retroactively
The ponencia correctly holds that section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not a statute of limitations. As
postulated in the précis, the one-year or two-year bar is a special
procedural rule qualifying the right of the State to prosecute
cases already filed in court. The time-bar under the new rule does
not curtail the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
The State retains the full period under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code within which to secure the necessary evidence and file
the appropriate criminal cases against the accused. But once the
State files a criminal case and involves the courts, the constitutional
power of this Court to set the rules of procedure for the
prosecution of cases cannot be doubted. The power belongs to this
Court alone and there are no uncertain umbras and penumbras in
its parameters which other branches of the government can claim.
To emphasize, the time-bar for the revival of provisionally
dismissed cases was adopted for the purpose, among others, of (1)
discouraging hasty and baseless filing of criminal cases; and (2)
penalizing the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases
already filed in court. The non-revival of provisionally dismissed
cases after the lapse of the one-year or two-year period creates a
disputable presumption of inexcusable delay on the part of the
State in prosecuting the case. But this does not mean that the mere
passage of the one-year or two-year period bars the State from
reviving the provisionally dismissed cases. The State has the right
to present compelling reasons to justify the revival of the cases
beyond the one-year or two-year time bar. The reservation of this
right should remove any charge of unfairness to the State.
Regrettably, the ponencia concedes that section 8, Rule 117 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is a procedural rule but holds that
it could not be applied retroactively. It is unreasonably struck by
the fear that its retroactive application would cause "injustice or
hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of
justice in general and of criminal laws in particular." It contends
that the period from March 30, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should
be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the
new rule prescribing it was then not yet in effect.
Again, I beg to disagree. Jurisprudence that has resisted the
tempest of time teaches us that statutes and rules should be
construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
sought to be remedied. The unerring principle that ought to guide
any attempt to construe them should be their intended scope and
purpose.8 In the case at bar, it is crystal clear that the new rule is
intended to apply to all provisionally dismissed cases before its
passage. It is a remedial measure to check the continuing inaction
on the part of the State to prosecute pending cases in court. Its
purpose is to press the State to act on cases it has inexcusably put
in deep slumber in our courts of justice. It provides relief to the
accused who are prejudiced when the cases filed in court against
them remain dormant for an unreasonable length of time. In fine,
the new rule is a remedial rule that looks back even as it looks
forward. It reaches both the past and the future. It is both
retrospective and prospective.
To be sure, there is nothing novel in the new rule when it reaches
the past. Under the ruling case law, statutes regulating the
procedure of courts are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its passage.9The retroactive
application of procedural rules cannot be challenged as violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.
The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
nor give rise from, procedural laws.10
The only conceivable exception to this general rule is if the
retroactive application of the procedural rule "would not be
feasible or would work injustice."11 As amply demonstrated,
however, the new rule will not impair the right of the State to
prosecute criminals. The State is not prejudiced by the time-bar if
it can justify its delay in the prosecution of cases. If it cannot justify
its delay, it cannot complain of unfairness. No government can
claim the right to prosecute at its perpetual pleasure. It cannot file
a criminal case and sleep on it. It is self-evident that inexcusable
delays in the prosecution of a case deny an accused the right to a
fair trial.
With due respect, I submit that the ponencia sends a wrong
message in batting only for the prospective application of the new
rule. To hold that the State could not be faulted for not reviving the
case within two years simply because the new rule was not yet in
effect implies that this Court sanctions delays in the prosecution of
cases, however inexcusable the delays were. Pushed to the
extreme, the majority in effect bars the application of the new rule
to cases provisionally dismissed five or ten years ago on the simple
reason that during the interregnum, the new rule was not yet in
effect. Let us not half pause in applying the new rule for it addresses
inexcusable delays in the prosecution of cases already filed in court.
Devoid of legalese, it tells the State not to sleep on its job. If we
cannot tell the prosecution to do its job within a reasonable time
frame, we might as well close shop.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DENY petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration.
Separate Opinion
VITUG, J.:
Petitioners argue that while Section 8, Rule 117, of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure bars the revival of a case upon the lapse of the
one-year period or the two-year period, as the case may be, after
its provisional dismissal, the rule, however, does not contain any
proscription against the filing of a new information involving the
same incident so long as it is done within prescriptive period of the
offense provided in Article 90 and Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code or such as may otherwise be expressed by statute.
Prescription of crimes pertains to the loss or waiver by the State of
its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law.1 It is
the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt and that
statutes enforcing that promptitude should be maintained, these
provisions being not merely acts of grace but checks imposed by
the State upon itself "to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns
and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained."2 Once a criminal case is instituted, the issue on
prescription is addressed and the rule on prescription as a
substantive provision would have then so served its purpose.
Thenceforth, assuming the timely filing of the case, the rules of
procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court must govern. In fine,
while Article 90 and Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fix the
period when the State must file a case against an accused after the
discovery of the crime by the offended party, Section 8, Rule 117,
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, applies once an action
has been instituted. The substantive provisions govern the
institution of the case; the procedural rules steps in thereafter. The
Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to
"promulgate rules concerning x x x pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts."3 The 1987 Charter not only has deleted the
authority of the legislature to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
promulgated by the Court but it also expanded the Court’s rule-
making power to cover the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights.4 Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the
Supreme Court has incorporated Section 8, Rule 117, in the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, viz:
"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
"The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable
by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived."
In this regard, I share the conclusions reached by my esteemed
colleague, Justice Reynato S. Puno, that there are yet a number of
factors that must first be established and considered mainly
evidentiary, before this Court can appropriately rule on the
applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Dissenting Opinion
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I find petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of our Resolution
dated May 28, 2002 bereft of merit. The cases filed against
respondent Senator Panfilo M. Lacson should be DISMISSED on the
grounds that his constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition of cases has been violated and that the filing of new
Informations against him constitutes persecution.
