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An economic
An economic classification classification
of “health need” of “health need”
Ruth F.G. Williams
Regional School of Business, Latrobe University, Bendigo, Australia and 291
Australian Institute for Suicide Research and Prevention, Griffith University,
Mount Grawatt, Australia, and
D.P. Doessel
Australian Institute for Suicide Research and Prevention,
Griffith University, Mount Grawatt, Australia
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Abstract
Purpose – Multiple connotations and conceptions of health need are currently in use. The purpose of
this paper is to specify some important distinctions regarding this confusing multiplicity in a taxonomic
fashion relevant to the economic problems that arise in addressing health need. Classification is possible
with the relevant concepts in conventional economic theory. The classification applies wherever
economic considerations bear upon health need.
Design/methodology/approach – Initially, some seminal economic ideas about need are presented
from Marshall, Pauly, Banfield, Jevons, Deaton and Meullbauer, and Georgescu-Roegen. Recent
discussions of basic needs by Sen and Nussbaum concerning “capabilities” and human flourishing are
also considered. Ruger’s subsequent developments of these concepts specifically for health are noted.
The paper then specifies and classifies the current economic connotations of “health need” by applying
positive economic analysis and the framework of economic theory. In particular, the conventional
theories of consumer demand and production supply are useful. Geometric tools of analysis along with
illustrations from the health sector specify various distinctions and classifications.
Findings – The uses of the generic term “need” relate to quite different economic problems. The
findings show how diverse interpretations of need can be specified.
Originality/value – Distinctions over health need are important since, in many Western countries,
need is one of the “pillars” of the Welfare State. Effective policy requires sound conceptions and
measurements of need. Given the relevance of economics for approaching competing resource uses in
the face of health need, measurement of need is improved with taxonomy, and confusion reduced.
Keywords Resource management, Classification, Personal health, Health services, Social economics
Paper type Conceptual paper
1. Introduction
Multiple, confusing conceptions about health need are currently in use. “Need” is a word
heard in other applications too, such as education, and services for vulnerable people
(the aged, the unemployed, homeless, veterans, people with either congenital or acquired
disabilities, low-income households, and so forth). Conceptions of need also arise as a
“pillar” of policies based on selective versus universal welfare, or targeted welfare, or the
construction of means tests to determine people’s “need” for welfare. For a general International Journal of Social
discussion of this welfare literature, see Mitchell et al. (1994), and the literatures Economics
Vol. 38 No. 3, 2011
cited therein. Generally speaking, Welfare State subsidies are based on the principle pp. 291-309
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0306-8293
The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments provided by the reviewer. DOI 10.1108/03068291111105219
IJSE of “equal access for equal need”. This principle adds to the multiplicity of concepts of
38,3 need in existence.
Given the number and variety of health services and programs, which involve
public provision at zero prices or private provision at fully or partly subsidised prices,
economic forces clearly bear upon “need”. Often, need is defined in a context of equity,
equality and so forth (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993; Wagstaff et al., 1991, and the
292 subsequent literature; Wagstaff, 2002). However, the economic aspects of health need
seldom are conceived of in terms of need per se.
The equity or justice context is not surprising when vulnerable people face problems
relating to human existence, such as who lives, how well, and for how long. Despite the
programs, the government subsidies and social insurance structures, all of which exist
to make society fairer, the “necessities” of life for some are not well satisfied.
Economists generally are not concerned with defining need, despite economic forces
clearly bearing upon need. The focus of economics has tended to be upon understanding
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those forces rather than upon the need itself. For a single term, need, to be used in various
contexts invites confusion: our (ultimate) objective is to shed light on this confusing state
of knowledge about need.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In the next section, the existing economic
definitions of need are reviewed. In Section 3, a conception of “health need” which uses
the conventional economic theory of consumer demand is defined. Some applications,
variations and complexities are also discussed. By exploring the duality between
demand and production, another definition of need is provided in Section 4. This
interpretation, which specifies the relationship between need and the output of health
care, namely, health status (HS), uses conventional production theory. Illustrations from
the health sector are again supplied. A discussion of the implications of the paper and
a conclusion are provided in Section 5.
