Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016) 69–77

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Energy Research & Social Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss

Original research article

Negotiating uncertainty: Corporate responsibility and Greenland’s

energy future
Emma Wilson
Associate of the Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Until recently energy and minerals development were seen as a promising way for Greenland to earn
Received 27 September 2015 the revenues to gain full independence from Denmark. Yet with the collapse in the price of oil in 2014,
Received in revised form 7 March 2016 a future that is reliant on commodity markets is looking less certain. This paper looks at Greenland’s
Accepted 16 March 2016
hydrocarbon sector through the lens of corporate social responsibility. Greenland’s business community
Available online 8 April 2016
has a well-developed sense of what CSR means in the Greenlandic context, while foreign companies
have introduced the need to systematise these values as business strategy and policies. A weakness in
the potential of foreign companies to contribute to sustainable local-level development is the possibility
of them withdrawing when investments no longer appear viable, as some oil majors did in January 2015.
Government capacities need to evolve to address the heightened risks of environmental damage, societal
vulnerability and the unpredictability of investment and revenues associated with extractive industry
development. A particular challenge is the lack of meaningful public involvement in decision making and
the risk that the ‘social licence to operate’ of future energy projects will be determined by a few elected
politicians. The role of civil society is critical to help tackle this challenge.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction In the context of unpredictable and often politicised energy and

Until 2014, Greenland’s energy and mineral resources were seen
by many as the country’s great hope for securing independence
from Denmark [86]. Yet several factors have caused the govern-
ment and industry to reassess this potential. In January 2015 three
oil majors pulled out of exploration in Baffin Bay following the
oil price crash of 2014, and a major iron ore project was rescued
from bankruptcy by the Chinese [2,56,41]. At the same time, a long-
awaited aluminium smelting project that would utilise Greenland’s
hydropower potential remains inactive; while the relaxation of a
moratorium on uranium mining has led to public protest and polit-
ical disagreement [78,67]. All of this indicates uncertainty around
an independent future that is heavily reliant on the extractive
industries and associated commodity markets. Yet the prospect
is enticing. Greenland has some of the world’s richest resources,
including rare earth metals, iron ore, gold, copper, zinc, gem-
stones, uranium and hydropower. Oil development is still in the
exploratory stages, but exploration itself has a range of effects, as
this article explores.1
mineral resource development, a lack of experience within govern-
ment and local industry in managing large-scale industrial projects,
and an overstretched civil society, this paper considers the respon-
sibilities of business – both local and international – in ensuring
that Greenland’s energy future is sustainable. How do corporate
social responsibility (CSR) approaches differ among Greenlandic
and foreign businesses and how do they complement one another?
Should the government provide stronger regulation and guidance
on CSR?2 How do the responsibilities of business relate to those of
other sectors of society, in particular government and civil society?
To what extent should the responsibilities of business relate to the
sustainable future development of Greenland, even in cases where
companies themselves are unsure about their long-term commit-
ment to resource extraction in the country?.
2. Contextual analysis: energy and minerals in Greenland
Global energy markets and trends could shape Greenland’s
future in different ways, and there is considerable international

E-mail address: emma.wilson@ecwenergy.com
1
Greenland’s gas is currently less interesting for investors due to the difficulty of
transportation to markets, which are well supplied at present.
2
Abbreviations: CSR—corporate social responsibility; EIA—environmental impact
assessment; FPIC—free, prior and informed consent; GOIA—the Greenland Oil Indus-
try Association; IBA—impact and benefit agreement; UNDRIP − the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.03.009
2214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
70 E. Wilson / Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016) 69–77
interest in being part of Greenland’s energy and minerals future.
The European Union is engaged in ‘raw material diplomacy’ with
Greenland’s government [39], has its own Arctic strategy and is
the largest funder of Arctic research (D 20 million/year) [28]. In
addition to the multinational interest in Greenland’s hydrocarbons
and the Chinese takeover of the iron ore project mentioned above,
South Koreans are investing in the Kvanefjeld rare earths and ura-
nium project and Canadians and Norwegians are investing in the
Aappaluttoq ruby and sapphire project [48].
In Greenland itself, energy and mining issues have contributed
to political disruption that resulted in two general elections in 2013
and 2014 respectively [55]. At the heart of Greenland’s debates
on extractive industry development is the question of indepen-
dence from Denmark. With a land mass the size of Western Europe
and a population of just less than 56,000 (predominantly indige-
nous Inuit), Greenland achieved self-government status within the
Kingdom of Denmark in 2009 and aspires towards ever greater
economic and political freedom from its former colonial power.
Greenland’s economic model is based on high levels of public sector
employment and dependency on two main sources of income—the
fishing industry, which accounts for 90% of Greenland’s export, and
a block grant of subsidies provided every year from Denmark. In
2014 the block grant totalled DKK 3642 million (or £376 million),
or around one third of the annual budget [84]. Maintaining Green-
landic society in its current form is expensive, with a large public
sector budget and considerable infrastructure and transportation
challenges associated with serving Greenland’s rural settlements. A
key challenge is how to preserve traditional and subsistence liveli-
hoods in these settlements and avoid the mistakes of the social
restructuring of previous decades, particularly the resettlement of
the 1960s and 1970s [65].