Also, I maintain that Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, an implementing Rule of the right to speedy
trial and speedy disposition of cases, applies to respondent’s cases
upon a showing before the trial court that its requirements have
been complied with.
I. Respondent’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition of his cases has been violated.
Statutes cannot be effective to place any limitation on a person’s
constitutional right,1 and therefore they should not be regarded as
a definition of the constitutional provision.2 It is thus conceivable
that the constitutional provision is violated although its
implementing statute is not.3 This is because constitutions are not
adopted to control the rights and procedures of the moment but to
establish broad principles of justice and fair play for all time.4
The present controversy brings into focus the novel provision,
Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which reads:
"Sec. 8. Provisional Dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
"The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable
by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two years after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived."(Emphasis supplied)
In our Resolution now being challenged by petitioners in their
Motion for Reconsideration, we held that the above Rule is
inapplicable to the cases of respondent because the records fail to
show that its requirements have been complied with. These
requirements as applied to his cases are: the provisional dismissal
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Quezon City of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 against respondent must have been
with his express consent and with notice to the offended parties;
and the reckoning date of the two-year period within which to
revive the cases should have been properly determined.
Consequently, in the same Resolution, we remanded the case at
bar to the trial court to enable the parties to adduce evidence on
whether the said requirements have been complied with on the
basis of which the trial court should rule on whether the newly filed
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 against respondent
should be dismissed or not.
In petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, they contend that the
retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 117 violates the people’s
right to due process; and that for lack of express consent of
respondent and prior notice to the offended parties, the Rule does
not apply to his cases.
The novelty of Section 8, Rule 117 somehow shades the more
important issue of whether respondent’s constitutional right to
speedy trial and disposition of cases has been violated.
Section 8 of Rule 117 was promulgated pursuant to the
constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and speedy disposition of
cases. Clearly, there can be no automatic inference that because
Section 8 was found to be inapplicable, as claimed by petitioners,
respondent’s right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of his
cases was not violated. Lest we miss the forest for the trees,
extreme caution should be exercised so that the general terms of
the constitutional guarantee would not be lost in the specific and
detailed provisions of the rules promulgated for its enforcement.
Speedy trial is said to constitute not a privilege,5 but a right, one
that is recognized as fundamental. It is one of the most basic and
inviolable rights.6 Thus, enshrined in our Constitution is the
mandate that "in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy trial."7 To expedite not only the trial stage but
also the disposition of the case itself, the framers of our
Constitution saw the need to further provide that "all persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."8
The crusade towards a speedy justice did not stop in the
Constitution. To supplement it and to render its guarantee more
effective, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act
of 1998) which aims to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases
before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. For its part, this Court
promulgated Circular No. 39-98 for the purpose of implementing
the provisions of RA 8493. And when the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure was drafted, substantial portions of RA 8493
and Circular No. 39-98 were included therein, thus:
Section 1 (g) of Rule 116 – Unless a shorter period is provided by
special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be
held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the
pendency or a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other
causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded
in computing the period.
Section 1 of Rule 119 – After a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The
trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-
trial order.
Section 2 of Rule 119 -- Trial once commenced shall continue from
day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be
postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.
The Court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense
counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-
term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one
hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.
And still, to achieve speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases,
this Court promulgated Section 8, Rule 117.
The foregoing laws and rules are merely tools to enforce the
constitutional guarantee. They do not constitute its "definition." It
bears reiterating that just because Section 8, Rule 117 is found to
be inapplicable does not ipso factoindicate that there is no
violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of
cases. The laws and rules, which are just legislative construction or
application of the pervasive constitutional guarantee must be
construed fairly in view of the right they seek to enforce. They
cannot be considered to have a limiting effect on the constitutional
guarantee. Significantly, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is not silent on the matter. Section 10, Rule 119
specifically states:
SEC. 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in
the Constitution. – No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule
implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge
of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by section 14 (2),
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ultimately, whether the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial has
been complied with is still a judicial question to be answered in the
light of the circumstances of each particular case and guided by the
principle that the proceedings were free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays.9 Our case law is rich with doctrines setting
the parameters of the right to speedy trial and the right to speedy
disposition of cases. In the recent case of People vs. Leviste,10 we
reiterated our ruling that the right to speedy trial is violated only
where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay
without the participation or fault of the accused, or when
unjustified postponements are sought which prolong the trial for
unreasonable length of time.
On the other hand, in Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr.11 we laid down the
guidelines in determining the applicability of the "speedy
disposition" formula. There, we held that speedy disposition of
cases is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It
is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances.
What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Years of serious deliberation yield certain factors to be considered
in the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial
and speedy disposition of cases has been violated. These are: 1)
length of delay; 2) reason for the delay; 3) assertion of the right or
failure to assert it; and 4) prejudice caused by the delay.12 These
factors are effective in balancing the interest of the State and the
accused.
Records show that the period between the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 and the refiling of the new
Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112, is two (2) years and two (2) months. It may be recalled that
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 were dismissed on March 29,
1999.13 The Department of Justice (DOJ) re-investigated the cases
only upon its receipt on March 29, 2001 of General Leandro
Mendoza’s letter indorsing the affidavits of P/S Ins. Abelardo
Ramos and P/ Ins. Ysmael Yu. On June 6, 2001, new Informations
were filed against respondent. Petitioners justify the belated re-
investigation on the ground that prior to the appearance of Ramos
and Yu, the government had no evidence to sustain the refiling of
the cases.14 They also claim that due to respondent’s close
association with Former President Joseph Estrada and his position
then as PNP Chief, the witnesses were deterred from coming out
with the truth.15
The justifications raised by petitioners are contrary to the records.
