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MULTICULTURALISM IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES: THE ROLE OF

ETHNICITY IN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL HEGEMONY

A paper to be presented to the Conference, Bandung +60, Jakarta, Indonesia


on October 26-31, 2015

By Heidi K. Gloria

Ateneo de Davao University

Introduction

This paper is an inquiry into the interplay between culture and history and
the cultural as well as historical changes that form and transform the fabric of
Philippine society. The study highlights the role that ethnic communities in
the island of Mindanao play in the changing landscape in internal and external
hegemony.

Ethnicity, the concept of shared ancestry, memory, and collective behavioral


habits that include language, beliefs, diet, manner of dressing, social behavior
and the like is synonymous with the identity of a distinct human group hence,
its salience in this study. Ethnicity or group identity refers to the assertion of
the group’s differences from other groups. It finds expression in a fierce
loyalty to the group’s characteristics that set it apart from others. In an
extreme form this loyalty may be recognized as ethnocentrism or chauvinism,
the belief that their group’s attributes are superior to others. When placed in
the context of a multicultural society the danger zones for conflict and rivalry
become clearly delineated.

Multiculturalism on the other hand, appears to be a glorification or a


dramatization of the existence of multiple ethnicities in a single political entity
such as a modern state either because of historical factors or some
sociological forces e.g. migration. However, some contemporary authors on
this issue are not convinced that the current platitudes in praise of cultural
diversity or multi-ethnicity in a given society are well-deserved. The
articulation of plural cultures can only be envisaged within the context of a
complex and changing world. In most Asian and African societies which are
products of an oppressive colonial past, multiculturalism is one of the
dubious legacies of the colonial policy of “divide and rule” that multiplied
social boundaries among a subject people. (see E. San Juan, Jr., 1999)

Cultural pluralism is endemic in Southeast Asia which is a known historical


cross-roads of various peoples in this part of the world. This is not to say that
the embeddedness of cultural pluralism in the Southeast Asian milieu makes
the demographic attribute less threatening to the national polity or modern
state and to its various members. On the contrary, the diversity of cultures
has evolved new and more complexed problems. Whereas in the past each
ethnic polity co-existed more or less peacefully (unless certain cultural
boundaries were transgressed) with neighboring groups, the passing of time
to new historical epochs i.e. colonial period introduced new contenders. The
presence of a new protagonist i.e. the colonial power not only added to the
number of polities competing for the same space on the ground; it also
brought with it new realities such as hegemony or the dominance of one
group over all the others.

The island of Mindanao in the Philippine south has presently taken center
stage in the arena of complex problems that beset post-colonial and post-
independence Philippines. Centuries of conflict that are rooted in the colonial
past have persisted buoyed up by old as well as new forces such as continuing
domination, discrimination, deprivation and threat to life and property. The
highly volatile situation in Mindanao is highlighted by the secessionist
aspirations of the major Muslim groups and the antagonisms of the non-
Muslim indigenous peoples along with the Catholics and other Christians in
Mindanao towards the imminent creation of the Bangsamoro, a proposed
autonomous region for Muslim Mindanao. The latter antagonism is
predicated on the controversial provisions of the proposed bill for the
creation of the Bangsamoro polity investing it with substate powers which
eventually will foist the Muslims groups into a position of hegemony of a
minority group over the majority.

No problem of this magnitude emerges overnight and as with other Southeast


Asian countries which share post-colonial and post-independence struggles
for a stable government in a multicultural society, Mindanao in the Philippines
looks to the various factors that have brought about problems of hegemony in
the national polity. The problem is not only political as might seem but is
essentially a complex one whose bifurcations and ramifications extend to
social, economic and cultural beginnings.

Island Nations

At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards in the Philippines, Mindanao was
peopled by four major Muslim groups of distinct ethnicities: the Tausug of the
Sulu Archipelago, the Magindanao and the Buayan (Buhayan or Buhahayen) of
the island of Mindanao, the Maranao (Ilianen, Iranun?) of the Lake Lanao
region, and the Sangir (Sangires, Sangil) of the Sarangani islands on the
southeast portion of the island. In the course of the three hundred year
colonial period under Spanish hegemony, various sub-groups of each Muslim
group came to be identified such as the Samal and Badjao, the Yakans of
Zamboanga Peninsula, the Iranuns of Lake Lanao and Jolo, etc.

