(Advances in Environmental Engineering and Green Technologies) Davorin Mata

Risk Analysis for
Prevention of Hazardous
Situations in Petroleum
and Natural Gas
Engineering
Davorin Matanovic
University of Zagreb, Croatia
Nediljka Gaurina-Medjimurec
Katarina Simon
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Risk analysis for prevention of hazardous situations in petroleum and natural gas engineering / Davorin Matanovic, Nediljka
Gaurina-Medjimurec, and Katarina Simon, editors.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary: “This book explains the potential hazards of petroleum engineering activities, emphasizing risk assessments in
drilling, completion, and production, and the gathering, transportation, and storage of hydrocarbons”-- Provided by
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ISBN 978-1-4666-4777-0 (hardcover) -- ISBN 978-1-4666-4778-7 (ebook) -- ISBN 978-1-4666-4779-4 (print & perpetual
access) 1. Petroleum industry and trade--Safety measures. 2. Petroleum industry and trade--Accidents--Risk assessment. 3.
Gas industry--Accidents--Risk assessment. 4. Oil well drilling--Safety measures. 5. Gas well drilling--Safety measures. I.
Matanovic, Davorin, 1949- II. Gaurina-Medjimurec, Nediljka, 1957- III. Simon, Katarina, 1962-
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Risk Analysis for Prevention of Hazardous Situations in Petroleum and Natural Gas Engineering
Davorin Matanovic (University of Zagreb, Croatia) Nediljka Gaurina- Medjimurec (University of Zagreb, Croatia)
and Katarina Simon (University of Zagreb, Croatia)
Engineering Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 415pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466647770) • US $185.00 (our price)
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Malaysia Terengganu, Malaysia) Ab Saman Ab Kader (Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Malaysia) and Wan Mohd
Norsani Wan Nik (University Malaysia Terengganu, Malaysia)
Information Science Reference • copyright 2014 • 338pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781466643178) • US $195.00 (our price)
Sustainable Technologies, Policies, and Constraints in the Green Economy

Andrei Jean-Vasile (Petroleum and Gas University of Ploiesti, Romania) Turek Rahoveanu Adrian (Institute of
Research for Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Romania) Jonel Subic (Institute of Agricultural
Economics, Belgrade, Serbia) and Dorel Dusmanescu (Petroleum and Gas University of Ploiesti, Romania)
Energy-Aware Systems and Networking for Sustainable Initiatives

Naima Kaabouch (University of North Dakota, USA) and Wen-Chen Hu (University of North Dakota, USA)
Green and Ecological Technologies for Urban Planning Creating Smart Cities
Ozge Yalciner Ercoskun (Gazi University, Turkey)
Environmental Modeling for Sustainable Regional Development System Approaches and Advanced Methods
Vladimír Olej (University of Pardubice, Czech Republic) Ilona Obršálová (University of Pardubice, Czech Republic)
and Jirí Krupka (University of Pardubice, Czech Republic)
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Vladislav Brkic, INA Plc, Croatia
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Frankica Kapor, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Table of Contents
Preface . ...................................................................................................................................xv
Chapter 1
General Approach to Risk Analysis ...........................................................................................1
Davorin Matanovic, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Chapter 2
Risk Due to Wellbore Instability . ............................................................................................23
Nediljka Gaurina-Medjimurec, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Borivoje Pasic, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Chapter 3
Risk Due to Pipe Sticking ........................................................................................................47
Chapter 4
Lost Circulation .......................................................................................................................73
Chapter 5
Simultaneous Operations .........................................................................................................96
Zdenko Kristafor, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Chapter 6
The Macondo 252 Disaster: Causes and Consequences.........................................................115
Chapter 7
Risk Analysis of Completion and Production Systems .........................................................132
Chapter 8
Risk and Remediation of Irreducible Casing Pressure at Petroleum Wells ...........................155
Andrew K. Wojtanowicz, Louisiana State University, USA
Chapter 9
Risk Analysis in the Process of Hydraulic Fracturing ...........................................................181
Sonja Koščak Kolin, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Marin Čikeš, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Chapter 10
Workover Impact on Accidental Risk ....................................................................................199
Bojan Moslavac, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Chapter 11
Gathering Systems and Processing Facilities Risk Analysis .................................................218
Svijetlana Dubovski, INA Plc, Croatia
Chapter 12
Activities in Oil and Gas Processing for Avoiding or Minimizing Environmental
Impacts . .................................................................................................................................247
Chapter 13
Transportation Risk Analysis .................................................................................................264
Dragan Crnčević, INA Plc, Croatia
Chapter 14
Oil and Gas Storage Tank Risk Analysis ...............................................................................303
Katarina Simon, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Chapter 15
CO2 Underground Storage and Wellbore Integrity ................................................................322
Chapter 16
Petroleum Industry Environmental Performance and Risk ...................................................358
Lidia Hrncevic, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Compilation of References ..................................................................................................388
About the Contributors .......................................................................................................410
Index.......................................................................................................................................413
Detailed Table of Contents
Preface . ...................................................................................................................................xv
Chapter 1
General Approach to Risk Analysis ...........................................................................................1
Broadly accepted methodology that is implemented in the oil industry when dealing with risks
includes as the first step the identification of possible hazards. That is done by gathering informa-
tion about degree of risk according to working procedures, processes, and individuals involved
in the operation of the process. That is the first step in risk management, an iterative process
that must lead to the use of proper measurements in the way of protecting people, facilities
and environment. The analysis is done based on the combination of probability and severity of
undesirable events, and the final consequences. Explanation of basic terms, their interdepen-
dence, dilemmas, and methods of risk analysis are introduced. Each method is shortly described
with main anteriority and shortcomings. Differences between quantitative methods, qualitative
methods, and hybrid methods (the combination of qualitative-quantitative or semi-quantitative
methods) are elaborated. The impact, occurrence, and the consequences are at the end compared
to risk acceptance criteria concept. The ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) framework
is explained with some observation on the quality and acceptance in petroleum industry. Finally,
the human impact on the risk and consequences is analyzed.
Chapter 2
Risk Due to Wellbore Instability . ............................................................................................23
Exploration and production as one of the most important parts of the petroleum industry en-
counters different problems, usually resulting in nonproductive time and additional expenses.
The most common and most expensive of them are related to wellbore instability and associ-
ated problems. Wellbore instability problems are usually related to drilling operation, but they
can also appear during completion, workover, or the production stage of a certain well. The
traditional solution for wellbore instability problems is composed from the early recognition
of specific wellbore instability problems, the main cause identification and swift response. For
more effective solution it is necessary to incorporate wellbore stability and risk assessment in
the early phase of well design. This chapter gives one general overview of wellbore instability
problems and their causes as well as an overview of actual approaches and methods in wellbore
stability and risk assessment.
Chapter 3
Risk Due to Pipe Sticking ........................................................................................................47
A stuck pipe is a common worldwide drilling problem in terms of time and financial cost. It
causes significant increases in non-productive time and losses of millions of dollars each year in
the petroleum industry. There are many factors affecting stuck pipe occurrence such as improper
mud design, poor hole cleaning, differential pressure, key seating, balling up of bit, accumula-
tion of cuttings, poor bottom hole assembly configuration, etc. The causes of a stuck pipe can be
divided into two categories: (a) differential sticking and (b) mechanical sticking. Differential-
pressure pipe sticking occurs when a portion of the drill string becomes embedded in a filter
cake that forms on the wall of a permeable formation during drilling. Mechanical sticking is
connected with key seating, formation-related wellbore instability, wellbore geometry (devia-
tion and ledges), inadequate hole cleaning, junk in hole, collapsed casing, and cement related
problems. Stuck pipe risk could be minimized by using available methodologies for stuck pipe
prediction and avoiding based on available drilling parameters.
Chapter 4
Lost Circulation .......................................................................................................................73
Lost circulation is defined as the uncontrolled flow of mud into a thief zone and presents one of
the major risks associated with drilling. The complete prevention of lost circulation is impossible,
but limiting circulation loss is possible if certain precautions are taken. Failure to minimize lost
circulation can greatly increase the cost of drilling, as well as the risk of well loss. The risk of
drilling a well in areas known to contain potential zones of lost circulation such as fractured,
cavernous, or high permeability formations is a key factor in making a decision to approve or
cancel a drilling project. The successful management of lost circulation should include iden-
tification of potential loss zones, optimization of drilling hydraulics, and remedial measures
when lost circulation occures.
Chapter 5
Simultaneous Operations .........................................................................................................96
Zdenko Kristafor, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Simultaneous operations can be defined as conducting independent operations in which the
course of any operation may impact the safety of personnel, equipment, and environment of
another operation. Operations are meant in terms of performing drilling, completion, work-
over, and construction or production activities simultaneously, mainly at offshore facilities. In
general, they have an impact on the installation safety procedures and contingency planning
program. Thus, for the purpose of performing simultaneous operations, they must comply with
organizational safety and technological requirements. They are to be coordinated through joint
planning efforts by supervisors who plan and direct activities. Typical chain-of-command as
well as simultaneous operations decision making process flow diagrams are presented in this
chapter. Basic steps to be regarded are performing risk assessment, assess and control risks,
monitor the simultaneous tasks and communicate the control measures. Communication is the
key to performing these tasks safely.
Chapter 6
The Macondo 252 Disaster: Causes and Consequences.........................................................115
The disaster of the Deepwater Horizon platform, while drilling the Macondo 252 well in the Gulf
of Mexico in 2010 is for now the last of numerous tragedies, blowouts, and oil spills resulting
from petroleum engineering activities. After the accident, several commissions, investigation
groups, advisory committees, and company reports were prepared. They investigate causes and
consequences of the disaster from different standpoints, but mainly come to the same conclu-
sions. The “nth” approach is presented in this chapter.
Chapter 7
Risk Analysis of Completion and Production Systems .........................................................132
A variety of definitions are available through the literature, but the universal one is in defining
the well completion as the optimal path for the reservoir fluids to be produced. That means to
achieve a desired production with minimal costs. Wells represent the greatest part of expenditure
when developing the reservoir. For a long period of time it was defined to be simple, reliable,
and safe with enough flexibility to allow future operations. Nowadays, so called “intelligent
completions” appear to give more financial benefits, flexibility, and control. The reliability of
system components is essential for long-lasting production. In addition, the differences accord-
ing to natural flowing well risk and artificial lift are given.
Chapter 8
Risk and Remediation of Irreducible Casing Pressure at Petroleum Wells ...........................155
Andrew K. Wojtanowicz, Louisiana State University, USA
Oil well cement problems such as small cracks or channels may result in gas migration and
lead to irreducible pressure at the casing head. Irreducible casing pressure also termed, Sus-
tained Casing Pressure (SCP) is hazardous for a safe operation and the affected wells cannot
be terminated without remedial operations. It is believed that even very small leaks might lead
to continuous emissions of gas to the atmosphere. In the chapter, the author describes physical
mechanisms of irreducible casing pressure and qualifies the associated risk by showing statis-
tical data from the Gulf of Mexico and discussing the regulatory approach. This chapter also
introduces a new approach to evaluate risk of casing pressure by computing a probable rate of
atmospheric emissions from wells with failed casing heads resulting from excessive pressure.
Also presented is a new method for assessing potential for self-plugging of such wells flowing
wet gas as the gas migration channels could be plugged off by the condensate.
Chapter 9
Risk Analysis in the Process of Hydraulic Fracturing ...........................................................181
Sonja Koščak Kolin, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Marin Čikeš, University of Zagreb, Croatia
This chapter focuses on risk to the environment from hydraulic fracturing operations, starting
with transport of materials and ending when the well is routed to the production facilities. The
initial assumption for the fracturing risk analysis is that the well is new and was constructed
correctly so that all producible formations are securely isolated behind the barriers of casing
and competent cement. The justification for this assumption is that the vast majority of fractur-
ing is the first major stimulation in a well and occurs immediately after completing a new well.
Although many well development problems are blamed on fracturing, there are only excluded
problems that are real and worthy of the discussion to help define boundaries of the fracturing
risk (King, 2012).
Chapter 10
Workover Impact on Accidental Risk ....................................................................................199
Bojan Moslavac, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Certain risks are very common to any application of a downhole control system during workover
while others will be field-specific or at least increased or decreased by the given well conditions.
Workover anomalies may be caused by erosion, corrosion, mechanical errors, temperature effects
on electronics, wear and tear on the dynamic seals, or seizure of moving components. Obviously,
the simpler the system and the fewer moving parts, the fewer components are available to fail.
Procedures and supporting control software must be developed to ensure optimum system use.
Blowouts are not very common today as most blowout preventing systems serve the purpose.
However, occasionally, these systems may fail due to either technical problems on the wellbore
equipment or human error. Both reasons can cause enormous damage on wellbore equipment,
reservoir, surface facilities, or even human loss. The right accidental risk assessment approach
can reduce the chances of repeating bad scenarios that happened in the past.
Chapter 11
Gathering Systems and Processing Facilities Risk Analysis .................................................218
Gathering system is defined as one or more segments of pipeline, usually interconnected to form
a network that transports oil and natural gas from the production wells to one or more produc-
tion facilities, gas processing plant, storage facility, or a shipping point. There are two types of
pipeline networks: radial and trunk system. Produced well fluids are often complex mixtures
of the liquid hydrocarbons, gas, and some impurities that can have detrimental effects on the
integrity of the gathering pipelines. It is necessary to eliminate most of the impurities before
oil and natural gas can be stored and sold. Complexity of the processing facility depends on
the treated fluid composition. Environmental impacts during the oil and gas transportation and
processing phase will cause long-term habitat changes. To minimize that, it is very important
to implement appropriate activities across the designing, construction, operational, and decom-
missioning phases.
Chapter 12
Activities in Oil and Gas Processing for Avoiding or Minimizing Environmental
Impacts . ................................................................................................................................247
Formal risk assessments are necessary at various phases of the asset life cycle as they help
personnel identify, evaluate, and control hazards that could result in loss of life, injury, pollu-
tion, property damage, or business disruption. Hazard evaluations of production development
concepts or facility design are well-defined processes, for which much literature is available as
guidance. Such evaluations are mandated in some jurisdictions for project regulatory approval.
This chapter provides guidance on activities implementation from designing phase, construction
phase, operational phase, and decommissioning phase of gathering and processing systems. For
each phase, activities that can be implemented to avoid or minimize environmental impact are
described, emphasizing the implementation purpose.
Chapter 13
Transportation Risk Analysis .................................................................................................264
Dragan Crnčević, INA Plc, Croatia
Petroleum is transported across the water in barges and tankers, and on land, using pipelines,
trucks, and trains. Natural gas is moved, mainly, by pipelines. The most common causes of
tanker accidents are: fire/explosions, loading/offloading, structural damage, collision, and
grounding. Pipeline accidents are due to: corrosion, third parties activities, mechanical damage,
natural events, and operational error. Some of the most commonly applied preventive activities
that reduce spills in waterborne transportation are: double-hulled tanker, navigation safety and
radio communications equipment, tanker exclusion zone, etc. The pipeline condition can be
recorded by using various nondestructive measurement techniques or by chemical analysis of
fluid flows. Different types of sensors can be used to locate and determine the size of an anomaly
in the pipeline geometry. Mayor methods for detecting leaks are measuring the hydrodynamic
parameters or registering abnormal conditions in the fluid flow and detecting phenomena in the
immediate vicinity of the pipeline.
Chapter 14
Oil and Gas Storage Tank Risk Analysis ...............................................................................303
Katarina Simon, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Storage tanks are widely used in the oil refinery and petrochemical industry in storing a multi-
tude of different products ranging from gases, liquids, solids, and mixtures. Design and safety
concerns have become a priority due to tank failures causing environment pollution as well as
fires and explosions, which can result in injuries and fatalities. The chapter illustrates different
types of crude oil and oil product storage tanks as well as the risks regarding the storage itself.
Considering that the natural gas, in its gaseous state, is stored in underground storages like oil
and gas depleted reservoirs, aquifers or salt caverns, and there are numerous publications and
books covering the subject in detail, this chapter only illustrates the storage of liquefied natural
gas and the risks posed by its storage.
Chapter 15
CO2 Underground Storage and Wellbore Integrity ................................................................322
Geologic storage is the component of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in which the carbon
dioxide (CO2) is disposed in the appropriate underground formation. To successfully inject
CO2 into the subsurface to mitigate greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the CO2 must to be
trapped in the subsurface and must not be allowed to leak to the surface or to potable water
sources above the injection zone. For the purposes of risk assessment, a priority is to evaluate
what would happen if CO2 migrated unexpectedly through the confining unit(s), potentially
resulting in undesirable impacts on a variety of potential receptors. One of the main risks iden-
tified in geological CO2 storage is the potential for CO2 leakage through or along wells. To
avoid leakage from the injection wells, the integrity of the wells must be maintained during the
injection period and for as long as free CO2 exists in the injection zone.
Chapter 16
Petroleum Industry Environmental Performance and Risk ...................................................358
Lidia Hrncevic, University of Zagreb, Croatia
The petroleum industry holds long- and short-term environmental risks. Besides production
fluids, all petroleum industry activities involve either use of fluids, which contain abundant
substances, or waste generation, both associated with potential risk to the environment. The
principal environmental risk associated with the petroleum industry is the risk of fluid spill/
emission to the environment. Although in recent decades the risk analysis methodologies have
matured, to date there is still no universally accepted methodology for environmental risk as-
sessment in petroleum industry. In this chapter, the petroleum industry’s environmental incident
history and statistics are presented. The environmental impact of the petroleum industry’s ac-
tivities, its extent, and trends are analyzed. The overview of pollution sources with associated
environmental risk is given along with the analysis of the causes and consequences of incidents
in the petroleum industry.
Compilation of References ..................................................................................................388
About the Contributors .......................................................................................................410
Index.......................................................................................................................................413
xv
Preface
The accelerated growth of the world population and their living standard also includes the growth
of energy needs. New developments in knowledge and technology change the prediction of
Hubbert’s oil peak curve philosophy in the direction of much higher hydrocarbon reserves that
can be exploited. These reserves are spread all over the world, but the largest reserves are con-
centrated in several areas that correspond with the known spacing of the source rocks (Middle
East, Northern and Central Africa, Siberia-Russia, North Sea, Alaska, Central USA, Gulf of
Mexico, South America, Indonesia, China, etc.). The estimated quantity of oil which engineer-
ing and economic data demonstrate that is recoverable with reasonable certainty, under existing
economic and operating conditions, has been estimated about 1.27·1012 barrels (202·109 m3) in
2003, and 1.39·1012 barrels (216·109 m3) in 2011, but the different estimations are going up to
3.9·1012 barrels (620·109 m3). At the same time, the gas reserves are estimated to be 6.4·1015 ft3
(1.8·1014 m3).
Such growing demands demand new paths for supply from the layer/deposit to the users. The
supply path starts with the well (that exists or must be drilled) and continues with completion,
production, gathering, and transportation to the storage systems. All of that can be a potential
source of hazard for people and the environment.
The Macondo disaster, the last known worldwide oil spill, is only the fourth of the world’s
largest oil spills. The first, the Gulf War oil spill in Kuwait (11·106 barrels; 1.75·106 m3), was
the result of the destruction of thousands of wellheads that prevented blowout and controlled
production from the well when functioning correctly. Several others on the list were the result
of blowouts, starting with the first one, Shaw Gusher (Canada, 1862), and the Lucas Gusher
(USA, 1901). Qom Wildcat Gusher (Iran, 1956) was the largest one with a spill of about 10.8·106
barrels (1.71·106 m3) of oil.
The second largest oil spills are the result of tanker disasters. The biggest was the Atlantic
Empress (West Indies, 1979), with 2.1·106 bbl (0.33·106 m3) of oil spilled. Several other large
tanker disasters are known, but the most publicity was given to Exxon Valdez (Alaska, 1989)
with “only” 260,000 barrels (41,340 m3) of oil spilled.
When talking about petroleum transport, it is mainly through the pipelines. The leakages
of such systems are usually not visible because they are buried in the ground. In some areas
(Africa), human greediness or poverty can result in tragedies, when the stealing of oil from the
pipeline finishes with explosion or fire.
xvi
As the last point of the pathway is the storage system, which can differ in volume. They have
to store all the produced hydrocarbons before the final use. Statistically, it is possible that some
or many of them could catch fire, but much more of them can leak.
All of that shows that the path of the oil or gas from the layer/deposit to the user can seriously
endanger people and the environment.
The essential part of the book will be the engineering analysis of potential hazards and risk
assessment in three areas: (1) drilling, (2) completion, production, workover, and formation treat-
ments, and (3) gathering, transportation, and storage of hydrocarbons. In addition, the sources
and triggers of the hazards are determined, and remedial or controlling actions elaborated.
The aim of the book is to point out the potential risk of any of those three segments of pe-
troleum engineering activities. The risk assessment and the designing and working approach
in direction of avoiding accidents are elaborated.
The book gives a short introduction to the problem with the approach to risk analysis in chapter
1. Explanation of basic terms, their interdependence, dilemmas, and methods of risk analysis
are introduced. Each method is shortly described with main anteriority and shortcomings. The
impact, occurrence, and the consequences are at the end compared to the risk acceptance criteria
concept. The ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) framework is explained with some
observation on the quality and acceptance in petroleum industry. Finally, the human impact on
the risk and consequences is analyzed.
Wellbore instability problems are usually related to drilling operation, but they can also
appear during completion, workover, or the production stage of certain wells. Chapter 2 gives
one general overview of wellbore instability problems and their causes as well as an overview
of actual approaches and methods in wellbore stability and risk assessment.
causes significant increases in non-productive time and losses of millions of dollars each year
in the petroleum industry. Stuck pipe risk could be minimized by using available methodolo-
gies for stuck pipe prediction and avoiding based on available drilling parameters as is stated
in chapter 3.
In chapter 4, lost circulation is defined as the uncontrolled flow of mud into a thief zone and
presents one of the major risks associated with drilling. Successful management of lost circula-
tion should include identification of potential loss zones, optimization of drilling hydraulics,
and remedial measures when lost circulation occurs.
Simultaneous operations as given in chapter 5 are to be coordinated through joint planning
efforts by production, workover/completion, drilling and construction supervisors, and/or
engineers, who plan and direct activities. Typical chain-of-command as well as simultaneous
operations decision making process flow diagrams are presented in this chapter. In general,
they have an impact on the installation safety procedures and contingency planning program.
Once the simultaneous operations have been identified, there are basic steps to be regarded:
performing risk assessment, assess and control risks, monitor the simultaneous tasks, and com-
municate the control measures.
xvii
After the accident on the Deepwater Horizon platform, while drilling the Macondo 252 well
in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, several commissions, investigation groups, advisory commit-
tees, and company reports have been prepared. The author’s approach is presented in chapter 6.
Well completion is defined as the optimal path for the reservoir fluids to be produced. The
reliability of system components is essential for long lasting production. In addition, the differ-
ences according to natural flowing well risk and artificial lift are given. Nowadays, so called
“intelligent completions” appear to give more financial benefits, flexibility, and control, but
also a new range of risks, as explained in chapter 7.
Irreducible casing pressure, also termed Sustained Casing Pressure (SCP), is hazardous for
a safe operation, and the affected wells cannot be terminated without remedial operations. In
chapter 8, physical mechanisms of irreducible casing pressure and qualification of the associ-
ated risk by showing statistical data from the Gulf of Mexico and discussing the regulatory ap-
proach are introduced, with new approach to evaluate the risk of casing pressure by computing
a probable rate of atmospheric emissions from wells with failed casing heads resulting from
excessive pressure.
Chapter 9 is focused on the risk to the environment from hydraulic fracturing operations.
problems that are real and worthy of the discussion to help define boundaries of the fractur-
ing risk. The initial assumption for the fracturing risk analysis is that the well is new and was
constructed correctly so that all producible formations are securely isolated behind the barriers
of casing and competent cement.
Workover risk and anomalies may be caused by erosion, corrosion, mechanical errors, and
temperature effects on electronics, wear and tear on the dynamic seals, or seizure of moving
components. Obviously, the simpler the system and the fewer moving parts, the fewer compo-
nents are available to fail. The right approach and operating system selection is essential, as
shown in chapter 10.
Gathering system as defined in chapter 11, include one or more segments of pipeline, usu-
ally interconnected to form a network that transports oil and natural gas from the production
wells to one or more production facilities as well as from production facility to the inlet of a
gas processing plant, storage facility, or a shipping point. Complexity of the processing facility
depends on the treated fluid composition. Environmental impact during the oil and gas trans-
portation and processing phase will cause long-term habitat changes. Such impact would also
occur when surface facilities are removed after their useful life in a process of decommissioning.
To avoid or minimize the environmental impact of gathering systems and surface facilities, it is
very important to implement appropriate activities across the various phases: designing phase,
construction, operational, and decommissioning phase.
Chapter 12 provides guidance on activity implementation from the designing phase, construc-
tion phase, operational phase, and decommissioning phase of gathering and processing systems.
xviii
Petroleum and natural gas must be moved from the production site to refineries or to users.
These movements are made by using a number of different modes of transportation. Petroleum is
transported across the water in barges and tankers. On land, petroleum is moved using pipelines,
trucks, and trains. Natural gas is moved, mainly, by pipelines. Most of the time petroleum and
natural gas are transported quietly and safely. However, accidents do occur. Chapter 13 describes
the causes of incidents during oil and gas transportation both on land and across water.
Chapter 14 illustrates different types of crude oil and oil product storage tanks as well as the
risks regarding the storage itself. Considering that the natural gas, in its gaseous state, is stored
in underground storages like oil and gas depleted reservoirs, aquifers or salt caverns, and there
are numerous publications and books covering the subject in detail, this chapter will only il-
lustrate the storage of liquefied natural gas and the risks posed by its storage.
Geologic storage as the component of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is elaborated in
chapter 15. For the purposes of risk assessment, a priority is to evaluate what would happen if
CO2 migrated unexpectedly through the confining unit(s), potentially resulting in undesirable
impacts on a variety of potential receptors. One of the main risks identified in geological CO2
storage is the potential for CO2 leakage through or along wells. To avoid leakage from the injec-
tion wells, the integrity of the wells must be maintained during the injection period and for as
long as free CO2 exists in the injection zone.
In chapter 16, the petroleum industry’s environmental incident history and statistics are pre-
sented. In addition, the environmental impact of the petroleum industry’s activities, its extent,
and trends is analyzed. The overview of pollution sources with associated environmental risk
is given along with the analysis of the causes and consequences of incidents in the petroleum
industry. The impact on live organisms, soil, water, and air are discussed in general.
Davorin Matanovic
1
Chapter 1
General Approach to
Risk Analysis
Davorin Matanovic
ABSTRACT
Broadly accepted methodology that is implemented in the oil industry when dealing with risks
includes as the first step the identification of possible hazards. That is done by gathering informa-
tion about degree of risk according to working procedures, processes, and individuals involved
in the operation of the process. That is the first step in risk management, an iterative process
that must lead to the use of proper measurements in the way of protecting people, facilities and
environment. The analysis is done based on the combination of probability and severity of un-
desirable events, and the final consequences. Explanation of basic terms, their interdependence,
dilemmas, and methods of risk analysis are introduced. Each method is shortly described with
main anteriority and shortcomings. Differences between quantitative methods, qualitative methods,
and hybrid methods (the combination of qualitative-quantitative or semi-quantitative methods)
are elaborated. The impact, occurrence, and the consequences are at the end compared to risk
acceptance criteria concept. The ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) framework is
explained with some observation on the quality and acceptance in petroleum industry. Finally,
the human impact on the risk and consequences is analyzed.
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch001
Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
General Approach to Risk Analysis
INTRODUCTION ponents acting. Also that will help to select

possible solutions to eliminate the hazard. A
The best approach in defining the risk is hazard can be defined as a substance, event
the implementation of risk management. It or situation, with the potential to cause direct
includes at the same time measures to avoid harm or initiate a sequence of events leading
the occurrence of the hazard and other to to harm. Harm is defined as a physical injury
reduce possible harms. Reason for that is the or damage to the health of people or damage
cognition that risk cannot be eliminated; so to property or the environment (ISO/IEC,
it has to be managed. 2012). In petroleum engineering it can include
In decision-making process or system release of flammable or explosive substances
design; the hazard analysis, the risk analy- or vapors, chemical spills, leaking pipes or
ses, and at last the risk assessment should be valves, falling objects, etc. The effects or the
conducted as the part of the risk management consequences of the hazard can be immediate
process (Kavianian, 2003). They are used to or long-term. They should impact people, the
identify possible hazards and treats, analyze environment or the economic resources. The
the causes and consequences and give the problems themselves are many and varied, and
description of possible risk. To understand different methods are required in order to deal
the meaning of risk analysis, some differences with them. Most of the techniques developed
and meanings attached to the term should be to date are applied during the development of
precisely defined. The term “risk analysis” a specific project. Therefore they should be
has been adopted by petroleum industry rather discussed according to the normal sequence
than “hazard analysis” adopted by some au- of project development phases: conceptual
thors involved in chemical industry problems design and planning; detailed analysis; con-
(Kletz, 1999). Nevertheless the term would be struction; commissioning and operation. The
(risk analysis or hazard analysis) it is used to identification of a hazard is referred as the most
describe methods that are used to identify haz- important step in a risk assessment process. It
ards and help to estimate the probability and relies on knowledge retention, which means,
possible consequences of possible accident. to be able to store and retrieve the information
The relation of probability and severity of the and knowledge generated earlier, learning
undesirable event, can determine if the risk is through experience and accidents involved.
acceptable or not. When it is not acceptable, It also includes the ability to predict hazards
must the system be modified to lower one or and combinations of hazards that have not yet
another or both causes of the accident. To been encountered. Figure 1 is an illustration
repeat in other words; the term “risk analysis” of the hazard identification process.
in this book will be addressed to description Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) meth-
and identification of the undesirable events odology, that was developed by nuclear in-
and characterization the cause and effects of dustry, and can be implied on oil and gas
“hazards”. Two important items in the analysis industry, in fact answers three questions: (1)
terminology are “risk” and “hazard”. What can go wrong in the process?; (2) How
The risk assessment will indicate the appro- likely is the accident scenario to occur as the
priate process hazard analysis methodology probability or a frequency?; and (3) What
that should be applied to the process. This should be the consequences? In quantitative
will add in identifying of the different types risk assessment (QRA), hazard identification
of hazards that influence the system com- can be the most important step. The explana-
2
Figure 1. Illustration of the hazard identification process (Brandsæter, 2002)
tion can be that something not identified, can 0 and 1 is used. In fact the probability of a
not be evaluated nor mitigated. The process given occurrence or event is equal to 1 minus
reclines on stored and retrieved knowledge the risk for this event not occurring. When
through information gathered in previous work there are simultaneous occurrences of several
or project designs. Also experiences when independent events, the probability is equal to
coping with accidents, blow-outs or other are the product of their individual probabilities.
beneficial. Site visits to drilling rigs, produc- If there are occurrences of several mutually
tion or other systems are important too. They exclusive events, the probability of occurrence
enable the control of system functioning, and of at least one event is equal to the sum of the
the most important are the safety systems. probabilities of each individual event. Defin-
Hazard identification can be accomplished ing of probability of either one or both of two
using different techniques; reviews, check- independent events is done using combination
lists, using hazard and operability studies rule. That means that the overall probability
(HAZOP), what-if analysis and other. The is the sum of independent probabilities minus
outputs are the possible accidents that should their multiplication.
be further analyzed. The best results can be achieved when used
The confusion in terminology can lead to through the development of the project. The
misunderstanding. That is because accord- approach is illustrated in Figure 2.
ing to the definition of the risk it implies The idea is to analyze the project through
that for quantitative expression of risk, the design and development stages. Doing so, it
probability or expected frequency is used. makes possible to make necessary changes
The probability (P) scale ranges from 0.0 to that arise from prior analysis.
1.0 where the end points of the scale; P = 1.0 Risk refers to the likelihood of occurrence
means 100% certainty and P = 0.0 means 0% of events that would have adverse consequenc-
certainty. The opposite of probability is risk. es upon the safety of people, the environment,
Much more, the fraction in interval between or economic resources. To be able to specify
3
Figure 2. Illustration of hazard analyses during the development of a project (Yokel & Simiu, 1985)
the risk, it is necessary to specify the event Also the term exposure (E) should be a
that must be considered, the possibility of the part of the expression of a risk, because the
event to occur at the specific site over a given setting in which the event frequency and
period of time, and the possible consequences consequences were considered, to be able to
of the event according to value or degree of directly relate risk estimates to specific activi-
losses which my be incurred. The probability ties considered for safety action, standard or
of such undesirable events to occur can be regulations.
expressed in two ways; qualitatively (e.g. rare,
occasional, frequent) or quantitatively, as a R=f(F, C, E) (2)
normalized frequency or probability.
In the petroleum industry the favorable When exposure is included, risk is ex-
definition of risk (R) involves the frequency of pressed in terms of probable consequences per
an undesired event (F) and the consequences unit of exposure through the period of time
of the event (C); (It is an combination of the that was analyzed for specific activity. The
probability of an event and its consequences: consequences of a hazard can be immediate or
act on long-term. They can also be expressed
R=f(F,C) (1)
4
quantitatively through economic loss or fatal- just the exposure of biological organisms to
ity rate, or qualitatively as severe or minor. the damage. The idea is too find the mostly
Risk when defined as the consequence per endangered species and analyze the way it
unit of time is in fact the multiplication of can sustain the hazard. If it shows that the
the frequency expressed as event per unit of reproduction potential and natural mortality
time and the magnitude of the consequence rate is related, the recovery time should be
per event. determined.
Risk analysis is a relatively promising
n approach which might be used to identify,
Risk = ∑ C i Fi (3)
i =1
analyze, and manage the hazards associated
with complex technological projects such as
onshore and offshore oil and gas operations.
where (Ci) is the consequence of undesir-
A full risk analysis of a design or an operat-
able event that can be expressed in currency,
ing procedure requires a number of steps, as
lives or volume of hydrocarbons; (Fi) is the
shown in Figure 3.
frequency of occurrence expressed per unit
For a specified system, with definite design
of time, per installation or per operation, and
and operating procedures, the first step in risk
(i) is the ith sequence.
analysis is the identification of the hazards,
When dealing with people and the rest of
risks and consequences. Knowing the accep-
the environment as the subjects in a process,
tance criteria and other requirements if any,
the term “vulnerability” can play significant
risks are evaluated as acceptable or unaccept-
role in understanding hazard impact. In
able. When risks can not be accepted, the
such context risk is the product of hazard
whole procedure or the design should be re-
and vulnerability. The impact may be lethal,
vised or acceptance criteria and requirements
what includes loss of lives or non-lethal with
Figure 3. Flow diagram of risk analysis
5
modified, until one can proceed with the (International Electro technical Commission)
project. recommendations.
When hazards and possible threats are The first step is to analyze risk through
identified, cause and consequence analysis three steps. First is the hazard identification
done and risk is described, the next step is through the identification of sources of po-
the evaluation of obtained results. The evalu- tentially hazardous situations. The aim is to
ation process is defined as risk assessment. define likelihood of such occurrences. Next
Next step connote the treatment of risk in the step is the identification of sequence of events
way of reduction or other way of treatment. that can lead to hazards. There is always some
Such process is called risk management kind of initiator or trigger that starts the se-
and means all activities with regard to risk. quence of events and the result can be hazards
According to Aven &Vinnenm (2007) risk and exposure to harmful impacts. Simply, any
management means to achieve “an appropri- outcome having potential to cause harm or
ate balance between realizing opportunities damage relevant to the risk acceptance crite-
for gains while minimizing losses”. Figure ria must be considered. Such incidents can
4 is the flow diagram of the risk assessment lead to losses and damages. They can be hu-
and reduction process as a combination of man lives, damage of the environment or
two concepts based on ISO (International material losses of different kind. Such pos-
Organization for Standardization) and IEC sible consequences should be identified and
Figure 4. Flow diagram of risk management process
6
evaluated. Through that the risk is evaluated reviews with questions and process parameters
as well. The derived risks are than compared that are used to discuss the process design,
to the criteria or guidelines or legislative to operation or malfunction. Quantitative tech-
determine the tolerability of the achieved risk. niques are represented by mathematical evalu-
That is the step of making the decision in the ation, based on historical evidence through
way of risk reduction measures if risk is not data bases, about failures. Using such data it
tolerable. In petroleum engineering there is is than possible to predict the occurrence of
a wide range of possible failure cases that undesired event or hazard. Hybrid techniques
should lead to hazards. The main can be de- represent the combination of those mentioned
fined as: (1) blowouts through the drilling, before. They are more complex due to their ad
completion, workover and well abandonment, hoc character that changes the combination
(2) all kind of well control incidents that are of used techniques according to the problem
not so severe as blowouts, (3) any leak of gas, that must be analyzed.
oil or both in production, gathering, storage The first group – Quantitative Techniques
and transportation processes, (4) fires regard- that are widely and mostly in use (relative
less to cause and place, (5) spills of other frequency is over 65%) are based on numeri-
dangerous materials – chemicals, fuels, bottled cal values of the probability, vulnerability and
gas leaks, radioactive materials etc., (6) ac- consequences, that as a result gives a nu-
cidental explosive detonations – perforator merical value of the risk.
charges, (7) dropped objects on rigs and plat- The Proportional Risk-Assessment (PRAT)
forms, through construction, derrick rigging- Technique: (Ayyub, 2003) Calculates the risk
up, crane transfer etc., (8) transport accidents, using a proportional formula with included
(9) marine events and collisions including consideration of potential consequences of the
diving accidents, and (10) structural events accident, the probability of the accident and
due to material fatigue, design error, founda- the possible exposure. The risk is the product
tion failure, different collapses and natural of the probability factor, severity factor and
disasters. the frequency or exposure factor. It strongly
relies on the ability to validly estimate input
parameters.
RISK ANALYSIS AND The Decision Matrix Risk-Assessment
ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES (DMRA) Technique: (Haimes, 2009) Is a com-
bination (product) of severity and likelihood,
Lot of different techniques can be applied in that categorizes risk on an informed judgment
the risk analysis or assessment process. Ac- basis. The interpretation can be quantitative,
cording to Mahravilas et al. (2011), they can be because the risk is measured and graphical.
classified into three groups, as shown in Figure The severity and probability ratings in petro-
5. The original representation is slightly modi- leum engineering (PE) are addressed to the
fied to include analysis that are also possible identified hazard by using the risk matrix
but are not mentioned originally (gray shaded). and environmental consequence description
That are: qualitative, quantitative and hybrid (Table 1). The risk description can be based
techniques. Qualitative techniques include on the product of the severity and likelihood
studies based on the personnel experience. No with adequate designations.
mathematical expressions and estimations are Risk Measures of Societal Risk: Associ-
included. In fact they represent the checklist ated with petroleum engineering technical
7
Figure 5. The classification of main risk analysis and assessment (RAA) methodologies
systems can also be evaluated in the way representation of the analysis is drawn as the
presented on the basis of accident scenario F-N curve (Figure 6). It represents the relation
(the category of the accident), frequency of of the fatalities cumulative frequency (F) with
the scenario (probability per time unit) and respect to number of fatalities (N) in log-log
the consequence of the scenario (number of relationship. Also the tolerable and intoler-
injuries or fatalities or financial losses). The able criteria lines are drawn. The position of
8
Table 1. Risk matrix
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE
0 A B C D E
Non- Rare to Unlikely to Credible to Probable to Frequent to
credible occur occur occur occur occur
to occur Reported Once in Several Several Several
ENVIRONMENT
Could for PE Company times in times/year times/
SEVERITY
HEALTH
SAFETY
happen in Company in company year in one

PE location
1 Slight Slight Slight LOW

impact impact impact
2 Minor Minor Minor MEDIUM
3 Big Big Local HIGH
4 Mayor Mayor Mayor
5 Extensive Extensive Extensive
DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTION
Slight impact - small discharges, limited and occasional impact, not visible, small greenhouse gasses
emissions (GHG), good materials selection
Minor impact - discharges that impact the area but have transitory effect, less than one week for clean
up and 1 to 2 years for natural recovery, slight impact of GHG emissions, adequate
materials selection
Big/local impact - discharges of limited amount that affect nearby environment with longer effects, short
term wider impact on water, soil and biodiversity, les than 1 month for clean up and 2
to 5 years for natural recovery, limited GHG emission, inadequate materials selected
Mayor impact - large discharges that impact the environment with severe and long lasting damage,
widespread impact even on some threatened species or functions, 1 to 5 months
needed for clean up and 5 to 10 years for natural recovery, significant GHG emission,
financially significant input to restore the damage, poor materials selected
Extensive impact - large discharges with persistent damage of the environment, long-term and broader
impact with possible permanent loss of species or ecosystem functions, more than
5 months for clean up and more than 10 years for natural recovery, extremely poor
material selection
F-N between these two criteria lines means Quantitative Risk-Assessment (QRA):
that the technical system is acceptable accord- Have been developed to enable risk assess-
ing to social preferences (Kosmovski, 2006). ment from large blowouts with fires (dust
The ways to reduce risk if necessary, can be explosion hazards). It is based on calculations
determined by the use of ALARP (as low as that are performed to select appropriate sce-
reasonably practicable) principle (Holmberg nario. Also methodology and tools have to
& Knochenhauer, 2007). bee used to estimate consequences and give
fair representation of expected accident sce-
9
Figure 6. F-N curve with criteria for societal risk determination
nario. The tools are recalibrated and vali- scenarios should be analyzed with regard to
dated against experience and test results and primary event.
real measurements (van der Voort et al., 2007). Clinical Risk and Error Analysis (CREA):
Quantitative Assessment of Domino Sce- Is related to medical domain and enables the
narios (QADS): Assumes that an accident with determination of risk index (or the sum of
a primary triggering event is propagating and risk indexes) by combining the probability
causing several secondary events resulting of occurrence and the severity with included
with the more severe consequences that those the occurrence of error mode. All of that is
from primary event alone. That results from based on available data and expert’s judgment.
the growth and acceleration of the overall Predictive, Epistemic Approach (PEA): Is
accident due to so called “domino effect”. In based on state-of-knowledge and gives the op-
the analysis it is necessary to investigate and portunity to combine real data and subjective
determine the primary accidental scenario, information to predict accidental situations.
than realize and determine the propagation The damages from abnormal actions can be
effects with respect to the vectors of propa- predicted by deterministic or probabilistic
gation and escalation. Also other associated analytical approach.
10
The weighted risk analysis (WRA): Enables what can be the consequences. The technique
the comparation of different risks (loss of lives, is systematic, but depends on expert team
economic losses) with respect to the same quality through the questions generation and
reference that can be money or some other. comprehensiveness of the review. Also they
Not only technical aspects are analyzed but have to control and ensure that the adequate
also the environmental, economical, political safeguards are implemented and in place.
and societal as well. The weighing factors When conducted by more than one team of
are attributed to related scenarios according experts that work together it seams to be a
to consequences giving the opportunity to high-level and detailed risk-assessment tech-
compare them and determine the measures nique. The final report is a review of potential
to be taken for risk reduction (Suddle, 2009). problems and a list of recommendations for
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis their prevention.
(FMEA): Gives a systematic tabular presen- Safety Audits: Include different procedures
tation with evaluation results of causes and prepared for inspection of installations, pro-
effects of recorded or known types of equip- cesses or plants according to the safety. The
ment or component failures represented with auditors review and verify the implementation
annual estimation. of appropriate approach in system design,
Second group – Qualitative Techniques in controlling operational conditions and in
include an analytical estimation process and safety measures. The result should be a list
the engineers’ ability, to interpret the risk using of recommendations about safety procedures,
a word form, rating scales of descriptive or possible improvements and awareness of the
numeric kind to describe the magnitude and operating personnel (Reiniers et al., 2005).
likelihood of potential consequence. Task Analysis: Its primary use is in identi-
Checklist Analysis: Is the first technique in a fication of the interaction between the system
group and is a list of questions or a worksheet and personnel involved. The principle is in
about operation, maintenance, installation process analysis and the personnel job per-
safety concerns, and is a simplest method formance and mutual interaction (Doytchev
for hazard identification. It can be described & Szwillus, 12009). The result of the task
as a systematic approach built on the histori- analysis is so called “Task Model”. The
cal knowledge. Application is possible in all analysis process comprises collection of
systems or activities regardless to equipment data about human interventions and system
or human impact. The most important in demands, graphical representation of results
the implementation is that it is carried out and comparison between system demands and
by the trained and experienced person or a operator capabilities in order to ensure their
small group. Quality of the analysis strongly compatibility (Landau et al., 1998).
depends on the experience and quality of the The Sequentially Timed Event Plotting
checklist creators and the users. Technique: Combines the timing and se-
What-if-Analysis: Is simply compiled of a quence of events or actions that can be a
number of investigative questions that should trigger or can lead to the accident (Hendrick
be asked by an experienced team about the & Benner, 1987). To do so, the sequences of
system components under examination (here events that can contribute to the accident are
we are talking about hydrocarbon systems, plotted, which provides overview over the
generally petroleum engineering systems). initiation of the accident or changes that can
The idea is to determine what can go wrong and disrupt the system or the process. The event
11
building blocks those are used to identify the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA):
event contain the information about the time Identifies each hazard according to potential
at which the event has started, his duration, causes and effects. The list of recommenda-
the trigger (agent) that caused the event, the tions or protective measures (known and
description of the event and the source of possible) to be used are listed there. The
such information. At the end all events are “preliminary” term means that it is usually
connected with incoming and outgoing re- upgraded by performing additional studies.
sults showing relationships between events The energy sources and hazard materials are
in term of proceeding or following sequence in focus and special attention is dedicated to
(Kontogiannis et al., 2000). identify those hazardous features of a system
Hazard and Operability Study: Includes or plant that can result in unacceptable risk
systematical approach for identification and (Kavianian, 2003).
documentation of hazards. That is in fact Relative Ranking Techniques (DOW and
critical safety study on deviations intended MOND Hazard Indices): Method is based on
through the design of each system component. penalties or award points that are assigned for
Such deviations are formulated and analyzed hazard and protective measures. All of them
from a standardized list. The expression of are listed in a checklist accounting form and
risk is in qualitative series (e.g., numerical at the end combined into an index. Such index
from 1 to 5) relative one to another. Also some is an indication of the relative ranking of the
kind of sets of guide words can be used (e.g., system risk.
NONE – complete negation to design inten- Third group - hybrid techniques are the
tion, MORE THAN – quantitative increase, combination of qualitative and quantitative
LESS THAN – quantitative decrease, PART techniques or are of semi-quantitative type.
OF – only part of intention is fulfilled, AS Human Error Analysis Techniques (HEAT)
WELL AS – something else out of the design or Human Factor Event Analysis (HFEA):
intention, REVERSE – the occurrence of logi- Have been introduced because it has been
cal opposition of design intention, OTHER recognized that people and their errors have
THAN – complete substitution). In that way major contribution in accidents in petroleum
the corresponding process variable deviations industry. It has been stated that about 85-90%
are obtained (Khan & Abbasi, 1997). The ap- of accidents are due to human factor. The
proach gives the insight in potential problems reasons for errors can be the lack of human
in the process or a system, because the basic reliability and consistency. The fluctuation
principle of the HAZOP study is that hazard and deficiency of qualified working personal
arises in the system due the deviations that that has been recognized resulted with work-
are not expected in process normal behavior. ers that are not familiar with normative treat-
The analysis of the system should be done as ments, some times unpredictable according
a typical sequence starting with the selection to misdiagnoses and wrong actions. Error
of a study node (Yang & Yang, 2005). By concealment is in human nature in attempt to
applying guidewords the possible hazard and avoid blame or material consequences. Also
operability problems are identified. If there to be prominent many engineers make wrong
are none next node is used. If problems appear solutions trying to be dominant, which leads
the causes and consequences are recorded and to various kinds of failures or losses. One
solutions suggested. problem has also been realized through the
efficacy of different jobs. That is the perfor-
12
mance of routine tasks that after a while leads self-understanding and visible, procedures
to unsafe behavior and poor efficiency. The according to the actions prepared in written
example can be the performance of different shape and distributed to the personnel. That
jobs with coiled tubing that have been analyzed should be followed by adequate training and
(Engel & Mackey, 2001). When coiled tub- at last supervision.
ing was first introduced as a new technology, In the petroleum industry, not only the
major advances were made with clean/wash personnel but also the technique and technol-
out operations, to assist with the sand clean ogy are changed all the time. That means that
out from the wells. They have covered about the people should be prepared to understand
32% of coiled tubing jobs at that time. The and accept new knowledge and technologies.
analysis covered about 1200 runs over the The influence of technical and technological
23 month period and showed an overall suc- progress on economical efficiency can be
cess of 82% by addressing these issues. The closely examined through the scientific and
database has suggested that there are three technical and technological progress.
fundamental causes of failure. Clean out (sand Technical progress is defined as an eco-
wash out), along with tools and drilling are nomical appearance that values all changes in
among them. Detailed planning and training means for production, technological progress
has been identified as the primary solution and organization of production and distribu-
of these problems. tion that leads to increase of production and
The usual errors in human action are slips increase of product value. It also leads to in-
(the action is not performed in time or is crease of producer’s knowledge and improve-
performed incorrectly), lapses (actions that ment of their work (Matanovic et al., 2001).
are commissioned or not in time), mistakes Stress factors that influence the human
(doing something in wrong way or not doing action can be psychological, physical or
necessary at all), and omission of detection organizational. Regardless the reason the
(because of the lack of detection nothing or stress level drastically changes the ability of
irrelevant acts are performed (Kumamoto, personnel to perform tasks. The dependence
2007). The reasons for human errors can re- of stress level on human performance shows
sult from (a) changes in teamwork according that extremes are not optimal, but that there
to actions performance, (b) changes in skill is an optimal peak in between when the per-
level needed for the action that have not been formance is the best.
followed by proper training and adequate set The stress level can be lowered and so the
of information, (c) change in communication human-error-probability by fulfilling several
demands due the complexity of the equip- requirements (ASME, 2003). Written pro-
ment or the procedure, and (d) change in cedures (for performing tasks) should been
environmental conditions that can influence prepared and the quality of human-machine
negatively the working capabilities of the interface balanced with the personnel train-
personnel. Because of that there is a necessity ing and abilities. Lowering of stress level can
to prepare personnel by adequate training to also be accomplished by increasing of opera-
increase human reliability. The environment tors training and experience (better quality
is such as it is, but the working place can be and frequency of practice), higher quality of
adjusted to be friendlier (heating in the cold written procedures and controls, proper instal-
areas and the opposite, air-conditioning in lation and functionality control of securing
tropical areas). Working interfaces should be and signaling instrumentation, and by raising
13
the available time to response according the the system. Basic faults or events are those
required complexity. Also acting with explo- that lead to the top event because of fatigue
sives (perforating guns), radioactive materials or malfunction and are represented with circle
(nuclear logging devices), environment with (Harms-Ringdahl, 2001). The other symbols
lethal gases (hydrogen sulfide), high pressures that are used in fault tree construction can be
and in the area of great potential for explosion a “diamond” representing an undeveloped
or fire generation, rises the stress level from event, triangle representing the point of
the beginning. transfer in or out depending on connecting
Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA): Can be pre- line. Some other different symbols can be
sented as the combination of graphical and used to represent inhibit gate, external event
mathematical model that enables to combine or conditional event (Ostebo, 1991).
points of failures of greatest importance and Event Tree Analysis (ETA): Are also
give expression of their probability. Through mathematical and graphical presentation of
visualization of interrelations among different combination of events and circumstances
system elements or constituents, equipment according to possible accident sequence
failure is related to human error or environ- according to annual estimation. It uses deci-
mental factors that can lead to the accident. sion tree to logically develop and visualize
The term “Fault Three” in fact shows the way models that will lead from an initial event
of analyzing systems or interrelations. The top to the outcomes. The name of the system
event (something unwanted) is a starting point arises from the presentation shape. It starts
and is represented by a rectangle. Through with initiating event and grows up like a tree
different branches according to the system as the number of sequence events increases.
intricacy, possible causes of the hazard are The initial event and subsequent events can
identified and ranked. Elements of the system, diverse to probable events finishing with final
process and conditions are described through results. There is no relation between probable
logic gates with only two possibilities (“AND subsequent events. All events are also time
or “OR”). The main point is called the top related because the sequence is of importance
event, and must be fully described. Than the like in domino effect. The results can be as
system is analyzed by personnel that under- qualitative description of problems coming
stand the relations and interdependences in from combination of events resulting from
the system that can cause the top event. For initial event. Also the quantitative estima-
the construction of a fault three diagram dif- tion of event frequency and various failure
ferent symbols are used with specified mean- sequences is possible. Much more the list of
ing. The cause of a top event (some kind of recommendations how to reduce risk can be
leakage usually in petroleum industry) can prepared in design, construction or operating
be a miss function or bad material selection stage of the system (Hong et al., 2009).
of one or more system components. “AND” Risk-Based Maintenance (RBM) Method:
gates are used when all indicated components Is also the combination of qualitative and
or conditions can contribute for top event to quantitative techniques. Quantitative descrip-
exist. The “OR” gates show that only one of tion arises from the quality of prepared con-
the system parts can lead to the top event if sequence study. Based on those estimations
not functioning well. Undeveloped events are of the probability of failure are determined.
considered to be out of scope of interest, there Method consists of three modules. First one is
is not enough information, or can not affect risk determination by the event identification
14
and estimation. Second one analyzes conse- and Total risk analysis ad main viewpoint is
quences and acceptance criteria. Finally the technology.
maintenance is planed with consideration of Task analyses (Hierarchical task analysis
risk factors included (Khan & Haddara, 2003). HTA) are used to analyze human actions and
Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA): decisions and are also used as the base for hu-
Follows the diagram presentation of events man reliability analyses (Kontogiannis, 2003).
that have been started by the critical event. Organizational Risk Analyses: (e.g. Bar-
The sequence of events that develop from rier and operational risk analysis – BORA,
the critical event and the performance of System-action-management - SAM) Are
the controlling and safety systems should be used in quantitative approach when analyz-
taken into account. Analysis can be expressed ing effect of organizational and management
qualitatively, quantitatively or in both ways ac- factors. All aspects (human, technology and
cording the defined objectives of the analysis. organizational conditions) are in the focus of
Being an illustrative logic diagram it gives a the analysis but the main application phase is
good visualization of the development from the operational phase.
the initiation to different consequences of Qualitative Risk Analyses: Verify un-
critical event, especially in systems where wanted events qualitatively (e.g. Preliminary
such sequences of occurrence are vital in hazard analysis – PHA, Structured what if
development of critical event to the hazard. technique – SWIFT, Hazard identification –
The similar overview of the risk analysis HAZID) with all aspects in focus but mostly
and risk management methods (Andersen & applied in design phase).
Mostue, 2012) that are especially applicable in Systemic Model Based Analyses: Are
petroleum industry (e.g. integrated operations focused on flexibility of socio-technical sys-
– IO). In the overview some other resources tems (Function resonance analysis method –
have been used (Everdij & Bloom, 2006; FRAM, System theoretic accident model and
Sklet, 2002) grouping and characterizing the process – STAMP) with same aspect according
methods in some different way. to human, organization and technology. The
The overview starts with technical reli- application is usually in operational phase.
ability analyses as a quantification of the Verification Analyses: Validate human,
technical reliability as the input to quantita- technical and organizational conditions (Crisis
tive risk analyses represented by the FMEA, intervention in offshore production – CRIOP)
Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis used in design and operational phase accord-
and Reliability and availability of computer ing to all aspects.
based safety system. The methods are mainly
focused on technology and applied in the
design phase of the project. RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
Consequence Analyses: Identify affects of
the accidents by the use of physical phenomena The petroleum activities almost always in-
models. They are represented by FTA, ETA volve risk. Aspects of acceptance criteria for
and Consequence and escalation models, and risk differ according the countries and their
focused on humans and technology. regulations. Because of that there is a need for
Quantitative Risk Analyses: Give the generally accepted criteria. In fact the univer-
hazard evaluation and identification through sal goal is to eliminate risk, but this can never
quantitative data. The methods are QRA be completely achieved. So the criteria of risk
15
acceptability must be adopted. Risk is only vided in three bands, defining two levels of risk
acceptable if there is a kind of benefit when criteria. First band represents the unacceptable
deciding of the acceptance (Fischhoff et. al., region with almost no tolerance to the risk
1981). Through the acceptance of risk criteria except in specially determined circumstances.
the numerical risk estimates determined using In this region the risk reduction measures
quantitative risk assessment are translated in are essential. So called ALARP or tolerable
terms of being low enough to proceed with region enables to determine to use or not to
the project or give some economic benefit. use risk reduction measures according to the
The problems appear when pre-determined proportion between costs and benefits. The
quantitative risk acceptance criteria are used broadly acceptable region at the bottom states
because it can lead to focusing in wrong direc- that no risk reduction measures are needed.
tion. Trying to satisfy criteria the possibility So the two levels of criteria are the maximum
to obtain overall applicable and cost-effective tolerable criterion above which risk can not
solution or measure can be overlooked. Also be tolerated and the other below whish the
the tools to check the risk to meet criteria are risk has no significance.
not always sufficiently accurate to be used To obtain optimal results through the
without additional review. That is especially ALARP determination process it is necessary
true when talking about environmental risk, to follow several steps. The first one is the
because it always includes some extent of identification and assess of the hazard. Then
political influence on the acceptability. The the confirmation that minimum acceptance
broadly used framework used for risk crite- criteria are met follows. Third step is men-
ria states that risk should be reduced to the tioned to be critical. That is the identification
level that is as low as reasonably practicable of complete range of possible risk reduction
(ALARP). The framework (Figure 7) is di- measures. Optimal approach is the identifica-
Figure 7. Framework for risk tolerability (Dumitran & Onutu, 2010)
16
tion of feasible improvements that can be individual risk that is calculated through the
applied to eliminate hazards, reduction to the identification of all sources of fatality risk
exposure of the personnel, reduction of the to an individual. The contribution from the
frequency of occurrence, diminishing of the source is than defined and at the end all of
consequences and improvement of the neces- them are summarized to obtain the overall
sary evacuation (Lewis, 2007). Different tools risk. In petroleum engineering primary risk
can be used to demonstrate ALARP in regard sources are occupational accidents, transporta-
with the complexity and risks. The lowest tion related accidents and petroleum related
level is satisfied through codes and standards. leading to fires or explosions. Individual risk
Than at the next level the good practice and criteria (IRPA) expressed annually differs in
engineering judgment will do. The broadest various countries (AIChE, 2009). For workers
region is covered by risk assessment and cost the maximum tolerable criterion is 10-3 per
benefit analysis. The highest two levels are year, and broadly acceptable criterion is 10-6
searching for peer reviews, benchmarking and per year. For the members of public the range
at the end consultations with stakeholders. is from 10-4 to 10-6 per year. It is possible that
The acceptance criteria are used for evalu- companies use more strict criteria for new
ation of results obtained through risk analyses facilities designs. Talking about societal risk
and must be given for the personnel on the it is necessary to point out that criterion are
installation as a whole, and those groups or defined to limit the risk of major or huge ac-
individuals mostly endangered or exposed cidents to avoid restriction of activities or land
to risk. The loss of main safety functions use. The statistical value of the life regarding
and the pollution from the installation must to the societal investments in risk reducing
also be evaluated. If cost-benefit is a guiding measures for offshore petroleum industry
principle instead of mechanistic approach that is about 6,000,000 GBP (HSE, 2006). The
can lead to encouragement of the operating analysis of costs and benefits of risk reduction
companies to consider if further risk reduc- measures appear to be about 7.5 times more
tion is possible and reasonable. Two aspects per expected life saved.
of criteria are widely accepted. One is the
17
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making the decision recommendation on
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS whether probable risks are tolerable and risk
control measures adequate.
ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Prac-
Risk Management: The systematic ap-
ticable): The principle that states that the
proach in identifying, analyzing, assessing,
risk tolerability depends on the level of risk
mitigation and monitoring of the risk.
(when lower than the limit of tolerability)
Vulnerability: Shows the degree of fragil-
compared to practicability or costs to gained
ity of a natural or social community towards a
improvement.
hazard, based on resulted risk and the potential
Consequence: An impact or the outcome
to react or withstand it (based on adaptability
that may result from a hazard, that may be
or coping capacity).
expressed quantitatively as the amount of
money, as a category of high medium or low
level, or in descriptive manner.
22
23
Chapter 2
Risk Due to Wellbore Instability
Borivoje Pasic
ABSTRACT
Exploration and production as one of the most important parts of the petroleum industry en-
counters different problems, usually resulting in nonproductive time and additional expenses.
The most common and most expensive of them are related to wellbore instability and associ-
ated problems. Wellbore instability problems are usually related to drilling operation, but they
can also appear during completion, workover, or the production stage of a certain well. The
traditional solution for wellbore instability problems is composed from the early recognition
of specific wellbore instability problems, the main cause identification and swift response. For
more effective solution it is necessary to incorporate wellbore stability and risk assessment in
the early phase of well design. This chapter gives one general overview of wellbore instability
problems and their causes as well as an overview of actual approaches and methods in wellbore
stability and risk assessment.
INTRODUCTION production department (petroleum engineers,