Greenland’s Inuit leaders have insisted in recent years that
exploiting the country’s energy and mineral resources is the only
way to secure an economic basis for self-governance. Yet there are
concerns about the lack of experience of large industrial projects on
the part of the workforce, administration and government regula-
tors. Moreover, industry experts and analysts believe that only very
large-scale projects such as the Isua iron ore project, the Kvanef-
jeld rare earths and uranium project, and offshore oil and gas will be
sufficient to finance independence, and that it will take time to get
sufficient numbers of such projects up and running [13]. Moreover,
the oil price crash of 2014 was a reminder of the unpredictability
of commodity markets, with Statoil, GDF Suez and Dong Energy all
returning exploration licences in January 2015 [86].
In October 2013, the Greenlandic parliament (Inatsisartut) lifted
a ban on uranium mining to allow for the extraction of rare earth
metals which are often found trapped within uranium reserves,
a move that attracted controversy and public protest. Along with
accusations of misuse of government funds, the uranium decision
– and a perceived lack of public involvement in that decision – is
thought to have been a factor forcing Aleqa Hammond to step down
as Prime Minister in September 2014 [73]. Public protest has also
been strong in relation to a perceived lack of public consultation
relating to the Isua iron ore project [66] (see Section 5.3). There has
been less local protest relating to oil and gas, which is largely the
domain of international NGOs such as Greenpeace, who are primar-
ily concerned with climate change, oil spill response capacities, and
the health of Arctic ecosystems. However, local hunters and fish-
ermen have expressed concern about potential impacts of offshore
drilling on marine-based livelihood activities (see Section 5.2.).
In November 2014, Aleqa Hammond’s party Siumut won by
a narrow margin, but with a new leader, Kim Kielsen. Siumut
has expressed its continued support for the extractive industries
but is now recognizing the need to diversify [56]. A 2014 report
commissioned by Greenpeace analyses various sectors – including
energy and minerals – that could contribute to Greenland’s future
development and employ local people [75]. Others include fish-
eries, tourism, agriculture, seal products, and industrial use and
export of hydropower [75]. There is also potential to develop
an ethical gemstone industry involving artisanal miners [53].
Greenlanders look to the experience of Iceland which created
employment and a knowledge economy around industrial-scale
use of hydropower [4]. For rural Greenlanders, the future might be
seen as a combination of traditional activities and industrial devel-
opment, with good education a key requirement for their children
to succeed [7]. As this article explores, these are also key elements
of the Greenlandic model of CSR.
3. Methodology
This paper is based on a combination of desk-based research,
field research and post-fieldwork interviews and correspondence
with key respondents. The fieldwork took place in Greenland dur-
ing a three-week period in October and November 2012. This was
supplemented by follow up email correspondence, skype calls and
direct engagement between 2013 and 2015. The fieldwork took
place in Kulusuk (population 273) and Tasiilaq (population 2093)
in Eastern Greenland, and Nuuk (population 16,992) and Maniitsoq
(population 2530) in Western Greenland [84,94].
The field research involved over 30 formal and informal inter-
views, and other forms of engagement, including a University
lecture and discussion with students; participation in a public con-
sultation meeting for the Isua iron ore project; and ad hoc informal
discussions (with shopkeepers, waiters and local people encoun-
tered on the street). All engagement took place in English. Nine of
these engagements are referred to in the text as ‘personal commu-
nications’ and are listed in the references. Handwritten notes were
taken during interviews and meetings and a diary was kept dur-
ing the visit. The material has been supplemented with analysis of
publicly available materials from company, government and civil
society websites, academic journal articles, popular publications
and the media. The author has followed ongoing events closely
through online sources such as Barents Observer, the Arctic Journal,
the Financial Times and the Guardian. Material from this research
project was first published in 2015 as a 60-page country report cov-
ering both energy and mining [94]. This article focuses mainly on
the petroleum sector, and explores in greater depth the literature
on CSR, analysing the field results more systematically through the
CSR lens. The findings have also been updated since the first report
was published by reference to more recent online and academic
sources.
4. Corporate responsibility in theory
In countries such as Greenland that are just starting to develop
a rich natural resource base, appropriate regulation may be lacking
and the capacities of government, business and civil society might
be under-developed or overstretched. This may increase the risk of
that country succumbing to the so-called ‘resource curse,’ whereby
countries with greater natural resource wealth tend to under-
perform economically compared to those without such resources,
and power imbalances may be augmented to detrimental effect
for society [3,76,29,43,32]. To counter the risk, there is a greater
need for companies themselves to contribute to the development
of appropriate capacities and institutions and to proactively meet
their responsibilities towards society as a whole.
In Europe, the notion of a company’s ‘social responsibility’ orig-
inally came out of the literature and practice of the 19th century,
relating to a company’s responsibility towards its workforce and
local community [80]. The origin of theoretical thinking on the
topic of corporate responsibility is attributed to Howard Bowen’s
 E. Wilson / Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016) 69–77
book, ‘Social responsibilities of the businessman’ [14]. Bowen’s
book sits within the specific US business context of the time (when
most business people were indeed men) and reflects the emerging
debates about the need for firms to exercise greater social responsi-
bility in response to the evolving moral expectations and demands
of society. Bowen defines the responsibility of business as the align-
ing of business policies and decisions to the objectives and values
of society ([14][2013], p.6). He highlights the need for a combina-
tion of government regulation, an articulate and informed public
that can formulate its demands and hold business to account, and
a proactive business community able to meet its responsibility to
respond to society’s expectations. In Bowen’s analysis, business-
men are driven both by self-interest and by moral responsibility
and values, as members of the societies in which they live.
