1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
EDGAR LAGMAY y on their way to "smokey mountain", they stopped at
ALARCON
G.R. No. 125310 April 21, 1999
FACTS On 1994, accused-appellant, a Marine
Engineering student graduate, was at MATS
College in Agdao, Davao City, to get his SOLAS
Certificate for his application as a seaman. He went
to school in the afternoon and left at about 6:30 in
the evening. At around 7:30 in the evening, he
boarded a jeep together with other passengers.
They accused fell asleep during the trip. When the
jeep stopped at a police checkpoint in Ulas, a tap
on the shoulder awakened him. Someone asked
him if he owned the bag beside his seat. The
accused answered that the bag was not his. SPO3
Laput, one of the policemen in the checkpoint,
kept asking him if the bag belonged to him. Again,
he said no. The policeman then asked the accused
to alight from the jeep and carry the bag. He
followed the police but did not carry the bag. The
policeman immediately frisked him at the waist and
asked if he was a military man, to which he
answered no.
At that time, the police officer did not bother to
question the other passengers. Instead, he insisted
that the accused carry the bag accused however
denied ownership of the bag and refused to carry
it. At this instance, the policeman cocked his
armalite rifle and pointed it at the accused, and
told him that he would shoot the accused, which
caused the latter to scamper and hide. From his
hiding place, the accused overheard the
policeman say that he would not be shot but
arrested instead. Only then did he come out of his
hiding place whereupon, he was immediately
accosted by the policeman and ordered to lie
face flat on the ground while they tied his hands.
They again asked him if he owned the bag. Again,
he denied owning the bag.
Accused was brought to the Ulas Police Sub-
Station, and again questioned about the bag
which was found to contain 3,051.3 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. After several refusal of ownership
by the accused, a certain Capt. Yu then
threatened the accused that he would be
delivered to the NARCOM. When accused asked
where he would be taken, he was hit with the butt
of the rifle at the right side of his stomach, and was
told that he would be brought to the "smokey
mountain", a known salvage area in Davao. While
a dimly lit place somewhere in Ma-a, Davao City, a
well known salvage area, where Capt. Yu ordered
the accused to run. He refused and was asked
again whether he owned the bag. Again, he
denied ownership of the bag.
During the entire interrogation accused was never
asked whether he needed a lawyer. According to
the accused, he was hit repeatedly by the
policemen until he could no longer move, and until
the policemen got tired of hitting him. He was
detained for four (4) days and was made to lie
down on a table, with handcuffs on and then
transferred to a place they called a stockade at
Catitipan, Diversion Highway, Davao City.
Accused strongly denied the accusation against
him. The trial court, however, after hearing the
evidence presented by both the prosecution and
the defense ruled in favor of the prosecution and
sentenced the accused to death.
Hence this automatic review.
ISSUE: WON the trial court proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty
RULING: NO.In this case, the prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of accused Edgar Lagmay y
Alarcon beyond reasonable doubt.
The presumption of innocence is not a mere
procedural tool of the law. It is not overcome by
the presumption of regularity; indeed, it can be
rebutted only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
“x xx the prosecution must overthrow the
presumption of innocence with proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.”
In offenses involving the capital punishment, the
presumption of innocence takes an even more
paramount significance. “It is safely entrenched in
our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution
discharges its burden to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter
need not even offer evidence in his behalf.”
It is noteworthy to mention that the distance from
Agdao to Anda-San Pedro Street is at least four (4)
kilometers, and during the trip several passengers
boarded and alighted from the vehicle. For the
driver to remember the appearances and bags
1|RULE 115
carried by the passengers is very doubtful. This
Court in many cases has held that “evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness but it must also be credible in
itself, such that common experience and
observation of mankind lead to the inference of its
probability under the circumstances.”
We have held that "if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction." \
Furthermore, "the equipoise rule provides that
where the evidence in a criminal case evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused."
We therefore "take this opportunity to repeat this
age-old observation and experience of mankind
on the penological and societal effect of capital
punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent, if
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby REVERSES the
appealed decision and ACQUITS the accused,
2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTEMIO
CALAYCA
G.R. No. 121212 (January 20, 1999)
FACTS: This case was for an automatic review
before the Supreme Court for appellant Artemio
Calayca, who was facing a death sentence
penalty after having been found guilty of the crime
of rape rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 24) of Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal
Case No. 95-129.
Neddy Calayca through a sworn complain,
initiated a rape charge against her father, Artemio
Calayca with supporting affidavits and documents.
MCTC Judge Alfredo Cain found sufficient ground
to prosecute the appellant for the crime of rape
which was concurred by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Misamis Oriental upon examination of
the records of the preliminary investigation
forwarded to it.
An information was filled against Artemio Calayca
which reads:
“The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor II,
upon sworn complaint of the offended party,
Neddy Calayca, accuses ARTEMIO CALAYCA of
the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of January, 1994 at
about 1:00 o’clock in the morning, more or less, at
Barangay Solo, Municipality of Balingasag, Province
of Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force
and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her own daughter, Neddy
Calayca, against her will and consent.