geologists, geomechanical engineers, geo-
The petroleum industry as well as other indus- physics etc.) work in very specific conditions
tries, encounters different problems because of and environment, and with limited data avail-
the specific nature of the job itself and always ability. The main objectives of this part of the
presents a possible human fault. Unlike other petroleum industry are discovering hydrocar-
industries, the petroleum industry employees, bons reservoirs and creating facilities for their
especially engineers in the exploration and economical, safe and ecological acceptable
production. One of the most important parts
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch002 in the exploration and production activities is
drilling a borehole, a subsurface object that one tenth of the entire drilling expenses today.
connects a reservoir with the surface facil- From the comparison of this data with the
ity and provides a pathway for hydrocarbon available date from the last decade of twentieth
production. In general, drilling is a specific century it can be concluded that unscheduled
technical and technological process and be- expenses are continually increasing and that
cause of that, it requires specific engineer’s they have increased for about 100% in the
skills and the usage of specific equipment last 20 years. Additionally, based on ten year
and instruments. On the other hand, drilling researching and data collecting, Muniz et al.
is very expensive. Aldred et al. in their work (2005) concluded that 30% of all additional
published in 1999 estimate that oil and gas expenses during drilling have been spent for
companies spend about 20x109 dollars an- solving wellbore instability problems.
nually on drilling worldwide. Today, drilling In the past, the wellbore instability prob-
implies drilling in harsh surface environment lems were solved most frequently on trial/
(artic areas, deep seas, etc.) as well as drilling failure bases (van Oort et al., 1996; Tare et
though complex lithology (tectonically active al., 2002). This method can provide a possible
areas, fracture and faulted zones, areas with solution for the wellbore instability problems
salt or magma intrusions etc.). Additionally, on the certain well, but it doesn’t provide the
drilling an extended reach or slim hole wells ultimate solution for a particular wellbore
especially in such environment make drilling instability problem or wellbore instability
process more complex and expensive. problems as a whole. There isn’t a unique
From the beginning of the drilling up solution for all wellbore instability problems
to nowadays, oil and gas companies have because each well represents an individual
probably continuously encountered a certain case and demands an individual approach. The
wellbore instability problem or problems. well individuality is the result of difference in
Wellbore instability can simply be explained as lithology (sandstone, shale, limestone etc.),
any change in wellbore diameter in comparison rock properties (compressive/tensile strength,
to the bit diameter used for the hole drilling. in-situ stress conditions, fractures, anisotropy
The appearance of the wellbore instability in etc.), local tectonics (faulted zones, local
a certain well can result in different problems magmatic and salt intrusion etc.) and wellbore
like hole cleaning problems (cuttings volume properties (depth, trajectory, azimuth, inclina-
increase, caving appearance, hole pack-off tion etc.). Because of this, wells on the same
etc.), in the inability to run a casing string field sometimes experience quite different
into the hole, or the inability of performing wellbore instability problems.
the cementing or logging operation and etc. In As mentioned earlier, wellbore instability
some cases, wellbore instability problems can problems can occur during drilling or during
cause the abandonment of one portion of the a different operation on a certain well (e.g.
hole or in the extreme case of a whole wellbore. completion, workover, production, stimulation
The most important consequence of wellbore etc.). Since the wellbore instability problems
instability problems are Non Productive Time become more complicated with elapsed time
(NPT) and additional (unscheduled) expenses. (time between problem spotting and the solu-
The petroleum industry spends more than tion), the key factor for efficient solving of a
1x109 of dollars annually for solving wellbore distinct wellbore instability problem is in time
instability problems (Tare et al., 2002; Zhang detection. Possible indicators (symptoms)
et al., 2004; Khodja et al., 2010) what is about of wellbore instability which are primarily
24
caused by wellbore collapse or convergence etc. may be a result of wellbore instability

are shown in Table 1. McLellan (1994) has problems, but also may be a result of im-
classified the indicators of wellbore instability proper drilling regime, equipment failure or
into two groups: direct and indirect indica- a technical mistake. For example, drillstring
tors respectively. A direct indicator includes failure may be a result of wellbore instability
observations such as an oversized or under- problem, fatigue of materials or unsatisfactory
gauged hole (readily observed from caliper drillstring design.
logs), caving at the surface and etc., as the
unmistakable evidence of existing wellbore
instability problems. The caving from the THE CAUSES OF WELLBORE
wellbore wall, circulated to the surface, and INSTABILITY
the hole fill after tripping confirm that spall-
ing processes are occurring in the wellbore. Solving of certain wellbore instability prob-
Large volumes of cuttings and/or cavings, in lems requires two basic elements, recognition
an excess of the volume of rock which would and understanding of given wellbore insta-
have been excavated in a gauge hole, similarly bility mechanisms as well as defining their
attest to hole enlargement. If the fracture gradi- major causes. According to Darly (1969),
ent was not exceeded and vuggy or naturally the majority of main wellbore instability
fractured formations were not encountered, causes were defined in 1938. by Halbouty &
a requirement for a cement volume in excess Kaldenbach. Today, the classification of the
of the calculated drilled hole volume is also wellbore instability causes can be done in two
a direct indication that the enlargement has ways. The first classification of the wellbore
occurred. On the other hand indicators such instability causes is based on the possibility
excessive drillstring vibration, high torque to control them. This classification given by
and drag friction, deviation control problems McLellan classifies them into two groups of
Table 1. Indicators of wellbore instability (McLellan, 1996)
Direct indicators Indirect indicators

Oversize hole High torque and drag friction
Undergauge hole Hanging up of drillstring, casing, or coiled tubing
Excessive volume of cuttings Increased circulating pressures
Excessive volume of cavings Stuck pipe
Cavings at surface Excessive drillstring vibrations
Hole fill after tripping Drillstring failure
Excess cement volume required Deviation control problems
Inability to run logs
Poor logging response
Annular gas leakage due to poor cement job
Keyhole seating
Excessive doglegs
25
factors: uncontrollable and controllable fac- may cause clay minerals hydration and pore
tors respectively (Table 2). Uncontrollable pressure increasing in a near wellbore region.
factors are mostly related to lithology, local Moreover, these processes and related process
tectonic activities (faulting and folding) and such as hydration stress, rock softening and
rock properties. Unlike uncontrollable factors e.g. may cause a change of the rock properties
the group of controllable factors is mostly which are important for mechanical integrity
related to drilling process itself and may be and stability of rock. In the next sections,
successfully controlled through proper drilling physico-chemical and mechanical causes and
process design and good engineer practice. related mechanisms of wellbore instability
Similar classification can be found in the will be briefly described (Zhang et al., 2004;
work of Mohiuddina et al. published in 2005. Rojas et al., 2006; Ewy & Morton, 2009).
Except for the above-mentioned classifica-
tion of wellbore instability causes given by The Mechanical Causes of
McLellan, there is also the second classifica- Wellbore Instability
tion which is broadly accepted by different
authors. Based on this classification, the Throughout history, in the geological sense
causes of wellbore instability were divided Earth was being changed as consequences
into mechanical and physico-chemical causes of different geological processes. These
respectively (Chenevert & Pernot, 1998; processes such sedimentation, volcano activi-
Osuji et al., 2008). In spite of this very clear ties, different tectonic activities (earthquake,
classification, it is fairly difficult to identify folding, faulting) etc., had an influence on
the exact cause of wellbore instability. The the present underground lithology and rock
majority of wellbore instabilities are the result properties. Before the borehole drilling, rock
of the joint acting of the either groups. This at the certain depth is in an equilibrium state
is because one group may cause changing of as a result of above mentioned processes. This
the rock properties or in-situ conditions around equilibrium in-situ stress state may be pre-
wellbore, generating, in this way, a prerequi- sented with three main stresses: 1) maximum
site for the other wellbore instability mecha- main stress (σv), 2) maximum horizontal stress
nisms which are caused by totally different (σH) and 3) minimum horizontal stress (σh).
groups of causes. For example, a shale/drill- The mentioned classification of in-situ
ing fluid interaction (physico-chemical cause) stresses implied normal conditions, where
Table 2. The causes of wellbore instability (McLellan, 1994)
Uncontrollable (Natural) Factors Controllable Factors

Naturally Fractured or Faulted Formations Bottom Hole Pressure (Mud Density)
Tectonically Stressed Formations Well Inclination and Azimuth
High In-situ Stresses Transient Pore Pressures
Mobile Formations Physico-chemical rock-Fluid Interaction
Unconsolidated Formations Drill String Vibrations
Naturally Over-Pressured Shale Collapse Erosion
Induced Over-Pressured Shale Collapse Temperature
26
overburden stress is the maximum main is consisted of three each other perpendicular
stress at the same time. Likewise, there are stresses: 1) axial stress (σa), 2) radial stress
areas with specific conditions (tectonically (σr) and 3) tangential stress (σt) (Figure 1).
active area) where horizontal stress exceeds From a rock mechanics´ point of view,
overburden stress and becomes main in-situ wellbore stability depends on the relation
stress (Lake, 2006). During borehole drilling, between rock in-situ stresses and stresses
certain rock volume is substituted with equal developed on the wellbore wall as well as the
mud volume of a certain density (less then mechanical properties of rock (rock strength,
rock) causing the development of a new stress rock properties anisotropy etc.). Depending
regime (McLean & Addis, 1990). This new on these relations, one of the two main well-
stress regime developed on the wellbore wall bore instability failure mechanisms can be
Figure 1. Stress redistribution around the wellbore wall during drilling
27
developed in a certain well: shear (collapse) of different lithology. Mechanical wellbore

or tensile failure. The appearance of the cer- stability also extremely depends on well
tain rock failure also depends on the rock characteristics, on well trajectory in particu-
drilling fluid interaction and its influence on lar, then azimuth and inclination (Labenski
the original (in-situ) mechanical and petro- et al., 2003). The relation between in-situ
physical rock properties (Lal, 1999). Accord- stresses, well inclination and azimuth dis-
ing to Zhang et al. (2006a), stresses magnitude played in the coordinate system was shown
and distribution on the wellbore wall are be- in Figure 2.
ing depended on mechanical, chemical, ther- The placement of the wellbore with certain
mal and hydraulic effect. It is important to azimuth and inclination and existing in-situ
emphasize the possibility of the concurrently stresses in the coordinate system is important
appearances of different wellbore failure for the calculation of stresses developed on
mechanisms in the same borehole, as result the wellbore wall. At a vertical wellbore, there
Figure 2. Relation between in-situ stresses and coordinate systems for vertical and deviated well
28
is no difference between the coordinate system σr = ½·(σH + σh) + ½·(σH - σh)·cos2θ (4)
(x´, y´, z´) and the coordinate system (x, y, z)
which make the calculation of stresses on the σt= ½·(σH + σh) - ½·(σH - σh)·cos2θ (5)
wellbore wall simplest. Unlike the vertical
well, in the case of deviated or horizontal well σa = σv (6)
drilling calculation of stresses developed on
wellbore wall are more perplexed as a result Unlike the equations for stresses calcula-
of difference between the two mentioned tion on the wellbore wall, for the point on a
coordinate systems. Local stresses induced certain distance from the wellbore wall radial
by in-situ stress and hydraulic effects at the and tangential stresses depends on minimum
wellbore wall (r = rw), for the vertical well and maximum in-situ stresses and a point
can be described as follows (Pasic et al., 2007): location angle.
According to the above mentioned equa-
σr = pw (1) tions it can be concluded that radial, axial
and tangential stress tend to equalize with
σt = (σH + σh) - 2·(σH - σh)·cos2θ - pw (2) in-situ stresses with increasing distance from
wellbore wall. The total equalization between
σa = σv - 2·(σH - σh)·ν·cos2θ (3) radial, axial and tangential stresses on one
side and maximum and minimum horizontal
where: and vertical stresses on the other side, the
examining point on certain distance from the
σr - Radial normal stress at wellbore [Pa], wellbore in the maximum horizontal stress
pw - Wellbore pressure [Pa], direction (θ = 0) can be observed. In this
σt - Hoop stress at wellbore [Pa], case, radial stress well is equal along with
σH - Maximum in-situ horizontal stress [Pa], maximum horizontal stress, tangential with
σh - Minimum in-situ horizontal stress [Pa], minimum horizontal stress and axial along
θ - Point location angle [°], with vertical stress respectively.
σa - Axial stress at wellbore [Pa], Unlike the vertical stress, in the case of
σv - Vertical (overburden) stress at wellbore deviated and horizontal well drilling, it is much
[Pa], heavier to calculate stresses at the wellbore
ν - POISSON ration [-]. wall. Local stresses induced by in-situ stress
and hydraulic effects at the wellbore wall (r
According to the previous equations it can = rw), can be calculated with the following
be concluded that the radial stress (σr) depends equations (Awal et al., 2001, Simangunsong
on the wellbore pressure or mud weight. The et al., 2006):
tangential (σt) and axial (σa) stress depends
on σH, σh, pw, ν and θ. σr = pw (7)
With the increasing of distance from the
wellbore wall radial, axial and tangential stress σt = (σx + σy) - 2·(σx - σy) cos2θ - 4·τxy·sin2θ
are changed. Stress calculation for a certain - pw (8)
point on large distance from wellbore wall (r
→∞) can be calculated with the fallowing σa = σz - ν [2·(σx - σy)·cos2θ + 4·τxy·sin2θ] (9)
equations (Pasic et al., 2007):
τθz = 2·(τyx·cosθ - τxz·sinθ) (10)
29
τrθ = τrz = 0 (11) During drilling, drilling mud is circulated

through a borehole while cooling and heating
where: different parts of the borehole at the same
time. This means that wellbore has a thermal
σx - normal (in-situ) stress in x-direction [Pa], neutral point, below which drilling mud cools
σy - normal (in-situ) stress in y-direction [Pa], the formations and above which the same
τxy - in-situ shear stress in (x,y,z) coordinated fluid heats formations. A result is a more
system [Pa], stable hole below the thermal neutral point
σz - normal (in-situ) stress in z-direction [Pa], and less stable above. Cooling or heating of
τθz - shear stress at wellbore [Pa], the certain rock results in the change in col-
τyx - in-situ shear stress in (x,y,z) coordinated lapse and fracture pressure whether drilling
system [Pa], a vertical, deviated or horizontal well (Chen
τxz - in-situ shear stress in (x,y,z) coordinated et al., 2001). Although different laboratory
system [Pa], investigations and field observations were
τrθ - shear stress at wellbore [Pa], conducted, numerous discussions upon the
τrz - shear stress at wellbore [Pa]. influence the thermal effects have on wellbore
stability still exist. According to Chen et al.
Besides the mentioned influence of in-situ (2001), when determining minimum mud
stress and hydraulic effect, stresses at the well- weight required, the influence of the thermal
bore wall also strongly depend on temperature effect in the case of horizontal well drilling is
difference between rock and drilling fluid as smaller as compared to the effect on a verti-
well as their physico-chemical interaction. The cal well. In order to investigate the effect of
stresses alterations at the wellbore wall (r = cooling and heating of rock during drilling on
rb) due to thermal and physic-chemical effect its stability, Zhang et al (2006a) conducted a
can be expressed by the following equations comprehensive laboratory study. They demon-
(Chen et al., 2001; Zhang et al., 2006a): strated that both the lower and upper critical
mud weight decrease with cooling and increase
σr = 0 (12) with mud heating. In other words mud cooling
is beneficial to preventing compressive failure
σ t = ((αp·(1-2·ν))/(1-ν))·(pw-p p)+((E·α p)/ and mud heating is beneficial to avoiding lost
(3·(1-ν)))·(Tw-Tf) (13) circulation. They also found that the magni-
tude of thermal effects on wellbore stability
σ t = ((αp·(1-2·ν))/(1-ν))·(pw-p p)+((E·α p)/ depends on volumetric-thermal-expansion
(3·(1-ν)))·(Tw-Tf) (14) coefficient. Both the lower and upper critical
mud weights decrease with increasing matrix
where: volumetric-thermal-expansion coefficient.
Since the bottom hole mud temperature for
αp - Biot´s constant [-], this particular case is less than the formation
pp - initial pore pressure [Pa], temperature, a lower thermal compressive
E - Young´s modulus [Pa], stress is generated when the matrix volumetric
αt - volumetric-thermal-expansion-coefficient thermal expansion coefficient is high.
[1/°C], Besides the hydraulic and thermal effect,
Tw - wellbore wall temperature [°C], wellbore stability of vertical, deviated and
Tf - initial formation temperature [°C]. horizontal wells strongly depends on regional
30
tectonic activity and prevailing in situ stress There are two main wellbore failure types,
(normal, overthrust/reverse or strike-slip). Ac- shear failure and tensile failure type respec-
cording to Awal et al. (2001), during drilling tively (Table 3). The development of a spe-
in normal stressed formation (σv > σH > σh) a cific failure type depends upon the magnitude
vertical well is more stable than a horizontal of induced stresses developed on a wellbore
or deviated one, until, while drilling through wall as well as rock compressive and tensile
formation under a strike slip stress regime (σH strength.
> σv > σh) the vertical well is less stable than There are several different peak-strength
the deviated and horizontal ones. There is also criteria that are commonly used to predict
recommendation that the wellbore should not mechanical wellbore instability. According
be drilled parallel to maximum horizontal to McLean & Addis (1990) these criteria can
stress (σH) in order to minimize wellbore be divided in four groups (Table 4), based on
instability problems (Zhang et al., 2006a). principal stresses used for wellbore stability
Because shale formations represent the criterion definition and assumed rock behav-
majority of all drilled formation, a physico- ior (linear or non-linear).
chemical interaction between shale and drill- The peek-strength criterion can be deter-
ing mud also plays an important role in the mined directly from laboratory testing if core
assurance of wellbore mechanical stability. is available or from a back analysis of hole
Moreover, it is well-known that controlling conditions recorded from calipers and drilling
of water and cations movement into or out the logs. More sophisticated numerical analyses
shale formation during drilling is one of the which include non-linear anisotropic materiel
key factors in controlling wellbore stability. A behavior may be conducted only when the
water flux into shale formation causes stress data from core laboratory testing are available.
redistribution around wellbore, shale strength-
ens and Young´s modulus decreases, and The Physico-Chemical Causes
pore pressure increases. These changes may of Wellbore Instability
have detrimental effect on wellbore stability.
(Zhang et al., 2004). Unlike hydration, shale Drilling and stress redistribution always re-
dehydration to a certain level can be beneficial sults at the same time as interaction between
to wellbore stability. Shale over-dehydration used mud and rock on the wellbore wall and
results in fractures in the near wellbore in near wellbore zone. Most frequently, this
formation and may also disturb wellbore undesirable interaction is the result of impro-
stability, especially during drilling through priate drilling fluid design and mineralogical
natural fractured shale (See Table 4). Water composition and petro physical properties of
desorption in fractured shales may widen the rock (porosity, permeability, pore throat size
fractures and destabilize the wellbore. Some etc.). In most cases, wellbore instability prob-
authors point out the beneficial effect of small lems caused by physico-chemical interaction
degree water adsorption on wellbore stability between rock and drilling fluid are associated
during drilling through naturally fractured with shale.
shale. In a fractured stressed shale formation Shale is fine-grained, clastic sedimentary
it is particularly important to control water rock with a certain portion of different clay
movement because the in-situ stresses are in minerals (smectites, kaolinite, illite, chlorite
a critical state (Rojas et al. 2006). and mixed layer clay minerals). Shale repre-
sents 75% of all drilled formation worldwide
31
Table 3. Shear and tensile failure types (Pasic et al., 2007)
Failure type Geometry and Orientation

Shear failure types
Shear Failure Shallow Knockout The failure will occur in the radial/axial plane because the maximum (σa) and minimum
σa > σ t > σ r (σr) stresses are oriented in this plane (a vertical plane).
Shear Failure Wide Breakout The failure will occur in the radial/tangential plane because the maximum (σt) and mini-
σt > σa > σr mum (σr) stresses are oriented in this plane (the horizontal plane).
Shear Failure High-Angle Echelon The failure will occur in the axial/tangential arc because the maximum (σa) and mini-
σa > σr > σt mum (σt) stresses are oriented in this arc (the arc of the borehole wall).
Shear Failure Narrow Breakout The failure will occur in the radial/tangential plane because the maximum (σr) and mini-
σr > σa > σt mum (σt) stresses are oriented in this plane (the horizontal plane).
Shear Failure Deep Knockout The failure will occur in the radial/axial plane because the maximum (σr) and minimum
σr > σt > σa (σa) stresses are oriented in this plane (a vertical plane).
Shear Failure Low-Angle Echelon The failure will occur in the axial/tangential arc because the maximum (σt) and mini-
σt > σr > σa mum (σa) stresses are oriented in this arc (the arc of the borehole wall).
Tensile failure types
Tensile Failure Cylindrical This failure is concentric with the borehole. A low mud weight would favor the failure
σr ≤ -To due to the magnitude of σr being lower.
Tensile Failure Horizontal
This failure creates horizontal fractures.
σa ≤ -To
This failure creates a vertical fracture parallel with the maximum horizontal stress direc-
Tensile Failure Vertical
tion. This is because is this orientation the tangential stress has to overcome the smallest
σt ≤ -To
formation tensile strength.
Table 4. The categorization of peak-strength criterion (McLean & Addis, 1990)
Criterion Principal stresses used for defining of wellbore stability criterion

Maximum (σ1), intermediate (σ2) and mini- Maximum (σ1) and minimum (σ3) principal
mum (σ3) principal stresses stresses
Linear Criterion Category A Category B
e.g. Drucker-Prager e.g. Mohr-Coulomb
Non-Linaer Criterion Category C Category D
e.g. Pariseau e.g. Hoek-Brown
and causes about 90% of all wellbore instabil- low permeability and low pore throat size
ity problems (Tan et al., 2002). Besides min- (the range from 0.01 to 0.001 µm) mud filter
eralogical composition, shale behavior during cake is not generated at the wellbore wall. So
interaction with water base mud strongly there are no physical barriers between mud
depends on shale permeability. Shale has very and shale.
low permeability comparing to sandstone, Shales are primary composed from a
ranging from a few to few tens nanoDarcies certain portion of quartz (SiO2) and differ-
(Labenski et al., 2003). Because of the shale ent types of clay minerals, but there is also a
32
small content of calcite, dolomite, pyrite and hydration (water molecules adsorption) and
other. From wellbore stability point of view can occur in all types of clay minerals. This
the most important is clay mineral content, type of clay minerals hydration causes slight
especially content of water sensitive clay min- swelling as a result of small increase in clay
erals. Depending on the total clay content and minerals interlayer space (in the range from 9
the content of a specific type of clay mineral to 20 Å). For wellbore stability assurance the
(montmorilonite, illite, kaolinite, chlorite most important process is osmotic swelling or
and mixed layer minerals) shale formations water absorption into clay mineral structure.
demonstrate different behavior during contact Osmotic swelling is addressed only to spe-
with water from drilling muds (dispersion, cific clay minerals and causes a tremendous
swelling, caving tendencies etc.). Based on increase of clay interlayer space in the range
these characteristics, shales are divided into of 20 to 130 Å. The Intensity of osmotic
five classes, ranging from soft (gumbo) shale swelling strongly depends on an exchange-
to very hard shale (O´Brein & Chenevert, able cation appearance in clay minerals and
1973) (Table 5). shale membrane efficiency (shale acts as an
imperfect semi-permeable membrane). In
Crystalline and Osmotic Hydration the 1983, Fritz and Marine first researched
(Swelling) of the Clay Minerals membrane reflection coefficient, and osmotic
potential of compacted clay minerals (Ewy
All above mentioned suggest that mud and & Morton, 2009). Today, laboratory equip-
shale can develop one or more different inter- ment and methods are developed based on
action mechanisms. These mechanisms can be that knowledge.
developed simultaneously, sometimes acting Besides the shale volume increase, clay
in opposite direction and causing water and minerals hydration and swelling also cause a
ions movement in/out from shale. This move- change in shale pore pressure and shale me-
ment of water molecules in or out from shale chanical properties (e.g. rock strength). These
results in hydration or dehydration process. changes, which are directly the outcome of
There are two swelling mechanism of clay mud/shale interaction, affect the mechanical
minerals. The first mechanism, also known stability of the rock. For these reasons, well-
as crystalline swelling, is related to surface bore stability, especially in a water sensitive
Table 5. Shale clasifications (O´Brein & Chenevert, 1973)
Class Shale Clay content Characteristics

High in montmorillonite,
1 Soft (Gumbo) High dispersion
some illite
Fairly high in montmorillonite,
2 Soft fairly high dispersion
High in illite
High in interlayered clays, Moderate dispersion, sloughing
3 Medium-hard
High in illite, chlorit tendencies
Moderateillite, little dispersion,
4 Hard
Moderate chlorite sloughing tendencies
brittle, no
High in illite,
5 Very hard significant dispersion,
moderate chlorite
caving tendencies
33
Figure 3. Wellbore instability during drilling through shale formation (Adapted from Chenevert &
Osisanya, 1989)
formation like shale, generally results in the Wellbore instability during drilling through
concurrent action of mechanical and physico- shale is shown in Figure 3. Before drilling,
chemical cause. clay platelets are only partially hydrated within
There are four main mechanisms related to shale (Figure 3a). During drilling, shale draws
water and ion movement during shale/drilling water from drilling fluids (Figure 3b) and
fluid interaction: chemical osmosis, hydraulic causes its swelling and dispersion (Figure 3c).
flow, capillary pressure and diffusion flow.
34
Chemical Osmosis properties, shale properties (e.g. pore throat

radius, cation exchange capacity) and other
By definition chemical osmosis can be factors like shale compaction and diagnosis
described as water molecules movement degree (van Oort et al., 1995). Schlemmer et al.
(passage) between two media with differ- (2003) recognized and described three distinct
ent solutes concentration (water activities) types of shale membranes. Type 1 membranes
through a semi-permeable membrane. This are generally characterized by coupled flows
process presents the main water driving force of water and solutes between fluid and shale.
during shale/drilling fluid interaction. In Type 2 membranes are generally character-
shale/drilling fluid system shale is acting as ized by greatly reduced near-wellbore shale
a semi-permeable membrane and the whole permeability which result in water and solutes
process is determined by the water activity flow decreasing. Invert-emulsion fluids tend
difference between drilling mud and shale pore to form efficient Type 3 membranes. Type 3
fluid at in-situ conditions. The flow direction membranes transport water more selectively,
is always from high water activity (low salt but shale permeability and fluid chemistry may
concentration) to low water activity (high salt alter performance measurements. However,
concentration) (Abass et al., 2006). This phe- under certain conditions, these fluids can
nomenon can occur in water-based drilling or yield lower capillary pressures than described
emulsion drilling fluids as the latter includes a previously and invade the interstitial fabric of
water phase. Water flow from shale formation high permeability shales. Theoretical osmotic
into drilling fluid (shale dehydration) can be pressure and shale membrane reflection co-
induced only by increasing of salt content in efficient can be described by the following
drilling fluid (drilling fluid activity decreas- equations (van Oort et al., 1995; Ewy &
ing) with respect to shale water activity. Morton, 2009):
All solutes of a solution to which a mem-
brane is exposed will be fully or partially Δπ = -((R·T)/V)·ln(ash/adf) (15)
“reflected” by the membrane. An ideal semi-
permeable membrane (i.e., one that allows where:
passage of the solvent only) has a reflection
coefficient of 100% (or 1). Nonideal mem- Δπ – theoretical osmotic pressure [Pa]
branes, which allow a partial passage of sol- V - partial molar volume of water [0.018 m3/
ute, have reflection coefficients of less than mol],
1 and are, therefore, referred to as “leaky.” R - gas constant [8.314·J/(mol·°K)]
(Schlemmer et al., 2003). According to Al- T - absolute temperature [°K]
Bazali et al. (2006) shale in contact with water ash - water activity of shale [-],
based muds develop a low membrane with a adf - water activity of drilling fluid [-].
very low reflection coefficient in the range
from 0.18% to 4.23%. Unlike the results of αm=Δpos/Δπ (16)
researching which was conducted by Al-Bazali
et al. (2006), Tan et al. (2002) stated that new where:
generation water based muds are capable of
generating a membrane with efficiencies in αm - membrane reflection coefficient [-],
the range from 55% to 85%. Shale membrane Δpos - osmotic pressure difference accounting
reflection coefficient depends on drilling mud for membrane efficiency [Pa],
35
Hydraulic Flow drilling fluid flow due to overbalance pressure.

Capillary pressure developed on wellbore wall
Hydraulic flow (convective, Darcian flow) is can by expressed by the following equation
drilling mud flow due to difference between (van Oort et al., 1996):
drilling mud pressure and shale pore pressure.
During the overbalance drilling operation pc = (2·σ·cosγ)/rp (18)
(drilling fluid pressure is higher than pore
fluid pressure), the drilling fluid flow is where:
usually from wellbore to shale formation. In
comparison with water based fluids, oil based pc – Capillary pressure [Pa],
drilling fluids have an advantage in this type σ – Interfacial tension [N/m],
of flow because of the interfacial tension cap- γ – Contact angle [°],
illary pressure. When oil based mud is used, rp – pore throat radius [m].
the radial stress on a wellbore wall is higher
in comparison with water based muds because Diffusion Flow
of the pressure dissipation of the later as it is
miscible with the shale pore water (Abass et As mentioned above, shale acts as a non-ideal
al., 2006). The hydraulic flow is controlled or leaky membrane with a very low membrane
by Darcy’s law and can be expressed with reflection coefficient, which means that it’s
the following equation (Zhang et al., 2006b): leaky for certain ions presents in both, pore
water and drilling fluid. In this situation there
vo = - (k/μ)·(p - ρ·g) (17) is an additional flow in the shale/drilling fluid
interaction, called a diffusion flow. This flow
where: is governed by the difference in ions concen-
tration between the drilling fluid and the pore
vo - bulk flow velocity [m/s], water. The direction of the diffusion flow is
k - permeability [m2], always from a system with higher to a system
µ - viscosity of drilling fluid [Pa·s], with lower ion concentration, which means
p - pressure gradient between the mud hydrau- the opposite direction of the osmotic flow.
lic pressure and pore pressure [Pa/m], The movement of ions through shale can be
ρ - drilling fluid density [kg/m3], restricted due to the narrow pore throats, cation
g - gravitational acceleration [m/s2]. exchange capacity, dimension of hydrate ions
and negatively charged clay surfaces (Zhang
Capillary Pressure et al., 2006b). The diffusion of ions can be
expressed by using Fick’s law (Equation 19).
One of the possible solutions for solving
wellbore instability problems in shale is the Ji = -Dsi·((Ci,sh – Ci,m)/Δx) (19)
use of oil based muds. Because of a very
small pore throat radius and surface tension where:
between two immiscible fluids (oil based
mud and pore water), capillary pressure is Ji - mass flux of ith ion [mol/(m2·s)],
developed on wellbore walls. This capillary Dsi - diffusion coefficient of the ith ion in the
pressure prevents drilling fluid flow into shale shale [m2/s],
pore space and at the same time it neutralizes
36
Ci,sh - concentration of ith ion in pore fluid titative risk assessment in casing design was
[mol/m3], conducted by Moos et al. and the results were
Ci,m - concentration of ith ion in mud [mol/m3], published in 2003.
Δx - length of shale [m]. Risk is composed of two components:
the probability of an event occurring and the
economic consequences if it occurs. Personnel
WELLBORE INSTABILITY involved in different aspects of drilling process
RISK ASSESSMENT make decisions based on the risk assessment
every day. Decisions making process in the
In oil and gas exploration and production past has been based more on personal experi-
operation as well as in other different indus- ence and intuition than science. Today com-
tries where uncertainties appear risk analysis panies implement more explicit risk models
can be a very useful tool (Cunha, 2004). The that quantify both the risk and the potential
first article related to risk analysis and risk for economic impact on drilling projects
assessment in drilling operation was published (Houtchens et al., 2007). There are a number
in 1968 by Newendorp and Root. In this fun- of techniques which have been developed to
damental article, the authors considered the predict optimal drilling operational parameters
possibility of risk analysis in drilling invest- (mud weights or drilling trajectories). Tradi-
ment (Cunha et al., 2005). After that, wellbore tionally, these techniques have been limited
instability risk analysis and assessment were to deterministic analyses that are based on
discussed by various authors. According to the assumption that in situ conditions and
Cunha (2004) risk analysis has been widely rock properties are precisely known (Moos
implemented in all aspects of exploration and et al., 2003, Tutuncu et al., 2005). Whereas,
production activity, especially in decision due to insufficient geomechanical data and
making process related to specific drilling problem related to the uncertainty (error)
operations such as: optimum depth to set cas- associated with measurement, data collecting
ing, directional drilling, wireline operation, and interpretation it was started with utiliz-
special remedial operation, borehole stability, ing of probabilistic methods. In 1999 Ottesen
the prediction of pore pressure and fracture et al. presented a new statistical approach
gradient etc. Besides, applying the risk model based on Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA).
to new technology such for example casing Quantitative risk analysis is a technique for
while drilling can be very difficult because establishing the uncertainty of a given out-
there is no experience base for quantifying come as a function of the uncertainties in the
either the probability of an event occurring input parameter. This technique was applied
or the economic consequences of the event. to wellbore stability assessment by a number
Risk assessment can also be a very useful of authors (Moos et al., 2004).
tool when techniques and approaches dif- Wellbore stability assessment represents
ferent from well-known engineer practices one of the key parts of modern wellbore design
are considered. For example, operators in approach, and it is incorporated at early stage
Gulf of Mexico considered much more ag- of well planning. Fully wellbore stability risk
gressive casing design in order to reach the assessment consisted from different part like,
target sand with the optimum borehole size developing of geomechanical earth model,
and the minimum number of strings (Brehm well planning, drilling regime optimization,
et al., 2004). A similar application of quan- collecting and interpretation of real-time
37
drilling data and geomechanical earth model a lack of information of different geological
improvement (Alderd et al., 1999). structural and stratigraphic anomalies, such as
The first step in wellbore stability assess- existing of magmatic intrusion (e.g. laccolite)
ment is 1D or 3D mechanical or geomechanical or salt dome. The presence of salt formation
earth model developing. The mechanical or (intrusions) causes changes in in-situ stresses
geomechanical earth model is a numerical (Dusseault, et al., 2004). Unlike typical sand/
representation and computer (software) vi- shale formations (in-situ stress in the vertical
sualization of the geomechanical and other direction is equal to the overburden stress and
(geological, petro physical etc.) properties the horizontal stress is somewhat less than the
of the rock regarding to depth. The accuracy vertical stress) in a salt formation, the in-situ
and complexity of developed geomechani- stress is generally assumed to be equal in all
cal earth model strongly depends on avail- directions and is equal to the weight of the
able data (Brehm et al., 2004). Usually, the overburden stress (Baker et al., 1994).
development of geomechanical earth model Quantitative risk assessment is used to
has started with tree main components: in-situ assess uncertainties in input data and results
stress magnitude and orientation pore pres- present probability to achieve a desired de-
sure and effective rock strength. According gree of stability as a function of mud weight.
to Moos et al., 2004 quantifiable sources of It is also a method for identification of the
uncertainty include critical parameters that contribute the most
to the uncertainties in the results. A mud
• Uncertainties in the velocities derived weight window represents a range of allow-
from the seismic data, able equivalent mud densities or pressures
• Uncertainties in the functional form of that provide wellbore stability on the specific
the transforms between velocities and depth. The minimum mud pressure (lower
other parameters such as density that boundary) must be higher than wellbore col-
are intermediate results in the analysis, lapse pressure and maximum mud pressure
• Uncertainties in the parameters used in (upper boundary) lower than lost circulation
the transform equations, and pressure, at a certain depth. Wellbore collapse
• Depth uncertainties from time-to-depth pressures is the mud pressure below which
calculations. the entire wellbore wall becomes unstable,
and lost circulation pressure is the pressure
During the development of a new filed in an at which a significant amount of mud is lost
unexplored area, there are always much more into the formation as a result of the initiation
uncertainties than in drilling a well on an exist- and propagation of hydraulic fractures. Both
ing field. Uncertainties are primarily related pressures strongly depend on orientations
to the quality and quantity of available data. and magnitudes of in-situ stresses, wellbore
Data reliability can be increased through ap- orientation, rock strength and pore pressure.
propriate correlations between date obtained Quantitative risk analysis can be done com-
by seismic measurement and data obtained monly by using Monte Carlo simulation as
by well logging measurement and laboratory well as competitive neural network.
testing on core sample. Data correlation and Collecting of real-time data during drilling
calibration cannot be done prior to drilling is useful for geomechanical model improving,
the first (exploration) well. Another source of as well as the improvement of the decision
uncertainty in the computations results from making process of overall wellbore stability
38
risk assessment. At the real-time data collect- In the past, solutions for wellbore instabil-
ing, their quality mast be considered as well as ity problems were composed from the early
the purpose of collecting certain data. In this recognition of specific wellbore instability
regard, Millheim et al. (1998) concluded the problems, main cause identification and swift
following: first, company and drilling organi- response. A more effective solution is nec-
zation collect drilling data without questioning essary to incorporate quantitative wellbore
its quality and without a clear picture of what stability and risk analysis and assessment
their data needs are, and second, drilling data in the early phase of well design. Relatively
are not collected with the thought that they new technologies like underbalanced drilling,
can be analyzed later and for specific purpose slimhole completions, re-entry wells with
(Lagreca et al., 2008). Sadilier et al. (2011) open hole build sections, and multilateral
suggest the introduction of computer alarm wells have to take into consideration, dur-
system in the entire drilling process in order ing the well planning stage and wellbore
to filter and distribute the relevant informa- instability risk assessment. The objective of
tion to personnel more effectively. The main a wellbore stability assessment is to quantify
objective of this approach is ensuring that the the influence of those parameters that affect
right person receives the right information at the integrity of a given well such as a lack of
the right time to make the correct decision. sufficient wellbore pressure, pore pressure
transmission, hole inclination and others.
A wide variety of analytical and numerical
CONCLUSION models exist for prediction wellbore stresses
and modes of instability for nearly all possible
Wellbore instability has been one of the most loading conditions, well geometries, rock
intriguing problems in the petroleum indus- properties and wellbore fluids. Dedicated
try, especially in the drilling and exploration laboratory tests and in-situ stress measure-
department. Anomalies appearing within ments are desirable to have more confidence
wellbore instability are mainly caused by in predictions achieved with analytical or
the shale formations represented with 75% numerical modeling tools. Every well should
of all drilled formations. Problems involv- be evaluated individually based on the next
ing wellbore instability include tight hole criteria: the type of anticipated problems, their
spots, wellbore diameter enlargement, cav- potential severity, the quantity and quality of
ing appearance, the inability of carrying out data needed for a proper analysis, time and
wireline operations, poor hole cleaning and budget, and the success of previous analyses
unsuccessful wellbore cementing operations of this type. An advanced quantitative risk
and others. Sometimes, these problems cause analysis of wellbore instability can be done
even the abandonment of a certain sections or commonly by using Monte Carlo simulation
the whole well. According to recent studies, as well as competitive neural network.
wellbore instability and associated problems
costs are more than 1x109 US dollars per year.
39
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Parra, J. G., Celis, E., & De Gennaro, S. technico-economical overview. Paper SPE
(2003). Wellbore stability simulations for 28021 presented at the SPE/ISRM Rock Me-
underbalanced drilling operations in highly chanics in Petroleum Engineering Conference,
depleted reservoirs. SPE Drilling & Comple- Delft, The Netherlands.
tion, June, 146-151.
Seymour, K. P., Rae, G., Peden, J. M., &
Plumb, R. A., Hooyman, P., Veeningen, D., Ormston, K. (1993, September). Drilling close
Dutta, N., Ritchie, G., & Bennaceur, K. (2004, to salt diapirs in the North sea. Paper SPE
June). A new geomechanics process reduces 26693 presented at the Offshore European
operational risk from exploration to produc- Conference, Aberdeen, UK.
tion. Paper ARMA/NARMS 04-616 presented
at Gulf Rocks 2004, the 6th North America
Rock Mechanics Symposium (NARMS),
Rock Mechanics Across Borders and Disci-
plines, Houston, Texas. U.S.A.
45
Singh, S. K., Subekti, H., Al-Asmakh, M., & KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Al-Samarraie, L. (2012, May). An integrated
approach to well integrity evaluation via Clay Minerals Hydration: Represents
reliability assessment of well integrity tools a process of water molecules adsorption or
and methods: results from Dukhan field, absorption on inner or outer surface of the
Qatar. Paper SPE 156052 presented at the clay minerals. Intensity and magnitude of clay
SPE International Production and Operations minerals hydration depend on clay minerals
Conference and Exhibition, Doha, Qatar. type and in-situ conditions.
Crystalline Swelling: Short-range swell-
Skogdalen, J. E., & Vinnem, J. E. (2012). ing and it is characteristic of all clay minerals.
Quantitative risk analysis of oil and gas drill- Crystalline swelling of a certain clay mineral
ing, using deepwater horizon as case study. causes slightly increasing of interlayer space
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 100, which lies between 9 to 20 Å.
58–66. doi:10.1016/j.ress.2011.12.002 Mechanical Earth Model (MEM): Nu-
Tan, C. P., Rahman, S. S., Chen, X., Wil- merical representation and computer (soft-
loughby, D. R., Choi, S. K., & Wu, B. (1998, ware) visualization of the geomechanical and
September). Wellbore stability analysis and other (geological, petro physical etc.) proper-
guidelines for efficient shale instability man- ties of the rock regarding to depth.
agement. Paper IADC/SPE 47795 presented at Mud Weight Window: Represents a range
the IADC/SPE Asia Pacific Drilling Technol- of allowable equivalent mud densities or pres-
ogy ´98 Conference and Exhibition, Jakarta, sures that provide wellbore stability on the
Indonesia. specific depth. The minimum mud pressure
(lower boundary) must be higher than wellbore
Tan, C. P., & Willoughby, D. R. (1993). collapse pressure and maximum mud pressure
Critical mud weight and risk contour plots (upper boundary) lower then lost circulation
for designing inclined wells. Paper SPE 26325 pressure, at the certain depth.
presented at the 68th Annual Technical Confer- Osmotic Swelling: Clay swelling type
ence and Exhibition of Society of Petroleum limited to certain clay minerals which con-
Engineers, Houston, Texas, U.S.A. tain exchangeable cations in interlayer space.
Willson, S. M., Edwards, S., Heppard, P. D., This type of swelling causes tremendously
Li, X., Coltrin, G., Chester, D. K., et al. (2003, increases in interlayer space and clay volume
October). Wellbore stability challenges in (much larger than at crystalline swelling).
the deep water, Gulf of Mexico: case history Rock in-Situ Stress: Represents native
examples from the Pompano field. Paper SPE stress of the certain rock in undisturbed
84266 presented at the SPE Annual Technical condition as a result of different geological
Conference and Exhibition, Denver, Colorado, processes (sedimentation, falding, foulting
U.S.A. etc.) and local tectonic activities.
Shale Swelling: Represents volume in-
Zeynali, M. E. (2012). Mechanical and crease of the shale rock as a result of clay
physico-chemical aspects of wellbore stability hydration.
during drilling operations. Journal of Petro- Wellbore Instability: Can be defined as
leum Science Engineering, 82-83, 120–124. any change in borehole diameter by compari-
doi:10.1016/j.petrol.2012.01.006 son with diameter of drilling bit used for its
drilling.
46
47
Chapter 3
Risk Due to Pipe Sticking
Borivoje Pasic
ABSTRACT
causes significant increases in non-productive time and losses of millions of dollars each year
in the petroleum industry. There are many factors affecting stuck pipe occurrence such as
improper mud design, poor hole cleaning, differential pressure, key seating, balling up of bit,
accumulation of cuttings, poor bottom hole assembly configuration, etc. The causes of a stuck
pipe can be divided into two categories: (a) differential sticking and (b) mechanical sticking.
Differential-pressure pipe sticking occurs when a portion of the drill string becomes embedded
in a filter cake that forms on the wall of a permeable formation during drilling. Mechanical
sticking is connected with key seating, formation-related wellbore instability, wellbore geometry
(deviation and ledges), inadequate hole cleaning, junk in hole, collapsed casing, and cement
related problems. Stuck pipe risk could be minimized by using available methodologies for stuck
pipe prediction and avoiding based on available drilling parameters.
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch003
INTRODUCTION too. If this risk is not appropriately managed

and effectively mitigated, significant finan-
Pipe sticking is, for most drilling organiza- cial exposure can result from the cost of the
tions, the greatest drilling problem worldwide. multi-day fishing operations (Prasad et al.,
It results in a significant amount of non-pro- 2012). The physical mechanisms of sticking
ductive time and ends up as one of the major wireline tools are similar to the mechanisms
causes of increased well costs (Yarim et al., involved in drill-pipe sticking. The complexity
2008; Reid et al., 2000; Pal et al., 2000). It of the wells has increased significantly in later
may result in abandonment of the current hole years. Reach has been more than doubled,
and force a sidetrack. It is estimated that the and high inclination and fully 3-D well paths
cost of stuck pipe in deep oil and gas wells can are common. However, statistics shows that
be approximately 25% of the overall budget. sidetracking the boreholes due to stuck pipe
In some areas, events related to differentially has also shown a significant increase, and
stuck pipe can be responsible for as much as is presently a high cost factor. The margins
40% of the total well cost (Reid et al., 2000). between success and failure are now much
The causes of stuck pipe can be divided into smaller (Aadnøy et al., 1999). Traditionally,
two categories (Isambourg, et al., 1999): (a) stuck pipe problems are solved by using some
mechanical (key seating, formation-related standard methods and techniques after they
wellbore instability, wellbore geometry (de- occur, but the real key to savings and success
viation and ledges), inadequate hole cleaning, is in the avoidance of the risks associated with
junk in a hole or collapsed casing, cement the stuck pipe. Minimizing the risks of stuck
related) and (b) differential pressure (wall pipe while drilling has been the goal of many
sticking). Differential pressure sticking is operators recently.
usually indicated when the drill string cannot Many researchers attempt to identify the
be rotated, raised or lowered, but full circu- parameters and their corresponding effects to
lation at normal pressure can be established minimize the risk of stuck pipe (Chamkalani
(Bushnell-Watson & Panesar, 1991). The et al., 2013; Jahanbakhshi et al., 2012; Al-
force required to pull the pipe free can exceed Baiyat & Heinze, 2012; Meqeem et al., 2012;
the strength of the pipe. Usually, even if the Shoraka et al., 2011; Meschi et al., 2010;
stuck condition starts with the possibility of Murillo et al., 2009; Miri et al., 2007; Aadnøy
limited pipe rotation or vertical movement, it et al., 1999; Hopkins & Leicksenring, 1995;
will degrade to the inability to move the pipe Howard & Glover, 1994; Hempkins et al.,
at all. Many oil and gas reservoirs are mature 1987; Courteille & Zurdo, 1985; Kingsbor-
and are becoming increasingly depleted of ough et al., 1985). They proposed models or
hydrocarbons, which increases the risk in- techniques to identify and diagnose the stuck
volved with the stuck pipe. This is due to the pipe early and prevent its occurrence. The
fact that decreasing pore pressure increases accuracy of the predictive model depends on
the chance of stuck pipe. Therefore, the risk the size of database and the variables selected
of differentially stuck pipe increases when for analysis. Even if different techniques and
drilling depleted reservoirs and avoids when guidelines have been developed to reduce the
drilling underbalanced. The increased use of probability of occurrence of stuck pipe and
deep, highly-deviated and tortuous wells has these have saved drilling industry millions of
increased the risk of drill pipe and wireline dollars, they suffer from exclusive prediction
logging tool strings getting stuck downhole, of this event. In some cases where the pipe is
48
not freed, fishing and even sidetracking should at pipe/cake interface can occur. Therefore if
be employed which imparts a huge financial filter cake can be made thin enough, sticking
load on the final cost of drilling the well. can be avoided. Three differential forces have
been used to free the pipe: axial (equivalent to
working the pipe up or down), radial (equiva-
DIFFERENTIAL STICKING lent to pulling the pipe across the wellbore)
and torque (rotation of the pipe) (Figure 1c). In
Differential sticking by definition is a situa- practice it is likely to be a combination of an
tion in which the drilling assembly (pipe, drill axial force and torque which is used to free the
collars and bottom hole assembly) is stuck in pipe. The force required to free differentially
a filter cake that was previously deposited on stuck pipe must overcome adhesion and the
a permeable zone (Figure 1a). A significant differential pressure exerted by the mud. It has
overbalance must also exist and the pipe must a tendency to increase with time until all water
be stationary, or almost stationary, to allow the is expelled from the filter cake. Once sticking
bond between the cake and the pipe to develop. is established, a significant force is required
The pipe is held in the cake by a difference in to free the pipe, even if the mud overbalance
pressures (ΔP) between the hydrostatic pres- is removed. At best, several hours of rig time
sure of the mud (Pm) and the formation (pore) can be spent in various freeing operations. In
pressure (Pf) in the permeable zone (Santos, more serious cases, the pipe cannot be freed
2000). This pressure (ΔP) acts upon the area and the well has to be sidetracked or aban-
of the pipe in contact with the filter cake and doned. Pullout force needed to free a stuck
isolated from the pressure of the mud in the pipe is equal to:
hole by a new filter cake (Figure 1b). There
must be a minimum penetration of the drill F = ΔP.A.µ (1)
pipe before a significant change of pressure
Figure 1. Pipe before stuck (a), stuck pipe (b) and forces to free the pipe (c)
49
where: differential pressure (Figure 2b). In highly

deviated wellbores, with pipe being stationary,
F - pullout force [N] pressure between the mud filter cake and the
ΔP - differential pressure [Pa] drill collar varies from zero to the value of
A - contact area [m2] differential pressure (ΔP) (Figure 2c).
µ– coefficient of friction [-]
Methods of Reducing the Risk of
The value of pullout force (F) is also in- Differential Sticking
creased with compressibility and thickness of
the filter cake, hole deviation, and diameter Differential sticking tendencies of mud de-
of the drill collars. It is decreased with an pend on mud filter cake properties: thickness,
increase in diameter of the hole. The pullout shear strenght, and lubricity. These filter cake
force is time-dependent since contact area properties are influenced by a combination
(A) and coefficient of friction between the of variables such as: mud overbalance, solids
collars and the cake (µ) increases with time. content of the mud (both high-gravity and
low-gravity solids), mud type (e.g., oil-based,
Differential Sticking Causes polymer water-based, gel water-based), spe-
cific mud composition, and fluid loss. Early
Differential sticking causes could be: (a) rela- detection of differential pressure sticking
tively high differential pressure and (b) mud risks could be made through the observation
cake characteristics (thickness, permeability, of torque and drag levels while drilling to
and lubricity). In the situations when it is not detect any sign of deviation from a normal
possible to reduce the differential pressure by trend for the well. The objective of the stuck
reducing the mud weight the option is to act pipe avoidance practices is to ensure condi-
on the mud cake (Outmans, 1974). In a situ- tions are maintained at all times that allow
ation when a pipe is rotating, a dynamic filter pulling force to exceed sticking force (shear
cake is formed and a drill collar penetrates strength) (Dupriest et al., 2010). To mitigate
only a short distance into a mud filter cake differential pressure sticking events, opera-
(Figure 2a) but when the pipe is stationary, a tors often (Montgomery et al., 2007; Simon
static mud filter cake is formed and the drill et al., 2005):
collar is pushed into the mud filter cake by
Figure 2. Situation in wellbore with pipe rotating (a) and pipe stationary (b and c) (Caenn et al., 2011)
50
• Minimize the overbalance (by decreas- Methods of Freeing the Stuck Pipe
ing mud weight),
• Maintain a low filtration rate, Methods used to get the pipe free, in addition
• Keep low-gravity solids to a minimum, to pulling and torqueing the pipe, include: (a)
• Minimize stationary time (drill string lowering hydrostatic pressure in the wellbore
rotates at all times), (by reducing the mud weight; this will reduce
• Minimize drilled length through low the differential pressure; should not be used
pressure formations, if well control is a problem), (b) placing a
• Increase drill collar and drill string spotting fluid next to the stuck zone and (c)
stabilization, applying shock force just above the stuck point
• Optimize fluid properties in attempts to by mechanical jarring, or (d) all the above. The
minimize the risk of sticking, and most common approach, however, to getting
• Select a drilling fluid that will yield a pipe free is to pump a chemical spotting fluid
smooth filter cake with low coefficient in a wellbore annulus. Before the placement
of friction. of the spotting fluid, the depth (free point)
to where the drill string is free and where
The addition of certain lubricants to wa- sticking starts must be determined. This free
ter- and oil- based muds will reduce the risk point can be calculated using measurements
of differential sticking and, should sticking of the drillstring stretch taken on the rig floor.
still occur, reduce the force needed to free the Knowing the stretch (ΔL) and the forces ap-
stuck pipe or tool. Lubricants are designed to plied (F1) and (F2), Hooke’s law, the length
reduce the coefficient of friction of drilling of the drill string from the surface to the free
fluid which decreases torque and drag. De- point (Lf) is equal to:
pending on their chemical composition and
the state of dispersion or solubility in the base E ⋅ A ⋅ ∆L
Lf = (2)
mud, lubricants can: (a) coat metal surfaces, F2 − F1
reducing the adhesion of steel to the mud
cake, (b) be incorporated into the filter cake
and provide better fluid-loss control (result- where:
ing in thinner cakes), and (c) be incorporated
into the filter cake to reduce the yield stress E - Elastic Modulus (Young’s Modulus) of
of the cake. steel [i.e., 200 GPa],
However, despite the best efforts of opera- A - cross-sectional area of the pipe body [m2],
tors a differential pressure sticking event may ΔL - stretch distance (elastical stretch of the
still occur (Ayers et al., 1989). The best cure free portion of the drill string) (m),
for differential sticking is to prevent it by use F1 - force to place the entire drill string in
of drill-collar stabilizers and, more important, tension (N),
conscientiously shortening the intervals of rest F2 - force greater than F1 but less that the
when the pipe is opposite permeable forma- force limited by the yield stress of the
tions (Dupriest et al., 2010). pipe grade [N].
51
Spotting Fluid Spotting fluids need to be in place as

