Ateneo de Davao University
College of Law
Criminal Law I
ARTICLE 11. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES.-
THE FOLLOWING DO NOT INCUR ANY
CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his
person or rights , provided that the
following circumstances concur
FIRST: Unlawful aggression
SECOND: Reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
THIRD: Lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending
himself
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the
person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters or of his relatives
by affinity in the same degrees, and
those by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree, provided that the
first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the
further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making
defense had no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the
person or rights of a stranger,
provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this article are
present that the person defending
be not induced by revenge,
resentment or other evil motive.
1 Cherry Ann C. Namoc
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an
evil or injury, does an act which
causes damage to another, provided
that the following requisites are
present:
First: That the evil sought to be
avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be
greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other
practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the
fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts on obedience
to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose.
A. SELF-DEFENSE
PEOPLE V ABRAZALDO
FACTS: On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00
o’clock in the evening, at Barangay Pogo,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-appellant,
then intoxicated,4 attempted to hack his
uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the
post of the latter’s house.5 The incident was
reported to the barangay authorities,
prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo,
Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of
the barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois to
rush to the scene. Upon reaching the place,
Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at
his uncle, "I will kill you!" Thereafter, he saw
accused-appellant coming out of Quinto’s
house with blood oozing from his
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forehead.6 At that time, the place was well ISSUE: W/N THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE
lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban tried OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE APPRECIATED
to assist accused-appellant. However, for
unknown reason, accused-apellant and HELD: NO Consistent is the jurisprudence that
Guban shouted at each other and grappled where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent
"face to face." Accused-appellant pulled out upon the accused to prove by clear and
his knife, stabbed Guban at the convincing evidence that (1) he is not the
abdomen7 and ran away. When Fajardo got unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he
hold of Guban, the latter said, "I was
employed reasonable means to prevent and
stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo."8 Fajardo, repel an aggression. On appeal, the burden
together with the other barangay tanod, becomes even more difficult as the accused
rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison must show that the court below committed
Memorial Hospital where he was operated reversible error in appreciating the evidence. 26
by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer
III. But after a few hours, Guban died. Dr. Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge
Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate the burden. To show that he was not the
stating that the cause of death was "stab unlawful aggressor, he testified that it was
wound, epigastrium, massive hemothorax Guban who went to his house, threatened to kill
right." him,27 hit him with an iron pipe,28 and attacked
him with a knife.29 We quote accused-
appellant’s testimony, thus the Accused-
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant
appellant Federico Abrazaldo is declared guilty
presented a different version. On July 15,
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
1995 at about 10:00 in the evening, he was
making fans inside his house at Barangay
Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan.15 His wife
Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin and
Christelle were with him. Suddenly, Delfin
Guban, who was then drunk, went to his
house and shouted at him, saying, "Get out
Feding I will kill you!"16 When accused-
appellant went out, Guban hit him with an
iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards
his house and got his two children. Guban,
now armed with a knife, followed him and
they grappled for its possession. In the
course thereof, both fell down.17 It was then
that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit
him. Accused-appellant did not know which
part of Guban’s body was hit. Thereafter, he
got the knife in order to surrender it to the
police.

2 Cherry Ann C. Namoc

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PEOPLE V DURAN
FACTS: That on or about the 9th day of January,
2009, in the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, using an unlicensed
firearm, employing treachery and nocturnity,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot GILBERT GRIMALDO Y NERA
on the back of his head and thereafter as the
victim lay helpless and wounded on the ground
with abuse of superior strength shot him
another three times, inflicting upon the latter
multiple gunshot wounds which cause (sic) his
instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter's heirs.
ISSUE: W/N DURAN IS GUILTY OF MURDER,
QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY
HELD: This Court is convinced that there was no
unlawful aggression. Assuming that Grimaldo
and his unidentified companion really tried to
hold-up Duran, the latter's testimony shows that
the aggression had already ceased when he
(Duran) was able to successfully take the gun
from the possession of Grimaldo.
Having now the possession of the gun, there
was obviously no reason for him to shoot the
victim successively because the unlawful
aggression from the victim has stopped. Duran
by his own admission stated that he shot
Grimaldo four times. Hence, no unlawful
aggression by the victim was shown. Be it
remembered that the presence of said primary
requisite is a condition sine qua non of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Absent
3 Cherry Ann C. Namoc
such, there could be no self[-] defense to speak
of. The other two requisites need not be
discussed.