It would appear from the Spanish historical sources that the Tausug of the
Sulu Archipelago was the most ethnically variegated and socially splintered
group. A hierarchy of sub-groups namely the Samal (Sama), Badjao and Yakan
existed and was apparently a part of the Tausug family sharing more or less
the culture of the latter. The Magindanao and their immediate neighbor, the
Buayan had the closest affinity with each other (both claimed direct descent
from the same founding ancestor, Kabungsuan) and with the Maranao of the
Lake Lanao region. This affinity includes the Sangir (Sangil) of Sarangani and
Davao Gulf; the only Muslim group found to inhabit the southeastern portion
of Mindanao and whose kings had intermarried with Magindanao royalty. The
latter were in turn sanguineally and affinally related to the Moluccans of
Ternate and Tidore. This makes the Magindanao the biggest group in
Mindanao whose kinsmen extended to the Moluccans across the Celebes in
the same way that the Tausug, Yakan, Samal, and Badjao were relatives of the
Borneans and other Malays of the peninsula.

The demographic taxonomy into Muslims and non-Muslims (pagans or


infieles) was resorted to by the Spanish writers to distinguish one group of
indigenous inhabitants from the others. This brings to light the fact that from
the very beginning, the nature of the indigenous peoples of Mindanao was
multicultural and cultural diversity was the norm. Besides the Muslim
identities the other component of the social landscape was the infieles or
pagan groups as referred to in the Spanish chronicles. The early Spanish
accounts (see Combes, 1690 and Cartas, 1887) of the identities of the
inhabitants of the Philippine south were limited to a general bifurcation of the
islands into east and west. For instance, the Muslim groups with the
exception of the Sangir were concentrated on the western half of Mindanao
while the various infieles were found on the opposite side; the east or Pacific
Ocean side.

On the eastern side of Mindanao, the first group of pagan peoples with whom
the Spaniards were acquainted with were the so-called Caragans named from
an obscure kingdom of the same name somewhere in the Pacific littoral. Its
king, Rajah Siaui boasted to Antonio Pigafetta and the members of the
Magellan expedition that in his kingdom, gold the size of ducks’ eggs could be
found in abundance. (Pigafetta, 1536 in FBG, 1969) Later, the generic
appellation of Caragan gave way to the more specific identities such as the
Mandaya, Mansaka, Manobo, Mamanwa and Tagakaulo of the Pacific coast all
the way from Agusan in the north to the tip of the San Agustin peninsula in the
southeast.

On the western front, the biggest group of infieles was the Subanon (Subanen)
whose name indicated that their settlements were found along the rivers
(suba) of the Zamboanga peninsula. Unknown to the Spaniards until much
later were the Higaunon, Talaandig, Tiruray, Blaan, Tboli, Bagobo and Ata.
Some groups namely; the Manobo, Bagobo, Ata and Blaan had settlements that
were found east and west of Mindanao. As the Spaniards were to admit later,
there were numerous groups of infieles yet unidentified in the vast interiors of
Mindanao.

Moros, Infieles and Tribes

The Spanish colonial government in the Philippines was part of “España en


Ultramar” the Spanish term for its colonial possessions in America and the
Philippines. Hence, the governance and administration of the colonies were
closely patterned after the Spanish monarchical system. The colonial
government in the Philippines was administered as a theocracy with the
preponderance of the religious corporations such as the Augustinians,
Franciscans, Dominicans etc. in administrative and political affairs. From the
religious or clerical standpoint the perception of non-Christians in the
unpacified areas in Mindanao and Sulu was that of an infiel (pagan) a word
connoted with savagery and barbarism. Since the pacification of Mindanao
and Sulu was not forthcoming following the establishment of the colonial
government in Luzon and the Visayas Spanish policy evolved into a harsh
distinction between Christians and non-Christians. Over the centuries of
Spanish colonial rule this perception of the moro as uncivilized, savage, and
barbaric was imbibed by the Christianized inhabitants thus transforming the
cultural ideology of the Filipino.