quickly as possible (within six hours after a
A spotting fluid (spot) is a small volume or pipe becoming stuck). Figure 3 shows a free
pill of any substance, oil or water base that drill collar in the center of the hole (a), initial
is positioned in the wellbore to achieve a (b) and final (c) position of the drill collar
specific purpose. Most service companies in contact with the wall, before spotting the
provide multiple spotting fluid options. The fluid. When pipe sticking occurs, pumping of
purpose of the spotting fluid is to dissolve or spotting fluid has to be as quickly as possible
break down the filter cake so the pipe can be to minimize the continued filter cake buildup
freed. Possible mechanisms of spotting fluid which leads to a higher contact angle and pull
action to help free differentially stuck pipe free forces (Figure 3c). The mud filter cake
are (Montgomery et al., 2007): shrunk after spotting fluid (Figure 3d) and
the drill collar is freed (Figure 3e).
• Breaks the capillary forces that hold the Spotting fluids could be divided into four
drillstring against the wellbore wall; main categories: (a) water-based spotting
• Penetrates, dehydrates and cracks fluids, (b) diesel-based spotting fluids, (c)
(breaks up) the mud filter cake; synthetic-based spotting fluids, and (d) acid
• Reduces the contact (stuck) area be- based spotting fluid. They could be unweight-
tween pipe and wall; ed or weighted (spotting fluid, viscosifier and
• Reduces the forces needed to work the weighting material) and consist of detergents,
pipe free; soaps, oils, surfactants and other chemicals
• Increases drillstring lubricity through- (wall cake cracking material). Oil-based mud
out stuck zone; is the traditional spotting fluid (Krol, 1981;
• Allows pipe to be pulled free. Ayers et al., 1989). Because of concern about
Figure 3. The position of a drill collar in the hole before and after spotting fluid
52
mud disposal, spotting fluids used offshore the hole, and running tools with too large a
are either synthetic-based fluids or benign gauge for the hole diameter (Bowes & Procter,
water-based fluids (such as drill-in fluids and 1997; Chamkalani et al., 2013).
salt solutions) (Kercheville et al.,1986). Drill-
in fluids are low and ultra-low solids fluids; Key Seating
the sealing mechanism is generated inside the
rock, so they are leaving just a thin film on Key seating is a situation frequently encoun-
the borehole walls. Salt solutions with a low tered in deviated holes when the drill pipe
activity coefficient combined with environ- wears into the wall. It is caused when the
mentally-safe lubricants (two-phase spot) drill pipe, which is of smaller diameter than
produce low torque levels. the drill collars, rubs against the side of the
hole and wears a slot (Figure 4a). The body
and tool joints of the drill pipe wear a groove
MECHANICAL STICKING in the rock about the same diameter as the
tool joints. Key seating is diagnosed when
The term mechanically sticking is broadly used the drill pipe can be reciprocated within the
to describe all sorts of sticking problems except range of tool joint distances or until the collar
differential sticking. Mechanical sticking oc- reaches the key seat, while pipe rotation and
curs as a result of one or more of the following circulation remain normal. It is still possible
conditions: key seating, formation instability, to drill ahead when key seating has occurred.
inadequate hole cleaning, running into under a However, when pulling out of the hole, the
gauge hole, accumulation of cuttings, drilling larger diameter drill collars will hang up on
plastic formations, large boulders falling into the key seat and the pipe will become stuck.
Figure 4. Key seating (a) and reaming (b)
53
The greater the dogleg severity, the greater geomechanical analysis, stress modeling,
the side load and the faster the key seat can and ensuring optimal mud weight and good
be developed. This type of sticking is likely borehole clean up. A natural fracture system
to happen in a soft formation while dropping in the rock can often be found near faults.
angle. Key seats can also be developed at Rock near faults can be broken into large or
ledges and casing shoes where the groove is small pieces. If they are loose they can fall
worn into the metal instead of the formation. into the wellbore and jam the string in the
The development of key seats is directly af- hole (Nguyen et al., 2007). Even if the pieces
fected by the number of rotating hours. A pre- are bonded together, impacts from the BHA
ventive measure is to carefully control upper due to drill string vibrations can cause the
hole deviation and dogleg severity throughout formation to fall into the wellbore (Figure
the well path. This action will eliminate the 5a) and stuck pipe can occur while drilling.
force that leads to key seat creation. Once a Drill string vibrations have to be minimized
key seat is formed, the best solution is to ream to help stabilize these formations (Bowes &
out the small-diameter portion of the hole Procter, 1997).
with reaming tools (Figure 4b). This action When a hole is drilled in an area of high
will solve the immediate stuck-pipe problem, tectonic stresses the rock around the wellbore
but the key seat can be formed again unless will collapse into the wellbore and produce
preventive steps are taken. splintery cavings similar to those produced
by over-pressured shale (Figure 5b). In the
Formation-Related Wellbore tectonic stress case the hydrostatic pressure
Instability required to stabilize the wellbore may be much
higher than the fracture pressure of the other
Formation related sticking is caused by the exposed formations (Bowes & Procter, 1997).
constriction of the borehole by mechanically or This mechanism usually occurs in or near
chemically unstable formations. This includes mountainous regions. Planning to case off
naturally fractured or faulted formations, these formations as quickly as possible and
tectonically stressed formations, mobile salt maintaining adequate drilling fluid weight
formations, unconsolidated sands, swelling can help to stabilize these formations. In
shales, etc (Pasic et al., 2007; Prasad et al., tectonically stressed areas with fractured
2012). The best practices for maintaining shales, drilling practices can contribute to
a stable borehole during drilling involves destabilizing the wellbore. Mechanical dis-
Figure 5. Pipe stuck caused by unstable formations: a) naturally fractured or faulted formations b) tec-
tonically stressed formations, c) mobile (plastic flowing) formations, and d) unconsolidated formations
54
turbance of yielded rock caused by backream- Some formations are particularly weak and
ing, excessive drill string vibrations and ex- unconsolidated and are prone to swelling (e.g.,
cessive pressure fluctuations mobilized large shale) and/or sloughing (eg., coal or shale). In
volumes of cavings that resulted in stuck pipe general, shale is the formation that causes the
if they were not transported out of the well most problems regarding stuck pipe. Shales
(Yarim et al., 2008). This material and also are weaker along the formation bedding plane
the solids removed from wash out zones can than across it. For this reason, hole stability
result in a sudden pack off situation. The may vary greatly in holes through the same
mechanical action of the drill string while formation but at different inclinations and
backreaming will cause agitation to the already directions. During drilling operations, swell-
weakened rock. It will also cause an enlarged ing and sloughing can grip the pipe and cause
annulus and more solids to remove from the sticking. Brittle/sloughing shales slough into
wellbore. This can be a challenging situation the hole after breaking into pieces. Sloughing
as it may not be possible to provide adequate shale indications are: large amounts of shale at
hole cleaning without pipe rotation which the shaker screens after circulating bottoms up,
then causes more problems. The solution in excess drag during trips, and high levels of fill.
this case may be to pump at the maximum Some shales chemically react with water and
rate without rotation and very slowly pull out swell (Pasic et al., 2007). All swelling shales
of the hole. An additional problem occurs are potential causes of stuck pipe whether
when the BHA moves from a failing rock to they are highly reactive gumbos, or shales
a competent rock (over gauge to gauge hole). which hydrate very quickly. Even though the
In this case, a significant concentration of hole may be cleaned by sufficient flow rates
cavings ahead of the BHA can cause stuck during drilling, it may need to be re-drilled
pipe at the interface between the over gauge after each stand as the swelling continues. The
and gauge hole. Prevention actions during indications of swelling are: torque increases
drilling through overpressured formations during drilling, difficulty in sliding the Bot-
include monitoring cuttings and the Rate of tom Hole Assembly (BHA) when orienting,
Penetration (ROP) and the use of adequate drag in connections, excessive drag when
hole cleaning procedures. Pull Out of Hole (POOH), requirement for
The mobile (plastic flowing) formation repeated reaming of sections, and an increase
squeezes into the wellbore because it is being in Methylene Blue Test (MBT) of water based
compressed by the overburden forces (Figure muds. To avoid stuck pipe in shales mud
5c). It behaves in a plastic manner, deforming properties must be maintained. Time spent
under pressure. This mechanism normally conditioning mud is not time wasted even if
occurs while drilling salt because the mud it means tripping back to the shoe because it
weight is not sufficient to prevent the forma- may prevent a stuck pipe incident. Tripping
tion squeezing into the wellbore (Bowes & with caution through swelling formations is
Procter, 1997). The deformation results in necessarily. Reaming of each single in tight
an undergauge hole, causing problems of hole is recommended. Also, when using a
running BHA´s, logging tools, and casing. top drive, stopping rotation, picking up mid-
An appropriate drilling fluid and maintaining way through each stand and reaming down
sufficient drilling fluid weight are required to is advisable. If hole conditions are severe,
help stabilize these formations. more frequent reaming may be required. A
top drive allows tight sections to be tripped
55
through using slow rotation and circulation. pension characteristics exhibit strong packing
After pulling into a tight spot, running back off tendencies. The indications of inadequate
into gauge hole and circulating before back hole cleaning are: mass balance incorrect
reaming out is advantageous. Sections which while drilling, excessive fill after trips, lack of
proved to be tight during a trip out of the hole cuttings on shakers, increase in pump pressure,
should always be reamed on the trip in. Drilling excessive overpull on connections and trips,
top hole in unconsolidated formations usually erratic and increasing torque while drilling,
results in large pieces of rock (boulders) fall- sudden smooth increase in drag whilst pull
ing into the hole (Figure 5d). Boulders can out of hole, and stuck shortly after pumps off.
be dislodged and fall into the hole or against Poor hole cleaning will cause hole conditions
the drill string causing erratic torque, erratic to steadily deteriorate. Consequently, there
drag on connections, and tendency to stick should be an opportunity to recognise and
when pulling out of the hole. react to the problem. Prior to starting a trip,
the hole should be circulated until it is as clean
Inadequate Hole Cleaning as is practically possible. A trip should not be
started if there are still significant quantities
Cuttings which are not adequately removed of cuttings coming over the shakers at that
out of a hole will settle on the lower side of time. It may be beneficial to rotate and recip-
the hole and may cause the hole to pack off, rocate the string while circulating in inclined
resulting in stuck pipe. Due to the tendency wells, as the movement assists hole cleaning
of the cuttings to fall to the lower side of the by disturbing cuttings beds. A lower rate of
hole, high angle holes are more difficult to penetration results in less cuttings so they can
clean than vertical wells. When a downhole be removed efficiently.
motor is being used in an inclined well, without
rotating the drill string, it is probable that the Undergauge Hole
cuttings beds are not being disturbed. In addi-
tion, for effective hole cleaning, the circulation Undergauge hole occurs when the gauge pro-
rate must be higher than the slip velocity of tection on the bit and stabilizer has become
the cuttings. This is more difficult to achieve ineffective through drilling long sections of
in a deviated hole than in a vertical hole. If abrasive formations. If care is not taken when
backreaming operations are conducted too tripping in the new bit or it can become jammed
fast, solids from washouts and cavings are in- in the undergauge hole. If a full gauge BHA
troduced into the circulating system at a faster is tripped into an undergauge hole, a stuck
rate than the hole is being cleaned. This can pipe situation can occur, too. Greater care in
then result in a pack off, too. It should not be keeping the hole full gauge will prevent this
assumed that any resistance is always at the problem. Also, running large gauge tools
bit; stabilizers and drill collars contact may will most likely result in stuck pipe, and are
be indicative of a buildup of loose material in normally associated with a mistake in the
the hole and a potential pack off situation. As selection of a downhole component. The un-
the wellbore inclination increases, especially dergauge hole is indicated by: an increase in
between 30° to 60°, hole cleaning becomes down drag on run in hole (RIH), increasing
more critical, the well becomes more prone or erratic torque, bit stalling, and a reduction
to cutting beds and avalanches (Yarim et al., in rate of penetration (ROP). Preventive ac-
2008). Drilling-fluid systems with poor sus- tions include: the identification of abrasive/
56
hard formations, checking bit and stabilizers to reduce the frequency of stuck pipe occur-
gauge before and after each trip, slow trips rences and the associated costs. Kingsborough
and reaming the hole. If the hole is thought et al. (1985) and Hempkins et al. (1987) were
to be under gauged, extreme caution must be the first in demonstrating the application of
applied when tripping into the hole. Addition- multivariate statistical analysis to examine a
ally, the undergauge hole can result from any large body of drilling data to find prevailing
of the following causes: (1) plastic flowing differences in drilling variables between wells
formations, (2) wall-cake buildup in a perme- which were non-stuck and wells which were
able formation, and (3) swelling shales. The stuck, and to predict the occurrence of stuck
importance of maintaining a gauge hole and drill pipe based upon patterns in drilling pa-
efficient removal of cuttings has long been rameters. They studied Gulf of Mexico stuck
recognized. An in-gauge, stable hole not only pipe problems, and collected all information
allows for trouble free drilling but also helps from stuck pipe occurrences that might be
to ensure quality logs, better cement jobs and pertinent to the phenomenon. Data collected
hence increased profit. for the 131 cases of sticking (experienced in
period between 1981 and 1984) included 96
Remedial Procedures for Stuck Pipe drilling parameters recorded on a daily basis
for at least 3 days before and including the
Freeing stuck pipe can be undertaken in a day of sticking and 77 items recorded once for
number of ways, depending on what caused each case. The parameters collected included
the sticking (Table 1). The decision on how mud properties, depths, hole-geometry infor-
long to continue attempting to free stuck pipe mation, costs, hydraulics, bit data, bottomhole
vs. back off, plug back, and then sidetrack is assembly (BHA) data, operational remarks,
an economic issue. etc. Most data came from daily reports and
consisted of normal drilling parameters col-
lected and measured in accordance with the
STUCK PIPE RISK ASSESMENT American Petroleum Institute (API) recom-
mended practices. A multivariate statistical
Many authors have tried to determine how and approach was taken to analyze these data.
why a drill pipe becomes stuck and to recom- The stuck pipe occurrences were classified
mend changes in operating practices in order as either differentially stuck or mechanically
Table 1. Stuck pipe causes and recommended freeing methods
Causes Steps to free stuck pipe

High differential pressure. Mud cake characteristics Slump string and rotate. Reduce mud weight. Use
Differential sticking
(thickness, permeability and lubricity). spotting fluid.
Key seating Work string down and rotate. Ream the key seat.
Increase mud weight. Underream.
Undergauge hole
Circulate fresh water (in case of salt formation).
Mechanical sticking
Rotate and reciprocate drillstring. Increase flow rate
without exceeding the maximum allowed Equiva-
Inadequate hole cleaning (Packing off)
lent Circulating Density (ECD).
Back off and wash over.
57
stuck on the basis of the observed behavior of to 87% success rate. In addition, the stuck
the well and operations at the time of sticking. pipe discriminant plots can be used to make
In addition, a third set of data was gathered risk evaluations and decisions when a well is
from wells that had not become stuck for use drilled in order to enhance drilling efficiency
as a control in the analysis. The nonstuck data and reduce stuck pipe cost.
were collected from randomly selected wells Howard & Glover (1994) used Multivari-
in the same general areas of operation as the ate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) to develop
stuck wells. stuck pipe predictive models for wells drilled
Nineteen runs were made with the discrimi- in the Gulf of Mexico and North Sea areas.
nant analysis program. A total of 28 variables Two stuck pipe data bases have been developed
(drilling parameters) were investigated includ- with data from more than 1000 wells drilled in
ing Measured Depth (MD), True Vertical the Gulf of Mexico and in the European North
Depth (TVD), average drill gas, maximum Sea. A total of 20 oil operating companies
drill gas, connection gas, trip gas, survey angle, were involved in project, and each company
mud weight, plastic viscosity, yield point, collected about 50 data sets. For the Gulf of
10-second gel, 10-minute gel, water loss, Mexico each data set contains three days of
filtrate pH, filtrate chloride, filtrate calcium, information, which was extended to five days
oil percent, water percent, hole size, flow for the North Sea data base. Each company
rate, drill-collar outside diameter, bit depth, submitted half stuck wells and half not stuck
BHA length, drill-collar length, time stuck, wells drilled in the previous five years. Sta-
torque, drag, and percent solids (Hempkins et tistical techniques were used to develop stuck
al., 1987). Each run used different combina- pipe predictive models with two classification
tions of these variables to evaluate the effects types. When classifying in three categories
of each parameter on the discrimination of (differentially, mechanically or not stuck) - an
the three groups. The final result yielded an accuracy of 75% is achieved, rising to 80%
overall correct classification of 87%, which for two-class (stuck or not stuck) prediction.
means that 87% of the time the discriminant Using these models, graphical tracking of the
analysis was able to identify correctly the probability of stuck pipe occurring may be
wells belonging to the appropriate predeter- undertaken, to monitor drilling operations for
mined group (differentially stuck, mechani- stuck pipe avoidance. Multivariate Discrimi-
cally stuck, and nonstuck). This final result nant Analysis was also used to develop models
used 20 commonly reported variables. These to predict the probability of freeing pipe once
variables describe most drilling phenomena stuck. They also introduced the Freeing Index
and relationships including measured depth, (FI) as a linear combination of 9 variables
true vertical depth, open hole, survey angle, identified as being most important such as
mud weight, plastic viscosity, yield point, stuck time, time to position spotting fluid,
10-second gel, 10-minute gel, API water loss, hours soak before jarring, hours jar functioned,
filtrate pH, filtrate chlorides, water percent, well profile (straight, build & hold, S-type),
hole size, flow rate, drill-collar outside di- hole angle and over pull. If the value of the
ameter, drill-collar length, torque, drag, and FI is less than -0.7353 (Gulf of Mexico) or
percent solids. The multivariate discriminant 0.2745 (North Sea), the model predicts that
analysis, with these 20 variables, can be the stuck drill string can be freed (Howard &
used to differentiate between mechanically, Glover, 1994). The FI correctly predicts 83%
differentially, and nonstuck wells with an 81 freed wells, and 81% not freed for the Gulf of
58
Mexico, and 90% freed wells, and 86% not analyzed: (1) the forces developed during
freed for the North Sea. Mechanically stuck differential sticking, (2) pipe strength under
wells have a higher probability of freeing than combined loads; tension, torque and pressure,
differentially stuck; 46% vs. 37% for the Gulf (3) effects of buoyancy under various condi-
of Mexico, 74% vs. 60% for the North Sea. tions like equal or different mud densities in
Hopkins & Leicksenring (1995) described drill pipe and annulus, (4) wellbore friction
ways for reducing the risk of stuck pipe in as related to torque and drag. They derived
the Netherlands. All the wells drilled in new equations to estimate the depth to the
1993 were thoroughly analyzed to identify stuck point in deviated wellbores, based on
the causes of the stuck pipe incidents. Well pull and torsion (rotation) tests. In particular
bore instability and the inefficient removal of it is shown that bends in the wellbore leads to
solids (cuttings and cavings) accounted for more friction, which with the new equations
nearly 60% of the events and occurred mainly results in a deeper stuck point in a deviated well
in the 311.15 mm (12 1/4”) and larger hole compared to a similar vertical well. Equations
sizes. If stuck logging tools and casings are for pipe strength under combined loading are
excluded, then the share rises to 70%. In more also defined. In particular, it is shown that
than 90% of these cases, the drill string was the drill pipe can be loaded towards uniaxial
being pulled out of hole. Differential sticking pipe strength even if a full pump pressure is
was observed mainly in the smaller hole sizes, applied on the inside. The differential pressure
across reservoir sections, and was identified across the stuck interval is the dominating
to be the main cause for stuck logging tools. factor. The authors presented three methods
The Cost of Stuck Pipe events and Stuck Pipe to free the pipe, which were developed from
Incident Frequency (SPIF) were introduced the analysis: (1) maximum mechanical force
as the primary performance indicators to method, (2) minimum density method, and
measure and control Stuck Pipe Incidents. (3) maximum buoyancy method. The most
Stuck equipment awareness has been shown important remedy to free the pipe is to reduce
to be essential in ensuring faster, safer drilling. the bottom hole pressure. This can be done by
Drag charts are an excellent tool to monitor displacing the well with a lighter mud. One
hole conditions, and to assist in interpreting can also increase buoyancy by displacing the
the causes of deteriorating hole. The use of inside of the drill string with seawater.
computer programs cart aids the choice of There are various predictive models for the
mud weights. Input data can be derived from assessment and reduction of risks associated
offset wells and when available, cores and/or with wireline conveyance (Underhill et al.,
logs. The active approach to designing wells 1998; Prasad et al., 2012.). The likelihood
by providing mud weight predictions neces- of tool and cable sticking during formation
sary for borehole stability based on offset testing operations is a function of multiple
data, providing advice on hole cleaning (flow parameters that include high overbalance,
rates and rheology), and introducing drag poor mud quality, long and heavy tool string
charts and other trend analysis methods has in highly deviated well, a small difference
resulted in a significant improvement in well between the borehole and the tool diameter,
cost effectiveness. duration of stationary times, existence of de-
Aadnøy et al. (1999) applied a mechanis- pleted reservoirs in the open-hole, etc (Prasad
tic analysis of differentially stuck pipe in a et al., 2012.). Computer programs are avail-
deviated well. The following elements were able to model the forces acting on the tool
59
string during the logging run and evaluate the stuck pipe incidents can be estimated based on
sticking risk quantitatively at any depth. Such solids induced packoffs which accounted for
modeling can identify the nature and magni- about 65% of stuck pipe incidents from 2004
tude of tool deployment risks, and should, in to 2006 (Yarim et al., 2007). The majority of
particular, be used in situations where the well these solids induced pack off incidents oc-
geometry, trajectory, mud properties and field curred while tripping out of the hole and back-
experience suggest that the tool string is likely reaming. In addition, most of the drill string
to become stuck. Another computer program components, especially BHA components,
that allows quantitative assessment of the are designed to work in compression while
risks is Cerberus for Wireline™ (Trademark drilling with weight on bit, and backreaming
of NOV CTES). This program analyzes the exerts some additional loads and forces that
forces acting on the tool string as a function can lead to tool failures. The paper published
of depth, and enables risk assessment through by Yarim et al. (2008) focuses on backream-
management of key parameters like the cable ing operations, reviews the implications of
compression, overpull capacity, and weak backreaming by using real-time data and case
point strength that are essential for a safe and histories, and suggests proven procedures
successful operation (Castillo et al., 2008; to trouble-free backreaming. Backreaming
Prasad et al., 2012.). should not be practiced as a first action if there
Many stuck pipe incidents occur while are indications of a large amount of cuttings
tripping and backreaming out of a hole, and in the annular space, or if the indications of
it is clear that this is a high risk activity and wellbore instability exist. The first action
requires special attention (Yarim et al., 2007 should be taken by going down with the
and 2008). Backreaming is the practice of drillstring and circulating to clean the hole.
pumping and rotating the drillstring while If backreaming is not done properly, it may
simultaneously pulling out of the hole. When complicate the operations, causing wellbore
reliable top drive drilling systems (TDS) on stability issues, higher equivalent circulating
conventional drilling rigs were introduced over densities (ECDs), and it may also cause stuck
30 years ago, the practice of backreaming has pipe incidents due to packoffs. They recom-
become a popular technique in the driller’s mend the conditions that require backreaming
toolbox for tripping out of the hole initially and also suggest wellbore conditions that are
in deviated wells. In general, backreaming not recommended for backreaming. More im-
operations have become a popular solution portantly, they propose key drilling parameters
to poor hole conditions while pulling out of that need to be monitored when backreaming.
the hole, but they are also known for causing These include pump pressure, torque, hook
the very same problems they are supposed load, cuttings rate and downhole measure-
to prevent, such as stuck pipe (Yarim et al., ments (if available) to detect and prevent
2008). Backreaming is generally performed: backreaming induced operational problems.
(1) when there is a problem to trip out of the In addition, they provide guidelines for suc-
hole normally without circulation and rota- cessful backreaming operations and define
tion, (2) to prepare the wellbore to run logs, conditions that may be resolved without need-
(3) to prepare the wellbore to run casing, (4) ing to backream. There are several wellbore
to eliminate tight hole conditions, and (5) to conditions that may require backreaming but
clean the hole to eliminate cuttings beds and there are also conditions where backreaming
hole cavings. The impact of backreaming on should be avoided. The conditions that may
60
require backreaming are: (1) when tripping and neural network model were: measured
out of the hole cannot be carried out on the depth, true vertical depth, bit flow rate, 10
elevators without excessive overpull and the min gel, 10 sec gel, mud weight, plastic vis-
risk of stuck pipe, (2) if there are concerns cosity, yield point, calcium filtrate, chloride
about swabbing, especially with balled up bit/ filtrate, torque, circulating pressure, weight
BHA (although pumping out of hole could be on bit, drag, bit size, bottomhole assembly,
an alternative), (3) where there is insufficient the rate of penetration, revolutions per min-
mud weight to hold back plastic formations ute, discriminant function F1, discriminant
e.g., salt, mobile shales in order to allow nor- function F2 (Murillo et al., 2009). The output
mal tripping procedures, and (4) if there are parameters (variables) in the fuzzy and neural
known wellbore mechanical issues, e.g., tight network model were: Fuzzy Function, Fuzzy
hole conditions that cannot be resolved by cir- Function 2, Neural Network Function 1, Neu-
culating. The conditions where backreaming ral Network Function 2, Stuck, Differential
should be avoided (if possible) are: (1) when Stuck, Mechanical Stuck, Non-stuck.
tripping out of the hole is possible without The variables of the dataset for modeling
circulation and rotation (i.e., backreaming development were chosen. These variables
should not be automatic especially in wells were common to both stuck and non-stuck
with inclination <30°), (2) when backream- wells. Three major groups of data were identi-
ing may destabilize the formation, e.g., where fied: mechanical, differential, and non-stuck.
there is pre-existing fractured/failed rock, These groups form the basis of the entire
(3) where cuttings beds exist in high angle analysis in this project. The wells were classi-
wells and the risk of packoff is high, and (4) fied into 59 differentials, 68 mechanical stuck
where rig pumps have insufficient capacity pipe, and 58 non-stuck as a control input in
for adequate hole cleaning. the entire analysis. A discriminant analysis is
The fuzzy logic and neural network mod- used to generate a predictive model of group
elling are successfully used to estimate and membership, based on similar characteristics
predict differential pipe sticking (Siruvuri et of each group. Discriminant functions can
al., 2006; Murillo et al., 2009). These methods be built based on a linear combination of the
are widely used in other industries and in the predictor variables. Given a set of independent
petroleum field, especially in reservoir and variables, the discriminant analysis attempts
core analyses, and make it possible to estimate to find linear combinations of those variables
the risk of stuck pipe occurrence in the well that best separate the groups of cases. These
planning procedure and during drilling in real combinations are called discriminant func-
time. The no-convolutional analysis of the tions (F1 and F2) and have the form displayed
model is based on the constraints of differ- in the equation (3) (Murillo et al., 2009):
ent drilling variables. Discriminant function
analysis and fuzzy logic were used to classify F1,2 = b + b1 x1 + ...+ bn xn (3)
drilling and mud variables. Extensive simula-
tions were performed. In a study conducted by where:
Murillo et al. (2009) there were 185 datasets
generated from the obtained drilling and mud F1,2 - Discriminant score
reports. The input parameters used in the fuzzy b - Discriminant coefficient
61
x - Independent variable A neural network is a powerful data model-

ing tool that is able to capture and represent
The number of possible discriminant complex input/output relationships. The true
functions can be computed by finding the power and advantage of neural networks lies
minimum of either number of groups minus in their ability to represent both linear and
1 or the number of independent variables non-linear relationships and in their ability to
(Hempkin et al., 1987). In this case, the num- learn these relationships directly from the data
ber of groups being 3 minus 1 is 2 and the being modeled. Traditional linear models are
number of independent variables (predictor simply inadequate when it comes to modeling
variables) is 18. The final result yielded an data that contains non-linear characteristics
overall correct classification of 98.4% cases. (Murillo et al., 2008). It can be used to ex-
Differential stuck and non-stuck cases were tract patterns and detect trends that are too
100% correctly classified and the mechani- complex to be noticed by either human or
cally stuck cases exhibited some misclas- other computer techniques (Siruvuri et al.,
sification error. Approximately 2.9% of the 2006). The motivation for the development
mechanically stuck cases were misclassified of neural network technology stemmed from
as non-stuck and 1.5% was misclassified as the desire to develop an artificial system that
differentially stuck. could perform “intelligent” tasks similar to
Fuzzy logic is an analytical statistical those performed by the human brain. Math-
technique developed to handle the concept of ematically, neural networks can be viewed
“partial truth”; truth values that lie between as a multi-variable non-linear regression. It
„completely true“and „completely false“. In initially assumes a random relationship be-
fuzzy logic, any interpretation is possible, but tween all the inputs and the desired outputs.
some are more probable than others. The gen- By comparing its first attempt at an answer to
erated datasets will have error and uncertainty. the desired output, it self-modifies this initial
Fuzzy logic uses this error and uncertainty random relationship into a relationship that
as a powerful predictive tool to complement best fits the outputs. The network is presented
conventional techniques. Therefore, this tool with many example of inputs and outputs,
is used to complement the discriminant func- and relationships are learned after reviewing
tion classification of stuck and non-stuck pipe the examples over and over again, as many as
occurrences with associated probabilities. ten million times (Boomer, 1995). The neural
The fuzzy model was used to predict stuck network model was also used to predict stuck
pipe occurrences and to provide the optimal pipe occurrences and to provide the optimal
values of the variables necessary to move a values of the variables necessary to move a
well from the stuck region into the non-stuck well from the stuck region into the non-stuck
region. The 18 variables were reduced into region. The redefined variables were also
five dimensionless forms (depth ratio, gel used as the input curves F1, F2 discriminant
ratio, RB (Rheology Factor * Bit Factor), salt functions from the discriminant analysis as
ratio, BR (Bit Force Factor * ROP Factor)). the output curves. The results showed small
The redefined variables were used as indepen- error between the predicted and actual func-
dent variables for the fuzzy input and F1, F2 tions. There were misclassifications of the
discriminant functions from the discriminant type of stuck for both fuzzy logic and neural
analysis were used as control input. network (Murillo et al., 2008). Data availabil-
62
ity is a potential problem when carrying out be used for the prevention of risk due to the
an analysis to predict stuck pipe. Insufficient stuck drill string. Next, using the multivariate
amount of data to train/test and cross validate statistical discriminant analysis techniques
a network can lead to a poor generalization two function were found and they detect dif-
(Siruvuri et al., 2006). ferences in drilling variables between wells.
Meschi et al. (2010) introduced a new pa- The data were gathered for the one hundred
rameter called Reducing Stuck Index (RSI). fifteen (115) stuck cases and one hundred
They studied mud logging and daily reports five (105) non–stuck cases in the study. From
of 75 wells in one of Iranian Southwest oil one hundred fifteen (115) stuck case, fifty
fields. The performance of wells that did not (50) were mechanically stuck and sixty five
experience stuck pipe was compared with the (65) were differentially stuck, that induced
performance of those that led to stuck pipe. twenty four (24) variables typically reported
Mud weight, yield point, plastic viscosity, on morning drilling reports. The drilling data
initial gel strength, Marsh funnel viscosity, dial were gathered for the actual sticking day at
reading at 600 rpm, solid content, temperature, the time of sticking. Regression analysis and
washout and the period that pumps do not need Discriminant analysis are two types of mul-
maintenance were employed to introduce RSI tivariate techniques.
which contains all the mentioned parameters. Regression analysis is a statistical tool for
It was found that RSI is proportional to the evaluating the relationship of one or more
mud weight, initial gel strength; yield point, independent variables x1, x2, xk to a single,
solid content and temperature and inversely continuous dependent variable Y. In most of
proportional to plastic viscosity, Marsh funnel statistical approach, one variable is usually
viscosity and dial reading at 600 rpm to the taken to be a response or dependent variable
power of 0.3, in stuck and non-stuck condi- that is a variable to be predicted from other
tions. The value of RSI for non-stuck well will variables. The other variables are called pre-
be greater than stuck well at the particular dictor or independent variables. One of the
depth. Monitoring RSI helps the driller to first steps of calculating an equation with
know whether the drilling process results in several dependent variables is to calculate
stuck pipe. If the situation is leading to stuck a correlation matrix for all the variables.
pipe, the drilling parameters can be managed This matrix shows the correlation between
in such a way that RSI lies in the safe range the dependent variable (DIFPR-Differential
and stuck pipe is prevented. Pressure, psi) and any other independent vari-
Shoraka et al. (2011) developed model for able (GPM-Flow rate, gal/min; AAN-Cross
stuck drill pipe in Iranian southern oil field Section of Annulus, in2; GL1-10 Second Gel,
drilling wells for Ilam and Sarvak formations. lbs/100 ft2; GL2-10 Minute Gel, lbs/100 ft2;
For this purpose, drilling data including: mea- MW-Mud Weight, ppg; TVD-True Vertical
sured depth, true vertical depth, mud weight, Depth, ft; Formation Pressure, Differential
percent oil and water, formation pressure, etc. Pressure, psi; ANGLE- Angle of Well, degree;
from forty (40) wells drilled in one of the field DRCODIA-Drill Collar Outside Diameter,
were selected (Ilam and Sarvak formation in in; DCLENGHT- Drill Collar Length, ft; YP-
Ahwaz and Abb-Taymoor oil field). Using Yield Point, lbs/100 ft2, and MD-Measured
the multivariate statistical regression analy- Depth, ft), and also the correlation among the
sis an equation representing stuck pipe has independent variables. The high correlation
been developed. The developed equation can among variables is shown by a greater number
63
so that this number ranges from 0 to 1 and the – (0.028) OIL + (0.398) HOLE + (0.003)
closer the number is to 1, those two variables FRPR – (0.042) DRCODIA – (0.058) PH +
show greater correlation to each other. The (7.939) (5)
minus sign indicates that those two variables
have reverse relationship. The most appropri- Function 2:
ate model is obtained which can be seen in
Equation (4) (Shoraka et al., 2011): (-0.483) MW – (0.013) PV – (0.019) YP +
(0.155) GL1 – (0.162) GL2 + (0.115) VIS
DIFPR = (0.515) TVD + (577.893) + (0.105) FL – (0.001) DIFPR + (0.005)
MW – (10.893) GL1 + (12.424) GL2 + GPM – (0.102) AAN + (0.019) RPM +
(1.031) AAN + (0.107) ANGLE – (0.944) (0.001) CA + (0.004) SOLID + (0.082)
FRPR + (5.056) DRCODIA + (0.03577) WATER + (0.072) OIL – (0.026) HOLE
DCLENGHT – (0.642) YP – (0.01056) – (0.001) FRPR – (0.218) DRCODIA
GPM – (0.0019190) MD (4) + (0.002) DCLENGHT + (0.032) PH –
(6.239) (6)
Using the model obtained above and ap-
plying the values related to its variables, the By putting the quantities of the variables
possibility of stuck pipe according to drilling in these functions for the next three days, two
conditions can be estimated, and by changing numbers of the above mentioned functions
the values of the above variables, there could will result, by plotting which in figure 6, a unit
be prevention from this occurrence. In a regres- point will be reached. The drilling conditions
sion analysis, if a number related to DIFPR for the next 3 days can be predicted.
is between 689.47 – 2757.9 kPa (100 - 400 A discriminate analysis can be used to
psi), drilling conditions will be safe and the differentiate between three groups of wells,
less predictive of stuck pipe may exist, but, if using plotting in the graph with a 80% to 86%
is outer of this range, risk of stuck pipe will success rates. For applying the calculated
exit (Shoraka et al., 2011). models in the actual field, the position of
In a discriminant analysis the statistical drilling can be located in the region of “non-
problem is to develop a rule, or a discriminant stuck” in the graph of discriminant analysis,
function. Two discriminant functions (Func- and by locating the differential pressure in a
tion 1 and Function 2) were proposed, and by regression model in the range of 689.47 –
using these two functions and substituting the 2757.9 kPa (100 - 400 psi), the predicted stuck
values of the identified variables, stuck prob- pipe is prevented.
ability can be predictable according to drilling Chamkalani et al. (2013) describe a robust
conditions (Shoraka et al., 2011): support vector regression (SVR) methodology
that offers a superior performance for stuck
Function 1: pipe prediction either mechanically or differ-
entially by using available drilling parameters.
(-0.001) TVD – (0.993) MW + (0.015) This diagnosis guides drilling managers to
PV – (0.028) YP + (0.371) GL1 – (0.327) choose appropriate solutions and remedial
GL2 + (0.014) VIS + (0.001) FL + (0.005) operations. A new hybrid Least Square Sup-
DIFPR – (0.004) GPM – (0.062) AAN + port Vector Machine (LSSVM) model is
(0.003) RPM – (0.001) MD + (0.011) AN- developed by using drilling parameters such
GLE + (0.016) SOLID – (0.019) WATER as measured depth, mud weight, plastic vis-
64
Figure 6. Position of three day drilling (Shoraka et al., 2011)
cosity, yield point, gel strengths, PH and solid data were gathered in which non-stuck had a
percent from different wells to predict the pipe portion of 109 data, mechanical acquired 51
sticking. LSSVM model identifies nearly all dataset, and the remaining, 59 data, were al-
the cases except some cases which it might be lotted to differential sticking. Due to different
subjected to field observation or human faults parameters affecting stuck pipe prediction,
and errors. A performance analysis shows that it is not possible to visualize the LSSVM’s
LSSVM classifier has high accuracy. The data output. Chamkalani et al. (2013) developed
provided for this study were gathered from a two dimensional correlation which utilized
Iranian oilfields in order to classify and predict the two discriminant functions proposed by
the pipe sticking (Shoraka et al., 2011). The Shoraka et al. (2011). All the inputs are 23
model is constructed on the basis of classify- parameters which are transformed into two
ing the stuck pipe challenge to non-stuck and functions where the real inputs of model are
stuck conditions. Consecutively, the stuck these two functions. The Differential, Me-
condition was considered as differential and chanical, and Non-Sticking titles were set up
mechanical modes. In the study, 219 sets of for the output. Figure 7 represents a universal
65
Figure 7. Predictor for determination of stuck pipe into mechanical, differential, and non-stuck
classifier which has validated its performance tions. It can occur while drilling, making a
and preciseness. According to the results, the connection, logging, testing, or during any
proposed methodology derives a very precise kind of operation which involves leaving the
prediction for diagnosing pipe sticking with equipment in the hole. This problem is known
accuracy of 95% and higher (Chamkalani et to occur in a form of several major mechanisms
al., 2013). including: wellbore instability, differential
sticking forces, improper hole cleaning and
the forming of drill-cutting beds, especially
CONCLUSION in high angle wells. The consequences of a
stuck pipe are very costly and include: lost
Pipe sticking is a big problem for the petroleum drilling time when freeing the pipe, time and
industry and will continue in the future. The cost of fishing, trying to pull out of the hole
recent increase in drilling activity, the shortage the broken part of the BHA, and abandon-
of experienced personnel and equipment, and ment of the tool in the hole because it is very
drilling in higher-risk areas has increased the difficult or too expensive to remove it. The
risk of stuck pipe events in all drilling opera- petroleum industry has widely recognized
66
that mud design and training of well site per- is in the avoidance of the risks associated with
sonnel is essential to achieve a reduction of the stuck pipe. Many researchers attempt to
stuck pipe. Many incidents could be avoided identify the parameters and their correspond-
by more careful planning or greater care at ing effects to minimize the risk of stuck pipe
the rig site. While stuck pipe continues to be by using different models such as Multivariate
a problem much has been done to reduce the Statistical Analysis, Discriminated Analysis,
occurrence of such events and to minimize Artificial Neural Network Model, Support
the time and cost impact when such events Vector Machine Model, and Adaptive Fuzzy
occur. If the risks associated with the stuck Logic Model.
pipe are identified in advance, better solu- Improved planning and risk analysis
tions can be provided to reduce the cost for through computer modeling can significantly
drilling operation (tripping, fishing) and for reduce the chances of pipe sticking. Such a
drilling mud, to minimize time for drilling a proactive approach also helps in identifying
well, and to minimize damage of BHA and options and solutions in case of a sticking
surface equipment. Traditionally, stuck pipe event. The accuracy of the predictive model
problems have been solved by using some depends on the size of database and the vari-
standard methods and techniques after they ables selected for analysis.
occur, but the real key to savings and success
67
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Aadnøy, B. S., Larsen, K., & Berg, P. C. wells with high flow rates using downhole
(1999). Analysis of stuck pipe in deviated tractors. Paper presented at the SPE Annual
boreholes. Paper presented at the 1999 SPE Technical Conference and Exhibition. Den-
Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition. ver, CO.
Houston, TX.
Chamkalani, A., Pordel Shahri, M., & Poor-
Al-Baiyat, I., & Heinze, L. (2012). Implement- dad, S. (2013). Support vector machine model:
ing artificial neural networks and support A new methodology for stuck pipe prediction.
vector machines in stuck pipe prediction. Paper presented at the SPE Middle East Un-
Paper presented at the SPE Kuwait Interna- conventional Gas Conference and Exhibition.
tional Petroleum Conference and Exhibition. Muscat, Oman.
Kuwait City, Kuwait.
Courteille, J. M., & Zurdo, C. (1985). A new
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Isambourg, P., Ottesen, S., Benaissa, S., & Miri, R., Sampaio, J., Afshar, M., & Lourenco,
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Nguyen, V., Abousleiman, Y., & Hoang, S.
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presented at the 56th Annual Fall Technical rock formations: Nahr Umr shale. Paper pre-
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Meschi, M. R., Shahbazi, K., & Pordel Shahri,
M. (2010). A new criteria to predict stuck pipe Outmans, H. D. (1974, July 15). Spot fluid
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Cairo, Egypt.
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Pal, K., Mangla, V. K., Joshi, N. P., Tewari, Siruvuri, C., Nagarakanti, S., & Samuel, R.
P. P., & Bose, U. N. (2000). A new approach (2006). Stuck pipe prediction and avoidance:
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2000 SPE Annual Technical Conference and Conference. Miami, FL.
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Underhill, W. B., Moore, L., & Meeten, G. H.
Pasic, B., Gaurina-Medjimurec, N., & Mata- (1998). Model-based sticking risk assessment
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and consequences. The Mining-Geological- Coast. Paper presented at the SPE Annual
Petroleum Engineering Bulletin, 19, 87–98. Technical Conference and Exhibition. New
Orleans, LA.
Prasad, T., Castillo, H. C., & Elshahawi, H.
(2012). Effective mitigation of tool sticking Yarim, G., Ritchie, G. M., & May, R. B.
risk in formation testing and fluid sampling (2008). A guide to successful backreaming:
operations. Paper presented at the SPE An- Real-time case histories. Paper presented at
nual Technical Conference and Exhibition. the 2008 SPE Annual Technical Conference
San Antonio, TX. and Exhibition. Denver, CO.
Reid, P. I., Meeten, G. H., Way, P. W., Clark, Yarim, G., Uchytil, R., May, R. B., Trejo, A.,
P., Chambers, B. D., Gilmour, A., & Sanders, & Church, P. (2007). Stuck pipe prevention – A
M. W. (2000). Differential-sticking mecha- proactive solution to an old problem. Paper
nisms and a simple wellsite test for monitor- presented at the 2007 SPE Annual Technical
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SPE Drilling & Completion, 15(2), 97–104.
doi:10.2118/64114-PA
Santos, H. (2000). Differentially stuck pipe: ADDITIONAL READING
Early diagnostic and solution. Paper presented
at the IADC/SPE Drilling Conference. New Aarrestad, T. V., & Blikra, H. (1994, June).
Orleans, LA. Torque and drag: key factors in extended reach
drilling. Paper IADC/SPE 27491 presented
Shoraka, S. A. R., Shadizadeh, S. R., & Pordel at the 1994 IADC/SPE Drilling Conferencce,
Shahri, M. (2011). Prediction of stuck pipe Dalas, Texas, U.S.A
in Iranian south oil fields using multivariate
statistical analysis. Paper presented at the Adams, N. (1977, October). A field case
Nigeria Annual International Conference and study of differential pressure sticking. Paper
Exhibition. Abuja, Nigeria. SPE 6716 presented at the 1977 SPE An-
nual Technical Conference and Exhibition,
Simon, K., Gaurina-Medjimurec, N., & Denver, U.S.A.
Pasic, B. (2005). Drilling fluids differential
sticking tendency determination. The Mining-
Geological-Petroleum Engineering Bulletin,
17, 31–35.
70
Addis, M. A., Barton, N. R., Bandis, S. C., & Guzman, J. M., Khalil, M. E., Orban, N.,
Henry, J. P. (1990, September). Laboratory Mohiuddin, M. A., Verna, J., & Ganda, S.
studies on the stability of vertical and devi- (2012, April). Stuck-pipe prevention solutions
ated borehole. Paper SPE 20406 presented in deep gas drilling, new approaches. Paper
at the 65th Annual Technical Conference SPE 160875 presented at the SPE Saudi Sec-
and Exhibition of the Society of Petroleum tion Technical Symposium and Exhibition,
Engineers, New Orleans, LA, U.S.A. Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia.
Al-Dossary, A. (2013, March). New offshore Haduch, G. A., & Samuels, D. A. (1994,
sidetrack practices reduced significantly stuck February). Solution of common stuck pipe
pipes in KSA. Paper SPE 16461 presented at problems through the adaptation of torque
the 6th International Petroleum Technology drag calculations. Paper IADC/SPE 27490
Conference, Beijing, China. presented at the SPE/IADC Drilling Confer-
ence, Dallas, Texas, U.S.A.
Ayers, R. C., & O’Reily, J. E. (1989, February-
March). Offshore operators committee Gulf Harrison, C. G. (1982). Fishing decisions
of Mexico spotting fluid survey. Paper SPE under uncertainty. JPT, February, 299-300.
18683 presented at the 1989 SPE/lADC Drill-
Keller, P. D., Brinkman, P. E., & Taneja, P. K.
ing Conference, New Orleans, U.S.A.
(1984, May). Economic and statistical analy-
Biegler, M. W., & Kuhn, G. R. (1994, Febru- sis of time limitations for spotting fluids and
ary). Advances in prediction of stuck pipe using fishing operations. Paper OTC 4792 presented
multivariate statistical analysis. Paper IADC/ at the 1984 Annual Offshore Technology
SPE 27529 presented at 1994 IADC/SPE Conference, Houston, Texas, U.S.A.
Drilling Conference. Dallas, Texas, U.S.A.
Kemp, K., Elshahawi, H., Megat, A., Tollef-
Brouse, M. (1982). How to handle stuck pipe sen, E., Kok, J., & Fey, S. (2011, May). Ana-
and fishing problems. World Oil, November, lyzing the critical effects of time on station.
103-24. Paper presented at the SPWLA 52nd Annual
logging Symposium, Colorado Springs, Colo-
Bushnell-Watson, Y. M., & Panesar, S. S.
rado, U.S.A.
(1991, October). Differential sticking labo-
ratory tests can improve mud design. Paper Love, T. E. (1983, February). Stickiness factor
SPE 22549-MS presented at the SPE Annual - A new way of looking at stuck pipe. Paper
Technical Conference and Exhibition, Dallas, IADC/SPE 11383 presented at the IADC/SPE
Texas, U.S.A. Drilling Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana,
U.S.A.
Castillo, H., & Wills, P. (2007, March). Effec-
tive application of an innovative conveyance Martins, A. L., Sansoni, U., Jr., de Camargo,
risk management methodology to reduce J. W., & de Oliveira, S. F. (2000, November).
well intervention cost and risks in long/deep/ Guidelines for efficient spot fluid displace-
tortuous wells. Paper SPE 106562 presented ment in highly inclined and horizontal wells.
at the SPE/ICoTA Coiled Tubing and Well Paper SPE 64705 presented at the International
Intervention Conference and Exhibition, The Oil and Gas Conference and Exhibition, Bei-
Woodlands, Texas, U.S.A. jing, China.
71
Robson, R. I. (2012, October). Comparison Filter Cake: The residue deposited on

of stuck-pipe and lost-in-hole outcomes by a permeable medium, such as filter paper,
operator and well complexity in US land ceramic disc or permeable zones in the well-
taken from a global bit run dataset. Paper bore, when a drilling fluid is forced against
SPE 147555 presented at the SPE Annual the medium under a pressure.
Technical Conference and Exhibition, San Fishing: The application of tools, equip-
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. ment and techniques for the removal of junk
or debris from a wellbore.
Voghell, M., Mohanna, A., Hanley, C., Al-
Key Seat: A small-diameter channel,
Khiriseh, C., Al-Mousa, A., & Al-Amri, A.
similar to the diameter of the drillpipe, worn
(2013, March). Downhole vibration analysis:
into the side of a larger diameter wellbore as
Fishing agitation tool efficiency in stuck pipe
the result of a sharp change in direction of the
recovery. Paper SPE/IADC 163516 presented
wellbore (a dogleg), or if a hard formation
at the 2013 SPE/IADC Drilling Conference
ledge is left between softer formations that
and Exhibition, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
enlarge over time.
Wisnie, A. P., & Zhu, Z. (1994, September). Mechanical Sticking: The limiting or
Quantifying stuck pipe risk in Gulf of Mexico prevention of motion of the drillstring while
oil and gas drilling. Paper SPE 28298 pre- drilling caused by junk in the hole, key seats,
sented at the SPE 69th Annual Technical wellbore geometry (deviation and ledges),
Conference and Exhibition, New Orleans, formation instability, cement, or a buildup of
Louisiana, U.S.A. cuttings in the annulus.
Pack Off: A situation in which the well-
bore around a drillstring is pluged as a result
of inadequate hole cleaning.
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Sidetrack: A secondary wellbore drilled
Differential Sticking: A situation in which away from an original wellbore to bypass an
the drilling assembly (pipe, drill collars and unusable section of the original wellbore due
bottomhole assembly), casing or logging tool to an irretrievable fish, junk in the hole, or a
becomes embedded in filter cake that was collapsed wellbore.
previously deposited on a permeable zone Spotting Fluid: A small volume or pill
and is held there by a significant amount of of fluid placed in a wellbore annulus to free
differential pressure. differentially stuck pipe by covering the stuck
Dogleg: A section of the hole that changes region, breaking up the filter cake, reducing the
direction faster than anticipated or desired, stuck area and allowing pipe to be pulled free.
increasing the overall friction to the drillstring, Stuck: An inability to remove the drill-
and the likelihood of getting stuck. string from the wellbore, lower it back into
the wellbore, or rotate the drillstring in the
wellbore.
72
73
Chapter 4
Lost Circulation
Borivoje Pasic
ABSTRACT
Lost circulation is defined as the uncontrolled flow of mud into a thief zone and presents one
of the major risks associated with drilling. The complete prevention of lost circulation is im-
possible, but limiting circulation loss is possible if certain precautions are taken. Failure to
minimize lost circulation can greatly increase the cost of drilling, as well as the risk of well
loss. The risk of drilling a well in areas known to contain potential zones of lost circulation such
as fractured, cavernous, or high permeability formations is a key factor in making a decision
to approve or cancel a drilling project. The successful management of lost circulation should
include identification of potential loss zones, optimization of drilling hydraulics, and remedial
measures when lost circulation occures.
INTRODUCTION bbl/hr) to a complete loss of returns. When

circulation is lost, the drilling fluid costs rise
Lost circulation or lost returns are the partial considerably, along with expenses associated
or total loss of mud to subsurface formations. with rig and equipment delays. The industry
It occurs when the openings in the forma- spends millions of dollars a year to combat
tion allow the mud flow into the formation, lost circulation and the detrimental effect it
resulting in losses ranging from 0.16 m3/hr (1 propagates. Potential problems associated
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch004
Lost Circulation
with lost circulation during drilling include: resulted in failure to secure production tests
loss of mud, lost time, poor cement job, re- and samples, while the plugging of produc-
duced safety, stuck pipe, additional casing tion zones have led to decreased productivity.
string, failure to reach target depth, blowout Special bridging agents and sealing materials
and kill operations, downhole blowouts, en- should be used to form a good seal and filter
vironmental incident, and the abandonment cake on the depleted zone. The petroleum
of expensive wells. Lost circulation during industry has invested a significant effort into
cementing could result in reduced annular cov- understanding the mechanisms behind lost
erage, casing corrosion, poor zonal isolation circulation, developing new tools to help locate
and also reduced safety. In addition, during the thief zone, and implementing new steps to
completion/workover operation, existing loss minimize or eliminate this problem because
zone can cause the loss of completion fluid, prevention is more effective than remediation
lost rig time, formation damage and lost re- (Whitfill et al., 2007).
serves of oil and gas. In partial lost circulation, Whitfill (2003) recommends a fully engi-
mud continues to flow to the surface with some neered approach that incorporates a number
loss to the formation. Total lost circulation oc- of planning tools, including: borehole stabil-
curs when all the mud flows into a formation ity analysis, hydraulics modeling to estimate
with no return to surface. If drilling continues Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD),
during total lost circulation, it is referred to as drilling fluid and Lost Circulation Materials
blind drilling. This is not a common practice (LCM) selection to help minimize effects on
in the field unless the formations above the ECD.
thief zone are mechanically stable, without Conventional lost circulation materials
production and the fluid is clear water. Blind including pills, squeezes, pretreatments, and
drilling also may continue if it is economically drilling procedures employing equivalent
feasible and safe. circulating density management often reach
The complete prevention of lost circulation their limit in effectiveness and become unsuc-
is impossible because some formations, such cessful in the deeper hole conditions where
as inherently fractured, vugular, cavernous, some formations are depleted, structurally
unconsolidated (high-permeability zones) weak, or naturally fractured and faulted (Wang
or depleted low-pressure formations (usually et al., 2005). With continued drilling of deep
sands), are not avoidable if the target zone is water wells, High Pressure High Temperature
to be reached (Al Ubaidan et al., 2000; Algu (HPHT) wells, infill wells, etc., the mud-
et al., 2007; Bell et al. 1987; Davidson et al., weight window is not only becoming much
2000; Ferras et al., 2002). The problem of lost narrower, but also more uncertain. To address
circulation was magnified considerably when these issues, new lost circulation solutions
operators began drilling deeper and/or deplet- and concepts such as borehole strengthening
ed formations (Sanders et al., 2003; Suyan et or Wellbore-Pressure Containment (WPC)
al., 2009). The high hydraulic pressure forces have been developed. Proposed mechanisms
mud to invade the depleted formation. If this behind various means proposed and used
situation exists, plans should be formulated to enhance wellbore-pressure containment
to prevent lost circulation or stuck pipe from include sealing incipient fractures at the
occurring in the depleted zone. Moreover, wellbore wall; propping open multiple short
lost circulation has even been blamed for fractures at the wellbore wall, thus increasing
minimized production in that losses have compressive stresses around wellbore; and
74
Lost Circulation
sealing fractures with various materials using LOST CIRCULATION

hesitation-squeeze technology (Wang et al., ZONES AND CAUSES
2005; Salehi & Nygaard, 2012).
Where unsustainable losses occcur and Potential zones of lost circulation include
conventional circulation is no longer pos- highly-permeable formations, highly-porous
sible the Pressurized Mud Cap Closed Hole formations, cavernous and vugular formations,
Circulation Drilling (CHCD) technique may fractured formations with natural or induced
be used to allow the continuation of drilling fractures, as well as depleted formations
in circulation loss zones by controling the an- (Figure 1).
nulus pressure and injecting a sacrificial fluid Highly-Permeable and Highly Porous
into the thief formation. Masi et al. (2010) Formations: Formations such as massive,
discuss the operational details of conduct- unconsolidated or shalow sands, gravel beds,
ing CHCD as well as the risk-management shell beds, reef and oyster beds, zones in
approach, which involves the identification, carbonates (limestone or dolomite) and natu-
evaluation, and mapping of all risks involved in ral fractures, faults and transition zones in
each scenario (qualitative risk assessment). A carbonates or hard shales can have suffi-
probabilistic model is, therefore, developed to ciently high permeability (in excess of 14 μm2
combine all the risks identified and to address (14 D)) for whole mud to invade the formation
their consequences within operational time. matrix, resulting in lost circulation. It can
Figure 1. Potential zones of lost circulation
75
Lost Circulation
cause continuous gradual seepage losses and interconnected. Similar vugs and caverns can
partial losses which may develop slowly and develop during the cooling of volcanic magma
increase with penetration. The rate of loss is or ash. Cavernous and vugular formations are
dependent on the degree of permeability. One often easily traceable from offset wells and
important reason for preventing mud loss in predictable from mud logs and lithology.
shallow intervals is that it may cause these Fractured Formations with Natural or
unconsolidated formations to wash out, form- Induced Fractures: Natural fractures exist
ing a large cavity that is less stable which in many cases, which may be impermeable
could cave in more easily from overburden under balanced pressure conditions. They
and rig weight. may be indicated when losses occur during or
Cavernous and Vugular Formations: For- immediately subsequent to rough drilling or
mations such as limestones (with large cav- sudden formation change. Mud loss also oc-
erns), dolomite, chalk, and other formations curs in fissures or fractures in wells where no
with secondary porosity can cause sudden coarsely permeable or cavernous formations
and severe to complete loss of returns which exist. These fissures or fractures may occur
may be accompanied by sudden erratic rates naturally, or may be initiated or extended by
of penetration. Formations of this nature are hydraulically imposed pressures. Losses may
generally predictable in areas with significant also occur at unsealed fault boundaries.
drilling histories. Cavernous or vugular zones Induced Fractures: Are indicated where
are usually associated with low-pressure car- losses occur while tripping a pipe, breaking
bonate (limestone and dolomite) or volcanic circulation, or raising mud weights. Hydraulic
formations. In limestone, vugs are created by fracturing is initiated and lost circulation oc-
the previous continuous flow of water that dis- curs when some critical fracture pressure is
solved part of the rock matrix, creating a void reached or exceeded (Ivan et al., 2002).
space often later filled with oil. When these The major causes of induced fractures
vugular formations are drilled, the drillstring include excessive wellbore pressures (exceed-
may fall freely through the void zone and a ing the fracture gradient) with excessive mud
rapid loss of mud is usually experienced. The weights or high surge pressures and setting
volume and persistence of this kind of loss intermediate casing, especially in the transi-
depends on the degree to which the vugs are tion zone, too high (Table 1). Once a fracture
Table 1. Excessive downhole pressures causes
Mechanical forces Hole conditions Mud properties
Sloughing shale or increased solids loading Excessive viscosities and gel strengths.
Excessive pump rates and velocities.
in the annulus. Buildup of drilled solids.
Raising or lowering the pipe too fast Accumulation of cuttings in a washed out Thick filter cakes that reduce the hydraulic diam-
(surge/swab). portion of the hole or in the mud. eter of the wellbore.
Cuttings beds or barite sag forming on the
Excessive mud density or increasing mud density
Spudding bridges. low side of a directional well, or possible
too fast.
slumping.
Excessive Rate of Penetration (ROP). Bridges. Unbalanced mud columns.
Pipe whipping. Kicks and well control procedures. Barite sag.
76
Lost Circulation
is created or opened by an imposed pressure, of induced formation fractures are always

it may be difficult to repair (heal) and it may subject to the nature of the formation, drilling
never regain the original formation strength. and mechanical effects, as well as geological
Lost circulation may persist even though the influences over time (Sanders, 2003).
pressure is later reduced. This is one reason Depleted Formations. These formations
why it is better to pretreat for, and prevent, (usually sands) are another potential loss zone.
lost circulation than to permit it to occur. The problem of lost circulation was magnified
Excessive wellbore pressures are caused considerably when operators began drilling
by high flow rates (high annular-friction pres- deeper and/or depleted formations. Formation
sure loss) or tripping in too fast (high surge pressure in producing formations decreases
pressure), which can lead to mud equivalent due to the extraction of the formation fluids
circulating densities. and may become subnormal. Drilling a new
Rapid movement of the drillstring will well in the same field, or general vicinity,
cause pressure surges that can induce fractures requires adequate mud weights. However, in
or reopen previously sealed loss zones. Unless such a case, mud weights required to control
a previously sealed loss zone has been pres- other exposed formation pressures may be too
sure tested it should always be assumed this high for the depleted low-pressure formation.
area remains a potential source of losses. The A type of loss is best determined by the
rate of pipe movement during trips and while lithology. The identifying features of four
reaming should be adjusted to compensate for types of formations in which mud losses occur
this weakness. are presented in Table 2 (see also Figure 1).
Increasing pump rates too rapidly after
connections and trips can put much higher
circulating pressures on the formation due to PREVENTIVE MEASURES
the tendency of muds to thicken during trips.
In addition, improper annular hole cleaning, Lost circulation, as the result of formation
excessive mud weight, or shutting in a well fracture or drilling into a porous formation,
in high-pressure shallow gas can induce frac- is largely proportional to the positive differ-
tures, which can cause lost circulation. ential pressure of the circulating fluid over
Excessive Rate of Penetration (ROP) for the formation pressure. Therefore, in order
a given flow rate will result in high cuttings to prevent lost circulation, it is important to
concentration in the annular fluid causing a maintain density, gel strengths, yield point,
high ECD. If intermediate casing is set above and viscosity of the drilling fluid at the lowest
the transition zone crossing from normal to levels that still allow for effective drilling, and
abnormal pressures, the pressures exerted in particular hole cleaning. High viscosities
by the heavier mud (required to balance the can increase the ECD to a level that will break
increasing pressures) will often induce frac- down the formation. Stopping and re-starting
turing at the weak casing seat. Losses due circulation take the fluid dynamics through
to fracturing are most commonly near the many changes in turbulence (quantity and lo-
previous casing seat, not at bit depth even if cation) and, in unstable formations, inevitably
casing is properly set. erode the exposed formation wall, more than if
When dealing with induced fractures the circulation is continuous and steady. Continu-
problem is even more complicated than with ous circulation provides the best conditions
natural fractures, as the shape and structure for establishing a minimum filter cake and
77
Lost Circulation
Table 2. The identifying features of thief formations in which mud losses occur
Type of formation Identifying features