As early as July 1999, Yu executed an affidavit attesting to the very
same facts contained in his March 24, 2001 affidavit.16 Another
witness, Mario Enad, also executed his affidavit as early as August
8, 1995.17 Petitioners have never claimed that these two were
unwilling to testify on earlier dates. Also, nowhere in their affidavits
is a statement that they were afraid of testifying against
respondent because he is a friend of the Former President or was a
PNP Chief. The two even mentioned the names of other witnesses
whom petitioners could have utilized in an earlier re-investigation.
Clearly, what glares from the records is that from the time of the
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89, there was an
unjustified interval of inactivity of more than two (2) years on the
part of the prosecution.
Petitioners cannot argue that respondent failed to assert his right
to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. While we have ruled
that if an accused wants to exercise his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of
the case,18 however, the same cannot be expected of respondent.
It would be ludicrous for him to ask for the trial of his cases when
the same had already been dismissed. During the interval, there
were no incidents that would prompt him to invoke the right.
Indeed, the delay could only be attributed to the inaction on the
part of the investigating officials.19
Neither can petitioners argue that the right to speedy trial is
inapplicable since the charges have been dismissed. As explained
by Justice Marshall, the anxiety brought by public prosecution does
not disappear simply because the initial charges are temporarily
dismissed. After all, the government has revealed the seriousness
of its threat of prosecution by initially bringing
charges.20 Consequently, when the government has already
investigated and charged an accused, it is in a much better position
and properly shoulders a greater responsibility to reinvestigate and
re-prosecute him with reasonable promptness. Sadly, this was not
done in this case. In Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan,21 we upheld the
accused’s right to speedy disposition of his case notwithstanding
his alleged failure to take any step to assert his right, thus:
"We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor’s ratiocination. It is the
duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as
mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner
did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his
acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him."
Generally, the question of how much lapse of time is consistent
with the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and speedy
disposition of cases varies with the particular circumstances. There
is no constitutional basis for holding that the right to a speedy trial
can be quantified into a specified number of days and
months.22 The mere passage of time is not sufficient to establish a
denial of a right to a speedy trial, but a lengthy delay, which is
presumptively prejudicial, triggers the examination of other factors
to determine whether rights have been violated.23 In a case, it has
been held that a delay of more than one (1) year is presumptively
prejudicial and shifts the burden to the government to justify the
delay.24 Certainly, the two-year delay here is prejudicial to
respondent and it should be taken against petitioners, they having
failed to show any good cause or reason for such delay.
Another factor to be considered in determining whether
respondent’s right to a speedy trial and disposition of cases has
been violated is the prejudice to him. In his comment, he states:
"x x x (i) he had every reason to believe that the sword of Damocles
which had hang atop his head by virtue of the filing of the original
charges in 1995 had been obliterated by their dismissal in 1999 as
he has the right to Due Process and to be rid of the paranoia of
being harassed for charges by the Republic and to indict him for
heinous offenses and subject him to a non-bailable action
disenfranchises eight (8) Million or so voters who had put him in
office as their representative, (ii) it smacks of oppression as
petitioner DOJ Secretary had filed or instigated new cases against
him for an undisclosed political agenda, (iii) his detractors,
including petitioner DOJ Secretary, have the capacity to influence
the litigation including the investigation and prosecution thereof,
(iv) it is plainly a vindictive action perpetrated by a PNP Senior
Superintendent whom petitioner had accused of kidnapping for
which he was punished and sent to the National Penitentiary until
he was recently released and re-assumed a post as Intelligence
Chief under the current administration, and (v) respondent is now
the subject of persecution and not prosecution."25
There is no denying that the filing of new Informations against
respondent had caused him undue prejudice. Almost eight (8) years
have elapsed since November 21, 1995,26 the date the original
Informations were filed, and more than three (3) years have passed
since Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 were dismissed on
March 29, 1999. It is therefore reasonable for respondent to expect
that by this time, petitioners would finally give him peace of mind.
In Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan,27 we ruled that the delay in the
disposition of the case had caused "much prejudice, distress and
anxiety to petitioner whose career as bank executive and
businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled to an
unresolved criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles’
sword over his head for more than a decade." There, we stressed
the consequences and problems inherent in protracted litigation
which include, among others, the stagnant professional growth,
hampered travel opportunities and a besmirched reputation. It
cannot be said that respondent does not suffer the same
consequences now.
Prejudice does not only consist of impairment of the accused’s
ability to defend himself, it may also include other sufferings, such
as anxiety and stigma.28 Respondent is not an ordinary citizen. He
is a Senator who has a reputation to protect. The publicity caused
by the refiling of new Informations undoubtedly tainted his name.
Moreover, he has to defend himself constantly from the nagging
accusations that interfere in the performance of his duties as a
Senator.
I believe that the prosecution now of respondent is tantamount to
persecution.
While it is the policy of this Court not to interfere in the exercise of
the prosecutors’ discretion, however, it cannot tolerate a refiling of
new Informations, as in this case, at the impulse of the officials in
command. The prosecution of an accused must not be made to
depend on who is perceived as an enemy by those who sit in power
but on the sacrosanct duty of prosecutors to bring to justice those
believed to be offenders of the law while ensuring that their rights
under the Constitution remain inviolable.
The sudden over-eagerness of petitioners to prosecute
respondent, to my mind, is not really an indicum of competence, it
is a clear example of persecution. This was not overlooked by the
Court of Appeals which held:
"x x x Apparently, hints of persecution are manifest in the case of
petitioner. For one, though earlier accused as an accessory in the
original multiple murder cases, petitioner is now charged as a
principal in the recent revival of the criminal cases – obviously to
preclude any opportunity on his part to evade incarceration by
seeking bail. Persecution is likewise apparent in the hurried pace at
which the preliminary investigation of the subject criminal cases
was completed by respondent prosecutors and in the immediate
and abrupt filing of the Informations against petitioners in only a
matter of days after the original petition had been filed in this
Court."29
Petitioners ought to be reminded of the caveat in Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan30 that "prosecutors should not allow and should
avoid giving the impression that their noble office is being used or
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without
fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor,
weak or strong, powerless or mighty." Their undue haste in
conducting the preliminary investigation of the 26 accused and
their inordinate interest to re-file the cases hurriedly raise a
quizzical eyebrow.