A third notion of need in the literature is a view that there is a structure to wants. In the
1840s, Thomas Banfield referred to a “graduated scale of wants” (Black, 1987, p. 182).
Banfield was one of the main sources of inspiration of Jevons’ (1862) Theory of Political
Economy, which argued that “the satisfaction of a lower want [. . .] merely permits the
higher want to manifest itself” (Jevons, cited in Georgescu-Roegen, 1954, p. 193). These
notions which Banfield and Jevons (and others) suggested are not anachronisms. Related
notions can be found more recently in, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980, p. 122)
conceptions based on asserting a “natural ordering of preferences in groups”. The key
point is that if there is a broad structure in wants, then “lower” wants can be distinguished
from “higher” wants.
A fourth, and related, point argues that personal preferences over commodities are
subject to a spectrum of intensity, from strong to weak, and that commodities for which
preferences are intense are needs. Weaker preferences are associated with commodities
that satisfy higher order wants. Despite some intuitive appeal to that distinction, it does
not of itself distinguish preference intensity from emotion-charged persuasion. For an
alternative conception, see Georgescu-Roegen’s (1954, 1968) argument that some
commodities are maximally substitutable, and these are luxuries. Other commodities are
minimally substitutable. These are needs, e.g. “Bread cannot save someone from dying of
thirst [. . .] living in a luxurious palace does not constitute a substitute for food, etc. [. . .] ”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1954, pp. 196-7).
The illustrations from the health sector about a person’s HS in part indicate that a
person’s strength of preference for a health service indicates where a medical service
sits in the hierarchy of wants. Thus, a definition of need is implied by HS, as this is an
objective measure of strength of preference. Donabedian (1973), a medical practitioner,
operating at an intuitive level, also came to recognise HS as a measure of need.
as the activity and duty of the polis, and Enlightenment philosophers like David Hume
and Adam Smith had continued to emphasise this in their writings. However, these
concepts were increasingly overlooked in post-Enlightenment Western philosophy and
economics.
Ruger (2010) provides an application of these various arguments to health need. Her
Health and Social Justice is a detailed development of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s
conceptions of capabilities and human flourishing, specifically for health. Ruger
explains the need for a paradigm shift towards “health capabilities”, and argues that
there is a place for a set of “higher-order values” with respect to health. She argues that
health has intrinsic value and that there is a point at which health ought to be protected
from all trade-offs. Moreover, since policies and decisions made by all countries
profoundly affect the distribution of health, a coherent set of ethical, reasoned
principles about health need is urgently required. (She emphasises the informational
bases for forming policy that develops human flourishing and the principles that will
remove the gaps in preventable mortality and morbidity.) These include arguments
about the intrinsic nature of the value of health to wellbeing, the concept of a shortfall
of the HS of one group relative to a reference group and the basis for applying
disproportionate amounts of effort to reduce health deprivation in disadvantaged
groups.
In summary, there is not just one, but various, economic ideas about need in the
economic literature, and several different views and perspectives can be adopted
towards health need. However, it does not follow that need is a “matter of opinion”. The
approach of positive economics is relevant to the scientific task of economically
specifying and classifying need. The remainder of this paper embarks on that exercise,
in which a didactic style is adopted. The purpose is to demonstrate that, by applying
conventional economic theory, an economic specification and classification of different
types of needs is possible. It is appropriate therefore to regard the remainder of this
article as an exercise in economic taxonomy of health need.
(Lewis, 1992, p. 34). Consider the demand curve in Figure 1.What happens at the point
OQ1? In such a case, the marginal utility of antibiotic medication goes to zero. Note that
there are, in fact, many cases of medical services where marginal utility reaches zero,
e.g. tonsillectomy, appendectomy, and so forth (in all such cases a binary choice is
involved[2] ).
Thus, it can be seen that the specification of a specific “need” at OQ1, is one
magnitude, and the points on the demand curve, as depicted by the price-quantity
combinations in Figure 1, are “different” magnitudes from OQ1. Drawing attention to
this distinction particularly matters where “the need” is one of the “necessaries” of life or
basic human existence (and is increasingly receiving attention in terms of the concepts
with which Sen, Nussbaum, Ruger and others are clarifying): this taxonomic distinction
has particular importance in those contexts[3].
