GARDINER v MAGSALIN (full text)
For
It appears that on October 30, 1940, the herein
petitioner, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga, filed an information against the
said Catalino Fernandez and the herein
respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas,
Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and Rufino
Maun, charging them with having conspired
together to kill, and that they did kill, one
Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premiditation.
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez
pleaded guilty and his five coaccused, not
guilty. At the trial of the latter, the former was
called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify to
the alleged conspiracy. Upon objection of
counsel for the defense, the respondent judge
did no permit the witness Catalino Fernandez to
testify against his coaccused, on the ground
that he being a conspirator, his act or
declaration is not admissible against his
coconspirators until the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration,
under section 12, rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
A written motion for reconsideration, supported
with lenthy argument, was filed by the fiscal to
no avail. Hence the present petition
for mandamus.
The only question raised here is the
interpretation of section 12 of rule 123, which
reads as follows:
SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. — The
act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence
against the coconspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
That is not a new rule of evidence. It is a re-
enactment of paragraph 6, section 298 of the
old Code of Civil Procedure, which provided
that after proof of a conspiracy, the act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy may be given in evidence. This rule
has a well-settled meaning in jurisprudence, but
apparently the respondents completely missed
it. It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter
alios" rule. It refers to an extrajudicial
declaration of a conspirator — not to his
testimony by way of direct evidence.
illustration, let us suppose that after the
formation but before the consummation of the
alleged conspiracy between Catalino
Fernandez and his five coaccused, the former
borrowed a bolo from a friend, stating that he
and his coaccused were going to kill
Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and declaration of
Fernandez's friend to the effect that Fernandez
borrowed his bolo and told him that he
(Fernandez) and his coaccused were going to
kill Gaudencion Viviar would be admissible
against Fernandez, but not against his
coaccused unless the conspiracy between
them be proven first. It is admissible against
Fernandez because the act, declaration, or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him (section 7, rule
123). But, without proof of conspiracy, it is not
admissible against Fernandez's coaccused
because the act and declaration of Fernandez
are res inter alios as to his coaccused and,
therefore, cannot affect them. But if there is
conspiracy, each conspirator is privy to the acts
of the others; the act of one conspirator is the
act of all the coconspirators.
To further explain the rule in the language of the
jurisprudence on the subject, we add:
... The evidence adduced in court by the
coconspirators as witnesses are not
declarations of conspirators, but directly
testimony to the facts to which they
testify. Aside from the discredit which
attaches to them as accomplices, their
evidence is entirely competent to
establish the facts to which they testify.
The rule for which counsel contends is
applicable only when it sought to
introduce extrajudicial declarations and
statements of coconspirators
(People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 203 P. 78,
84.)
There is no rule requiring the prosecution to
establish a conspiracy in order to permit a
witness to testify what one or all of several
accused persons did; and evidence
adduced by coconspirators as witnesses,
which is direct evidence of the facts to which
they testify, is not within the rule requiring a
conspiracy to be shown as a prerequisite to
its admissibility.
PEOPLE v BARLIS
FACTS: Jonathan Barlis was charged with a
crime of robbery with homice together with his
co-accused Ferdinand Lopez and Eduardo
Nining.
Barlis voluntary surrendered to the authority and
gave a confession with the assistance of Atty.
Confesor Sansano of the IBP-Quezon City
Chapter, after he was duly apprised of his
constitutional rights in Tagalog. Based from the
record, Barlis confessed in details what
happened during that day and even named his
co-accused and the reason why he confessed
is that he is innocent.
Argate, the person who was with the victim that
time clearly identifies that he saw Jonathan
becacuse it has no hat. When she was brought
to the comfort room she noticed that the sound
of radio became louder and the dogs were
barking. When se go out, the accused-
appellant and his company were no longer
there.
Barlis was found guilty by the trial court however
the two accused remain at large. The trial court
found that there was a conspiracy among
Jonathan and his companions in the
commission of the crime and convicted the
former on the basis of the circumstantial
evidence and his extrajudicial confession.
In his second assignment of error, the appellant
contends that the trial court erred in giving
credence to his sworn statement or "salaysay"
(Exhibit "B") which was taken without the
assistance of a lawyer in violation of Section
12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
ISSUE: WON the swron statement made by Barlis
should be given weight by the court.