Since Bowen, the analysis of CSR has expanded in the spheres of
academia and management, yet there is no single understanding of
what it means in theory or practice [19,69]. CSR also means differ-
ent things to different people in different places, and so regional and
country studies, such as this one of Greenland, are particularly use-
ful in situating CSR within national and local contexts [71,93,27].
Frynas and Blowfield [9] define CSR as:
‘an umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices that
each recognise the following: (a) that companies have a respon-
sibility for their impact on society and the natural environment,
sometimes beyond that of legal compliance and the liability of indi-
viduals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the behaviour
of others with whom they do business (e.g., within supply chains);
and (c) that business needs to manage its relationship with wider
society, whether for reasons of commercial viability or to add value
to society’ ([27], p.6).
In 1970 Milton Friedman established what was subsequently
referred to as the ‘shareholder model’ of corporate responsibil-
ity, by suggesting that the only social responsibility of business
is to maximise its profits for the benefit of its shareholders [25].
Friedman’s thinking was challenged by ‘stakeholder theory’ which
focuses on the relationship between business and the groups or
individuals who might affect it or be affected by it (the stakehold-
ers). This brought a moral element back into debates by suggesting
that companies should respond to the needs not only of their share-
holders, but of all their stakeholders, from workers and suppliers
to civil society groups and communities [24,40]. A tension remains
between the ‘shareholder’ and ‘stakeholder’ models, particularly
in corporate statements on CSR, although most companies see the
‘stakeholder’ as a cornerstone of their CSR policy [95]. Moreover,
some theorists see ‘strategic’ stakeholder approaches as merely an
expansion of the shareholder model [30].
A further lack of clarity exists around whether CSR should refer
solely to what companies do over and above their legal obligations
and narrow economic self interest [69]. Yet in practice the divid-
ing line between government regulation and incentives; between
corporate policies and the conditionalities of international finan-
cial institutions; and between the different ways that companies
interpret and comply with regulations or engage with their stake-
holders makes this distinction an unnecessary distraction in many
cases, and is particularly unhelpful when CSR is thereby reduced to
the sphere of philanthropic activity.
The importance of government roles in supporting and incen-
tivising sustainable business practices should not be overlooked.
Ward [91] p.1 writes:
‘CSR is at heart a process of managing the costs and benefits
of business activity to internal and external stakeholders—from
workers, shareholders, and investors through to customers, sup-
pliers, civil society, and community groups. Setting the boundaries
for how those costs and benefits are managed is partly a ques-
tion of business policy and strategy and partly a question of public
governance.’
71
International conventions play a crucial role in framing gov-
ernment responsibilities to ensure key elements are in place to
promote responsible business practice. An important convention
is the 1998 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Envi-
ronmental Matters (or the Aarhus Convention). According to the
UNECE website, this convention ‘[e]stablishes that sustainable
development can be achieved only through the involvement of all
stakeholders’ [90]. The Aarhus Convention was ratified by Denmark
in 2000, but this does not extend to Greenland or the Faroe Islands
[79] (see Section 5.3).
In Arctic CSR analysis relating to the extractive industries,
the rights of indigenous peoples have a particular significance
[83,42,61,63]. A key concept, established in international conven-
tions is the right of indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed
consent (FPIC) in relation to industrial activities that affect their
livelihoods, particularly in the case of resettlement from traditional
lands [52,15,35]. The right to FPIC is established in the 1989 ILO
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO 169), which
Denmark ratified in 1996; and the 2007 UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which Denmark adopted
in 2007. Denmark and Greenland report jointly on ILO 169, and
Greenland’s self-government arrangement is seen as evidence of
Denmark’s implementation of UNDRIP [89] (see also Section 5.3).
In international documents the establishment of land rights
and implementation of FPIC are primarily seen as a government
responsibility. However, companies have responsibilities even if
host governments have not met their obligations under these
conventions [44]. Moreover, the responsibilities of companies
themselves in the sphere of human rights and community engage-
ment, and to a certain extent indigenous rights, are also established
in international standards. These include the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises (1997, latest update 2011); the UN
Global Compact (2000); the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on
Social Responsibility (2010); the UN Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights (UNGPs) (2011) and the performance
standards of international financial institutions, such as the Inter-
national Finance Corporation (IFC). The latter require companies
to implement FPIC in cases where indigenous communities’ liveli-
hoods will be affected by their operations. International standards
increasingly require companies and governments to engage in
‘meaningful consultation’ or ‘meaningful stakeholder engagement’
and attempts to define and measure this are evolving [68,5,89].
Blowfield and Murray [10] argue that CSR is not an end-goal,
but something that is negotiated with society. The notion of a com-
pany’s ‘social licence to operate’ is useful in exploring the power
relations between industry, government and civil society, and in
understanding CSR as a response to society’s expectations and
demands [60,59]. The concept of the social licence highlights the
element of negotiation and dialogue, but in order to be effective in
practice, it requires communities and civil society to be informed,
articulate, proactive and empowered enough to shape the ‘social
licence’ so that it takes account of their needs, goals and expecta-
tions [95].