“CONTRARY TO and in VIOLATION OF Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659.
The evidence for the prosecution was anchored
mainly on the testimony of 16-year old Neddy
Calayca who, on May 2, 1995, narrated that at
about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of January 29,
1994, she was sound asleep inside their house at
Barangay Solo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental when
she was awakened by the weight of her father,
herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who was
already on top of her, naked and armed with a
bolo. He forcibly undressed her, inserted his penis
into her vagina and made a push and pull motion.
Feeling the pain in her vagina, she resisted his
onslaught by kicking and boxing him, telling him
with bitter tears, "I wish you would die. You are a
father without good morals."
But she was helpless to resist his lustful desire as he
threatened her with a knife saying, "I will kill you if
you will not agree."
After the sexual assault, she picked up her clothes,
dressed up and was left weeping. She was then 15
years old when this incident happened.
The accused was convicted with the crime of
qualified rape for raping her 15-year old daughter
and was convicted to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of accused
Artemio Calayca with the crime of qualified rape
proper.
HELD: No, the conviction was improper.
The Supreme Court reasoned out that the
Information failed to allege the minority of the
2|RULE 115
victim. The concurrence of the minority of the
victim and her relationship with the offender give a
different character to the rape defined in the first
part of Article 335. They raise the imposable
penalty upon a person accused of rape from
reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme
penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts
relationship and minority of the offended party into
the nature of a special qualifying circumstance.
A reading of the Information for rape filed against
appellant in the present case reveals that he is
merely charged with the crime of simple rape
which warrants the imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. This is so because the fact of
the minority of the victim, is not stated in the
Information.
What was alleged therein was only the relationship
of the offender as the parent of the victim. , it has
long been the rule that qualifying circumstances
must be properly pleaded in the indictment.
Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him
and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is
charged with simple rape and be convicted of its
qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged
in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
There being no allegation of the minority of the
victim in the Information under which the appellant
was arraigned, he cannot be convicted of
qualified rape as he was not properly informed that
he is being accused of qualified
rape.
There being no allegation of the minority of the
victim in the Information under which the appellant
was arraigned, he cannot be convicted of
qualified rape as he was not properly informed that
he is being accused of qualified
rape.
In a criminal prosecution, it is the fundamental rule
that every element of the crime charged must be
alleged in the Information. The main purpose of this
constitutional requirement is to enable the accused
to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court
convicting appellant ARTEMIO CALAYCA of
qualified rape is MODIFIED in the sense that
appellant is declared guilty of simple rape and his
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua…
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS,
G.R. No. 120420
April 21, 1999
FACTS:
On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas,
15 years old, was raped by her own father,
appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down
on a wooden bed inside their house at Creek Drive
II, San Antonio Valley 8, Parañaque, Metro Manila
(pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife,
appellant removed the victim's shorts and panty,
placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her
vagina and conducted coital movements (pp. 7-
8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful
desire, he threatened the victim with death if she
reports the incident to anyone.
On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically
examined at the NBI, which yielded the following
findings:
The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of
extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of
the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen,
intact but distensible and its office wide (2.7 cm. In
diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an
average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any hymenal
laceration.
The defense proffered the testimony of the
accused, who denied the charge, and that of his
married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who
attributed the accusation made by her younger
sister to a mere resentment by the latter.
The accused vehemently denied that he has ever
committed the crime of rape on her daughter, the
complainant. He told the Court that he could not
do such a thing because he loves so much his
daughter and his other children. In fact, he said
that he even performed the dual role of a father
and a mother to his children since the time of his
separation from his wife.
The trial court convicted the accused.
3|RULE 115
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was deprived of
due process.
HELD:
Yes. The Court, after a painstaking review of the
records, finds merit in the appeal enough to
warrant a remand of the case for new trial.
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to
be put at the witness stand. He denied the
accusation against him. The next witness to be
presented was his married daughter who
corroborated her father's claim of innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over
from Atty. Lonzame who himself, for one reason or
another, had ceased to appear for and in behalf of
accused-appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably,
that accused-appellant has not properly and
effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So
important is the right to counsel that it has been
enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor
laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935
Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused has
already been recognized under General Order No.
58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in
all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at
every stage of the proceedings, 10 and that if he is
unable to employ counsel, the court must assign
one to defend him. 11 The 1935 Constitution has no
less been expressive in declaring, in Article III,
Section 17, thereof, that —
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the
right to counsel under the 1973 Constitution,
essentially, has remained unchanged. Under the
1987 Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has
been introduced is the provision from which
prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the
right to counsel as early as the stage of custodial
interrogation can be deemed to be predicated.
The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14, Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution, states —
Sec 12. (1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares in
Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the
accused at the trial to be present in person and by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the
arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the
defense of an accused in criminal proceedings
should never be taken lightly.