RULING: He alleges that he surrendered to the
police only to help them find the real culprits,
that Pfc. Rivera misled him into signing the sworn
statement by telling him not to worry, and that
he was brought to the Office of the IBP-Quezon
City Chapter where Atty. Sansano signed the
document without conferring with him.
Furthermore, he questions the fact that the
names of his girlfriend, Cristina Lopez, and his
mother, Luzviminda Barlis, appear as witnesses
in Exhibit "B-1" although they had not signed it.
We are not persuaded. It was the appellant's
uncle who surrendered him to Pfc. Rivera, his
uncle's colleague. Before he was questioned,
he was duly informed and advised in Tagalog,
a language he speaks and understands, of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. 28 He voluntarily
agreed to be assisted by no less than the
Chairman of the Legal Aid Assistance Office of
the IBP-Quezon City Chapter, Atty. Confesor
Sansano. The latter affirmed in court that he
assisted the appellant during the investigation.
A lawyer is an officer of the court and upon his
shoulders lies the responsibility to see to it that
protection has been accorded the rights of the
accused and that no injustice to him has been
committed. 29 He has in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
his duties. This presumption was not rebutted in
this case. With the presence of Atty. Sansano,
we believe that the rights of the appellant were
duly protected.
The failure of the mother and the girlfriend of the
appellant to sign as witnesses to the taking of his
sworn statement is of no moment for the
Constitution does not require the presence of
witnesses during custodial investigation. What is
required is the assistance of counsel, which can
even be waived. As held in People vs. Layuso,
30 what is sought to be protected by the
Constitution is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed
merely to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something
false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.
PEOPLE v NARCISO
FACTS: Rufino Pena is the only accused-apellant
left in this case since Elias Gloria since then
remained at large and Narciso was already
dead. The three accused were able to give
their extra judicial cofesseions.
Rufina gave his extra judicial confession. It
appears that the confession was taken by Det.
Cpl. Carlos Martin, Jr. in the presence of Det.
Sgt. Herminio Clemente at the headquarters of
the MPD in the early morning of July 11, 1961,
about seven (7) hours after the commission of
the crime or at about 6:20 a.m., to be precise.
In that statement, Rufino Peña appears to have
declared in Tagalog dialect
“that he knew why he was at the headquarters
of the MPD at the time, i.e., there was a man
they killed the night before inside Cell 2-A; that
he knew the person they killed only by face;
that they agreed to attack (tirahin) that person
because he was a member of the "Bahala Na
Gang"; that there was nothing wrong at all
being a member of that gang, only there was
already feud between the two gangs; that
those who agreed to kill the man were Boy AA,
Ely, Celso and he (Rufino Peña appears to have
been asked to point to the persons he
mentioned and pointed to Ramon Narciso as
Boy AA, to Elias Gloria as Ely, and to Francisco
Celso as Celso, who were then all present in the
same room where the investigation was
conducted); that they agreed to kill the man at
about 9:00 that evening (to a similar question
that followed, the answer given was: that they
agreed to kill the man that same evening after
the roll call at about 11:00 o'clock) ; that when
they first came near the man to strike him, the
man was lying on the cement floor on his back
(tihaya), one of his arms raised near his head;
that the first to come near the man was Boy AA
who immediately covered the face of the man
with a blanket; that the blanket shown to him
(he appears to have been shown the
bloodstained blanket recovered by the police
at the scene of the crime) was the one used by
Boy AA in covering the face of the man they hit;
that the piece of wood (measuring 1-½" x 1-¼" x
23") shown to him was the one used by them in
hitting the man; that they alternately used
(aming pinagpasahan) that piece of wood,
until all of them were able to hit the man; that
he was the first to strike, followed by Celso; the
next was Ely, and the last one was Boy AA; that
the place where they killed the man was the
cement floor where he was lying inside Cell 2-A;
that they made the killing at about 11:00 o'clock
after the roll call; that they decided to kill the
man because the "Bahala Na Gang" were all
enemies; that he studied in school and finished
Grade III; that he knew how to read and
understood Tagalog; and that having read and
understood the contents of the statement, he is
willing to sign the same to attest to the truth of
what he had therein stated.”
Accused Rufino Peña claimed during the trial of
the case that his confession (Exh. K) was signed
by him only after the members of the MPD had
given him a countless number of blows all over
his body, and after they mercilessly gave him
repeated doses of 7-Up treatment into his nose.
The trial court convicted the accused based
from several pieces of evidence including the
witnesses of prosecution and the extra judicial
confessions of three accused.
ISSUE: WON the trial court was right in admitting
in evidence against Rufino Peña his own
extrajudicial confession (Exh. K), and the
respective extrajudicial confessions (Exhs. J, L
and M) of his co-accused Elias Gloria, Francisco
Celso and Ramon Narciso.
RULING: It was shown by the prosecution that all
the accused were investigated in the same
room at the headquarters of the MPD, but there