Not to be glossed over is the fact that the preliminary investigation
which resulted in the filing of new Informations was initiated only
by the letter dated March 27, 2001 of PNP Chief General Mendoza
to then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez. I do not think that the
said letter could qualify as a complaint under Section 3, Rule 112 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,31 the basis for a
preliminary investigation. The procedure adopted is a departure
from the usual mode. Again, in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,32 we
held:
"A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression
that political motivations played a vital role in activating and
propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after Tatad had a falling out
with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which
require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for fact-finding investigation and report."
Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the new
Informations against respondent are indicative of persecution and
not prosecution.
One thing for which this Court must guard itself against is to be
used as an instrument of political manipulation. As the last bulwark
of the defenseless and the accused, our duty is to uphold the law
and no other. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights
takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and
when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards
the former.33
II. Section 8, Rule 117 applies to respondent’s cases upon
compliance with its requirements.
Going back to Section 8, Rule 117, the remand of this case to the
trial court for the determination of whether or not the
requirements of this provision have been complied with is
imperative.
I am not convinced that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to 89 was without the consent of respondent and that the
offended parties were not notified. It appears from the
Resolution34 dated March 29, 1999 of the trial court that
respondent’s prayer was for that court to "(1) make a judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants
in the meantime; and (3) dismiss the cases should the court find
probable cause." Clearly, this third plea is a manifestation that the
dismissal of the cases was with respondent’s consent. While it is
true that what he filed is a mere motion for the judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses, the same was anchored on the case
of Allado vs. Diokno.35 There, we ruled that "[I]f upon the filing of
the information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the
information and the document attached thereto, finds that no
probable cause exists, he must either call for the complainant and
the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no
reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an
open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause
exists." With this as respondent’s premise, I believe it is safe to
conclude that the dismissal was with his express consent.
At any rate, considering the view that there is doubt on whether
respondent gave his express consent to the dismissal of the cases,
as expressed in our challenged Resolution, this incident should be
determined by the trial court. With respect to the requirement of
notice to the offended parties, again the same should be addressed
to the trial court which can hear the parties thereon. We must
maintain a hands-off stance on these matters for a different
approach might lead us astray into the field of factual conflict
where our legal pronouncements would not rest on solid grounds.
Time and again we have ruled that this Court is not a trier of facts.36
The petitioners maintain that Section 8, Rule 117 cannot be applied
retroactively for to do so would work injustice to the People.
Settled in our jurisprudence is the principle that when a new law
will be advantageous to the accused, the same may be given
retroactive effect.37 This is more particularly so when the law is
merely procedural. In several cases, we applied the provisions of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactively.38 We should
take the same action on Section 8, Rule 117 considering that it is a
reinforcement of a person’s constitutional right to speedy trial and
speedy disposition of cases.
Moreover, it has been held that the constitutional provision barring
the passage of retroactive laws protects only the rights of citizens.
Hence, a state may constitutionally pass a retroactive law that
impairs its own rights.39 Only private, and not public, rights may
become vested in a constitutional sense.40 Otherwise stated, there
is a distinction between the effect to be given a retroactive statute
when it relates to private rights and when it relates to public rights.
Public rights may always be modified or annulled by subsequent
legislation without contravening the Due Process Clause.41
While I concurred in our challenged Resolution that this case should
be remanded to the trial court to enable it to determine whether
the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with,
however, I still believe that we should settle now once and for all
the most crucial issue, i.e., whether or not the provisional dismissal
contemplated in the Rule shall become permanent two years after
the issuance of the order and thus constitutes a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. To evade it now is to delay the
day of reckoning and to put the legal community in a quandary.
The principle adhered to by petitioners is that the rule "prohibits
only a revival of a criminal case after the lapse of the periods
prescribed therein and does not impinge on the right of the State
to prosecute an offender for the same offense under a new
Information."42 Thus, there arises the distinction between "revival"
and "filing of a new Information."
Section 8 of Rule 117 is a new provision. To reiterate, it draws its
life from the constitutional guarantees of speedy trial43 and speedy
disposition of cases. Its mandate is explicit, i.e., a provisional
dismissal of an offense becomes "permanent" if not revive within
the prescribed periods (or two years in respondent’s cases). To say
that this "permanent" dismissal prohibits only the "revival" of the
case but not the "filing" of new Information, is to render the
provision ineffectual, providing only lip service to the accused’s
constitutional right it seeks to enforce. Indeed, what difference will
the provision make if after the lapse of two years, the State can still
prosecute the accused for the same offense by merely "filing" a new
Information? With the interpretation given, the dismissal cannot
really be considered "permanent." After two years, all the
prosecution has to do is to file a new Information. Thus, whether
by "revival" or by "filing a new Information," the effect is the
same, i.e., the prosecution of the accused for the same offense
continues. What is overlooked is that, in the interim, he continues
to suffer all the prejudices that come with the failure of the
prosecution to put a real end to his case. We might as well take
heed of the warning against "allowing doctrinaire concepts… to
submerge the practical demands of the constitutional right to a
speedy trial."44
What price does the State have to pay for its lethargy or negligence
to prosecute? If I am to follow petitioners’ position, then I can say
that the only sanction for the violation of the periods prescribed in
Section 8 is that the State should conduct the corresponding new
preliminary investigation before it can file a new information. It
seems to me that the new preliminary investigation is the only
difference between "filing a new information" and "revival." To my
mind, conducting a preliminary investigation is hardly a sanction for
the prosecution’s negligence. While a new preliminary
investigation causes intense inconvenience to the prosecution, the
accused suffers as well. Indeed, considering the additional delay
the prosecution incurs in bringing the case to a conclusion as a
result of the filing of a new information and the anxiety on the part
of the accused by a threat of a new prosecution, the interpretation
accorded to Section 8, Rule 117 has not advanced its real purpose.
