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A review of flaws and damage in space launch vehicles: Motors and engines

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DOI: 10.1177/1045389X13493360

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Special Issue Article

Journal of Intelligent Material Systems

and Structures
2014, Vol. 25(5) 524–540
A review of flaws and damage in space Ó The Author(s) 2013
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launch vehicles: Motors and engines sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1045389X13493360
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Dipesh Dhital1, Jung R Lee1, Charles Farrar2 and

David Mascarenas2

Abstract
Rocket engines are complex systems which usually operate under extreme physical conditions such as very high tem-
perature and pressure, strong erosion, and high-density energy release. Mechanical and chemical complexity, long service
lives, aging materials, and designs with small margins of safety are typical for space launch vehicle components including
the engine. Furthermore, these components can be exposed to various flaws and damage during the manufacturing,
assembly, or ground handling phase. In regard to the engine, its performance characteristics can be significantly affected
by the degradation resulting from such flaws and damages, which, in turn, might lead to failure of the entire space mis-
sion. Any manufacturing/operational damage needs to be detected at the earliest stage possible, so that the required pre-
ventive measures can be implemented, and component readiness and reliability must be checked either during
manufacturing or during field inspections. This review study lists such possible flaws/damages on rocket engine compo-
nents. This information could be beneficial for determining and developing the efficient techniques for reliable nondes-
tructive evaluation and structural health monitoring.

Keywords
Space launch vehicle, solid rocket motor, liquid rocket engine, flaws and damages, nondestructive evaluation, structural
health monitoring

Introduction fact, the maintenance of the Space Shuttle is so costly

A space launch vehicle or carrier rocket carries payload
or human crew into outer space. They have been used
to send manned spacecraft, unmanned space probes,
and satellites into space. The Soyuz and Proton launch-
ers of Russia, the Ariane series of Europe, the Space
Shuttle, Atlas, Delta, and Titan families of vehicles of
the United States are few of the examples (Gregersen,
2009). They are generally categorized as expendable
launch vehicle (ELV) or reusable launch vehicle (RLV).
Most space probes, which are designed for single use,
get launched on expendable ‘‘throwaway’’ rockets. The
only partially reusable systems have been the US Space
Shuttle and the Soviet Buran vehicle (which was flown
only once) (Gregersen, 2009; Pelt, 2006). The Space
Shuttle consists of the orbiter, a large external tank,
and two enormous solid rocket boosters. It returns
astronauts and materials to the earth and is partially
reusable, although an enormous effort is needed to
refurbish the vehicle after each flight. The reason that
expendable rockets are still used more than reusable
systems like the Space Shuttle is that they are much less
expensive to develop and much easier to operate. In
that, for the relatively few times per year that a satellite
needs to be launched, it is cheaper to build and use an
expendable, one-shot rocket (Pelt, 2006). Attempts to
develop a fully RLV in order to reduce the cost of
access to space have so far not been successful, primar-
ily because the propulsion system and materials needed
for successful development of such a vehicle have not
been available (Gregersen, 2009).
An ELV in general is composed of one or more
rocket engines, whose fuel is carried in fuel tanks; gui-
dance, navigation, and control systems; a payload; and
a structure housing all of these elements, to which extra
engines may be attached for added lift (Gregersen,
1
Department of Aerospace Engineering and LANL-CBNU Engineering
Institute Korea, Chonbuk National University, Jeonju, Republic of Korea
2
Engineering Institute, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
NM, USA
Corresponding author:
Jung R Lee, Department of Aerospace Engineering and LANL-CBNU
Engineering Institute Korea, Chonbuk National University, 567 Baekje-
daero, Deokjin-gu, Jeonju 561-756, Republic of Korea.
Email: leejrr@jbnu.ac.kr
Dhital et al. 525

2009). Figure 1 shows a Delta II launch vehicle, which In theory, launch vehicles can be thermal-propelled
has a liquid-fuel engine as the main propulsion system (chemical, nuclear, solar, laser), electric-propelled, or
and solid rocket motors (SRMs) as strap-on boosters nuclear-propelled (radioisotype, explosion) systems.
(Pelt, 2006). The basic approach taken to launch a However, the primary propulsion system for launch
vehicle divides the vehicle into stages. Most ELVs in vehicles is currently restricted to solid- or liquid-
use today have only two or three stages, but in the past, propelled chemical rockets (Fortescue et al., 2003).
an ELV would need as many as five stages, each lighter Solid systems are usually called motors, and liquid sys-
than its predecessor, to reach orbital velocity. The first tems are referred to as engines (Gregersen, 2009). The
stage is the heaviest part of the vehicle and has the larg- burning of chemical propellants, solid or liquid, at high
est rocket engines, the largest fuel, and oxidizer tanks, pressure liberates large quantities of energy in a com-
all providing the highest thrust; the objective of this pact volume. The subsequent expansion of these high
stage is to impart the initial thrust needed to overcome temperature products of combustion, through a nozzle,
earth’s gravity and thus to lift the total weight of the converts thermal energy to directed kinetic energy for
vehicle and its payload off the earth. When the first- rocket propulsion (Fortescue et al., 2003). Most of the
stage propellants are used up, this stage is detached weight of a launch vehicle is actually the total weight of
from the remaining parts of the launch vehicle and falls its propellants: the fuel and the oxidizer needed to burn
back to the earth. With the weight of the first stage the fuel often make up 80% or more of the total weight
gone, the second stage, with its own rocket engines and of a launch vehicle–payload combination prior to
propellants, continues to accelerate the vehicle. A par- launch (Gregersen, 2009).
ticular launch vehicle can be configured in several dif-
ferent ways, depending on its mission and the weight of Space launch failures and causes
the spacecraft to be launched; various numbers of
strap-on boosters, usually SRMs, can be added to the A space launch failure is an unsuccessful attempt to
vehicle’s first stage or a different number of upper place a payload into the intended orbit. This definition
stages can be used (Gregersen, 2009). includes all catastrophic launch mishaps including
launch vehicle destruction or explosion, significant
reduction in payload service life, and extensive effort or
Payload substantial cost for mission recovery (Chang, 2005).
Spacecraft Payload
Fairing
(Payload) Fairing Launch vehicles are designed to be as light as possible
Clamp to maximize their payload lifting capability. As a result,
Bands Attach Fitting
during a launch every part in a launch vehicle operates
Stage Three
close to its breaking point as the vehicle undergoes the
stresses associated with accelerating past the speed of
Spin Table sound and transiting the atmosphere. Its rocket engines
operate under extremes of pressure, temperature, shock,
Fairing
and vibration (Gregersen, 2009). In addition, a small
Guidance
Electronics Access defect or damage could lead to an accident and the fail-
Support Truss Door ure of the entire operation.