Price of antibiotic medication
P2
D
O
Q2 Q1
Quantity of antibiotic medication Figure 1.
Consumption need
Note: Need compared with demand for antibiotic medication
IJSE 3.2 The consumption dimension of need: the magnitude
38,3 It is possible now to specify a magnitude with respect to “consumption need”. Note that
the terminology being used such as “consumption need” (and later “production need”)
has a pragmatic intention for the didactic purpose here. The purpose relates to
classifying various connotations and conceptions of need that are in use.
In regards to the present illustration, the magnitude under discussion OQ1 refers to
296 the quantity of antibiotic medication that would be wanted in the absence of constraint
by economic variables, such as price or income[4]. The marginal utility is zero since the
treatment cures the condition; there is no further need for treatment. The income
elasticity of demand also equals zero at zero price.
Note that neither price nor income constrains the medical indication of antibiotic
medication at the point of need. Were the price of antibiotic medication to be zero,
consumers would not trade-off the medication in terms of any other commodity. That
is, OQ1 is the point of unconstrained consumption.
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Thus, when the need under study originates from a “shortfall” in a demand factor
(as opposed to supply factors), then “need” in the economic framework of consumer
theory can be specified as the gap between the point of consumption (with a given, or
suspected, medical condition) that is not constrained by any economic variable and
another point of consumption, such as the status quo, which is constrained by economic
variables. In Figure 1, this is Q1Q2.
Such “need” can also be depicted in Becker-type commodity space (Becker, 1965;
Grossman, 1972a, b). One argument represents antibiotic medication, and the other
argument is a composite, all other commodities[5]. In commodity space, the
indifference curve will cut the axis at the point where the marginal rate of substitution
will be zero for a “needed” medical service.
297
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DA DB
O
Q2 Figure 2.
Quantity of antibiotic medication Consumption “need” and
poverty
Note: Antibiotic medication when incomes differ
The unbreakable habit is one such variation. Heroin addiction gives rise to a need
for heroin, but the perfectly inelastic demand associated with heroin addiction does not
equate with the health need. The health need is the breaking of the habit or addiction,
with an approach that generates a need for a substitute, e.g. methadone, as well as
addressing other life habits (for a review of the historical and clinical issues in this need
and the treatment of heroin addiction by methadone (Joseph et al., 2000).
Sometimes specific circumstances surrounding a need can lead to economically
unusual consumption patterns. In satisfying some needs, the conventional negative
relationship between price and quantity demanded of the “normal good” collapses if, as
the price of a good rises, and no cheaper substitutes are available, the quantity consumed
does not fall in the process of satisfying that need. The so-called Giffen good or “the
Giffen paradox” was noted a long while ago in economics by Sir Robert Giffen
(1837-1910). The evidence for Giffen goods is relatively limited and it is notoriously
difficult to demonstrate the Giffen paradox anywhere other than a laboratory setting.
In a relatively recent laboratory demonstration, results are reported about smoker
behaviour towards choice of cigarette brand amongst nicotine-dependent smokers
(DeGrandpre et al., 1993). They found a direct relationship, rather than inverse, between
price and quantity consumed of a substitute brand when the smoker’s liked brand was
not available. However, results in economics from laboratory experiments like these
have limited application as they are too far removed from reality for confidence to be
placed in the observed behaviour. For a detailed study of Giffen behaviour, see Jensen
and Miller (2008) who have undertaken a conventional demand study in China and find
Giffen behaviour for two products rice and wheat/noodles. These results imply Giffen
behaviour may arise in subsistence consumption and suggest some cases of health need
may lead to Giffen behaviour in subsistence circumstances: further studies of health
need and consumption activity in the genre of Jensen and Miller are warranted.
Attention will turn now from these various specifications and examples of need
which are consumption-related to some specifications that are production- or
supply-related, i.e. “production need”.