The Spanish colonial period ended in 1898 as an aftermath of the Spanish


defeat in the Spanish- American War over Cuba. The passing of the Philippine
colonial period to the American colonial era was the product of the duplicity
of American generals who pretended to encourage the revolutionary
government of Emilio Aguinaldo to renew the hostilities against the Spanish
colonial government with the promise of military assistance and recognition
of Philippine independence. However, the Americans secretly entered into an
agreement with the Spanish government to purchase the Philippines for
twenty million pesos and include the whole archipelago in the cession of all
Spanish possessions in the Americas to the United States in the Treaty of Paris
of 1898. Henceforth, all inhabitants of the Philippines who became subjects of
Spain upon conquest in 1565 became the first Filipino citizens under the
American colonial government.

The definition of Filipino citizenship by the Cooper Act or the Jones Law of
1902 was the first milestone in the changing identities of the indigenous
peoples of Mindanao and the rest of the Philippines. Unknown to the
multitude of these former island nations they had become, all of a sudden a
single nation with the same identity as citizens of the American territorial
possession known as the Philippines. A new hegemony had emerged; that of
the United States to lead and change the lives of the people under its control.

With the exception of the Christian towns of Misamis, Agusan and Surigao
vast areas in Mindanao and Sulu were reorganized into the Moro Province of
1903, the first political aggregation of the different Muslim peoples in the
Philippine south. The other exceptions to the province were the non-Muslim
groups inhabiting the interiors and eastern parts of the island of Mindanao.
The former infieles were renamed “tribes” to avoid a classification that would
have a religious implication prohibited by American laws on the separation of
church and state. (Forbes, 1945). Thus, Tribal Wards were organized for the
various non-Muslim peoples and this time the aggrupations were based on
ethnic identity e.g. Tribal Ward of the Manobo etc.

The change in hegemony from Spanish to American resulted in great changes


in the identity of the indigenous peoples of Mindanao and Sulu. During the
Spanish colonial period the different Muslim groups were collectively
denominated as “moro”, the Spanish word for the Muslim Moors of northern
Africa who colonized Spain for 700 years. Hence, the connotation of the word
“moro” meant Muslim or one who professed the Islamic religion.
Anthropologist Eric Casiño pointed out that the term “Moro Wars” was first
coined in Cesar Majul’s book, Muslims in the Philippines (1973). The Spanish
sources such as Vicente Barrantes (1878), Emilio Bernaldez (1857) and
Montero y Vidal (1888) all referred to the 300 year old war as “Guerras
Piraticas” or piratical wars. Ostensibly, the only similarity between the Moors
and the “moros” was the Islamic religion. Beyond religion no other semblance
of cultural affinity or affiliation could be accounted for by the name “moro”.
At the beginning, American policy regarded the different ethnic groups in the
Philippines as “tribes” which was changed to non-Christians after the
realization that the Filipino Christians were culturally homogenized by
religious affiliation. The new colonial American administration did not differ
much from the previous Spanish colonial government however, the former
initiated a vigorous scientific study of all the so-called non-Christian tribes.
(see Barrows, 1901) Consequently, every cultural group and its cultural
characteristics was studiously documented. Ethnic differentiation had
resurfaced and group identity emerged to take its place in political affairs.

The Tribal Wards were divided into political districts adding the geographic
and political elements into the ethnic or cultural taxonomy hence, recognizing
the idea of territoriality or location as a component of ethnicity. The
association of the term tribal with the name of the ethnic group as in Bagobo
tribe was fraught with cultural underpinnings. While “moro” simply meant
Muslim, tribal Bagobo or Manobo and any other non-Muslim group identified
as a tribe, denoted a separate ethnic identity with its own culture cum
territory. On the other hand, the terms “Moro Wars” and “Moro Province”
were indicative of religion but not of ethnic identity.

In 1912 the Moro Province was abolished and the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu took its place as the administrative unit in charge of its affairs and
governance. Four years later, the Jones Law of 1916 reorganizing the
Philippine government established a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes for the
various ethnic groups in Mindanao and Sulu.