• Offset records that identify the zone and its characteristics.
Shallow, unconsolidated formations where
• Gradual lowering of mud level in pits.
rock permeability can exceed 14 μm2 (14 D).
• Loss may become complete if drilling is continued.
• Normally confined to limestone and dolomite.
Carbonate formations that contain cavernous • Loss of returns is usually sudden and complete.
and vugular zones. • Drill string may drop from a few cm (inches) to a few dm (feet) just preceding loss.
• Excessive torque may be experienced before loss.
• Offset records and geological markers.
Formations that have natural fractures such as • May occur in any type of hard, brittle rock.
limestone and some hard shale formations. • Loss is evidenced by gradual lowering of mud in pits.
• Loss may become complete if drilling is continued and more fractures are exposed.
• Offset records that include excessive annular hydraulics.
• Could occur in any type of rock, but would be expected in formations with character-
Formations that have fractures induced
istically weak planes, such as soft shales.
through mechanical or hydraulic forces exerted
• Loss is usually sudden and complete.
on them.
• Loss may follow any increase in mud weight or sudden surge in pressure.
• Can be in competent or incompetent formations.
minimising erosion of the exposed formation. niques still focus on avoiding loss, but also on
The steady pressure, throughout the drilling increasing the apparent fracture gradient by
of the section, is most likely to minimise the sealing the fracture and isolating the fracture
loss of mud to the formation. A return flow tip to keep it from further elongating, while
rate was often determined by measuring the lost circulation only mitigates losses of whole
level of drilling fluid in the mud pit or by drilling fluid.
installing paddle-wheel meters in the return
line. When the downhole flow rate is higher
than the return flow rate, it is an indication LOCATING LOSS ZONES
of lost circulation. The ability to detect small AND DETERMINING THE
differences between the downhole and the re- SEVERITY OF LOSS
turn flow rate can be hampered by the limited
accuracy, sensitivity, and reliability of these Locating the Loss Zone
two methods. Any variation in the return flow
can be taken as an early sign of lost circulation Locating the exact point of lost circulation and
or a kick and the response can be quicker and restoring circulation as quickly as possible is
therefore more effective. The possibility of very important since lost circulation increases
lost circulation can be limited by strengthen- mud cost and can cause other wellbore prob-
ing the wellbore, also. The most widely used lems that result in additional operational costs.
method to increase wellbore strength involves The probable location of the loss zone may be
utilizing specially-sized granular additives, determined from knowledge available at the
others include rigid-plug forming treatments, rig site such as operational information and
chemical sealants and low-fluid loss muds. information about drilled formations. Loss
Wellbore-strengthening techniques are similar zone could be on bottom or off bottom of the
to lost-circulation techniques, but there are hole. Losses are normally “on bottom” if: (a)
significant differences. Strengthening tech- they first occur while drilling ahead, (b) the
78
Lost Circulation
loss is accompanied by a notable change in the information is needed to make decisions,

rate of penetration (ROP), torque, or drilling developing a plan to acquire the information
vibration, and (c) the loss is due to natural in the right time frame, interpreting results
fractures, faults, caverns, vugs or high perme- through tailored software tools and reporting
ability sands and gravels (well site geology the resuIts and recommendations in a clear
data, drilling break with increase in torque and precise manner (Power et al., 2003). A
and kelly free falls while drilling coupled fracture prediction model can be included
with a instant loss in circulation). Losses are that employs an array propagation resistivity
normally “off bottom” if: (a) they first occur tool to reliably evaluate environmental effects
while tripping, drilling fast or increasing mud such as hole enlargements or drilling induced
weight, (b) they are the result of shutting the fractures (Bratton et al., 2001). Two resistiv-
well in and killing the well, and (c) the annular ity channels are monitored in real time. One
loading is such as to increase the return ap- real-time signal is a low-frequency phase shift
parent mud weight higher than the last casing resistivity that reads deep into the formation.
shoe fracture gradient. It is insensitive to tool eccentricity and large
Contrary to the common belief, the major- boreholes when shale resistivity is low. The
ity of the losses do not occur at the bottom second signal, sent to the surface continuously,
of the hole. It has been established that more is the tool’s shallowest measurement, the
than half of the losses occur just below the one most sensitive to eccentricity, hole size
last casing shoe. enlargement and fracturing. The separation
Several types of tools and methods are of these two curves is an early indication of
available for locating the thief point of lost hole problems or induced fractures (Caughorn
circulation. These include (Power et al., 2003; et al., 2002).
Wang et al. 2005; Chilingarian & Vorabutr, Pre-Drill Geological Analysis: This analy-
1981): sis can also be used for determining thief zone
location.
• Real-time geomechanical analysis,
• Pre-drill geological analysis, • If the losses are experienced while
• Pressure transducer surveys, drilling, it is likely that the loss zone
• Open hole logs, is on bottom and is caused by natural
• Hot wire surveys, fractures, caverns or highly permeable
• Radioactive transducer surveys, formations.
• Temperature surveys, and • Drilling into a sub-normally pressured,
• Spinner surveys. naturally fractured formation is usually
indicated by a sudden high loss of re-
The Real-Time Geomechanical Analysis: turns accompanied by an increase in ro-
This process combines personnel, software tary torque. This is a reliable indication
tools, data synchronization and visualization that the lost circulation zone is at a bit
in a process to transform all available data into depth where no previous problems have
actionable information to optimize drilling. been encountered.
It begins with data gathering as part of pre- • Induced fractures on bottom can be
drill planning and is updated in real time by caused by a balled-up BHA or bit re-
measurements obtained while drilling. The stricting the annulus.
program is a mechanism for deciding what
79
Lost Circulation
• If losses are experienced while tripping lost-circulation events. The resistivity and
or while increasing mud weight, then pressure data, viewed in both time and depth
it is likely that the loss zone is not on domains, contributes to a better understanding
bottom and is due to induced fractures. of fracture behavior. The abnormal real-time
Recognizing losses while tripping back resistivity readings, suggest the initiation of
into the hole requires attention to the fractures. It can be confirmed with time-lapse
volume of fluid being displaced by the measurements made while tripping out of the
pipe. This volume can be determined by hole. If the real-time resistivity data show
either visual observation or from regu- elevated resistivities that can be indication of
lar examination of the pit level record. fracture growth. It can be confirmed with time-
lapse measurements. The analysis provides the
Pressure Tansducer Surveys: This type of location of the problem zone, the formation
survey involves using a short cylinder open at type, and the wellbore pressure activating the
the top and swaged at the bottom to restrict fractures. The additional information provide
the flow of mud through the tube. A window a better understanding of the initiated fracture
with a neoprene diaphragm is fitted on one characteristics and enable drilling the section
side of the tube. There is an electrode that to total depth without mud losses.
moves back and forth between the two fixed Hot Wire Surveys: The hot wire tool is
electrodes on the diaphragm. As the pressure essentially a calibrated resistance wire that is
differential varies across the diaphragm, the sensitive to temperature changes. It is run to
potential varies in the electric circuit indicat- a desired point in the hole and the resistance
ing the rate of flow of the mud and where the is noted. Mud is then pumped into the hole.
mud becomes static.This method appears to If the tool is above the point of loss, mud
have certain advantages: (a) it is simple in will flow by it, changing the resistance. If the
construction and operation, (b) it is not easily resistance does not change, the tool is below
clogged by lost circulation material (LCM), the point of loss. The tool can be used in any
(c) it is workable in almost any type of mud, kind of mud, but a large amount of mud is
and (d) it can be used to locate a hole inside required while making the survey.
of casing.Two apparent disadvantages are: Radioactive Tracer Surveys: Radioactive
considerable mud flow is required and the surveys for locating the point of loss consist
equipment may not be readily available. of making two gamma ray surveys. A base log
Open Hole Logs: Lost circulation problems is run before the introduction of radioactive
occurring in weak formations far below the material. A slug of mud containing radioac-
casing shoe can be located with logging data. tive material is then pumped down the hole
Formation resistivity and annular pressure and a new log is run. High concentrations of
measurements, combined with time-lapse the radioactive material will be located at the
logging data, can be used to determine a point of loss. This method provides accurate
more accurate fracture pressure, enabling data for locating the point of loss, but requires
cost-effective real-time drilling decisions expensive equipment and additional deliberate
(Akamine et al., 2003). Resistivity data are loss of mud to obtain the desired information.
used to diagnose and precisely locate fractures. Temperature Surveys: The temperature
Pressure data are used to quantify fracture survey depends on a subsurface thermom-
opening and closing. Early fracture diagnosis eter for measuring the difference in the mud
while drilling allows time to plan to reduce temperature and the formation temperature.
80
Lost Circulation
Figure 2. Lost circulation zone located by temperature survey (Goins & Dawson, 1953)
It is made by running a sensitive element in will be very slow until the point of loss is
the hole that changes its resistance as the reached. There is a definite increase in the
temperature changes. Two surveys are run. rotor’s speed at the point of loss.There are
The first is run to establish the temperature two objections to this method: (a) it requires
gradient of the well after the mud has come deliberate loss of large volume of mud, and
to equilibrium with the formation. The second (b) it is not effective where sealing material
survey is run immediately after adding fresh is already present in the mud.
cool mud to the well. A sharp temperature Though it is a good practice to locate the
discrepancy will occur at the point of loss thief zone, there are several reasons why
(Figure 2) (Goins & Dawson, 1953). surveys are not run more often. They are: (a)
Spinner Surveys: The spinner survey is considerable time is spent getting the neces-
made by running a small spinner attachment sary equipment to the rig, and a deliberate
into the well on a single conductor cable in loss of mud is required for these surveys, (b)
such a manner that the vaned rotor will spin the results of these surveys are sometimes dif-
or turn if there is any horizontal motion of ficult to interpret, and (c) conditions are not
the mud. The rotor speed are recorded on film always such that the tools may be run because
as a series of dashes or spaces. The rotor speed of abnormal subsurface pressure.
81
Lost Circulation
Table 3. Classification of mud loss according to its severity
Severity of loss Rate of loss Type of formation

Any permeable formation type when the bridging agents are not
0.16 to 1.6 m3/hr
Seepage losses large enough to form a seal, or when there are no fine particles to
(1 to 10 bbl/hr)
complete the seal.
1.6 m3/hr to 16 m3/hr Highly-porous or fractured formations, gravel, small natural
Partial losses
(10 to 100 bbl/hr) fractures and barely opened induced fractures.
Complete loss Long, open sections of gravel, long intervals of small natural
hole full to mud level at 61 to 152 m
(total loss of fractures, large natural fractures (caverns, vugs) or open induced
(200 to 500 ft)
returns) fractures.
Severe com- hole full to mud level at 152 to 305 + m
Large, open natural fractures, caverns and open induced fractures.
plete loss (500 to 1,000+ ft)
The most commonly used logging tools Plz - pressure of the loss zone [Pa],
for flow detection are temperature and noise ρm - mud density inside the drill pipe [kg/m3],
tools. Oxygen activation and water flow g - gravity [m/s2],
measurements tools are also available (Wang Hlz - True Vertical Depth (TVD) of the loss
et al., 2005). zone [m],
hm - mud drop inside the drill pipe [m].
Determining Loss Severity
The static mud density (ρlz) which the zone
The best approach to control lost circulation will support is calculated as follows:
is to make an assessment of the severity of a
loss zone and match the remedial material and ρlz= Plz/(g∙Hlz) (2)
technique to it in terms of both the size of the
material and its function. The maximum allow- where:
able drilling fluid loss is of the order of 0.16
m3/hr (<1 bbl/hr) (Chilingarian & Vorabutr, ρlz - mud weight that the zone will support
1981). This loss can be measured in the pits [kg/m3].
at the surface. Preventive measures must be
adopted in case the mud loss exceeds 0.16 m3/
hr. The severity of loss is best determined by LOST CIRCULATION MATERIALS
the amount of loss and the static mud column
height (Table 3). The standard practice when using conventional
In case of complete loss the static fluid drilling techniques through loss circulation
level can be determined and then the pressure zones is to minimize losses by attempting
within the loss zone (Pz) is calculated as fol- to seal off the thief zone prior to continuing
lows: drilling. This is usually done by pumping Loss
Circulation Materials pills (LCM’s) and set-
Plz = ρm∙g∙(Hlz–hm) (1) ting gunks and cement plugs such that the mud
weight will overbalance formation pressure
where: at all times (Masi et al., 2010).
82
Lost Circulation
The common Lost Circulation Materials that low rates of loss occur through small
(LCMs) that generally are mixed with the openings and higher rates of loss occur through
mud to seal loss zones may be grouped as larger openings. LCM materials that are too
fibrous (e.g. wood and mineral fiber, paper), large will form a bridge at the face of the
flaked (e.g. cellophane, mica), granular (e.g. opening, while properly sized materials form
nut shells, graphite, calcium carbonate) and a a bridge in the opening where it is not as
combination of fibrous, flaked, and granular likely to be eroded away when circulation is
materials (Whitfill & Hemphill, 2003; Whit- restored (Figure 4).
fill, 2008; Kefi et al., 2010). LCM slurries LCM as blends of materials of different
(pills) containing a blend of materials are sizes, shapes and properties may be used one
most effective. These materials are available time or on a regular basis while drilling ahead.
in fine, medium, and coarse grades for an at- Particle size distribution of LCM should match
tempt to seal low to moderate lost-circulation the distribution of openings in rock (Bruton
zones (Figure 3) (Howard & Scott Jr., 1951). et al., 2001; Dick et al., 2000). They are mixed
The size and concentration of each LCM in in mud from the circulating system or in
the pill should be adjusted according to the freshly prepared, viscous, bentonit slurry.
severity of loss, and to the type of fluid in the When selecting the size of LCMs to use, the
hole (Ivan et al., 2003). size of the nozzles in the bit and other posible
The size of the LCM material must be restrictions (e.g. Measurement While Drilling
tailored to the severity of loss since the sizes (MWD) tools, mud motors) should always be
of the openings taking the mud are seldom considered.
known. This logic is based on the knowledge
Figure 3. Effect of LCM material concentration and type on sealing fractures (Howard & Scott Jr., 1951)
83
Lost Circulation
Figure 4. Improper (left) and proper fracture bridging (right)
The control of seepage losses requires cessful in reducing and eliminating seepage
correctly sized LCM (fine granular material, losses, in both Water-Based Mud (WBM) and
fine fiber and cellophane flakes) and is ide- Synthetic-Based Mud (SBM). The synthetic
ally based on the knowledge of the fracture graphite is inert and does not react with the
size or pore throat size in the seepage zone. mud, thereby not causing unwanted viscosity
Wellbore-imaging and formation samples increases. One of the more significant proper-
are required in order to determine fracture/ ties of the synthetic graphite is its ability to
pore size and fracture density information. deform under compression without breacking
The Ideal Packing Theory (IPT) is then used down, and the ability to heal fractures that
for defining the right Particle Size Distribu- are formed when the material is already in
tion (PSD) to eliminate the seepage losses the mud system.
(Power, 2003). As the severity of the loss zone increases,
According to the IPT, the D90 value of only the size of the bridging material should
the PSD (90% of the particles are less than a be increased. Concentrations of LCMs above
certain diameter) should be equal to the size 60 kg/m3 (20 lb/bbl) do not improve effective-
of the fracture opening (Ivan et al., 2002). If ness. Coarse granular material, fine to coarse
the LCM particles are too large (Figure 3), fiber and coarse flakes should be used against
the bridge builds up on the wellbore and is complete losses. In the case of severe lost
quickly eroded, while smaller LCM (Figure 4) circulations, the use of various plugs (gunk
goes through the open ing and does not form plug or cement plug) to seal the zone becomes
a bridge. Correct1y sized calcium carbonate mandatory (Ivan et al., 2003, Fidan et al., 2004;
and synthetic graphite have been highly suc- Romero et al., 2006). The gunk plug forms
84
Lost Circulation
when water comes in contact with bentonite work in various brines. Both surface activated
that has been placed in the hole as a concen- and down hole activated pills react very much
trated suspension in diesel oil. Water causes like bentonit diesel oil pills when contacting
the bentonite to swell to form a putty-like mass. water (Figure 5).
When the gunk plug is placed through the High solid-content and high fluid loss
drill pipe, care must be taken to have enough squeeze pills are effective if carrying fluid
diesel oil precede and follow the bentonite leaks off into formation. Fluid leakoff requires
suspension to serve as a barrier to prevent formation permeability and a pressure dif-
any mixing with water before the suspension ferential. This type of treatment typically
has been displaced from the pipe. Typically a works well in depleted, highly permeable
mixture of 825-1140 kg/m3 (300-400 ppb) of formations with water-based mud (Hang et
bentonite in diesel or synthetic oil is pumped. al., 2005; Sanders et al., 2010). This treatment
The bentonite affinity for water causes rapid would hardly work in impermeable shale.
thickening (or hardening) that can seal a zone However, this is a long and often unsuc-
of loss. A 50:50 mixture of bentonite/oil and cessful process because multiple leakoff zones
mud can plug open holes because it gives near may be encountered in sequence or because
instantaneous setting. The one drawback to massively fractured zones cannot be cured.
this method of curing losses is that you are Furthemore, these methods have several
to be pretty sure that you know exactly what disadvantages such as: offering uncertain
part of the hole the loss zone is in. results, being time consuming and therefore
When total loss of returns is attributed expensive (time and cost increase), and fi-
to large vugular and cavernous formations nally in hydrocarbon reservoirs these may
a polymer plug may be spotted and allowed seriously reduce well productivity (damages
to hydrate and expand within the formation on well productivity). Major differences in
with time and temperature. Chemical reactive permeability between shale, sandstone and
polymer pills consist of blends of loss circula- vugular limestone show that one-size-fits-all
tion materials and a hydrateable cross-linked solutions are not going to be effective or ef-
polymer that is spotted across the zone of ficient (Whitfill & Wang, 2005).
interest and then squeezed at 1035- 1380 kPa Where unsustainable losses occcur and
(150-200 psi) (Bruton et al., 2001). conventional circulation is no longer possible
Polymer plugs are either surface activated the Pressurized Mud Cap Closed Hole Circula-
as they are mixed and then chemically acti- tion Drilling (CHCD) technique may be used
vated or cross-linked as pumping down hole to allow the continuation of drilling in circu-
begins or down hole activated when the pill lation loss zones by controling the annulus
contacts mud or formation fluid forming a pressure and injecting a sacrificial fluid into
plug. Down hole activated polymer pills are the thief formations, thereby minimizing the
high concentrations of polymer suspended in non-productive time and costs (large amounts
an inert carrier such as diesel or mineral oil. of lost drilling fluid and non-productive rig
These polymer plugs form hard very plastic time) typically required to implement the
plugs when the pill contacts the mud or for- traditional methods of circulation loss control
mation fluid and some are used to control (Masi et al., 2010). The CHCD technique is
water flow on producing wells. Down hole not simple or an inexpensive system. It is not
activated polymer pills can be selected to underbalanced drilling. The annulus is closed
85
Lost Circulation
Figure 5. The operational procedure of chemical sealant placement
and no returns are circulated to the surface. It REMEDIAL PROCEDURES

is used only when other systems for controling FOR LOSS CIRCULATION
losses have proven to be ineffective. Large
quantities of water and mud are required as When lost circulation is first noted, the condi-
well as additional equipment and specialized tions at the time the loss occurred should be
personnel. An accurate evaluation of several accurately recorded and analyzed. The time
factors has to be performed. Drilling hazard of the occurrence (while drilling, circulating
is the major issue as the primary barrier to or tripping), the type of the loss (seepage,
well influx is jeopardised, but also rig time, partial or complete) and the severity of the
material availability and consumption have to loss with respect to the exposed formations
be considered. Masi et al. (2010) developed a should be considered. This information will
probabilistic model to combine all the risks help determine why the loss occurred, where in
identified and to address their consequences the hole the loss occurred and the best remedy
within operational time (quantitative risk for the situation. The probable location of the
assessment). loss zone may be determined from knowledge
86
Lost Circulation
available at the rig site such as operational THE APPLICATION OF RISK

information and information about drilled ANALYSIS FOR LOST CIRCULATION
formations. Failure to minimize lost circula-
tion can greatly increase the already high cost Risk analysis can be a useful tool in certain
of drilling, as well as risking loss of the well. processes where uncertainty such as lost cir-
Successful management of lost circulation culation is involved. The implementation of
should incorporate identification of potential risk analysis involves three basic steps (Cunha,
loss zones, optimization of drilling hydraulics, 2004): (1) identifying an opportunity (or event)
and clear, easy to follow procedures should lost where the tool can be applied, (2) quantifying
circulation be encountered. Many times when the consequences of various possible deci-
lost circulation is encountered, no log data sions and (3) assessing, within the possible
or time for detailed log analysis is available. outcomes, the estimated best economic or
Parameters required for designing a treatment operational result. The use of risk analysis
would rely on diagnostic methods. One of the tools requires methodical quantification of
major causes for a failed treatment is the loss uncertainties and use of data from past op-
zone identification. Accurate information is erations that are not always easily available.
very important for a good definition of the In order to have any method implemented,
loss problem and for selection of the best type a careful analysis of existing data is neces-
of LCM and its placement procedure into the sary so that the quantification of uncertain-
well (Table 4). ties can be as realistic as possible. Historical
data can be of great value as a base line. In
Table 4. Recommended treatments for different types of loss
Severity of loss Recommended treatment

Pull up and wait technique.
Treat system with fine lost circualation material (LCM).
Seepage losses Accompany LCM treatments with additions of a viscosifier to improve particle-size distribution.
Avoid excessive circulation rates and/or penetration rates to minimize ECD and solids loading of the annulus.
Reduce mud weight if possible.
Treat system with various sizes of LCM. Mixtures of different shapes are often quite effective.
For severe losses, spot pill opposite the loss zone utilizing 86 to 114 kg/m3 (30 to 40 lb/bbl) of various types
Partial losses of LCM. Pull up into casing and allow 6 to 8 hours.
Squeeze the zone with an high-filtration slurry.
The same techniques used in seeping losses should be used in partial losses.
Pull up and wait technique.
Use high-filter-loss slurry squeeze technique.
Complete loss If returns are not regained with this technique, a hard plug such as a cement, cement-bentonite, cement-
gilsonite or diesel-oil-bentonite-cement is recommended (see techniques for cement slurries).
Squeeze with either a high-filter-loss slurry squeeze or large amounts of diesel-oil-bentonite-cement slurries.
Spot plug (e.g. Thermally Activated Oil Gelling Pill, Polymer-based Cross-linked Pills (PCP), Chemically
Activated Cross-linked Pills (CACP), Reverse Gunk, Barite/Hematite Pills, Thixotropic Cement)
Severe complete loss
If the severe, complete losses continue to occur as more open, natural fractures or caverns are penetrated, the
technique of drilling blind or with aerated mud and setting casing should be considered.
87
Lost Circulation
areas where there is a lack of reliable data, present categories of the likelihood that a par-
information from other areas or fields with ticulart event will occur (incident occurrence
comparable situation can be used. The use of probability) and the severity of consequences
risk analysis was deemed as fundamental to (the magnitude of harm or damage that could
minimize losses or to maximize the possibility result).
of adopting, for a certain situation, the right The consequences of lost circulation can be
decision. Particularly, for drilling operations as little as the loss of a few dollars of a drill-
there have been various articles where differing fluid, or as disastrous as a blowout and
ent aspects of the drilling process have been loss of life, so close monitoring of tanks, pits,
studied using risk analysis as an auxiliary tool and flow from the well, to quickly assess and
on the decision-making process. control lost circulation, is taught and practiced.
One characteristic of the use of the quan- If the amount of fluid in the wellbore drops
titative risk analysis is that normally, after due to lost circulation, hydrostatic pressure is
implementation, its use is fairly simple and reduced, which can allow a gas or fluid being
straightforward. The objective of risk analy- is under a higher pressure than the reduced
sis is to produce outputs that can be used to hydrostatic pressure to flow into the wellbore.
evaluate the nature and distribution of risk, Another consequence of lost circulation is
and to develop appropriate strategies to man- blind (or dry) drilling in which the drilling
age the risk. Risk assessment methods can fluid is not returned to the surface. The ef-
be qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative fects of blind drilling range from as minor as
methods use descriptive terms to identify destroying a bit to as serious as major damage
consequences and likelihoods of events and to the wellbore requiring a new well to be
resultant risk as the product of consequence drilled. Blind drilling can also cause severe
and likelihood. Quantitative methods identify damage to the drill string, including snapping
likelihoods as frequencies or probabilities, the pipe, and the drilling rig itself.
and consequences in terms of relative scale Qualitative risk assessment methods use
(orders of magnitude) or in terms of specific descriptive terms to define the likelihoods
values (for example estimates of cost). Monte and consequences of risk events. Outputs
Carlo simulation methods are often used to from qualitative risk analyses are usually
incorporate uncertainty into the quantitative evaluated using a risk matrix format, such
estimates. as the example in Table 5. Events with more
Once an event is identified and likelihood significant consequences and likelihood are
(incident occurrence probability) for all pos- identified as higher risk, and are selected for
sible results have already been quantified, the higher priority mitigation actions in order to
last step will be to apply the model in order decrease the likelihood of the event occurring
to have expected results (outcomes) for the and/or reduce the consequences if the event
various actions possible to be adopted. was to occur.
Qualitative approaches to risk assessment Risk should be ranked so that priorities
are the most commonly applied, and the risk can be established. Each risk is categorized
matrix can be used as a method to display the in accordance with the terms shown in Table
combinations of likelihood and the severity 5. such as: Extreme (E), High (H), Moderate
of consequences. They enable to separate (M), and Low (L). Generally, remedial actions
risk events into risk ratings. There are simple or acceptance for different risk category are:
and complex risk assessment matrices but all
88
Lost Circulation
Table 5. An example of a qualitative risk matrix
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost Certain
E D C B A
Severe 5 M H H E E
Major 4 M M H H E
Moderate 3 L M H H H
Minor 2 L L M M H
Negligibe 1 L L M M H
Risk rating: E- Extreme, H- High, M- Moderate, L- Low
• Extreme Risk (E): Operation not prevention and treatment of lost circulation.
permissible. An understanding of the cause and possible
• High Risk (H): Remedial action to mechanisms of both the loss and the treatment
have high priority. is the key to determine the approach that in-
• Moderate Risk (M): Remedial action cludes both planning software and specialized
to be taken in appropriate time. materials. Managing the equivalent circulat-
• Low (L): Risk is acceptable; remedial ac- ing densities (ECD) is a primary focus in the
tion is discretionary. well plans. One important part of a preventive
plan is the design of wellbore strengthening to
improve the ability of the wellbore to contain
CONCLUSION higher pressures without losing circulation.
The integrative preplanning process analyzes
Lost circulation is one of the largest con- offset histories and formation data not only
tributors to drilling non-productive time. It to identify risk zones but also to gather infor-
causes an increase in drilling fluid costs, and mation on the exact fracture and pore size as
increase in expenses associated with rig and well as fracture density. In an effort to con-
equipment. Especially with oil muds, losses trol losses, a wide variety of lost circulation
can be very expensive, unsafe (underground materials can be applied in thief zones (e.g.
blowout), and time consuming. While it is LCMs, pills containing sized solids, gunk
critical that losses be stopped once they occur, squeezes, PCP squeeze, conventional cement
it is equally important that they be prevented squeezes, foamed cement, etc.). Therefore, a
whenever possible. For maximum success strategy for managing lost circulation must be
emphasis should be placed on the lost circu- an integral part of well planning and should
lation assessment and a planning process to include: best drilling practice, drilling fluid
evaluate specific lost circulation problems and selection, Wellbore Strengthening Materi-
link them to existing products, systems and als (WSM), and Lost Circulation Materials
services. Lost circulation planning includes (LCM). The key to success is proper planning,
both prevention and remediation methods. risk assessments to identify potential high risk
Depending on the cause, there are several dif- problems, quality materials and equipment,
ferent engineering approaches to take for the and experienced supervision.
89
Lost Circulation
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90
Lost Circulation
Howard, G. C., & Scott, P. P. Jr. (1951). Salehi, S., & Nygaard, R. (2012). Numerical
An analysis and control of lost circulation. modeling of induced fracture propagation: A
Journal of Petroleum Technology, 3(6). novel approach for lost circulation materi-
doi:10.2118/951171-G als (LCM) design in borehole strengthening
applications of deep offshore drilling. Paper
Ivan, C. D., Bruton, J. R., Thiercelin, M., &
presented at the SPE Annual Technical Con-
Bedel, J. P. (2002). Making a case for rethink-
ference and Exhibition. San Antonio, TX.
ing lost circulation treatments in induced
fractures. Paper presented at the SPE Annual Sanders, M. W., Scorsone, J. T., & Friedheim,
Technical Conference. San Antonio, TX. J. E. (2010). High-fluid-loss, high-strength
lost circulation treatments. Paper presented at
Kefi, S., Lee, J. C., Shindgikar, N. D., Brunet-
the SPE Deepwater Drilling and Completions
Cambus, C., Vidick, B., & Diaz, N. I. (2010).
Conference. Galveston, TX.
Optimizting in four steps composite lost-
circulation pills without knowing loss zone Sanders, W. W., Williamson, R. N., Ivan, C. D.,
width. Paper presented at the IADC/SPE Asia & Powell, D. (2003). Lost circulation assess-
Pacific Drilling Technology Conference and ment and planning program: Evolving strategy
Exhibition. Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. to control severe losses in deepwater projects.
Paper presented at the SPE/IADC Drilling
Masi, S., Molaschi, C., Zausa, F., & Michelez,
J. (2010). Managing circulation losses in a
harsh drilling environment: Conventional Suyan, K. M., Sharma, V., & Jain, V. K.
solution vs. CHCD through a risk assessment. (2009). An innovative material for severe lost
Paper presented at the IADC/SPE Drilling circulation control in depleted formations.
Conference and Exhibition. New Orleans, LA. Paper presented at the SPE/IADC Middle East
Drilling Technology Conference & Exhibi-
Power, D., Ivan, C. D., & Brooks, S. W.
tion. Manama, Bahrain.
(2003). The top 10 lost circulation concerns
in deepwater drilling. Paper presented at the Wang, H., Sweatman, R., Engelman, B.,
SPE Latin American and Caribbean Petroleum Deeg, W., & Whitfill, D. (2005). The key to
Engineering Conference. Port-of-Spain, West successfully applying today’s lost-circulation
Indies. solutions. Paper presented at the 2005 SPE
Romero, S. N., Monroy, R. R., Johnson, C.,
Dallas, TX.
Cardenas, F., & Abraham, G. A. T. (2006,
September). Preventing lost circulation by use Whitfill, D. (2008). Lost circulation mate-
of lightweight slurries with reticular systems: rial selection, particle size distribution and
Depleted reservoirs in southern Mexico. SPE fracture modeling with fracture simulation
Drilling & Completion, 185-192. software. Paper presented at the IADC/SPE
Asia Pacific Drilling Technology Conference
and Exhibition. Jakarta, Indonesia.
91
Lost Circulation
Whitfill, D., & Wang, H. (2005). Making Collins, N., Kharitonov, A., Whitfill, D.,
economic decisions to mitigate lost circula- Miller, M., & Kulakov, K. (2010, October).
tion. Paper presented at the 2005 SPE An- Comprehensive approach to severe lost circu-
nual Technical Conference and Exhibition. lation problems in Russia. Paper SPE 135704
Dallas, TX. presented at the 2010 SPE Russian Oil &
Gas Technical Conference and Exhibition,
Whitfill, D. L., & Hemphill, T. (2003). All
Moscow, Russia.
lost-circultion materials and systems are not
created equal. Paper presented at the SPE Corbett, J. S. (2001, February). An integrated
Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition. and structured approach to the management
Denver, CO. of exploration and development risks. Paper
SPE 66511 presented at the SPE/EPA/DOE
Whitfill, D. L., Wang, M., Jamison, D., &
Exploration and production Environmental
Angrove-Rogers, A. (2007). Preventing lost
Conference, San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
circulation requires planning ahead. Paper
presented at the 2007 International Oil Con- Dear, S. F. III, Beasley, R. D., & Barr, K. P.
ference and Exhibition. Veracruz, Mexico. (1995). Use of a decision tree to select the mud
system for the Oso field, Nigeria. Journal of
Petroleum Technology, (October): 909–912.
ADDITIONAL READING Dusseault, M. B., Maury, V., Sanfilippo, F., &
Santarelli, F. J. (2004, June). Drilling around
Aldred, W., Hutin, R., Luppens, J. C., & salt: risks, stresses and uncertainties. Paper
Ritchie, G. (2008, March). Development and ARMA/NARMS 04-647 presented at Gulf
testing of a rig-based quick event detection Rocks 2004, the 6th North America Rock
system to mitigate drilling risk. Paper IADC/ Mechanics Symposium (NARMS), Rock
SPE 111757 presented at the 2008 IADC/SPE Mechanics Across Borders and Disciplines,
Drilling Conference, Orlando, Florida, U.S.A. Houston, Texas, U.S.A.
Arild, Ø., Fjelde, K. K., & Løberg, T. (2006, El-Hassan, H., Abbas, R., Jarouj, H., & Munk,
November). An integrated approach to risk T. (2003, October). Using a novel fiber ce-
and hydraulic simulations in a well control ment system to control lost circulation: case
planning perspective. Paper IADC/SPE histories from the Middle East and the Far
103853 presented at the IADC/SPE Asia East. Paper SPE/IADC 85324 presented at the
Pacific Drilling Technology Conference and SPE/IADC Middle East Drilling Technology
Exhibition, Bangkok, Thailand. Conference & Exhibition, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.
Castillo, D. Ryles, P., & John, K. (2002, Sep- Fang, C. C., & Thaemlitz, C. (2005, March).
tember). The legendre field development and OSPAR-Compliant technologies for managing
geomechanical program: from exploration drilling-fluid lost-circulation events. Paper
to drilling to production. Paper IADC/SPE SPE 94434 presented at the 2005 SPE/EPA/
77255 presented at the IADC/SPE Asia Pa- DOE Exploration and Production Environ-
cific Drilling Technology, Jakarta, Indonesia. mental Conference, Galveston, Texas, U.S.A.
92
Lost Circulation
Fidan, E., Babadagli, T., & Kuru, E. (2004, Malik, H. K., Litwin, R. J., & Jones, B. C.
June). Use of cement as lost-circulation (2010, October). Successful use of managed
material: best practices. Paper 2004-090 pressure drilling (MPD) to counteract loss
presented at the Petroleum Society’s 5th Ca- circulation and HP gas zones: A case study
nadian International Petroleum Conference from Red Rock South Wapiti field in Grande
(55th Annual Technical Meeting), Calgary, Prairie, Alberta, Canada. Paper CSUG/SPE
Alberta, Canada. 137428 presented at the Canadian Unconven-
tional Resources & International Petroleum
Guan, Z., Ke, K., & Lu, Baoping (2010, June).
Conference, Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
A new approach for casing program design
with pressure uncertainties of deepwater ex- Marriott, T., Rogers, H., Lloyd, S., Quinton,
ploration wells. Paper SPE 130822 presented C., & Tetrault, N. (2006, June). Innovative
at the CPS/SPE International Oil & Gas cement plug setting process reduces risk and
Conferenece and Exhibition, Beijing, China. lowers NPT. Paper 2006-015 presented at the
Petroleum Society’s 7th Canadian International
Hettema, M. H. H., Bostrøm, B., & Lund, T.
Petroleum Conference (57th Annual Technical
(2004, September). Analysis of lost circula-
Meeting), Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
tion during drilling in cooled formations.
Paper SPE 90442 presented at the SPE An- Morita, N., Black, A. D., & Fuh, G. F. (1990,
nual Technical Conference and Exhibition, September). Theory of lost circulation pres-
Houston, Texas, U.S.A. sure. Paper SPE 20409 presented at the SPE
Annual Technical Conference. New Orleans,
Houtchens, B., Foster, J., & Tessari, R. (2007,
Louisiana, U.S.A.
February). Applying risk analysis to casing
while drilling. Paper SPE/IADC 105678 Nilsen, T. (2002, September). Risk manage-
presented at the 2007 SPE/IADC Drilling ment for planning of challenging reservoir
Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. sections. Paper IADC/SPE 77228 presented
at the IADC/SPE Asia Pacific Drilling Tech-
Kok, K. H., Pruimboom, J., David, F. M., &
nology, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Jit-Chiun, T. (2003, October). Geosteer with
resistivity forward modeling to prevent drill- Nilsen, T., & Karlsen, H. C. (2008, December).
ing into the lost circulation zone of a prolific Risk based decision support for the planning of
carbonate reservoir. Paper SPE/IADC 85306 a challenging HPHT drilling operation. Paper
presented at the SPE/IADC Middle East Drill- IPTC 12526 presented at the International
ing Technology Conference & Exhibition, Petroleum Technology Conference, Kuala
Abu Dhabi, U.A.E. Lumpur, Malaysia.
Kristiansen, T. G., Mandziuch, K., Heavey, P., Oakley, D., & Conn, L. (2011, March). Drill-
& Kol, H. (1999, March). Minimizing drilling ing fluid design enlarges the hydraulic oper-
risk in extended-reach wells at Valhall using ating windows of managed pressure drilling
geomechanics, geoscience and 3D visualiza- operations. Paper SPE/IADC 139623 pre-
tion technology. Paper SPE/IADC 52863 sented at the SPE/IADC Drilling Conference
presented at the 1999 SPE/IADC Drilling and Exhibition, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Conference, Amsterdam, Holland.
93
Lost Circulation
Økland, D., Gabrielsen, G. K., Gjerde, J., Suyan, K. M., Dasgupta, D., Sanyal, D.,
Sinke, K., & Williams, E. L. (2002, October). Sharma, V., & Jain, V. K. (2007, November).
The importance of extended leak-off test data Managing total circulation losses with cross-
for combatting lost circulation. Paper SPE/ flow while drilling: case history of practical
ISRM 78219 presented at the SPE/ISRM solutions. Paper SPE 109898 presented at
Rock Mechanics Conference, Irving, Texas. the 2007 SPE Annual Technical Conference
and Exhibition, Anaheim, California, U.S.A.
Ostebo, R., Tronstad, L., & Fikse, T. (1991,
March). Risk analysis of drilling and well Tessari, R. M., Warren, T. M., & Jo, J. Y.
operations. Paper SPE/IADC 21952 presented (2006, October). Drilling with casing reduces
at the SPE/IADC Drilling Conference. Am- cost and risk. Paper SPE 101819 presented at
sterdam, The Netherlands. the 2006 SPE Russian Oil and Gas Technical
Conference and Exhibition, Moscow, Russia.
Rosato, M. J., & Courville, P. W. (2000, April).
Managing differential pressure during coiled Tranquini, N., Soto, J., Reveth, V., Prato, L., &
tubing operation. Paper SPE 60707 presented Williams, H. (2007, April). Proven synergistic
at the 2000 SPE/ICoTA Coiled Tubing Round- approach in well cementing across thief zones:
table, Houston, Texas, U.S.A. East Venezuela. Paper SPE 107501 presented
at the 2007 SPE Latin American and Carib-
Sadlier, A., Wolfe, C., Reese, M., & Says,
bean Petroleum Engineering Conference,
I. (2011, October/November). Automated
Buenos Aires, Argentina.
alarms for managing drilling pressure and
maintaining wellbore stability - new concepts Wang, H. M., Sweatman, R., Engelman, B.,
in while-drilling decision making. Paper SPE Deeg, W., Whitfill, D., Soliman, M., & Towler,
146298 presented at the SPE Annual Tech- B. F. (2008). Best practice in understanding
nical Conference and Exhibition, Denver, and managing lost circulation challenges.
Colorado, U.S.A. SPE Drilling & Completion, June, 168-175.
Sanad, M., Butler, C., Waheed, A., Engelman,
B., & Sweatman, R. (2004, March). Numeri-
cal models help analyze lost-circulation/flow KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
events and frac gradient increase to control
an HPHT well in the East Mediterranean Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD):
Sea. Paper IADC/SPE 87094 presented at The effective density exerted by a circulating
the IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, Dallas, fluid against the formation that takes into ac-
Texas, U.S.A. count the pressure drop in the annulus above
the point being considered.
Sheremetov, L., Batyrshin, I., Filatov, D., Fiber Lost Circulation Material: A
Martinez, J., & Rodriguez, H. (2008). Fuzzy long, slender and flexible fiber of various
expert system for solving lost circulation prob- sizes and lengths added to drilling fluid and
lem. Applied Soft Computing, 8(1), 14–29. placed downhole to help retard mud loss into
doi:10.1016/j.asoc.2006.11.003 fractures or highly permeable zones.
94
Lost Circulation
Flake Lost Circulation Material: A type Lost Circulation Zone: A very permeable,
of lost circulation material (e.g. mica flakes highly fractured or cavernous rock layer that
and pieces of cellophane) that is thin and flat takes excessive amounts of drilling mud as it
in shape, with a large surface area. Its purpose is being drilled.
is to seal off fluid loss zones in a well and Pill: Any relatively small quantity (less
help stop lost circulation. than 30 m3 (200 bbl) of lost circulation mate-
Gunk Plug (Or Diesel-Oil Plug): A small rial to plug a thief zone.
batch of the slurry that consists of bentonite Seepage Loss: Loss of mud during drilling
in diesel oil, and is pumped down a well that but with loss rate less than 3 m3/hr [20 bbl/hr].
has lost circulation to seal the leaky zone. Thief Zone: A formation encountered
Gunk Squeeze: The operation of squeez- during drilling into which circulating fluids
ing a gunk plug into the loss zone. can be lost.
Lost Circulation (Lost Returns): The Total Lost Returns: Situation during
reduced or total absence of drilling fluid flow drilling process when drilling fluid is pumped
up the annulus when fluid is pumped through through the drillstring but no fluid comes out
the drillstring. of the annulus.
Lost Circulation Material: Fibrous, Vugular Rock: A rock containing cavities,
granular or flake material intentionally intro- voids or large pores that are commonly lined
duced into a mud and pumped down a well with mineral precipitates.
to reduce and eventually prevent the flow of
drilling fluid into a weak, fractured or vugular
formation or seal loss zones.
95
96
Chapter 5
Simultaneous Operations
Zdenko Kristafor
ABSTRACT
Simultaneous operations can be defined as conducting independent operations in which the
course of any operation may impact the safety of personnel, equipment, and environment of
another operation. Operations are meant in terms of performing drilling, completion, work-
over, and construction or production activities simultaneously, mainly at offshore facilities. In
general, they have an impact on the installation safety procedures and contingency planning
program. Thus, for the purpose of performing simultaneous operations, they must comply with
organizational safety and technological requirements. They are to be coordinated through joint
planning efforts by supervisors who plan and direct activities. Typical chain-of-command as
well as simultaneous operations decision making process flow diagrams are presented in this
chapter. Basic steps to be regarded are performing risk assessment, assess and control risks,
monitor the simultaneous tasks and communicate the control measures. Communication is the
key to performing these tasks safely.
INTRODUCTION operation in a safe and risk acceptable manner.

Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) shall be
There’s large scope of both onshore and par- thoroughly planned, analyzed and performed
ticularly offshore activities in the oil and gas with the objective of limiting excessive risk
and other marine industries where one activity imposed by multiple operations at the same
can strongly affect performing another covered time, comparing to the risk associated with
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch005
the execution of these operations individually. trols implemented. Any residual risks should
These operations can range from something as correspond to the ALARP (As Low As Rea-
common as a crew change with a crew boat, sonably Practicable) principle. The relevant
food, fuel, material provision etc., to a much authority should approve the safety-case, as
larger scale involving multiple, heavy con- well as any subsequent changes to it, before
struction assets and personnel (Ross, 2007). any operations can commence“ (Draft report
Is spite of the concept favorising opinion in 2011/XXXX(INI)). In the U.S., Bureau of
the entering stage of project that “the avoided Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
SIMOPS is the best SIMOPS“, it is obvious Enforcement (BOEMRE) is a single agency
that all simultaneous operations cannot be where licensing, health and safety issues are
avoided. Relevant procedures for the control consolidated.
of simultaneous or parallel operations shall The E.U. Commission on Safety of offshore
be developed and validated or assessed prior oil and gas prospection, exploration and pro-
to commencement of operations. duction activities formed the European Union
Deepwater Horizon disaster prompted all Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group that
those involved in the exploration and produc- shall be composed of Member States’ authori-
tion of offshore oil and gas to reassess the ties responsible for the regulatory oversight
safety of their industry. The National Commis- of offshore oil and gas activities and related
sion on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill policy issues. Different EU regulations have
and Offshore Drilling (2011) made a series of been proposed and adopted, among others,
recommendations, many of which have been Proposal for a regulatory initiative on safety
implemented already. But, according to the of offshore oil and gas prospection, explora-
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy tion and production activities. In the context
of the European Parliament, the implications of the Directive 1994/22/EC the competent
for Europe are less clear. Many of the recom- authority is required to consider the technical
mendations for the U.S. regulatory regime and financial risks, and where appropriate, the
reflect practices that have been applied and previous record of responsibility of applicants
prevalent in parts of the E.U. for twenty years seeking exclusive exploration and production
and more. One of the first recommendations in licenses. There is the need to ensure that when
the National Commission’s report states: “The examining the technical and financial capabil-
Department of the Interior should develop a ity of the licensee the competent authorities
proactive, risk-based performance approach thoroughly examine also its capability for
specific to individual facilities, operations ensuring continued safe and effective opera-
and environments, similar to the “safety- tions under all foreseeable conditions. Just
case“ approach in the North Sea“ (Report to to emphasize two chapters in this Regulation
the President, p.252). In the North Sea area where “Prevention of major hazards related
mature industries are operating in mostly to offshore oil and gas activities“ as well as
well-developed fields under the oversight “Preparation for and conduct of offshore oil
of well established and evolving regulatory and gas activities based on risk assessment“
regimes. “The “safety case“ is a risk-based, are treated. The operator’s duty is to organize
site specific approach which requires opera- his activities around a best practice model,
tors to demonstrate to the relevant national prepare a major hazards report and to submit
health, safety and environmental authorities this to the competent authority for assess-
that all risks have been considered and con- ment. In addition, the operator is to submit
97
a notification for each well operation to the SIMOPS, a typical chain-of-command flow
regulator. For both major hazard reports and diagram and SIMOPS general structure. To
well notifications, independent verification assist in decision making on whether a limited
of the safety critical elements is required. number of operations could be performed
An operator of an installation which is to be simultaneously and safely or not decision ma-
involved in a combined operation shall send trices were developed. In addition, a number of
to the competent authority a notification con- concisely structured SIMOPS manuals exist,
taining details of the combined operation in but having in general very similar approach.
accordance with the requirements of Annex
II, part 7 (EU Proposal, 2011).
International Association of Drilling BACKGROUND
Contractors issued HSE Case Guidelines for
Offshore Drilling Contractors with enumera- There is a wide range of definitions for simul-
tion of reference documents on international taneous operations provided by professional
standards and industry guidelines (IADC, associations, companies and entities involved
2009). A detailed safety-case submission in both onshore and offshore activities. These
requirements and acceptance regime are activities are not always recognized by all sub-
explained with respect to referent regulators jects involved. To safely perform certain tasks
and legislation authorities in most leading and activities that are running concurrently
countries involved in offshore operations and requires awareness of all the people involved
activities (Norway, U.K., Germany, Denmark, in them. So, have we identified them as simul-
Australia, the Netherlands). taneous tasks? “Identifying and controlling
Several globally recognized associations, simultaneous operations is not currently a
moreover most of major companies involved legislative requirement. However, the major
in offshore activities worldwide, provide companies are introducing this requirement
operators and contractors with documents into all operations“ (http://EzineArticles.
intended as a general guideline to assist them com, 2012).
with better understanding and applying safe
work practice expectations. A consistent si- Terms and Definitions
multaneous operations plan provides instruc-
tions in conducting safe and environmentally • SIMOPS is the performance of poten-
sensitive operations. The heightened potential tially conflicting operations at the same
for accidents when simultaneous operations time, in the same location (www.slide-
are in progress as well as a need for attention share.net/lifecombo/ngisimops). Both
to safety, communication and coordination jobs may be done safely, but without
necessary in these situations is recognized coordination, one act could have a dan-
long ago. Offshore operating companies gerous consequence to other.
have developed their HSE plans, which also • A term used mainly on offshore plat-
include simultaneous operations, based on forms, or installations with multiple
risk assessment for offshore installations in wellheads, where more than one well-
the operational phase. bore is being accessed, such as where a
The basic steps in managing risk of si- drilling rig, slickline unit or coiled tub-
multaneous operations will be presented in ing unit may be operating at the same
this chapter, followed by life cycle model for time. Simultaneous operations gener-
98
ally have an impact on the installation ment systems and controls for effective
safety producers and contingency plan- use of resources and to minimize risks.
ning processes (Schlumberger Oilfield • Total Fina ELF (2001) states that
Glossary, 2013). construction, commissioning, utility
• Simultaneous operations are defined systems running and production op-
as any two or more different sets of ac- erations with potential interference
tivities (macro activities) carried out, between them should be forecasted to
within a defined area, by different or- minimize any interference. Information
ganizations (functional groups) or un- relevant to simultaneous activities with
der different management systems that, a possible / potential impact to the other
because of their proximity or other team should be given for every planned
critical factors, could interact adversely operation as well as for contingency
with each other (ENI, 2005). and emergency situation.
• Simultaneous operations are described
as the potential clash of activities which From available sources different terms
could bring about an undesired event of can be found for simultaneous operations.
set of circumstances, e.g. safety, envi- Terms such parallel, concurrent, multiple or
ronment, damage to assets, schedule, combined are used, mostly in the same context
commercial, financial etc. SIMOPS are as simultaneous. However, in some manuals
defined as performing two or more op- or operational practices a subtle distinction
erations concurrently. These activities among them is indicated. Anyhow, if two
typically include, but are not limited to or more of the following operations are per-
the following: formed concurrently within the defined area
◦◦ A vessel undertaking a non-rou- for such activity, then these operations should
tine operation within an installa- be considered as simultaneous operations:
tion’s 500 m zone;
◦◦ Subsea umbilical, risers and flow- • Production operations or injection
line operations; • Live well operations
◦◦ A field development with multi- • Heavy construction
vessel/contractor operations. • Heavy lifts
• Rig operations or rig moves
SIMOPS often involve multiple companies • Mobilization and demobilization of
(owners, contractors, subcontractors, vendors), equipment
large multi-disciplined workforces and a wide • Anchoring the vessels
range of daily, 24 hour, routine and non-routine • Pigging operations exposing drilling
construction and commissioning activities (IMCA, and well area
2010). • Hot work
• Drilling operations and workover
• Woodhill Frontier limited (http://wood- • Conductor driving and installation
hill.co.uk) describe combined & simul- • Seismic or geotechnical operations
taneous operations in terms of two or • Injection to annulus
more installations, and combined op- • Pumping through temporary lines
erations such as construction and pro- • Repair or change-out of Christmas tree
duction, that need appropriate manage- • Diving operations
99
• Helicopter landing or takeoff For special circumstances regarding Ma-

• Emergency and/or spill response condo well in the Gulf of Mexico, as a response
to oil spill after Deepwater Horizon platform
First four quoted operations, some sources disaster, an overview of simultaneous opera-
believe macro-activities. Any combination tions is shown in Figure 1.
of two or more macro-activities can gener- At the start of some offshore projects SI-
ate SIMOPS (if one of macro-activities is MOPS were not considered as a normal way
performed by using drilling rig) or parallel of working, but as a downgraded mode of
operations (in case without the use of drilling operation. Implementation of simultaneous
rig). Both require the same scheme in terms operations was strictly exceptional and sub-
of basic steps to be shown later on. According jected to an acceptable risk assessment.
to ENI (2005), if two different operations are However, in a later stage of field development,
carried out by using two drilling rigs, this can due to the necessity to reduce the delay be-
be identified as particular case of simultaneous tween drilling and producing a well, to speed
operations, named concurrent operations – up the overall project by starting, for example,
CONOPS. In most other considerations those drilling on platforms not fully commissioned
terms are just synonyms. or built, and to allow routine maintenance,
Another way of looking at simultaneous installation, lay-out of new pipelines and
operations in the offshore environment refers generally construction work on the field, si-
to the problems associated with dynamic multaneous operations may become a normal
positioning which is, unlike the back deck way of working in a number of combinations
operations on the platforms, often considered drilling-production-construction to be con-
as a secondary task. In this sense one can dis- ducted (Saintpère at all., 2005).
tinguish vessel SIMOPS as well as seafloor Norwegian standards, with the highest
SIMOPS (Ross, 2007, IMCA 2010). Vessel reputation in petroleum engineering, also in-
simultaneous operations encompass two or clude simultaneous operations. General safety
more vessels undertaking a non-routine ac- requirements, barrier philosophy, preparation
tivity within the same area/close proximity of program, risk analysis, application of con-
to each other, or within an installation’s 500 sents, permits and approvals, HSE manage-
meters safety zone. Vessels may include a ment system and simultaneous operations
variety of barges, supply boats, diving sup- are elaborated in detail. As outlined in the
port vessels, accommodation, pipe lay or scope, the NORSOK Standard for Drilling
cable lay, seismic, survey, heavy lift, ROV and Well Operations defines “functional and
and other vessels operating in dynamic posi- performance oriented requirements for well
tioning mode. Installations include fixed and design and planning and execution of safe
floating production platforms, drilling rigs, and efficient drilling and well operations in
fluid production, storage and offloading unit/ Norwegian waters” (NORSOK, 1998). It also
vessel (FPSO), fluid production units (FPU), stipulates an acceptable safety level. In larger
and dynamically positioned production units. extent it contributes in replacing individual
When undertaking the seafloor activities, a oil company specifications, documents, guide-
number of operations in and around the trees, lines and recommendations for existing and
piles, manifolds, umbilicals, caissons, risers future oil industry development.
and flowlines must be thoroughly planned.
100
Figure 1. BP oil disaster simultaneous operations overview (http://arcanumdeepsecrets.wordpress.com)
Concept of Barriers outline that quantitative risk assessment tech-

niques have experienced wide application in
Modern technologies have developed many Norwegian offshore oil and gas industry in
safeguards and barriers to prevent major ac- the early eighties and came into force in Nor-
cidents and undesired events to happen. Better wegian regulations in 1990. Pursuant to the
understanding and limiting their occurrence regulations, in order to identify the hazardous
still represent challenges to oil industry. Most events that may occur during the activities,
of operating companies have established and the risk analysis is to be carried out. Later on,
implemented the barrier philosophy in order the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD)
to meet local and international legislative re- as a key authority, issued a regulation on
quirements, which shall also be respected and safety barriers (on emergency preparedness)
adapted by companies or personnel working taking into consideration scenarios defini-
for or behalf the operator. Vinnem at all. (2003) tions, performance standards of emergency
101
preparedness measures and analyses carried The protection against accidents in the
out as a basis for the design of the emergency petroleum industry rely on multiple barriers
preparedness system. concept in which maintenance of their integ-
Emphasized by the Management regula- rity is a key issue for risk management in the
tions (NPD, 2002), the barriers include both operational phase. It has to be known what
organizational or administrative measures and barriers have been established and which
physical measures respectively. Organiza- function are designed for. This also implies
tional barriers or safety measures are explained the awareness on non-functioning or impair-
as measures to insure continuous adequate ing of barriers and what effect this still has
performance of technical and human barriers. on the risk levels.
Despite the emphasis on the barriers phi- Another important aspect in the operational
losophy (Figure 2), there is no strict definition phase is that performing operations of short
in the regulations. ISO (2002) adopted the duration with the associated high risk level is
definition for barrier as “a measure, which often in combination with special conditions,
reduces the probability of realizing a haz- requirements and premises.
ard’s potential for harm and which reduces In October 2010, U.S. Department of Inte-
its consequence”. Barriers may be physical rior enacted new offshore drilling regulation,
(materials, devices, segregation, etc.) or including Drilling safety rule and Workplace
non-physical (procedures, inspection, drills, safety rule. These rules are a combination
training, etc.) Today’s regulations are turned of both prescriptive and, for the first time
to functional or performance requirements in U.S. offshore drilling safety and environ-
for barriers rather than to physical ones (e.g. mental regulation history, performance-based
safety systems). regulation. Both rules are addressed to the
Figure 2. The barrier principle
102
wellbore integrity and well control equipment The Simultaneous

respectively. Regarding drilling-completion- Operations Process
production activities, at least two independent
and tested barriers across each flow path dur- A sequence of performing activities in an
ing the performance of high risk operations onshore or offshore area has its own routine.
should be present at all times (also certified Their interaction and correlation makes the
by a registered engineer). This request is a effectiveness of certain operations more
part of any operators´ company policy. If one complex. A lack in the skill to identify simul-
of these barriers is in danger, all other opera- taneous operations sometimes represents a
tions must be warned and ready to suspend, common difficulty. Performing some opera-
until the problem is solved. When one barrier tions may strongly affect on success of others,
completely fails all simultaneous operations, increasing the risk of carrying them out. For
(with the exception of those activities related this reason, when scheduling and planning ac-
to the barrier restoration) should be secured tivities, consideration should be given to bring
and suspended until the established number the occurrence of simultaneous operations to
of barriers has been restored. the least possible extent. In managing risks of
During drilling and workover operations a simultaneous operations the basic principles
primary barrier is usually provided by hydro- must be regarded. This process generally starts
static fluid column, with blowout preventers with identifying simultaneous operations. By
available to be activated as a secondary bar- identifying all of them it is enabled to manage
rier. While setting casing strings or liners, risks. Consequently, full risk assessment must
the casing itself and annulus cement shield be performed prior to carrying out SIMOPS
isolate hydrocarbons from leaking, making allowing to identify all risks introduced by the
the primary barrier. A shoe track with two task as well as their level. Monitoring parallel
types of mechanical barriers, cement in the activities allows to verify that the controls are
shoe and the float collar valves or liner hanger in place and adequate. If not, work shall be
seals, provide the secondary barrier. It is of stopped and control measures in the risk as-
the highest priority that no single failure of sessment shall be reviewed. While SIMOPS
barrier or barrier element, whether caused by are being carried out, a single responsibility
operational error or equipment failure, shall shall be assigned. At the outset of simultaneous
lead to loss of well control. That is the reason operations communication shall be established
why two independent and tested barriers shall and maintained on the daily basis, enabling
be available (NORSOK, 1998). all persons involved in tasks understand and
Simultaneous operations involving the implement control measures.
potential leak of hydrocarbons, for example in A literature and a field practice provide
live well operations or production operations different approaches to explaining the basic
and hot work activities in the vicinity of the steps of simultaneous operations, elaborated
wellhead area or of another potential source in short above, sometimes limited to specific
of hydrocarbon release, should be limited in conditions in which they occur. One of those at-
number as much as possible, and be given tempts is unusual but very convenient because
particular attention in terms of risk assessment it hits the essence of simultaneous operations,
and operational procedures. using in its clarifying their acronym. Accord-
103
ing to Ross (2007) when working on offshore what (additional) conditions. In that process,
projects where a possible SIMOPS situation decision matrices, developed by most leading
can occur, “we should think of SIMOPS in operators or contractors, are very helpful.
terms of Sharing Information Maximizes Our
Personnel Safety. With this stated, a plan can Decision Matrix
be created by following a process outlined as
SIMOPS - Study the project, Identify possible At the outset of simultaneous operations
SIMOPS, Meet with all parties involved, Or- it is necessary to establish communication
ganize a Plan and Share the plan/information“. between all parties involved, maintained and
Timely identification of possible simultaneous discussed daily through all combination of
operations for some project early on in the conditions to be expected. This communi-
development phase will allow to distinguish cation shall also be regularly documented.
situations that can cause costly delays, or Based on these daily meetings a simultaneous
even worse, cause serious harm or injuries to operations plan is created in a written form,
personnel involved in each operation. whose role is to:
The policy of a particular operator in
relation to simultaneous operations can be • Designate the responsible parties for
summarized in few sentences. It is indicated the various operations to be executed;
that simultaneous operations, require suitable • Establish awareness on emergency re-
policies and procedures to be put in place sponse and contacts;
that are effectively administered to ensure • Identify hazards and take precaution
the control of hazards evolving from multiple measures and actions for appropriate
activities, performed at the same time, and mitigation;
at the same place. Besides, the effective co- • Make communication between opera-
ordination of all activities and the definition tions clear, and
of clear lines of responsibility is required. • Establish a clear and consistent chain
The operational personnel will be provided of command.
with the best practice with the fundamental
principles needed to reduce the cumulative Operation premises and a detailed descrip-
risk level of two or more high-risk activities tion of the planned tasks to be executed shall
occurring together to a tolerable level. In the be included in specific operations programs for
same time it does not mean that all individual the operation in question. The program shall be
operations during SIMOPS are fully covered subjected to an inter-discipline check involv-
by procedures necessary to carry them out in ing the operator and the main contractor(s)
a safe and effective manner. Each discipline is prior to implementation. The program may
expected to have its own series of operational be supplemented by more detailed guidelines
manuals and procedures. and risk analyses. For example, with produc-
In order to establish responsibilities and the tion and construction activities carried out
decision-making structure all simultaneous concurrently only a permit-to-work (a system
operations shell be perceived and identified, to manage and control work tasks and the
defining whether individual activities can be personnel carrying them out) is required.
performed simultaneously or not, and under But, depending on specific hazards and com-
104
plexity of the project, insured by the proper When interpreting the advisability of con-
authorization of designated work by the field ducting operations/activities concurrently,
management team, SIMOPS procedures may color or letter codes are used. At the intersect-
be required (Chevron, 2012). Any deviation ing point of a pair of activities the code indi-
from the program, which proved to be neces- cates which activities can be executed without
sary to perform simultaneous operations must any restriction, which activities can be per-
be formally identified and requested from the formed respecting some restrictions and which
appropriate regulatory authority for approval. activities cannot be conducted at the same
It should be noted that in some cases local time.
regulations may require the approval of the During planning phase (i.e., rig mobiliza-
SIMOPS Operating plan by competent statu- tion/demobilization), as well as prior to and
tory authorities before starting simultaneous while carrying out operations simultaneously,
operations. a set of requirements is to be met. These
To assist in decision making whether a requirements are usually explained in terms
limited number of operations, identified at of “shall“, ”should“ or ”must“ rules. In that
the start of the project, could be executed sense, shall is a verbal form used to indicate
simultaneously and safely or not, a decision requirements strictly to be followed in order
matrix was developed. An installation-specific to conform to the standard and from which no
SIMOPS decision matrix, based on a detailed deviation is permitted, unless accepted by the
risk assessment study, should be prepared Operator“ (NORSOK, 1998). In other words,
for every job, case by case. Therefore, such shall rules cannot be deviated from under
a matrix can be an integral part of some any circumstances (Gilbert, 1991). Should
manual where a set of minimum requirements is a verbal form used to indicate that among
for each simultaneous operations scenario is several possibilities one is recommended as
described, within the scope of activities for particularly suitable, without mentioning or
some particular company. A decision matrix excluding others, or that a certain course of
is usually presented as two-dimensional list action is preferred but not necessarily re-
of activities to be performed at the installation quired“ (NORSOK, 1998). The should and
to each other. There is no limit placed on the must rules can be deviated from, provided
number of operations to be carried out simul- special precautions are taken and the devia-
taneously. But, as stated by Gilbert (1991), tion is approved beforehand by the authorized
a pair of operations have to be considered person appointed through a typical chain-of
separately, ensuring that the implications of command system.
each activity are examined with respect to all As far as two or more vessels are operat-
other operations. ing in the same area in the vicinity to each
Addressing the objective of making SI- other, the SIMOPS vessel hierarchy must be
MOPS decision matrices user-friendly, most assigned. This makes the overall planning of
of them are developed in a similar way enabling operations smoother. Ross (2007) says, when
to make work schedule and to help manage the assigning the hierarchy a great attention must
safe performing of work. The next example in be paid to the vessel(s) relying on advanced
Figure 3 shows a possible clash of activities acoustic type of dynamic positioning (DP).
at drilling and production installation. These vessels (drill ships, semi-submersible
platforms, heavy construction vessels, etc.)
105
Figure 3. The SIMOPS decision matrix (Coastal Energy, 2012)
tend to be costly operations with high prior- elaborated system of responsibilities, and the
ity assigned, which other vessels can easily schedule for the SIMOPS, based on all the
interfere with. There are many examples with strategies and company best practices that
hierarchy assignment, but when drilling in have to be taken in order to safely perform
progress the DP drilling vessel will be the the activity. This plan will be used as a mini-
lead vessel during SIMOPS and this operation. mum. Supplemental plans or modifications
During the developing phase of the project, may be developed to define all changes to the
entering to the other phase, this will and can existing structures/installations /systems, as
be refined, but more than likely the drilling well as risk reducing measures, that need to
vessel will be ranked as the leading one. be implemented before the safe execution of
simultaneous operations. The main purpose
Chain of Responsibilities of the simultaneous operation safety rules
and procedures is to provide all personnel
Depending on the scope of the individual involved with simultaneous operations with
company’s activities, before carrying out a knowledge of the relevant safe practices
simultaneous operations, a site specific SI- and procedures.
MOPS operating plan has to be prepared. In preparation of final document covering
Besides the scope of activities, the operating all the considerations outlined earlier, a clear
plan should contain the resources required, management structure during carrying out
106
simultaneous operations must be adopted. ate to each of them. Among many of flow
That is usually covered in chapters relating diagrams available, one is shown in Figure 4.
to the roles, responsibilities and coordinating The main person who has overall respon-
procedures within specific operating manual/ sibility for the operations to be performed at
guidelines. Mainly, “a single point responsibil- the facility (installation) is simultaneous op-
ity“ is declared as a key principle for the safe erations authority. When SIMOPS are being
and efficient management of simultaneous conducted the simultaneous operations au-
operations. thority (SOA) must be overseeing activities
Regarding the chain-of-command in place on the facility at all times, for both onshore
for a given simultaneous operations situation, and offshore operations. A person designated
clear direction must be provided. A full un- by the company is the highest in the SIMOPS
derstanding of this decision-making practice hierarchy in which lower-ranked persons are
has proved to be justified, greatly enhancing responsible for coordinating with SOA one
the capability of an emergency response or- of the contributing simultaneous operations.
ganization. The various simultaneous opera- In companies´ guidelines or manuals different
tions situations may be addressed (platform names for the same hierarchical level are
drilling while producing at a hub platform, given, depending of the type of activity and
large commission work while producing at their possible number. The most commonly
an outlying platform, etc.) and a flow chart used term world-wide for the person respon-
describes the chain-of-command appropri- sible for carrying out simultaneous operations
is “person-in-charge“ (PIC). Numerous op-
Figure 4. A characteristic chain-of-command (SIMOPS organization) flow diagram (adapted from ENI,
2005)
107
erators and contractors are using some alter- simultaneous activities at the facility;
nate term as a synonym for person-in-charge, he receives delegation for these respon-
such as: SIMOPS Controller (Chevron, 2012), sibilities from the site manager (district
Simultaneous Operations Leader - SOL (To- manager, company representative);
tal Fina ELF, 2001), Simultaneous Operations • He liaises with all supervisors (pro-
Authority - SOA (ENI, 2005), Person-in- duction, construction, commissioning,
Charge or Lead Operator (Apache, 2013), etc. maintenance, safety, etc. - also called
For the role of the head of simultaneous SIMOPS representatives) and area /in-
operations (PIC/SOL/SOA...), a minimum stallation authorities;
knowledge is usually required: • Participates in risk assessments, iden-
tifying potential hazards and proposing
• The ability to understand and control risk reducing measures;
simultaneous operations; • Reports to the operations manager;
• The requirements of the relevant safe • Should have the autonomy, authority
work practices standards; and power to take decisions;
• Hazard identification and evaluation; • Is responsible for defining priorities
• The permit process; so that safety is maintained and down-
• Awareness on impact their activ- times reduced as much as possible;
ity could potentially have on other • Should authorize all work permits in
operations; accordance with the permit-to-work
• Emergency plan; (PTW) system, and will ensure counter-
• The responsibility and authority to signature by the respective supervisor(s)
shut the operations down if something of the involved discipline(s);
is observed to be unsafe (stop work • Is responsible for ensuring the compli-
authority); ance with rules and regulations, and the
• Establish clear communication be- follow-up of the working condition of
tween parallel operations; the safety systems;
• SIMOPS plan form, checklist and daily • Is responsible for deciding the prior-
logs, and other. ity of simultaneous activities, and for
making the final decision on general
Depending on type of operations, head of production shutdown in case of an
simultaneous operations may act as operation emergency;
supervisor (OS), offshore installation manager • Is responsible for approving the start-
(OIM), drill site manager (DSM) or well site up of new wells or resumption of pro-
manager (WSM). In parentheses the common duction from existing wells;
acronyms are highlighted. The main duties of • Ensure that hand-over notes are pre-
the person-in-charge for simultaneous opera- pared to allow for a smooth continua-
tions are listed below (ENI, 2005; Chevron, tion of the operations at shift handover;
2012): • Should ensure that emergency and all
necessary drills are periodically per-
• The person-in-charge is the company formed in all work areas;
designee who is responsible for coor-
dinating and safe management of the
108
• Is responsible for the preparation and Life Cycle Model for SIMOPS
issue of the permit-to-work for produc-
tion operations; As stated earlier, the cycle of simultaneous
• Is the drill site manager or well site operations goes through a series of inter-
manager on all drilling and completion related and conditional steps. By their logic,
operations. interdisciplinary approach must include all
procedures and measures to prevent obstruc-
The head of simultaneous operations (PIC, tions or interference, to minimize constraints
SOA, SOL) should have sufficient technical and to reduce risk of operations to the great-
background and knowledge related to the est extent possible. The SIMOPS program
major activities being performed and should should establish a mechanism for review of
be trained/competent as to make clear and proposed activities through ongoing com-
timely decisions. Although he may not be fully munication, meetings and joint efforts of all
experienced in every aspect of all operations parties involved. Emerging from this process,
being executed, he will be formally informed a decision matrix is derived to authorize si-
of such activities and of their status and rel- multaneous activities. The objectives of the
evant program in order to be able to assess SIMOPS program and procedures are to ensure
the levels of safety controls in place and give their execution on controlled and safe man-
the final agreement for their start with respect ner. One can easily conclude that in offshore
to other activities in progress. environments significantly more demanding,
For unexpected events, requiring immedi- dangerous or risky situations are generated,
ate intervention, that are implemented under comparing to onshore. Therefore, hereinafter
the responsibility of the well/production/ described cycle mainly relates to offshore
construction operations supervisor in charge parallel activities, which does not mean that
(i.e. lower ranked persons), the head of si- in number of specific circumstances cannot
multaneous operations should be informed be applied to onshore situations.
as soon as possible. Then, he should evalu- Based on the large experience and rep-
ate the impact of change and the measures resenting offshore marine and underwater
taken on the other activities in progress, and engineering companies, International Marine
should be ready to take any further decisions Contractors Association (IMCA) has become
on the matter. Additionally, in establishing among leading authorities in providing struc-
consistency with regard to the expectations tural approach to managing safety through risk
of all personnel involved in dangerous or rou- assessment, technical interaction, supervision,
tine operations possibly causing an increase trained personnel, management of change and
in risk, it is necessary (in written form) to feedback. Representing its members as well as
specify conditions to be complied with and offering guidance to industry their influence is
all precaution measures to be adopted before, beneficial to all industry parties, from operat-
during and after the carrying out simultane- ing companies, contractors and suppliers as
ous operations. well as to oil companies in general, govern-
mental and regulatory bodies. For the purpose
to provide guidance on simultaneous marine
operations in support of offshore oil and gas
109
Figure 5. The SIMOPS process flowchart (based on IMCA, 2010)
exploration and production or related con- and vessel activities, due to physical (loss
struction and survey activities, the SIMOPS of position, anchor patterns), environmental
process is documented covering all its phases. (weather limitations, currents, icebergs) and/
Emphasis is made on the use of explanatory or failure impacts (leakage, gas, explosion
formats and schematics flowcharts. etc.). Furthermore, intervention in the area
Following the main SIMOPS premises, of 500 m around the existing infrastructure
elaborated in previous sub-chapters, the ex- and other combined activities in the area of
planation of basic steps (indicated in Figure operation which could compromise project
5) will be briefly elaborated. success.
• Identifying simultaneous operations • SIMOPS meetings
It is very important that simultaneous Prior to start-up of simultaneous activi-

operations are identified at an early stage ties all supervisors and authorities must be
before the work starts. They can arise as the convened to a kick-off meeting by the site
result of a variety of issues. Usually, there is manager so that the scope of work can be
overlapping of activities in the same area at composed and to ensure that all precautions
the same, i.e. schedule clash. But also simul- have been implemented and reliable equip-
taneous operations may come about as a result ment is available.
of interference between platform operations
110
The kick-off meeting should identify all formally identified, recorded, and ap-
the SIMOPS operations to be performed, time proved within the procedure, where
frame required for each part, as well as present applicable;
the evidence that operations can start (accord- • Many other measures and limitations
ing to the operational plan and authorization regarding whether, communication
given by the operation manager). Emphasis systems, assets allocation due to posi-
will be placed on the operational steps to be tioning systems used to avoid interfer-
taken in case of an emergency and the check ence between vessels, subsea tools and
list of corresponding mitigation measures equipment, remotely operated vehicles;
should be drawn up. The meetings should be • Checklist of actions to be taken for each
minuted and properly documented. work-specific SIMOPS operation, and
• Contingency plans for all operations
• Preparing documents (dossiers) and measures listed previously.
Based on the kick-off meeting and scope • Performing SIMOPS assessment review
of work developed for the field operations a and developing interface documentation
daily work coordination meeting is required, All the risks in conducting SIMOPS,
attended by simultaneous operations leader contained in each party’s dossier, should be
(SOL, SOA, PIC) and all supervisors involved identified and reassessed using methodology
in the simultaneous operations, in order to or tools such as hazard identification and
manage and plan the safe performing of the risk assessment (HIRA), clash analysis and
SIMOPS, in relation to the progress of ongo- interdependency analysis.
ing activities. For each of the parties involved During the SIMOPS assessment review it
a work-specific dossier should be prepared is important that the roles and responsibilities
containing the following (IMCA, 2010): of each party involved are clearly identified
and a hierarchy of control established for dif-
• A summary of work set out in a step by ferent phases of operations, covering in that
step procedure; way reporting lines in normal and emergency
• A conceptual field sketch showing the mode.
surrounding offshore installations asso- Depending on the scope of SIMOPS activi-
ciated with the activities and restriction ties one interface document covering all the
zones; work could be required. Alternatively this can
• A list of assets (platforms, vessels, comprise several documents covering clearly
jack-ups etc.) to be used in each part of identified specific SIMOPS activities. Typical
the SIMOPS; SIMOPS interface document should contain
• A summary of constraints; all items as shown in Figure 5.
• Organization chart and a summary of
the main hazards for each operation; • Undertaking the simultaneous operations
• Mitigation strategies and precautions
proposed for each specific operation; If required by local regulations, the op-
• As the operations proceed, significant erational plan should be submitted to and
deviations from the program shall be approved by the relevant statutory authority
111
before starting simultaneous operations. The CONCLUSION

plan should be updated or modified whenever
significant deviation requests for already ap- Carrying out different operations concurrently
proved activities are planned, and a new ap- is nowadays a common practice in a wide
proval should be obtained. Authorization to range of onshore and particularly offshore
commence simultaneous operations is given activities. Significant economic effect, which
by the operations manager once he has verified improves the efficiency of the process of ex-
that the operational plan has been approved, ploitation of oil and gas in general, is achieved
when the requirements established in the op- by their performing. Depending on the scope
erational plan are fulfilled, when an effective of work of particular companies involved, a
structure of management, supervision and large number of activities can take place si-
control is in place and that the installations multaneously. Once simultaneous operations
are suitable and prepared for the work to be are identified, their planning and managing
carried out. is based on the fundamental principles that
Once the SIMOPS has started daily calls or include - the implementation of risk analysis
meetings (if feasible) should be held between before carrying them out, the hierarchy of
the representatives of the involved parties for responsibilities assigned and the permit-to-
the purpose of monitoring progress of the work system put in place during their execu-
current SIMOPS activity and to organize safe tion, while ensuring all necessary action to
planning for the remaining work. As identified meet HSE requirements. Communication is a
in the SIMOPS interface document, regular key factor for the successful implementation
and emergency communications should be of these basic principles while performing
followed. SIMOPS operations.
The person-in-charge should coordinate In order for simultaneous operations to be
simultaneous operations, as identified in the carried out in a safe and controlled manner,
interface document. The PIC should manage manuals or documents intended to provide
operations through single permit-to-work sys- guidance were developed by major companies
tem. When deviations from the control limits and professional associations. The guidelines
are identified, the change should follow the cover the entire simultaneous operations cycle,
agreed change control mechanism defined in starting from their identifying, performing
the interface document. and completing. For the purpose of making
a decision on performing SIMOPS, decision
• SIMOPS close out matrix significantly helps, which is mainly
linked to the scope of activities within the
Upon completed SIMOPS operations it company where it originates. Simultaneous
is always helpful to undertake the process operations are unavoidable and essential in
of their evaluation and closing either at the offshore activities, but safety must never be
involved companies level or entire project compromised while performing. Therefore,
level. The objective of the close out review is the operational plan should be submitted
to examine what has been learnt in terms of to and approved by the relevant legislation
the application of further SIMOPS activities. authority, if so required by local regulations,
before starting a simultaneous operation.
112
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Retrieved from http://ebookbrowse.com/
Apache. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://sems- manta-to-richmond-simops-matrix-final-pdf-
portal.apachecorp.com/ d459244888
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SIMOP%20Manta%20RM/Manta%20to- management regulation). Retrieved from
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Matrix%20FINAL.pdf htm
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the challenges of the safety of offshore oil
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case guidelines for offshore drilling contrac-
tors. Author. Ross, D. (2007). Planning and communicat-
ing for conducting safe SIMOPS. Paper pre-
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(IMCA). (2010). Guidance on simultaneous Houston, TX.
operations (SIMOPS). Retrieved from www.
Imca-int.com Saintpère, S., Faget, J.B., Payer, N., Vergnot,
D., Baranthol, C. (2005). Simultaneous
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Slideshare. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www. KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

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Barrier: Administrative, organisational or
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ADDITIONAL READING carrying them out.
Person-in-Charge: The person respon-
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114
115
Chapter 6
The Macondo 252 Disaster:
Causes and Consequences
Davorin Matanovic
ABSTRACT
The disaster of the Deepwater Horizon platform, while drilling the Macondo 252 well in the Gulf
of Mexico in 2010 is for now the last of numerous tragedies, blowouts, and oil spills resulting
from petroleum engineering activities. After the accident, several commissions, investigation
groups, advisory committees, and company reports were prepared. They investigate causes and
consequences of the disaster from different standpoints, but mainly come to the same conclu-
sions. The “nth” approach is presented in this chapter.
INTRODUCTION errors and safety barriers malfunctioning,

gas that has found the way from the layer to
The Macondo 252 well supposed to be an ex- the surface caused the explosion and fire.
ploratory well in Macondo prospect onshore, The consequences were dramatic. From the
at the water depth of about 1,500 m (5,000 standpoint of families, the worst one was the
ft). It was at the same time designed to serve loss of 11 lives and 17 people injured. As the
as a production well if sufficient hydrocarbon efforts to fight the fire were unsuccessful, the
reserves were proved. Unfortunately on April platform sank in the morning of April 22, 2010
20, 2010, after lot of bad decisions, human (the Day of the Planet Earth). All attempts to
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch006
The Macondo 252 Disaster
close the well were also unsuccessful so the drilling blowout preventer system (BOP) and
oil spill continues at the seabed level for 87 high pressure riser if installed. Casing design
days more. About 210,000 gallons of oil was is one of the most important parts of the well
spilled every day and in only three days it design process. It determines casing material
covered over 580 square miles. Spreading to quality, wall thicknesses, joints and placement
the coast it has influenced the coastal marine (from the bottom to the top of the well, or as
life as well. a liner). The purpose of the casing/liner is to
serve as the physical barrier against the well
bore wall rocks (API Bull 5C2, 1999; Bull
SAFETY IN DRILLING OPERATIONS 5C3, 1994). All fluids inside the formation,
formation pressure, and the weight of the
To that time one of the best standards for casing are acting on the string all the time the
elaboration of well integrity in drilling opera- drilling of the next section is in the process.
tions was NORSOK standard D-010 (2004) Also casing must withstand those stresses
due the extensive activities offshore. It defines through the well lifetime (API Spec. 5CT,
the requirements and guidelines related to well 1995; API Spec. 5B, 1996). Casing design
barriers with adequate schematics and tables should be done on the basis of nominal di-
determining features and acceptance criteria mensions and material quality. The ellipse of
for primary and secondary barriers. plasticity, showing allowed triaxial stresses is
the best representation. The use of different
Drilling Concern design factors as is the practice in most of
companies is not the best way because it can
At the moment of the accident the Macondo be misleading (Adams et al., 1993). To avoid
252 well was in phase of drilling and trip- uncontrolled fluid flow casing or liner should
ping with shearable drill string. According to be leak tested after the placement. Usually
adequate schematics primary well barrier has casing/liner is cemented. That means to place
to be drilling fluid column. It must exert the cement slurry in the annular space and below
pressure on the bottom of the well that will the cementing shoe, wait for cement and con-
prevent any influx (kick) of formation fluid. tinue with drilling if needed after tightness test-
Such pressure should be equal or adequate ing. Doing so the continuous and permanent
to control estimated or previously measured assuming impermeable hydraulic seal is set
reservoir (pore) pressure with respect to surge along determined hole length in the annulus,
or swabing pressure changes. The properties of to prevent any formation fluid flow and even
the drilling fluid should be controlled. Pressure more stabilize the formation rocks. The proper
on the bottom should never exceed the forma- placement and quality is the primary demand
tion fracture pressure. Control and verification for such kind of barrier. The predetermined
is done by control of the fluid level/s in the length/casing to liner overlap, of the column
well and spare tanks, the amount and intensity should be achieved and proper cement sheath
of fluid returns over the vibration screens and quality as well. Of great importance is the
in the tanks. To maintain circulation all the adequate “wait on cement” time that should
time enough fluid should be prepared (about be determined through testing on surface
20% of the fluid in circulation system at the samples. The pressure in the annulus should
moment). Secondary well barriers are cas- be monitored regularly (not only through the
ing, cement sheet in the annulus, wellhead, drilling process). All casing strings are sus-
116
pended over the wellhead that is constructed that can resist to fluids and temperatures that
in the same manner that casing strings are are acting on them. Each element of the BOP
landed in the well (API Spec 6A, 1999; API and riser system should be leak tested after
Spec 6A, 1999). Each wellhead spool should the mounting or if reinstalled.
have annulus access ports with manometers Drilling string is composed according to
(control of annular pressure change), seals and the needs (API Spec 7, 1997; API RP 7G,
hanger. At the same time during the drilling 1998; API Spec 5D, 1999). Usually it con-
process it is a basement for blowout preven- sists of the bit, drill collars, drill pipes, subs
ters and risers mounting. Each section of the and according the way the string is rotated;
wellhead should be selected according to the kelly at the top (for rotary table connection)
maximum possible/anticipated well shut in or downhole motor at the bottom, or noth-
pressure. The future purpose of the conduit ing of that if top-drive is used. In a manner
should also be considered due the differences of the barrier it is important in fulfilling the
in fluid and pressures acting on the wellhead. purpose of providing the drilling fluid circu-
Wing valves should be mounted and pressure lation without leaking in spite of any stress,
and function tested to allow pressure control in temperature, corrosion or wear.
the annulus or killing of the well if necessary. Stab in safety valve should be mounted and
At the top of the wellhead for each segment closed at the top of any open ended tubular
of the well drilling, adequate BOP system joint of string suspended in the rotary table
should be used (API RP 53, 1997). Several if string closure and sealing is needed. The
preventers are used with different purposes; a) influence of primary and secondary well bar-
ram preventers for closing the annulus around riers on risk must be determined through the
the drill pipes or drill collars or to close the analysis and understanding of hazards and
full cross section of the well, b) ram preventer accompanying events. They are considered as
capable to shear the drill pipe, c) annular measures that are implemented or designed
preventer that closes around any pipe in the with the purpose to reduce likelihood of
cross section and the full cross section area triggering potential of hazardous event and/
without pipes inside, d) rotational preventer if or to reduce the consequences of such event
some under balance is needed or allowed. For (Holnagel, 2008). The performance of the
drilling in deep water there should be more safety systems in reducing the probability
precautions, so the second annular preventer (likelihood) of the event to occur and their
is used and double control and operating consequences can be represented according
system too. One or both of them should be a to Figure 1.
part of the lower marine riser package. The When using such system performance for
dynamically positioned vessel must enable drilling process, the sequence of usual events
shearing of the full casing strings with sealing can be traced. Daily operations include drill-
ability at the end; otherwise the liners should ing through different sequence of rocks/for-
be run instead full casing string. High pres- mations, with different pore pressures and
sure riser is used as an extension of the BOP fluids that have to be controlled because if
if they are positioned at different levels. The not controlled appropriate they can lead to
purpose is to prevent fluid flow from the well hazards. Prevention of unwanted events as-
bore to the environment. It should be of the sociated with high pressures and hydrocarbons
same pressure rating as the BOP used, with is done by reduction of likelihood of kick
gas tight connections and sealing elements (unwanted influx) by appropriate maintenance
117
Figure 1. Safety system performance with successive layers of defenses (Handal & Øie, 2013)
of the mud (primary well barrier). If for any propagation of the accident is possible. Active
reason primary barrier fails, the unexpected failures result from human errors or technol-
event can be experienced. Protection of un- ogy malfunction that can lead to the accident
expected event is achieved by reduction of (mud loss or excessive mud returns not de-
likelihood and of unwanted outcomes by re- tected, or BOP failure). Latent conditions
duction of consequences. Reduction of con- represent the mistakes in process functioning
sequences of primary barrier failure is reduced and systems involved (cement slurry quality;
by activation of secondary barriers that must wait on cement; casing or liner design). The
act all the time until the function of primary model anticipates that any of barriers is ca-
barrier is restored. Unvented outcome results pable to stop the accident sequence. In se-
when both barriers have failed. The quality quence, the next barrier must succeed if first
of reduction measures can be represented with has failed. They should all the time be inde-
the number of slices of Swiss cheese (Reason, pendent in functioning. The as low as reason-
1997). Such model represents the set of bar- able practicable approach is used to determine
riers where the accidents are prevented by the number of necessary barriers. Single
successive protective systems, where holes failures are not considered as the cause of a
represent the possible path for active failures major accident. The “holes” that can lead to
and latent condition failures. Only when all accident if correspond should be as small as
of preventing systems fail to stop the hazard possible and the parallelism avoided.
118
CAUSES OF THE have been prevented. In spite of worldwide

MACONDO DISASTER known companies (British Petroleum, Hal-
liburton and Transocean) the risk manage-
Serious of reports, articles and books have ment was poor with lot of systematic failures.
been written since the end of the struggling That has showed the real state in the industry
with the Macondo 252 well was successfully involved in deepwater exploration. So in the
killed (put under control). The official reports future, not only regulatory oversight to en-
are usually done by the authorities that create sure safety will be sufficient. The involved
a comity of professionals from related topics industry should also try to improve practices
(BOEMRE, 2010; BP, 2010; Lane et al., 2011; and work with the governments. At the end
National Commission, 2011). The report the scientific elaboration of environmental
should describe the sequence of actions or conditions, sensitivity and possible response
oversight that lead to the top event. Also the is also necessary.
effectiveness of the control and emergency
shut down systems should be reviewed. The Overview of the Accident
impact of the technical staff and management through the Critical Factors
must also be revised, because the universal
truth in petroleum business is that about 85- The possible approach in determining the
90% of accidents are due to human factor causes of the disaster is to use Root Cause
(Yokel, F.Y. & Simiu, E., 1985). At the end Analysis (RCA). It can identify the root causes
some kind of conclusions or recommenda- of the incident, but also direct corrective mea-
tions should appear in favor of prevention sures to minimize of problem to appear again
of future accidents of such type. They can (Garg & Gokavarapu, 2012). The method fol-
lead to change of regulations, improvements lows three steps: 1) first it defines the problem
in technology, equipment and managing or by defining what, when and where has hap-
communication system. Going towards more pened, 2) than the problem is analyzed, and
and more challenging areas and situations 3) the solution of the problem must be found.
it is obvious that the overall culture of the The answer to the first is that well integrity
offshore industry must educe (Sutton, 2013). was not established satisfactory. Because of
The hierarchy and responsibilities should be that hydrocarbons have entered in the well,
defined, and legislative in way of treaties. they expand through the well uncontrolled.
Much more the workers and their skills do Reaching the surface with BOP not sealing,
not follow the challenges of new sophisticated they spread over the platform, ignited and the
equipment and technologies. The reasons for platform exploded and sunk in fire.
that are both, the fluctuation and deficiency of The basis of the analysis is in the organiza-
properly educated and skilled personnel and tion of the chronological order of events that
extreme advancement in other technologies lead to the disaster by building the timeline
implemented in offshore activities (Matanovic with description of events following one
et al., 2001). To overcome the safety and another. The starting event is the result of
environmental problems, safety management previous mistakes in well design, cementing
topics are elaborated in API RP 75 (2004). and equipment functioning control. Because
The national Commission Report (National the cement sheath in the annulus did not seal
Commission, 2011) has stated as the most the space and the casing shoe and float col-
important, that the Macondo disaster could lar failed to prevent cement return. Cement
119
slurry design was crucial for the first, because to be lifted up due the changes in pressures
of the narrow margin between pore pressure and temperature so forming another path for
and fracture gradient of the rocks. Because of reservoir fluids penetration.
that cement slurry was mixed with nitrogen The casing string mentioned earlier as
to be at the downhole pressure and tempera- the one of the barriers has been selected and
ture foam cement. In such circumstances it mounted properly so it did not contribute in
is important to avoid any mixing of cement leaking.
slurry with drilling mud or formation fluids. After the casing placement, cementing and
The independent laboratory that has prepared after waiting on cement (about ten and a half
and tested such cement slurry has found that hour) the negative pressure test was conducted
due the bad rheological properties the slurry (Omrcen, B. et al., 2011). That means to es-
was instable with potential for nitrogen break tablish such conditions that the pressure inside
out. At the end due the long displacement it the casing is below the reservoir pressure. In
was possible that mixing the slurry with oil such conditions the three times grater fluid
based spacer has occurred and some formation return that calculated was experienced, as an
fluids should also penetrate to cement because indication of communications flow paths with
no fluid loss additives have been used. All the reservoir. At the same time pressure rise
of that can result in nitrogen migration and in drill pipes was detected but misinterpreted
formation of future way for gas encroachment. by the well site leaders (showing their level
Also due the overlap between casings of competencies). Providing negative pressure
there was the necessity of proper slurry place- test was probably the trigger for gas break-
ment. With small overlap there is an extreme through. Regardless that the main thing during
necessity that casing is centralized inside the all drilling processes is to control pressures
well bore and the walls of the hole cleaned on gauges mounted at appropriate places. Not
of the mud cake. The change in centralizer only can the gauges be the indicators of the
number and positioning has happened. That gas kick. The basic knowledge of the bachelor
has weakened the annulus cement barrier at is to know basic kick indicators (Kristafor, et
the beginning. al., 1992; Matanovic & Gaurina-Medjimurec,
The inside of the casing is protected of the 1993).
formation fluids ingress by two sealing parts. They are explained in Figure 2.
Those are casing shoe and the float collar Not realizing the problem, mud in the well
placed one length of casing above. Also the was displaced by the sea water that decreased
space between should be filled with cement. the bottom hole pressure even more. The
But findings show that they have also failed investigations have shown the fluid gain of
because of the contamination by nitrogen about 6.2 m3 (39 bbl) that was not detected
breakout and mud cake. Not confirmed, but by the crew nor automatic level controls. Some
possible, there was also some kind of float explanations tend to state that the reason was
collar malfunction (check valves do not seal). in end-of-well activities, and mud transfer to
When running liner it is always suspended the supply vessel. About 30 minutes have
with the casing hanger seal assembly and passed from the displacement starting to the
placement must be seal tested. The findings moment when differential pressure has been
have shown that unfortunately the seal as- realized on the rig floor. About 38.6·105 Pa
sembly was not locked mechanically in the (560 psi) pressure rise was detected inside the
hanger, which can allow the seal assembly drill pipes. The most important thing for the
120
Figure 2. Preliminary clues and indicators of the gas kick (Boyd, W. E., 1971)
crew working offshore is to be certificated would be better that crew has selected the
and trained according to the well control and diversion overboard through starboard di-
survival. Unfortunately for the crew on the verter. So the majority of the gas from the
Deepwater Horizon that was not true. When mud was not vented securely. The following
mud started to flow uncontrolled over the rig action of closing variable bore rams to seal
floor, the crew tries to close annular preventer the annulus caused the pressure rise in the
in the BOP system. Due the huge amount of drill pipes to about 395·105 Pa (5,730 psi).
the hydrocarbons in the riser (models have Modeling of gas dispersion over the rig floor
shown the amount of 48 m3 (300 bbl), and the and the platform has shown that also the
fast expand of the gas when reaching the secondary protective system has failed. The
surface, the annular preventer did not fully idea of those systems is to make impossible
seal around the drill pipes. Even than the new the gas to reach any ignition point and to
decision to divert the mud through the mud ignite. They should also detect the dispersion
gas separator was wrong. In spite of that it of gas beyond electrically classified areas.
121
Opposite of that the gas has reached the sup- blind shear rams to cut the pipes and loose
ply air intakes for engine rooms, where the free. Also the attempts with remote operating
temperature and the concentration were high vehicle have succeeded to close them shearing
enough to start the fire and cause at least two was not complete and sealing was not achieved.
explosions. The automatically shutdown Because of that oil and gas have flown at the
system failed also to act. sea bed all the time. The only way to kill the
Whenever the indicators show the possibil- well was to drill so called relief wells. The
ity of gas kick, the first action is to securely first have been started in May 2010 and suc-
close the well. For such purpose a number cessfully finished with bottom kill maneuver
of preventers are mounted together to form a in September 2010.
blowout preventer system. They all have to be
controlled according to functioning periodi-
cally and testing registered and documented. POST MACONDO CHANGES
The Macondo disaster had a blowout preventer AND IMPROVEMENTS
malfunction as one of the eight critical fac-
tors for hazard to take place. The testing done Findings and conclusions of Commissions
previously has shown some problems in BOP and Committees have lead to determine about
activation but has been neglected. It must be possible solutions of the analyzed problems.
stressed that offshore BOP stacks are more Unfortunately the leadership and technical
complex than those onshore. Also they are competencies that are required for effective
equipped with two pod systems. The fault performance in drilling operations has failed
tree for such systems can be used to indicate from the beginning. The “hunger” for money
possible malfunctions and to be aware of con- resulted with the accident (Cheng et. al., 2013).
sequences (Ostebo et al., 1991). The failure Because the primary and secondary barri-
analysis using the fault tree representation is ers (and third as well; unable to shear the pipes
applicable for complex systems in a way of and seal the well in BOP) have failed the new
inclusion of each event contribution to the top guideline describing the barrier management
event. At the same time it enables the better has been issued (OGP, 2012). It describes
understanding of system failure behavior with barrier management as follows:
easy overview, and possibility to calculate
the probability of the critical event to occur A comprehensive and common understanding
in determined tome interval. from well design and construction through op-
The system acting was investigated accord- erations and abandonment of what constitutes
ing to function prior and after the explosion. barriers to flow (primary and secondary),
Before the explosion as was mentioned the and how barriers are verified, monitored and
annular preventer failed to seal around drill repaired. Understanding how well barrier
pipes and the variable ram preventer was elements make up a well barrier envelope and
activated successfully but too late. the importance of maintaining a minimum
After the explosion multiplex cables and capability of two well barriers when the well
hydraulic control lines were damaged. Los- is capable of discharging hydrocarbons or
ing the activation signal annular BOP has other fluids to the environment. In situations
opened. With the rig and platform drifted where two barriers are not feasible alternative
from the location, the emergency disconnect control procedures may be adopted. (OGP,
system should be activated. The activation of 2012, p.2)
automatic mode function should activate the
122
Managed pressure drilling systems (MPD), functions necessary for primary barrier to
and control equipment are introduced as the perform the task. All identified functions
improvement of barrier analysis and function- should than be listed with description of: (1)
ing (Saeed et al., 2012; Falk et al., 2011). Three list of equipment performing specified func-
main steps illustrate such barrier analysis. tion; (2) list of potential failures that may cause
Those are: (1) system and case description, (2) top event (kick; blowout); (3) what can be the
functional analysis of pressure control equip- potential consequences, with specified affect
ment, and (3) fault tree analysis with blowout at the primary barrier; (4) which failures can
as the top event. First step is the identification be critical; and (5) list of potential recovery
of the system with its main functions (mud or redundancy measures. Parallel to that a
as the primary barrier). All functions and technical hierarchy represented on Figure 3
sub functions of the barrier are determined is determined as well (Handal & Øie, 2013).
through the hierarchy according how the func- Those two hierarchy lists can be considered
tion is accomplished. It goes as deep as the like the first “slice of the cheese”. Finally
functioning of the barrier depends on (mud the fault three analyses are used to represent
storage and preparation system, mud pumps how each or combination of several system
functioning, mud cleaning systems; vibration and failure events may cause the top event
screens, degassers etc.). The presentation is (blowout). Such representation can serve to
done through the function tree (Figure 3) that identify holes in successive layers of defense
can be developed from both sides (Rausand with introduction of secondary barriers as
& Høyland, 2004). The one mentioned, and well (Figure 4).
the opposite by determining the lower sub-
Figure 3. Presentation of technical hierarchy for primary well control
123
Figure 4. Fault tree analysis of loss of well control through the primary and secondary barrier
124
The MPD control equipment manages and et al., 2001). The result of the method is ob-
controls flow and pressures in the well. That tained by mapping the issued REWI to the
means to maintain all pressures within the determined causes of the Deepwater Horizon
operational pressure window. To do so it is (DWH) catastrophe. Such mapping is done
equipped with logic units that serve as con- based on the four questions asking: (1) if all
trollers (with different interfaces; dynamic of the contributing factors of the accident are
and static pressure, hydraulics, mechanics, included, (2) which links can exist between
external well monitoring such as mud volume, REWI and DWH causes, (3) is there a need
drilling parameters control etc.). System is for any other cause to be encompassed, and (4)
monitored through measuring devices such the universal question of the possibility that
as; flow meters, pressure transmitters, tem- the method prevents the accident. To method
perature transmitters and other. Finally the to be successful it is necessary to assure so
pressure control equipment is used for dy- called contributing success factors explained
namical adaptation of the pressure especially as the risk understanding, attention, response,
in the annulus. In that way the dynamical decision support etc. Such factors have been
bottom hole pressure is controlled to avoid developed through a number of workshops of
kicks or formation fracturing. Such dynamic professionals and scientists of different engi-
pressure control equipment involve auto- neering background. Several general issues
mated choke manifold with adjustable chokes, with appropriate indicators are stated from
mud and cementing pumps, all kind of circu- the beginning; even new ones can be added at
lating system lines, check valves, annular and any time. The goal is to provide a dialogue in
ram preventers, rotating preventer and rotating direction that makes sense on the system and
or no rotating control devices. All of these its behaviour. Doing so, it should be possible
systems can be interpreted in the fault tree to prevent wrong cement and negative pres-
diagram (Figure 4). It helps to illustrate the sure test result explanations. Also the visible
possible relationships according to hazards. pressure changes that were lasting certain time,
Unfortunately the lack of knowledge and would not lead to the blowout if proper atten-
experience of the personnel can be the mayor tion of adequately trained personnel existed.
concern. It shows that even with several well There is also a need for the biggest truth, that
barrier elements it is possible to experience after the battle anyone can be a general. So
kick and the blowout. even proved on the stated example the method
One of the proposed methods that should should be developed and modified according
prevent unwanted spills is based on the use of to the challenge.
warning indicators (Øien, & Nielsen, 2012).
The Resilience based Early Warning Indicator BOP Post-Macondo Upgrades
(REWI) method that they have proposed maps
the important underlying causes: (1) ineffec- Two important and tragic things have been
tive leadership, (2) deficient communication, experienced in the Macondo accident, due the
(3) failure to provide timely procedures, (4) BOP malfunction. First one was the failure of
poor training and supervision, (5) ineffec- annular preventer to close the annular space
tive management and oversight of control, without leakage, and the second one is in
(6) inadequate use of instrumentation and inability to shear the pipes after the platform
equipment, (7) poorly analyzed and respected has sunk. The most important is the fact that
risk, (8) focus on day rates not safety; to the BOP system is the final barrier to prevent
direct causes mentioned earlier (Matanovic the blowout. Different problems have been
125
experienced with deepwater BOP control and collars have been proposed (outer thicker
activation. First one has appeared in 1980’s steel skin and inner thin steal skin, with lead
when accumulator capacities have been re- centre wall). Also the other parts of the sys-
calculated for ideal gas to real gas (nitrogen) tems that are known and specified (API Spec
calculations. After that the problem rises 17D, 1992) can gain the level of control of
with the depth of seabed. Than the double the BOP system functioning.
control lines have been placed (control and
balance line). Nowadays after the Macondo
disaster American Petroleum Institute (API) CONCLUSION
is changing the Recommended Practices for
Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for The eight direct causes of the accident that
Drilling Wells to the Standard level (Sattler, were defined with the precise sequence should
2013). The improvements and changes will be prevented timely. The reason that has not
be in direction of BOP and well compatibil- happened lies in underlying causes. The last
ity and especially the shearing capability of one stated is the “focus on time and costs rather
the shear rams. Also due to the high costs of than control of major accident risks” (Øien &
maintenance and original spare parts some Nielsen, 2012). Such inconsistency between
of the Servicing Companies try to cut the time (money) saving but at the same time
costs. Because of that the BOP certification, increasing risk at different stages of design
increased equipment monitoring and specific and well construction and drilling process,
maintenance requirements will be included in have lead to the disaster. Total time saving
Safety and Environmental Management Sys- achieved up to the moment of blowout, fire
tem (SEMS). The problem is in the possibility and explosions on Macondo 252 well were
of individual perception as the reliability deter- 170 hours (about 7 days). Change in casing
mination component, or even more the insur- design earns three days, using BOP in spite of
ance companies’ statistics. Due the frequent obvious failures (one day), mud displacement
hydraulic control system leaks (especially before placing cement plug (one day), and the
control lines) the electronic control systems rest goes to the others (reducing number of
are implemented. The same problems that centralizers, locking the sliding sleeve, elimi-
are experienced with intelligent completion nating cement bond and quality logging and
systems are visible here so the improvement inadequate pressure testing). Something that
in components reliability is the main concert. is not stated but should be also considered is
The oil spill from the destructed well had the needed time to “wait on cement”. That is
lasted about three months before the well the time needed that cement slurry solidifies
was killed. It was due the inability to share and get proper mechanical properties. When
the pipes inside shear rams. New upgrades talking about seven or eight (7 or 8) cemented
of the system have been done in the use of annular spaces (barriers) the possibility of
depth compensated accumulators (Baugh et any one to leak is multiplied. The time graph
al., 2011). They enable to close the preventers (Omrcen et al., 2011) has shown the discrep-
with increased safety regardless the depth of ancy between projected time schedule and that
the see. Much more the shearing ability and realy realized. The intervals for casing/liner
the emergency disconnect operations should placement, cementation, wait on cement and
be improved. The shear problem with drill wellhead construction and testing have been
pipe connection is more obvious with drill shortened, which also has contributed to the
collars. Because of that the shareable drill accident.
126
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130
Størseth, F., Tinmannsvik, R. K., & Øien, K. of about 1,500 m (5,000 ft). Unfortunately
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the standpoint of families, the worst one was
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the loss of 11 lives and 17 people injured. As
Regulations and Industry Standards. Paper
the efforts to fight the fire were unsuccessful,
SPE 144011 presented at the SPE Western
the platform sank in the morning of April 22,
North American Regional Meeting, Anchor-
2010 (the Day of the Planet Earth).
age, USA.
Managed Pressure Drilling Systems
(MPD): And control equipment are introduced
as the improvement of barrier analysis and
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS functioning.
Mud: The liquid (suspension of clay in
Blowout: An uncontrolled out flow of oil water) that is circulated through the drill string,
gas or other reservoir or well fluids into the bit and annular space along the well to clean
environment at the surface or into other un- the bottom and carry the cuttings from the
derground formation. It usually occurs when well, exert adequate pressure at the bottom and
formation pressure is greater than pressure the walls of the hole among other functions.
applied by the hydrostatic pressure of the Shear Rams: The component in a blowout
servicing fluid column in the well. preventer system that has the purpose to cut
Blowout Preventers: Stack of several seal- the drill pipe body when needed and continue
ing devices installed at the top of the well (on to seal the area; especially important offshore
the wellhead) which can close annular place when quick move of the rig from the position
around the pipes in the well or entire cross is necessary.
section of the well without pipes in it. Resilience Based Early Warning Indica-
Casing: Steel pipe placed in the well to tor (REWI) Method: That they have proposed
prevent the walls of the borehole to cave maps the important underlying.
inside, than to prevent fluid communication Wait on Cement: The time needed that
among different formations when cemented. after the placement of cement slurry in the
Macondo 252: The Macondo 252 well well it can harden sufficiently.
supposed to be an exploratory well in Ma- Wellbore: Hole (borehole) made by drill-
condo prospect onshore, at the water depth ing or coring in the ground.
131
132
Chapter 7
Risk Analysis of Completion
and Production Systems
Davorin Matanovic
ABSTRACT
A variety of definitions are available through the literature, but the universal one is in defining
the well completion as the optimal path for the reservoir fluids to be produced. That means to
achieve a desired production with minimal costs. Wells represent the greatest part of expenditure
when developing the reservoir. For a long period of time it was defined to be simple, reliable,
and safe with enough flexibility to allow future operations. Nowadays, so called “intelligent
completions” appear to give more financial benefits, flexibility, and control. The reliability of
system components is essential for long-lasting production. In addition, the differences accord-
ing to natural flowing well risk and artificial lift are given.
INTRODUCTION duction well many circumstances should be