Stage Two Helium Spheres
Nitrogen Sphere Space launch failure incidents
Second Stage
Liquid Engine One of the investigations showed that, among the 4378
Interstage
space launches conducted worldwide, 390 launches
failed (a failure rate of 8.9%) in terms of loss or signifi-
cant reduction in the service life of 455 satellites (some
launches included multiple payloads). A US Vanguard
Stage One vehicle exploded 2 s after liftoff on 6 December 1957
Fuel Tank Centerbody Section due to the low fuel tank and injector pressure, which
allowed the high-pressure chamber gas to enter the fuel
Solid Rocket system through the fuel injector head. A fire started in
Motors Stage One
Oxidizer Tank the fuel injector, destroying the injector and causing the
complete loss of the thruster immediately following lift-
First Stage off (Chang, 2005). The US Saturn V had a single failure
Liquid Engine in the Apollo 6 mission on 4 April 1968, when the
third-stage engine failed to restart because of fuel injec-
Figure 1. A Delta II launch vehicle with various structural tor burn-through. The Space Transportation System
components (Pelt, 2006). (STS) also suffered a single launch failure on 28
526
January 1986, when the Challenger, carrying a seven-
member crew, exploded 73 s into flight. When exposed
to low temperatures, the rubber O-rings in the motor
case joint lost their resiliency, and the combustion
flame leaked through the O-rings and case joint, lead-
ing to the explosion of the vehicle. The newly developed
US commercial launch systems, including Delta III,
Conestoga, Athena, and Pegasus, suffered launch fail-
ures during their early developmental flights in a repeat
of Vanguard, Juno, Thor, and Atlas failures in the late
1950s and early 1960s (Chang, 2005). One CIS/USSR
space launch failure involved an SL-12 Proton vehicle
carrying a Mars-96 spacecraft on 16 November 1996.
The second burn of the Proton’s fourth stage did not
take place, and the spacecraft did not reach the inter-
planetary trajectory. Another failure involved a new
Ariane-5 vehicle, on 4 June 1996. It veered off its flight
path and exploded at an altitude of 3700 m only 40 s
after liftoff. The failure was attributed to errors in the
design and testing of the flight software. The Chinese
space launch had a catastrophic failure during the
launch of a CZ-3B vehicle carrying a commercial satel-
lite, Intelsat 708, on 14 February 1996. The vehicle and
its payload hit the ground and exploded in an inhabited
area near the launch site 22 s after liftoff. The cause of
failure was traced to the CZ-3B’s guidance and control
subsystem. A gold-aluminum solder joint in the output
of one of the gyro servo loops failed, cutting electrical
current output from the power module and causing the
inertial reference platform of the vehicle’s guidance and
control system to slope. Japanese liquid-propellant
rockets (H-II) suffered two launch failures during 1998
and 1999. Japan’s other seven launch failures (including
four Lambda-4S failures during the period 1966–1969)
involved solid-propellant rockets (Chang, 2005). These
are few of the examples among many such space launch
failure incidents.
Causes/sources of failure
Available launch failure data reveal much about pat-
terns in the possible causes of failure. Some causes of
failure are due to human error, such as poor workman-
ship, judgment, or launch management decisions, and
some are the result of defective parts. Failure can occur
in any phase of launch vehicle development in cases
designs and component tests have been inadequate,
components and materials have been improperly
handled in manufacturing and repair processes, and
prelaunch checkouts have been insufficient. Many past
failures could have been prevented if rigorous
reliability-enhancement measures had been taken.
Launch vehicle failure is usually attributed to problems
associated with a subsystem, such as propulsion, avio-
nics, separation/staging, electrical, or structures. In
some cases, failure is ascribed to problems in another
area altogether (e.g., launchpad, ground power
Journal of Intelligent Material Systems and Structures 25(5)
umbilical, ground flight control, lightning strike), or to
unknown causes (usually when subsystem failure infor-
mation is not available) (Chang, 2005).
Among the causes of failure worldwide, propulsion
subsystem problems predominated. The propulsion
subsystem, the heaviest and largest subsystem of a
launch vehicle, consists of components that generate,
direct, or change a launch vehicle’s position or attitude.
Its many elements include the main propulsion compo-
nents of rocket motors, liquid engines, and thrusters;
combustion chamber; nozzle; propellant (both solid
and liquid); propellant storage; thrust vector actuator
and gimbal mechanism; fuel and propulsion control
components; feed lines; control valves; turbopumps;
igniters; and motor and engine insulators (Chang,
2005). Propulsion subsystem failures can be divided
into failures in SRMs and liquid rocket engines.
Taurus, Conestoga, Athena, Pegasus, and Scout are
few of the solid-propellant launch systems, while Titan
II, Titan IIIA, Titan IIIB, Atlas (except Atlas IIAS),
and Delta DM19, A, B, and C are a few of the liquid-
propellant launch systems. Hybrid launch systems, con-
sisting of liquid-propellant and solid-propellant rock-
ets, include the STS, Titan IV, Titan III, Atlas IIAS,
and all other Deltas. Engine failures due to insufficient
brazing in the combustion chamber, combustion
instability, hydrogen injector valve leakage, clogged
fuel lines, and so on are among the causes as found
from previous failure analyses (Chang, 2005).
Propulsion engines, propellant system, and attitude
control are clearly major contributors to launcher fail-
ure (Parkinson, 1999). SRM failures generally seem to
be related to faults in manufacturing, although in the
famous case of the Challenger, the failure was due to
operations outside the safe environmental limits.
Unlike the development of air-launched or shoulder-
launched missile motors, only a few firings have been
carried out in the development of large solid motor
boosters. As a result, a great deal of confidence is
placed on the ability of the theoretical predictions to
confirm motor behavior and on quality control to
ensure no faults in the motor when delivered
(Parkinson, 1999). For liquid-propellant rocket
engines, reliability appears to be related to the number
of ‘‘start–stop’’ cycles accumulated by the engine type.
Although engines are tested under a variety of environ-
mental conditions, for the testing of long duration fir-
ing capability in particular, the ultimate reliability that
is attained at the end of the development program
(assuming the development program has been compe-
tently carried out) appears to be a function of how
many firings have been carried out, not how long the
firings have been carried out. In-flight experience sug-
gests that many engine failures are associated with igni-
tion and the early stages of firing (Parkinson, 1999).
Hence such failure patterns should be clearly under-
stood to ensure reliability in future operations.
Dhital et al.
Figure 2. A typical solid-propellant rocket motor (Whitfield and Keller, 1970).
Flaws and damages in rocket engines
Various flaws or damage events might occur during the
rocket engine manufacturing/operational phase. This
review study lists possible damage types for rocket
engines and their components, which can be considered
hot spot locations. The identification of such high-risk
hot spot locations will be beneficial for developing and
determining techniques for reliable nondestructive eva-
luation (NDE) and structural health monitoring
(SHM).
SRM
While the terms ‘‘SRM’’ and ‘‘solid rocket booster’’ are
often used interchangeably, technically, they have spe-
cific meanings. ‘‘Solid rocket booster’’ applies to the
entire rocket assembly, which includes the recovery
parachutes, electronic instrumentation, separation
rockets, range safety destruct system, and thrust vector
control. The term ‘‘SRM’’ is composed of a segmented
motor case loaded with solid propellants, an ignition
system, a movable nozzle, and the necessary instrumen-
tation and integration hardware. A typical SRM is
shown in Figure 2. SRMs are very reliable and simpler
and have more thrust than liquid engines but are diffi-
cult to control and are less efficient in comparison.
Unlike liquid-propellant engines, solid-propellant
motors cannot be shut down. Once ignited, they will
burn until all the propellant is exhausted (Braeunig,
2008; Chang, 2005).
In an SRM, the propellant consists of one or more
pieces mounted directly in the motor ‘‘case,’’ which
serves both as a propellant tank and as a combustion
chamber. The propellant is usually arranged to protect
the motor case from heating. Most modern propellant
charges are formed by pouring a viscous mix into the
motor case with suitable mold fixtures. The propellant
solidifies (usually by polymerization) and the mold fix-
tures are removed, leaving the propellant bonded to the
527
motor case with a suitably shaped perforation down
the middle (Gregersen, 2009). Furthermore, the fuel
and oxidizing chemicals are suspended in a solid bin-
der, making them more compact. As a result, rocket
motors are typically used as strap-on boosters for first
stages in launch vehicles, in the Space Shuttle and the
Delta series, and for applications that require simple
compact designs.