A ‘social licence’ may exist in various forms, from informal rela-
tions to the more formal impact and benefit agreements or IBAs
[8]. IBAs are meant to address the imbalance of costs and benefits
that often characterise extractive industry projects, as revenues and
economic linkages tend to benefit the national or regional levels,
and local businesses and workforces may have insufficient skills
and experience to compete in the market [70]. IBAs can also address
the unpredictable nature of mineral markets, the socio-economic
impacts of mine closure, and the need for inter-generational equity
[70]. IBAs between companies and indigenous and local communi-
ties are now standard in Australia and Canada [82,16], and there is
72 E. Wilson / Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016) 69–77
varied experience in Russia, Nigeria and other extractive industry
regions [81,23,77].
IBAs may cover employment and business opportunities, envi-
ronmental impacts, education and training, revenue sharing,
infrastructure, cultural awareness training for workers, restrictions
on hunting and fishing, and community participation in planning
(see Section 5.2). Some IBAs have been criticised for providing
inadequate information or insufficient compensation, or for focus-
ing too much on compensation instead of discussing impacts and
desirable development scenarios [81,16,97]. Greater transparency
and community participation in the governance of an IBA is con-
sidered important for generating trust and buy-in [62]. Over the
years, implementation and oversight of IBAs has improved greatly
[70], although better ways are still needed to measure successful
outcomes [77].
Communities often need to build their negotiation skills and
articulate their needs and expectations adequately before engag-
ing in negotiations with industry or government. One approach is to
draw up community protocols (which are traditionally held orally)
in a written form [85]. In Canada, several First Nations communities
have developed consultation protocols and guidelines for industry
proponents [54]. Civil society organisations may work with com-
munities to help define their expectations of future development
[85]. A comprehensive exploration of the responsibilities of civil
society in relation to business and government is currently lacking
in CSR literature, although some efforts have been made to define
these responsibilities in relation to conservation NGOs [49].
The literature analysed above suggests that corporate respon-
sibility can be interpreted as a company’s response to society’s
expectations and demands. It may be a two- or three-way dialogue
(industry, community, government), and is frequently a process of
negotiation and re-negotiation. To take part in this kind of engage-
ment, all parties need to be informed as well as open minded, and
therefore capacity building and preparation is important for all par-
ties. Companies need to understand the values, norms and cultural
practices of local societies and be willing to align their policies and
objectives accordingly. The role of government is fundamental in
providing an ethical steer that reflects local values; in setting stan-
dards and regulating effectively; in building public awareness and
capacities; and in creating spaces for the public to engage meaning-
fully both with government agencies and with industry. The public
itself needs to be well informed and able not only to engage on equal
terms in the negotiation of benefits, but also to hold both govern-
ment and industry to account in relation to industrial impacts. The
role of civil society – an under-analysed area in CSR literature –
is particular important in building local awareness and helping to
articulate local expectations and demands.
5. Shaping corporate responsibility in Greenland
This section looks at CSR in Greenland, particularly as it relates
to the nascent petroleum sector, from three different perspectives:
(1) how the government is regulating and incentivising responsible
business practice; (2) how local and international businesses per-
ceive and implement CSR in the Greenlandic context; and (3) public
participation and the role of civil society in holding government and
business to account.
5.1. Government regulation of business activity
Greenland’s Oil and Mineral Strategy (2014–2018) states that
the government’s goal in promoting extractive industries is to
enhance prosperity and welfare by creating new income and
employment opportunities. The Mineral Resources Act (2009,
amended 2012) seeks to increase sustainability by building
government capacities and by dividing the responsibilities of the
former Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) between the Min-
istry of Industry, Mineral Resources and Labour, the Mineral Licence
and Safety Authority and the Environment Agency for Mineral
Resources Activities [33]. Despite this welcome division of respon-
sibilities, the Act has been criticised by the Worldwide Fund for
Nature (WWF) for overruling other environmental protection acts,
resulting in parallel regimes for extractive industries and other
activities [26] (Frost, personal communication).
A key area of government regulation is impact assessment.
Strategic Environmental Impact Assessments (SEIAs) are required
for offshore hydrocarbon activities and completed SEIAs are avail-
able on the government website [34]. The aim of these SEIAs is
to inform and define the content of companies’ EIAs for discrete
projects. The strategic assessments are important from the perspec-
tive of environmental risk mitigation, but as no public consultation
is required, the public does not have the opportunity to define the
scope of impact assessment at the strategic or project level. The
SEIAs also have very little coverage of social issues, aside from sub-
sistence hunting practices [94]. EIAs and social impact assessments
(SIAs) are both required by law for extractive industry activities.
Guidelines are available on the government website [11,12], as are
the EIAs that have been produced to date for offshore oil explo-
ration [34]. The level of transparency around impact assessments
is therefore high (see also Section 5.2).
Greenland’s government has very little experience of extractive
industry development, and there is some concern around govern-
ment capacities to manage large-scale projects. It was difficult to
arrange interviews with public officials in the capital Nuuk in 2012,
but the two officials whom I spoke to in Nuuk, gave the impression
that the government was seeking to address capacity gaps within
its departments, and understood the importance of greater public
accountability in extractive industry development. A key area of
low capacity in Greenland is oil-spill response, which is an issue
of international concern, especially for international NGOs such as
Greenpeace. Greenland’s regulators address this capacity gap by
requiring companies themselves to demonstrate that they have the
capacities to clean up if there is a spill [87] (Thrane Leth, personal
communication).