encountered. The completion must balance
The optimal well completion minimizes the factors related to (Patton & Abbott, 1979)
initial and overall cost according to produc- environment, constraints, and resources. The
tion completion, while providing the optimal aim of the design is to decide about intervals
path for reservoir fluid to reach the surface. of the reservoir to be completed, comple-
When designing the completion of an pro- tion method, number of completions in the
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch007
Risk Analysis of Completion and Production Systems
well, casing and tubing configuration and performances. Tubing and other down-hole
size, perforating considerations etc. So the components have to satisfy according the
optimum production (injection) performance flow optimization, mechanical properties
include safety by providing the means of pro- (three-axial stresses) and overall reliability.
duction interruption or control restoration in The specification of the completion sequence
controlled or emergency situations (Peden & and the running procedures are also imple-
Leadbetter, 1986). The integrity of the system mented in the iteration design process, to be
and reliability of the components must allow in position to consider all eventualities. The
long lasting production with little need for design quality depends on the available data.
intervention. Because everything is subject Such data are of two kinds: (1) quantitative
of the economic evaluation, the associated data are based on reservoir condition and well
costs of initial completion, production costs, parameters and changes can be recalculated
and workover and remedial operations and and (2) qualitative data are based on the in-
stimulations should be encountered. To obtain dividual or company experience. Data can
optimal completion design there is a need of be grouped according to the scope. Those
well performance prediction, than the perfo- talking about well objectives and reservoir
rating procedures and equipment are selected, parameters include well path data, casing
servicing fluid specified and production string program, reservoir depth and thickness, fluid
and its components as well, and completion contact zones, reservoir initial pressure and
sequence and running procedures elaborated. temperature, maximal production rate, well
Completion design is influenced by several fluids composition and properties and flowing
parameters. They are related to the determined bottom-hole and tubing head pressure. Initial
well purpose, dependent on the environment completion and workover data should include
(e.g. land, off-shore), drilled hole diameter, the well history, equipment failure records,
reservoir properties, production characteris- perforating conditions and servicing fluid
tics and possibilities and available comple- characteristics. Completion equipment data
tion techniques. Much more it is necessary specify tubing properties, perforating equip-
if desired to enable borehole wall stability, ment weight and gun outer diameter and length
selective production from different layers, due the tubing clearance. All other parts of
create minimal pressure drop due the fluid the down-hole equipment should also satisfy
flow, enable the adjustment of flow rate, and material manufacturing requirements, with
allow needed operations and measurements inner diameters (due to flow restrictions and
without a need for workover and over all to mandrel seating) and setting position (depth,
ensure the well safety. To achieve optimal sequence etc.). Due the change of formation
completion design the prediction of well fluids properties when flowing up the tubing,
performance is of interest (now and changes there is also the necessity of determining the
in the future) (Economides, 1998). The well depth of wax, hydrate or scale formation if any.
servicing fluid with concern to compatibility Corrosion problems are also strongly related to
with formation rocks and formation fluids changes with depth and temperature. Finally
is the next factor in the loop. Specification clay swelling and wettability changes can ap-
of perforating equipment (retrievable, non- pear due the completion or workover works.
retrievable, tubing conveyed), procedures From the production point of view, safety
(underbalanced or overbalanced) and perfora- is a top concern. Whatever the way of produc-
tions density and spacing impact the inflow tion is applied (naturally flowing well or some
133
kind of artificial lift used) the designer must Completion Concern

be aware of changes in the reservoir pressure
with rise of cumulative production. Depend- When completing the well the primary barrier
ing on the level of wellhead pressure and the is represented by servicing fluid column and
fluid produced (oil or gas) the pressure rating installed and pressure tested casing/liner and
of the controlling or safety elements must be isolating valve or plug. The secondary barrier
selected. That means e.g. double wing valves at that time is the wellhead connected to cas-
on the Christmas tree and subsurface safety ing with mounted blowout preventer system.
valve on wells that produce gas. When installing downhole equipment the
blowout preventer system should enable the
shearing of any tool that will pass the bar-
SAFETY IN COMPLETION rier and than to seal the cross section of the
AND PRODUCTION wellhead (Fowler & Roche, 1993). Also the
sealing around any tool that can be inside the
The critical point in selection the completion preventer during system installation must be
or production equipment is related to safety. It enabled. Any of the barriers should be veri-
should be the same in relation to installation fied through the leak testing according to the
or operation process. The completion design predetermined differential pressure. Also the
means at the same time the optimal path for operational functioning (close/open) should
fluids up and down through the well and at be performed periodically. The leak testing is
the same time the barriers that are controlling performed immediately after the installation,
high pressures and direct fluid flow. There are always after replacement, when suspicion
different approaches in various companies, on leak exists and when the expected rate of
but there is a general overall rule that there differential pressure that the barrier will be
have always to be at least two means of well exposed to in near future is close to pressure
control. Whatever they are they have to be rating of the system. The testing pressure is
tested according to function needed. Very applied from the flow direction side. Two
good and reliable approach can be found in tests are performed. First the low pressure
NORSOK Standard D-010 (2004). It defines one with 1.5 to 2 MPa lasting five minutes
well integrity systems in drilling and well because the leak will rather start at low pres-
operations. They should include two inevi- sures. The second one, high pressure leak test
table barriers all the time of well activities or is done up to the pressure rating of the system
production takes place. That also means that part tested and must maintain the same for 10
there is a pressure difference that can cause minutes. The cross-section of well completed
uncontrolled outflow from the wellbore to the for production, with specified elements used
environment on the surface. Any well barrier as barriers or safety and control systems is
should be designed and selected to withstand presented in Figure 1.
the maximal differential pressure that can oc- Completion covers all activities to install
cur. It is always tested according to reliable the tubular with appropriate downhole equip-
and leak proof functioning. It should be placed ment and to suspend it at the surface allowing
at the appropriate place that location is well the fluid to flow from the reservoir through
known. Barriers can be defined as primary the production system to the gathering system.
and secondary (Bellarby, 2009). Optimal downhole production completion
134
Figure 1. The cross-section of well completed for production, with specified elements used as barriers
or safety and control systems
135
equipment includes tubing (string of produc- or distorted. It is improved with injection of

tion pipes connected with appropriate threads/ cement slurry. The changes in the downhole
connections), with sealing device (packer) producing area depend on the amount of cu-
that seals the annular space between the cas- mulative sand volume that has been produced.
ing and tubing and so forcing the fluid to flow The worst case, catastrophic sand production
inside the tubing and other parts of the string. is the result of high rate sand influx that can
Some kind of flowing device (sliding sleeve collapse production casing or tubing, or fill up
or sliding doors) are used to enable the com- parts of the producing system and terminate
munication between those two areas if production (Veeken et al., 1974).
needed. All gas wells and also all wells with To fit the purpose the casing strings have
reservoir pressure high enough to lift hydro- to withstand any pressure or load that can
carbons to seabed level should be equipped appear during the lifetime of the well (API
with some kind of subsurface safety valve. Bulletin 5C2, 1984; API Bulletin 5C3, 1985;
The usual kind is that controlled from the API Spec. 5B, 1996; API Spec. 5CT (metric),
surface by the control line/s. Also some kind 1995). When designing casing strings the
of annular safety valve is used in gas lift service-life model should be used instead the
completions or with potential of hydrocarbon conventional casing design based on design
flow through the annulus. factors (Klementich & Jellison, 1986). Loads
Before the completion starts the well is off imposed during initial running and cementing
course drilled, production casing set in the (high differential burst and collapse pressures)
borehole and the annular space cemented to differ from those after cementing (significant
the top (usual practice in Croatia). All casing changes in temperatures). They have stated
strings (if more) are suspended in adequate that the performance life of the casing begins
spool and sealed. Casing strings can be po- with cementing phase, and than when cement
sitioned from the bottom of the well to the has set additional forces and stresses influence
top, or as liners (just overlapping previous the casing servicing life.
casing string with length of 50 to 100 meters The probabilistic reliability method applied
or more if needed). Its function is to serve as to casing design was used to enable lower-
a support for the surrounding rocks and to ing the overall costs of such tubular that was
prevent uncontrolled fluid flow between the estimated to be about 16% of average years
wellbore and back-side of casing. drilling expenditures (Payne & Swanson,
The worst up today example for cata- 1990). They have realized that the expected
strophic destruction of wellhead/casing load and given casing rating for particular
systems was due the sand production and design were defined by the load capacity of
formation rocks compaction at Wilmington the tubular and the maximum load expected
field resulted with surface subsidence of through the well’s life. The objective was to
up to 10 m. Several earthquakes have been ensure that all that time tubular load capacity is
registered and about 300 producing oil wells greater than maximum load expected. Also the
have been damaged with complete loss of 120 quantitative risk analysis (Adams et al., 1993)
more (Suman, 1974). Usually the compaction has given the assign in dependence of design
of the reservoir increases axial loading and factors and probability of failure according to
shortening of casing or slotted liner. If loads the acceptable probability of failure. Casing
exceed elastic limit of the steel, pipe can be strings are always designed using some kind
plastically deformed or slots can be bulged of design factors (Adams et al., 1993). Regard-
136
less the design factor used the blowout rate casing due the change of mud density and
due the structural failure alone was through temperature, cement volume decrease with
the investigated period in the range of 10-4, pore collapse, and due the thermal cycling
what means 1 failure (blowout/leakage) in (Bois et al., 2012). The bulk shrinkage is the
10,000 wells. At the same time failures due result of the decrease in pore pressure as a
the human error have been recorded in ten result of cement hydration. That means that
time higher range. So the overall blowout rate the volume of reaction product (cement) is
was 1 in 1,000 wells. smaller compared to the volume of reactants
The cementation can be realized as one (water and cement powder). It has been shown
of the most important stages in well comple- (Thiercelin et all, 1998) that the bulk shrink-
tion process. When cement slurry is set age is dependent on the boundary conditions
down it cures and forms the cement sheath and initial conditions. The most important is
that stabilizes and supports the casing and the initial pore pressure that if high enough
avoids fluid migration so providing a zonal prevents the cavitations of water. Experience
isolation between different layers in forma- in the field has also indicated the problems of
tion. Bad cementation is a great problem and gas leakage through cement due the pressure
can be if detected solved with technical and testing of the casing (radial deformation of
financial additional expenses. One way is casing and so the cement sheath). The reason
the use of squeeze cementing. The annular can also be the reduction of the hydrostatic
space when cemented provides a continuous pressure inside casing after the cement has
(when cemented to the top) and imperme- set (Jackson & Murphey, 1993). It can be
able hydraulic seal where it is placed. That due the change of high density mud with the
is a permanent state so cement must resist light servicing fluids (completion and packer
pressures from all sides, prevent uncontrolled fluid). The special consideration must be un-
fluid flow and support casing or liner string dertaken when dealing with high pressure gas
for the well life. The quality and the position wells or the wells that are used for gas storage
of the cement in annulus must be verified purpose or CO2 storage wells. In such cases
according to the strength, cement bond logs the long period of seal ability is needed and
and variable density tool logs. The problems the problem results from changing pressures
can arise if there are leakage pathways or in the wells and in the formation in contact
debonding from casing or the well walls. (Teodoriu et al., 2010). If unexpected pres-
Two types of mechanisms can influence the sure rise in the annulus is registered that my
cement integrity. As first that is mechanical be the result of wellhead seal or casing leak,
degradation due to high compressive or tensile or improper cementation or cement channel-
loads that overcame its strength (Goodvin & ing. Because of that surface casing and casing
Crook, 1992). Second one is the chemical head are also influenced by the corrosion. The
degradation that propagates slowly unless oxygenated water or moisture positioned in
leakage pathways have been formed before the annulus will tend to corrode materials in
(Barlet-Gouédard et al., 2006). The worst contact (Singh et al., 2012).
situation is the simultaneous functioning of As the casing strings are set down, the
both effects. The sheath integrity can change wellhead is constructed. All changes that affect
due the volume variations through the hydra- the casing string are in some way affecting
tion process (shrinkage/expansion and heat the wellhead to. Because of that it is neces-
production), contraction or dilation of the sary to monitor the fluctuation in pressure
137
changes registered in different parts at the the formation rocks and fluids, with the den-
wellhead. Wellhead is constructed by add- sity adequate to formation pressure. When
ing spools as the well is drilled. Each casing completing the well with open end comple-
string is suspended and sealed in adequate tion string several elements are used as the
spool (API Spec. 6A, 1999; API RP 6AR, barrier. The primary barrier is the servicing
1994). Sealing between spools is provided fluid (exerts a hydrostatic pressure that is the
by the use of metal rings. Once mounted and product of the fluid density, column height
sealed wellheads can serve the purpose for and gravity) that must overcome the formation
a long period of time. Problems can arise pressure. It must be adjusted not to exceed the
due the mechanical and thermal induced formation fracture pressure when circulated
stresses. Mechanical stresses are connected or due the surge and swab pressures while
to settling of overburden layers resulting of tripping. The control is done by verifying
formation compaction as it becomes depleted. the stable fluid level, density and rheological
Almost the same problem is one mentioned properties. Secondary barrier represents cas-
connected with catastrophic sand producing string usually cemented to the top of the
tion. Very good analysis of resultant casing/ annulus and suspended in the wellhead. The
wellhead load distribution can be found in casing hanger holds the casing in place and
Stahl and Baur (1983) for offshore platform primary and secondary seals seal the annulus.
casing design, and Kocian et al. (1990) for For emergency tubing cutting purpose and
surface casing onshore wells. The analyses closing of full area or area around the pipe
have been focused on the differences among inside the well, blowout preventers are used
single string design and multistring systems (API RP 53, 1999). Two of them are always
joined at the wellhead. The focus was on the used. They are determined by the expected
axial and radial response of the wellhead and wellhead maximal pressure including safety
casing system under combined axial loading, margin for killing operation. They can be of
thermal changes (casing expansion or shrink- ram type or spherical type. Shearing is pos-
age) and annular pressure buildup. They have sible only with ram type preventers. Also the
realized that for hot production operations the number of pipe rams must be equal to the
most intensive buckling is at the tubing and number of possible string outer diameters.
inner casing, because of their greatest free Kill and choke lines are connected on the
length. Likely such changes have no significant wellhead connectors.
impact on wellhead displacement. Working String of production pipes (tubing) is
in direction of cooling the system (killing or designed according to algorithm presented
injection with cold fluid) the surface casing in Figure 2 (Peden & Leadbetter, 1986).
will be influenced mostly. Static loads and The design of the completion string is done
their changes are mainly distributed onto the with regard to flow optimization with regard
outer casing. But because it is short and in to available reservoir energy. Tubing outer
most cases almost always cemented to top diameter is restricted with inside casing di-
there will also be little impact on overall ameter. So the optimal inside diameter must
wellhead displacement. be determined through the nodal analysis.
When landing the production string at the It is recommended always to determine real
top of the wellhead blowout preventers are tubing properties according to stresses. They
mounted. The mud in the well is replaced are changing with change of state in the well;
with clean servicing fluid compatible with shut-in well, production or injection. Pipes
138
Figure 2. Tubing design procedure
139
and joints are checked for axial tension, or Production Concern with Naturally
compression, burst pressure or collapse pres- Flowing Wells
sure, and triaxial stresses. Ovality is also one
part of concern especially when determining On the other hand for the naturally flowing
axial tensile stresses combined with collapse well the primary barrier is the Christmas
pressure. Design factor can be always used ac- tree and the tubing packer system, and the
cording the company policies. Because tubing secondary consists of the casing (cemented
is connected with packer, possible movements or no cemented), wellhead and tubing hanger
and forces have to be determined too. The and for gas wells the subsurface safety valve.
temperature is the factor that strongly affects Production through wells with artificial lift
material properties or changes. Strength of the system depends on the system and is usually
material decreases with temperature increase. controlled by Christmas tree, master valve,
Young’s modulus of elasticity lowers with wellhead and casing as primary barrier,
stresses at the plastic deformation range. The and artificial lift system shut-down as the
critical parts of the string are connections es- secondary one. They should be independent
pecially gas tight connections. There is strong of each other, but sometimes they rely one
difference in threads and make up control upon another.
when dealing with steel tubing for oil wells After the well is completed and casing
and corrosion resistant alloy joints for sour and cement shield perforated the production
gas completions (Bannon et al., 1991; Payne stage begins. It concludes with any workover,
et al., 1995). Premium threaded connections well operation, plugging or well abandon-
have been analyzed through the finite element ment. In fact for naturally flowing wells
analysis and full-scale testing (Hilbert & Kalil, production is controlled eruption. The flow
1992). Full-scale testing can only determine is controlled through the Christmas tree and
if the connection is leaking or not. Finite ele- can be justified or interrupted if needed by
ment analysis gives insight in stresses from the body valve, master valve or wing valves.
makeup alone and then changes under loading Operating production parameters should the
conditions (Sato et al., 1985). Seal integrity entire time be in the boundaries specified for
is achieved with the metal-to-metal contact. completion design. Well integrity during this
There is also a great influence of surface period depends also on primary and second-
finish and compound grease to galling and ary barriers. The primary is combination of
material deformation. Grease is used to fill production packer and tubing with surface or
the gap between threads. Such way it helps to subsurface controlled subsurface safety valve
transfer loads from one surface to the other (if needed). Secondary are casing (cemented,
and whole joint acts as a solid element. When suspended and sealed in the wellhead spool),
to much grease is trapped in the gaps there tubing hanger (connected with tubing by
is a significant pressure built up in that area threaded connection and sealed inside tubing
when making connections (Tsuru et al., 1990). spool) and production (Christmas) tree. Also
Landing nipples can be positioned along the any annular space is equipped with access
string to enable mandrels placement. They line, valve and if possible gauge to detect
can than hold plugs, check valves etc. pressure change.
Packer is the sealing and anchoring ele-
ment that consists of a body, cones, slips and
sealing elements. When activated it divides
140
the inside of the tubing and the annular space 30 minutes must be performed. They can be
between casing inner diameter and tubing tubing retrievable (when landed as a part of
outer diameter above packer sealing element. a tubing string) or wireline retrievable (when
It is necessary that the functioning of the mounted inside the landing nipple or tubing
packer is permanent regardless the changes in retrievable one). When analyzing liability or
pressures and forces acting with the change of reliability it is optimal to consider the use of
conditions in the well. The slips should hold tubing retrievable one with the possibility to
packer in place while sealing assembly and repair method by wireline tools manipulation
polished bore extensions should enable tubing inserting the wireline retrievable valve inside
movement according the changes from one opened tubing retrievable one. If than both fail
state to the other. The barrier verification is the tubing can be retrieved at the end (Busch et
according to the allowed differential pressure al., 1985). In addition surface controlled valves
usually in the direction of flow. are mostly in use. That means that the control
At the top production string (tubing) is line/s is used to force the closing element to
suspended and sealed in tubing hanger that be opened. If the pressure in control line is
is pressure tested with other elements of the lost (destroyed, bleed-of) the valve closes.
wellhead. Control lines can be the reason of valve mal-
Subsurface safety valves (SSV) purpose is function especially in deep see completions
in fact to stop the flow of fluids up the tubing and productions. Than dual control lines are
in situations when there is an erratic change usually used. The reliability of closing element
in flow line pressure if the well head is dam- (ball or flapper) has been detected to be about
aged, Christmas tree or connected lines have same (Medley, 1978; Engen & Rausand, 1982;
been destroyed or malfunction for whatever Gunt, 1976). Even so the experience in the
reason. Surface controlled or differential field has shown that there are more problems
subsurface safety valves (API RP 14B, 1996) in opening ball valves than flapper valves if
consist of a body with threaded connections, control line fails. Also the problem with wire
close/open sealing mechanism that allows or line tools manipulation through the flapper
stop the fluid flow. When controlled from valve can result in valve closure when pulling
the surface they are connected with the hy- out because of possible hitch.
draulic control unit by the hydraulic control Production tree (API Spec. 6AV1, 1996;
line/s. In such conditions closing pressure API Spec. 6D, 1994) can be placed on the
is the function of control fluid gradient. In surface or as a sub-sea one. In general it con-
other cases it depends on the surrounding sists of a housing (flanged spools or as a solid
temperature and pressure conditions with block) with bores that are fitted with valves
regards to hydrates forming or wax or scale (swab, master, kill and flow). The purpose
deposition. The other thing to be considered is to provide the controlled path for the fluid
is the position of kick-off point, to be below coming up the tubing to the surface lines of
it in case of well collision. It must be tested gathering system. Also it mast be able to stop
initially by applying low and high differential the flow by closing some of valves mentioned.
pressure. Also periodical testing in regular
intervals (each month, every three months,
and every six months) with test duration of
141
Production Concern When evaluating the production system the

with Artificial Lift analysis applied by Woodyard (1980; 1981)
can be applied. The fault tree and reliability
At some point of the production the pressure analysis have been used to combine the con-
decline comes to the value when some kind of sequence or the risk to be avoided with the
artificial lift is need to maintain the produc- component or the entire system reliability.
tion from the reservoir. That means that the To estimate reliability it is necessary to de-
pressure in the reservoir is to low to raise the termine the failure rate of the component. It
hydrocarbons from the depth of the reservoir is well known from the tribology approach
to the surface. Several systems can be used that the failure rate is greatest in the start up
than. The broadly used is the beam pumping, period and when wear out period is reached.
than come gas lift, electrical submersible In between there is a long useful life period of
pumps, Moineau pumps and hydraulic lift. minimal and stable failure rate. That stresses
For all of them the pressure on the surface out the importance of elimination of early
in the producing part of the well will be the failures through proper control of materials
function of the pressure exerted by the driving and production of the items and also on time
force of the artificial system used. That means replacements when necessary. To calculate
when the system drive is shut off there will be the reliability of the system Equation 1 can
no pressure at the surface. That is true for all be used:
systems except the gas lift system. Regardless
the gas lift system used there is the part of the R(t ) = e −λ⋅t (1)
well under the pressure of the injected gas.
That means that such amount of the gas in the
where R(t) is the probability that the part of
container can bleed if some kind of leaking is
the system will operate without failure for
possible. For such purpose the annular safety
the period (t) for stated operating conditions;
valves (ASV) are used. They should seal the
(λ) expressed in hours-1 or years-1, is the com-
annulus between tubing and the casing, so
ponent failure rate; and (t) is the application
protecting the surface facilities and workers
period expressed in hours or years.
from the gas trapped in the event of wellhead
At the other hand the probability of the
integrity lost (Morris & Pringle, 1988).
failure during the same period of time will
be expressed by Equation 2:
Reliability Concept
P (t ) = 1 − e −λ⋅t (2)
The main item in risk or reliability analysis
is the equipment failure rate. So the unavail-
ability or unreliability of the system can be where P(t) is the probability that the part of the
predicted, and so can be the risk (Shafagi, system will fail within the period of time (t).
2008). The same can be applied to completion Some other analysis terms can be used.
and production systems. The blowout as the One of them is equipment mean-time-between
worst detrimental impact or the leak of with failures (MTBF). It represents the average time
less impact is considered to influence the between occurrences of a specific failure mode
personnel, production systems and environ- of the part of the system and mathematically
ment. So the prediction of possible blowout it is the inverse of the equipment failure rate
or leakage is essential to determine the risk. (Equation 3):
142
1 ability of the system can be calculated if reli-

MTBF = (3)
λ abilities of the components are known. Data
on mean times between failures can (MTBF)
Sometimes there is of interest to know be obtained from literature. For example, the
the mean-time-to-restoration (MTTR). That tubing joints failure survey (metal-to-metal gas
is the average time needed to restore the tight) has shown the MTBF to be in a range of
equipment operation (time to detect failure, 2.52·108 hours. Because it represents the best
diagnose problem, and repair and again start seal quality any other sealing element below
the production). It and can be expressed by that class will have lover range of MTBF. Sur-
Equation 4: veys with subsurface safety valves have been
done by different companies and institutions
1 (Brill, 1974; Lawson & Brill, 1975; Engen
MTTR = (4) & Rausand, 1982; Busch et al., 1985). The
θ
quality and the reliability is improved with
each subsequent survey. The mean value of
where (θ) is the equipment restoration rate MTBF obtained was about 1.82·105 hours for
usually represented in hours, because (MTTR) valves closing element and 1.84·106 hours
is very small compared to (MTBF). for control systems. Broader analysis has
Component reliabilities can be obtained been presented by Grassick et al. (1990) and
from historical data (depending on availabil- Grassick et al. (1992). They have covered
ity they can also be very limited), controlled gas-lift completions, through the analysis of
experiments that are not practical and engi- wellhead tree, tubing, SSSV, single gas-lift
neering judgement that can be broad but of completion, dual, hybrid and concentric. Re-
varying quality. Some intend also to use the sults were presented as the average blowout
insurance company documentation that can frequency against part reliability as MTBF.
also lead to false conclusions. Results have shown that there is the greatest
In production systems the most important reliability of the dual string gas-lift completion
is the sealing function, so just ranking the with MTBF of about 1.75·105 hours. Tubing if
seals and their reliability can be enough to properly selected is very reliable part lasting
compare different systems with the same or up to forty years when continuously installed,
different sealing elements. The best seals ac- which means almost double compared to the
cording to the reliability are metal-to-metal overall gas-lift installation. Unfortunately due
seals and wellhead packing, when installed at the uncontrolled production it is possible to
the surface and tested. Next, ranged as good complete the well with new tubing and change
are all other static seals installed at the surface it in a year. The wellhead and Christmas tree
and permanent packer sealing elements as can be realized as the most reliable part of the
well. Fair reliability enable dynamic seals on system because it can withstand even more
machined parts, retrievable packer and static than tubing string if installed properly and
packer bore sealing elements and downhole not disconnected.
wireline installed seals. The worst are the The Fault Tree approach presented in
dynamic packer bore seals regardless installed Figure 3 represents components associated
on the surface or downhole. The overall reli-
143
Figure 3. Fault Tree for a simple completion of gas production well
144
with gas production. The probability of the eling of intelligent completions are verified
leak in the system can occur only if the cas- with accelerated testing procedures, and come-
ing and tubing hanger seals fail and tubing at-able data enable creation of framework
or packer leaks at the same time. The surface scheme for correct decision making during
controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) designing process, if:
can influence the system only if the tubing
leaks above it. • The incremental value derived from
implementation of intelligent well
Intelligent Completion Reliability technology is defined,
• Available and applied adequate equip-
Intelligent completion comes out of today’s ment according to project requirements
more complex technical demands with de- and functionality,
velopmental scenarios that incorporate eco- • Ensured that all factors that enable
nomical and environment protection aspects. proper determination of earning of ex-
That is particularly important in off-shore tra profit through the time of intelligent
activities or in communications with mul- completion implementation exist.
tiple layers through only one well. Concept
of “intelligent completion” basically means So the reliability becomes to be a key
to lower the basic control equipment down requirement for all systems that permanently
hole regardless that is producing or injection and remotely control inflow and monitor the
well. Intelligent completion (Vachon et al., changes in reservoir. The reliability lifetime
2006) includes two primary concepts: (1) has in the past been mostly determined from
instantaneous surveillance– that means the the history of the available data. The thor-
possibility to measure and gather data of ough analysis has shown that it corresponds
changes in the layer pressure and changes to the people survival function, due the same
in flow at layer level; and (2) instantaneous mathematical behavior over time (Veneruso et
control (real-time control) – the possibility al., 2000). The failure of the system elements
to control and change flow conditions by regardless they are electrical or mechanical
remote steerage of down hole control equip- are a function of operational time. At the be-
ment. Data collection is provided by the use ginning an initial period exists where failures
of different sensors, and data transfer enable result from manufacturing and installation
electrical and optical cables, while driving reasons. In the middle is a long period of
of downhole equipment is possible through constant failure rate, and at the end, there is a
hydraulic control lines. Figure 4 illustrates wear out period with increased failure intensity
basic differences between conventional (a) due the wear, fatigue or aging. Through the
and intelligent (b) completion. twenty years of experience with permanent
Each project is evaluated according to two downhole installations the improvements
criterions: (1) risk or reliability with regard in testing and engineering processes ad the
to technical integrity of the system and (2) by quality to system reliability and risk reduc-
its return. The reliability of the system (Ma- tion. The main reasons for failures appear to
thieson et al., 2003) must be in accordance be numerous environmental parameters such
with requirements set up in the project. Mod- as temperature and pressure changes (cycles),
145
Figure 4. Basic differences between conventional (a) and intelligent (b) completion
146
flow rates, erosion due the sand production, where probability (R) is the function of time
corrosion due the well fluids chemistry and (t), Weibull time parameter (α) and Weibull
vibrations as well (Drakeley et all., 2001). shape parameter (β) that can be greater than 1
To increase elements reliability an active when the failure rate increases with time, less
reliability program has been established. It than 1 when it decreases with time and equal
starts with product design phase by definition to 1 when it is constant over time (Veneruso
of the mission profile (the set of fundamental et al., 2003).
boundaries for the system, functionality, life
expectations and environment). In the testing
phase Failure Modes Effects and Criticality CONCLUSION
Analyses (FMECA), Failure Mode Testing
(FMT), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Ac- General conclusion of the analysis of blow-
celerated Life/Stress Testing (QAL/ST) are outs or well leaks (Roland, 2000) connected
performed (Williams &.Holbrook, 2001). with completion and production is related to
Much more the Weibull reliability analysis duration and released amounts of hydrocar-
method enables to analyze failure rates that bons. Well leaks have short duration (up to 10
are not constant and vary with time. It can minutes). Also the amount of released fluid is
be written as: less than 100 m3 per leak. From at the moment,
broadest and available database (Holand,
( α)
− t
β
2006) it is obvious that the risk of the blowout
R =e (5) or well leak during completion is 0.00077 in-
cidents per completion and 0.000047 incidents
per well year during production.
147
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Imbò, P., & Gandini, G. (2011, March) Electro Ducasse, A., & Barzu, E. (2008, September)
Magnetic Wireline Retrievable - Surface Con- Improving Well Safety and Maximizing Re-
trolled Subsurface Safety Valve: A New Backup serves Using an Innovative Surface Controlled
for Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Subsurface Safety Valve (SC-SSSV). Paper
Valve to Avoid Workover. Paper presented at SPE 113829 presented at the SPE Annual
10th Offshore Mediterranean Conference and Technical Conference and Exhibition, Den-
Exhibition, Ravena, Italy. ver, USA.
152
Ostebo, R., Kallestad, O., & Grytdal, I. (2001, KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
April/May) Subsea Reliability – Success
factors for sustainable deepwater concept Blowout: An uncontrolled out flow of oil
development. Paper OTC 13290 presented gas or other reservoir or well fluids into the
at the Offshore Technology Conference, environment at the surface or into other un-
Houston, USA. derground formation. It usually occurs when
formation pressure is greater than pressure
Ravi, K., Bosma, M., & Gastebed, O. (2002, applied by the hydrostatic pressure of the
February) Improve the Economics of Oil and servicing fluid column in the well.
Gas Wells by Reducing the Risk of Cement Casing: Steel pipe placed in the well to
Failure. Paper SPE 74497 presented at the prevent the walls of the borehole to cave
IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, Dallas, USA. inside, than to prevent fluid communication
Samuel, G. R., & Gonzales, A. (1999, Oc- among different formations when cemented.
tober) Optimization of Multistring Casing Casing Head: Flanged steel fitting con-
Design with Wellhead Growth. Paper SPE nected to the top of the casing in the well
56762 presented at the SPE Annual Technical (introduction casing) or other spools mounted
Conference and Exhibition, Houston, USA. one over another. It provides space for slips
(casing hanger) and packing assembly landing
Stewart, R. B., & Shouten, F. C. (1988). In- so to seal the annular space.
vasion and Migration in Cemented Annuli: Christmas Tree: Composed or mono-
Causes and Cures. SPE Drilling Engineering, block steel element with control valves, pres-
3(1), 77–82. doi:10.2118/14779-PA sure gauges and chokes, mounted on the top
Thiercelin, M. J., Dargaud, B., Baret, J. F., of wellhead, to control the flow of oil or gas
& Rodrigez, W. J. (1998) Cement Design when produced naturally.
Based on Cement Mechanical Response. SPE Packer: Element of the downhole equip-
Drilling & Completion, December 1998, pp. ment which purpose is to seal the annular space
266-273. between the tubing and casing or wellbore
walls. That enables to control the fluid flow
Weiner, P. D., & True, M. E. (1969, March) A through the packer body and continue through
Method of Obtaining Leak proof API Threaded tubing. Elements of the packer can be only
Connections in High Pressure Gas Service. the body with connections and the sealing
Paper 69-040 presented at the API Spring element, but also there can be slips, cones,
Meeting, Southern District Div. of Production, drag blocks, “J” lock, equalizing valve and etc.
USA. Drilling and Production practice 1969, Packer Fluid: Some kind of servicing fluid
pp. 40-47 http://www.onepetro.org (e.g. oil, salt water or mud) that is placed in the
annular space with the density near to killing
fluid density. It should not change properties
with the time and must be noncorrosive.
153
Safety Valve: A device that closes or opens Tubing Hanger: Consists of slips and
automatically when an abnormal condition packing elements and is used to suspend and
occurs. Surface safety valve is mounted in seal tubing inside the tubing head.
the Christmas tree assembly, to stop the fluid Tubing Head: Is a spool with flanged fit-
flow from the well if assembly is damaged. ting that holds tubing string over the tubing
Sub-surface safety valve is mounted in gas hanger and at the same time seals the space
wells below the surface deep enough to prevent between tubing and casing holding the pres-
the valve freezing, hydrates forming or wax sure. The upper flange enables the connecting
or scale deposition. and support for a Christmas tree.
Tubing: Is steel or reinforced (glass or Wellbore: Hole (borehole) made by drill-
kevlar fiber) polymer pipe that is run into a ing or coring in the ground.
well and serves as a conduit for reservoir fluid
production or fluid injection from the surface
to the reservoir.
154
155
Chapter 8
Risk and Remediation of
Irreducible Casing Pressure
at Petroleum Wells
Andrew K. Wojtanowicz
Louisiana State University, USA
ABSTRACT
Oil well cement problems such as small cracks or channels may result in gas migration and lead
to irreducible pressure at the casing head. Irreducible casing pressure also termed, Sustained
Casing Pressure (SCP) is hazardous for a safe operation and the affected wells cannot be ter-
minated without remedial operations. It is believed that even very small leaks might lead to
continuous emissions of gas to the atmosphere. In the chapter, the author describes physical
mechanisms of irreducible casing pressure and qualifies the associated risk by showing statis-
tical data from the Gulf of Mexico and discussing the regulatory approach. This chapter also
introduces a new approach to evaluate risk of casing pressure by computing a probable rate of
atmospheric emissions from wells with failed casing heads resulting from excessive pressure.
Also presented is a new method for assessing potential for self-plugging of such wells flowing
wet gas as the gas migration channels could be plugged off by the condensate.
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch008
Risk and Remediation of Irreducible Casing Pressure at Petroleum Wells
ANNULAR AND SUSTAINED CASING assembly and completion hardware (including

PRESSURES packers and seals) respectively. In addition,
there may be an annular safety valve, gas lift
Petroleum wells are usually constructed such valves and related equipment depending on
that their casing–casing annuli do not experi- the nature of the well.
ence abnormal pressures. The exception oc- The secondary (outer) annuli (B, C, etc.)
curs in gas lifted wells where gas is injected can be of two kinds- Types II and III. The
into the production tubing–casing annulus. Type II annulus is formed by two adjacent
Annuli differ from other well components in casing strings. It is bounded at the top by the
that they are usually not the result of purposeful wellhead seal assembly and at the bottom by
design. Rather, they are a consequence of the the cement. The cement top in this instance
design of tubulars and the well construction is above the shoe of the outer string of the
process. Therefore, the ability of an annulus to annulus. The type III annulus is essentially
withstand loads that occur on its components similar, except that its bottom is open to the
is (or should be) evaluated at the end of the formation. The cement top lies below the shoe
design process. of the outer casing string, either by design or
The right figure in Figure 1 shows different accident.
kinds of annuli in a well bore (JIP, 2001). The By definition (as well as design) an annulus
primary annulus (Type I, or A) is formed by is a sealed volume, and there should be no flow
the production tubing and casing. It is bounded paths that cause migration of fluids into (from)
on the top and bottom by the wellbore seal the annulus from (into) its surroundings. In
Figure 1. Simplified well schematic and types of annuli in a wellbore (Detail “A”)
156
principle, given the annular configuration, all chapter has primarily been the SCP problem
leak paths that can compromise its integrity in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). However, the
should be identified. This identification is an “surface casing vent leakage” problem with
integral part of the design process and is the gas wells in Alberta has essentially the same
basis for the diagnosis and management of downhole causes. It has received substantial
sustained casing pressure (SCP), later in the attention via regulation by the Alberta En-
life of the well. ergy and Utilities Board and prevention and
The left figure in Figure 1 is a typical well remediation efforts by the industry. Serious
completion showing the placement of cement problems resulting from unintended pressure
to seal off the interior of various casing strings on casing/casing annuli have also been re-
from the subsurface formations exposed by ported in the San Juan Basin of New Mexico,
the drill bit (Bourgoyne et al., 1999). Ideally, in South Louisiana, in India, Norway, Poland,
the well should have pressure only on the and in Tunisia. Hydrocarbon intrusion into
production tubing. Pressure gauges on all of drinking water aquifers has occurred in the San
the casing strings should read zero if: Juan Basin and in Alberta, and its potential
for occurrence should be a major concern in
• The well is allowed to come to a steady- any onshore producing area.
state flowing condition, and Occurrence of SCP was early reported in
• The effect of any liquid pressurization technical papers by Attard (1991) and Michel
due to heating of the casing and com- (1991). Attard’s paper describes the repeated
pletion fluids by the produced fluids is occurrence of SCP in the primary and sec-
allowed to bleed off by opening a nee- ondary annuli of wells in the Hutton field,
dle valve at the casing top. offshore North Sea. This paper discusses the
engineering basis for management and re-
Only a small volume of fluid would be medial actions that were necessary following
bled off in order for the casing pressure to fall the discovery of SCP in the wells. The paper
to atmospheric pressure if the pressure was by Michel deals with operational aspects of
caused by thermal expansion effects. diagnosing SCP and isolating causes with
If the needle valve is closed and the well specific details pertinent to wells on the North
remains at the same steady-state condition, Slope of Alaska.
then the annular casing pressure should re- In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Louisiana
main at zero. If the annular casing pressure State University (LSU) studies (Bourgoyne et
returns when the needle valve is closed, then al., 1999), revealed that:
the casing is said to exhibit sustained casing
pressure (SCP). In some cases the pressure • 50% of the casing strings exhibiting
can reach dangerously high values. sustained casing pressure are produc-
tion casing strings;
SCP Problem Occurrence • 10% of the casing strings exhibiting
sustained casing pressure are interme-
Persistent, unintended pressure on closed diate casing strings.
casing/casing annuli (SCP) and leakage of • 30% of the casing strings exhibiting
formation fluids from open casing/casing sustained casing pressure are surface
annuli are a significant problem in many oil casing strings;
and gas producing areas. The impetus for this
157
• 10% of the casing strings exhibiting • 34.6% of the casing strings exhibiting
sustained casing pressure are conduc- sustained casing pressure are surface
tor casing strings. casing strings;
• 15.4% of the casing strings exhibiting
The study also concluded that poor ce- sustained casing pressure are conductor
menting was the major source of SCP in the casing strings.
outer annuli.
Also analyzed was a GOM field most se- Shown in Figure 2 is a summary of the oc-
verely affected by the SCP problem (Wojtano- currence of SCP on the outer casing strings in
wicz et al, 2000). Of the total 26 wells in this the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf
field, 22 wells (85%) displayed SCP. Distri- (OCS) region by block. The occurrence of
bution by casing type in this field was quite SCP on production casing was assumed to
different to that for the whole GOM; be caused by tubing, packer, or wellhead seal
leaks and thus not related to geology. For this
• 30.8% of the casing strings exhibiting reason, the reported occurrence of SCP on
sustained casing pressure are produc- production casing is not included in the data
tion casing; of Figure 2. The left side of Figure 2 gives
• 65.4% of the casing strings exhibiting the occurrence of SCP on outer casing strings
sustained casing pressure are interme- as a percentage of the wells completed in the
diate casing strings; various GOM areas. The right side of Figure
Figure 2. Sustained Casing Pressure by area in GOM (Bourgoyne et al., 1999)
158
2 gives the total number of wells in which Discussion of SCP Accidents in

SCP was reported on one or more outer cas- GOM
ing strings. Note that the occurrence of SCP
is widespread and affects a large number of During the period of 1980 to 1990, the oil and
wells. gas industry in the GOM Outer Continental
Figure 3 shows the frequency density and Shelf (OCS) experienced several catastrophic
the cumulative frequency distributions of SCP accidents as a direct result of high SCP. Four
for all casing strings by pressure for all wells such case histories are described in more de-
in GOM with SCP. These plots show that tail and discussed, below (Bourgoyne et al.,
about 90% of sustained casing pressures ob- 1999; JIP, 2001).
served are less than 1,000 psi (70·105 Pa) in
magnitude.
Figure 3. Sustained Casing Pressure value distribution in GOM
159
Case 1 Though the outcome cannot be disputed, it is

difficult to make definite conclusions in the
Two wells on a platform developed SCP on absence of a design basis, post-mortem or even
the production casing about six years after the a well schematic. For instance, why did the
wells were completed. The operator reported production casing fail at 3,400 psi, if its pipe
that the shut-in casing pressure was about body yield is 6,900 psi? What was the load
3,400 psi (234·105 Pa) and the minimum in- state on the production casing (i.e., what was
ternal yield on the casing was about 6,900 psi the differential pressure on it?). What kinds
(475·105 Pa). Thus, the operator argued that a of connections were used? Is it possible that
safe operation could be maintained. The well the blow-out was a consequence of pressure
continued to be produced. Two years later, build up (or failure of cement) in the outer cas-
the well began blowing out from the annulus ings, and was independent of the fact that the
between the production casing and surface production casing also saw pressure? The only
casing. The well was out of control for 46 clue to probable mismanagement of the prob-
days and released an estimated 600 MMSCF lem during initial stages comes from the fact
(17·106 m3) of gas and 3,200 Bbl (509 m3) that the operator applied for a departure when
of condensate during this period. Pollution the SCP was measured at 3,400 psi (which is
washed up on about 4 miles of beach. The nearly 49% of the MIYP). Unless the basis for
well cratered and the platform tipped over. granting departure and the diagnostic results
The blowout was killed using a relief well and prior to departure grant are known, among
the platform and wells had to be abandoned other things, it is difficult to re-construct the
and removed. The wells were plugged and events leading to the explosion.
cut off below the mudline. It is believed that
the production casing became pressurized Case 2
through tubing or packer leaks. Failure of the
production casing led to pressure on the outer Five years after a well was put on production,
strings through which the blowout occurred. SCP was measured on the production casing
and the well was allowed to continue produc-
Discussion tion for a period of one year. At the end of
this year, the operator requested permission to
This case describes a well that cratered due to continue production, reporting that the SCP
SCP of 3,400 psi on the production casing. The on the production casing ranged from 1,400
only detail pertaining to the well parameters psi (96.5·105 Pa) to 1,800 psi (124·105 Pa)..
is the minimum internal yield point (MIYP) Mineral Management Service (MMS) granted
of the production casing (6,900 psi). The case the renewal with a diagnostic monitoring
history concludes by stating that “It is believed program in place to periodically bleed down
that the production casing became pressurized the pressure to determine the rate of pressure
through tubing or packer leaks. Failure of the buildup. About six months later, the SCP
production casing led to pressure on the outer began fluctuating and bubbles were observed
strings through which the blowout occurred.” below the platform. The underground blowout
160
was confirmed in one of the wells that had from about 700 psi (48·105 Pa). The flow path
been sidetracked during drilling operations was thought to be from the production casing
because of a stuck drill string. The foundation of one well, into a shallow water sand, and up
below one of the platform legs eroded, and the surface casing/conductor casing annulus.
the platform began to shift and settle. This A number of wells had to be abandoned and
platform leg failed below the mudline. All replacement wells drilled as a result of this
of the wells on the platform were temporarily problem.
plugged, and work proceeded on repairing the
platform and killing the underground blowout. Discussion
A relief well was needed to kill the blowout.
This work was eventually successful, with Case 3 is not clearly relevant to the effect
about 250,000 cubic yards (191,150 m3) of of migration from well’s deeper section the
fill sand being needed to fill the crater around incident of SCP was limited to the surface
the platform leg. The wells were returned to casing/conductor annulus, and the cause-effect
production after about two years of blowout analysis is not fairly clear from the reported
control and remediation work. Holes in the history.
production tubing at and below about 1500 ft
(457.2 m) were found during the remediation Case 4
work. The next two outer casing strings had
also failed in the vicinity of the tubing leak. Soon after the well was completed and put
on production, the operator reported SCP on
Discussion the intermediate casing of 4,600 psi (317·105
Pa), which was about 46% of the minimum
Case 2 describes a well with an underground internal yield point and requested permission
blowout which eventually caused platform to continue production. Initially, it was thought
settling at the mudline. Holes in the tubing that the casing pressure could have been due
were discovered at 1500 ft. Once again, as in to thermal expansion. Eighteen months later,
case 1, the cause and effect sequence is not work was done on the well to determine why
clear from the data presented. the production rates were lower than expected.
Temperature and Thermal Decay Time (TDT)
Case 3 logs were run and a bottom hole pressure
(BHP) survey was made. It was determined
About four years after the well was drilled, that an underground blowout was in progress
the well began to flow mud, gas, and water through holes in the tubing, production casing,
from the annular space between the surface and intermediate casing. Flow was exiting
casing and the conductor casing. Some of the into salt water sand below the surface cas-
wells had SCP on the production casing. All ing. About two months were required to kill
of the six wells within the leg of the platform the underground blowout, and the well was
containing the flowing well were killed with plugged and abandoned. Some damage was
mud. It was noted that the flow stopped when done to the platform foundation, and some
the SCP on an adjacent well was bled down settlement of the platform occurred.
161
Discussion control of wells. MMS has interpreted 30

CFR 250.517 to mean that no SCP is to be
It was believed that the primary (tubing- maintained on any annulus of an OCS well.
casing) annulus played important role in this However, with thousands of wells affected in
case. The cause of the SCP was assumed to the GOM, immediate elimination of all SCP
be thermal pressure buildup. Again, it is not was impractical. Thus, MMS has developed a
clear what the pressure on the primary annulus step-wise strategy to remove SCP in wells that
was when the intermediate casing recorded represent the greatest hazard, and establish a
4,600 psi. Thermal pressure buildup effects tiered-monitoring system for the remaining
are felt also in the primary annulus. However, wells, while working towards elimination of
the primary annulus pressure was not reported the problem. The strategy has been reflected
to be considered in analysis of this case his- in Letters to Lessees (LTL) and Notices to
tory. Based on what eventually happened, this Lessees (NTL) on August 5, 1991 and Janu-
case seems to demonstrate wrong diagnosis, ary 13, 1994, and in the draft NTL published
since an underground blowout was the cause November 9, 2001.
of the problem. Regulations of MMS in the Gulf of Mexico
The reported case histories demonstrate require that an operator may continue produc-
a very important point that SCP could have tion (i.e. become “self-approved”) if:
(and has had) disastrous consequences if it is
poorly diagnosed or managed. They empha- • Casing pressure remains at less than
size the issue of SCP as a situation that must 20% of internal yield rating of casing;
be addressed by regulatory authorities and and
operators alike. The most important conclu- • Casing pressure bleeds to zero during
sions from the LSU report are: diagnostic tests.
• There is a large incidence of sustained If casing pressures are greater than 20%
casing pressure in one or more annuli of internal yield, a departure from the MMS
in GOM wells, regulations may be applied for. The granting
• If poorly managed, SCP has the poten- of a departure allows the well to continue
tial for dangerous consequences. producing without elimination of SCP.
Normally, departures are granted for pro-
ducing wells with casing pressures that bleed
REGULATORY CONTROL AND to zero and demonstrate a relatively slow sub-
INDUSTRY STANDARDS FOR SCP sequent 24-hour build-up rate. (However, for
wells that have been temporarily abandoned or
In the US, Mineral Management Service has permanently abandoned MMS requires that all
systematically streamlined and tightened casing pressures remain at zero which means
technical requirements for operators of wells elimination of SCP is mandatory.) To date, the
with casing pressure. The principal require- LTL’s have permitted departure from manda-
ment derives from the US Code of Federal tory elimination of casing pressure specified
Regulations 30 CFR 250.517 (2010) that by 30 CFR 250.517 for thousands of wells with
addresses tubing and wellhead equipment small or non-persistent casing pressures. In
with intent to achieve and maintain pressure 2000, for example, the MMS processed 632
162
requests (of 672 total received) of which 455 be taken when SCP occurs (API RP-90, 2006).
(72%) received the departure status (238 wells The RP objective is to summarize and stan-
qualified for self-approved departure and 217 dardize the consensus industry knowledge
wells were granted departure) (Bourgoyne et for dealing with the SCP problem in a set of
al., 1999). performance-based procedures. Moreover,
However, the proposed Notice to Lessees of as the development was supported by MMS,
November 9, 2001 would further reduced op- it is expected that the RP will be ultimately
erator eligibility for being granted a departure. incorporated in the MMS regulations.
It introduced one-year fixed-term departures
for some producing wells, eliminates depar- Evaluation of Wells with SCP
tures for non-producing wells, and requires
operators to eliminate SCP on temporarily Regulators require that all casing head pres-
abandoned wells. Also, the proposed regu- sures, excluding drive or structural casing,
lation requires operators to document their must be reported to the agency that, presently
plans for SCP removal thus making operators for the GOM – is Bureau of Safety and Envi-
actively responsible and prepared for future ronmental Enforcement (BSEE). Diagnostic
removal of SCP in all wells. In conclusion, tests are required on a well when sustained
there is an undeniable trend in the MMS regu- pressure is first discovered on one or more
latory strategy to require remedial treatments casing strings among other data, the diagnostic
of SCP rather than tolerate the SCP problem. test records must contain:
Operators are stakeholders in the SCP
problem since they are being affected by the • Identification of the casing annulus;
potential impacts of SCP on personnel and fa- • SCP value and initial pressures on tub-
cility safety, and loss of reserves, as well as the ing and all other casing strings at be-
regulatory strategy of MMS. The petroleum ginning of test;
industry is trying to preserve productivity of • Pressure bleed-down and pressure
wells with SCP and comply with regulatory buildup charts showing time required
requirements while controlling operational to bleed pressure down to zero and the
costs. The industry has accumulated consider- return pressure recorded for 24-hour
able experience in monitoring and diagnosing period.
SCP. It has improved cementing technology
to prevent SCP. Also, it has developed several The pressure bleed-down and build-up
new techniques for control and removal of SCP. charts or tables should identify and record
There is a need, therefore, to combine all this pressures on strings not being bled as well as
experience in a systematic set of guidelines. the casing string being bled to detect possible
In response to the proposed NTL of communication between annuli.
November 9, 2001, the petroleum indus- Monitoring of casing head pressure (Pcsg) is
try, through American Petroleum Institute different in fixed-platform versus subsea wells.
(API), and Offshore Operators Committee For fixed platform wells, each non-structural
(OOC) submitted comments and proposed an casing string is equipped with gauge and the
industry-developed Recommended Practice pressure in each annulus can be monitored
(RP) on SCP. This new API RP 90, published monthly from taps or flanges installed directly
in August 2006, addresses the monitoring, on the wellhead. For subsea wells, pressure
diagnostics, and remedial actions that should in the innermost tubing-casing annulus can
163
be monitored. However, other annuli are hy- needle valve, followed by a 24 hour shut-in
draulically isolated after the casing strings period. Based on the outcome, the environ-
have been landed in the wellhead. Thus it is mental risk is categorized as none, small or
a technical challenge to monitor the pressures high. If the pressure cannot be bled off within
in subsea well-heads. 24 hours, the risk is considered high. Else if it
In the USA the BSEE regulations require is bled to zero but builds back up when shut
that casing pressure in the fixed platform wells in, the risk is considered small. If no build
must be monitored on a regular basis. A bleed- up is observed, the (Pcsg) is not considered
down/ build-up (B-B) test must be performed due SCP constituting no risk. The three cases
if (Pcsg) is greater than 100 psig (6.9·105 Pa) are shown on a qualitative B-B test chart in
(MMS 30 CFR Part 250). In Canada, Energy Figure 4.
and Utilities Board (EUB) regulates SCP us- The API Recommended Practice 90 iden-
ing the flowing bleed-down pressure and the tifies risk of SCP based on the magnitude of
increase of (Pcsg) during the shut-in period (Pcsg) and its comparison with the maximum
(BCO&GC, 2008). If flowing pressure is allowable well-head operating pressure (MA-
greater than 14·105 Pa, or increases more than WOP) (API RP 90). If any (Pcsg) is greater
42 psig (2.9·105 Pa) during test shut in period, than 100 psig (6.9·105 Pa) or exceeds the cas-
the SCP is considered to constitute high risk. ing’s minimum internal yield pressure
In Norway, NORSOK Standard D-010 Well (MIYP), a B-B test must be performed. A
Integrity in Drilling and Well Operations flowchart demonstrating the risk-rating logic
(NORSOK, 2004) regulates SCP using an is shown in Figure 5.
arbitrary sub-surface failure criterion. If (Pcsg) The logic of B-B test analysis can be sum-
is greater than 70·105 Pa for any intermediate marized as follows:
casing, SCP is considered high risk.
The B-B test is performed by bleeding off 1. If the pressure bleeds to zero psig and
the wellhead pressure through a one-half inch doesn’t build back up within 24 consecu-
Figure 4. Possible outcomes from Bleed-down/Buildup (B-B) test
164
Figure 5. Current evaluation of SCP (Kinik, 2012)
tive hours, then the annulus in question the pressure not building to its original
does not have SCP. The pressure source value within 24 consecutive hours may
was either thermal in origin or resulted include the following:
from a leak of very low rate. a. The leak rate is very small.
2. If the pressure bleeds to zero through a b. There is a large gas cap at the top
1/2-in. (12.7 mm) needle valve at a low of the annulus.
differential pressure and builds back up c. A portion of the original pressure
to original pressure within 24 consecutive was caused by thermal effects.
hours, then the annulus in question has d. The initial pressure build-up after
a small leak. The leak rate is considered the bleed-down has a full column
acceptable and the barriers for pressure of fluid, and higher pressure will
containment are considered adequate. develop later as small gas bubbles
This well will need to be monitored for slowly migrate to the top of the
changing conditions. An increase in the annulus.
annulus pressure is not necessarily an 4. If the pressure does not bleed to zero
indication of an increase in leak rate. psig within 24 cumulative hours through
This annulus will need to be re-evaluated a 1/2-in. needle valve, then the barrier to
periodically. pressure containment may have partially
3. If the pressure bleeds to zero psig and failed and, in some cases, the leak rate
builds back up to a lower pressure within may be unacceptable. This condition may
24 consecutive hours, then the annulus in indicate that the leak rate is greater than
question has a small leak. This assumes what may pass through the orifice of the
that the well is able to bleed to zero psig 1/2-in. needle valve at a low differential
through a 1/2-in. needle valve at a low pressure.
differential pressure. The reasons for
165
a. If this condition is on the “A” annu- the pipe body of the next outer casing, or 75%
lus, further investigation is needed of collapse rating of the inner tubular pipe
to determine the leak path and leak body, whichever is smaller. For the outermost
source. Repair plans may also need casing, MAWOP is the lesser value of 30%
to be developed. of MIYP of the pipe body for the casing or
b. If this condition exists on the outer production riser being evaluated or 75% of
annuli, it is recognized that options inner tubular pipe body collapse rating. The
for correction are very limited. analysis based on MAWOP addresses only risk
of casing head failure without considering its
Wells with annular pressure that do not consequences – emissions to the atmosphere.
bleed to zero psig should be evaluated further When the well’s external integrity fails,
on a case-by-case basis. emissions of hazardous substances and cri-
It is important to note that SCP may develop teria pollutants into the ambient air are dif-
in time and, if not remediated, may not remain ficult to quantify without special monitoring
constant. It may increase over time as a result equipment. A source test is the most accurate
of factors such as deterioration of the cement way to measure the type and quantity of the
sheath, damage to primary cement caused by emission, which requires proper sampling,
mechanical shock impacts during tripping, equipment and training of the personnel
thermal cracking, or dissolution of cement (Wilson & Frederick, 1999). Methods have
by acidic formation brines. Several studies been published to calculate or estimate the
have reported cases of the problem-free wells emission rates for specific equipment and
developing sustained casing pressure over processes. However, there is no quantitative
time (Xu, 2002). methodology for possible air emissions from
wells with SCP. Such a procedure has been
recently developed using the LSU model and
RISK OF AIR POLLUTION DUE method. Calculation of emission rates required
SCP – MAXIMUM EMISSION RATE a correct modeling of uncontrolled gas flow
in the well annulus open to the atmosphere
Sustained casing pressure brings about a risk (Kinik & Wojtanowicz, 2011).
of well integrity loss resulting in emissions In a well with sustained casing pressure
to the environment (Kinik & Wojtanowicz, (SCP), the wellhead pressure (Pcsg) results
2011, and Kinik, 2012). Currently, the risk from the system equilibrium. As the gas from
is qualified by the value of annular surface the source formation is charged into the ce-
pressure that may cause failure of casing ment, accumulation of the gas above the mud
head. The qualification is made by compar- column brings the system to the equilibrium
ing casing pressure with maximum available (Bourgoyne et al., 1999). A schematic of
wellhead operating pressure (MAWOP) to vertical well with (Pcsg) is shown in Figure 6.
size the problem and decide on the course of When the well’s annulus is In equilibrium,
further action (MMS 30 CFR Part 250, 2010 formation pressure (Pf) is balanced with (Pcsg),
and API RP 90, 2006). The value of MAWOP hydrostatic pressure created by the mud col-
is set arbitrarily by considering the collapse umn (Phyd) and hydrostatic pressure of the
failure of the inner tubular and burst failure of fluids inside the cement leak. If the cement
the outer tubular. The MAWOP value equals leak is filled with gas, the pressure balance
either 50% of MIYP of the pipe body for the or pressure at the top of cement (PTOC) can be
casing being evaluated, or 80% of MIYP of simplified as (Xu, 2002),
166
Pf ≅ PTOC = Pcsg + Phyd (1) ∆Ptotal = ∆Pcement + ∆Pmud + ∆Pgas (3)
In case of the casing well-head failure, and,