SRMs are subject to chemical attacks, which may
occur entirely inside the motor or could involve the
external environment, for example, moist or saline
environments. The structure of the rocket motor itself
contains a number of bondlines, which are often the
location of structural flaws that may affect the integrity
of the system (Ruderman, 2009). Common modes of
failure in SRMs include fracture of the grain, failure of
case bonding, and air pockets in the grain. All of these
produce an instantaneous increase in burn surface area
and a corresponding increase in the amount and pres-
sure of the exhaust gas, which may rupture the casing
(Solid-fuel rocket, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid-
fuel_rocket; AGARD, 1997; Cocchiaro, 2001).
Propellant cracks could exist in an SRM igniter or
throughout the motor. If they occur in the propellant
near the propellant-liner interface, they will detach the
motor grain from the bonding surface (Ruderman,
2009). In grain, if the crack propagation speed is
greater than that of the flame, the crack will propagate,
and the burning surface will be exposed deeper into the
motor than it was expected. Early exposure can over-
whelm the insulation, heating the case and creating an
opportunity for failure (Ruderman, 2009). Left unde-
tected, such a flaw could lead to the mistiming of
motor ignition or, when it occurs in the motor propel-
lant, can cause premature failure of the SRM (Johnson
and Esquivel, 2006).
Thermal decomposition (pyrolysis) and outgassing
inside the inner motor case can cause the liner to
debond, as shown in Figure 3. Gas pressure from liner
528
Figure 3. Thermal decomposition (pyrolysis) and outgassing,
which debonds the case from the liner in solid rocket motor.
pyrolysis or propellant combustion may rupture the
motor case at a hot spot as well as the vent system.
Alternatively, the pressure in the gap may cause the
collapse of the inner bore, the structural failure (frac-
ture) of the propellant grain, or the unzipping of the
case-liner bond. Pressure vessel type rupture/explosion
of the motor case could be one outcome (Cocchiaro,
2001). SRMs are also susceptible to a flow-driven effect
called ‘‘bore choking.’’ This phenomenon occurs when
pressure gradients across the propellant surface, partic-
ularly near steps and leading edges, cause the propel-
lant surface to deflect inward, further restricting the
gas flow in the bore. This problem can have a cascad-
ing effect. If port velocities are high enough and the
propellant modulus low enough, unrestrained deforma-
tions that lead to motor failure from over pressuriza-
tion can develop (Millin and Furfaro, 2004). The
detection of these defects is essential as these may lead
to unacceptable pressure levels during the operation of
an SRM, which may lead to the failure of the mission
itself (Rao et al., 2000). Since SRMs also consist of a
thin metallic or composite shell filled with a soft rub-
bery propellant, they are vulnerable and prone to buck-
ling from sudden external pressures generated by a
nearby detonation (Li, 1998).
Multiple different effects including material property
variation (spatial nonuniformity), defects (voids and
inclusions), and material aging (chemical-mechanical
link) make structural analysis and health monitoring
challenging for SRMs (Ruderman, 2009). Aging of
motor materials is one of the greatest concerns affect-
ing the long-term viability of a motor. Aging generally
falls into three categories: first, the materials themselves
may simply change chemically (and therefore mechani-
cally) over time; second, adjacent materials may influ-
ence each other, typically involving chemical diffusion
at the various bondlines between the propellant, liner,
insulator, and the case; and third, direct mechanical
Journal of Intelligent Material Systems and Structures 25(5)
changes can occur in the properties of the materials,
typically as a result of thermal cycling, vibration loads,
or physical insult, known as ‘‘mechanical aging’’ or
‘‘mechanical damage’’ in the SRM community. The
third type of aging can weaken the bonds, either
between a particle and binder or within the binder
itself, which can lead to weak spots, fractures, or
increased porosity (Ruderman, 2009).
SRM: casings. The casing of an SRM is a pressure vessel
that ensures the integrity of the motor at high pressures
during operation. The outer case of a motor is consid-
ered isotropic (metallic) or anisotropic (composite) (Li,
1998). The motor case types include conventional steel,
steel strip laminate, and filament wound fiber/epoxy
composite such as Kevlar, glass, or carbon fiber
(Cocchiaro, 2001; Ruderman, 2009). It has a head end
dome that contains the igniter and an aft-end dome
that houses or supports the nozzle. The front and aft
domes are wound as integral parts of the case. Suitable
openings and fixtures are included to permit removal
of the (collapsible) motor case form, loading of propel-
lant, and attachment of igniter and nozzle. Motor cases
ordinarily have insulation on their interior surfaces,
especially those not covered by propellant, for protec-
tion against thermal degradation. When a mission
requires particularly lightweight components, the
motor cases are often made by filament winding high-
strength fibers into a suitable form. The filaments are
held in place by continuous application and curing of
plastic during winding (Gregersen, 2009). Rocket
motor cases are also subjected to internal pressuriza-
tion from the ignition of the propellant, as well as axial
tension and/or bending moments from launch loading
(Paris, 1994).
SRM: metal casings. An SRM consists of a casing,
usually steel, filled with a solid-propellant charge,
called the grain, which contains all the chemical consti-
tuents (fuel plus oxidizer) for a complete burn as shown
in Figure 4 (Cocchiaro, 2001). In the design of a motor
case, structural material and configuration are selected,
which yield the optimum performance while satisfying
constraints. A thermal barrier is provided on the inner
surface to prevent high temperature gases from achiev-
ing direct contact with the case metal. The combustion
chamber consists of a steel casing (Kamran and
Guozhou, 2011). The reusable solid rocket motor
(RSRM) used in the Space Shuttle launch system is
made up of 12 thin wall steel cylindrical segments.
During the prelaunch phase of liftoff, the Space Shuttle
main engines produce approximately one million
pounds of thrust. The RSRMs respond to this load by
initially bending along the motor, resulting in a 26-in
displacement at the RSRM nose cone and then
rebounding back. At this point during the launch,
Dhital et al.
Figure 4. Solid rocket motor with metal casing and propellant grain—Ares I–X motor segment.
buckling becomes a serious concern. RSRM cylinders
can be subject to buckling failure (Weidner and Larsen,
2002).
Maraging steel motor cases were used as booster
cases in satellite launch vehicles. Failure analysis
revealed that maraging steel fails due to normal tensile
overload fracture (Diwakar et al., 1985). Fracture at
the junction between the nozzle end and propulsion
cylinder, crack propagation along the longitudinal weld
adjacent to the weld bead in the propulsion cylinder,
and stub cylinder tearing was found (Diwakar et al.,
1985). The design of a rocket motor case fabricated out
of a high-strength alloy steel such as maraging steel is
based on fracture mechanics, for which input data on
crack size, gross section area stress, fracture mode, and
detectable flaw sizes by available NDE techniques are
essential (Diwakar et al., 1985). Fractures can originate
in the motor casing during hydraulic pressurization,
which might later lead to rupture of the casing (Kishi
and Mori, 1979). One of the studies indicated that hot
gases can be ejected from the SRM combustion cham-
ber through a failure of the SRM case or one of its
joints, leading to the loss of vehicle control during
ascent. If a sufficiently large breach develops, the
moment caused by the thrust augmentation may over-
whelm flight control. The rocket may start tumbling
and eventually break up. This was the case in the
Challenger accident (Gorinevsky, 2007).
The casing must be designed to withstand the pres-
sure and resulting stresses of the SRM, possibly at ele-
vated temperatures. To protect the casing from
corrosive hot gases, a sacrificial thermal liner on the
inside of the casing is often used, which ablates to pro-
long the life of the motor casing. A convergent–
divergent (CD) design accelerates the exhaust gas out
of the nozzle to produce thrust. The nozzle must be
constructed from a material that can withstand the heat
of the combustion gas flow (Solid-fuel rocket, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid-fuel_rocket). Weak liner/
529
propellant bonding or poor interfacial bonding
between the rubber liner of a cylinder rocket motor
and solid fuel propellant was studied for NDE of a
rocket motor consisting of an outer steel casing, rubber
liner, and inner core of solid propellant (Sinclair et al.,
2004).
Depending on the structural material selected, failure
of the case may occur either as a brittle or as a ductile
failure. Catastrophic brittle structural failure caused by
crack propagation at stresses below the material yield
strength is more acute in rocket motor case design
because of the emphasis on weight reduction and
increased size. The types of corrosion frequently
encountered include pitting corrosion, galvanic corro-
sion, stress corrosion cracking (SCC), and hydrogen
embrittlement (Whitfield and Keller, 1970). SCC is the
result of a complex interplay of tensile stress and corro-
sion in a metal or alloy within a period of time, which is
dependent upon the material, the environment, and the
magnitude of the applied or residual stress. The envir-
onments that are most conducive to SCC produce
highly localized attacks and may not produce any sig-
nificant, general surface corrosion. The severity and
rapidity of SCC are accelerated by the presence of a
prior crack or other surface discontinuities (Brown,
1966; Whitfield and Keller, 1970). Hydrogen embrittle-
ment can be caused by hydrogen absorption during
steel production and pickling or plating operations.
Furthermore, steels that are cathodically protected
against corrosion can absorb sufficient hydrogen to
promote brittle failure. Generally, higher strength mate-
rials are more readily affected by hydrogen and are sub-
ject to hydrogen-induced brittle failures at relatively
low stress levels (Slunder and Boyd, 1961; Whitfield
and Keller, 1970).
SRM: filament wound rocket motor casing. Composite
materials are widely used in both commercial and
defense SRMs. Composite parts are not limited to the
530
Figure 5. (a) Defect-free and (b) impact damaged regions in graphite epoxy motor case/rubber liner specimen.
case, nozzle, flex seal, igniter, attachments mounting
pads and stiffener rings. They provide an advantage of
high strength-to-weight ratio. In addition, these materi-
als are relatively chemically inert and are not subject to
corrosion during storage and assembly as are metals.
However, damage can result from a number of factors.
Defects may be introduced during the manufacturing
process: bondline contamination, improper curing, por-
osity, and low density of materials. Also, some of the
motors have extended shelf life, and thus chemical
aging may lead to the degradation of their mechanical
properties as well (Degtyar and Pearson, 1999).
Unlike metal cases, composites can be fairly easily
damaged by impact, which can occur during manufac-
turing, transportation, and storage. The resulting dam-
age, though undetectable to the naked eye, can be
severe enough to cause a catastrophic motor failure
(Child et al., 2006; Degtyar and Pearson, 1999;
Finlayson et al., 2003; Foedinger et al., 1999; Foedinger
and Rea, 1999; Kess, 2003; Poe, 1992; Qing et al., 2006;
Ruderman, 2009). A relatively defect-free and impact
damaged region in a graphite epoxy motor case is
shown in Figure 5(a) and (b), respectively (Miller et al.,
2003). Impacts can cause both visible and barely visible
internal (subsurface) damages in the form of matrix
cracking and broken fibers on a graphite/epoxy fila-
ment wound rocket motor casing (Degtyar and
Pearson, 1999; Finlayson et al., 2003; Paris, 1994; Poe,
1992). Internal damage is the result of delamination or
subsurface fiber breakage, which decreases in-plane
properties, especially compression properties by 50%–
60% (Kess, 2003). The factors, which potentially influ-
ence the damage extent, are void, structural support
conditions, and the location of the impact on the struc-
ture. The voids are not avoidable in the filament wind-
ing manufacturing process. Therefore, the quality
Journal of Intelligent Material Systems and Structures 25(5)
control based on void density evaluation is recommend-
able, but it is true that any NDE method is still not pro-
mising to evaluate the sub-millimeter defects in the
complex composite cases. An unsupported case, that is,
when the motor is not loaded, is more susceptible to
delaminations when impacted than a case backed with
an insulator and propellant as in a loaded motor. Fiber
breakage is the primary concern in the cylindrical por-
tion of the motor case because of the prevalence of in-
plane tensile loads. Delaminations are a concern when
in-plane shear and compressive loads are present, such
as in domes, skirts, and nozzles (Degtyar and Pearson,
1999). Impact damage degrades hoop and axial tensile
strengths under biaxial loading, greatly reducing the
load-bearing capability of a structural composite (Paris,
1994). The progressive failure of damaged ligaments
then causes the failed ligaments to delaminate from the
unbroken ligaments. The phenomenon of delamination
in filament wound cases may be distinctly different
from that in fabric composites. Bending moments
increase the potential for buckling failure due to dam-
age at an impact site. In contrast, low-velocity loading
of thin wall cylinders induces flexure, depending on the
span length of the cylinders and the flexure induces
delamination and tensile cracking on the back face wall
that opposes the impact because of the flexural stresses
imposed by impact loading (Paris, 1994).
The filament winding process takes a bundle of com-
posite fibers (a tow) and winds it over a cylindrical
mandrel to build up successive layers of composite rein-
forcement (Lin et al., 2003). A composite pressure ves-
sel is commonly constructed with a filament overwrap
of fiberglass, carbon, or aramid fiber in customized
resin systems. The process for producing a composite
pressure vessel is termed filament winding, which was
applied to produce the motor casings of P80 vega,
Dhital et al.
Atlas V, and Delta IV launch vehicles. Filament wound
composite materials are used as a substitute for the
steel currently used in SRM casings. In order to realize
a more efficient process, enhanced operational perfor-
mance, increased durability, improved damage toler-
ance, and improved NDE techniques are required for
assessing the structural integrity of composite motor
case structures for different operating conditions and
loading environments. One study performed low-
velocity impact tests on booster motors from the Space
Shuttle using various indenters (Foedinger and Rea,
1999). It was determined that damage was always loca-
lized to the impact site. Nonvisible damage below the
surface consisted of fiber breakage and shear cracks in
the epoxy (Kess, 2003; Poe, 1992).
Solid rocket propellants. A propellant is the chemical mix-
ture burned to produce thrust in rockets and consists
of a fuel and an oxidizer. Fuel is a substance which
burns when combined with oxygen to produce gas for
propulsion. An oxidizer is an agent that releases oxygen
for combination with the fuel. The ratio of oxidizer to
fuel is called the mixture ratio. Propellants are classified
according to their state—liquid, solid, or hybrid
(Braeunig, 2008). In contrast to liquid and hybrid, the
solid-propellant rocket is of comparatively simple
design. The propellant is stored within the combustion
chamber in the form of shaped grains (propellant
charges) bounded by the walls of the chamber
(Fortescue et al., 2003). Once ignited, combustion will
generally proceed until all the propellant is consumed;
the thrust–time relationship is then fixed by the grain
configuration. Limited thrust regulation is possible.
Solid propellants are typically of two types: either (1)
double-base, composed of homogeneous colloidal mix-
ture of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine or (2) a mix-
ture of organic fuel and crystalline inorganic salt.
Ammonium perchlorate, NH4ClO4 (a granular oxidi-
zer), is the principal oxidizer used in composite propel-
lants with a polymer fuel binder, typically polyurethane
or polybutadiene (Fortescue et al., 2003; Gregersen,
2009).
Only solid propellants are considered in this review,
as only these can be physically damaged. A solid rocket
propellant is a granular composite consisted of oxidizer
particles, fuel particles, and a polymeric binder (Doyle
et al., 1993; Gregersen, 2009). When ignited, a solid
propellant burns from the center out toward the sides
of the casing. The shape of the center channel deter-
mines the rate and pattern of the burn, so it can be a
parameter that can be used to control thrust (Braeunig,
2008). Modern composite propellants are heteroge-
neous powders (mixtures), which use crystallized or
finely ground mineral salt as the oxidizer, often ammo-
nium perchlorate, which constitutes between 60% and
90% of the mass of the propellant. The fuel itself is
531
generally aluminum. Solid-propellant charges (grain)
are typically cast or extruded. The components are
mixed in the form of a dough, perhaps using a plastici-
zer, and cast or pumped into a mold or directly into
the combustion chamber. The grain geometry is fixed
by a mandrel, which is removed after curing and solidi-
fication (Fortescue et al., 2003). The grain behaves like
a solid mass, burning in a predictable fashion and pro-
ducing exhaust gases. In spite of the stringent quality
control measures at various stages of propellant manu-
facturing, the production of defect-free solid-propellant
grains is a formidable challenge due to the inherent
complexities in the manufacture of a rocket motor
(Ghose and Kankane, 2008). Combustion malfunction
of the propellant grain generally leads to excessive com-
bustion pressure and violent rupture of the motor case
(AGARD, 1997). If the grain suffers a structural fail-
ure, either before or during the operational phase, the
burning characteristics will change as a result, which
may lead to catastrophic failure upon ignition
(AGARD, 1997; Cocchiaro, 2001).
Any structural malfunctioning which prevents the
solid-propellant rocket grain from performing its mis-
sion can be classified as failure of the solid-propellant
rocket grain. A crack or disbond of sufficient size,
which is exposed to hot combustion gases, may result
in a catastrophic pressure increase or premature burn-
through to the case wall. Basically there are four
elementary types of failure, namely, surface cracks,
interface debonding, dewetting (dilatation), and exces-
sive deformation as shown in Figure 6(a) to (d)
(AGARD, 1997).
Surface macrocracks. Surface cracks can easily occur
in a solid motor grain, as shown in Figure 6(a). A solid
motor grain with cracks is very dangerous during a
launch, because the surface cracks may cause unstable
propagation when internal pressure is applied on the
surface crack cavities. During the manufacture and
storage of an SRM, cracks often exist around the sur-
face of a solid motor grain (Yuan et al., 2006). Cracks
in the grain start to grow at areas where the load pro-
duces a strain energy release rate greater than the frac-
ture toughness of the material. In the worst case, the
pressure rise is high enough to exceed the burst pres-
sure of the case or the particles of the grains detach
from the residual structure and block the nozzle throat,
causing a fatal malfunction (AGARD, 1997). Rupture
of propellants can be ‘‘brittle’’ (at low temperatures
and high strain rates) or ‘‘ductile’’ (at high temperatures
and low strain rates). ‘‘Ductile’’ fracture occurs after
high strains. Therefore, this type of fracture is preceded
by the dewetting of the propellant, which makes the
fracture more difficult to predict. Cracks occur usually
at the bore surface of the propellant grain in the case of
bonded motors because of cure shrinkage during and
after curing (post curing), propellant fatigue due to
532
longitudinal crack
(a) case
circumferential crack
propellant
(c) polymeric binder
vacuole formation
possible crack formation
local stress concentration
oxidizers
Figure 6. (a) Surface microcrack, (b) typical debonding at the propellant/bondline/case interface, (c) schematic sketch of dewetting
failure mode, and (d) deformation of propellant grain (AGARD, 1997).
thermal cycling during long-term storage (cumulative
damage), thermal shocks at low temperatures, ignition
pressurization, and degradation in material properties
due to moisture contamination (composite propellants
are particularly sensitive).
The effects of temperature, strain-rate, and aging on
the crack growth mechanism in a composite propellant
have been examined. Severe thermal loads also result in
the deterioration of the mechanical properties of the
propellant, which increases the likelihood of material
cracking or bondline failure (Ide et al., 1999). A crack
propagating in a propellant grain creates additional
surface area for burning, which affects the ballistic per-
formance of the rocket motor. Microcracks generated
ahead of a crack tip in a damage or failure zone
increase in number with the applied strain. As the
strain increases, the voids fuse and the fibrils rupture at
thinned sections of a material strained between filler
particles or debonded at the binder/filler interface. The
crack propagates into the damage zone by fusing with
the voids and microcracks as the fibrils fail (Ide et al.,
1999). As the strain increases, these secondary cracks
begin to propagate, eventually connecting with the
original crack and leading ultimately to specimen fail-
ure. Aging also results in the binder becoming brittle
and hardened with the subsequent reduction in the
Journal of Intelligent Material Systems and Structures 25(5)
(b) debonding area
case
propellant
bondline system
(d)
deformed grain part
propellant
case
deformed grain part
strain to failure of the propellant. As the temperature
increases while stress remains constant, the rate at
which bonds are ruptured increases, resulting in higher
crack velocities. Figure 7 shows the fracture surface
and crack propagation in a propellant grain (Ide et al.,
1999).
Debonding of propellant/liner/insulator/case interfaces. The
interface region between the case and the propellant con-
sisting of various layers such as liner, insulator, and inhi-
bitor is subjected to stress due to thermal and mechanical
loading for most types of case-bonded and cartridge-
loaded grains. If, however, these kinds of stresses exceed
the bond strength of the interface materials, the propel-
lant may separate from the case. This phenomenon is
named debonding of the propellant/liner interface or
sometimes even adhesive bond fracture, as shown in
Figure 6(b). In some cases, the debonded area can offer a
path for hot gases to attack the unprotected area of a
case, leading to a possible burn-through. Debonding
results inherently from weak case bond systems, poor
control of motor manufacturing, chemical degradation
(due to human and moisture contamination and liquid
diffusion into or away from the region of the bond), and
bond fatigue. Bond and flap terminations are always
high-suspicion regions for failure (AGARD, 1997).
Dhital et al.
Figure 7. (a) Scanning electron microscopy showing fracture surface in accelerated aged propellant, T = 25°C, and (b) the crack
propagation in a specimen of propellant that had been subjected to accelerated aging condition (Ide et al., 1999).
Dewetting (dilatation). For propellant systems in which
binders and fillers are used, dewetting or dilatation is
defined as the microscopic process of debonding at the
interface between the harder oxidizers and the
embedded softer polymeric binder, as shown in Figure
6(c). Loading of the composite structure produces
stress concentrations around the oxidizers, which may
lead to the breakdown of the binder. After the binder is
broken, it is pulled away from the solids causing the
formation of micro-voids or vacuoles (vacuum holes).
As the grain begins to harden due to post curing and is
subjected to large thermal and/or mechanical cyclic
loading condition, the voids may begin to tear at their
weakest links and propagate, forming microcracks or
crazing on the surface of the grain (as well as through-
out the bulk of the grain) (AGARD, 1997). With con-
tinued loading, different vacuoles merge with adjacent
ones producing macrocracks and finally cause the ulti-
mate failure. Dewetting is always accompanied by an
increase in propellant volume. Dewetting always pre-
cedes a propellant fracture and can be, therefore, con-
sidered as a separate failure mode. With respect to
motor performance, dewetting tends to increase the
effective burning surface.
Excessive deformation. Excessive grain deformation, as
shown in Figure 6(d), is a failure mode if the shape of
the grain changes to such an extent that it unacceptably
affects the performance of the motor. Excessive defor-
mation of the grain may occur under high acceleration
during launch or captive flight; under long-term storage
(slump); as a result of vibration; or under a differential
pressure drop along the length of the grain (especially
true for loose grains). This failure mode is critical for
any low modulus propellant. Also under pressurization,
propellants especially in composite casings, which
deform more than metallic ones, may exhibit large
533
deformations, which have to be handled with special
caution (AGARD, 1997).
Besides changing the burning surface geometry,
which will lead to erosive burning effects in the motor
and thus, to an abnormal thrust history, this type of
grain deformation can also result in a more serious
problem called port blockage (obduration). The inter-
action will continue until the pressure inside the motor
reaches the burst pressure of the case, resulting in a cat-
astrophic failure. This type of interaction may be
referred to as structural ballistic interaction.
Other possible defects. Powder charges are one of the
components used in the production of solid-propellant
charge. The main methods of the propellant charge
production are pressing and casting, which are known
as powder rod technologies. However, there are always
possibilities for the introduction of defects during pro-
duction and storage. These defects are generally classi-
fied as powder rod technological defects and powder
rod maintenance defects, respectively. During the pro-
duction phase, in the pressed rods, defects like delami-
nation of the propellant mass parallel to the axe of the
charge, and inclusions of foreign matters, mainly of
metallic type, occur. Hence, it is necessary to detect
delamination of the mass propellant, inclusions of for-
eign matters and cracking of the mass propellant. The
defects due to storage condition are again divided into
two categories: mechanical and chemical defects. The
most common mechanical defects due to the aging are
propellant mass cracking, spalling, and propellant mass
delamination (Tomkiewicz et al., 1999).
Another potential failure mode is implosion of the
propellant grain due to pressures generated from flame
propagation into the motor case-propellant bond area
via propellant cracks or bondline flaws, as shown in
Figure 8 (Cocchiaro, 2001). The hot motor case can
534
Figure 8. Possible grain implosion failure mechanism leading to
detonation (Cocchiaro, 2001).
also burst if the flame propagates into the center bore
of the propellant. This motor case bond shear failure
mechanism leading to detonations is shown in Figure 9
(Cocchiaro, 2001).
Liquid rocket engines
Liquid systems have been used extensively as first-stage
launch vehicles for space missions, as in, for example,
the Saturn (United States), Ariane (European), and
Energia (Soviet) launch vehicles (Gregersen, 2009).
Liquids are desirable because their reasonably high
density allows the use of relatively small propellant
tanks and lightweight pumps to pump the propellant
from the tanks into the engines. The resulting advan-
tage is that the propellants can be maintained at low
pressure. Therefore, low mass propellant tanks can be
used, permitting a high mass ratio for the rocket.
Liquid rocket engines are more powerful than SRMs
and can generate more thrust, but they are more com-
plex with respect to the numbers of pipes, pumps,
valves, gauges, and other parts. Liquid rockets require
attention to storage issues and often need to be main-
tained at very cold temperatures. Their complexity
affects vehicle reliability, only because the increased
part count allows more chances for problems to occur
(Chang, 2005). However, they offer several advantages
as well. By controlling the flow of the propellant to the
combustion chamber, the engine can be throttled,
stopped, or restarted (Braeunig, 2008). These advan-
tages include (1) higher attainable exhaust velocities,
(2) higher mass fractions (propellant mass divided by
the total mass of inert components), and (3) control of
flight operation (throttle ability), which can include
stop-and-restart capabilities as well as emergency shut-
down (Gregersen, 2009). Liquid-propellant systems
carry the propellant in tanks external to the combus-
tion chamber. Liquid rockets have been built as mono-
propellant rockets using a single type of propellant, as
bipropellant rockets using two types of propellants, or
as more exotic tripropellant rockets using three types
of propellants. Most liquid-propellant rockets use
bipropellant systems, those in which an oxidizer and a
fuel are tanked separately and mixed in the combustion
Journal of Intelligent Material Systems and Structures 25(5)
Figure 9. Large high-energy motor case bond shear failure
mechanism leading to detonation (Cocchiaro, 2001).
Figure 10. Schematic representation of a typical pumped
bipropellant liquid rocket engine.
chamber (Gregersen, 2009). A typical bipropellant
rocket is shown in Figure 10. The modern liquid rocket
engine is a complex fluid-mechanical thermodynamical
system; it usually operates under extreme physical con-
ditions such as very high temperature and pressure,
strong erosion, and high-density energy release (Wu,
2005).
Cavitation can occur in the oxidizer lines. In one
case, cracks were revealed in the gimbal joint flowliners,
which direct the liquid hydrogen (LH2) into the low-
pressure fuel turbo pump of the engine. The cracks were
located at the slots in the flowliner, so the cracks could
be cleaned easily during manufacturing and trapped
propellant could be released, as shown in Figure 11
(Bridges, 2005).
A study suggests other different types of failures as
well, such as leaks in the hydraulic and gas mains,
breakdowns of impellers and bearings, cavitation in
pumps, and turbine shroud burnout (Prisnyakov et al.,
1993). Rocket propulsion systems can fail for many
reasons. Many of these failures will have adverse conse-
quences on safety, cost, life, and/or schedule. Typical
failure modes for liquid chemical rocket systems are (1)
failure of the propellant feed system, (2) failure of the
turbo pump (caused by turbine blade cracks), (3) rup-
ture of the tube/pipe connections, (4) failure in the pro-
pellant storage system, (5) rupture of the tank shell
(due to, for example, improper welding or shell damage
Dhital et al.
Figure 11. (a) Space Shuttle main engines and liquid hydrogen feed line with flowliners (inset). In 2002, inspections revealed cracks
in the gimbal joint flowliners, which direct the LH2 into the low-pressure fuel turbo pump of the Space Shuttle main engines and (b)
flowliner slot inspection (Bridges, 2005).
during handling), (6) rupture of the chamber shell/ves-
sel, (7) failure of the engine structure (http://www.lr.
tudelft.nl/en/organisation/departments-and-chairs/
space-engineering/space-systems-engineering/expertise-
areas/space-propulsion/design-of-elements/failures/fail-
ure-modes/), (8) leakage of the poppet seal and leakage
of the thrust chamber, which can occur in the fuel feed
subsystem, and (9) failure of the combustion chamber
nozzle tube. Structural failures are considered high
probable risks as well (Ray, 2002).
Failure of liquid rocket engine systems can be
divided into slow and urgent failures. Slow failures or
incipient faults, such as wearing of gears and small
amount leakage of the propellant, can result in the dete-
rioration of engine performance, but urgent (abrupt)
failures, for example, leakage of fuel into the oxidizer
pump, may lead to an engine explosion (Wu, 2005).
Combustion instability, which is often induced by the
interaction of the combustion zone and the acoustic
field in a combustion chamber, can cause the deteriora-
tion of combustion performance and severe physical
damage to the rocket combustor hardware, conse-
quently resulting in a mission failure (Flandro et al.,
2004; Kim et al., 2008). Failures in liquid rocket engine
pressure vessels have many causes. Some of the most
common failure modes include corrosion, pitting, stress
corrosion cracks, seam weld cracks, and dents due to
internal or external impacts. Ultimately, these defects
could lead to a catastrophic failure of the entire rocket
engine (Qing et al., 2006).
One of the major concerns in liquid rocket engines is
that the oxidizer-rich gases mixed with cryogenic dro-
plets come in contact with the combustion chamber
walls (Haidn, 2008). Copper alloy linings of the rocket
535
engine combustion chamber have been found to dete-
riorate when exposed to cyclic reducing/oxidizing envir-
onments, which result from the combustion process.
This deterioration is known as blanching (Haidn, 2008;
Raj et al., 2007), which is clearly visible on the wall of
the combustion chamber liner as shown in Figure 12(a)
(Haidn, 2008). Blanching causes the inner surface of the
liner to slowly become powdery and flaky, and this cor-
rosion will worsen if the surface is not polished between
each mission. Thus, the structurally weakened liner
walls subject to such corrosion will be unable to carry
mechanical loads and will show reduced heat transfer
capability (Raj et al., 2007).
Cyclic fatigue of the combustion chamber liner
material is also one of the life limiting factors of a
liquid rocket engine (Haidn, 2008). The liner is exposed
to thermal stress and mechanical loads, such as static
pressure or pressure fluctuations or mechanical vibra-
tions of various sources. Its material is also weakened
by hydrogen embrittlement, high temperature fatigue,
or creep and chemical attacks by OH or other radicals
or simple oxidation through exposure to oxygen-rich
gases. All these conditions lead to a typical longitudinal
failure of the chamber liner as shown in Figure 12(b)
(Haidn, 2008). Thus, protective coatings are used to
minimize or eliminate many of the problems experi-
enced by uncoated liners and to significantly extend
their operational lives (Raj et al., 2007).
Nozzles
A nozzle is a subcomponent of the rocket engine and
an extension of the combustion chamber, through
which hot gases flow. A typical nozzle structure is
536 Journal of Intelligent Material Systems and Structures 25(5)

Figure 12. (a) Deterioration of combustion chamber liner known as blanching and (b) a typical longitudinal failure in the chamber
liner (Haidn, 2008).

shown in Figure 13. It accelerates the exhaust gases,

such that the gas pressure which is initially equal to the
combustion chamber pressure becomes equal to the
exterior pressure, to produce thrust. This function is
accomplished by proper contouring and sizing of the
conduit (Gregersen, 2009). Typically, nozzles are
designed with a fixed convergent section followed by a
fixed divergent section; this nozzle configuration is
called a CD nozzle. A plug nozzle has a solid surface
along the centerline of the nozzle and a free surface
along the outside. Plug nozzles can match the exit pres-
sure over a wider range of flight conditions than a CD
nozzle but tend to be heavier than a CD nozzle. The
aerospike engine uses a rectangular plug nozzle and
multiple combustion chambers. These types of nozzles
are currently in the research phase and are not yet used Figure 13. A typical solid rocket motor nozzle (NASA, 2010).
on commercial rockets.
The increasing demand for higher performance from heat flux to the nozzle wall, thermally eroding the wall
rocket launchers drives the nozzle development, which (Cho et al., 2001; Strobel and King, 1993). The surface
is basically achieved by increasing the expansion ratio. erosion rate is strongly dependent on particle size, par-
However, this may lead to flow separation (the flow ticle impact angle, and surface material (Cho et al.,
will not be fully attached but separated from the nozzle 2001). For a solid rocket nozzle, the particle free zone
wall), and in the consequent nonstationary, asymmetric in the nozzle divergent section increases quickly with
forces, so-called side-loads, which can damage both the increasing particle size, and the maximum heat transfer
nozzle itself and other engine components, can result in density occurs at the starting region of the nozzle con-
a serious failure of the launcher (Ostlund, 2005). The vergent section (Cho et al., 2001). Particle erosion will
propulsion material of a solid rocket contains alumi- cause excessive material removal in the throat entrance
num powder, which increases thrust. During the com- region and, therefore, will result in large negative mar-
bustion process, this powder forms oxidized aluminum gins of safety (Strobel and King, 1993). Aerospike noz-
droplets that float in the combustion gas. The melted zles are considered for hybrid rocket motors (where
Al2O3 droplets seriously damage the nozzle wall and fuel and the oxidizer are in different phases prior to
the jet vane installed in the nozzle (Bae, 1998; Cho combustion). These nozzles, however, are even more
et al., 2001; Neilson and Gilchrist, 1968). When the susceptible to throat ablation than regular CD nozzles,
floating particles collide to the nozzle components, the due the nature of their flow expansion mechanism. The
surfaces of the components are damaged severely. The high heat loads at the base of the spike can cause abla-
deposition of high temperature particles transfers large tion of the spike and lead to the degradation of
Dhital et al.
performance and eventually even cause failure of the
entire nozzle and rocket. Nitrous oxide cooling has
been considered for such nozzles, which was found
effective not only at reducing damage in the most abla-
tive region of the nozzle but also at saving the nozzle
for multiple test runs (Lemieux, 2010).
Thick ablative composite materials are used as abla-
tive liners in rocket nozzles, due to its structural
strength, low density, and very high thermal insulation
property. These materials allow the nozzle to function
under high thermal and erosive environments and to
properly transfer the combustion gases from the burn-
ing propellant surface through the nozzle without dam-
age to the metal structure (Karthikeyan et al., 2009;
NASA, 2010; Sreelekshmi et al., 2006). Carbon fiber–
and silica fiber–based composite structures are used in
the nozzles of large SRMs (Sreelekshmi et al., 2006).
Similarly, the aluminum structure of the SRM nozzle is
protected from the heat of the expanding gases by a
series of carbon cloth phenolic rings backed up by glass
or silica cloth phenolic rings. The glass and silica cloth
phenolic backup rings provide structural, thermal, and
galvanic corrosion protection. However, not adhering
to the proven practices of design, manufacture, and
testing of ablative composite materials could result in a
low material density, separation of fibers, and contami-
nation (NASA, 2010). Defects like delaminations, lack
of adhesive material, gap between windings, resin lean
region, porosity between layers (Sreelekshmi et al.,
2006), cracks, and voids are commonly observed in
rocket nozzles (Blatchley, 1989). In a slightly different
case, defects in several of the rocket nozzle assembly
joints and in the nozzle insulation had been observed in
a space shuttle. A flaw in the nozzle insulation allows
hot combustion gases to reach the thermal barrier
(Steinetz and Dunlap, 1999). Any of these defects could
cause possible schedule delays. The ultimate impact of
not adhering to precise in-process controls could be the
burn-through of the nozzle, which can cause the failure
of the entire mission and loss of life, as well
(Karthikeyan et al., 2009; NASA, 2010).
Damage evaluation necessity and
conventional techniques
Damage evaluation necessity
Detection of damage and prediction of strength loss
from an expected damage are critical tasks for the
launch operation of a space launch vehicle. Each failure
puts the space launch operation ‘‘on hold’’ until ser-
vices can resume. A typical estimate for the cost of fail-
ure for Ariane 4 was estimated to be US$466m (total
launcher system cost) + US$79m (total customer
costs). The ‘‘downtime’’ associated with a launch failure
also varies considerably, for example, 3.7 months for
Delta and 8.1 months for Ariane. After the Challenger
537
accident, the Space Shuttle took 2 years and 8 months
to return to service (Parkinson, 1999).
Invisible flaws, such as impact damage or a partially
bonded joint, can lead to expensive failures during
launch or in orbit, where components generally cannot
be fixed. Detection of flaws is therefore essential.
Moreover, flaws need to be discovered in a nondestruc-
tive manner, that is, the process used to test for them
must not damage the potentially unflawed component
being tested (Johnson and Esquivel, 2006). The process
of flaw detection and characterization is known as
NDE, and it is an important part of ensuring the flight-
worthiness of launch vehicles and spacecrafts. The pro-
cess begins with the inspection of raw materials, both
to check material characteristics and to screen for inci-
pient flaws. This process continues through manufac-
turing and assembly for process control and quality
assurance. It concludes with the final check of compo-
nents for damage incurred during shipping, storage,
and handling (Johnson and Esquivel, 2006). The early
detection of faults can help avoid unnecessary system
shutdown, breakdown, and catastrophes involving
human fatality and material damage. The maintenance
cost of industrial processes can therefore be reduced
and product quality can be enhanced (Wu, 2005). An
advanced health monitoring system would also track
critical parameters to improve or ensure the desired
performance of the whole propulsion system during
both ground firing test and flight. It is particularly use-
ful for evaluating the overall health of an engine during
the development of a fault problem before it becomes
catastrophic. Therefore, there is an increasing demand
for monitoring to improve the safety of rocket engines
(Yang et al., 2007).
Conventional techniques
Various types of NDEs can be applied, depending on
the component and material. Critical inspection para-
meters include the geometry and constitution of a part
and the type of defect to be detected. If surface cracks
are the primary concern, a penetrating dye can be
applied to make the cracks more visible. To check for
cracks just below the surface, an eddy-current probe
can be used to look for the changes in conductivity
associated with subsurface flaws (assuming the material
is conductive). To look for even deeper cracks, in a weld
line, the best approach might be to direct ultrasonic
shear waves into the weld and look for characteristic
echoes (Johnson and Esquivel, 2006). In the aerospace
industry, two of the most widely used techniques for
detecting volumetric (subsurface) flaws are radio-
graphic and ultrasonic testing. In radiographic testing,
X-rays, gamma rays, or neutrons are directed at a part
and detected after passing through it. Flaws give rise to
shadows or bright spots in the detection field recorded
on film or on a detector array. Typical applications
538
include detection of voids in solid propellants, casted
ingots, and adhesives; assembly verification; detection
of core anomalies in honeycomb panels; and inspection
of welds (Johnson and Esquivel, 2006). X-ray computed
tomography for composite (filament wound) rocket
motor cases appears to have merit for accurate geome-
trical characterization of local damages, supporting the
development of analytical models of micromechanics
(Paris, 1994).
Other techniques like thermography, shearography,
and acoustic emission monitoring are also available. In
a thermographic test, subsurface defects impede or
enhance the flow of heat through a part, resulting in
localized hot or cold regions on the surface of the part.
Applications include detecting bondline flaws beneath
composite face sheets in honeycomb structures and
detecting heat leaks (Johnson and Esquivel, 2006).
Shearography is a field applicable holographic tech-
nique that can be used to identify regions of very fine
relative displacement or strain. A special camera takes
pictures of the reflection of diffuse laser light from the
test article surface before and after it is subjected to a
mechanical stress, like slight pressurization of a fuel
tank. These pictures are processed to yield an image
consisting of fringe patterns. Regions of concentrated
surface strain under load result in a higher density of
fringes. Fringe pattern anomalies are indicative of sub-
surface flaws. This method could be used to detect
impact damage in the spherical composite-overwrapped
pressurization vessels that are used to contain com-
pressed gases for a number of spacecraft (Johnson and
Esquivel, 2006). Acoustic emission monitoring can be
performed during hardware proof tests. Small micro-
phones, sensitive to sound at frequencies beyond the
audible range, are affixed at strategic locations on the
test article. The acoustic transducers are monitored for
sound emissions emanating from the hardware
throughout the loading cycle. Cracks and other flaws
that grow during the proof test make noise that is
picked up by these sensitive microphones, and the loca-
tion of these flaws can be determined through triangu-
lation. One example is the proof testing of some
composite SRM cases (Johnson and Esquivel, 2006).
Acoustic emission technique has also been used in the
burst test of a rocket motor case to evaluate the struc-
tural integrity of the motor case during hydraulic pres-
surization. This evaluation allowed the prediction of
fracture characteristics very well before a motor casing
rupture (Kishi and Mori, 1979). Acousto-ultrasonics is
similar to the acoustic emission technique where a
structure is loaded and the structure monitored by
transducers. This technique was used for events such as
breaking fibers, matrix cracking, and delaminations,
which produce ultrasonic signals as the strain energy
associated with the events is released (Paris, 1994).
Eddy-current inspection is based on the generation and
induction of electrical currents in a workpiece and their
Journal of Intelligent Material Systems and Structures 25(5)
response to flaws or material changes such as subsur-
face cracks, voids, impurities, and corrosion. The tech-
nique was used on cracked flight nozzle on a Delta
rocket’s graphite epoxy motor case, whose liner was
detected to be out of tolerance (Johnson and Esquivel,
2006). Plume spectroscopy, acoustic emission, optical
pyrometer, solid-state leak sensor, polyvinylidene fluor-
ide sensor, plume electrical diagnostics, fiber optic
defect meter, and laser vibration sensor are few of the
conventional sensor technologies used for liquid rocket
engines (Wu, 2005).
However, these conventional techniques pose some
limitations as well. NDE of large structures with re-
entrant or closed surfaces, such as filled pressure ves-
sels, is difficult. Ultrasonic techniques such as C-scan
require large fixtures and usually access to both sides of
a structure (Paris, 1994). The problem with acoustic
emission is that there is no clear spatial location for
‘‘events,’’ and it is difficult to correlate specific types of
damage in complex structures with specific acoustic
emission events (Paris, 1994). A major difficulty with
acousto-ultrasonics is the need to couple the acoustic
signal to the structure by immersion either in a fluid,
such as oil and grease, or other coupling medium. The
presence of surface roughness and contamination can
change reflectivity and emissivity, which in turn can
change the energy transfer to the structure (Paris,
1994). In order to apply many NDE techniques includ-
ing the ultrasonic technique, X-ray technique, and eddy
current, the components have to be disassembled before
inspection (Qing et al., 2006). Hence, much research is
being conducted to further study and improve the con-
ventional NDE techniques and to develop technologies
applicable to full-scale assembled structures that also
meet the aerospace requirements for zero-defect space
launch structures.
Conclusion
A space launch vehicle engine is a complex system with
several components. Flaws during the manufacturing
phase or damage induced during assembly/ground han-
dling increases the probability of failure of the engine
during a space launch operation. Most failures will have
adverse consequences on safety, cost, life, and/or sched-
ule. Hence failure prevention is necessary up to the
point where the effort of failure prevention no longer
outweighs the consequences of failure. Many of these
failures can be prevented through proper design, test-
ing, and operation. Since different materials are used
for different components, the nature and types of dam-
age also differ. Possible flaws and damage in SRMs,
liquid rocket engines, nozzles, and solid rocket propel-
lants were investigated in detail to achieve a better
understanding of the individual risks inherent with each
major component. Understanding the unique risks
Dhital et al.
associated with each component is a required prerequi-
site for developing an efficient and reliable nondestruc-
tive inspection system for space launch vehicle engines.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.
Funding
This study was supported by the Basic Science Research
Program (2011-0010489) through the National Research
Foundation of Korea funded by the Ministry of Education,
Science and Technology. In addition, this study was sup-
ported by the University Collaboration Enhancement Project
of the Korea Aerospace Research Institute. David
Mascareñas’ work on this article is supported by Los Alamos
National Laboratory as a Director’s Funded Postdoctoral
researcher (LA-UR 12-01492).
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