The Indigenous Political Systems in the Dynamics

Of Internal Hegemony

The indigenous political systems of pre-Islamic Mindanao and Sulu are


reflected in the customary law or adat, a body of unwritten laws that is
invoked and today, continues to be obeyed in tandem with the shariah, the
Islamic law. It would appear that a tradition of participatory rule has been
preserved well after the Islamic political system or the sultanate had
overtaken the indigenous institutions. However, absolute rule and the Divine
Right Theory as existed in western civilization were not recognized norms.
The local chiefs or datus did not govern like absolute monarchs but always
had the tempering influence of a group of advisers or council.

According to the Ming Annals (in Majul, 1973) written in the 15 th century, the
title of “Paduka Batara” was given to a Sulu chief who made a visit to the
Chinese emperor. Since chiefs usually travelled with an entourage composed
of their families together with servants or slaves the title “paduka” was
likewise given to members of his family such as wives and children. The
people of the kingdom of Brunei whose rulers were related to the Sulu chiefs
were wont to refer to Sulu rulers as Batara (meaning lord in Sanskrit). The
Genealogy of Sulu (Saleeby in Majul, 1973) recorded two pre-Islamic Sulu
rulers whose names were “Rajah Sipad” which Majul said was a contraction
and variation of Rajah Sri Pada or Rajah Sri Paduka. Thus, the Ming Annal and
the Sulu Genealogy converged on this point. These titles were used in Sulu up
to the end of the 19th century.

It would seem that in pre-colonial times an external hegemonic polity i.e. the
Chinese emperor was recognized among the Tausug in the Sulu archipelago.
The recognition of this hegemonic polity was indicative of a political readiness
of Sulu rulers to acknowledge a higher level of authority than ethnic norms
would permit. In the island of Mindanao the Ming annals mentioned a King
Ganlai Yibendum from the kingdom of Kumalarang somewhere in the
Zamboanga peninsula who similarly visited Beijing to petition the Chinese
emperor for a tributary status for his kingdom. Then, there was the ancient
kingdom of Butuan, awash in gold and probably the most prosperous trading
port in the whole archipelago (see Gloria, 2015) whose kings likewise sought
tributary relations with the Chinese empire. In brief, the idea of a an external
sovereign whose protection was sought and whose influence on rulers was
made known through the adaption of titles that acknowledged their subject
status was already part of the early political experience of the people.

The Sulu Genealogy is replete with names used by an authoctonous hierarchy


of officials and persons of authority: datu, tuan, shaikh, and orangkaya before
the advent of Islam. The datu was the highest rung in the sociopolitical
structure followed by the tuan. The Shaikh was a religious personage while
the orangkaya were commoners with means. Some orangkaya held high
political offices and were called mantri. Prior to the Islamisation of Sulu and
the establishment of the sultanate at Buansa the datu was the highest poltical
personage in the indigenous political hierarchy. The institution of datuship
did not give way to the new order i.e. the sultanate even after its
entrenchment in Sulu and Mindanao. Notwithstanding, the sultanate system
became the symbol of sweeping changes in the life of the people of the Sulu
archipelago after Islamisation. The new sociopolitical dispensation had to
come to terms with the indigenous system by integrating those significant
institutions such as the datu for otherwise the transformation from the old to
the new would not have been possible.

Cesar Majul (1973) pointed out that the sultanate system gave rise to a new
line of datus of royal blood that is, those who descended directly from the first
Sulu Sultan, Sharif ul-Hashim in distinction to the authoctonous datus prior to
the introduction of the sultanate. In the 16th century, Spanish records
mentioned some Sulu rulers who carried the title pangiran indicating a
member of the royal family. Nevertheless, there existed local datus who were
not of royal blood in the sense that they could not claim direct descent from
the first sultan but were in fact older personages than the royal datus who
were descended from Sharif ul-Hashim.

The traditional belief that the ascendancy of the sultanate as the highest
governing power or sovereign in the realm took place peacefully and without
bloodshed arose from the tartib, a narrative of some events purporting to be
historically connected with the proclamation of the first sultan. Sulu sultans
based their political power and other prerogatives such as land ownership on
a supposed contract or agreement between the first sultan and the local
peoples who had consented to Islamisation. This was a most significant
development because it signified the confrontation between the newly
introduced institution which was the sultanate and the previously existing
datuship. In the confrontation, the latter were said to agree to the imposition
of a higher or more powerful authority (sultan) as part of the process of
Islamisation. Moreover, together with the acceptance of this higher authority
the local peoples also agreed to concede lands and territory that became the
Sultan’s base of his wealth and power. The datus were naturally careful to
preserve their own rights and privileges as part of their accustomed source of
wealth and power in the agreement. In case of conflict, both sultan and datu
were to have recourse to this ancient agreement where the force of tradition
was held to be more binding than any Islamic law. Since the essence or source
of power was an agreement it may be safely inferred that the nature of the
institution of sultanate and the sultan was not rigid or changeless but one that
allowed constant negotiation and re-negotiation.