Let it be stressed that Section 8 was introduced not so much for the
interest of the State but precisely for the protection of the accused
against protracted prosecution. The measure of protection
consistent with its language is the treatment of the "permanent"
dismissal as a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
The discharge of an accused for failure of the prosecution to bring
him to trial within the prescribed period is not an entirely new
concept. Even prior to the introduction of Section 8, there were
already provisions of similar import in other jurisdictions. Under
certain statutes implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to speedy trial, a discharge granted pursuant to the statute
is held to be a bar to subsequent prosecution, whether under the
same or new indictment. This view has been defended on the
ground that any other construction would open the way for
complete evasion of the statute and that the constitutional
provision can only be given its legitimate effect by holding that a
person once discharged is entitled to immunity from further
prosecution for the same offense.45
In State vs. Crawford,46 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia entered a judgment forever discharging the accused from
prosecution for the offense on the basis of a rule requiring that
"every person charged with felony, and remanded to a circuit court
for trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the
offense, if there be three regular terms of such court, after the
indictment is found against him without a trial." The discharge was
decreed notwithstanding the fact that it was within the third
term that the State entered a nolle prosequi and at the same time
reindict for the same offense. The court ratiocinated:
"When a prisoner has stood ready for trial through two full terms
and substantially through the third one, and, no doubt, until the
jury has been discharged and the opportunity for trial at that term
annihilated, he has substantially performed all the statutory
conditions required to his right of discharge. Although such a
discharge is not the moral equivalent of an acquittal, and he may
be guilty, his constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence
determined by a trial within a reasonable time cannot be frittered
away upon purely technical and unsubstantial ground. Nor is the
legislative act designed to enforce such right to be interpreted
otherwise than in accordance with the recognized rules of
construction. To permit the state to enter a nolle prosequi within
the third term and reindict for the same offense, and thus deprive
the prisoner of the terms fully elapsed as well as the term about to
end, would make it possible to keep the prisoner in custody or under
recognizance for an indefinite period of time, on charges of a single
offense, unless perhaps, he could enforce a trial by the writ of
mandamus. Such a construction as substantially tends to the defeat
or undue limitation of the purpose of a statute is not permissible in
any jurisdiction.
"4 That statutes shall be so construed as to effectuate the legislative
purpose, not defeat it, is fundamental and all-pervasive in statutory
construction. The remedy given by law for failure to accord a
prompt trial to one charged with felony is right to be discharged,
not mandamus to obtain such trial. x x x."
In People vs. Allen,47 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a
discharge of the accused for failure of the prosecution to try him
within four months after written demand, renders him immune
from trial for the same offense whether under the same or a new
indictment. In Newlin vs. People,48 the same court ruled that where
a defendant, indicted and committed for crime, is entitled, under
the statute, to a discharge for delay in not bringing him to trial while
being held under the indictment, the fact that a second indictment
is found for the same offense and a nolle prosequientered as to the
first indictment, does not defeat his right to be discharged. Again,
in People vs. Heider49 the same court held that an accused who has
obtained his discharge owing to the failure of the People to bring
his case to trial within the time prescribed by the statute enacted
to carry into effect the constitutional guaranty of the right to a
speedy trial, cannot be committed or held for the same offense
under a new indictment.
Clearly, there is a catena of jurisprudence supporting the principle
that the first discharge of the accused under a statute
implementing the constitutional right to speedy trial constitutes a
bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. I see no
reason why we cannot adopt the same principle.
To reiterate, Section 8, Rule 117 seeks to implement the
constitutional guarantees that a) in all criminal prosecution, the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial,50 and b) that all
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.51 The
importance of these rights cannot be overemphasized. They are
necessary and vital because a person should not have to face
continued anxiety under a prolonged threat of criminal
prosecution. Postponement of trial for a long time will ordinarily
handicap an accused through the disappearance of necessary
witnesses and loss of documentary evidence. Furthermore, after
many months or years, the memory of those witnesses who are
available will likely be impaired by the passage of time. These rights
are protections too against the harassment of being subjected to
accusation, with its harmful effect on the accused’s reputation and
business affairs.52 As aptly observed in a case, "unreasonable delay
between formal accusation and trial threatens to produce more
than one sort of harm, including ‘oppressive pre-trial
incarceration,’ ‘anxiety and concern of the accused,’ and the
‘possibility that the accused’s defense will be impaired’ by dimming
memories and loss of exculpatory evidence." Of these forms of
prejudice, the most serious is the last because the inability of the
accused to prepare his case skews the fairness of the system.53
The high regard attributed by this Court to the accused’s right to a
speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of his case is evident from
the tradition established by our case law that the dismissal of a
criminal case based on the denial of the accused’s right to speedy
trial amounts to an acquittal and constitutes a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. 54 It is on the same light that we
should view Section 8.
A rule with the force of law should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed.55 It
should be given such a construction as will advance the object and
secure the benefits intended.56This Court’s Committee on Revision
of the Rules of Court surely saw the prejudice to the rights of the
accused caused by a suspended provisional dismissal of his case.
Apparently, Section 8 was introduced owing to the many instances
where police agencies have refused to issue clearances, for
purposes of employment or travel abroad, to persons having
pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of such cases by
the court was merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that
such provisional dismissal, more often than not, had been done five
or ten years ago.57
In addition to the prejudice on the part of the accused, perceived
by the Committee, we cannot disregard the anxiety that he suffers
because of a public accusation.