HSmax G
∆HS1
HS1 F
∆HS2 E
HSXmax
Health status
∆HS3 A
HS2 D
∆HS4
HS3
C
B
A
A*
Figure 3.
O
T2 T1 Smax SXmax Production “needs”
in the health sector
Number of medical services
IJSE 4.2 Specifying production “need”
38,3 Can a meaning of “need” be specified in the context of production? Clearly, it can be. The
difference in health status HS2HS3 may be thought of as a “need” because, when provided
for, this would result in the HS of this community returning to HS2, i.e. depicted by DHS4
in Figure 3. In this context, the meaning of need is unambiguous. When a gap is due to a
supply “shortfall” (i.e. of an input), the relevant approach is to use the conventional
300 production function, which is another economic relationship that is unconstrained by
any economic variable. The appropriate definition, then, of a production “need” is the
gap between the specified output level, i.e. HS, which is explained empirically by
variations in input levels of a relevant production function, and the current level of
output as determined by existing input levels.
Technically, it is possible to estimate that magnitude. This empirical task has not been
undertaken for the health production function, but it has been undertaken for other
sectors (Frantz, 1987).
DHS1 þ DHS2 The X-inefficiency loss in HS, which often is then associated with a
need being experienced
DHS2 The production loss in HS associated with a combination of an input
shortfall of Sxmax T1 on an X-inefficient production function, which then
is often associated with the experience of a need
DHS1 þ DHS2 þ DHS3 Another production loss in HS associated with a combination of an
input shortfall on an X-inefficient production function, which then is
often associated with the experience of a need Table I.
DHS2 þ DHS3 þ DHS4 A production loss in HS similar to (DHS1 þ DHS2 þ DHS3), and Some concepts of human
differing only in the quantity of the input shortfall. That impact is the need classified in a
experience of a need production framework
IJSE
38,3
302
Health status
HS′max
A′
HSmax
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A A
O
M′max Mmax
Figure 4. Number of medical services
Production
Note: “Need” for technological change and cure
Consider the cases of two groups, Group S, which is diagnosed with schizophrenia and
Group N, which has a neurotic disorder due, say, to a mid-life crisis. The two mental
health production functions depicted are SS for the group with schizophrenia, and NN for
the group having a mid-life crisis in Figure 5. Given the location of NN and SS, it is clear
that schizophrenia has a larger impact on mental HS than does a neurotic disorder.
The number of psychiatric services is indicated on the X-axis and mental HS
MHSmax N
S
Mental health status
∆MHSN
N
∆MHSS
Figure 5. O
Connotations of “need” for PS
mental health services and Number of psychiatric services
severity of illness notions
Note: The mental health production function
(as measured by, say, the Global Assessment of Functioning diagnostic instrument An economic
scale) is depicted on the Y-axis, all other factors held constant. MHSmax depicts each classification
group’s mental HS prior to the onset of illness. According to Figure 5, both groups have
the same potential mental HS, as indicated by MHSmax. However, the mental HS of each of “health need”
group is “under-par” at this time, assuming that each group consumes zero psychiatric
services. Thus, we now address the issue that is commonly called “severity of
illness”[11]. 303
How is “need” in the case of severity of illness to be defined? One approach to the
conception of “need” in the context of severity of illness is to observe the magnitude
MHSmaxS in Figure 5. This is the change in mental HS needed by Group S to attain its
former level of health (assuming, for now, that this is possible). However, the change in
mental HS that Group N needs, in order to reach MHSmax, is MHSmaxN. Let us proceed
by considering the effect of OPS psychiatric services on the two illnesses. It is also
relevant to note that, other things being equal, the change in mental HS achieved for
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Group S at the given production function for a given level of psychiatric services OPS
is far greater than it is for Group N, with the same level of psychiatric services. The
relevant magnitudes are DMHSN and DMHSS[12]. It can be said that both groups have
a “need” in so far as each group has an illness; but in terms of interpersonal
comparisons, Group S’s need is greater than Group N’s, ceteris paribus. It could be said
that conceiving of need through the lens of severity of illness transforms need from an
absolute sense into a relative sense that is more finely classifiable.