The Maranao of Lake Lanao possessed an ancient political system that may
have been truly indigenous in Mindanao. The socio-political system was
based on the pat-a-panganmpong or four states of Lanao consisting of
Bayabao, Masiu, Unayan and Baloi. Tradionally, the state of Baloi
comprehended the whole northern part of the lake area roughly equivalent to
what is now the modern province of Lanao del Norte. The three other states
today comprise the present province of Lanao del Sur. All four states were
Islamized without the agency of any foreign dignitary or personage such as
Sharif Kabungsuan. The Islamisation of the Lanao region was simply the
result of the northward expansion of Islam from the Pulangi or Magindanao
area.

In early Islamic times, there were fifteen “higher sultanates” and “twenty-
eight lower sultanates” which as a result of internal rivalries underwent
further subdivision and fragmented into hundreds of smaller units with less
and less power and authority. The tendency to fragment into smaller units
gave rise to the more localized groupings known as soko, inged and agama.
(Saber, 1978) This reverse process of political evolution in Lanao might have
signified a form of an active resistance to external hegemony such as
Islamisation even as the religion itself was accepted by the people.

In an analysis of the ancient political system of the Maranao Teresita Barcenas


(1985) identified two important institutions: the pegawidan (superordinate)
and the pegawid (subordinate). Barcenas identified these institutions as the
organizing principles in the power distribution within the pangampong.
Under this system the pegawid were obliged to support the rule of the
pegawidan whose rank and social status derived from the male line (wata sa
mama) of the community’s ancestors. On the other hand, the pegawid’s
subordinate position owed to a descent from the female line (wata sa bubai).
Underneath the seeming political fragmentation and ambiguity of the
sultanate system was a tightly-knit society with centuries-old tradition built
on strong kinship and family ties.

The hierarchical system was supported by a set of values and beliefs known
as maratabat. Maratabat was translated into collective shame or dishonor
which was individually incurred but collectively avenged by the family and the
community as a whole. (Saber, 1978). It was one of the social mores that was
strictly enforced to the point of death to the offender. In many cases, it could
take several generations before an act of vengeance or retribution could be
exacted to wipe out the maratabat but the community had a long memory for
this and was not known to condone the offense. Unlike other cultural traits
which were acquired or learned, the maratabat was inherited along with the
obligation to exact vengeance. It was directly proportional to one’s rank and
status in the community. The higher one’s rank was, the bigger the sense of
shame conversely, the lower one’s social status was, the smaller the
maratabat. A slave would not be easily offended but a datu or anyone
belonging to his family would be.

The ancient Magindanao political structure was closely patterned after that of
the Malay sultanates. The highest layer was occupied by the ruling nobility of
sultan and datus while the political units were structured around the principle
of four high ministerial offices administered like a fiefdom. Only persons of
royal lineage could occupy these offices and all four ministers were known as
Pat-a-Tumad’ng sa Magindanao or “Four Pillars of Magindanao”. Below was
another set of four officials and offices with titles but had no territorial
administrative units assigned to them. Their titles were : Datu Shabandar,
Maharajah Laila, Maharajah Adinda, and Matuharajah. They were known as
Pat-a-Lukes sa Magindanao or the Council of Four Elders. (Casiño, 2000)
The sultanate system did not exceed the bounds of Muslim Mindanao and
Sulu. Among the Manobo of Agusan and other non-Muslim indigenous
peoples a different political system existed. The word datu had no currency
among the non-Muslims instead, more local terms were used. The word for a
Manobo chief or headman varied depending upon the rank: hanagan,
tinubudan, kinaboan, luto or linamburan, and lunugun or lipus. These titles
were earned based on the satisfaction of certain requirements. The highest
rank went to the lipus as a warrior who has killed from fifteen to a hundred
people and who had eaten the heart or liver of an enemy slain in battle. This
feat was said to earn the favor of tagbusao, the Manobo blood spirit.
Appropriate clothing and colors were used by each rank and distinguished
one from the others. (Garvan, 1931) According to Fr. Pablo Pastells, S.J.
(1897) Manobo leadership was invested in a chief warrior known as bagani,
one who had distinguished himself by killing as many men or enemies. As a
warrior among warriors he was privileged to wear clothing with the color red
from head to toe. Apart from being a warrior, the bagani was also recognized
as high priest who alone can perform the most secret rituals of the clan or
tribe.