Several respondents in 2012 expressed anxiety that the gov-
ernment lacks the skills to engage on an equal footing with major
companies, for example in negotiating licences and investment
agreements. One government official acknowledged that, ‘Compa-
nies can get help from top lawyers, but governments can’t afford
that’ [87] (Thrane Leth, personal communication). Hansen et al. [38]
observe a lack of faith among their respondents that the govern-
ment will protect their interests or offer a strong counterbalance to
the power and strategic competence of private companies. Nuttall
[67] observes how civil society representatives fear that the gov-
ernment has not been tough enough in negotiating with companies
to date, while legislation has been altered in favour of industry (see
also Ref. [58]).
Despite concerns about governance capacities, Greenland is
not a corrupt society, and as part of Denmark it currently sits at
the top of the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index [88]. Yet with such a small population, personal relations
and nepotism are present in politics and decision making, while
the Greenlandic administration is seen as non-transparent, with
key people keen to maintain the status quo [94]. In 2012 Trans-
parency International Greenland published its ‘Integrity study on
the public sector in Greenland’ [50]. The study concluded that
Greenland’s government had a high turnover of staff and com-
plicated, sometimes unclear legislation, which increases the risk
of arbitrary administration and corruption. It recommends bet-
ter whistle-blower arrangements; strengthening and streamlining
 E. Wilson / Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016) 69–77
of public consultation procedures; and improved public access to
information (see also Section 5.3).
5.2. Business statements and action on CSR
The concept of CSR is well integrated into business practice
in Greenland, and both Greenlandic and foreign companies are
active in promoting CSR initiatives [92]. The term CSR itself is fre-
quently used and the Greenlandic interpretation of the concept
has been well articulated by the business community, in particular
through the business network CSR Greenland [20]. There are how-
ever some CSR sceptics, particularly among academics and NGOs,
who highlight the contrast between rhetoric and practice in public
consultation, impact assessment and information sharing [67].
The prospect of increased investment in energy and minerals
and the heightened risk of corruption and social and environmen-
tal impacts motivated companies and the Employers’ Association
of Greenland to set up CSR Greenland [20]. There is a strong tra-
dition in Greenland of businesses caring for their workers and
local communities. CSR in Greenland is also about the interdepen-
dency of business and society, about mutual need and co-existence
[20]. The CSR Greenland network also seeks to increase govern-
ment capacities for effective governance, and civil society capacities
to hold government and business to account (e.g. by support-
ing Transparency International Greenland) (see Section 5.3). Other
CSR-related forums include the Greenland Oil Industry Association
(GOIA), which was set up in 2009 for the oil and gas companies hold-
ing licences in Greenland. The forum is used to share experience and
good practice and there are working groups on oil-spill response,
drilling, environment, health and safety. The Employers’ Associa-
tion of Greenland also works to build awareness and capacities on
CSR within the business community (see Section 5.3).
Greenland’s national oil company Nunaoil, sees its role in society
primarily to build oil industry capacities and knowledge within the
company itself and within broader society and to maximise benefits
to Greenland from any oil discoveries that are made [64]. According
to the company’s 2014 annual report, it commits ‘continuously to
contribute by giving lectures, participation in conferences, meet-
ings in the local communities or any other relevant support and to
increase the efforts and the focus of Greenland on education, voca-
tional training and building up of competence within the mineral
industry’ (Ref. [64], p.26).
An interview with Nunaoil’s CEO in 2012 was more revealing of
the company’s ethics and values than the annual report. A native
Greenlander and trained ore geologist, Hans Kristian Olsen has been
CEO of Nunaoil since 2005 [72] (Olsen, personal communication).
He explained that Greenlanders are concerned about preserving
their traditional way of life, especially hunting and fishing. They
ask Nunaoil about potential impacts to the marine environment and
express concern about oil spill response (see Section 5.1). As a con-
dition of their licences, foreign companies provide capacity building
for Nunaoil’s employees. Olsen believes Greenland also needs to
prepare for the future by training geologists, lawyers, economists
and business managers, and by preparing small enterprises for
opportunities in the service sector. One of Nunaoil’s responsibil-
ities is to manage expectations about employment (as Greenland’s
workers will not have the capacity or know-how to take all the
jobs available) and about the broader economic benefits, as it may
be 10–20 years or longer before oil is produced. Olsen believes that
Greenland needs to control its own development: ‘We want the
development, but we want to do it on our own terms; we need to
develop with dignity and integrity’ [72] (Olsen, personal commu-
nication).
While CSR values are not new to the Greenlandic business
community, a new challenge has been incorporating CSR into
business strategy and processes, particularly in response to the
73
requirements of foreign companies [92,20]. An employee of Air
Greenland noted in an interview in 2012 that Shell and Cairn Energy
want them to have policies on environment, social responsibility
and anti-corruption, adding: ‘We have seen this as an opportunity
to make what we do anyway more systematic and strategic’ [21]
(Christensen Bang, personal communication).