It is never enough that accused be simply informed
of his right to counsel; he should also be asked
whether he wants to avail himself of one and
should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own
choice if he so desires or that one can be provided
to him at his request.
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the
court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint
4. PEOPLE V. CONTINENTE
G.R. Nos. 100801-02 (August 25, 2000)
FACTS: Appellant DonatoContinente and several
other John Does were initially charged with the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2)
separate Informations dated June 20, 1989 in
connection with the shooting incident on April 21,
1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and
Timog Avenue in Quezon City which caused the
death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously
wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest
of another suspect, JuanitoItaas, on August 27, 1989
in Davao City, the prosecution, with prior leave of
court, filed two (2) separate amended Informations
for murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito
T. Itaas, among the other accused.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
the involvement of appellant Continente was
established upon further investigation of CIS agents
(Central Intelligence Service). CIS investigation
4|RULE 115
team proceeded to the U.P. campus in Diliman,
where the appellant was an employee, to conduct
a surveillance. After accosting appellant
Continente inside the said U.P. campus, the CIS
team took him to Camp Crame in Quezon City for
questioning. During the interrogation which was
conducted by CIS Investigator VirgilioPablico in the
presence of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala in Camp
Crame, appellant Continente admitted to his
participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe
and his driver as a member of the surveillance unit
under the Political Assassination Team of the CPP-
NPA.
Another confidential intelligence information
established the participation of appellant Itaas. He
was arrested in Davao City and was brought to
Manila. CIS Investigator Pablico investigated and
took down the statements of appellant Itaas who
disclosed during the investigation that he was an
active member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA
based in Davao City and confessed, in the
presence of Atty. Corpuz who apprised and
explained to him his constitutional rights, that he
was one of those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi
Galant car of Col. James Rowe.
During arraignment, Continente and Itaas pleaded
not guilty. The trial court rendered its decision
finding both appellants JuanitoItaas and
DonatoContinente guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder.
Before the Supreme Court, the apellants raised the
issue...
ISSUE: Whether the waivers of the constitutional
rights during custodial investigation by the
appellants were valid
RULING: YES
The rights of the accused during custodial
investigation are enshrined in Article III, Section 12
(1) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel."
The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be
waived by the accused provided that the
constitutional requirements are complied with. It
must appear clear that the accused was initially
accorded his right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
In addition, the waiver must be in writing and in the
presence of counsel. If the waiver complies with the
constitutional requirements, then the extrajudicial
confession will be tested for voluntariness, i. e., if it
was given freely-without coercion, intimidation,
inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if
it was consistent with the normal experience of
mankind.
1. In assailing the validity of their written statements,
appellants DonatoContinente and JuanitoItaas
contend that they were not properly informed of
their custodial rights under the constitution as to
enable them to make a valid waiver.
We have consistently declared in a string of cases
that the advice or "Paliwanag" found at the
beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely
enumerate to the accused his custodial rights do
not meet the standard provided by law. We
emphasized that when the constitution requires a
person under investigation "to be informed" of his
rights to remain silent and to have an independent
and competent counsel preferably of his own
choice, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle. In other words, the
right of a person under investigation "to be
informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that
results in understanding of what is conveyed. Short
of this, there is a denial of the right.
It must be noted however, that far from being a
mere enumeration of the custodial rights of an
accused, the assailed ("Paliwanag") of the written
statements contain an explanation as to the nature
of the investigation that is, regarding the respective
participations of the appellants in the ambush on
April 21, 1989 that resulted in the killing of U.S. Col.
James Rowe while seriously wounding his driver,
Joaquin Vinuya. They also include an advice that
the appellants may choose not to give any
statement to the investigator and a warning that
any statement obtained from the appellants may
be used in favor or against them in court. In
addition, they contain an advice that the
5|RULE 115
appellants may engage the services of a lawyer of
their own choice. If they cannot afford the services
of a lawyer, they will be provided with one by the
government for free. Thereafter, both appellants
manifested to CIS Investigator VirgilioPablico their
intentions to give their statements even in the
absence of counsel.
Despite the manifestations of the appellants,
Investigator Pablico requested for the legal services
of Atty. Manansala to act as counsel for appellant
Continente and Atty. Corpuz for appellant Itaas.
Significantly, Investigator Pablico disclosed that
appellant Continente conferred with Atty.
Manansala in his presence for about half an hour
before the investigation started. Nevertheless, the
appellant (Continente) maintained his decision to
give a statement even in the absence of counsel.
As proof thereof, the appellant signed the
"Pagpapatunay" that contains an express waiver of
his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty.
Manansala who also signed the same as counsel of
the appellant.
With respect to appellant Itaas,. Atty. Corpuz stated
that he conferred with the appellant before the
investigations and explained to him his rights under
the constitution and the consequences of waiving
said rights. After the explanation, appellant Itaas
decided to sign the "Pagpapatunay", which are
entirely written in Tagalog, a dialect which he
understands, in his written confessions stating that
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel were explained to him; that he fully
understood the same; and that he was willing to
give a written confession even without the
assistance of counsel.