Missionary accounts frequently denounced the bagani as the main obstacle to


the Spanish reduccion or resettlement, a precursor to the proper towns whose
inhabitants had agreed to be baptized and evangelized. The appointment of a
non-Manobo as a gobernadorcillo to a Manobo reduccion was said to incur the
strongest opposition of the people as among them only a kinsman was
recognized and obeyed as an authority. Christian settlements always stood in
fear of bagani attacks which were frequent.

The Sangir of southeast Mindanao were the inhabitants of the islands of


Sangihe and Talaud in the Moluccan archipelago. Spanish historical records
however, attest to their centuries old residence in the Sarangani islands.
Their settlements were likewise found along the coasts of the Davao Gulf and
the whole southern portion of Mindanao. Related to the Buayan and the
Magindanao, the Sangir fought in the Moro Wars against the Spanish colonial
government together with the Tausug, Iranun, Magindanao, Buayan, Maranao
and Caragan forces. Then as now, crossings from Mindanao to the Moluccas
and Sulawesi (Celebes) were commonplace. Individuals or families thought
nothing of shifting their residence from island to island, joining new
communities, founding or establishing one of their own in a new location.
The readiness and willingness to live in a new community or alongside new
ones was part of a cultural equipage that allowed peoples of kindred cultures
to make the necessary adjustments without the pain of cultural estrangement.

The mingling of Southeast Asian cultures that must have taken place well
before the Islamisation of island Southeast Asia is reflected in many cultural
practices among the Sangirese, Magindanao, Buayan and Ternatan. The
system of governance was based on Malay sociopolitical institutions known to
all three. In Mindanao the title of colano (king) and gugugu (prime minister)
are up to now known to the Sangir and Tboli, the latter is a non-Muslim group.
Before the time of the great Sultan Kudarat two affinal and sanguineal
tandems existed in Mindanao: the Magindanao and Ternatan, and the Buayan
and Sangir. At the outbreak of the Moro Wars a crisis presented itself to all
Muslim groups prompting them to cross bloodlines and cultural boundaries
against a common enemy.

The Ethnic Factor in External Hegemony

The ethnic factor in Mindanao has played an all important role in the long
history of colonial struggle and continues to do so in contemporary times.
However, there is a dark side to ethnicity; since ethnicity is an expression of
the “we” as against the “they” it follows that ethnocentrism, chauvinism,
prejudice and inevitably, conflict are natural by-products of the dynamics of
identity and belongingness. (see Steinberg, 1981) Steinberg has posited an
“iron law of ethnicity” by which he prognosticated that where there is ethnic
difference, (where difference means inequality) there will be ethnic conflict.
Everywhere in the modern world ethnic pluralism or cultural diversity has
been associated with dissent and instability. Nevertheless, the relationship
between ethnicity and conflict which may be understood as a cause and effect
relationship does not really operate automatically.
During the 350-year Moro Wars fought against Spain the different Muslim
groups united to conduct periodic raids on the Christian settlements in the
Visayas and Luzon in retaliation for Spanish attempts to subjugate them. At
this time, the sultanate system was already existing in Sulu and Magindanao
and palpably flourishing as an advanced form of a sociopolitical organization.
The exception was the Maranao whose tendency to fragment into smaller
units of political organization indicated a different response to Islamisation
and the introduction of the sultanate system. This could mean a stronger and
a more exclusive form of ethnicity or the absence of a motivation for
consolidating forces and identities. It may be recalled that the Tausug were
not at all averse to the idea of submitting themselves to a higher authority and
external hegemony i.e. the Chinese emperor in return for protection and other
material considerations. On the other hand, the Magindanao and the Buayan
of Pulangi, although engaged in intense competition for internal hegemony
willingly set aside their differences to consolidate their forces together with
other participants in the Moro Wars against the Spaniards.