On the part of the prosecution, it clearly proved
the presence of intent to kill on the part of the
accused. The fact that the shots fired by the
accused were directed to the vital body parts of
the victim, namely on the head and the chest,
shows intent to kill.
In addition thereto, the testimony of eye
witness Quilana is very credible. Witness saw
vividly how the shooting incident happened,
who the victim was - Gilbert Grimaldo and the
perpetrator of the crime - herein accused Paul
Duran. the Court DECLARES accused-appellant
Paul M. Duran, Jr. GUILTY of HOMICIDE
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:
(a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression.
ACTUAL OR MATERIAL UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION means an attack with physical
force or with a weapon, an offensive act
that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent
unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it
must not consist in a mere threatening
attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary,
but must be offensive and positively strong
(like aiming a revolver at another with
intent to shoot or opening a knife and
making a motion as if to attack).
IMMINENT UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION must
not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his
hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or
like aiming to throw a pot.26
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The burden of proof then shifts on him to prove,
with clear and convincing evidence, the
confluence of the essential requisites for such a
defense, namely: a.) UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM; b.) REASONABLE
NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED AND TO
PREVENT OR REPEL IT; and c.) LACK OF
SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF
THE PERSON DEFENDING HIMSELF
B. DOCTRINE OF RATIONAL EQUIVALENCE
DELA CRUZ V PEOPLE
FACTS: on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the
afternoon, petitioner went to the office of Sykes
Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s
Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When
petitioner was already inside the building, he
went to the work station of the deceased victim,
Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by
the configuration of the eye witness Antonette
Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his
computer terminal, with his back towards the
aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the
back, petitioner was already holding a gun
pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s head. At the last
second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of
petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle
for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter.
Petitioner won the struggle and remained in
possession of the said gun. Petitioner then
pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the
trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally
discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the
forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after
shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.
Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at
around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less,
petitioner, together with his children, went to
Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene
Dela Cruz (Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of
Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City, to
fetch the latter so that their family could spend
time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day.
Before entering the Robinson’s Summit Building,
4 Cherry Ann C. Namoc
petitioner underwent the regular security
check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the
guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of
said building and no firearm was found in his
possession. He registered his name at the
security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.
Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same
building, a security guard manning the entrance
once again frisked petitioner and, likewise,
found no gun in his possession; hence, he was
allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The
security guard also pointed to him the direction
towards his wife’s table.
However, as Darlene was then not on her table,
petitioner approached a certain man and asked
the latter as to the possible whereabouts of
Darlene. The person whom petitioner had
talked towas the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After
casually introducing himself as the husband of
Darlene, Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo
hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered,
"Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The response
given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled
petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo
sinusundo mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey,
petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he
was. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner.
Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in
his chair which happened to be a gun and
pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed
by a clicking sound. The gun, however, did not
fire.
Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner
grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the
gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2)
to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not
fire.
Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from
Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any
further confrontation with the latter.However,
Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s path
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and shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately
then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher,
aimed and was about to smash the same on
petitioner’s head.
Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack
while still holding the gun. While in the act of
parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the
reasonable force and contact that his parrying
hand had made with the fire extinguisher and
the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of
Jeffrey, which caused the latter to fall on the
floor and die.
Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe
premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards
the elevator. On his way to the elevator, he
heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong
nangyari?", but he was not able to answer.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned
petitioner and brought with her their two (2)
young children. Petitioner later learned that
Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship
when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene,
dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.
ISSUE:
WHETER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN
ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS DISCHARGED
THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH
OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT
OF DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE
CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE
DECEASED VICTIM.
HELD: The victim was holding the fire
extinguisher while the second was holding the
gun. The gun and the discharge thereof was
unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the
alleged aggression with the use of fire
extinguisher. The rule is that the means
5 Cherry Ann C. Namoc
employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between
the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs.
Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).