Pcsg =0, i.e. an instant pressure imbalance is
formed, which is the driving force for the gas ΔPcement - frictional pressure loss through the
flow. The resultant flow rate in such case de- cement sheath,
pends on the total pressure drop downstream
from the gas source as, ΔPhyd - mud column hydrostatic pressure, and
q gas = f (Pf − ∆Ptotal ) (2) ΔPgas - frictional pressure loss through the
gas column.
where,
Figure 6. Vertical well with equilibrium sustained casing pressure
167
In Equation 3 each term is a complex func- mathematical modeling approach and input
tion of the model parameters controlling the data obtained from the B-B test analysis (Xu
flow mechanism. Therefore, calculation of and Wojtanowicz,2001; Wojtanowicz et al,
the maximum gas rate requires mathematical 2000).
definition of each component and coupling the The Cement Top Inflow Performance
components at the cement top using Nodal (CTIP) represents gas flow in the cement
analysis. sheath and gas source formation. It depends
The well flow system comprises four nodes solely on cement leak size and the reservoir
shown in Figure 6: gas formation, cement, pressure of gas bearing formation. Gas well
mud, and well-head. Graphical representation testing theory provides mathematical descrip-
of the flow system performance is presented tion of flow from the formation to the top of
in Figure 7. cement. The flow is a combination of radial
Performance of the overall flow system and linear flow in series. In the LSU model,
can be expressed as two nodes coupled at the the reservoir pressure (Pf) is assumed constant.
cement top. The bottom node is that the for- The Cement Top Outflow Performance
mation responses to pressure drop by deliver- (CTOP) represents gas migration upwards
ing flow, and the upper node is that the pres- from the cement top through the mud column
sure drop from the top of cement to the and the liquid-free annulus above free level
atmosphere. The two nodes represent flow in of liquid. (When liquid unloading occurs, at
the cement sheath and gas migration in a high gas rates a narrow annulus and a liquid-
stagnant mud column, respectively. The ap- gas mixture with higher average density could
proach is similar to the widely accepted IPR- result in a significant pressure gradient that
TPR well performance analysis in gas well would add to the flowing pressures at the top
production design (Lee & Wattenbarger, of cement (TOC). At low gas rates, however,
1996). However, the complexity added by the contribution of the pressure drop due to fric-
flow in mud column requires a different tions above mud level become insignificant.
Figure 7. System performance of SCP well
168
Additional restriction to flow is the failed stabilize at various rates as shown by the points
well-head. The restriction behavior of this A, B and C in Figure 7.
component depends on the case by case well- More complexity is added by the liquid
head failure incident, thus in this study the unloading phenomenon. Pressure differential
well-head is assumed to form no restriction between the reservoir pressure and PTOC
to flow. determines the flow rate in the cement sheath.
Mathematically, the maximum steady-state Hydrostatic pressure created by the stagnant
gas flow rate (qg) is the common solution at mud column controls PTOC. As more gas is
the cement top. Graphically, the solution is released from the TOC into the mud column,
the intercept of the CTIP and CTOP curves. the mud volume expands and if its length ex-
Top cement inflow performance and cement ceeds the distance to the surface, some liquid
top outflow performance curves are shown get permanently removed at the top casing
in Figure 7. head and the annulus gets “unloaded” that, in
A Maximum Emission Rate (MER) model turn, further reduces pressure at the cement
and software, developed at Louisiana State top, PTOC, and the gas flow rate. Thus, liquid
University (LSU), provides numerical and unloading may set out an irreversible domino
graphical solutions for the two concurrent effect resulting in maximum gas rate corre-
mechanisms with a coupling criterion. The sponding to the absolute open flow potential
coupling criterion is the common value of of the system, AOF.
pressure at the top of cement (PTOC). The Other possible scenarios are as follows. If
graphical output gives superimposed plots the mud was not trapping any gas, and allow-
of the CTIP and CTOP relationships. The ing the gas bubbles to migrate to the top with
numerical output gives a single convergence zero gas cutting, the mud column would not
value of the equilibrium gas rate resulting from expand. With no expansion and unloading,
an iterative solution of the equation, (qgas) would be defined at point A in Figure
7. Hence, mud rheology becomes the critical
PCTIP (q g ) − PCTOP (q g ) = 0 (4) parameter since gas trapping is primarily con-
trolled by the residence time of the gas in the
mud. Gas residence time is a direct function
where, (PCTIP) and (PCTOP) are the system in- of gas rise velocity in mud.
flow and outflow performance relationships, If gas trapping occurs, certain volume of
respectively. annular fluid (mud) would be “ unloaded”
There are several possible scenarios of from the annulus before the system comes
gas flow and emissions for this annular flow to a steady state gas flow, which yields the
system depending on the well configuration, equilibrium rate shown at point B. Depend-
condition of the mud and the cement sheath. ing upon the leak size and formation pres-
For example, an expansion of the mud volume sure, complete unloading may happen - the
due gas cutting may trigger liquid unloading worst case scenario. In such a case, the gas
from the annulus causing reduction in PTOC. emission rate, (qgas), indicated by point C, is
Thus, for different scenarios the gas flow may at maximum.
169
SELF-PLUGGING POTENTIAL increase until the throats of the passage are

OF SCP WELLS blocked and the gas flow ceases. The process
may take some time and involve cycles of
From the regulatory standpoint, occurrence plugging and unplugging some throats until
of SCP disqualifies wells for safe operation. the column of condensate liquid develops
In principle, wells with large SCP cannot be sufficient hydrostatic and capillary pressure
produced and the wells with any SCP value to stop the flow.
cannot be terminated (Plugged and Aban- Obviously, the self-plugging effect is only
doned, P&A) without remedial operations. applicable to SCP wells with a wet/condensate
At present, the SCP removal is either capital gas source as the hydrostatic pressure bal-
intensive, as it requires well’s workover with ance of liquid phase in the cement channel
a rig, or less expensive but little reliable with is essential for complete plugging. Natural
rig-less techniques such as CARS or Bleed- hydrocarbon fluids are classified as oil, wet
and-Lube. However, gas migration in some gas and dry gas by drawing critical tempera-
wells may cease with little intervention when tures and pressures line on the phase envelope,
the migrating gas is wet and flow channels shown in Figure 9. Condensate gas exists for
in the cement small. Particularly, for the gas temperatures above critical point temperature
condensate wells gas migration can be stopped and below the maximum dew temperature
due the self-plugging effect. point. Outside the envelope, there is no liq-
The effect of plugging off the gas migration uid phase. Inside the envelope, the isolines
derives from the analogy between the perme- represent different concentrations of gas in
ability damage around gas wells and the leak the mixture of gas and condensate. Thus, gas
conductivity “damage” in the cemented an- changes into liquid (condensate oil) as pres-
nular (Duan & Wojtanowicz., 2005). The self- sure reduces. This is a reverse phenomenon
plugging effect should work in wells where comparing to normally increasing of the gas
SCP sources are the wet-gas or condensate phase as pressure decreases. It is called “ret-
gas formations. When the wellhead pressure rograde gas condensation”. A rich condensate
drops after opening the casing head needle gas may retrograde more liquid with heavier
valve, the pressure in the cement channel components than poor gas.
may decrease below dew point. Hence, con- The amount of condensate liquid depends
densate liquid would fill-up the channel and on gas composition, shape of the envelope
possibly stop the gas flow, as shown in Figure (gas behavior) and flow conditions. In gen-
8. This outcome is called “self-plugging” by eral, the richer the condensate gas is, the
condensate liquid. greater the retrograde liquid saturation be-
comes. Also, the volume of condensate is
Conditions for Self-Plugging proportional to cumulative volume of gas
flow. The latter is important for this method
After pressure in the cement channel drops since the filling -up of cement channel with
below the dew point, condensation begins. condensate liquid may require keeping the
The condensate liquid may initially form a casing head open to atmosphere for some
film around the inside passage. The retro- time.
grade liquid saturation in tiny channels will
170
Figure 8. Wellbore sketch of cement leak plugged with condensate liquid
As shown in Figure 8, after the casing head 9, the cement section BM-PT100 represents
opens to atmosphere, pressure in cement drops, the two-phase column of gas and condensate.
the gas begins to flow, and condensation Note that point PT100 represents mathemati-
begins. As the flow continues a condensate cally the intercept of the annular hydrostatic
liquid film lines up the flow channels and pressure and the phase envelope contour plots.
builds up the hydrostatic pressure while the In addition, the intercept is located at depth
gas may still flow in the channels. In Figure of the gas-condensate liquid contact. Ana-
171
lytically the pressure at the intercept point zPT100 = z(TPT100), from the T=T(z) correlation
p100 is a solution to equation, – depth of intercept point at phase envelope
p100 (T ) = pa (T ) (5) When the well stops flowing, the point of

intercept corresponding to the bottom of the
condensation zone moves to its final (equi-
where,
librium) position – PT100. Note that Equation
(6) gives the value of hydrostatic pressure
p100 (T) - gas phase envelope contour plot at point PT100’ when the well is still flowing
gas and the condensate liquid has already
pa (T) - plot of annular hydrostatic pressure filled up some channels in the well cement.
in flowing well. The flow will stop when capillary pressure
component adds to the hydrostatic pressure
The solution is, and brings the system to equilibrium. For the
equilibrium conditions, pressure at the casing
dp  dp 
pPT 100 = pCSH ' +   ∗ z BM ' +   ∗ (z PT 100 − z BM ) head (pCSH’’), becomes zero. The intercept point
 dz   dz 
m l pressure for the plugged well is
(6)
where, dp  dp 
pPT 100 =   ∗ z BM +   ∗ (z PT 100'' − z BM )
 dz   dz 
m l
(7)
Figure 9. Well annular pressure distribution for casing head closed (CSH) and opened (CSH’) super-
imposed over gas phase envelope (Duan & Wojtanowicz, 2005)
172
It is obvious that computation of Equations and block the gas flow. Hence, capillary pres-
(6) and (7) can only be performed by trial- sure plays an important role in stopping the
and-error using a gas phase envelope software. gas migration. As the cement voids surface is
hydrophilic, droplets of condensate entering
Capillary Pressure internal cement pores and throats are resisted.
Thus, capillary pressure would oppose the
Capillary pressure develops when condensate gas flow.
liquid accumulates in cracks or channels of the
annular cement. Geometry of these conduits Pressure Balance Calculation
is complex and has been simplified in Figure
10. Conductivity of the cement leak may be After gas condensation in the well cement
represented by a cluster of tiny sinuous tubes begins and the gas flow continues, hydrostatic
(matrix model) or a microannulus. pressure is gradually developed in the growing
For a cluster of tubes having diameter dc, condensate liquid column. The system comes
capillary pressure is, to equilibrium when the gas source formation
pressure is balanced by the hydrostatic and
4σ cos (θ ) capillary pressures as
pc = (8)
dc
dp  dp 
pGS =   ∗ z BM +  
dz  dz 
For a microannulus, having a slot size of m
dp 
l
y, shown in Figure 10, capillary pressure is, ∗ (z PT 100 '' − z BM ) +   (10)
 dz 
g
1 ∗ (zGS − zGT ) + pc

pc = 2σ cos (θ )   (9)
 y 
where, (dp/dz)m, (dp/dz)l, and (dp/dz)g are
After condensation, some liquid drops may pressure gradients of mud, condensate liquid
lump at narrow spots in the cement channels and gas, respectively.
Figure 10. Cement leak models: A – microannulus, B – matrix
173
Most of the data in Equation (10) is read- et al.’s critical rate. The velocity of migrating
ily available from the well/cementing records gas proved to be much smaller than critical.
and a laboratory analysis of the gas and con- The required Input data is listed in Table
densate liquid. However, two pieces of the 1A in the Appendix. The table also shows
data capillary pressure, pc, and the depth of possible sources of input data: SCP testing,
gas condensation (zBC), need to be discussed. well records and gas measurements. At first,
Analysis of Figure 10 indicates that Equation capillary pressure is computed from the es-
(10) specifies minimum value of capillary timated channel size based on the leak con-
pressure (pc), needed to reach pressure equi- ductivity (Ka), from the B_B test. Since the
librium and stop the gas flow. As evidenced size of sinuous tubes in the leak matrix model
by Equations (6) and (8), an estimation of the is unknown, their number (N), is computed
cement leak size is needed to determine the from the matrix model (see Appendix) and
capillary pressure. Such an estimate could be their size is given as,
made from the analysis of SCP bleed-down
and build-up (B_B) test. An improvement to A2
the current testing procedures is needed to dc = 774.6 *
(π / 2 + 3 ) * q g
provide the data (Xu & Wojtanowicz, 2001; (11)
XU, 2002). C * (pGS − pBM )
*
µ * (zGS − z BM ) * T c
Assessment of Well’s Self-Plugging
Potential with Condensate
For micro-annulus model, the gap size is,
Assessment of the self-plugging process
involves several steps and is based on the
2
π * Doi − (π * Doi ) − 128π * K a / A
y = (12)
following assumptions: 2*π
1. Gas phase envelope is constant and not By substituting (11) to (8) and (12) to (9)
affected by the process. we derive formulas for capillary pressure in
2. The liquid condensate in cement channel the cement leak represented either by micro-
becomes a continuous phase that gener- tubes (matrix) or micro-annulus, respectively.
ates hydraulic pressure. If the value of capillary pressure satisfies
3. Frictional measure loss of flowing gas Equation (10), the SCP well has a potential for
is neglected. self-plugging. The potential for self-plugging
4. Flow rate of gas during liquid loading requires that capillary pressure develops at the
of the cement leak is constant. bottom of the liquid-loaded section of cement-
5. There is no unloading of liquid phase by point “BC” and its value is large enough to
flowing gas in the channels due to very reach point “GT”.
low gas velocity. A SCP well with plugging potential may
still continue flowing if capillary pressure
The last assumption was verified by com- develops in the upper section of cement, or
paring estimated gas velocities in the leaking the actual leak geometry deviates from the
cement with those corresponding to the Turner model. Thus, it is important to determine
174
the maximum time of the well flow testing. Example of Self–Plugging

If the flow does not cease by this time, the Assessment
SCP could not be removed with this method.
It happens that the best estimate of this time is According to the U.S. Energy Information
the cement leak fill-up time calculated together Administration (EIA), about 20% wells in
with the flow rate as follows. the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) were producing
Volume of condensate liquid needed to condensate gas in 2003 (EIA). Thus, we may
fill up the cement flow passage is computed roughly assume that 20% of wells with ‘SCP”
using estimated capacity of the passages. For in GOM will be affected by wet gas, which
the micro-tube model of leaking cement the makes this method potentially applicable to
capacity is, the area.
To demonstrate the method, properties of
vl = π * N * dc 2 * (z BC − z BM ) (13) a wet gas from another area are used here as
an example (Duan & Wojtanowicz, 2005).
The formation pressure is 3,650 psi, and the
Volume capacity of the cement micro-
formation temperature gradient is 2.5 F/100
annulus is
ft. Average reservoir temperature is 255 F.
The depth of condensate liquid was calculated
vl = π * y * (Doi − 0.5 * y ) * (z BC − z BM ) (14) based on Equation (7).
In this well, the fill-up volume is 37.2 cu
As the gas-to-liquid ratio of wet gas is very ft and the gas migration channels are small
large, a considerable amount of gas should enough to generate high capillary pressure
pass through the cement leak to generate the value, 757 psi, to balance the formation pres-
fill-up condensate liquid. The values can be sure (see Appendix).
determined from the phase envelope section The gas flow plugging effect is evaluated
BM-PT100. The gas volume is using the phase envelope graph in Figure 11.
Similar to Figure 9, the plot in Figure11 in-
p dicates capillary pressure value large enough
Ts
vg = vl * * c
*f (15) to balance gas formation pressure (section
Tc ps PT100-GT). The plot also shows the continuity
of the pressure line (lower plot) from the gas
The rate of gas flow during liquid loading formation (GS) to the casing head (CSH”)
of the cement leak is, open to atmospheric pressure.
The results in Table 1A reveal that bleed-
Ka (pGS 2 − pBM 2 ) ing gas from the casing head would give the
q g = 0.11924 * * (16) emission rate (if the gas is not diverted) of
Tw * µg zGS − z BM
about 272 scf/d and the plugging off the ce-
ment leak should be completed in 23 days. It
The fill-up time estimate is, is also expected that the well should stop
flowing at this time. If not, the casing head
tl = vg / q g (17) should be closed and other methods considered
for SCP removal.
175
Figure 11. Example of SCP well self-plugging with condensate; pBC=pGT (Duan & Wojtanowicz, 2005)
Also, if the flow cannot be diverted but be “loaded” with condensates liquid from
just released and flared, the total volume of the flowing gas. It also estimates the value
gas 6.2 Mscf, is too small to cause serious air of capillary pressure opposing the gas flow.
pollution problem. Capillary pressure is essential for conden-
sate plug-over but it can only be estimated
Discussion of Self- from the value of hydraulic conductivity of
Plugging Potential leaking cement. Hydraulic conductivity (and
other data needed for this method) could be
The theoretical study shows physical merit computed from SCP bleed-off/build up test-
of SCP well self plugging and demonstrates ing. Present testing procedures, however, do
feasibility of new method for self-plugging not quantify the data and need to be improved.
potential evaluation. Wells with SCP prob- Since the self-plugging potential is merely
lem resulting from wet gas migration may be an estimate, the promising well needs to be
sealed-off with gas condensate liquid if their tested by continuous bleeding enough gas that
casing head remains open for a sufficient cement is loaded up with condensate liquid,
time period. The proposed technique is very which may (or not) result in cessation of flow
cheap and requires no mechanical interven- and removal of SCP. The bleeding time can
tion in the well. be estimated using the proposed method.
A simple method, developed in this work, Moreover, the study also demonstrates that
evaluates well’s potential for plug-over based opening casing head to gas flow may result
on static balance of pressure in the well an- in a very small flow rate and the total volume
nulus opened to atmospheric pressure of the of gas released during the flow test may be
casing head. The method determines length also small resulting in minimal air pollution.
of the top section of well cement that would
176
Nomenclature pS = surface pressure, psi

SCP = sustained casing pressure, psi
A = cross-sectional area of annulus, in2 PT100 = intercept point at phase envelope
Ka = annular conductivity, md-in2 ql = condensate flow rate, ft3/d
BC = bottom of condensate Q = flow rate, ft3/d
BM = mud column bottom – initial r = radius of a tube, m
BM’ = mud column bottom – final r1 = radius of curvature of o/g meniscus, m
C = coefficient for low gas flow in pipe, ft/s T = average temperature, F
CSH = casing head – initial TS = surface temperature, K
CSH’ = casing head – final Tw = average well temperature, F
dc = pore diameter, m tl = fill-up time, days
Doi = inside diameter of outer casing, in Tc = average cement temperature, K
Dio = outside diameter of inner casing, in yl = condensate volume, scf
f = average gas to condensate ratio, v/v yg = total gas volume for cement leak fill-
GS = gas source up, scf
GT = gas top z = depth, ft
µg = gas viscosity, cp γg = gas gravity
N = number of micro-tubes in matrix model σ = surface tension, dynes/cm
p = pressure, psi θ = contact angle, degree
pc = capillary pressure, psi
pc = average pressure in cement leak, psi
177
REFERENCES Lee, J. W., & Wattenbarger, R. A. (1996). Gas

reservoir engineering. Richardson, TX: SPE.
API RP 90. (2006). Annular casing pressure
management for offshore wells. Washington, Michel, C. M. (1991). Methods of detect-
DC: American Petroleum Institute. ing and locating tubing and packer leaks in
the Western operating area of Prudhoe Bay
Attard, M. (1991). The occurrence of annulus field. Paper presented at the 1991 Production
pressures in the North West Hutton Field: Operations Symposium. Oklahoma City, OK.
Problems and solutions. Paper presented at the
Offshore Europe Conference. Aberdeen, UK. MMS 30 CFR Part 250. (2010). Annular cas-
ing pressure management for offshore wells,
BCO&GC. (2008). Surface casing vent flow/ code of federal regulations, title 30, chapter
gas migration testing, reporting and repair ii, minerals management service. Washington,
requirements. Vancouver, Canada: British DC: United States Dpt. of Interior.
Columbia Oil and Gas Commission.
NORSOK Standard D-010. (2004). Well integ-
Bourgoyne, A. T., Jr., Scott, S. L., & Manows- rity in drilling and well operations. Lysaker,
ki, W. (1999). A review of sustained casing Norway: Standards Norway.
pressure occurring on the OCS. Retrieved
from ftp://www.mms.gov/TubingStudy/ Shoham, O. (2006). Mechanistic modeling of
gas-liquid two-phase flow in pipes. Richard-
Bourgoyne, A. T., Jr., Scott, S. L., & Regg, son, TX: Technology & Engineering, Society
J. B. (1999). Sustained casing pressure in of Petroleum Engineers.
offshore producing wells. Paper presented
at the Offshore Technology Conference. Wilson, M. J., & Frederick, J. D. (Eds.). (1999).
Houston, TX. Environmental engineering for exploration
and production activities. Richardson, TX:
Duan, S., & Wojtanowicz, A. K. (2005). Sur- Society of Petroleum Engineers.
face induced removal of sustained casinghead
pressure by sealing the well’s leaking cement Wojtanowicz, A. K., Nishikawa, S., & Xu,
with condensate from flowing gas. Paper pre- R. (2000). Diagnosis and remediation of
sented at the Petroleum Society’s 6th Canadian sustained casing pressure in wells. Retrieved
International Petroleum Conference (56th from http://www.bsee.gov/
Annual Technical Meeting). Calgary, Canada. Xu, R. (2002). Analysis of diagnostic testing
Joint Industry Project Report (JIP). (2001). of sustained casing pressure in wells. (PhD
Best practices for prevention and management Dissertation). Louisiana State University,
of sustained casing pressure. Houston, TX: Baton Rouge, LA.
Stress Engineering Services, Inc. Xu, R., & Wojtanowicz, A. K. (2001). Diagno-
Kinik, K. (2012). Risk of well integrity fail- sis of sustained casing pressure from bleed-off/
ure due sustained casing pressure. (Master buildup testing patterns. Paper presented at
Thesis). Louisiana State University, Baton the SPE Production Operations Symposium.
Rouge, LA. Oklahoma City, OK.
Kinik, K., & Wojtanowicz, A. K. (2011).

Identifying environmental risk of sustained
casing pressure. Paper presented at the HSSE
Conference. Houston, TX.
178
APPENDIX
For the matrix model, assuming equal size of the micro-tubes, the number of the tubes is
A
N = 2
(A-1)
π d
( + 3) * c
2 4
For laminar gas flow in a vertical micro-tube with known pressure drop (pGS - pBM), we have,
qg 37500 * C * (pGS − pBM ) * dc 2

( 2
) = (A-2)
A*N µ * (zGS − z BM ) * T c
Substituting Equation (A-1) in (A-2)
qg 2 37500 * C * (pGS − pBM ) * dc 2

= (A-3)
A2 4 µ * (zGS − z BM ) * T c
( * 2 )2
(π / 2 + 3 ) dc
Diameter of a single micro-tube is,
A2 C * (pGS − pBM )
dc = 774.6 * * (A-4)
(π / 2 + 3 ) * q g µ * (zGS − z BM ) * T c
For gas flow in a micro-annulus, the conductivity is
y
Ka = A * (Doi − y ) * π * (A-5)
32
Solving (A-5) for size, y, gives
π * Doi − (π * Doi )2 − 128π * Ka / A

y= (A-6)
2*π
where,
π
A= (Doi 2 − Dio 2 )
4
179
Table 1A. Input and output data for example
180
181
Chapter 9
Risk Analysis in the Process
of Hydraulic Fracturing
Sonja Koščak Kolin

Marin Čikeš
ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on risk to the environment from hydraulic fracturing operations, starting
with transport of materials and ending when the well is routed to the production facilities. The
initial assumption for the fracturing risk analysis is that the well is new and was constructed
correctly so that all producible formations are securely isolated behind the barriers of casing
and competent cement. The justification for this assumption is that the vast majority of fractur-
ing is the first major stimulation in a well and occurs immediately after completing a new well.
problems that are real and worthy of the discussion to help define boundaries of the fracturing
risk (King, 2012).
INTRODUCTION gas development has raised questions about

the appropriate regulatory approach to ensure
While hydraulic fracturing is a well-developed that groundwater resources and surface water
technology that has been used for more than are protected (Arthur, 2011). Millions of fracs
60 years in petroleum engineering, its wide- have been pumped (SPE - Society of Petroleum
spread use for coal-bed natural gas and shale Engineers estimate 2.5 million fracs world-
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch009
Risk Analysis in the Process of Hydraulic Fracturing
wide). The technical literature on hydraulic formations is known to be effectively limited

fracturing is extensive, addressing nearly by barriers and fluid leakoff (loss of fluid to
every aspect of oil and gas development, with the rock). Fracture heights limited by these
over 550 papers in shale fracturing. The shale physical and active barriers will simply not
papers in the past several years alone are from reach into fresh water sands.
more over 70 universities, over a dozen state, Although the fracturing process is more
federal and international agencies and more than thousand meters away from the water
then a hundred energy and service companies table, methane is showing up in residential
(King, 2010; Arthur, 2009). water wells, but this contamination in water
However, recent exposure of the general wells is caused by other natural and manmade
public to this technology, particularly as prac- causes. Part of the reason is the natural oc-
ticed with large volume of water, has resulted currence with biogenic methane forming from
in considerable fear and misunderstanding shallow decay of organic materials and natural
of what is occurring downhole. Fortunately, seeps of thermogenic methane (gas formed
the industry has been studied the problem of deep in the earth) that have been coming to
fracture height growth for several decades and the surface for millions of years, particularly
has been monitoring fractures with tiltmeters in regions with shale and coal outcrops or
for two decades and with microseismics for shallow formations that share the water table
over one decade. All data of investigation with fresh water wells.
has shown that hydraulic fracturing in typical However, part of the increasing methane
reservoirs is not threat to fracture into and content in water well may be coming from
contaminate or otherwise disturb groundwa- near-by improperly constructed gas or oil
ter (Warpinski, 2011). In engineering terms, well. These older wells predate the invention
fracturing concerns a precise stimulation ac- of hydraulic fracturing and most predate any
tivity, limited to the fluid action in initiating significant well construction regulations.
and extending cracks in the rock; while, for Deeper formations are at higher pressures and
many concerned citizens, bloggers and envi- exposure of these zones without sufficient
ronmentalists, fracturing has come to represent cementing isolation will allow gas seepage
nearly every phase of the well development that will build up a higher pressure that was
cycle from drilling to production. customary at shallower depths. This type of
First, scale drawings of the distance from methane leak is usually low volume and is
the surface and near-surface fresh water sup- made possible by poor or incomplete cement-
plies (nearly all fresh water formations are ing practices. The incident can be noticed
within the first 300 meters from the surface) soon after drilling and can start before the
are needed to show the physical distance be- well is fractured.
tween the surface and the completion interval In a fracturing risk analysis, that is main
of interest (pay zone). focus of the chapter, any local conditions will
Fracture height, predicted by computer influence the conclusions. For regional or area
models and confirmed by microseismics studies the impact and the occurrence informa-
monitoring during fracturing, post-frac tracer tion, from traffic accidents to fractured well
flows, temperature logs and even by mine- incidents should be from the area, but wider
back experiments (Warpinski, 1985), show studies of other factors may be necessary for
most vertical effective fracture growth at 100 purposes of well population and incident re-
meters or less. Fracture height growth in most view. Estimating risk at both regional and area
182
levels allows identification of risk areas and bilities in the range of 0.5 to 20×10-3 μm2,
refinement of that risk through knowledge of while this gas shale may have permeabilities
local conditions. Different companies operat- of 0.000001 to over 0.0001×10-3 μm2. Hy-
ing in different areas of the country may use draulic fracture treatments in wells from
the same risk estimation approach but reach unconventional reservoirs are required to
different values in roads, well construction ensure economic production rates for a long
requirements, infrastructure, engineering period of time (Čikeš, 2000).
experience, local geology, regulations and
other factors.
The level of permeability in a rock hold- HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
ing oil and gas dictates whether the reservoir PROCESS
must be hydraulically fractured (Figure 1). At
lower permeabilities or where oil viscosity is Fracturing Design and Chemicals
high or reservoir pressure is low, the flow of
fluids toward the wellbore can be assisted by Fracturing design is normally made by com-
fracturing, which creates a flow path of much puter, specifying fracturing volume, rate
higher permeability. Stable fractures offer a and other factors to achieve goals of fracture
flow path with average permeability of 100 height, fracture width and fracture length or
to over 1000 times the permeability of the fracture complexity. Typical fracture geometry
formation (Gaskari, 2006). At lower perme- (height, hf, width, w, and length, L) is shown
abilities, such as shale, most wells will not on the Figure 2.
flow economic quantities of fluids without The goal is to design a fracture that will
extensive hydraulic fracturing. stay in the pay zone, develop the maximum
The oil and gas containing shale featured pay or producing formation contact and
are classified on the basis of the size of the achieve maximum flow of hydrocarbons and
very fine particles or grains that make up the minimum flow of produced water.
rock. They are actually very fine grained Transport and storage of fresh or salty
sandstones, often with similar mechanical fracturing water, chemicals and equipment
properties to the sandstones that comprise fall under the general heading of transport,
conventional gas and oil producing reservoirs. and along with well construction, have been
As shown in Figure 1, the difference is that identified as a potential source of pollution.
conventional sandstones may have permea- Chemical spill risk can be reduced by using
Figure 1. Permeability range of producing formations (King, 2012)
183
Figure 2. Fracture geometry, PKN (Perkins-Kern-Nordgren) model (Economides, 2000)
double wall containers, collision-proof totes reduced when non-toxic or even foodgrade
and/or use of dry additives. Surface storage additives replace traditional chemicals.
vessel leaks and spills can range from less than Mixing and pumping of the frac increases
a few liters during connections in fracturing risk of leaks and spills as stored fracturing
fluid lines to the very rare leak of a truck load fluid is pumped, first to the chemical addi-
(20 m3) or the highly unlikely leak of a full tion trailer and then the blender where sand
fracturing tank (80 m3) of water. is added, before going to the high pressure
Leak impact can be reduced by container pumps and down the well.
mats underneath pipe connections, portable Chemicals, or more precisely, the lack of
tank containment berms and tank monitoring disclosure of chemical identities, have prob-
to immediately spot leaks. Impact of fracturing ably received and deserved the most vitriolic
base fluid leaks is usually minor if the leak- attacks in the “anti-frac” literature. There are
ing fluid is fresh water, since most fracturing very few chemicals used in fracturing and defi-
chemicals are mixed into the fluid only as it nitely not the “hundreds of toxic chemicals”.
is pumped into the well. Safe transport, stor- Independent laboratory analysis of surface
age and handling of chemical concentrates water sources used for fracturing do show a
are major concerns. These risks are sharply variety of chemicals at trace concentrations be-
low EPA (Environmental Protection Agency)
184
limits, that are not added as part of the fractur- infectant and common over-thecounter
ing process, but instead come from agricultural skin antiseptics). Disinfectants are used
sources (herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, to control the growth of certain kinds
etc.), that carry over into ground water runoff. of microbes that would destroy gelled
These same chemicals are found in the raw fracture fluids, or, in unusual cases,
water feed into drinking waters in nearly all may create a sour gas generation (H2S
areas, whether or not oil and gas operations or hydrogen sulfide) problem in the
are present. BTEX (benzene, toluene, xylene reservoir.
and ethylbenzene), diesel, fluorocarbons, etc., • Surfactant: That modify surface or
have been removed from fracturing in the past interfacial tension, break or prevent
several years as a caution or by regulations emulsions, and perform other specific
based on fear of somehow contaminating actions are used at 0.5 to 2 liters per one
fresh water supplies with fracturing fluids. cubic meter in all or part of the fracture
Most of the fracturing treatments used in fluid volume in some cases.
shale are water with a friction reducer and • Gelation Chemicals: (Thickeners)
no significant gelling agents – called a slick such as guar gum and cellulose poly-
water frac. The shale responds very well to mers are not frequent additions to slick
these inexpensive fracture treatments. Basic water frac formulations, but may be
slick water formulation (Fontaine, 2008) for used in hybrid fracturing (that use a
shale may include: ungelled water to initiate the fracture
and a gelled water to carry some of the
• Water: About 98% to 99% of total vol- proppant or sand). These gelling mate-
ume - commonly fresh water (<500 rials are common food additives, do not
mg/kg salinity), but increasingly con- break down into toxin and are not con-
taining treated produced water. sidered of concern (Hoeman, 2011).
• Proppant: About 1% to 1.9% of total • Scale Inhibitors: Rarely to commonly
volume – usually sand or ceramic parti- used depending on the specific shale,
cles carried by the fracturing fluid into prevent mineral scale precipitates,
the fracture to keep the fracture open eliminating the potential for concen-
when hydraulic pressure is released. trating problem ions in scale and block-
• Friction Reducer: About 0.025% of to- age of tubing and equipment.
tal volume – the non-acid form of poly- • Hydrochloric Acid: (Same material
acrylamide used as adsorbent in baby used in swimming pools and to clean
diapers and as a flocculent in drinking brick and other masonry projects) May
water preparation, and reduces friction be used in some cases to reduce frac-
pressure of water flowing through the ture initiation pressure (the downhole
pipe during high rate pumping, thereby pressure needed to create the first small
reducing required pump power output crack in the rock).
and air emissions from the pumps. • Corrosion Inhibitor: One of several
• Disinfectant (Biocide): About 0.005% organic compounds that may be toxic,
to 0.05% of total volume – common is used at 0.2% to 0.5% in only the acid
biocides of glutaraldehyde (a common (total inhibitor volume per fracturing is
antimicrobial used in hospitals and even 30 to 40 liters and only used if acid is
municipal water treating systems) or used.
quaternary amine (drinking water dis-
185
Chemicals returning from a well after a Most shale of marine origin has water salini-
fracturing treatment are at a fraction (usually ties near that of the sea water when deposited,
20% or less for chemicals and about 40% for usually about 35,000 mg/kg total salinity.
polymers) of what was pumped down the Formations in contact with waters in evaporite
well (King, 1988). Polymers decompose beds may be higher salinity (Blauch, 2010).
quickly at temperature, biocides are spent on Use of large volumes of fresh water for frac-
organic demand and degrade, surfactants are turing in arid areas causes severe problems.
adsorbed on rock surfaces and scale inhibitors By switching to a water source in the saline
precipitate and come back slowly at 10 to 15 to brine water range and/or adopting closed-
mg/kg for several months. If these chemicals loop fracturing water supply where possible,
are selected to have minimum impact (low/no the pressure on fresh water supplies could be
toxicity, full biodegradation, etc.) then impact greatly reduced.
from initially added chemicals in a spill of
recovered water is minor. Fluids returning Pumping
from the formation are best used as a resource
for pressure maintenance in oilfield enhanced Pumping of a fracturing stage may last from
recovery operations. Deep well disposal of 20 minutes to about 6 hours, depending upon
produced fluids (including frac flow back), is the design and intent of the fracturing. This
common, but there are other oil field uses for period of high pressure operation is probably
this resource including treatment for re-use as the only time most wells will experience pres-
saline fracturing water. Surface release of any sures above a level that will force reverse fluid
water that is high salinity and has chemicals flow (into the formation). Fracture vertical
above the specific safe limit is not a viable growth may extend up to a hundred meters
alternative to oilfield reuse or disposal. above the pay zone in a few cases where there
Utilizing alternate sources of water for drill- are no natural upper rock fracture barriers im-
ing and fracturing to displace fresh water use mediately over the pay zone, but more likely,
is a major work area in the industry. The water the fracture will be quickly limited by one
argument is a complicated issue that requires of dozens of rock barriers above and below
the oil and gas industry to examine alternate the pay zone. The fracture is also limited by
sources. As these have been investigated, a increasing loss of fracture fluid as it leaks
strong economic argument has emerged in into permeable formations as more rock is
many areas for switching from fresh water to contacted by the fracturing fluid. Driving a
salt water based fracturing fluids. fracture upwards through thousand of meters
Water used for shale gas developments of rock is simply not possible, given the limits
includes water for drilling, cementing and imposed by natural fracture barriers, fluid
fracturing. While fresh water for near surface leakoff and the natural stresses of the forma-
drilling and cementing is advantageous since tion and rocks above the pay zone.
the typical leak-off volumes of 1 to 3% will be Hydraulic fracture height growth limits
fresh water, deeper drilling and all fracturing in vertical fractures from horizontal wells
may be able to take advantage of salt water can be mapped with passive microseismics
as a base to prevent formation interactions. monitoring that triangulates the location of
Ideally, the salinity content of any water sounds made by rock breaking during shear
used in an oil or gas reservoir should roughly fracturing. Microseismics measurements are
match the salinity of the fluids already there. made with a 60 to 120 m long set of micro-
186
phones in a well within a hundred meters of or penetration). State regulators may also set
the well being fractured or, in some cases with specific limits on well depth, fracture volume,
several sets of microphones at the surface. rate, type or fluid. If well construction is not
Rock breaking during pumping will deflect properly done, then communication may be
slightly due to relaxation of built-up stress possible through the wellbore annulus (the
in the rock. In-situ rock stress is the result area between the un-cemented casing and the
of historical uplift, creep of salt formations wellbore rock wall): this is a pollution risk.
and other tectonic forces. In nature, these The special case of fracturing in very shallow
forces will build up until they reach the point wells, particularly those at depths less than
of rock failure. Evidence of this rock stress about 600 m or with fresh water within 300
relaxation reaction over geologic time is the m of the hydrocarbon containing formation
presence of numerous small faults and a few is cause for concern and very careful evalu-
very large faults. ations are required.
The energy released by rock breaking Fluid backflow, or flowback, is the activity
during pumping has a magnitude about one of cleaning up or flowing the well after frac-
hundred thousand times smaller than the turing to recover part of the fracturing fluid
magnitude of the slightest “felt” earthquake and initiate the gas production. Recovery of
(magnitude ~3.0) (USGS – U.S. Geologi- fluid depends on the formation and how much
cal Survey calculator). Hydraulic fracturing water that the formation adsorbs and absorbs
related creation of a moderate magnitude into its structure. The amount of water in a
earthquake (magnitude greater than 5) in an formation, or its percent of water saturation,
unknown fault system is a very remote pos- depends on the composition and form of the
sibility because of the generally low incidence minerals such as clays at the microscopic
of quakes after or during fracturing and the level. If the formation minerals do not have
ease of spotting larger faults on 3D seismics sufficient water in their structure, they will
surveys. Hydraulic fracturing may be able to trap and hold water from any available source
create small fault slippage and thus very small until the minerals reach an irreducible water
tremors that are at or usually well below the level. Water trapped in this manner may dry
“felt” threshold. Gas storage reservoirs that out again over geologic time through dry gas
exposed to fast charge and discharge rates evaporation of the bound water, but is not likely
(movement rates of more than millions of stan- to move during years of production. Water
dard cubic meters per day) have had long-term removed by dehydration will not transport
studies of rock movement and micro-tremors chemicals, which will remain trapped in the
(Deflandre, 2002). rock (Woodroof, 2003).
The actual act of fracturing in a properly Flowback of fracturing fluids during the
designed and constructed wellbore is the low- first two to three weeks after a shale fractur-
est risk action involved in the well developing may experience fluid recovery rates of
ment process, especially in wells more than 0.5 to as much as 1 m3/min for a few hours,
about 600 meters deep. The minimum depth often dropping to 150 m3/day (100 liters per
at which fracturing is practical and safe is set minute or about 8 times what a garden hose
by state regulators with knowledge of local will flow) within 24 hours and then quickly
fracturing experience and geological hazards decreasing over several days to the less than
such as faults and karsts, and effective fracture 50 m3/day, by the end of the second or third
barriers (rocks that resist fracture initiation week. This is followed by a gradual decrease
187
to a few hundred liters per day within a few A second control method that stops fracture
weeks. Modeling the flowback behavior has growth is the loss of fracture fluid, called fluid
benefits in optimizing well production opera- leakoff, into the reservoir rock. Fracturing
tions (Gdanski, 2010). Methane production is fluid under pressure is required to extend the
generally absent as the first water is produced. fracture, which also increases contact area with
Water rate usually drops quickly as gas produc- the formation. However, as the fluid increases
tion starts. Although methane venting during fracture contact area with the formation or
cleanup is still done in exploratory mode (to invades natural fractures, part of the fracturing
test rates in the first few wells in an area for fluid is lost to the formation, decreasing the
pipeline sizing), development wells can be amount of fracturing fluid left to drive fluid
turned to the production system within hours into the formation. With the large contact of
of gas flow start. thousands of natural fractures present in shale
and the low viscosity of slick water fracture
Fracture Monitoring fluids, the rapidly increasing loss of fluids to
the formation quickly matches the maximum
The crack that develops during fracturing, fracturing injection rate and the fracture stops
which produce a break in the rock, is narrow, growing. This is seen repeatedly in microseis-
usually 2 to 3 mm in width (1/10 to 1/8 in.) mics event replays of monitored fracturing
and grows outward, upward and downward with a very rapid fracture growth at the start
widening slightly until a barrier is encountered of the fracturing that very often decreases
or there is sufficient fluid leakoff into side to no growth during the last 10% of the job.
fractures or permeable formation to stop the The formation contact area that the frac-
fracture from growing. Even at an injection turing fluid creates with the pay zone in a
rate of 16 cubic meters per minute, the second- naturally fractured formation is normally very
ary fractures and permeable streaks will soon large, often accounting for several thousands to
absorb enough liquid from the main fracture a hundred thousand square meters in densely
to limit outward and upward fracture growth. naturally fractured shale well, all within a
When a fracture grows in a planar style, as total extent of a few hundred meters away
is common with sandstones and limestones, from the wellbore.
it conforms to a general direction set by the Downhole camera pictures in a well with
stresses in the rock, following what is called an open-hole completion are shown in Figure
“fracture direction” or orientation, perpen- 3. The camera was built and run by Amoco
dicular to the plane of least principle stress Research in the late 1960’s through the 1990’s
(stresses are created by tectonic forces gener- to study and map hydraulic fracture growth
ated by uplift and other natural forces). The in a variety of formations and compare per-
fractures are most commonly vertical and may formance of fracture variables (Smith, 1982).
extend laterally several hundred meters away The pictures here have a total view, (width
from the wellbore and usually grow upward and height), of about 5×3.8 cm (2×1.5 in.).
until it contacts a rock of different structure, Depth is about 1400 m, with pressure in bar
texture or strength to stop the fracture. These and time of day in 24 hour time.
“seal” or fracture barrier rocks, which stop Photo “A” shows narrow fractures stopping
the fracture upward or downward growth, are and starting again at a 6 mm (¼ in.) thick
very common in every environment. shale break that interrupts the development
of vertical fracture growth. Thicker shale lay-
188
Figure 3. Downhole camera pictures of hydraulic fractures (King, 2012)
ers will effectively stop the fracture growth of a vertical fracture while pressuring up on a
unless pressure can reapply itself above the formation and pumping at about 0.8 m3/min.
barrier such as happens in this open wellbore. The vertical fracture grew past the camera
If pressure is reduced and cannot be reapplied, with a recorded creation rate of about 30 cm
the fracture will stop growing. per second.
Photo “B” is a fully developed fracture Cameras are only good for viewing the
about 6 mm (¼ in.) wide with a camera- surface of an exposed wellbore in clear fluid
confirmed height of approximately 6 m. This and most only work at low pressures. Only a
fracture was in a limestone. The rock in the limited amount of information on fracturing
fracture is a piece of formation debris swept can be deduced unless the well is an open-hole
into the fracture after the crack was widened completion. Downhole cameras are com-
sufficiently to accept particles. monly used in the industry to help diagnose
Figures “C” and “D” are of the same well conditions. Other technologies using
fracture. Photo “C” was after the fracture electrical resistance, sound, impression blocks
was initiated but while the wellbore was at and measurements of temperature, pressure
low pressure. Photo “D” was of the same and sound are also common diagnostic tools
section of fracture after pressure was applied. (Barree, 2002; Salamy, 1991; Cipolla, 2009).
The camera was a rare, side-looking camera Primary monitoring methods for describ-
that used close-ups of fractures in open-hole ing fracture orientation, length, height, width
completions to help categorize fracture devel- and placement factors include microseismics,
opment from the wellbore. One very unusual tilt meters, tracers, data frac and several other
experiment with the camera captured creation technologies, as shown in Table 1.
189
Table 1. Fracture monitoring technique (King, 2012)
Fracture monitoring Fracture Fracture Fracture Fracture Investigation Specific

technique location in direction height length timing fracture flow
well
Surface pressure No No Indirect No Real time No
Downhole pressure No No Indirect No Post frac or real No
time
Fiber optics (temperature, Yes No No No Real time Yes
pressure, sound)
Microseismics Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 minutes delay No
Tilt meters Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 minutes delay No
Temperature logging Yes No Only in verti- No Post frac Yes
cal wells
Tracer tagged proppant Yes Transverse or Only in verti- No Post frac No
longitudinal cal wells
Chemicals tracers in No No No No Post frac Yes
fracturing fluid
Production log Yes No Only in verti- No Post frac Yes
cal wells
Pressure build up, produc- No Indirect Indirect Indirect Post production No
tion tests and interference
tests
These technologies are most actively ap- with local geology findings generated during
plied during the exploratory drilling and drilling are the first solid inputs. As fracture
early development, where fracturing treat- monitoring techniques add accuracy to the
ments are refined and observations can be assumptions, fracture models will be able to
made about local geologic impacts that opti- improve accuracy. Most early jobs are kept
mize wellbore and fracture placement. small until a more optimized fracture design
Once the well construction, lateral place- is constructed. Even with a more polished
ment and fracture dynamics are understood fracture design, improvements and innovative
in an area, the development phase is entered changes will still be part of the optimization
and well costs can be optimized with learning process. Local knowledge on fracturing is a
generated on the first few wells. Microseismics very good starting point in any area.
and tracers are rarely used in later stages of Data gathering from hydraulic fracturing
development. jobs can also be used to examine fracture
Fracture modeling by computer depends on growth and risk properties on a local or re-
the accuracy and range of a large number of gional basis.
variables (Britt, 2009; Cipolla, 2009; Meyer,
2010, Smith, 1982). Formation property as-
sumptions on permeability, porosity, in-situ A FRACTURING RISK ANALYSIS
stresses, mineralogy, fracture barrier loca-
tions and a dozen or more other variables Risk is generated by uncertainty of the out-
with wide ranges, make the first estimates of come of an action (Holton, 2004). The ele-
computer modeling less than ideal. The first ments of risk consist of probability (belief
wells in a development are opportunities to that a detrimental event can occur and that a
learn. Combining known regional geology frequency can be predicted for that event) and
190
severity (or impact) of that event. Probability The root cause of problem would be the well
that the fracturing materials spill can occur construction, not the well activity.
during the transport to the well is simple to Fracturing issues, defined here as the
determine using insurance tables on wreck transport of fracturing materials to the well,
frequency, fuel spills, truck roll-overs and the specific act of fracturing, the recovery of
some equipment failures where reliability fracturing fluids from the well prior to produc-
data exists. tion and the transport of fracturing materials
Potential pollution from the specific act from the well, offer similar base-line impact
of fracture pumping is not an easy predic- and probability, regardless of the operator,
tion to make since the bulk of the evidence given adherence to lawful and safe operational
for actual cases of pollution is negative and practices. Reduction in base-line impact and
the documentation of claimed detrimental probability comes from a company’s commit-
results are absent or discounted by scientific ment to use and optimize practices that reduce
and engineering investigation. This creates the impact of the event and/or the probability
significant uncertainty around the unmea- of the event.
sured or un-measurable part of any impact of Variances in local transport incident occur-
pollution from the specific act of fracturing. rence and local geology necessarily make a
Unfortunately, it is the best that can be done hydraulic fracture risk evaluation a local analy-
with the available scientific information. sis. There cannot be a single detailed over-all
The main fracturing activity discussed fracturing risk analysis. General analyses can
in the risk analysis is slick water hydraulic be constructed but the user must specify a
fracturing in shale formations. The pollution range of occurrence suitable for the areas to
potential include examination of pollution be compared. Many of the factors discussed
routes for fracturing fluids, chemicals, re- will be further influenced by the operator’s
turned fluids, unreturned fluids, seismic dis- experience, geological and engineering skill,
turbances, natural seep alteration, penetration ethics and projection of well design life and
of aquifers by fractures and emissions from well functions during that life (King, 2012).
fractures. Water sources specifically protected
from contamination include fresh and brackish Local Variances Included
water aquifers; sources that are suitable for in the Risk Analysis
economic levels of treating to make drinking
water. The objective is to identify high-risk 1. Traffic Wreck Incidence Frequency:
elements of fracturing activities and to assign From state-to-state and road types
appropriate risk reduction actions. from 2-lane rural to controlled access
The first action is to separate well con- interstate.
struction issues from fracturing issues. Well 2. Well Construction: Overpressure re-
construction issues, specifically the design, lated incident – these are fairly constant
supervision, application, testing and monitor- across a region with the lower frequency
ing of well construction, are influenced by a being in areas where there is a high
company’s design philosophy and commit- incidence of fracturing with common
ment to a sound design. Any well activity that knowledge of adequate fracturing ap-
begins with a sub-standard well will likely fail, plication for fracturing in the area. Prior
regardless of the quality of the well activity. to the fracturing job, well casing is tested
to the pressure expected in fracturing
191
plus a safety factor. Casing ruptures are well, the casing strength cement quality
very rare and are immediately seen by and the pipe strength must be considered
annulus pressure monitoring. low unless proved otherwise by testing. The
3. Depth of Intervals: Fracture height low pressure of these old wells would very
growth is limited by natural rock barri- likely create an immediate pressure drop in
ers and leakoff of fracturing fluid into any fracturing treatment that entered the old
permeable rock. As demonstrated by well, prompting investigation. Even when
microseismics monitoring during frac- intersected, a properly abandoned well will
turing, fractures rarely reach a vertical withstand fluid movement towards surface.
growth of a hundred meters above the No documentation could be found for this
pay zone, particularly when fracturing type incident, but estimates from field
rates are tailored to specific intervals. personnel active in fracturing application
Shallower zones, nominally those less over several decades indicates the figure
than 600 meters would have the highest is about one intersection or less in 10.000
potential for hydraulic fracturing com- fracturing jobs.
munication into a fresh water sand, al- 5. Other Factors: These are fracturing
though even for this potential event, there incidents that may or may not have an
is no documented proof. The deeper the impact on fresh water pollution but many
well, the less likely such an event would have a detrimental effect (King, 2012).
be. Deeper zones have more separation,
more fracture barriers and more perme-
able rock that would sap fracturing fluid FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
away from the stimulation. Most com-
mercial shale reservoirs are at 1000 m It is shown in the risk analysis that fracture
to 3500 m deep, with an average depth treatments do not penetrate fresh water sup-
of about 2000 m. plies in properly constructed well, which is
4. Fracture Intersection: Fractures inter- derived from a preponderance of evidence,
secting other fractures or other wells at such as monitoring fracture growth, absence
the same depth in a pay zone are likely of fracturing chemical components outside the
as the wellbore spacing (distance be- pay zone and a 60 years history documenting
tween wellbores at the depth of the pay fracturing containment in numerous geologic
zone) is diminished. Shale wellbores are settings. However, future research should
intentionally set close together because include more evidence on fracture pumping
fracture penetration is dominated by ex- and not innocently verdict the entire well
tensive natural fractures that limit overall development process.
fracture growth. Fracture intersection at Risk analysis also showed that the potential
depth and below the main cap rock or for chemical contamination of underground or
seal does not create a problem unless the surface sources of fresh water in adequately
intersected well is open to a fresh water constructed wells is arguably less than one in
zone. a million fracs. As it comes exclusively from
Fractures intersecting an abandoned well are the road transport of fracturing components,
a rare, but known occurrence. If the well is onsight storage and surface mixing, in the
properly abandoned, there is little or no risk future it can be sharply reduced by more
of fresh water contact or contamination. If attention to the root cause of these spill or
the well is an old, improperly abandoned leak events.
192
Although the impact of spill and leak CONCLUSION

events are generally low, they can be de-
creased further by reducing number, amount Drawing conclusions from this analysis
(concentration and/or activity), toxicity and involved an initial separation of well con-
environmental permanence of chemicals used struction issues (where a company’s design
in fracturing. Chemical rating systems that philosophy in a local geologic area can be a
focus on these issues should be a part of the major risk differentiator) from the specific
planning for any fracturing treatment. rock fracturing risk (where every company
For targeted hydrocarbon pays of less than faces near-identical risks).
600 m depth, state regulators with knowledge The primary conclusion that the potential
of local geological systems may need to set for even a small amount of chemical contami-
specific limits on well depth, fracture volume, nation of underground or surface sources of
rate, or type of fluid. The special case of fresh water from the specific act of fractur-
fracturing in very shallow wells, particularly ing, applied in adequately constructed wells
those at depths less than about 600 m or with with pay zone depth of greater than 600 m,
fresh water within 300 m of the hydrocarbon is arguably less than one in a million fracs
containing formation, is cause for concern and due to the self-limiting nature of fracturing
additional evaluations of geology, fracturing leakoff and the numerous frac barriers found
rates and volumes are required. in every deeper formation sequence.
Methane presence is commonly recorded The height of fracture growth in deep wells
in water wells and may predate any drilling or is usually a few hundred meters above the
fracturing in the area. Methane may increase targeted hydrocarbon zone but thousands of
during a water well’s life as water is produced, meters below the deepest fresh water sands,
as a result of liberating methane that was ad- which is documented by downhole microseis-
sorbed in and onto organic materials in the mics, tilt meters, tracers, logging and other
sediments. This type of methane increase is methods (Fisher, 2011).
particularly active in fresh water containing With proper well construction, there was no
coal seams and high clay content shale. As documented case located of fracturing chemi-
the fresh water aquifer levels are drawn down, cal migration to a fresh water aquifer or to the
the methane adsorbed on the organics will de- surface from a zone deeper than 600 m. Cases
sorb and overall methane content in the water of suspected contamination by chemicals in
well will increase. Avoiding coal seams and shallower zones are known, with many, if not
high organic source rocks by proper cement all, linked to poor isolation of the well during
isolation in the fresh water wells is required the well construction phase.
to minimize this problem (King, 2012).
193
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121177. Paper presented at the Latin Ameri- International Conference on Health, Safety
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197
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Permeability: Ability of rock to transmit