The most exemplary of these ethnic reactions to the Spanish hegemony was
that of the non-Muslim, non-Christian natives such as the Manobo, Higaunon,
Ata, and the rest of the indigenous cultural groups who resisted both Islam
and Christianity to the extent that to this day they have remained as before,
unaffected as they were by the inroads of external hegemony and cultural
influences. Their tenacious adherence to their beliefs and indigenous way of
life must have been so powerful so as to preclude all other considerations of
being a part of another way of life regardless of whether that new way of life
was beneficial to them or better than their own. The Mandaya of Caraga put it
very succinctly by explaining to a Spanish missionary that their culture is their
very life and to take it away from them by converting them to Christianity
would mean the death of their tribe. The effectiveness of their resistance to
external hegemony was predicated on only two means: avoidance or death.

Notwithstanding, there were those ethnic groups who conceded the loss of
some members to Islamisation or Christianization. Among the Subanen those
who converted to Islam were given a new name and identity which was
Kalibuganen while the Christianized Mandaya was renamed Calagan. The
most poignant expression of those who underwent a change of identity
through Islamisation was a legend about the division of the Teduray (Tiruray)
upon encounter with Islam. The story was told of how two Teduray brothers,
Tabunaway and Mamalu decided to go separate ways when confronted with
Islamisation. Tabunaway converted to Islam while Mamalu refused and chose
to remain Teduray. Mamalu took his family and followers with him to the
mountains where they remained to this day while Tabunaway and his own
were left in the lowlands. From then on, Mamalu was regarded as the
ancestor of all Teduray while Tabunaway was believed to be the ancestor of
all Islamised inhabitants in the area. The legend graphically illustrates the
non-violent way by which Islamisation had proceeded among a pre-Islamic
people in Mindanao and poignant in that it asserted the ancient brotherhood
of Muslims and non-Muslims before and after the introduction of an external
institution, Islam. What was overlooked was the fact that those who converted
to Islam lost their former identity as Teduray and became a different people.
The legend was a story of division and separation through the introduction of
an external hegemonic factor.

At times, the ethnic factor worked to the advantage of the indigenous peoples
as in the case of exemption from tribute. At the beginning of the intensive
evangelization of the infieles of Mindanao in the 19th century, the Spanish
missionaries strongly argued that a formidable obstacle to the conversion of
the natives was the payment of tribute along with the multitude of other taxes
imposed by the Spanish colonial administration to raise revenues. Hence,
unlike other places elsewhere in the country, the infieles of Mindanao were
exempted from paying tribute through the intercession of the missionaries.

The Jesuit mission in Tamontaka in the Moro heartland of Cotabato was a


veritable citadel for captive slaves ransomed from their Moro owners. The
Jesuit missionaries ransomed slaves most of whom were infieles and provided
them with food, clothing, and shelter as part of their freedom from slavery and
want. Going beyond these, the missionaries educated them in the modern
ways of hygiene, sanitation, and the use of modern medicines. The success of
this enterprise was attested to by the fact that the former Moro owners began
to bring themselves and their children to Tamontaka to be ministered to by
the missionaries.

In the Davao Gulf area the Moros did not take kindly to the interference of the
Jesuit missionaries in the selection of a new datu. The selection of a new datu
was by tradition the prerogative of other Moro datus in the Gulf area and
although the missionaries had already caused the election of Severo, a
Christian convert the Moro datus stood their ground. After converging in
Davao they proceeded to elect the datu of their choice. Hence, Davao at this
point, had two datus; one elected by the missionaries and the other, elected by
the Moro datus of Davao. (see Gloria, 1987)

The American colonial government was the first administration to establish a


form of government based on ethnic conditions in Mindanao and Sulu; the
Moro Province and Bureau of non-Christian Tribes. After more than three
hundred years the people of Mindanao were not about to surrender peacefully
to another colonizer. Predictably, the Muslims launched a continuation of the
Moro Wars this time, against the Americans. The Philippine-American War of
1899 saw the participation of the forces of the Malolos Republic under
President Emilio Aguinaldo, the Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu and the native
Higaunons of Bukidnon among others. The common aim was to expel the new
hegemony of the Americans.