2. Appellants Continente and Itaas likewise impugn
their respective written statements. They allege that
the statements appearing therein were supplied by
the CIS investigator. However, appellant
Continente appeared before City Prosecutor
Galicano of Quezon City and affirmed under oath
the truth of his statements by affixing his signature
on the left hand portion of every page of his written
confession. Likewise, appellant Itaas, accompanied
by Atty. Corpuz, affirmed under oath the truth of his
statements in his written confessions by affixing his
signature on every page thereof before the
administering officer.
3. In a desperate attempt to cast doubt on the
voluntariness of his confessions, appellant
Continente claims that he was under pressure to
read entirely his written confession before he affixed
his signature thereon. The unsubstantiated claim of
the appellant is belied by his own admission that he
was treated fairly during the investigation, There is
also no basis to support the claim of appellant Itaas
that he was tortured into giving a confession and
was threatened by the CIS agents to admit the
truth of the same before the administering officer.
4. The Court also notes that the respective written
confessions of appellants are replete with details
which could be supplied only by someone in the
know so to speak. They reflect spontaneity and
coherence which psychologically cannot be
associated with a mind to which violence and
torture have been applied.
5. Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly
repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal
assistance during their respective investigations as
biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized
that both appellants never signified their desire to
have lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it
has been ruled that while the initial choice of the
lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of the
lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators,
the accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators
is deemed engaged by the accused where he
never raised any objection against the former's
appointment during the course of the investigation
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer.
5. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216; G.R.
NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station.
It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities
in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance
with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with
the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was
sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the
amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team
were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
6|RULE 115
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was
prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered
a compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged
against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’
written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken
without the accused being represented by a
lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those
stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct
in making inadmissible as evidence the admission
and statement of accused.
Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution
provides that the right against self-incrimination
(only to witnesses other than accused, unless what
is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not
present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion
of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be
a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot
be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a
right that a witness knows or should know. He must
claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in
miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused
include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and
waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at
the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him
6.People vs Sayaboc
G.R. No. 147201
January 15, 2004
FACTS
In its decision, the trial court found Benjamin
Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder, with
treachery as the qualifying circumstance and craft
and price or reward as aggravating circumstances.
It then sentenced him to the maximum penalty of
death. As for the other accused, the court held that
the treachery employed by Sayaboc could not be
taken against them and, therefore, declared them
guilty of the crime of homicide only, with the first as
principal and the two others as accomplices. From
this decision, accused appealed.
Anent the third assignment of error, appellants
contend that the extrajudicial confession of
Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence against
him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who
was his counsel during the custodial investigation,
was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and
effective counsel. He was ineffective because he
remained silent during the entire proceedings. He
was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in
the National Police Commission, which was holding
court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession of
Sayaboc is not admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial
confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The
condition for this presumption, however, is that the
prosecution is able to show that the constitutional
requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights
during custodial investigation have been strictly
complied with, especially when the extrajudicial
confession has been denounced. The rationale for
this requirement is to allay any fear that the person
being investigated would succumb to coercion
while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment
7|RULE 115
that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore,
even if the confession may appear to have been
given voluntarily since the confessant did not file
charges against his alleged intimidators for
maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a
suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation
renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his
rights, the confession contains the passing of
information of the kind held to be in violation of the
right to be informed under Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution:
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
… means that the counsel should satisfy himself, during
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
The right to be informed requires “the transmission
of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle.”27 It should allow
the suspect to consider the effects and
consequences of any waiver he might make of
these rights. More so when the suspect is one like
Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of
Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and
had already been under the control of the police
officers for two days previous to the investigation,
albeit for another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his
constitutional right to a competent counsel. While
we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim
that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the
facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and
prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty.
Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of
the custodial investigation. The trial court attributed
the silence of Atty. Cornejo to the garrulous nature
and intelligence of Sayaboc, thus:
As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous
man and intelligent. It was in his character
for him to want to be a central figure in a
drama, albeit tragic – for others. He would
do what he wanted to do regardless of the
advice of others. Hence, Atty. Cornejo
could only advise him of his constitutional
rights, which was apparently done. The said
counsel could not stop him from making his
confession even if he did try.28
We find this explanation unacceptable. That
Sayaboc was a "garrulous" man who would "do
what he wanted to do regardless of the advice of
others" is immaterial. The waiver of a right is within
the rights of a suspect. What is lacking is a showing,
to the satisfaction of this Court, of a faithful attempt
at each stage of the investigation to make
Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions.
If anything, it appears that Sayaboc’s counsel was
ineffectual for having been cowed by his client’s
enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was indifferent to it.
The right to a competent and independent counsel
the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect
understands the import and consequences of
answering the questions propounded. In People v.