Nunaoil has an 8–12.5% stake in all the international hydrocar-
bon licences, and therefore direct exposure to its foreign partner
companies’ policies and standards [64]. However much of the
implementation is carried out by the partners themselves and they
have their own responsibilities for public engagement. Cairn Energy
has held public meetings in several settlements close to Baffin Bay,
publishing its findings online. These highlight the concerns of local
hunters and fishermen about the effect of drilling on marine mam-
mals and the potential impacts of an oil spill, and anxieties about
lack of skills and employment opportunities for their young people
[17].
In 2013, Nunaoil and the four international companies that were
operating in the Baffin Bay area (Maersk Oil, ConocoPhillips, Shell,
and Cairn Energy) carried out a collaborative social baseline study,
to form the basis of the operating companies’ respective EIAs and
SIAs, as required by the government. The collaboration itself was
not a government requirement, but was a voluntary measure to
optimise costs and avoid duplication and ‘stakeholder fatigue’, and
is seen as a positive precedent of cross-industry collaboration [37].
Social survey findings are also used as the basis for impact and
benefit agreements (IBAs), which are required according to govern-
ment regulations [22,38]. IBAs in Greenland are designed as formal
legal contracts between the investor, the host municipalities and
the national government. The process also includes public consul-
tation, although the IBAs do not form part of a consent-oriented
negotiation between the company and the community.
During the 2010 and 2011 drilling seasons, Cairn Energy signed
IBAs with Greenland’s Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP)
and the municipalities in its exploration areas. The IBAs covered
local employment, education and training, community develop-
ment projects, local business support and measures to reduce strain
on healthcare and other local services. Performance against the
IBAs has been monitored and published online [17]. By 2011, Cairn
Energy’s workforce was about 10 per cent Greenlandic while over
100 Greenlandic organisations were supplying £38 million of goods
and services to Cairn Energy’s subsidiary, Capricorn Greenland
Exploration AS [17,18]. Cairn Energy set up a £158,000 fund for
English language training in 2010; a £316,000 fund for technical
skills development in 2011; and a grant fund of £47,000, admin-
istered through a board of trustees, to support culture and youth
sport [18].
Local procurement, hiring and capacity building can also take
place outside of a formal IBA. For example, Cougar Helicopters
have taken Air Greenland’s pilots out on offshore flights to train
them in offshore flying [6] (Binzer, personal communication). Arc-
tic Base Supply has trained and employed local people as marine
mammal observers during seismic surveys [36] (Hansen, personal
communication). A representative of Royal Arctic Line, Greenland’s
government-owned cargo-shipping company that works with the
oil industry, explained in an interview in 2012 that the company
has a strong focus on workforce capacity building, seeing this as a
key CSR contribution [51] (Kristensen, personal communication).
In 2012, industry respondents commented on the challenges
of employing Greenlanders with little experience of an interna-
tional extractive industry working culture. They argued for instance
that Greenlanders prefer not to be far from home for long peri-
ods, and some fail to complete training courses for that reason;
or they do not like steady jobs and prefer to have more flexibil-
ity to going hunting or fishing when they need to; or they do not
thrive in competitive environments. Other respondents pointed
74 E. Wilson / Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016) 69–77
out that Greenlanders have adapted well to the harsh demands
of the commercial fishing industry (including long periods spent
at sea); and that local Greenlanders understand the environment
and natural phenomena much better than outsiders, which rep-
resents experience of obvious value to the extractive industries. A
key challenge – for workers and communities alike – is the fact that
English language is so predominant as the operational language of
health and safety as well as much scientific and technical documen-
tation. Working culture is a sensitive topic and is at the forefront
of business thinking as companies try to engage local workers on
extractive industry projects. It is an area where business needs to
build greater understanding of the local context and realities of
workers’ lives, as well as the value of local knowledge, and marry
that with the requirements of a demanding, internationalised busi-
ness environment.
One major drawback for CSR in Greenland at present is the short-
term and unpredictable nature of many companies’ involvement,
as exemplified by the sudden withdrawal of three oil companies
from exploration in Baffin Bay in January 2015. This raises the ques-
tion of what CSR ought to look like in a context where companies
might find that tomorrow they no longer have a reason to stay.
This phenomenon is not unique to Greenland, and underscores the
importance of government, industry and local civil society working
together to find ways to mitigate the negative impacts of repeated
boom and bust cycles [96].
5.3. Public engagement and civil society capacities
In 2009, then-premier Kuupik Kleist stated that Greenland’s
Self-Government Act ‘should be seen as a de facto implementa-
tion’ of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) (Ref. [45]: 10). However, in the sphere of public partic-
ipation in decision making on extractive industries, this claim has
been challenged [73,38] (see below). UNDRIP requires states to:
‘consult and co-operate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order
to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of
any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources’
(Article 32, paragraph 2). A key question is whether it is appropriate
for the Government of Greenland to grant that consent on behalf
of local communities, or indeed the wider public, particularly if
government interests might conflict with those of its citizens.