It was the accused who was in a vantage
position as he was armed with a gun, as
against the victim who was armed, so to
speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a
deadly weapon. Under the circumstances,
accused's alleged fear was unfounded. The
Supreme Court has ruled that neither an
imagined impending attack nor an impending or
threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute
unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency
Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a
settled rule that to constitute aggression, the
person attacked must be confronted by a real
threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought
to be avoided is imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary (Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA
695).[26]
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey
was trying to kill him, he should have just run,
despite any obstruction, considering that he
was already in possession of the gun. He could
have also immediately sought help from the
people around him, specifically the guard
stationed at the floor where the shooting
incident happened. In fact, he could have
reported the incident to the authorities as soon
as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed
an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet,
petitioner never did any of that.
PEOPLE V APOLINAR
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FACTS: Defense of propertyPeople vs. Apolinar
Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant
andappellant Anastacio Apolinar alias Atong
was at thattime the occupant of a parcel of land
owned by JoaquinGonzales in Papallasen, La
Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan.Armed with a
shotgun, Atong was looking over said landwhen
he observed that there was a man carrying
abundle on his shoulder.Believing that he was a
thief (of palay), the defendantcalled his
attention but he ignored him.The defendant
fired in the air and then at the person.The man,
identified as Domingo Petras, was able to
getback to his house and consequently narrated
to AngelNatividad, the barrio chief, that he had
been woundedin the back by a shotgun.He then
showed the two wounds - one in each side
of the spinal column - which wounds were
circular in formand a little bigger than a quarter
of an inch, according tothe medical report of Dr.
Mananquil.Petras died of the wounds he
sustained.The defendant surrendered to the
authoritiesimmediately after the incident and
gave a swornstatement (Exhibit F) before the
Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23,
1936.
Issue
: WON the killing of Petras was justified by
defenseof property
Held:
No; the right to property is not of
suchimportance as right to life, and defense of
property canbe invoked as a justifying
circumstance only when it iscoupled with an
attack on the person of one entrustedwith said
property
PEOPLE V NARVAEZ
6 Cherry Ann C. Namoc
FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of
murder(qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and FlavianoRubia. On August 22,
1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer andRubia
duringthe time the two were constructing a
fence that wouldprevent Narvaez from getting
into his house and ricemill. The defendant was
taking a nap when he heardsounds of
construction andfound fence being made. He
addressed the group andasked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could
talk things over. Fleischer responded with"No,
gadamit, proceed, goahead." Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shotFleisher with his
shotgun. He also shot Rubia who wasrunning
towards the jeep where the deceased's gun
wasplaced. Prior to theshooting, Fleischer and
Co. (the company of Fleischer'sfamily) was
involved in a legal battle with the defendantand
other land settlers of Cotabato over certain
piecesof property. At the timeof the shooting,
the civil case was still pending forannulment
(settlers wanted granting of property toFleisher
and Co. to be annulled). At time of theshooting,
defendant had leased hisproperty from Fleisher
(though case pending andownership uncertain)
to avoid trouble. On June 25,defendant received
letter terminating contract becausehe allegedly
didn't pay rent.He was given 6 months to
remove his house from theland. Shooting was
barely 2 months after letter.Defendant claims he
killed in defense of his person andproperty. CFI
ruled thatNarvaez was guilty. Aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation offset
by the mitigatingcircumstance of voluntary
surrender. For both murders,CFI sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua, to indemnifythe heirs,
and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting
defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and
chisellingof the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed aform of aggression on
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the part of the victim. However,thisaggression
was not done on the person of the victimbut
rather on his rights to property. On the first
issue,the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of theviolation of property rights,
the courts referred to Art.30 of the civil code
recognizing the right of owners toclose and
fence their land.Although is not in dispute, the
victim was not in theposition to subscribe to the
article because hisownership of the land being
awarded by thegovernment was still pending,
therefore puttingownership into question. It is
accepted that the victimwas the original
aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting
defendant-appellant although he acted in
defence of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the
justifyingcircumstance of self-defense is
applicable only if the 3 requirements are
fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumeratesthese
requisites:Unlawful aggression. In the case at
bar, there wasunlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights.Fleisher had given
Narvaez 6 months and he shouldhave left him in
peace before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art.
536of the Civil Code also provides that
possession may notbe acquired through force or
intimidation; while Art.539 provides that every
possessor has the right to berespected in his
possessionReasonable necessity of means
employed to prevent orrepel attack. In the case,
killing was disproportionate tothe attack.Lack of
sufficient provocation on part of
persondefending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at allsince he was asleepSince not
all requisites present, defendant is creditedwith
the special mitigating circumstance of
incompletedefense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC.
