PEOPLE vs. BINDOY Ruling: Yes, In the case of United State vs. Mendieta (34 Phil.
Ruling: Yes, In the case of United State vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), the court said:
G.R. No. L-34665 AUGUST 28, 1931
FACTS:
On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas' wife. She
refused and Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to
defend his wife and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The
disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle,
Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the
latter's hand, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest,
who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of
homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was caused
accidentally and without malicious intent.
ISSUE:
WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of
accident.
HELD:
Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised
Penal Code
RATIO:
1. There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed
Omamdam.
No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas.
No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence.
No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam.
On the contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other.
2. The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and
Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter
let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was
therefore hit in the chest, without Bindoy's seeing him, because Omamdam had passed
behind him. The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal
evidence adduced by the fiscal.
3. If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead
of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his act, since whoever
willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the
wrongful act done is different from that which he intended. This is not the case here.
Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. He was only trying to defend his possession of the
bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was perfectly
lawful.
People V. Gona
Facts: On the evening of October 26, 1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion
in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been liberal supply of
alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became intoxicated, with the result that a
quarrel took the place between the Mansaca Dunca and the defendant. Dunca and his
son Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and one Award.
The defendant left the house about the same time with intention of assaulting Dunca,
but in the darkness of the evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant,
the mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicated on him a mortal wound with a bolo.
Issue: Whether the accused is criminally liable even though he killed one man instead of
the person he intended to kill?
Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro
Acierto, even that, in view of the mortal wound which inflicted upon the latter, in no
way could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in
killing one man instead of another, when it is proved that he acted maliciously and
willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. Neither do we believe that the
fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be considered as a
mitigating circumstance.
The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant. So ordered.
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is
different from that intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is different
from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding
to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the
latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding
to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the
acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of
another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in
which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
Article 49 applies only when there is a mistake in the identity of the victim of the crime,
and the penalty for the crime committed is different from that for the crime intended to
be committed.
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 covers: (1) aberration ictus (mistake in the blow), (2) error in
personae (mistake in the identity of the victim), (3) praeter intentionem (where a more
serious consequence not intended by the offender befalls the same person)
Error in Personae
Examples:
A, thinking that the person walking in a dark alley was B, a stranger, fired at that
person, who killed as a result. It turned out that person C, the father of A.
In this case, the crime actually committed is parricide, punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death. The crime which A intended to commit is homicide, punishable by reclusion
temporal. In view of rule no.1 provided for in Art. 49, the penalty for homicide shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
But suppose that A wanted to kill his father and waited for the latter in a dark alley
where he used to pass in going home; when A saw a person coming and thinking that he
was his father, A shot him; and it turned out that that he was a stranger. In case, A
should be punished with the penalty for homicide to be applied in its maximum period.
Note that in either case, the lesser penalty is always to be imposed, only that it shall be
imposed in the maximum period.
Article 49 is applicable only when the intended crime and crime actually committed are
punished with different penalties.
Article 49 distinguished from Article 48
In article 49, the lesser penalty is to be imposed, to be applied in the maximum
period (Pars. 1 and 2); in Article 48, the penalty for the more or most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES, GR No. 38511, 1933-10-06
Facts:
on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the
sidewalk
While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and
when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father, the man that had been passing back
and forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind and suddenly and... without
warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell
backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the
sidewalk. His assailant immediately ran away.
The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, where he died... about
midnight.
Issues:
it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be punished in accordance with
article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, or for slight physical injuries instead of murder.
Ruling:
Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended; but in order that a person may be
criminally... liable for a felony different from that which he proposed to commit, it is
indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was
committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the... crime committed by the offender.
where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal violence, the mere
fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his
death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not
relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the... natural
consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt
from criminal liability, is taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance
There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is
nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct
consequence of defendants felonious... act, and the fact that the defendant did not
intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his
unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating circumstance... under the circumstances of this
case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was the direct
consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant
had not committed the assault in a treacherous... manner, he would nevertheless have
been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the
defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Principles:
where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal violence, the mere
fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his
death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not
relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the... natural
consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences.
People vs. Tomotorgo
[G.R. No. L-47941, April 30, 1985]
NATURE: Appealed decision rendered by the CFI.
FACTS: Magdalena de los Santos, the wife of Jaime Tomotorgo, had been persistently
asking her husband to sell the conjugal home and that their family transfer to the house
of her husband's in-laws. Tomotorgo would not accede to his wife's request. He did not
like to abandon the house wherein he and his wife were then living. Furthermore, he
had no inclination to leave because he has many plants and improvements on the land
which he was then farming.
On June 23, 1977, at about seven o'clock in the morning, the accused left his
home to work on his farm Upon his return, he found his wife and his three-month old
baby already gone. He finally saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle
of clothes some 200m away from their home. He asked and pleaded with his wife that
she should return home with their child but she adamantly refused to do so. When
appellant sought to take the child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy
portion of the trail hereby causing the latter to cry. This conduct of his wife aroused the
ire of the herein accused. Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond control, appellant
picked lip a piece of wood nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the
ground complaining of severe pains on her chest. Realizing what he had done, the
accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He then returned to
the place where the child was thrown and he likewise took this infant home. Soon
thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate
her pains.
After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident
to the Barangay Captain of their place who brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom
the accused surrendered. He also brought with him the piece of wood he used in
beating his wife.
He was charged with parricide and pleaded not guilty. Upon realizing the
gravity of his offense, he changed his plea to guilty. The court found him guilty of
parricide but with three mitigating circumstances – voluntary surrender, plea of guilty
and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion
and obfuscation.
He was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant claims that the court
handed him the wrong punishment. Appellant claims that article 49 of the Revised
Penal Code prescribes the proper applicable penalty when the crime committed is
different from what was intended. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is
higher than the offense which the accused wanted to commit, the penalty
corresponding to the later shall be imposed as the maximum period. Appellant avers
that the penalty for the felony committed by him – parricide – was higher than that
which he intended to commit – physical injuries.
ISSUE: W/N accused is guilty of physical injuries only and not parricide.
HELD: NO
RATIO: Accused is guilty of parricide. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly
states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that the
accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts.
Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more serious consequences
not intended by the offender result from his felonious act because under Art. 4 (1) of
the same code, he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful
act. His lack of intentiosn to commit a grave wrong is at best mitigating.
The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code
which prescribes graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed
is entirely misplaced and irrelevant considering that in this case the victim died very
soon after she was assaulted. The court held that the fact that the appellant intended to
maltreat the victim only or inflict physical imjuries does not exempt him from liability
for the resulting and more serious crime committed.

People vs. Monleon

December 10, 1946 (74 SCRA 263)

PARTIES:

plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

accused- appellant: Cosme Monleon

FACTS:

On June 1, 1970, Cosme Monleon in his inebriated state asked whether the carabao was
already fed. To check the veracity of the statement, he went to see the carabao. He
discovered that the carabao had not been adequately fed. He was about to hit
Marciano, his 10 year old son, when Concordia, his wife, intervened. Monleon choked
her, bashed her head against the post, and kicked her abdomen. Concordia died the
following day due to trauma or external violence.

ISSUE:

WON the accused is criminally liable although he had no intention to kill his wife.

HELD:

Yes. Art 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing a felony although the wrongful act don be different than that which
he intended to do. The maltreatment inflicted by the accused on his wife was the
proximate cause of her death. He could have easily killed his wife had he really intended
to take her life. He did not kill her outright. The accused was found guilty of parricide
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.