is no showing, since they were investigated
simultaneously and separately by different
investigators, that Rufino Peña knew that Elias
Gloria and Francisco Celso had implicated him
in the killing of Roberto Monreal in their
statements, or that Rufino Peña was thereafter
informed about the contents of their
statements. We have no doubt, therefore, that
the extrajudicial statements of Elias Gloria (Exh.
J) and Francisco Celso (Exh. M) may not be
directly introduced in evidence as proof of
specific facts against accused Rufino Peña, in
accordance with the well-settled rule that
extrajudicial statements of an accused
implicating his co-accused may not be utilized
against the latter unless repeated in open court.
The said extrajudicial confessions of Elias Gloria
and Francisco Celso are admissible only against
them but not against Rufino Peña as to whom
they are hearsay evidence, for the latter never
had any opportunity to cross-examine them.Of
course, these rules admit of exceptions. Thus, it
has been held that where confessions had
been made by several accused and there
could have been no collusion with reference to
them, the fact, that the statements are in all
material respects identical, is confirmatory of
the testimony of an accomplice.3 It will be
noted, however, that there is a marked
difference between the case of People vs.
Badilla and the one at bar. In the Badilla case,
several accused were charged under an
information alleging conspiracy, unlike in this
case where there was no such allegation in the
information and the defense had seasonably
objected to the admission of any evidence,
including Exhibits J and M, tending to prove
conspiracy. But even if conspiracy were
properly alleged and proven in this case, the
admissibility of Exhibits J and M as against
accused Rufino Peña should be qualified.
“While an extrajudicial declaration of a co-
conspirator may not be directly introduced in
evidence against another co-conspirator as
proof of specific facts, it may nevertheless
under certain conditions be taken into
consideration as a circumstance in the
credibility of the testimony of an accomplice.”
We find no plausible reason why the principle
should not be made to apply to this case where
several accused had been charged together
of a crime without any allegation of conspiracy;
but with the above-quoted authority, there
could be no doubt that for purposes of proving
the fact that Rufino Peña participated in the
killing of Roberto Monreal as declared by his co-
accused Elias Gloria and Francisco Celso in their
extrajudicial confessions Exhibits J and M, the
said statements are objectionable, although
the court may consider the fact that the
confessions of Rufino Peña and those of his co-
accused Elias Gloria and Francisco Celso are, in
all material respects, identical as a
circumstance in judging the credibility of Rufino
Peña's testimony in court for which purpose
Exhibits J and M are admissible against the
latter. The same rule of qualified admissibility is
applicable to the extrajudicial confession of
accused Ramon Narciso as against Rufino
Peña. Accused Ramon Narciso testified in court
for his own defense and was questioned at
length about his extrajudicial confession (Exh. L)
which he repudiated.
He died sometime thereafter; that is why the
case as against him had been dismissed, but his
said confession was legally before the court
with the extra-judicial confessions of all the
other accused and We do not think that the trial
court erred in taking cognizance of the fact
that they were substantially in accord for
purposes of passing upon Rufino Peña's
credibility. Rufino Peña's own statement (Exh. K),
on the other hand, is competent evidence as
against him for all purposes under the Rules,4
provided that its authenticity and voluntariness
are beyond question.
PEOPLE v PARAGSA
FACTS: Benben Paragsa was charged with the
rape of a 12 ½ year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes.
The information alleged that victim was alone in
her house when the Benben entered,
intimidated her with a hunting knife, forced her
to lie in bed and there they had intercourse. The
deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita,
knocked on the door of victim’s house.
Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had
seen the accused exiting the house when she
came knocking. The victim did not reveal what
happened to her until 6 days after the incident.
Appellant admits having sexual
intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining
witness, but he stoutly denied that he did so by
employing force or intimidation against Mirasol.
He claims he and Mirasol were sweethearts;
that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol
who invited him to the latter's house where they
had sexual intercourse after kissing each other;
and that the intercourse they had that
afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third
sexual intercourse
said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and
understood the statement; (2) that he was at
liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the
statement was in respect to some matter
affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer;
(4) that the facts were within his knowledge;
and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference
to be drawn from his silence would be material
to the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of
Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These
requisites of admission by silence all obtain in
the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol
on the facts asserted by the accused and his
witnesses may be safely construed as an
admission of the truth of such assertion.