These mitigatingcircumstances are: voluntary
surrender and passion andobfuscation (read p.
405 explanation) Crime is homicide(2 counts)
7 Cherry Ann C. Namoc
not murder because treachery is notapplicable
on account of provocation by the
deceased.Also, assault was not deliberately
chosen with view tokill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was alsono direct
evidence of planning or preparation to
kill. Art.249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal.However, due to mitigating
circumstances andincomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees(Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for
subsidiaryimprisonment since he is unable to pay the
civilindemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily
imprisoned fornonpayment of civil indemnity.
RA 5465 made theprovisions of Art. 39
applicable to fines only and not toreparation of
damage caused, indemnification
of consequential damages and costs of
proceedings.Although it was enacted only after
its conviction,considering that RA 5465 is
favorable to the accusedwho is not a habitual
delinquent, it may be givenretroactive effect
pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.Judgment:
Defendant guilty of homicide but w/mitigating
circumstances and extenuating circumstanceof
incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months
arrestomayor and to indemnifyeach group of
heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonmentand
w/o award for moral damages. Appellant
hasalready been detained 14 years so his
immediaterelease is ordered.Gutierrez,
dissenting. Defense of property can only
beinvoked when coupled with form of attack on
persondefending property. In the case at bar,
this was not so.Appellant should then be
sentenced to prision mayor.However, since he
has served more than that, he shouldbe
Released
PEOPLE V MARIVIC GENOSA
Facts:
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Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November
15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband
which ultimately led to his death. According to
the appellant, she did not provoke her husband
when she got home that night and it was her
husband who began the provocation. The
appellant said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to
make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage
she had tried to leave her husband at least five
times, but that Ben would always follow her and
they would reconcile. The appellant said that
the reason why Ben was violent and abusive
towards her that night was because he was
crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The appellant, after being interviewed by
specialist, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with
a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her
husband. She was found guilty of the crime of
parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while
asleep.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense
failed to establish all the elements of self-
defense arising from battered woman
syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimated
partner; (b) The final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed
to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At
the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable – not necessarily immediate
8 Cherry Ann C. Namoc
and actual – grave harm to the accused based
on the history of violence perpetuated by the
former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery
as an aggravating circumstance because the
quarrel or argument that preceded the killing
must have forewarned the victim of the
assailant’s aggression.
PEOPLE V GENOSA (DIFF VERSION)
The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband
for over eight years. She was 8 months pregnant when,
one evening, her husband came home drunk and
started to batter her. Shouting that his wife "might as
well be killed so there will be nobody to nag" him, he
dragged her towards a drawer where he kept a gun,
but was not able to open the drawer because it was
locked. So he got out a cutter from his wallet, but
dropped it. She was able to hit his arm with a pipe and
escape into another room. The wife, thinking of all the
suffering that her husband had been inflicting on her,
and thinking that he might really kill her and her
unborn child, distorted the drawer and got the gun.
She shot her husband, who was by then asleep on the
bed. She was tried and convicted for parricide, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day to
40 years) to death. On appeal, she alleged "battered
woman syndrome" as a form of self-defense. (For Full
Case, just click here.
FACTS:
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the
15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband,
which ultimately led to his death. According to the
appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that
her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make
sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The
Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical
Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and
hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she
had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times,
but that Ben would always follow her and they would
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reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben
was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu
Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists,
has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the
killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of
Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
ISSUES:
Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying
circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held
liable for the aggravating circumstance of
treachery?
No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered
woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown
to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in
the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of the
husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and
escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The
reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed
had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position
that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be no self-
defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant
complete or incomplete self-defense.
No, There is treachery when one commits any of the
crimes against persons by employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself
arising from the defense that the offended party might
make.
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the
killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the
appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic
is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the
deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to
have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
9 Cherry Ann C. Namoc
In the present case, however it was not conclusively
shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific
means of successfully attacking her husband without
any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he
might make. To the contrary, it appears that the
thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about
the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse.
In the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.
HELD:
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide
is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance attending her commission of the offense,
her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
ADDENDUM:
When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self
defense be appreciated?
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from
BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of
domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To
require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly
attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim
in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's
use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening
behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances
and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.
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