Petitioners attempt to create a conflict between the law on
prescription of crimes and the rule on provisional dismissal. They
argue that substantive law should override or prevail over
procedural law. The conflict is non-existent. The law on prescription
of crimes refers to the period during which criminal charges must
be filed.58Section 8 of Rule 117 refers to the period when a
provisional dismissal ceases to be temporary and becomes
permanent, thus, no longer subject to be set aside by the revival of
criminal charges. This rule comes into play only after the State has
commenced the prosecution.
The twenty-year prescriptive period for a case punishable by death
under Section 90 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to give law
enforcers ample time to apprehend criminals who go into hiding. It
also enables prosecutors to better prepare their cases, look for
witnesses, and insure that correct procedure has been followed. On
the other hand, the two-year period under Section 8, Rule 117 is
intended to warn the State that once it filed a case, it must have
the readiness and tenacity to bring it to a conclusion. The purpose
of the period is to encourage promptness in prosecuting cases.
Prejudice to the rights of the accused intensifies over time. While it
is true that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is
insufficient to determine a violation of an accused’s right to speedy
trial, we cannot disregard the reality that after the lapse of a certain
period, the reliability of a trial is compromised in ways that neither
party can prove or, for that matter, identify. It bears stressing that
the mere passage of time impairs memories, causes evidence to be
lost, deprives the accused of witnesses, and interferes with his
ability to defend himself. Now, these nuisances may be avoided if
we are to give full effect to Section 8 and consider the "permanent"
dismissal contemplated therein as a bar to a subsequent
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Not only will it be
in consonant with the cardinal principle of justice and fairness, it
will also provide force to the rule.
Let it be stated anew that this Court cannot and will not allow itself
to be made an instrument of politics nor be privy to any attempt at
the perpetration of injustice.59
In resumè, I reiterate that petitioners’ undue delay in conducting a
new preliminary investigation and refiling of new Informations
against respondent violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial
and speedy disposition of his cases. Respondent correctly invoked
the implementing Rule, Section 8, Rule 117. But as we held in our
questioned Resolution, it must first be shown before the trial court
that its requirements have been complied with. And I venture to
add that should the trial court find that these requirements have
been complied with, then the provisional dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 becomes permanent and thus
constitutes a bar to a subsequent prosecution of respondent for
the same crimes.
As a final word, punishment should be imposed on the accused only
if he violated the law. However, his constitutional privileges and
immunities must be protected against the State’s arbitrary
assertions of power. Obviously, its filing of new Informations
against respondent for the same crimes after the lapse of two years
contravenes no less than the universal principle of justice and
fairness, the bedrock of every Constitution, law and rule.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

G.R. No. 163866 July 29, 2005
ISIDRO OLIVAREZ, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Court of Appeals’ decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
228601 which affirmed the judgment2 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93,3 in Crim. Case No.
0505-SPL finding petitioner Isidro Olivarez guilty of violating
Section 5, Republic Act No. 7610;4 and its resolution denying
reconsideration thereof.5
The case originated from a complaint filed by the offended party
with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna which was the
basis upon which an information for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed
against Isidro Olivarez, to wit:
The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecution (sic) of
Laguna upon a sworn complaint filed by the private complainant,
CRISTINA B. ELITIONG, hereby accuses ISIDRO OLIVAREZ of the
crime of "VIOLATION OF RA 7610", committed as follows:
That on or about July 20, 1997, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said accused actuated by lewd design did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation
commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of one CRISTINA B.
ELITIONG, by touching her breasts and kissing her lips, against her
will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The established facts of this case are as follows:
... The offended party Cristina Elitiong was a 16-year old high school
student who with her brothers were employed by the accused, 64-
year old Isidro Olivarez, in the making of sampaguita garlands. For
one year she had been reporting for work during weekends at the
residence of the accused. Within the compound and at about three
armslength from the main door of the house was her workplace.
At about 11:30 o’clock in the morning of July 20, 1997, Cristina, her
two brothers Macoy and Dodong, and one named Liezel were at
their work when the accused who was near the main door called
for her. She dutifully approached him. The accused asked her if she
had told her mother that he gave her money, and when she said
that she did not, he embraced her and held her breast. The workers
were facing the street so that the two were not seen. He pulled her
to the kitchen and, closing the kitchen door, kissed her on the lips.
She pushed him away and went back to her station. Her brother
Macoy saw her crying when she came out of the house. She did not
say a word, but went to the faucet and washed her face.
The offended party continued to finish the garlands she was
working on, and waited until the afternoon for her wages. When
she arrived at her home, she first told her mother that she no
longer wished to go back. When pressed for a reason, she
said basta po mama ayaw ko ng magtuhog. Finally, she told her
mother what happened.
Aurora Elitiong, the mother, accompanied the offended party to
the San Vicente Barangay Hall on July 26 to report the incident and
give a statement. Days later, Cristina gave another statement to the
local police.
In the defense version, the offended party and her brothers had
slept overnight in the house of the accused. When Isidro woke up
in the early morning to relieve himself, he saw the girl sleeping on
the sofa. He admonished her to join her brothers in the basement.
He went back to his room and slept until 8 A.M. Two hours later, at
10 A.M., he left for the Caltex Service Station which was only a five
minute ride from his home by tricycle. His daughter Analee Olivarez
was staying in another house in the compound and attended a
morning mass. When she returned at 10:30 A.M., she no longer saw
her father. Maritess Buen, the laundrywoman, who was washing
clothes outside the kitchen, saw the accused earlier. By 10 A.M.,
when she entered the house, he already left. He returned by
noontime.
The accused testified that he was at the Caltex station for two and
a half hours waiting for the shipment of flowers from Pampanga.
The goods arrived at 12:15 P.M. He left shortly thereafter and
passed by the market before going home. He arrived at 12:30 P.M.