Deniega,29 we said:
The desired role of counsel in the process of
custodial investigation is rendered
meaningless if the lawyer merely gives
perfunctory advice as opposed to a
meaningful advocacy of the rights of the
person undergoing questioning. If the
advice given is so cursory as to be useless,
voluntariness is impaired.
7. FRANCISCO BELTRAN vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial
District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of
Isabela
G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the
petitioner complains that the respondent judge
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal
8|RULE 115
to take dictation in his own handwriting from the
latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he
who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.
Respondents contend that the petitioner is not
entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the
order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later
granted by the court below, and again which the
instant action was brought, is based on the
provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative
Code.
The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative
Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the
fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the
investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this
power must be exercised without prejudice to the
constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.
The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal
demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional
provision contained in the Jones Law and
incorporated in General Orders, No. 58 (Criminal
Procedure) which states that "Nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."
Issue:
Whether petitioner’s right against self-incrimination
was violated when he was compelled to write for
the purpose of determining whether he wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified.
Ruling:
YES
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case,
testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on
cross-examination be compelled to write in open
court in order that the jury maybe able to compare
his handwriting with the one in question. In this case,
the witness is compelled to write and create, by
means of the act of writing, evidence which does
not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it
is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens
without resorting to the means complained herein,
that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true
that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are
accidental and do not constitute the raison d'
etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons.
In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it
was plainly stated that the court preferred to rest its
decision on the reason of the case rather than on
blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the
case there consisted in that it was the case of the
examination of the body by physicians, which
could be and doubtless was interpreted by this
court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner
therein to furnish evidence by means of testimonial
act. In reality she was not compelled to execute
any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she
was only enjoined from something preventing the
examination; all of which is very different from what
is required of the petitioner of the present case,
where it is sought to compel him to perform
a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a
specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of
comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor vs.
Summers, it was sought to exhibit something
already in existence, while in the case at bar, the
question deals with something not yet in existence,
and it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to
make, prepare, or produce by this means,
evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this
evidence which may seriously incriminate him.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken,
and it is ordered that the respondents and those
under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down
dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison.
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RADEL GALLARDE
FACTS
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the
special complex crime of rape with homicide.
During the arraignment on 1 September 1997,
GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel, entered
a plea of not guilty.4 Trial of the case immediately
ensued as the defense waived the holding of the
pre-trial conference.
9|RULE 115
In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of
spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy.Trenchera,
Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged.
Among them were RadelGallarde, Francisco,
Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel
Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon
Talen, Noel Arellaga and RamilBargon. Idling by
was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan.
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime
and Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they
partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime,
too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside
the house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha
talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde
but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted
towards the road leading to his house. Thereafter,
Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a
kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked
where she was going. Editha answered that she
would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to
where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking
buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin
and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they
talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived
and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger
asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan
informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario
Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance.
The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia
and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in
joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and
fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime
mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he
sawtalking to Editha, the searchers went back to
the house of Gallarde. The searchers found
Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet
about 6 meters away from Gallarde's house; his
hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where
Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did
not do anything to her." To the question, "where did
you come from since a while ago you were not yet
in this toilet?" Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I
was asleep in their house. One of the searchers
Mario Bado, got angry and countered that
Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko
was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the
toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to
Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the
latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking
with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the
searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez
tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter,
noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole
among the disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad
Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside
and then Editha's hand pitted out. Fernandez
screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain
Mendoza heardshouts saying: "She is here, she is
now here already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's
safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way
though, they met policemen on board a vehicle.
He flagged them down and turned over the person
of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the
disappearance of the little girl. Since you are
already here, I am giving him to you." The
policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to
where the people found Editha. One of the
policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless
Editha was completely naked when she was
recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without
any counsel present.
Gallarde was charged with the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. The trial court
rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the
crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of
rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of
carnal knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the late EdithaTalan in the negotiated sum
of P70,000.00. The trial court rejected the
photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of
Gallarde immediately after the incident on the
ground that "the same were taken while he was
already under the mercy of the police." Gallarde
appealed his conviction to the SC.
ISSUE
Whether The taking of pictures of an accused
violates of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
RULING:
NO. The taking of pictures of an accused even
without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely
mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition
as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt,
10 | R U L E 1 1 5
hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel
is not required. The essence of the right against self-
incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a
woman charged with adultery may be compelled
to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to
expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline
of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints; and to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done.
9. People vs. Edgar Crispin
G.R. No. 128360 March 2, 2000
Doctrine:
An affidavit is hearsay and has weak
probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the
witness stand to testify on it.21 Being hearsay
evidence, it is inadmissible because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of his right
and opportunity to cross-examine the person to
whom the statement or writing is attributed.22 The
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him23 is a fundamental right of every
accused which may not be summarily done away
with. Another reason why the right to confrontation
is so essential is because the trial judge’s duty to
observe and test the credibility of the affiant can
only be met by his being brought to the witness
stand.24 That the affidavit formed part of the record
of the preliminary investigation does not justify its
being treated as evidence because the record of
the preliminary investigation does not form part of
the record of the case in the RTC.25 Such record
must be introduced as evidence during trial, and
the trial court is not compelled to take judicial
notice of the same.26
Facts:
About 8 o’clock in the evening of May 4,
1994, the accused alongside Felipe Crispin,
Edmond Losis, Henry Losis and Paquito Gomez
converged at the house of one Danilo de Asis were
they had a drinking spree until midnight.