The trial convicted the accused. Hence,

this petition for review. The accused contented
that

ISSUE: WON Mirasol’s silence and failure to

controvert the testimony of the accused is
considered as admission in silence.

RULING:

Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol

did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of
the appellant and his witnesses to the effect
that the accused and Mirasol were actually
sweethearts; and that they had had two
previous sexual communications before July 13,
1971, one of which happened on June 29, 1971
in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and
the accused slept together in the evening of
the same day after the mother of the accused

and Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta

of Bantayan, Cebu

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken

as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable
in criminal cases. But before the silence of a
party can be taken as an admission of what is
CUISON v CA
FACTS: Petitioner Kue Cuison is a sole
proprietorship engaged in the purchase and
sale of newsprint, bond paper and scrap.
Private respondent Valiant Investment
Associates, on the other hand, is a partnership
duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines with business address at
Kalookan City.
Private respondent delivered various
kinds of paper products amounting to
P297,487.30 to a certain Lilian Tan of LT Trading.
The deliveries were made by respondent
pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiu Huy
Tiac who was then employed in the Binondo
office of petitioner. It was likewise pursuant to
Tiac's instructions that the merchandise was
delivered to Lilian Tan. Upon delivery, Lilian Tan
paid for the merchandise by issuing several
checks payable to cash at the specific request
of Tiu Huy Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9)
postdated checks to private respondent as
payment for the paper products. Unfortunately,
sad checks were later dishonored by the
drawee bank.
Private respondent made several
demands upon petitioner to pay for the
merchandise in question, claiming that Tiu Huy
Tiac was duly authorized by petitioner as the
manager of his Binondo office, to enter into the
questioned transactions with private
respondent and Lilian Tan. Petitioner denied
any involvement in the transaction entered into
by Tiu Huy Tiac and refused to pay private
respondent the amount corresponding to the
selling price of the subject merchandise.
Left with no recourse, private respondent
filed an action against petitioner for the
collection of P297, 487.30 representing the price
of the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial
court dismissed the complaint against petitioner
for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the
decision of the trial court was modified, but was
in effect reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON Tiu Huy Tiac possessed the required
authority from petitioner sufficient to hold the
latter liable for the disputed transaction.
RULING: It is a well-established rule that one who
clothes another with apparent authority as his
agent and holds him out to the public as such
cannot be permitted to deny the authority of
such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice
of innocent third parties dealing with such
person in good faith and in the honest belief
that he is what he appears to be (Macke, et al,
v. Camps, 7 Phil. 553 (1907]; Philippine National
Bank. v Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357 [1979]).
From the facts and the evidence on record,
there is no doubt that this rule obtains. The
petition must therefore fail.
Petitioner held out Tiu Huy Tiac to the
public as the manager of his store in Sto. Cristo,
Binondo, Manila. More particularly, petitioner
explicitly introduced Tiu Huy Tiac to Bernardino
Villanueva, respondent's manager, as his
(petitioner's) branch manager as testified to by
Bernardino Villanueva. Secondly, Lilian Tan, who
has been doing business with petitioner for quite
a while, also testified that she knew Tiu Huy Tiac
to be the manager of petitioner's Sto. Cristo,
Binondo branch. This general perception of Tiu
Huy Tiac as the manager of petitioner's Sto.
Cristo store is even made manifest by the fact
that Tiu Huy Tiac is known in the community to
be the "kinakapatid" (godbrother) of petitioner.
In fact, even petitioner admitted his close
relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when he said that
they are "like brothers" (Rollo, p. 54). There was
thus no reason for anybody especially those
transacting business with petitioner to even
doubt the authority of Tiu Huy Tiac as his
manager in the Sto. Cristo Binondo branch.
Petitioner’s categorical admission on the
witness stand that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager
of his store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo convinced the
court to such admission, spontaneous no doubt,
and standing alone, is sufficient to negate all
the denials made by petitioner regarding the
capacity of Tiu Huy Tiac to enter into the
transaction in question. Furthermore, consistent
with and as an obvious indication of the fact
that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of the Sto.
Cristo branch, three (3) months after Tiu Huy Tiac
left petitioner's employ, petitioner even sent,
communications to its customers notifying them
that Tiu Huy Tiac is no longer connected with
petitioner's business. Such undertaking spoke
unmistakenly of Tiu Huy Tiac's valuable position
as petitioner's manager than any uttered
disclaimer. More than anything else, this act
taken together with the declaration of
petitioner in open court amount to admissions
under Rule 130 Section 22 of the Rules of Court,
to wit :

"The act, declaration or omission of a party as to

a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him." For well-settled is the rule that "a
man's acts, conduct, and declaration,
wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible
against him, for the reason that it is fair to
presume that they correspond with the truth,
and it is his fault if they do not. If a man's
extrajudicial admissions are admissible against
him, there seems to be no reason why his
admissions made in open court, under oath,
should not be accepted against him."