The next several days were uneventful for him until his
laundrywoman Maritess told him that there was a complaint
against him at the barangay office. A meeting took place between
him and the girl’s family in the presence of the barangay
authorities. The girl’s mother was demanding P30,000 for the
settlement of the case, but he refused to cave in and told a
barangay official Jaime Ramos that he would rather see his accusers
in court than give a centavo because he did not commit the crime.7
The trial court found Olivarez guilty of violating Section 5 of R.A.
7610 and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the
minor Cristina Elitiong in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court8 was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The motion for reconsideration9filed by the accused
was denied.10 Hence, this petition for review11 on the following
grounds:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that the essential elements in Violation of
Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610, which are age of the
offended party and that she is an abused or exploited child as
defined in the law, not having been alleged in the Information,
petitioner/accused cannot be found guilty of said offense and must
be acquitted.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred and committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the Information charging
petitioner/accused of Violation of Section 5, Republic Act 7610, but
failing to allege the essential elements of said offense, had
substantially complied with the requirements of due process for
the accused.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred and gravely abused its
discretion in not reversing the judgment of the trial court convicting
the accused/petitioner and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for alleged Violation of Section 5, Republic Act 7610,
which was not alleged in the Information.12
Petitioner alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him was violated for failure to
allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for
which he is being charged.
Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 states:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
...
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; ..." (Italics supplied)
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.13
Section 32, Article XIII, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person.14 (Emphasis supplied)
The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her
breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances.15
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is
likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:16
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, when the child indulges insexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group. ...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a
child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct. (Emphasis
supplied)
We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:17
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610
does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit,
but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct
through coercion or intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence
of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she
was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious
conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse
occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A.
7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that
Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover a
situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated
into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law
covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual
abuse. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or profit.’ I would
like to amend this, Mr. President, to cover a situation where the
minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious
conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover
those situations and not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY,
PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE
COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP
INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing
the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we
are still talking of the child who is being misused for sexual
purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying
to cover is the other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only
to the child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only for
money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where
the child may not have been used for profit or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because
the essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading
ought to be expanded. But, still, the President will agree that that is
a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the
Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr.
President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR
MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE
OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probable
‘child abuse’?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any
objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved. x x
x. (Italicization supplied)18
Petitioner makes much of the failure to allege in the information
that Cristina was a child below 18 years of age at the time the
offense was committed. He insists that the Court of Appeals
mistakenly relied on the case of People v. Rosare19 because unlike
in Rosare, he had no personal knowledge of Cristina’s age, which
he claims was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.20 A
complaint is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.21
The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.22 The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as
well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the
court to pronounce judgment.23
In the present case, the Court of Appeals found the information to
be sufficient. Relying on the principle laid down in People v. Rosare,
it held:
Before us is an information for violation of RA 7610 that, as
in Rosare, fails to mention an indispensable element of the offense,
the age of the offended party, but makes allusion to another
document, the sworn complaint of the offended party, and
declares it to be the basis upon which the information was filed.
This instrument is the complaint filed by the offended party with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in which she stated
that she was 16 years old at the time of the offense. It forms part
of the initial records of the case and comes before the posting of
bail and entry of the plea of not guilty before the RTC. It appears
that after the charge was filed with the MTC, and as the preliminary
investigation went underway, the accused filed a manifestation
stating that he had filed a counter-affidavit to the charge and
reserved the right to file a motion to quash the information if it was
filed. The MTC found probable cause against him and elevated the
records to the provincial prosecutor for filing of the information.
A complaint is under the Rules one of the two charging instruments
for the offense of which the accused was tried and convicted here.
While the criminal action was instituted by the complaint of the
offended party, the information signed only by the fiscal ushered in
the formal trial process. But both are accusations in writing against
the accused and serve the purpose of enabling him to take the
necessary legal steps for his defense. What is important is that the
information states that the accused is being charged of an offense
under RA 7610 based on the complaint of the offended party, to
which the accused had adequately responded. Under these
conditions, the accused was fully apprised of the accusation against
him. The purpose and objective of the constitutional mandate are
discharged and satisfied. The accused may not be said to be taken
by surprise by the failure of the information to state the age of the
offended party, when he had received the initiatory complaint
where he was told how old the offended party was.24
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In People
v. Rosare, the information did not allege that the victim was a
mental retardate which is an essential element of the crime of
statutory rape. This Court however sustained the trial court’s
judgment of conviction holding that the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor which formed the basis of the
information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that the
offended party is suffering from mental retardation. It ruled that
there was substantial compliance with the mandate that an
accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Thus:
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape
because the fact that the victim was a mental retardate was never
alleged in the information and, absent this element, the acts
charged negate the commission of the offense for which he was
convicted by the lower court.
Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, we have
decided to motu proprio take cognizance of the resolution issued
by the investigating prosecutor in I.S. No. 92-0197 dated June 2,
1992, which formed the basis of and a copy of which was attached
to the information for rape filed against herein appellant. Therein,
it is clearly stated that the offended party is suffering from mental
retardation. We hold, therefore, that this should be deemed a
substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an
accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. ...25
In People v. Villamor,26 the information failed to allege the age of
the offended party but since a copy of the order issued by the
investigating judge was attached in the record of the preliminary
investigation clearly stating that the complainant was nine years
old, it was held that there was substantial compliance with the
mandate to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation. It
was also declared that the defense cannot invoke the element of
surprise as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably prepare for
the accused’s defense, thus:
... Furthermore, even if the information filed did not allege that the
complainant was nine years old, there was substantial compliance
with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the
nature of the charge against him when the Order issued by the
investigating judge, a copy of which was attached in the record of
the preliminary investigation, clearly stated that the complainant
was nine years old. Consequently, the defense cannot invoke the
element of surprise as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably
prepare for the accused’s defense.27
In People v. Galido,28 the information for rape failed to allege the
element of force or intimidation. The Court ruled that this omission
is not fatal since the complaint specifically charged the accused
with three counts of rape committed by means of force and
intimidation. Thus:
Appellant avers that because the Informations on which he was
arraigned and convicted did not allege the element of force or
intimidation, he was deprived of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He
insists that such failure was a fatal defect that rendered the
Informations void.