Honorio Cabailo testified to witnessing the
attack on Miguel Badenas. As he was walking
towards Sitio Capalad, and from a distance of
about five meters, he recognized Edgar Crispin and
his cousin Felipe Crispin as well as the victim, all
being his barriomates in Magara, Roxas, Palawan.
Cabailo further testified that while herein accused-
appellant Edgar Crispin and Felipe Crispin stabbed
Badenas, three other men whom he failed to
identify blocked the way of the victim to prevent
the latter from escaping.3 Overcome with fear for
what he saw, Cabailo proceeded to Sitio Capalad
and did not learn about the death of Miguel
Badenas until three days after, when a relative of
Badenas told him that Badenas died of stab
wounds.
For his part, accused-appellant interposed
the defenses of denial and alibi. The trial court
rejected the denial and alibi of accused-appellant
and convicted him of murder.
Accused-appellant assails the trial court’s
extensive reference to the sworn statement of
Cesar Delima, taken by the police of Roxas,
Palawan, who also claimed to witness the five
accused attack and kill Miguel Badenas.14While
Cesar Delima was named in the Information as one
of the principal witnesses, he did not appear when
subpoenaed to testify.15 Accused-appellant decries
the fact that the trial court gave credence to the
allegations of the sworn statement despite the
prosecution’s failure to present Delima as a witness,
thus depriving the accused of his right to cross-
examine him. He further contends that the sworn
statement could not have been validly considered
by the trial court, it not having been formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution.
Issue: WoN the accused appellant is guilty of
murder? NO
An affidavit is hearsay and has weak
probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the
witness stand to testify on it.21 Being hearsay
evidence, it is inadmissible because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of his right
and opportunity to cross-examine the person to
whom the statement or writing is attributed.22 The
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him23 is a fundamental right of every
accused which may not be summarily done away
with. Another reason why the right to confrontation
is so essential is because the trial judge’s duty to
observe and test the credibility of the affiant can
only be met by his being brought to the witness
stand.24 That the affidavit formed part of the record
of the preliminary investigation does not justify its
being treated as evidence because the record of
11 | R U L E 1 1 5
the preliminary investigation does not form part of
the record of the case in the RTC.25 Such record
must be introduced as evidence during trial, and
the trial court is not compelled to take judicial
notice of the same.26 The prosecution having failed
to present Cesar Delima as a witness, his sworn
statement was patently inadmissible and deserves
no consideration at all.
10. People vs. Boholst
Facts:
The accused was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt by the trial court for selling, delivering and
distributing prohibited drugs. The accused was
apprehended when SGT. ENRIQUE C. DAVID, 51
years old police Officer-In-Charge, Drug
Enforcement Unit, Station 4, 2, Manila, after having
received several reports and denunciations from
Barangay Officials and residents of Gov. Forbes St.,
Sampaloc, on prohibited drug trafficking thereat,
he headed a team to arrest person/persons
involved composed of Pfc. Martin Orolfo, Jr., Pat.
Dennis Corbilla, Pat. Fidel Geronimo and Pat.
Bernardo Estamo; and as planned by him he
instructed Pfc. Corbilla dressed in the manner of a
Metro Aide in uniform and with the use of a P20.00-
bill with markings to proceed to the hang-out of the
"drug-pushing" activities and once there to pretend
to be a buyer; on their part each of them took
strategic positions in order to have a clear view of
the person engaged in the trading of prohibited
drugs; at about 7:30 p.m. that evening on 3
December 1984, after Pat. Corbilla as "poseur
buyer" consummated the deal with the suspect, he
lighted a cigarette-the pre-arranged signal to close
in, the team members did so and apprehended the
accused; the twenty-peso bill paid for the
marijuana was recovered from the rightpants
pocket including another two (2) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes. Theey brought Rodolfo Boholst alias
Bogart to their precinct for further investigation; on
the right upper corner number of Exh. E, inside the
figure zero is written "M.O. Jr."written by witness
before the operation was undertaken in order to
Identify said bill used in buying the marijuana in the
event that the accused have other bills in his
possession, while the alphabets "R B. A" were written
by the accused on the upper left corner of Exh. E
after his apprehension to show that said peso-bill
was recovered from him after the deal. At the
precinct, the accused was subjected to routine
questioning and next they prepared the Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report
The seized articles from accused were itemized in
Exh. C and before it was signed by accused, it was
first explained to him in Tagalog; he took pictures of
accused naked showing his tattoo-marks signifying
that he is a notorious person and as a member of
the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik: as required, witness made
a sketch indicating their respective positions
immediately prior to apprehending the
accused.Upon arraignment on January 28, 1985,
the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial
ensued. Not satisfied with the decision of the trial
court, the appellant interposes this appeal.