However, unlike the first phase of the Moro Wars, its continuation against the
Americans did not last very long. The Philippine-American War was brief but
decisive. The local forces beginning with the revolutionary army of President
Aguinaldo inevitably succumbed to superior manpower and arms of the
Americans. After the capture and surrender of Aguinaldo in Luzon the
resistance crumbled fast even as those in Mindanao continued to fight to the
bitter end. The Americans worked swiftly but methodically to secure the new
colonial possession; civil government was established as soon as armed
conflict was effectively subdued. Province after province was reorganized into
a new civilian administration and officials recruited from the local populace.
The American policy was to homogenize the various ethnicities in the
archipelago under a program known as Filipinization; little realizing that by
this time the cultural cleavages had deepened and widened more than ever.

The Ethnic Problem in Mindanao: Concluding Remarks

Through the long centuries of colonial rule and their rulers ethnicity, not state
sovereignty became the only refuge of every ethnic group in the country. In
Mindanao and Sulu the emergence of the Philippine state in 1946 hardly
stirred any excitement or applause from among the Muslims and the non-
Muslim natives. For them, the Philippine Republic was just another successor
to the string of unwanted leaderships that has been foisted on them without
their consent. The Muslims in particular, reacted with great scorn to the idea
of a government led by Christians, who to them were no better than the
Spaniards. At the outset, they asserted their opposition to the Independence
Movement undertaken by the Commonwealth Government under President
Manuel Quezon to the extent of petitioning the American government for a
grant of a separate independence for the Muslims of Mindanao.

On the other hand, the non-Muslim natives who were less advanced than the
Muslims in matters of sociopolitical organization remained passive and
unable to participate in the dynamics of the new polity (for obvious reasons)
retreated deeper into their shell of ethnicity. Group identity became their
only shield against national or state policies of Filipinization, integration, and
assimiliation. They have known all along that any assimilationist move from
the national government would result in the perpetuation of their inferior
social status. To lose their ethnicity is to disappear into that great void of
nameless and faceless mass of poverty-stricken peoples in the Philippine
society.

The cultures and traditions of the indigenous peoples of Mindanao have


served as a bastion of group and self-identity. In this identity they were able
to demand a recognition of their cultural differences that justified a separate
treatment from society. In this way, ethnicity has become a leverage for
levelling the inequalities that exist among the different sectors of population.
Whereas independence and the emergence of the Philippine state solely
benefitted the Christian majority of the post-colonial Filipinos ethnicity has
won significant political concessions such as autonomy for the Muslims and
rights of ancestral domain for the IPs. The tension which arose between group
identity and the new sovereignty was a natural outcome of the unequal social
status between the Christian majority and the indigenous Muslim as well as
non-Muslim minorities. For the Muslim groups political autonomy is the
assertion of the supremacy and preeminence of their group identity as against
Filipino identity. They do not consider themselves Filipinos.

It is not clear where the non-Muslim IPs (indigenous peoples) stand in regard
to the issue of sovereignty and group identity. Ancestral Domain rights have
given them social and economic rights over their ancestral lands on which
they have built their settlements from ancient times. However, unlike
autonomy ancestral domain does not provide political rights; the non-Muslim
IPs are subject to the national governance and obey the same laws as do the
rest of the Filipinos.

These rights do have something in common; the element of exclusivity. They


are rights inclusive only to the group and not to outsiders. As such, they are
bound to give rise to further conflicts. So, the saga of ethnicity lives on.
Eventually, group identity has to give way to larger and larger identities, as in
citizenship. Right now, the need of the hour is how to respond to the various
needs of the different groups to achieve a modicum of political stability.
Strengthening and building state sovereignty will depend on stabilizing the
dynamics of multiculturalism and ethnicity.

References Cited

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__________________and Samuel Tan. (2002). Mindanao and Sulu: history, peoples


and institutions. Davao City. Southern Philippines Development Authority.

Gowing, Gordon. (1977). Mandate in Moroland. Quezon City. Philippine


Center for Advanced Studies.

Gowing, Peter G. and Robert D. McAmis. (1974). The Muslim Filipinos.


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