Aside from the lack of clarity on the topic of consent, there is
also a lack of government guidance on how to go about public con-
sultation and there is considerable public dissatisfaction with the
way that consultation has been conducted for extractive industry
projects to date [38]. For example, in November 2012, protests took
place in Nuuk against the lack of public involvement in decision-
making on the Isua iron ore project [66]. The government’s EIA
guidelines suggest at least two public consultation meetings over
a six-week period, informing the public of how issues have been
addressed [12]: 8). The four public meetings held in 2012 for the
Isua project (one of which I attended) exceeded government recom-
mendations in terms of quantity, but were criticised by participants
for their substance. This included not providing enough opportu-
nity for people to get answers to their questions (questions were
asked at one meeting and some, but not all, were answered at the
following meeting); and failing to take into account local knowl-
edge about livelihood practices. It was difficult for most participants
to understand technical conclusions expressed in English, a matter
complicated at the meetings by lengthy translation into Danish and
then into Greenlandic and back [66].
Public protests also took place in Nuuk in October 2013 follow-
ing the parliamentary decision to lift a moratorium on uranium
mining [67]. Public feeling was that the government should not
have made such a major decision without broader public debate,
and the process was labelled ‘a democratic failure’ [73]. Greenlan-
ders were also upset by the lack of consideration of alternatives
and the lack of opportunity for people living close to mine sites to
make up their own minds about whether such development should
go ahead [98].
There has been less local public protest around Greenland’s oil
exploration. Most of the protest has taken place at the international
level, led by Greenpeace. Local Greenlanders are traditionally cau-
tious about Greenpeace, as some of them blame the organisation
(perhaps unjustly) for the 2010 EU ban on trade in seal products.
Some also object to Greenpeace’s publicity-seeking style of protest
and suggest that Greenlanders would prefer to decide things on
their own terms. Nonetheless, civil society organisations and offi-
cials alike greatly appreciate the work that Greenpeace is doing to
help local NGOs analyse the documentation produced around the
oil industry—something that local NGOs do not have the time, the
resources or indeed the experience to do themselves.
In 2012 the Employers’ Association of Greenland published a
report on stakeholder engagement, highlighting some of the key
issues and challenges and the importance of creating a dialogue, not
just holding public meetings [1]. The report concludes that there
is a need for better information sharing and open and inclusive
deliberation, with stakeholders being more open to each other’s
arguments. It urges the authorities to ensure public participation is
not limited by power asymmetries; to build trust and public interest
in the processes; and to develop tighter government guidelines for
companies on carrying out public consultation [1].
The potential threat of corruption and mismanagement of rev-
enues from the extractive industries led CSR Greenland to establish
Transparency International Greenland. This NGO aims to build
knowledge about corruption and related ‘grey areas’ of business
and administration and to advocate for appropriate legal and reg-
ulatory mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability. In
2013, WWF Denmark, Transparency International Greenland, the
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) Greenland, and the Association
of Fishermen and Hunters in Greenland set up an NGO coali-
tion for better consultation processes with the aim of providing
recommendations to the Greenlandic government. The recommen-
dations include increased transparency in public decision making
and accession to the Aarhus Convention [79].
Greenland’s civil society organisations are open-minded about
industrial development, but have strong views about the processes
required to ensure fair and sustainable outcomes. The head of
Transparency International Greenland stated in an interview: ‘We
don’t have a position on whether the extractive industries are good
or bad, but we want the right process and we need to take the time
that is required to do it properly’ [57] (Meilvang, personal com-
munication). Representatives of ICC Greenland said in an interview
that they were ‘not against resource development, but the people
need to be involved in the processes. We are afraid that companies
have too much power. [. . .] We need to start by educating people,
including on impact assessment procedures and human rights’ [47]
(Jeppsen and Lyberth, personal communication).
Civil society organisations struggle with fundraising, largely
because they are dependent on volunteers with very little free time.
Like the government, and unlike companies, civil society organ-
isations cannot afford to access top legal expertise. Respondents
suggested the government could provide support, even temporar-
ily, for organisations to build a secretariat and raise funds to start
growing and building their own capacities.
The University of Greenland in Nuuk has played an important
role in building awareness and capacities on extractive industries,
through targeted research projects and involvement in – and com-
mentary on – public consultation processes [67]. The university
runs an optional extractive industries course as part of the Sus-
tainable Resource Management bachelor’s degree, building on links
 E. Wilson / Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016) 69–77
with Canada’s experience. The Survey of Living Conditions in the
Arctic project (SLiCA) has also contributed to understanding local
livelihoods as they relate to extractive industries [74]. Academics
have also been considering the potential to set up an indepen-
dently managed fund for research, funded from extractive industry
contributions, which would help to preserve the impartiality and
perceived integrity of research findings.
6. Discussion
CSR in Greenland is shaped by the values and goals of local
society. These include protection of traditional livelihoods and
the natural environment; building societal resilience in the face
of economic and social change; creating appropriate and mean-
ingful local employment especially for young people; and local
control over industrial development that should not happen too
quickly. Society’s values are exercised to greater or lesser extent
through an elected government, legislation, regulation, and par-
liamentary debate; through company policies and statements and
local business initiatives; and through civil society defending the
environment and the interests of local communities and society as
a whole.
The Greenlandic business community has been able to develop
and articulate Greenlandic CSR values through the CSR Greenland
network and companies are keen to talk about the importance of
nurturing a good relationship between business and society. Capac-
ity building, local hiring and ensuring that benefits reach all levels of
society are key priorities for Greenlandic companies. International
collaboration has helped local businesses to build their capacities.
Some foreign companies have further contributed to the evolution
of CSR in Greenland, by requiring their local partners to establish
codes of conduct, environmental and anti-corruption policies, and
sustainability reporting. This means a greater degree of systemati-
sation of CSR values in business practice, and in principle this means
greater accountability.
Yet the increased presence of international oil and mining com-
panies with their wealth and considerable bargaining power is
cause for concern locally. It is also worth noting that not all interna-
tional companies have behaved in the same way in Greenland, with
some embracing Greenlandic CSR values and engaging construc-
tively with local people more than others. In this climate, people
fear that the government may lack the skills to negotiate a good
deal for local society, and may be vulnerable to corrupt influences
in the future. While the government has developed some regula-
tions specifically for the extractive industries, such as requirements
for foreign companies to deliver on oil spill response capacities and
negotiate legally binding IBAs with affected communities; there
are other areas where regulation and guidance could be stronger,
notably around public consultation.
Citizens have protested over public consultation processes (or
the lack of consultation) relating to extractive industries, as they
feel they have had no influence over decision-making. Despite the
claim by Greenland’s leaders that self-government satisfies the
requirements of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP), observers still note a lack of recognition of local
people’s right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Green-
landic civil society organisations are fairly open-minded about the
possible development of extractive industries in Greenland, their
main concern being that citizens have adequate opportunity to
know in good time what is happening and to have an influence over
decisions that are made. International organisations have provided
valuable support in helping local people to understand projects and
project documentation, and in pushing for better public consulta-
tion and stronger government guidelines and commitments.
75
Despite some positive indications of a strong corporate respon-
sibility ethic embedded within Greenland’s business community,
there is still a sense that Greenland remains poorly prepared for
extractive industry development. Partly this is because not all inter-
national companies appear to fully embrace the Greenlandic CSR
ethic, though many do. Partly it relates to the way that the gov-
ernment and industry inform and engage with the public on some
of the bigger extractive industry questions. The concluding section
suggests some ways to address this challenge.
7. Conclusions
The extractive industries promise much in terms of socio-
economic development potential, but they offer an uncertain
foundation, especially in today’s economic climate. In the near
future, Greenland’s industrial development might be limited to a
series of localised ‘boom’ periods associated with oil and mining
exploration (possibly underpinned by short-term IBAs). To mitigate
this, the government of Greenland needs to develop a broader-
based economy focusing not only on minerals and petroleum, but
also on other economic activities, including tourism and the knowl-
edge economy. Greenland’s leaders acknowledge this but need to
pursue the goal more pro-actively. At the same time, as an emerging
resource economy, Greenland needs to ensure that legislation and
governance structures are in place, and capacities built to manage
the changes that greater investment in the extractive industries
could bring. In response to criticism about some of its decision-
making not being ‘democratic’ in the past, the government now
needs to develop clear principles, commitments and guidance on
public consultation, including a statement relating to UNDRIP and
what FPIC means in the Greenlandic context.
Businesses (both local and international) need to understand
and respond to local expectations around industrial development
and optimise existing local skills and knowledge for mutual bene-
fit. As such, public engagement – establishing a dialogue, not just
holding public meetings – is a critical element of CSR practice in
Greenland. An IBA may offer an appropriate framework for such
a dialogue in local communities. Companies will need to under-
stand FPIC for themselves, including the government obligations
under ILO 169 and UNDRIP, and their own responsibilities as busi-
nesses, as well as local expectations. Companies could collaborate
– with each other and with local communities and the govern-
ment – on the strategic development of IBAs, as a way to enhance
the sustainability and targeted impact of their investments. This
could mitigate the time-bound and unpredictable nature of their
involvement, particularly during exploration.
The role of civil society organisations and academic institu-
tions in Greenland is critical in building local citizens’ capacities
to understand industrial development, changes in global society,
and their own rights in that context. This will help citizens to
formulate their expectations and demands, and to hold industry
and the government to account. International collaboration and
sharing of experience from other regions through NGO networks
and academic partnerships has been important for building local
capacities and confidence to date and should continue. The gov-
ernment or companies themselves might also consider establishing
a joint industry fund (independently managed) to finance inde-
pendent research and capacity building relating to the extractive
industries. With the right support, Greenland’s citizens will have a
better chance of influencing the shape of the ‘social licence to oper-
ate’ of energy projects of the future, rather than leaving this to be
determined by a small number of elected, though not necessarily
representative, politicians.
76 E. Wilson / Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016) 69–77
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of all my respondents
in Greenland in September–October 2012 and those who have com-
municated by email or phone since then. In particular Mark Nuttall
and Birger Poppel who hosted me at the University of Greenland,
Steen Hansen who provided invaluable logistical assistance during
my stay, Mette Frost of WWF and John Burgwald of Greenpeace,
Anne Merrild Hansen of Aalborg University, Hans Kristian Olsen of
Nunaoil, and two experts from Shell. I would like to acknowledge
the support of the project Indigenous Peoples and Resource Extraction
in the Arctic: Evaluating Ethical Guidelines, funded by the Norwe-
gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the project Sustainability and
Petroleum Extraction: Corporate and Community Perspectives, funded
by the Norwegian Research Council. The fieldwork for this project
was made possible with a grant from the International Institute for
Environment and Development (IIED). Finally I greatly appreciate
the insightful comments of two anonymous reviewers.
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