Appelant contends that thee documents signed by
him were obtained in violations of his constitutional
right and The same were allegedly obtained
through force, coercion, and intimidation, and that
the accused was without a counsel when he
signed the statements.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence are obtained in
violation of constitutional rights?
Ruling: NO.
Appellant's claim of maltreatment is untenable. The
records show that he never requested for a
medical examination or treatment of his alleged
injuries. He never mentioned this alleged
manhandling to anyone, not even to his own
mother. There is no confession or extrajudicial
statement involved in this case. The accused-
appellant did not give any statement against his
own interests.lawphil
The appellant's contention that the prosecution's
evidence is inadmissible due to the absence of a
counsel is immaterial since the documents referred
to are not confessions or extra-judicial statements.
They are receipts for property seized with the
specimen signature of the accused, the marked
P20.00 bill with conforme of the accused (Exh. E);
and a signature on the Booking and Arrest Sheet
(Exh. F). The receipt and specimen signature are
intended to show that the items were indeed taken
from the accused. The procedure is mandatory on
the part of apprehending and seizing police officers
11. FELICIDAD M, ROQUE and PRUDENCIO N.
MABANGLO vs.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON.
OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO; and HON.
12 | R U L E 1 1 5
MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao, respondents.
G.R. No. 129978 (May 12, 1999)
Consistent with the rights of all persons to due
process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution
commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act
promptly on complaints filed against public officials.
Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint
that has been pending for six years is clearly
violative of this mandate and the public officials'
rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled
to the dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division
Superintendent of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal,
South Cotabato, until her compulsory retirement on,
May 17, 1991.
Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a
Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS,
assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his
compulsory retirement on May 8, 1997.
On January 14, 1991, Laura S. and Carmencita
Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, conducted an audit
on the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECS
Regional Office No. XI to its division offices.
As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and
Enriquez found some major deficiencies and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019), violations of COA Circular
Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and
Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445.
Affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioners
Roque and Mabanglo.
On March 18, 1997, Mabanglo was found as
probably guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) and (g)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act 3019). The same was approved by
respondent Ombudsman Desierto on September
19, 1997. An Information dated March 18, 1997, for
Violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as
amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan,
Manila against petitioner Mabanglo.
On April 30, 1997, the complaint with the
Ombudsman-Mindanao which involved petitioner
Roque was resolved by recommending the filing [of
cases] and prosecution of all the respondents for
violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act
3019. The same was approved by respondent
Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.
Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as
amended, and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic 3019, as amended, were filed before the
Sandiganbayan, Manila. The Informations charged
petitioner Roque.
On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant
petition for mandamus premised on the allegation
that "[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases
proper for preliminary investigation were issued on
June[,] 1991 and the subsequent submission of their
counter-affidavits, until the present[,] or, more than
six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the
Public Respondent [and no] case [has] been filed
with the appropriate court against the herein
Petitioner".
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable
delay in resolving [the] complaints against
petitioners (respondents therein) which violated
their constitutional right to [a] speedy disposition of
cases.
Whether or not, such undue and unjustifiable delay
in resolving the complaints against petitioners,
would warrant dismissal of said complaints.
RULING:
Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded
the ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the
Constitution 12 and Republic Act No. 6770, 13 to
act promptly on complaints before him. More
important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
filed against them. Although respondents
attempted to justify the six months needed by
Ombudsman Desierto to review the
recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio,
no explanation was given why it took almost six
years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. 14
Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this Court
dismissed a Complaint that had been pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman for more than
six years, ruling as follows:
13 | R U L E 1 1 5
After a careful review of the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the Court finds
the inordinate delay of more than six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints
against petitioner to be violative of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process
and a speedy disposition of the cases against him,
thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases...
15
Similarly, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 16 this Court
dismissed the Complaints, which the then
tanodbayan was able to resolve only after the
lapse of three years since the cases had been
submitted for disposition, viz.:
We find the long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional
right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time
limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process
clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and
the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is
violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A
delay of close to three (3) years cannot be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are
not impressed by the attempt of the
Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay
may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny
by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation
merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official." In the first place, such a
statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republic Act 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating
such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would
justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges
relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of]
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting
more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly
do not warrant or justify the period of three years,
which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case."
(Emphasis supplied.)
We are not persuaded by respondents' arguments
that the Petition for Mandamus became moot and
academic when the Complaints were resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and
the Informations were filed. The same contention
was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein
the Court declared that long and unexplained
delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints
against petitioners was not corrected by the
eventual filing of the Informations. The Court ruled:
It has been suggested that the long delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation should not
be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence
of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True — [for] the
absence of a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such
investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of
a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for
until now, man has not yet invented a device for
setting back time.