Regional variation in production need. It is also possible to form an economic
definition of need to have a spatial dimension, e.g. need for health care for an area or
locality, such as a metropolitan suburb, a rural or remote area, or a state/territory. This
case is concerned with comparing levels of production need between two regions,
where the need for health services vary on a regional basis, a phenomenon that often
seems difficult to define and measure.
It is possible to classify a pattern of need using health production functions that
incorporates regional variations in inputs. The following discussion gives an approach
to the type of empirical work required to inform debate concerned with policies about
spatial variations in need. That debate is often referred to as achieving “equal spatial
access to health services” (note that the following discussion about spatial variation in
production need can be readily re-cast in terms of socio-economic variation too).
Figure 6 shows a health production function where the input on the X-axis is the
quantity of general practitioner (GP) services, and HS is on the Y-axis[13]. Health
production functions AA and BB for two regions, A and B, respectively, are indicated.
Note that the maximum HS attainable from AA is higher than that for BB. Region
A cannot attain HSmax at the current input of GP services OGPA. Also, Region B is not
attaining HSmax at the current level of GP services in Region B, OGPB. Figure 6 shows the
changes in HS required in order to attain HSmax. In this illustration, DHSB exceeds DHSA.
All of the above specifications serve to indicate some main classifications. More
work needs to be done in order to refine other variations and complexities relating to
production need which have not been addressed in the above.
∆HSB
Health status
304
A
A
HSB B
B
Figure 6.
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that the task is not about considering how to approach the question of whether, or not,
any defined need ought to be met. Despite the very important seminal developments in
the area of capabilities and human flourishing, which are overviewed above, those
developments are still in progress. The conceptions discussed in this paper serve to
clarify some of the tools relevant to objective economic analysis and measurement
of need.
The magnitudes discussed herein exist in the absence of opportunity costs and other
constraining economic forces. This deliberate abstraction does not reflect any intention
of suggesting that opportunity costs and other constraining economic factors are of no
relevance when need is under study. Rather, the purpose is to bring the analysis of need,
and ultimately the magnitudes required for policy debate, under the light of the scrutiny
provided by positive economics. Such scrutiny is warranted: the current policy climate
is one where some “needs” are “met” more than others. This happens for no other
reason than assertion often is a louder voice than reason in policy contexts. However,
few phenomena escape opportunity costs, including ongoing unmet (genuine) need.
An example of this is found in the rising trend in suicide (Doessel et al., 2009b; Williams
and Doessel, 2007).
It may be thought that it is conceptually confused to depict consumption need in
price-quantity space given that prices always imply opportunity costs; and yet we are
abstracting from them here. We demonstrate, though, that to conceptualise need in the
dimensions of a space where prices are depicted is not a conceptual contradiction. Doing
so here has served to demonstrate that need does not have to be an ambiguous notion
particularly in price-quantity space. For example, it is not helpful simply to dismiss need
or to consider its conception only in terms of the income elasticity of demand conception.
Need clearly has several complex dimensions.
It is noteworthy that both Rice (1992) and Olson (1993) have considered similar
arguments to those elaborated in this paper. Both of those authors in the early 1990s
were grappling with the inadequacies in the approaches at that time to the measurement
of the welfare loss of “excess” health insurance. Those authors arrived at notions similar An economic
to those above. It can take a long time for established views about concepts and their classification
relevance to be re-assessed.
Various cases of need have been characterised here. It should be noted that it is of “health need”
more straightforward to specify need in price-quantity space when a cure is involved
(which has been illustrated here) than it is when ongoing or complex treatment is
required. The information demands upon the latter are great. 305
The ultimate purpose of taxonomy is to clarify and classify types. Here, those types
are the approaches that will result in empirical work for informing policy debate. The
next task is then to examine various types of illness and conditions in order to show how
human need is influenced by each particular illness. Also, further work in the area of
capabilities, human flourishing and health need is required. Finally, the central message
given here is that empirical analyses of various conceptions of need can inform policy in
a lucid way. Conceptual clarity is the prerequisite by which the appropriate measures of
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Notes
1. A literature burgeoned from the 1970s onwards amongst health sector scholars over
“appropriate” and “inappropriate” care. The studies are largely found in a literature
concerned with small area variation (SAV). In a sense, Pauly’s paper is a response to SAV,
seeking to bring some clarity to that confusing literature (for an economic review of SAV,
see Doessel and Gargett (2001)).