As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it
is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them would be violated.
In the present case, appellant correctly pointed out that the
element of "force or intimidation" should have been expressly
alleged in the Informations. This omission is not fatal, however,
because the Complaint specifically accused him of three counts of
rape committed by means of force and intimidation...29
The same ground was adopted in People v. Mendez30 which
involved an information for rape that failed to allege force or
intimidation. We ruled therein that it was not a fatal omission
because it was stated in the complaint that accused Rosendo raped
Virginita "by means of force."
In People v. Torellos,31 the Court treated the information for rape
which failed to allege force and intimidation as merely defective
and that the deficiency was cured by the failure of the accused to
assail the insufficiency of the allegations in the Information and by
competent evidence presented during trial.
Thus, while it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the
crime in the information, the failure to do so is not an irremediable
vice. When the complaint or the resolution by the public prosecutor
which contain the missing averments is attached to the information
and form part of the records, the defect in the latter is effectively
cured, and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that
his right to be informed is violated.
In the instant case, the missing averment in the information is
supplied by the Complaint which reads in full:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned complainant, accuses ISIDRO OLIVAREZ, of the
crime of VIOLATION OF RA 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about 11:30 A.M. of July 20, 1997 at Brgy. San Vicente,
San Pedro, Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the said accused with lewd design did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of
lasciviousness against one CRISTINA ELITIONG Y BALDONO, 16
years old, by kissing and touching her private parts and embracing
her against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.32
Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was
mentioned in the information, hence he was adequately informed
of the age of the complainant. The prosecution has also established
the minority of the offended party through competent evidence.
Cristina testified that she was 16 years old and a certification from
the Office of the Local Registrar of San Pedro, Laguna was
presented showing that she was born on October 17, 1980.33 The
third element of sexual abuse is therefore present.
The information merely states that petitioner was being charged
for the crime of "violation of R.A. 7610" without citing the specific
sections alleged to have been violated by petitioner. Nonetheless,
we do not find this omission sufficient to invalidate the
information. The character of the crime is not determined by the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information.34 The sufficiency of
an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective
designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the
information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which
adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprise the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
True, the information herein may not refer to specific section/s of
R.A. 7610 alleged to have been violated by the petitioner, but it is
all to evident that the body of the information contains an
averment of the acts alleged to have been performed by petitioner
which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under Section 5 of
R.A. 7610. As to which section of R.A. 7610 is being violated by
petitioner is inconsequential. What is determinative of the offense
is the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.
The prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner committed acts of sexual abuse against Cristina. The trial
court found Cristina’s testimony to be clear, candid, and
straightforward.35 Her testimony, given in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner, is worthy of
faith and belief.36 In the face of the accusations against him,
petitioner could only interpose uncorroborated alibi and denial.
Denial, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail
over the positive and categorical identification provided by
eyewitnesses.37 Not only did Cristina identify the petitioner as her
assailant but no ill-motive was adduced why she would impute
against him so grave a charge. This Court will not interfere with the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses, absent any
indication that some material fact was overlooked or a grave abuse
of discretion committed. None of the exceptions obtain in the
instant case.38
In addition to moral damages, a fine in the amount of P15,000.00
should likewise be imposed pursuant to our ruling in Amployo v.
People:39
It does not end there. In People v. Abadies, and with respect
specifically to lascivious conduct amounting to child abuse under
Section 5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610, we imposed a fine of P30,000 for
each count of lascivious conduct in addition to the award of moral
damages on the justification that –
It will be noted that Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 7610
provides for the penalty of imprisonment. Nevertheless, Section
31(f), Article XII (Common Penal Provisions) thereof allows the
imposition of a fine subject to the discretion of the court, provided
that the same is to be administered as a cash fund by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for
the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member
of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense. This
provision is in accord with Article 39 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, to which the Philippines became a party on
August 21, 1990, which stresses the duty of states parties to ensure
the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of
abused and exploited children in an environment which fosters
their self-respect and human dignity.
With the case of Abadies as guidepost, we impose a fine of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) on petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 9, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22860 and its
resolution dated June 4, 2004, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
In addition to the award of P15,000.00 as moral damages,
petitioner Isidro Olivarez is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount
of P15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch
XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS
INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.
Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition
for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial
issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss
was anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil
in nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private
respondent, who was authorized to transact and underwrite
insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and
in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency
agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and
accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to
the principal office of private respondent located in the City of
Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account
which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result
she was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the respondent
Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge
in his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present
petition. It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial
Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu
City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were
collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is
purely civil in nature because the fact that private respondent
separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged
misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject
transaction complained of is not proper for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the
consistent rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash,
being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned
by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final
judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the
ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea,
go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA
171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain
exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial
if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense
or it is not the court of proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information
characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which
it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in
People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493)
this Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the
court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein
and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction
of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts
in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information, and not by the findings the court may make after
the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa,
committed as follows:
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth
under the laws of the Philippine with principal address at 9th floor,
G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following
manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance
agent of said corporation, among whose duties were to remit
collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn
over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or immediately
upon demand, collected and received the amount of P368,850.00
representing payments of insurance premiums from customers,
but herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do
so and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount
thereby misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said
amount of P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of said Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In
all criminal — prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense
was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed
"during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of
Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the
Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense
which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential
elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of
estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private
respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila.
The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she
collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private
respondent in Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is
purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this
point have still to be proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED