DENR et al VS. YAP et al G.R. No.

167707 October 8, 2008

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed
a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to
secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since
time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited
that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island
was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had
the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that
respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate
court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior
vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions

ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD
No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by
the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented
to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the
specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

MARTINEZ VS CA G.R. No. 170409

FACTS: Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during his lifetime inherited the properties from his
mother, Rosa Martinez Emitaño, who in turn inherited them from her own mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The
complaint alleged that sometime in 1992, petitioner, Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus
one of the descendants of Celedoniaand under that name applied for free patents over the properties with the CENRO.
Unbeknownst to private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez. When
private respondents later filed an application for land registration over the same properties, petitioner opposed the same. This
impelled private respondents to file the instant complaint.

The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to fraud and
misrepresentation in their procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of petitioner’s titles. Before
the Court of Appeals, She argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the lapse of one year from the issuance
of the titles.

Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is untenable
since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles.

ISSUE: Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and incontrovertible following the lapse of one year
from their issuance

RULING: No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one
year from their issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued on the basis of free patent procured through
fraud manifested in the facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one
of the descendants of Celedonia.

Under the recent jurisprudence, a certificate of title issued on the basis of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of
the law may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility. Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing where
fraud attended the issuance of the free patents and titles. The petition is denied.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013 Possession, Property Registration Decree,
Regalia Doctrine

FACTS:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased from Eduardo Velazco, claiming
that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.

The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed
the RTC Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said decision to this Court through a
petition for review on certiorari.

The petition was denied. Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

RULING: Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession – possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.

Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.

SUPREMA T. DUMO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 218269, June 06, 2018

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Suprema T. Dumo challenges
the 28 January 2014 Decision and the 19 May 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95732, which
modified the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Bauang, La Union, in Civil Case No. 1301-Bg for Accion
Reivindicatoria and LRC Case No. 270-Bg for Application for Land Registration.

Petitioner Suprema T. Dumo filed an application for registration of two parcels of land, covered by Advance Plan
of Lot Nos. 400398 and 400399with a total area of 1,273 square meters (LRC Case No. 270-Bg). Dumo alleged that the lots
belonged to her mother Bernarda M. Trinidad, and that she and her siblings inherited them upon their mother's death. She
further alleged that through a Deed of Partition with Absolute Sale dated 6February 1987, she acquired the subject lots from
her siblings. Dumo traces her title from her mother, Trinidad, who purchased the lots from Florencio Mabalay in August 1951.
Mabalay was Dumo's maternal grandfather. Mabalay, on the other hand, purchased the properties from Carlos Calica.The heirs
of Marcelino Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the ground that the properties sought to be
registered by Dumo are involved in the accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the RTC consolidated the land registration case with
the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages. On 2 July 2010, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding
that the subject property was owned by the heirs of Espinas. The RTC ordered the dismissal of Dumo's land registration
application on the ground of lack of registerable title, and ordered Dumo to restore ownership and possession of the lots to the
heirs of Espinas. The CA rendered its Decision dated 28 January 2014, affirming the RTC's decision dismissing the application for
land registration of Dumo, and finding that she failed to demonstrate that she and her predecessors-in¬ interest possessed the
property in the manner required by law to merit the grant of her application for land registration. The CA, however, modified
the decision of the RTC insofar as it found that the Subject Property belonged to the heirs of Espinas. The CA found that since
the property still belonged to the public domain, and the heirs of Espinas were not able to establish their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12June 1945 or
earlier, it was erroneous for the RTC to declare the heirs of Espinas as the owners of the Subject Property; hence, this petition.

Issues: Whether Dumo is able to prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of public
domain2.

Whether the requirement that documents to prove the status of land shall be based on the land classification approved by the
DENR Secretary is not a mere superfluity

Ruling:
NO, Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to prove that the land she seeks to register is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the
Court held that there are two (2) documents which must be presented: first, a copy of the original classification approved by
the Secretary of the DENR and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records, and second, a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or t
hePENRO based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary. In this case, none of the documents submitted by
respondent to the trial court indicated that the subject property was agricultural or part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. At most, the CENRO Report and Certification stated that the land was not covered by any kind of public
land application. This was far from an adequate proof of the classification of the land. Unfortunately for respondent, the
evidence submitted clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration in order to show the alienable character of
the lands subject herein2.
YES, the requirement that documents to prove the status of land shall be based on the land classification approved by
the DENR Secretary is not a mere superfluity. This requirement stems from the fact that the alienable and disposable
classification of agricultural land may be made by the President or DENR Secretary. And while the DENR Secretary may perform
this act in the regular course of business, this does not extend to the CENRO or PENRO the DENR Secretary may no longer
delegate the power to issue such certification as the power to classify lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable
lands is in itself a delegated power under CA No. 141 and PD No. 705.

Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986) G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
FACTS:
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
 possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
 land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-
Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or
within the public domain
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
 ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
 donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
 IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
 already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient
 it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
 The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares

Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu G.R. No. L-4641 13 March 1911
FACTS:
Petitioner Seminary of San Carlos asks for the registration of two pieces of land included in one plan located in the Cebu City,
alleging as its source of title a royal cession from the King of Spain. On the other hand, Respondent Municipality of Cebu denies
the title of the Seminary and alleges in itself ownership of the disputed land by stating that its title is based upon possession, and
for the period required by law to effect a title by prescription.

The disputed land is claimed by the Seminary is claimed to be a portion of one of the public squares of the Municipality. As
asserted by the Municipality, the land must be awarded to them since it appears clearly that the disputed land there is a well-
defined boundary separating from the public square the land upon which stands the church belonging to the seminary, and the
lands lie between the church and the iron fence, and do not therefore, extend into the plaza.
In the trial court, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Seminary, declaring it the owner of the disputed land and
ordering the same registered in its name. The trial court ruled that the portion of disputed land occupied by the Municipality as
public plaza is land described in the submitted evidence of the Seminary, while the Municipality presented no paper title that it
owned the disputed land. A motion for new trial was made by the Municipality to no avail. Hence, this petition filed by the
Municipality, claiming that it acquired the disputed land by adverse possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality acquired the disputed land by virtue of adverse possession or prescription.

RULING:
NO. As correctly ruled by the trial court, the disputed land now occupied by the Municipality as a public plaza is the land described
in the Seminary’s evidence such as the Royal Cession of the land to the Seminary, which includes not only the church building
itself, but also the land where the church stands. The land so stands extends to that of the land being claimed by the Municipality
as the public plaza. To this end, the Municipality presented no paper title on the land so occupied as a public plaza.

Further, the Court took cognizance of the document executed by the Political and Military Governor of Cebu in June 1869, where
the official certified that part of the disputed land belongs to the Seminary. This instrument conclusively characterizes the
occupation of the disputed land, and renders untenable the position of the Municipality that its possession was adverse and
should be made the basis of prescriptive title under the Civil Code.

The Civil Code provides that any express or implied recognition or acknowledgement which the possessor may make with regard
to the right of the owner amount to an interruption of the continuity of possession. As political and military governor of Cebu, all
acts and words of his giving color to that possession are binding upon the Municipality and conclusive as to the guilty thereof.

Ramos and Oli v. CA G.R. No. 111027 3 February 1999

FACTS:
In January 1940, Lucia Bautista, predecessor of Respondent Spouses Rodolfo Bautista and Felisa Lopez, in the cadastral
proceedings involving lots 572 and 579 of the Gattaran Cadastre, was issued OCT Nos. 17811 and 17812. In January 1976,
Petitioner Spouses Bernardino Ramos and Rosalia Oli, as buyers of the subject lots, filed an action for reconveyance with damages
against Spouses Bautista. They alleged that they bought the lots from Pedro Tolentino, claimants of the lots evidenced by two
“Escritura de Compra Venta”, and were in open, public, adverse, peaceful and continuous pessoon of the disputed lots for not
less than 50 years. Spouses Ramos presented certified copies thereof claiming that the originals were lost in a fire that gutted the
office of their counsel. They failed to present any person who could have witnessed the execution of the documents and likewise
failed to prove that those documents were later registered. By way of defense, Spouses Bautista argued that acquisitive
prescription would no longer be possible since the lots were already registered under the name of Lucia Bautista.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. It found that Ramos failed to file an answer in the cadastral proceedings and also failed
to avail of any petition to reopen proceedings, hence, laches had set in. It ruled that a title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible after the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree of registration; and that reconveyance may only
take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongfully registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the
wrongful registration. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Ramos acquire the disputed lots by prescription.

RULING:
NO. Unregistered documents bind only the parties thereto and cannot operate against the whole world because of the basic civil
law principle of relativity of contracts which provides that contracts can only bind the parties who had entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person. Thus, failure to register the "Escritura De Compra Venta" resulted in the sale binding
between the vendee and the vendor alone and cannot bind their successors-in-interest.

Further, under the Cadastral Act, the original certificate of title issued to the original registrant shall have the same effect of
certificates of title granted under the Land Registration Act because no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse prescription. Therefore, Pedro and Spouses Ramos have no valid
claim of ownership over the disputed lots since they failed to substantiate the nature and extent of Pedro’s rights over the lots.
Even assuming that the Spouses Ramos are correct in stating that the property was acquired through mistake or fraud, as they
were not able to substantiate, An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud. The period is counted from date of issuance of the original certificate of title which the law considers
"constructive notice to all persons." An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. Failure to avail
of any of the remedies within the prescribed periods foreclosed their claims.

Inattention to titled property does not constitute abandonment for holders of the title have in their favor the protection of the
law.

Ceniza v. CA G.R. No. L-46345 30 January 1990

FACTS:
When Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for resale in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon jointly purchased Lot 627 on
installment basis, and agreed for convenience that the land be registered in the name of Vicente in February 1939. Since then,
Jose, Vicente and their heirs have possessed their respective portion of the land.

In 1954, Vicente died and his seven children succeeded to his possession of a portion of the land. In November 1961, Lot 627 was
divided into 3 parts upon the request of Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza (Lot 627-ABC). However, the children of Vicente
refused to convey Lots 627-B and C to Restituto, claiming that Vicente was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627. Thus, Restituto
and brother Jesus filed a complaint for reconveyance of the disputed property in June 1967. In their answer, the Vicente children
alleged the Jose children’s right of action had already prescribed. However, the Jose children held that Vicente held the land in
trust for them as co-owners, hence, their action was imprescriptible.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Jose children, finding that there existed a co-ownership among the parties. On
appeal, however, the decision was reversed, ruling that the Jose children’s right of action had prescribed after the lapse of 20
years from the date of registration of land on February 1939 in Vicente’s name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of title in the name of one of the co-owners constituted a repudiation of co-ownership for
purposes of acquisitive prescription.

RULING:
NO. Since a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to exist between the predecessors-in-interest of both parties, the
prescription did not run in favor of Vicente’s heirs except from the time that they repudiated the co-ownership and made the
repudiation known to the Jose children. As provided under Par. 5 of Art. 494 of the Civil Code, no prescription shall run in favor
of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Further, the registration of Lot 627 in the name of Vicente created a trust in favor of his co-owner Jose, as such Art. 1452 of the
Civil Code provides that if two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the
name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each.

As a general rule, a trustee’s possession is not adverse and cannot ripen into a title by prescription. Adverse possession requires
the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1) Trustee has performed acts of repudiation amounting to ouster of cestui que trust;
2) Such positive acts of repudiation have made known to the cestui que trust;
3) Evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.

Above elements are not present in this case since the Jose children have not been ousted from the land. Even assuming that the
Vicente children’s rejection was an act of repudiation, the prescription had not yet set in when the Jose children instituted the
action for reconveyance.

HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR v. HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON 475 SCRA 73 (2005)

FACTS: Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children-compulsory heirs. Restar’s eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a Joint
Affidavit he executed with Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration in Restar’s name. The same covers a 5,918
square meter parcel of land in Aklan which was among the properties left by Restar. Flores thereafter sought the issuance of
another Tax Declaration in his name. Flores later on died.
Ten years later, the heirs of Flores’ sisters, Dolores R. Cichon, et. al. (Heirs of Cichon) filed a Complaint against Flores’ heirs for
“partition of the lot, declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction” before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan alleging that the widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the
education of her children, to which they agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education, it would be
divided into eight equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot, the defendants Flores‘ heirs refused, they claiming
that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores. Flores‘ heirs claimed that they had been in
possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time
immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that upon Flores’ death in 1989, Esmenia
requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her children’s education, they contending that by 1977, the children
had already finished their respective courses.

The RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership,
concluded that they had acquired the lot by prescription. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision finding that there was no
adequate notice by Flores to his co-heirs of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there a categorical assertion by
the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the plaintiffs’ claim of ownership.

ISSUE: Whether or not Heirs of Flores acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription

HELD: Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just
title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty
years.

When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Heirs of Chichon
never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint
for partition subject of the present petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s death and exercised acts
of dominion thereon — tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof. Flores’
possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the
earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.

Heirs of Cichon did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945,
they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973
(exhibit “20”). If they were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in
order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers
and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in
the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor
thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever
contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And
Flores’ adverse possession was continued by his heirs.

The trial court’s finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed the land in open, adverse
and continuous possession in the concept of owner — which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted
or disputed by any of the heirs of Cichon, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner
of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.

Heirs of Navarro v. IAC

Facts: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15,
1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano
Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that
this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila
Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the
accretion as the riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed
an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject
property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On
November 10, 1975, the courta quorendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of
the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the
findings of the courta quoand granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding certain areas. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the
Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract
of land.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion

Held: The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent
to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on
what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the
applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an
accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for
public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable
of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority."Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration
that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of
establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and
Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed
lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation
Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and
owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three
Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public
domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the
sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI
and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can
these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila
Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain
Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010
FACTS:

Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 pieces of land, professing themselves to be co-owners of these
lots having acquired them by succession from their predecessors. That until the time of the application, they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the
concept of an owner and that they had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation. In
support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the pertinent tax declarations, together with the receipts of
payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the application for the reason that the tax declaration submitted to the court did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition in good faith or of prior possession in the concept of an
owner.

ISSUE: WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under
a bona fide claim of ownership.

HELD: Respondents’ possession through their predecessors-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937 when the property had
already been declared for taxation by respondent’s father. Respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not
been for the fact that, the relevant portions of the tax records on file with the Provincial Assessor had been burned when its
office was razed by fire in 1997. With the tax assessments therecame next tax payments. Respondents’ receipts for tax
expenditures were likewise in therecords and in these documents the predecessors of respondents were the named owners of
the property. Tax declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence ofownership, nevertheless, they are a
good indication of possession in the concept of an owner. No one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or at least constructive possession. Indeed, respondents herein have been in possession of the land
in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the government or from
any private individual. Itself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled and hence, deserving of protection under the law.

Republic v Herbieto
FACTS: Before this Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in a
casewhich affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu,granting the application for land
registration of the respondents.Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed
with the MTC a single application for registration of two parcels of land. They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject
Lots, which they purchased from their parents on 25 June 1976.The petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an
Opposition to the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply
with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not genuine
and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence ofbona fideacquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots
were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.

Issues:WON the Subject Lots are part of the public domain and thus cannot be subject to private appropriation.

Held: Yes. Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation
or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for
their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their
parents, Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the
concept of an owner since 1950.Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and
Disposable, The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June
1963.Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as
amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots
became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.Hence, respondents application for registration of the
Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the
procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
Republic vs Hanover G.R. No. 172102, July 2, 2010
Pursuant to PD 1529 and CA 141, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had been possessing and
occupying the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Hanover’s President and General Manager testified only with
respect to his claim that he was the former owner of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the heirs of a
certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused the payment of realty taxes due on the property; that a tax declaration was issued in
favor of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey of the subject lot, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; and that his and
Hanover’s possession of the property started in 1990.

Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.

Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. vs. Enriquez & Register of Deeds of Marikina City (G.R. No. 146262. January 21, 2005)
FACTS:

Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration of title which was granted by the land registration court and
when the decision became final and executory, it issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration
(now LRA) issued on 20 October 1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife, and Ozaeta and his
wife. On 16 July 1997, petitioners, heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion alleging that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale over the lots
executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Invoking Section 22 of PD 1529, petitioners also prayed that the
court issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. However, the Register of
Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses on 18
August 1998, pursuant to the finality of the decision of the land registration court on the application of Sandoval and Ozaeta. Petitioners then filed another
motion to declare void Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificates of Title, questioning the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the
LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator Enriquez denied the request and explained the inconsistencies in the dates in a letter. On 25 November 1998,
petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCTs on the
ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court a motion to declare such as void. Petitioners attached to the application a copy
of the 25 November 1998 motion and the pertinent OCTs. But the Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to annotate the notice of
lis pendens due to the lack of the srcinal complaint in their application. Petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. Both the LRA and the CA,
upon appeal, dismissed petitioner’s petition and appeal.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s motion to declare void the decrees issued by the LRA is a proper basis for filing the notice of lis
pendens; (2) whether or not petitioners can file the motion to declare void the decrees issued by the land registration court
despite the fact that the court has not lifted the general order of default

HELD:
The petition has no merit. (1) The notice of lis pendenshereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party
who caused it to be recorded. As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a statement of the institution
of an action or proceeding, the court where the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain
a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the land affected and its registered
owner. The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens because “the application was bereft of the srcinal petition or complaint
upon which this office will base its action.”

Petitioners’ enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application
for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not srcinal parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as
contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold
that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens.
DIGNA VERGEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125154

Facts:
On May 26, 1994 petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an application
for registration of a parcel of land.

On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the application for
registration.

On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued "an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of Republic of the Philippines

On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales filed with the trial court an "Urgent
Motion to Set Aside the Order of General Default" alleging, inter alia, in her affidavit that she "is
claiming the land in question subject of this petition as an owner x x x" but was denied by the
RTC.
On December 13, 1995, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals.
On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision annulling the trial court’s
orders.

Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in setting aside the trial court’s order of general default in the land
registration case involved without making a specific finding of fraud, negligence, accident or
excusable mistake but relying on its view that substantial justice and speedy determination of
the controversy would be better attained in lifting the order of general default, to enable a
claimant to oppose and to establish a case of ownership in herself.

Held:
We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside the trial court’s order of
general default without factual basis save for its own gut feeling, ipse dixit. Respondent’s failure
to file timely opposition to the application for land registration because she missed reading the
publication of the notice in the Official Gazette or in the newspaper "Malaya" issue of August 8,
1994,12 in itself may not be considered excusable negligence.