2. Technically speaking, it is a single point on the vector of demand.
3. Note two contrasting connotations of medical need from a simple example of the case where a
person with diabetes needs two insulin injections daily. This need is sometimes defined, or
measured, in terms of an objective level or quantity: two injections being needed (i.e. not one or
three, or zero, injections). However, another definition/measure of need is in terms of a gap.
If this person with diabetes has no injections, then his/her need is for two injections but if the
person is having only one injection daily, in such a case, there is need is for one (more) injection
daily. Note that in Figure 1, “need” is defined in terms of a gap measured from a starting level
of current consumption greater than zero. There is thus a definition of “need” that is dependent
upon whether the current starting point is zero or a current level of non-zero consumption.
This is not a pedantic point. “Unmet need” is a term, indeed a measure, which is used loosely
in the health sector by some who muddle those two economically distinct meanings
and magnitudes. The economic distinctions in meaning just illustrated are not trivial
when political arguments exist over whose unmet needs are subsidised (Andrews and
Henderson, 2000).
4. Let us also abstract from time. Trade-offs often arise in the timing of undertaking medical
intervention, e.g. resourcing prompt intervention, against the discomfort of living with
reduced, or deteriorating, HS prior to treatment. Such trade-offs are particularly relevant
with chronic illnesses. People facing hip replacement surgery (for example) often live with
deteriorating HS long before the medical intervention (surgery) is performed. This type of
trade-off can occur also with acute conditions. But for the present conception about need, it is
possible to abstract from time and such complications will not be addressed here. For further
discussion of this important point, see Phelps (1997, pp. 110-13).
5. This case will not be depicted geometrically here.
6. Note that, technically speaking, demand here is Hicksian compensated demand (Hicks, 1946),
in which the responsiveness of quantity demanded involves no income effect.
IJSE For normal goods, the compensated demand curve is steeper in slope than the Marshallian
demand curve, i.e. it will have a different intercept on the X-axis.
38,3
7. The health need/s of a person can be conceptualised in terms of other examples too, say,
nutrition. However, nutrition is a more subjective need, relatively speaking. While the above
explanations apply equally as well to subjective needs as they do to relatively objective
needs, such as surgery (Pauly, 1979), the arguments are more complex. It is not necessary to
306 pursue other more complex cases here.
8. Note that we are abstracting here also from various other factors. One such subjective factor
is endogenous preferences (Bowles, 1998). Another possible factor, from which this analysis
abstracts for the present, is denial by persons of their own need. There can be denial on
another kind too, by society of a person’s need, such as when stigmas about some illnesses
are present. All such factors, being assumed away, are left for a separate analysis where
such assumptions can be relaxed.
9. Note that both AA and AB have an identical intercept of point A on the Y-axis in Figure 3.
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If X-inefficiency existed in some other determinant of health, e.g. if hospital services were
inefficient, then there would be a different (lower) intercept, such as A *.
10. A discussion of the mental health production function is found in Williams and Doessel (2001).
11. For a study from the 1980s about whether or not psychiatric services in Sydney were being
provided in the places where the need is greatest, see Opit and Gadiel (1982).
12. It is relevant to note that the empirical estimation of a mental health production function is
even more difficult than health production functions for general medical services. There are
few studies, of which the authors are aware, that have undertaken that work, e.g. Healey et al.
(2000) and Lu (1999). Williams and Doessel (2001, pp. 67-9) provide an overview.
13. The reader may also conceive of this application in terms of the services of psychiatrists on
the X-axis, rather than GPs, with mental HS depicted on the Y-axis.
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Further reading
Sen, A. (1992), Inequality Re-examined, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
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1. Darrel P. Doessel, Ruth F.G. Williams. 2011. Resource Misallocation in Australia’s Mental Health Sector
under Medicare: Evidence from Time-series Data*. Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and
policy 30:2, 253-264. [CrossRef]
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