. . . the inordinate delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation and filing the information in
the instant case is violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process
and the speedy disposition of cases against him.
Accordingly, the informations . . . should be
dismissed . . .. 17
Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of
a ruling directing the dismissal of Ombudsman Case
Nos. OMB-MIN-91-0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203, this
Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of
cases, resolves to dismiss the above cases directly.
This ruling is in line with Angchangco, in which the
Court dismissed the complaints outright, although
petitioner therein sought merely to compel the
ombudsman to do so.
12. CANSON V GARCHITORENA
SB-99-9-J. July 28, 1999
14 | R U L E 1 1 5
FACTS: NCR Command Chief Supt. Canson filed an
administrative complaint against Garchitorena,et.al
in allegedly knowingly and deliberately:
 delaying the transfer of Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 to RTC QC. (People v Aquino
re: slaying of the eleven suspected
members of the KuratongBaleleng Gang by
PNP personnel on May 18, 1995.)
 delaying to resolve motion for
reconsideration re: Crim Case of Aquino
Complainant - inaction of the respondent Justices is
due to more than simple innocent (sic) and simple
oversight on their part. While respondent Justices
were tarrying over the unresolved incident, the
Senate had already conducted its inquiry into the
KuratongBaleleng case, set legislative proceedings
into action to amend the law on the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan to include the very criminal
cases which the respondent Justices and the other
members of the Second Division, on a 3-2 vote, had
already resolved to transfer to the RTC, Quezon
City.
In anticipation of the amendatory law (RA 8249)
which could eliminate the jurisdictional objections
to the Sandiganbayan trying and deciding the said
cases instead of having them transferred to the RTC
the respondent Justices knowingly and intentionally
delayed resolving the pending incidents.
Had the respondent Justices promptly acted on the
motions for reconsideration by giving their
concurrence/dissent to the Associate Justice’s
signed ponencia to pave the way for the transfer of
the subject criminal cases to the RTC for trial, the
Sandiganbayan would have lost the opportunity to
retain the cases under the transitory provisions of
the amendatory law.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice is administratively liable for having
long deferred action on the motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 8,
1996 admitting the amended information and
delaying the transfer of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-
23057 to the RTC of Quezon City.
RULING:
YES. Respondent tarried too long in acting on the
motions for reconsideration hardly becomes open
to question, considering that the subject motions
remained pending for almost ten (10)
months despite several pleas made for the early
resolution thereof.
(Rule 115 Sec 1(h) applicable)
SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 states, inter
alia, that:
“x xx xxx xxx.
“The reorganized judiciary is tasked with the
tremendous responsibility of assisting parties litigants
in obtaining [a] just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their cases and proceedings as
directed in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court.31 Delay is a recurring complaint of every
litigant. The main objective of every judge,
particularly trial judges, should be to avoid delays,
or if it cannot be totally avoided, to hold them to
the minimum and to repudiate manifestly dilatory
tactics.
(and more Canons, cases and SC Admin Circulars
with the same tenor)
The primordial purpose of the constitutional right is
to prevent the oppression of the accused by
delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite
period of time.
 Justice delayed is justice denied
 requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes much more so in criminal cases
where an accused is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial
Consti right to SPEEDY TRIAL - one “[c]onducted
according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules and regulations, free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays.”
PURPOSE of Speedy Trial:
 to prevent the oppression of the accused
by delaying criminal prosecution for an
indefinite period of time
 to prevent delays in the administration of
justice by requiring judicial tribunals to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the
trial of criminal prosecutions.
Justices and judges alike, being paradigms of
justice, have been exhorted time and again to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and to
decide cases within the required periods.—We find
respondent’s delay in resolving the motions
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inexcusable and the same can not be condoned.
Delay not only results in undermining the people’s
faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing
of their supplications is anticipated and expected; it
also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the
impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so
slowly.
BUT this is not gross misconduct.
FALLO: respondent is hereby ADMONISHED and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. Respondent is likewise DIRECTED TO
promptly dispose of all matters submitted for
determination to the end that no one is deprived of
the right to a speedy, just and inexpensive
disposition of their cases.
13. JEJOMAR C. BINAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (October 1, 1999)
FACTS:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the
Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay
of Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds in violation
of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and
Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or
RA 3019 on September 1994. The informations filed
constituted crimes which were committed by the
petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987. The
petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the
delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation
of his constitutional right of due process. His
arraignment therefore was held in abeyance
pending the resolution of the motions.
Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying the
petitioner’s motion to quash and further the latter’s
motion for reconsideration.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an "Addendum to
Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative
reliefs)," praying that, should this Court hold that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the
criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the
same on the ground that the long delay of the
preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman
prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him
of his right to due process; and that, moreover,
there was no probable cause to warrant the filing
of the informations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to speedy
disposition has been violated.
RULING:
No.
Art. III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of
cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party
to a case may demand expeditious action on all
officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case
tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used
to determine whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the
length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the
right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.
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