fluid through pore spaces.
Coal-Bed Methane: Methane contained in Proppant: A granular substance (sand
coal seams. A coal seam is a layer or stratum grain and synthetic material as sintered bauxite
of coal parallel to the rock stratification. and ceramics) used to hold the walls of the
Flowback: After the hydraulic fractur- fracture apart to create a conductive path to
ing procedure is completed and pressure is the wellbore after pumping has stopped and
released, the direction of fluid flow reverses, the fracturing fluid has leaked off. Placing the
and water and excess proppant flow up through appropriate concentration and type of prop-
the wellbore to the surface. The water that pant in the fracture is critical to the success
returns to the surface is commonly referred of a hydraulic fracturing treatment.
to as flowback. Shale: A fine-grained sedimentary rock
Hydraulic Fracturing: The process of composed mostly of consolidated clay or
using high pressure to pump sand along with mud. Shale is the most frequently occurring
water and other fluids into subsurface rock sedimentary rock.
formations in order to improve flow of oil Tight Sands: A geological formation con-
and gas into a wellbore. sisting of low permeability and low porosity
sandstones.
198
199
Chapter 10
Workover Impact on
Accidental Risk
Bojan Moslavac
ABSTRACT
Certain risks are very common to any application of a downhole control system during workover
while others will be field-specific or at least increased or decreased by the given well conditions.
Workover anomalies may be caused by erosion, corrosion, mechanical errors, temperature effects
on electronics, wear and tear on the dynamic seals, or seizure of moving components. Obviously,
the simpler the system and the fewer moving parts, the fewer components are available to fail.
Procedures and supporting control software must be developed to ensure optimum system use.
Blowouts are not very common today as most blowout preventing systems serve the purpose.
However, occasionally, these systems may fail due to either technical problems on the wellbore
equipment or human error. Both reasons can cause enormous damage on wellbore equipment,
reservoir, surface facilities, or even human loss. The right accidental risk assessment approach
can reduce the chances of repeating bad scenarios that happened in the past.
INTRODUCTION tubing replacement, coiled tubing services,

snubbing unit services etc. Reasons for such
In general, workover refers to any kind of treatments or interventions are numerous
well intervention or remedial treatment on (Jahn et al., 2008)- mechanical damage of
oil or gas well involving different methods downhole equipment (corroded or damaged
and techniques common in drilling and tubing string, stuck wellbore tools), reservoir
completion department. In most cases it productivity impairment, flow restriction due
implies the wireline or slickline operations, to sand production or scale deposition, water
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch010
Workover Impact on Accidental Risk
or gas breakthrough, cross flow in the wellbore WELL INTEGRITY

or behind casing, downhole control system
failures, wellhead completion parts failures Well integrity represents risk reduction of
and other. Usually, if a workover operation formation fluids uncontrollable releases.
is needed, a workover rig is required as well, Reasons for well integrity loss are either of
except in cases of coiled tubing or subbing technical nature, as well completion or surface
unit operations. equipment failure or in a form of human error.
Perrin et al. (1999) described some of the Well control loss, and thus blowout, is a result
equipment failures and modifications urging of the two mentioned. Blowouts can lead to
for intervention. That would be wellhead disastrous events with the result of a loss of hu-
equipment failures (leaks at the lower master man life, environmental impacts or equipment
valve, tubing hanger or tie-down screws, dam- damage. Fatality risk in exploration activities
aged back pressure valve seat, leak or failure is partially expressed by blowout occurrence.
at the controllable subsurface valves control According to Corneliussen (2006) measure
line outlets, wellhead penetrator failures for the fatality risk is demonstrated as FAR
etc.), downhole equipment failures (tubing or (fatal accident rate), which is a frequency rate
wireline retrievable safety valves are faulty, defined as the expected number of fatalities per
landing nipple or wireline retrievable safety 108 hours of exposure. When elaborating the
valve, packer, locator, slip joint or circulating environmental pollution, workover blowouts
sleeve are leaking, control line failure, annular are more likely to cause severe pollution than
safety system failure, gas-lift valves stuck, fish the drilling blowouts because of the cased
not processed properly via wireline, downhole wellbore all down to the production zones. If
gauges failures) and many other problems met the well blows out in such a completed well,
during the life of a well. the fluid blowing out can be water, gas, oil or
Rig site safety is considered to be a signifi- condensate. Drilling blowouts mainly result
cant factor in the oilfield for many years now with gas blowout.
and continues to improve its worthiness. In Workover blowout is the end result of well
spite of all safety precautions undertaken dur- integrity loss due to loss of the well barriers,
ing a certain operations performed in the well primary and secondary ones, described in
accidents continue to occur with the results detail by Holand (1997) and Bellarby (2009).
mentioned earlier. What can we do to further Primary barrier is defined as a barrier which
improve safety on the rig is a question all the has a task to stop unpredictable fluid flow
oilfield companies try to answer investing a (examples: wellbore fluid, tubing, x-mass tree
lot of assets in it. Term rig safety firstly refers valves). Secondary barrier presents a primary
to human life preservation and then wellbore barrier backup (examples: downhole safety
integrity and equipment maintenance. As ev- valve, tubing hanger, wellhead). Secondary
erything starts with well integrity no human barriers have to be independent of the primary
life or wellbore equipment will be preserved barriers in case of failure of the latter. Swab-
without it. bing, low fluid column weight, trapped gas,
low cement preflush weight or bullheading
200
are considered to be the main causes for the fluids, but is also a phrase for any kind of fluid
primary barrier loss within the wellbore opera- force pumping downhole (acid treatment or
tions like pulling the wellbore equipment out scale removal for example). In case of gas kick,
of the hole, installing the equipment, perfo- when pumping kill fluids down the string, the
rating, pressure testing, circulation, snubbing gas is compressed and the wellbore pressure
operations or well abandonment. Secondary exceeds the reservoir pressure and gas leaks
barrier is mainly lost within unavailability or off into formation. Kill fluid should be pumped
failure of string safety valves, kelly stabbing until all the gas is displaced from the well and
failure, BOP activation failure, insufficient tubing string filled up with kill fluid having
frictional back pressure and annulus valve or a sufficient density to balance the formation
casing head failure (Holand, 1997). There- pressure (Oudeman et al., 1994).
fore, occasional pressure testing of wellbore As the bullheading is not a routinely per-
equipment is essential if barrier losses are to formed well control method and considering
be avoided. the fact that very high pressures are some-
Well barriers during the workover opera- times involved a special attention should be
tions are basically the same barriers that ex- addressed to operation execution. Exceeding
ist during the drilling processes. But, there the pressure rating of the used equipment can
are some differences. Workover fluids, for lead to a burst with the end result of equip-
example, are usually solids-free and they are ment damage and well kill failure which has a
free to escape into formation in open hole blow out potential. There are some operational
production systems without the mud cake considerations for bullheading that have to be
formed on the wellbore wall, which is not the followed to avoid kick occurrence: a) Detailed
case in drilling operations. job design before the operation execution- es-
Well Integrity Management System pecially on the equipment pressure rating, b)
(WIMS) is one of the risk assessment ap- Additional pumping unit available at the rig
proaches used to describe the status and handle site for better well control, c) Large pumping
the well integrity issues (Corneliussen, 2007; fluid volumes available in case of major losses,
Al-Ashhab et al., 2004; Tarmoom et al., 2007). d) Possibility of annulus area isolation in case
Generally, there are three basic elements of the of kill line failure.
system- data gathering, risk review and rank- There are some numerical models (Oude-
ing and well integrity database. Data gathering man et al., 1994; Dykhno et al., 2005) de-
considers identification of comprehensive data veloped to simulate a bullheading operation
set. Second element implies risk assessment which is very helpful for multiphase flow
methodology of reviewed and ranked data performance and analysis. In bullheading
after the analysis completion. Third element operations, when using sophisticated software,
presents an organization of the processed data associated blowout risk can be reduced to a
into the huge database. minimum.
Bullheading Swabbing - Surging
Bullheading is most often used when normal In the oilfield swabbing is a term for a pressure
well killing methods with conventional circu- reduction below the pipe string when moving
lation do not work and if there is a possibility upward. Adversely, pressure increase below
of hydrogen sulfide appearance in formation the pipe string when moving downward cor-
201
responds to surging. Swabbing is one of the ing process as well. If the rig crew does not
most frequent blowout causes in workover and respond promptly, an abundant gas influx may
drilling operations(Holand, 1997; Nielsen & initiate serious well control measures.
Karlsen, 2008). It appears mainly if wrong
pull out rate is applied not allowing fluid Trapped Gas
column to settle down fast enough below the
string. The end result is a state of downhole Trapped gas often refers to a gas that is trapped
pressure underbalance (negative differential under the production equipment, a tubing
pressure) with formation fluids entering the string anchored with a packer. If the comple-
wellbore. Bottom line, whatever the reason tion is to be replaced, when pulling the string
for string pull out is, it has to be done with to retrieve the packer trapped gas can rupture
extreme caution taking care about pull out rate the tubing, enter the area of lower pressure,
concerning the tubular hydraulics factors (cas- expand, push the workover fluid and damage
ing/tubing diameters and clearances, wellbore the wellbore equipment if shear ram or an-
fluid weight and viscosity etc.). Surging may nular preventer is not closed quickly enough.
cause formation fracturing and fluid leak off, Trapped gas can also form beneath the closed
but this is elaborated within another chapter subsurface safety valve. In that case, if a care-
dealing with fracturing operations. less blind back off is performed, pressure can
force the tubing out of the well.
Low Fluid Column Weight
Normally, bottom hole pressure in static con- COILED TUBING OPERATIONS

ditions should be greater than the reservoir
pressure (primary barrier) to prevent forma- Coiled tubing (CT) as a reeled flexible type of
tion fluid influx. If the hydrostatic bottom carbon steel, titanium or polymer tubing is ap-
hole pressure decreases below the formation plicable in various wellbore operations (Baker
pressure point, fluids start to flow into the well Hughes, 2003) like wellbore cleaning opera-
endangering the well integrity with possible tions (i.e. formation sand or proppant cleaning
well blowout. In these situations, the most out, wellbore debris catching, underreaming
important thing is to act promptly and close the tubing or other completion accessories,
in the well. Of course, not every fluid influx scale or cement milling, high pressure jet
is a potential for well closure. It depends on washing), fishing (i.e. completion parts recov-
the intensity and volumes entering the well- ery with various fishing tools, removing and
bore, so a good influx detection device or recovering obstructions- valves for instance,
method is extremely important. In workover pipe cutting with mechanical, chemical or
operations low fluid column weight situation explosive cutters, milling operations), zone
can appear after the cement squeezing job, isolation (i.e. through tubing zonal isolation,
pumping the cement preflush, perforation or wellbore accessories set up and retrieval), well
simply while circulating water down the tub- stimulation and fracturing (hydraulic fractur-
ing and out the annulus when the well starts ing and acidizing operations), sand control
to flow (Holand, 1997). Like in conventional (through tubing sand control operations), flow
drilling techniques, high pressure zones can management (velocity strings, production/
be discovered during the coiled tubing drill- injection logging, downhole equipment shift-
202
ing), wellbore abandonment (bridge plug or tubing with 2.77 mm (0.109 in) wall thickness
cement plug placement)and sidetracking (reis predicted to corrode at 100 mpy- mils per
entry wellbores drilling, slimhole drilling). It year (1 mpy equals 0.0254 mm per year). If
can be deployed in pressurized or dead well. it is expected to be used in over a year, there
Obviously, such a huge variety of CT ap- should be no hazard threat. But, in this case,
plications sometimes imposes certain com- if it is used for more than a year, an extensive
plications within the operational execution. corrosion inhibition plan has to be applied
Some leading reasons for coiled tubing failures (Martin & Van Arnam, 2003).
are (Crabtree, 2008) corrosion, mechanical Some evaluations (Metcalf et al., 2003;
damage, manufacturing flaws and defects, Nasr-El-Din & Metcalf, 2004) of the impact of
handling errors, H2S cracking, erosion, fatigue H2S on coiled tubing performance have already
and overload (Figure 1). been performed. According to those, preferred
maximum tensile strength of coiled tubing
Corrosion and Cracking for corrosion avoidance in H2S sour environ-
ment is 551.58·106 Pa (80 kpsi). Maximum
Carbon steel coiled tubing, as any other tool or concentrations of possibly harmful elements
accessory made of steel, is prone to corrosion. within wellbore fluids should be: 0.002 wt%
Unfortunately, installed coiled tubing systems (sulfur), 0.025 wt% (phosphorus) and 0.6
face produced water and CO2/H2S laden wt% (carbon). Corrosion aspects and types
natural gas as well (Martin & Van Arnam, such as sulfide stress cracking (SSC), stress
2003). CO2 is very aggressive corrosive gas corrosion cracking (SCC), hydrogen induced
which mainly corrodes downhole equipment cracking (HIC) and stress oriented hydrogen
by localized pitting at a certain penetration induced cracking (SOHIC) are often used to
rate depending on the partial pressure of the describe coiled tubing failure cause if a string
CO2 in the water phase, which represents CO2 overtensioning is not likely to be the damage
content. Partial pressure greater than 2.068·105 cause. From the data above it can be seen that
Pa (30 psi) almost ensures corrosion appear- a proper corrosion inhibition and operation
ance. A typical 44.45 mm (1 ¾ in) OD coiled performance within safe tension margins is
Figure 1. Reasons for coiled tubing failures (Crabtree, 2008)
203
very important if the wellbore integrity is (wall thickness loss due to erosion) increases
meant to be maintained. With 41% portion exponentially with the weight of proppant
of total coiled tubing failure causes (Figure pumped. Coiled tubing with 31.75 mm (1 1/4
1), corrosion and H2S cracking are the most in) OD or less has a potential for total damage
accounted. by erosion if more than 700 tons of proppant
are being pumped within the operation con-
Erosion sidering the wall thickness of 2.03 mm (0.08
in).If the wall loss is expressed by millimeters
As different fluids and particles are being per 100 tons of proppant pumped, which is
pumped through the coiled tubing string, correlated with distance of measuring spot
erosion effects start to change the flow char- from the CT reel core, the data obtained by
acteristics and reduce the wall thickness of Rosine et al. (2008) corresponds to Figure 2.
the string. It will affect the string capacity Abnormal increase in wall loss is observed
to contain pressure and apply load, reduce in reeled section of the coiled tubing and at
tensile strength and increase fatigue in the the tubing guide. In this case, first 400 m of
coiled tubing. Field experience implies differ- the coiled tubing is a critical section if huge
ent wall thickness loss in coiled and straight amounts of proppant are being pumped down
section. During the frac packing treatments, the string. A thorough operational hazard
for example, certain amount of proppant is analysis with worst scenarios is mandatory
pumped into the well to support fractures if the technical risk level is to be reduced to
and prevent migration of fines into the well a minimum.
(Ghalambor et al., 2009). According to Rispler
et al. (2001) and Rosine et al. (2008), CT wear
Figure 2. Measured coiled tubing wall loss (Rosine et al., 2008)
204
Mechanical Damage Operating and Manufacturing Errors
Coiled tubing is used in rough and dynamic en- Manufacturing defects are not very common
vironment that renders it delicate to mechani- in coiled tubing installations but are possible
cal damage. As Crabtree (2008) and Padron et to occur (Figure 1 – 15% of total failures).
al. (2007) state, mechanical damage of coiled Detected defects are either due to a problem
tubing is quite a big problem in the oilfield with the steel manufacturing or the tube
(accounts for 29% of total failure causes). It manufacturing processes (Crabtree, 2008).
includes running in or out damage of the tub- Welds to make a tube shaped pipe (seam or
ing body and surface equipment damage (reel, bias welds) can be poorly performed. Seam
gooseneck or other). This type of damage can welding problems dominate by inclusions in
affect the coiled tubing fatigue life by creat- the weld and lack of fusion. Inclusions are
ing concentration of stresses and strains or by usually a result of the slitting process where
causing micro cracking leading to premature the master coil is cut into the widths required
fatigue failures. Coiled tubing can be repaired for the strips later formed into coiled tubing.
by cutting out the damaged tubing section and Operating the coiled tubing unit is not an
replacing it with a butt-weld (welding tech- easy job to perform handling the tubing run in
nique used to connect parts which are nearly and out. Tubing overloading and thus buckling
parallel and do not overlap) or by removing and parting is sometimes a result of wrong
the damage by grinding and polishing to a operating practices or carelessness. Such
smooth surface finish. Fatigue failure process problems are solved by a frequent personnel
can be divided into five stages (Padron et al., education and stimulation. Operating errors
2007): a) Cyclic plastic deformation prior to account for about 9% of total failures.
fatigue crack initiation, b) Initiation of micro
cracks, c) Propagation of micro cracks to form Well Control
more of them, d) Propagation of one or more
micro cracks and e) Final failure. Wellbore integrity during the coiled tubing
One of the ways to reduce the likelihood operations has to be established, no matter
of coiled tubing mechanical damage failures dead or live (pressurized) well. Typical well
and improve reliability of the operations is control equipment scheme for coiled tubing
to understand and estimate the fatigue life. operations consists of stripper (stuffing box)
Experimental work on coiled tubing has to which provides primary seal between wellbore
be done for that matter, and that implies cycle fluids under high pressure and the surface
fatigue test methods and full scale bending under atmospheric pressure during the coiled
tests (Sisak & Crawford, 1994). The test results tubing operations and BOPs. Several strip-
depend on the damage geometry- depth, width, per designs are available today: 1) Side door
length and shape (ellipsoidal, cylindrical or stripper, 2) Radial stripper (applies a radial
conical); tubing characteristics (diameter, wall force directly to the stripper element) or 3)
thickness and grade) and operating parameters Inaccessible sealing elements stripper with
(internal pressure and bending radius). coiled tubing in place (early model).
Blowout preventers in a role of well bar-
riers prevent wellbore fluids from escaping
to the surface. Like the conventional BOPs,
205
coiled tubing BOPs are rated according to • Well control equipment is in place,
maximum expected wellhead pressure during which consists of CT stripper, BOP
the operational phase plus the safety factor. stack and CT safety head;
BOP stacks used are mainly rated to 344.74·105 • Metal-to-metal sealing should be ap-
Pa (5,000 psi), 689.48·105 Pa (10,000 psi) plied to all connections from the pro-
and 1,034.21·105 Pa (15,000 psi) incorporat- duction tree to CT BOP stack using
ing blind, shear, slip and pipe ram preventer manually and remotely operated valves;
types (Sas-Jaworsky et al., 2006). Each BOP • Pressure rated line should be connected
serves as a wellbore barrier for high pressure to the kill inlet of the surface well con-
confinement if needed closing around the pipe trol equipment;
(pipe and slip rams) or full wellhead inner • If subsurface safety valve is leaking,
diameter profile (blind and shear rams). High coiled tubing safety head should be in-
pressure causing fluid blowout can appear stalled and tested prior to rigging up
either from the tubing string or tubing/casing the well control equipment;
annulus. Downhole safety valves like back • Wellbore and surface tanks fluid level
pressure valve, flapper check valve or ball should be monitored at all times;
valve are used to control the wellbore from • If the bottom hole assembly (BHA)that
the tubing side. On the other hand, BOP’s cannot be cut is used, a special break
control the annulus or a full wellhead profile out joint use is mandatory;
(CTES, 2005). • In offshore environment shear/seal
Like any other operation, job planning is ram on the lower riser package (LRP)
an important aspect of wellbore operations should be the upper closure device in
executed by coiled tubing. Although a pre- the secondary well barrier when run-
job safety meetings and discussions are very ning the coiled tubing in completed
useful and can minimize risk of blowout or well. Also, the same ram inside the
other hazards and accidents by analyzing drilling BOP stack should be the upper
operational steps in detail, some failures can- closure device in the secondary well
not be avoided by applying a thorough safety barrier whenever a drilling BOP stack
toolbox talk. Leaks due to string corrosion, is installed when running the coiled
poor connection sealing or valve malfunc- tubing in the well;
tions, cement break-downs, collapsed coiled • A two well barrier situation is main-
tubing string, well fluid return system failure, tained if the coiled tubing is damaged
circulating system or pumping failure- they above the stripper and it is verified
can all appear by virtue of reasons shown in that there is no influx of well fluids in
Figure 1. the CT string nor the check valves are
According to NORSOK standard D-010 leaking.
(2004) there is a well barrier acceptance
criterion that has to be followed to safely per-
form coiled tubing operations and minimize SNUBBING OPERATIONS
technical risk occurrence. Steps to carry out
the aforesaid are: Snubbing unit is a special type of hydraulic
workover intervention unit operating in live
well conditions where the fluid column is
206
Figure 3. Snubbing unit

not able to balance the formation pressure
(Figure 3). It allows tubular to be run with
specialized handling and sealing equipment
under the pressure. Each pipe is made up or
broken up while running in or pulling out of the
well. To be able to do that dual slip system is
required- stationary and travelling slips. Both
slip systems are operated sequentially to grip
the pipes while they are snubbed into the well.
The stroke unit is simply mounted on top of
the x-mass tree with BOP stack and stripper
below the handling equipment. Stripper has
sealing elements to contain wellhead pressure
while running in or pulling out the string.
To run the snubbing unit a hydraulic power
unit is required. A diesel engine drives main
pumps for the jacks and an auxiliary pump for
the BOPs, equalizing and bleed valves, slips
and the winch (Leggett et al. 1991, Perrin et
al. 1999).
Safety Considerations
Safety wise, during the pipes snubbing pro-

cess into a live well, they are compressed due
to the wellbore pressure, so the risk of pipe
buckling is present. To avoid the possibility of
buckling appearance, the length of unguided
pipe (from stripper to the travelling slips) has
to be limited to critical buckling length. It
greatly depends on the pipe outer diameter and
wellhead pressure. Critical moment in such an
operation is at the beginning of the running in
phase. Force acting from below the pipe end
is the greatest when there are no other pipes
below to confront the wellhead pressure force.
Some safety margins on maximum allowable
pipe diameter and corresponding length of
the unguided pipe if the wellhead pressure
is about 10 MPa, were given by Perrin et al.
(1999). Such a pressure can be handled by
48.3 mm (1.9 in) OD pipe with about 4 m
207
of unguided pipe length or by 88.9 mm (3 ½ • Tool and components that cannot be

in) OD pipe with about 7 m of the mentioned cut by safety head should be identified;
length. An increase in length of the unguided • Wireline conveyed bridge plug for
part of the pipe may impose severe equipment setting inside the pipe being snubbed
damage or even worse. Stripper rubber seal- should be available;
ing elements are designed to last more than 3 • At least two pump down plugs should
000 m of string run in without any problems. be available on site;
After that round trip a rubber change might • The length from the swab valve to the
be necessary. upper stripper ram should be normally
To maintain safety on the rig, during the the well barrier limit when defining the
snubbing operations well barriers have to lubrication length.
be established as well. Some guidelines and
requirements on safely performed snubbing There is a wide array of failure types with
operations are presented by NORSOK stan- regard to snubbing operations and each of
dard D-010 (2004): them should be taken to consider when plan-
ning the operation execution. Power unit shut
• Well control equipment should consist down and loss of hydraulic circuits often first
of a stripper, dual stripper sealing ele- comes to mind when operating a unit depend-
ments (rams), snubbing BOP stack and ing on it. Prevention of this kind of problem
a safety head; lies in a good maintenance and engineering
• All connections from the production solutions. Further on, a slip bowl or stripper
tree to the top of the snubbing unit rubber failure may occur if the operating
should be flanged or clamped with met- hours on stripper and slips have exceeded
al-to-metal sealing; the tolerable limits. An occasional slip ele-
• Valve inlets and outlets should have ments and stripper rubber change is required
flanged or clamped connections. The as mentioned previously. Leakage from the
inner valve (shall not be used as a work- BOP rams is possible if they are damaged or
ing valve) should be bi-directional with inadequately designed by means of installa-
metal-to-metal seal in the bore and one tion of wrong pressure rated BOP. Possibility
of the two valves should be remotely of unintentional closing of shear rams on the
operated; BOP stack exists if the handles or buttons on
• Pressure rated line should be connected the BOP control panel are not secured or ac-
to kill inlet of the well; cidentally engaged. This is a good example
• Safety head should be installed and of a human error accident type. External and
pressure tested prior to rigging up the inside leaks during the wireline jobs through
well control equipment; the snubbing unit, or a choke system failure,
• Fluid level in the well should be moni- can also appear and are matters of well control
tored at all times when deploying long system failure. Workstring inside blowout,
BHA in an open well; intentional and unintentional dropping of
• If the bottom hole assembly (BHA) that the workstring or its shearing greatly impact
cannot be cut is used, a special break the wellbore integrity which is very much
out joint use is mandatory; endangered when operating in high pressure
snubbing operations.
208
WIRELINE OPERATIONS cable line and tools meant for run in, surface
logistics and wellhead equipment is needed as
In the oilfield wireline mainly refers to op- well. Standard surface equipment consists of
erations in producing or injection wells run- a unit with the winch and a drum where the
ning a steel cable, a slick line, and setting or wire is spooled up. The whole system is driven
retrieving wellbore tools. Wireline jobs can by an engine. Stuffing box and the lubricator
be classified into three main groups (Perrin (a pipe that allows tools to be run into the
et al., 1999): a) Checking and cleaning the well under pressure) are situated above the
downhole tubular or the bottom hole (tubular wellhead with bleed off valve located on the
calibration, corrosion detection, clogging, lubricator used for pressure release. Figure 4
sediments top detection and other), b) Down- shows a typical wireline installation with all
hole measurements (recordings of bottom hole belonging parts.
temperature and pressure, fluid sampling, During the wireline operations like deploy-
interfaces location, production logging and ment of various electrical and mechanical
other) and c) Running or retrieving wellbore downhole tools on electrical cable, braided
tools (setting and pulling subsurface safety cable or slickline, well integrity is maintained
valves, choke valves, two- or one-way-check through the primary and secondary well bar-
valves, gas lift valves, shifting circulating riers. Through the well life time different
sleeves, fishing, perforating and other). To be barrier systems exist in wireline operations.
able to perform such operations, besides the So, primary barriers most often include ce-
Figure 4. Wireline installation
209
ment, casing, production packer, completion underdesigned. To prevent the before said an
string, tubing hanger, production tree, BOP, extensive simulation of possible scenarios
lubricator or stuffing box, while the second- has to be run for appropriate cable, winch
ary barriers mainly include wireline safety and drum selection in particular operational
head, wellhead and sometimes already men- conditions (wellbore depth, anticipated drags
tioned primary barriers. and maximum tension values). High tension
As wireline operations are frequently per- operations planning is extensive and some-
formed during workovers, drilling and produc- times time consuming. The wireline convey-
tion, blowouts may occur in such events. Ac- ance has to be properly selected, maintained
cording to NORSOK standard D-010 (2004) and operationally evaluated risk wise with
there is a wide array of incident scenarios defined prevention and mitigation actions
that may happen in wireline operations. They (Sarian et al., 2013).
include loss of air supply during the operation
execution; loss of winch power or mechanical
failure; external leaks in lubricator, BOP stack PRODUCTION STRING
or below the safety head; broken cable blown CHANGE OPERATIONS
out of the wellbore; leak in the stuffing box,
BOP cable ram, surface production tree or Installation and retrieval of the tubing string
lubricator bleed off valve; external leaks in from the wellbore should be a routinely per-
landing string; emergency situations on the formed job without significant problems dur-
rig; fluid influx during the wireline logging ing the run in. But, there are some problems
etc. The most frequent operations and activi- that may occur on the well which needs a
ties in which blowouts occasionally occur are tubing string change (Heriot-Watt, 2000): a)
wireline running in and out activities. Main Mechanical failure of the tubing string- col-
causes for such events are primary and sec- lapse or a leak, b) Inability to conduct tubing
ondary barrier loss due to wireline lubricator wireline equipment replacement through the
failure (wellbore seal off failure), subsurface string due to internal diameter limitations, c)
safety valve failure, X-mass tree failure or String replacement due to an alternative design
running the wireline without the lubricator to allow the installation of other options or d)
(Holand, 1997). Wireline blowouts are typi- String replacement for reservoir performance
cally released through the tubing with release optimization. To retrieve the string a certain
point above the X-mass tree. The most critical pull has to be applied for packer deactivation.
release points are the lubricator and stuffing If a straight pull does not work, various tubing
box, so these elements should be given a cutting techniques and tools can be used (me-
particular care including pre-job tests and chanical cutters, chemical cutters, jet cutters,
proper certification. plasma cutters etc.). If the whole string cannot
Besides a typical blowout risk, there is be retrieved in one run, the retrieval operation
a cable break down risk as well. Normal can be partial by means of retrieving segments
wireline operations consider uniform tool of the string that can be accessed from the
movement applying risk free pulling forces surface. The retrieving, fishing equipment
within allowed boundaries. When an unex- has to be able to withstand tensile stresses
pected situation occurs requiring extra tension caused by overpulls for production packer
to be applied (tool sticking and dragging) release and to face tubing head pressure at the
problems appear when the whole system is surface in live wells. A suitable unit for live
210
well operations is a snubbing unit mentioned • A thorough understanding of the sys-

in one of the previous subchapters. Reasons tem and its operational characteristics,
for the production string failures are almost • The proper use of risk analysis meth-
the same like in case of coiled tubing. ods, and
• Risk input data of high quality.
RISK ASSESSMENT Risk and decision analysis software is as

diverse as the analysis methods doing Monte
It is very well known fact that the oilfield busi- Carlo simulations and decision trees. In order
ness investments bring uncertain outcomes. to quantify the fault trees, input data is required
Wellbore hardware malfunctions may cause for the related base events. It includes activity
additional expenses to appear endangering frequencies, equipment failure probabilities,
oilfield projects economically. Unfortunately, conditional probabilities for base events of a
at the rig site accidents of any type used to more operational nature and well character-
happen very often which has considerably istics (Edmondson & Hide, 1996).
lessened nowadays. The main reason for such After Corneliussen (2006) main well risk
reduction is a huge well history database, factors in the operational phase are divided
rigor safety precautions, better quality of in two main groups: a) Frequency factors and
the materials involved in wellbore tools and b) Consequence factors. Frequency factors
surface hardware make, personnel education include well barrier design as number of well
etc. Assessing the outcomes and assigning barriers present in a certain operational phase;
probabilities of occurrence and associated well barrier system availability factors (func-
values is the way to deal with risk manage- tionality, reliability, detection and repair of
ment. Risk quantification is the end result all failures) and external hazards like weather and
the uncertainty methods try to form. Modeling climate, human errors, fires and explosions.
and quantification of uncertainty is a prelude They are very much influenced by decisions
to risk mitigation which focuses on unaccept- made on well system level in the design phase.
able ranges of possibility. Generally speaking, Consequence factors are mainly controlled
risk mitigation is a kind of protection from by decisions made on installation level or by
unwanted situations (Lake & Warner, 2006). reservoir properties and include installation
Therefore, different risk assessment methods type (surface, subsea etc.), installation design
and approaches are involved to simplify the (subsea wellheads, templates, safety functions,
operational phases execution and make it living quarters placement etc.), installation
more safe. Risk analysis is usually compiled activity type (manned or unmanned), fluids
by using several different models and risk leakage type (hydrocarbons, water or other),
input data as both the models and the data fluids leakage characteristics (leak rates,
are incomplete. When performing one of the quantity, leak duration), fluids leakage exit
well-known risk assessment approaches like points (casing, formation, wellhead, x-mass
quantified risk analysis (QRA), there are three tree or other).
important aspects required to ensure a satisfac- According to before said, in workover
tory quality of the analysis (Holand, 1997): operations the main focus is on the two main
safety functions of the well: a) To prevent un-
211
controlled leakage of well fluids from the well • Assess the Risks:
to the environment (this function is usually ◦◦ After a risk model has been se-
referred to as well integrity and is a continuous lected and the data have been pre-
safety function that may fail at any instant of pared, risks can be assessed. This
time) and b) To shut in the well flow in case is a process of applying the rules
of a dangerous incident on the downstream to the collected data.
side of the x-mas tree. The well shut-in func- • Manage the Risks:
tion is an on demand function activated in a ◦◦ This step consists of determining
random critical situation. Some basic steps what actions are appropriate given
in related risk assessment are: the risk assessment results.
• Acquire a Risk Assessment Model:

◦◦ Set of algorithms or rules that use FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
available information and data re-
lationship to measure the levels of As for the future research, most probably it will
risk. go in direction of new risk analysis software
• Collect and Prepare Data: development advancing history database with
◦◦ Processes that result in data sets much more important data to deal with. Soft-
that are ready to be read into and ware input variables should be more certain
used by risk assessment model. and direct by means of accurately determining
• Devise and Implement a Segmentation well characteristics, failure probabilities and
Strategy: activity frequencies. It will be achieved if the
◦◦ It is important to segment the sys- oil business companies continue to cooperate
tem into sections with constant and share the valuable experience.
risk characteristics.
212
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tional Technical Conference and Exhibition, tion does not work. It is also a phrase for any
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ing different methods and techniques common
in drilling and completion department.
217
218
Chapter 11
Gathering Systems and
Processing Facilities
Risk Analysis
Svijetlana Dubovski
INA Plc, Croatia
ABSTRACT
Gathering system is defined as one or more segments of pipeline, usually interconnected to form
a network that transports oil and natural gas from the production wells to one or more produc-
tion facilities, gas processing plant, storage facility, or a shipping point. There are two types
of pipeline networks: radial and trunk system. Produced well fluids are often complex mixtures
of the liquid hydrocarbons, gas, and some impurities that can have detrimental effects on the
integrity of the gathering pipelines. It is necessary to eliminate most of the impurities before
oil and natural gas can be stored and sold. Complexity of the processing facility depends on
the treated fluid composition. Environmental impacts during the oil and gas transportation and
processing phase will cause long-term habitat changes. To minimize that, it is very important to
implement appropriate activities across the designing, construction, operational, and decom-
missioning phases.
INTRODUCTION were the raw material for the “petroleum” in-

dustry that flourished for about three thousand
The evolution of today’s gathering systems years. It primarily produced mastic and caulk
and surface facilities actually began several used in construction. The production system
thousand years ago. Seepages of asphqaltic was crude and involved merely the recovery of
bitumen in Mesopotamia around 3000 B.C. hydrocarbon in jars and casks. Surface facili-
ties for the production at the time involved a
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch011
crude type of distillation (JPT, 1999).
Gathering Systems and Processing Facilities Risk Analysis
Today, dramatic changes in the range of BACKGROUND

new technologies available ensure a new en-
vironmental and safety approach. Awareness Created in 1972, the United Nations Environ-
of the importance of environmental issues has ment Programme (UNEP) addresses environ-
become increasingly vital to our society. De- mental issues at the global and regional level.
signer’s understanding of all processes, safety UNEP provides leadership and encourages
and environmental tasks of newly developed partnership in caring for the environment by
technologies is essential. Now, as well as in inspiring, informing, and enabling nations
the future, the process and equipment choices and peoples to improve their quality of life
will have to be made before all aspects are without compromising the quality of lives
definitely known. Depending on the specific for the future generations.
application, it may make more sense to use an The E&P Forum is the international as-
older, proven technology instead of a newer sociation of oil companies and petroleum
one because the application does not require industry organizations formed in 1974. It was
a cutting-edge solution. established to represent its members’ interests
A prescriptive approach to safety and en- at the specialist agencies of the United Nations,
vironmental management of gathering system governmental and other international bodies
and surface facilities relies on a selection of concerned with regulating the exploration and
specific regulatory and technical requirements production of oil and gas. While maintaining
developed for all of the phases from design this activity, the Forum now concerns itself
to decommissioning. The owners must follow with all aspects of E&P operations, with par-
existing standards, practices, guidelines, and ticular emphasis on safety of personnel and
procedures. The owner of installations must protection of the environment, and seeks to
be completely knowledgeable in the regula- establish industry positions with regard to such
tions of each country in which it operates matters. At present the Forum has almost 60
and is responsible only for complying with members worldwide, the majority being oil
individual regulatory requirements. Complex and gas companies operating in 60 different
working situations occur on offshore installa- countries, but with a number of national oil
tions, possibly creating dangerous conditions industry associations/institutes.
that must be examined carefully and organized Environmental Management in Oil and
in the best way possible. Gas Exploration and Production, developed
This Chapter provides basic information re- by Oil Industry International Exploration and
garding the gathering and processing systems Production Forum and UNEP, provide an
and potential environmental impacts of these overview of environmental issues in the oil
systems. To avoid or minimize environmental and gas exploration and production industry,
impact of the gathering systems and surface and of the best approaches to achieving high
facilities it is very important to implement environmental performance in all parts of the
appropriate activities from designing phase, world. Their Technical Report Environmen-
construction, operational and decommission- tal management in oil and gas exploration
ing phase which will be also described in this and production provides an overview of the
Chapter. environmental issues and the technical and
management approaches to achieving high
environmental performance in the activities
219
necessary for oil and gas exploration and Manifolds and Flow Lines
production in the world.
This Chapter provides guidance on the oil The gathering system begins at the wellhead,
and gas gathering system and surface facilities which should include at least one choke, unless
and their potential environmental impacts. the well is on an artificial lift. On offshore
Because of the possible long-term habitat facilities and on shore high-risk facilities, wel-
changes, as it will be described in this section, head should contain an automatic shutdown
it is very important to implement appropriate valve. In all cases, block valves are needed so
activities from designing phase, construction, that the maintenance can be performed on the
operational and decommissioning phase. Also, choke in the event of a long flow line. There
this Chapter proposes practical elements and are two types of the of pipeline networks; radial
operational techniques which should be ap- and trunk system. The radial type brings all
plied on site to minimize the enviromental the flow lines to a central header, while the
impact of the gathering and processing system. trunk-line type uses several remote headers
to collect fluid.
Commingled flows from two or more wells
MAIN CHARASTERISTICS OF in a central facility require an installation of
GATHERING SYSTEM AND a manifold to allow flow from any well to be
SURFACE FACILITIES produced into any of the bulk or test produc-
tion systems. A production riser (offshore) or
It is very difficult to classify oil and gas surface gathering line (onshore) brings the well flow
production facilities by type, because they into the manifolds (Figure 1). Check valves
differ due to production rates, fluid proper- allow each well to be routed into one or more
ties, sale and disposal requirements, location, of several manifold lines. There will be at
and operator preference (www.cdphe.state. least one for each process train plus additional
co.us/ap/onglinks.asp, 2013). Regardless, manifolds for test and balancing purposes.
many parts of the process are quite similar in The test manifold allows one or more wells
principle. We find the wellheads and they feed to be routed to the test separator. Since there
into production and test manifolds called the is only one process train, the high pressure
gathering system. While there are oil or gas and low pressure manifolds allow groups of
only installations, more often the well-stream high pressure and low pressure wells to be
will consist of a full range of hydrocarbons. taken to the first and second stage separators,
With this well flow we will also get a vari- respectively. The chokes are set to reduce the
ety of unwanted components such as water, wellhead flow and pressure to the desired high
carbon dioxide, salts, sulfur and sand. The pressure and low pressure pressures separators
purpose of the surface facilities is to process (www.ipt.ntnu.no/~jsg/undervisning, 2013).
the well flow into clean marketable products:
oil, natural gas or condensates. Plants also Separators
include a number of utility systems, not part
of the actual process, but providing energy, Phase separation of the produced fluids is
water, air or some other utility to the plant. primary processing operation. A separator is
This section provides an overview of gathering a horizontal, vertical (Figure 2) or spherical
system and main surface facilities. vessel in which a mixture of produced fluids
is separated. The main principles used to
220
Figure 1. Manifold (part of author’s private collection of INA Plc’s facility)
Figure 2. Vertical separator (part of author’s

achieve physical separation of gas and liquids
private collection of INA Plc’s facility)
are gravity settling and coalescing. A well
stream separator must perform the following
(Stewart&Arnold, 1998a):
• Cause a primary phase separation of

the liquid hydrocarbon from those that
are gas;
• Refine the primary separation by re-
moving most of the entrained liquid
mist from the gas;
• Further refine the separation by remov-
ing the entrained gas from the liquid;
• Discharge the separated gas and liquid
from the vessel.
Because of the multi component nature of

the produced fluid, the higher the pressure at
which the initial separation occurs, the more
liquid will be obtained in the separator. This
liquid contains some light components that
vaporize in the stock tank downstream of the
separator. If the pressure for initial separation
is too high, too many light components will
221
stay in the liquid phase at the separator and oil-water mixture contains emulsion, which
will be lost to the gas phase at the tank. If causes problems during the process. However,
the pressure is too low, not as many of these the problem of the emulsion is solved by the
light components will be stabilized into liquid utilization of chemicals. As the oil is lighter
at the separator and they will be lost to the than the water, it rises. The water proceeds
gas phase. The tendency of any component downwards at the same time. Once the liquid
in the process stream to flash to the vapor reaches the end of the separator, the liquids
phase depends on its partial pressure. Thus, remaining- the oil and water- are discharged
if the pressure in the vessel is high, the partial separately. Although theoretically, this process
pressure for the component will be relatively is percieved as simple, it remains complex in
high and the molecules of that component will reality. Addition of a high number of chemi-
tend toward the liquid phase. As the separator cals, as well as the occasional heat utilization
pressure is increased, the liquid flow rate out to speed up the separation make this process
of the separator increases. The problem with complex.
this is that many of these molecules are the
lighter hydrocarbons (methane, ethane, and 2-Phase Separation for Liquid
propane), which have a strong tendency to
flash to the gas state at stock tank conditions A 2-phase separation operates identically as
(atmospheric pressure). In the stock tank, the the 3-phase separation, only lacking in gas
presence of these large numbers of molecules which has to be removed. Either the 2-phase
creates a low partial pressure for the interme- separation is a continuous process as described
diate range hydrocarbons (butanes, pentane, above, or it is done batch-wise. In a batch-wise
and heptanes) whose flashing tendency at separation the crude is brought in very big
stock tank conditions is very susceptible to tanks where it is stored for a defined amount
small changes in partial pressure. Thus, by of time. During this time gravity separates the
keeping the lighter molecules in the feed to oil, the emulsion and the water. The water- be-
the stock tank capture of a small amount of ing the heaviest- sits at the bottom while the
them as liquids is enabled, but many more of oil- being the lightest- is at the top. Emulsion
the intermediate range molecules are lost to is found in the middle as it is a mixture of oil
the gas phase. and water, and its weight therefore is between
that of water and oil.
3-Phase Separation After some time, normally hours, the crude
has separated and is pumped to further pro-
Wells with a high content of gas have a high cesses. The storage time in the tank is known
pressure. This pressure is reduced in high by experience, because the crude will not
pressure separators, and mid or low pressure separate any further, even when stored for a
separators. This process is a continuous one, longer time. The issues at this stage are bigger
where at the front of the separator the liquid/ than they initially seem. The quality of the
gas is constantly added. The gas is released at delivered oil might fluctuate, depending on
the top and the oil-water mixture is separated the situation at the wells. The water content
theough the use of gravity and chemicals. The is sometime higher or lower resulting in the
222
addition of chemicals in order to speed up the Well Testing

process as well as to reach a better separation
with purer components in a shorter time. It is necessary to keep track of the gas, oil, and
water production from each well to be able to
Elektrostatic Separation manage the reserves properly, evaluate where
further reserve potential may be found, and
Electrostatic separation is used as well in diagnose well problems as quickly as possible.
order to separate crude with lower percent- Proper allocation of income also requires
age of water content. Inside the separator is knowledge of daily production rates as the
a mesh of wires where an electrostatic field royalty or working interest ownership may
is introduced to the liquid. This high voltage be different for each well. In simple facilities
electrical field speeds up the separation and that contain only a few wells, it is attractive
produces water and oil of purer quality. Yet, to route each well to its own separator and/
there is a drawback with the machines. The or treater and measure its gas oil, and water
electrical field has to be adjusted to the qual- production on a continuous basis. In facilities
ity and the composure of the incoming crude. that handle production from many wells, it is
If the crude is changing fast, impurities will sometimes more convenient to enable each
settle at the mesh and the electrical field will well to flow through the manifold to one or
collapse. This leads to a shutdown of the pro- more test separators.
cess, as it requires cleaning before restarting Test separators are used to separate the well
the process. High amount of energy required flow from one or more wells for analysis and
to sustain the electrical field as well as a lot detailed flow measurement (Figure 3). In this
of chemicals are needed in the electrostatic way, the behavior of each well under different
separator. pressure flow conditions can be defined. This
Figure 3. Test separator (part of author’s private collection of INA Plc’s facility)
223
normally takes place when the well is taken always be installed. The oil is skimmed off
into production and later at regular intervals- the surface of the barrel and the water exits
typically one to two months- and it measures from the bottom either through a water leg
the total and component flow rates under or an interface controller and a dump valve.
different production conditions. Undesirable Since the volume of the liquid is fixed by
consequences such as slugging or sand can the oil outlet, barrels cannot be used as surge
also be determined. The separated components tanks. Flow from the treater goes to a surge
are analyzed in the laboratory to determine tank from which it either flows into a barge
hydrocarbon composition of the gas, oil and or truck or is pumped into a pipeline.
condensate. Test separators can also be used After the third stage separator, the oil can
to produce fuel gas for power generation when go to a coalescer for final water extraction.
the main process is not running. Alternatively, In this unit, the water content can be reduced
a three phase flow meter could be used. to below 0.1%. The coalescer is completely
filled with liquid: water at the bottom and oil
Oil Treating on top. Internal electrodes form an electric
field, breaking the surface bonds between
Most oil treating on offshore facilities is conductive water thus isolating oil in the oil-
done in vertical or horizontal treaters. A water emulsion. The coalescer field plates
gas blanket is provided to assure that there are generally steel, sometimes covered with
is always enough pressure in the treater so dielectric material to prevent short-circuits.
the water will flow to the water treating. At If the separated oil contains unacceptable
onshore locations the oil may be treated in amounts of salts, they can be removed in an
a big settling tank. All tanks should have a electrostatic desalter. The salts, which may
pressure/vacuum valve with flame arrester be sodium, calcium or magnesium chlorides
and gas blanket to keep a positive pressure come from the reservoir water and are also
on the system and exclude oxygen. This helps dissolved in the oil. The desalter will be
prevent corrosion, eliminate a potential safety placed after the first or second stage separa-
hazard, as well as conserve some of the hy- tor depending on gas/oil ratio and water cut.
drocarbon vapors. A pressure in the tank lifts
a weighted disk or pallet, which allows the Custody Transfer Oil Measurement
gas to escape. If there is a vacuum in the tank
because the gas blanket failed to maintain a In large facilities oil is typically sold through a
slight positive pressure, the greater ambient measurement unit, which is designed to meet
pressure lifts another disk, which allows air API Standards and whatever additional mea-
to enter. Although we wish to exclude air, it suring and sampling standards are required by
is preferable to allow a small controlled vol- the crude purchaser. The value received for
ume into the tank rather than allow the tank the crude will typically depend on its grav-
to collapse. Flame arrester contains tubes that ity, sediment and water content, and volume.
prevent the vent flame from traveling back into Therefore, the measurement unit must not
the tank. Flame arresters have a tendency to only measure the volume accurately, but must
gather excess paraffin resulting in the block- continuously monitor the sediment and water
age and thus must be installed where they can content and take a sufficiently representative
be inspected and maintained. Since they can sample so that the gravity, the sediment and
get blocked, a separate relieving device must water content can be measured. The crude
224
first flows through a strainer/gas eliminator to Pumps are sometimes used in water treating
protect the meter and to assure that there is no and disposal processes. In addition, many
gas in the liquid. An automatic sediment and small pumps may be required for pumping
water content probe is mounted in a vertical skimmed oil to higher pressure vessels for
run. When measured value exceeds the sales treating, glycol heat medium and cooling
contract quality, this probe automatically water service and firefighting.
actuates the diverter valve, which blocks the
liquid from going further in the measurement Water Treating
unit and sends it back to the process for further
treatment. Sampler in a vertical run, situated On an installation where the water cut is high,
downstream of the diverter, takes a calibrated there will be a huge amount of water produced.
sample that is proportional to the flow and Often this water contains sand particles bound
delivers it to a sample container. The sampler to the oil/water emulsion. The environmental
receives a signal from the meter to assure that regulations in most countries are quite strict
the sample size is always proportional to flow regarding the limits of oil in water discharged
even if the flow varies. The sample container in the environment. It also places limits on
has a mixing pump so that the liquid in the other forms of contaminants.
container can be mixed and made homoge- Water from the separators and coalescers
neous prior to taking a sample of this fluid. first goes to a sand cyclone, which removes
The liquid then flows through a positive dis- most of the sand. The sand is washed further
placement meter. Most sales contracts require before it is discharged. The water then goes
the meter to be proven at least once a month to a hydro cyclone, a centrifugal separator
and a new meter factor calculated. On large that will remove oil drops. The hydro cyclone
installations, a meter prover is included as a creates a standing vortex where oil collects
permanent part of the measurement unit or is in the middle and water is forced to the side.
brought to the location when a meter must be Finally the water is collected in the water de-
proven. The meter prover contains a known gassing drum. Dispersed gas will slowly rise
volume between two detector switches. A to the surface and pull remaining oil droplets
spheroid pig moves back and forth between to the surface by flotation. The surface oil
the detectors as the four-way valve is automati- film is drained, and the produced water can
cally switched. The volume recorded by the be discharged to the sea. Recovered oil in the
meter during the time the pig moves between water treatment system is typically recycled
detectors for a set number of traverses of the to the third stage separator.
prover is recorded electrically and compared
to the known volume of the meter prover. On Compressors
smaller installations, a master meter that has
been calibrated using a prover may be brought Gas enters the first-stage suction scrubber.
to the location to run in series with the meter Any liquids that may have come through the
to be proven. In many onshore locations a line are separated at this point and the gas
truck-mounted meter prover is used. The sales flows to the first stage. Compression heats
meter must have a proven repeatability. the gas. Due to the heating, there is a cooler
Pumps are normally needed to move oil after each compression stage. At the higher
through the measurement unit and deliver it at pressure, more liquids may separate, so the
pressure to a pipeline downstream of the unit. gas enters another scrubber before being com-
225
pressed and cooled again. The compressor is dial wheels, 6000-20000 rpm (highest
equipped with an automatic suction shut-in for small size), up to 80 MW load at
valve on each inlet and a discharge shut-in discharge pressure of up to 50bars and
valve so that when the unit shuts down, or inlet volumes of up to 500,000 m3/hour.
when an abnormal condition is detected, Pressure differential up to 10.
the shut-in valves actuate to isolate the unit
from any new sources of gas. Many operators Most compressors will not cover the full
prefer, and in some cases regulations require, pressure range efficiently. The lowest pressure
an automatic blow down valve installation so is atmospheric, for gas to pipeline, some 3
that- as well as in the isolating the unit- all to 5 MPa (30-50 bar) pressure is used, while
the gas contained within the unit is vented reservoir reinjection of gas will typically
safely at a remote location. Several types of require 20 MPa (200 bar) and upwards since
compressors are used for gas compression, there is no liquid in the tubing and the full res-
each with different characteristics such as ervoir pressure must be overcome. Therefore
operating power, speed, pressure and volume compression is divided into several stages to
(Devold, 2009; Nooijen H. & Clinton, 2012): improve maintenance and availability. Due to
single unit power limitations, compression is
• Reciprocating compressors which use often divided in several parallel trains.
a piston and cylinder design with 2-2 Compressors are driven by gas turbines or
cylinders are built up to about 30 MW electrical motors (for lower power also recipro-
power, around 500-1800 rpm (lower cating engines, steam turbines are sometimes
for higher power) with pressure up to 5 used if thermal energy is available). Often
MPa (500 bars). Used for lower capac- several stages in the same train are driven by
ity gas compression and high reservoir the same motor or turbine.
pressure gas injection. The main operating parameters for a com-
• Screw compressors are manufactured pressor are the flow and pressure differentials.
up to several MW, synchronous speed The product defines the total loading, so there
(3000/3600 rpm) and pressure up to is a ceiling set by the maximum design power.
about 2.5 MPa (25 bar). Two counter- Furthermore, there is a maximum differential
rotating screws with matching profiles pressure and choke flow, the maximum flow
provide positive displacement and a that can be achieved. At lower flow, there is
wide operating range. Typical use is a minimum pressure differential and flow
natural gas gathering. before the compressor will “surge” if there
• Axial blade and fin type compressors is not enough gas to operate. If variations
with up to 15 wheels provide high in flow are expected or difference between
volumes at relatively low pressure dif- common shaft compressors will occur, the
ferential (discharge pressure 3-5 times situation will be handled with recirculation.
inlet pressure), speeds of 5000-8000 A high flow, high pressure differential surge
rpm, and inlet flows up to 200000 m3/ control valve will open to let gas from the
hour. Applications include air com- discharge side back into the suction side. Since
pressors and cooling compression in this gas is heated, it will also pass through the
LNG plants. heat exchanger and it will be scrubber not to
• Larger oil and gas installations use become overheated by circulation.
centrifugal compressors with 3-10 ra-
226
The operating characteristics are defined control to optimize performance, based on

by the manufacturer. The objective of com- various corrective and predictive algorithms.
pressor performance control is to keep the If the compressor is turbine driven, a dedi-
operating point close to the optimal set point cated speed governor handles the fuel valves
without violating the constraints, by means and other controls on the turbine to maintain
of control outputs, such as the speed setting. efficiency and control rotational speed. For
However, gas turbine speed control response electrical motors, this function is handled by
is relatively slow and even electric motors are a variable speed drive.
not fast enough, since surge response must The final function around the compres-
be in the 100 ms range. Anti surge control sor itself is lube and seal oil handling. Most
will protect the compressor from going into compressors have wet seals, which serve
surge by operating the surge control valve. as traps around shafts where the oil at high
The basic strategy is to use distance between pressure prevents gas from leaking out to the
operating point and surge line to control the atmosphere or other parts of the equipment.
valve with a slower response time starting Oil is used for lubrication of the high speed
at the surge control line. Crossing the surge bearings. This oil gradually absorbs gas under
trip line will cause a fast response opening pressure and may become contaminated, so it
of the surge valve to protect the compressor. needs to be filtered and degassed.
Operation with recirculation wastes energy
(which could result in unnecessary emissions) Gas Dehydrators
and produces wear and tear, particularly on
the surge valve. Each vendor supplies several Natural gas contain water and should be de-
variants of compressor control and anti surge hydrated in dehydration unit (Figure 4) to a
Figure 4. Gas dehydrators (part of author’s private collection of INA Plc’s facility)
227
controlled water content to avoid hydration as the glycols show complete mutual solubility
well as to minimize the corrosion problems. in the liquid phase due to hydrogen-oxygen
Unless gas is dehydrated, liquid water may bonds, and their water vapor pressures are
condense in pipelines and accumulate at low very low.
points along the line, reducing its flow capac- This is the most common type of gas de-
ity. Several methods have been developed to hydration system, where bubble-cap glycol
dehydrate gases on an industrial scale. contact tower is used. Wet gas enters the base
The three major methods of dehydration of the tower and flows upward through the
are direct cooling, adsorption and absorption bubble caps. Dry glycol enters the top of the
(Stewart & Arnold, 1998b). tower and because of the down-comer wier
Molecular sieves, silica gel, and bauxite are on the edge of each tray, flows across the tray
the desiccants used in adsorption processes. and down to the next. There are typically six
In absorption processes, the most frequently to eight trays in most applications. The bubble
used desiccants are diethylene and triethylene caps assure that the upward flowing gas is
glycols. Usually, the absorption/stripping dispersed into small bubbles to maximize its
cycle is used for removing large amounts of contact area with the glycol. Before entering
water, and adsorption is used for cryogenic the contactor, the dry glycol is cooled by the
systems to reach low moisture contents. outlet gas to minimize vapor losses when it
enters the tower. The wet glycol leaves from the
Direct Cooling base of the tower and flows to the reconcentra-
tor (reboiler) by way of heat exchangers, a gas
The saturated vapor content of natural gas separator, and filters. In the reboiler the glycol
decreases with increased pressure or de- is heated to a sufficiently high temperature to
creased temperature. Thus, hot gas saturated drive off the water as steam. The dry glycol is
with water may be partially dehydrated by then pumped back to the contact tower. Most
direct cooling. Gas subjected to compression glycol dehydrators use tri ethylene glycol,
is normally “after cooled”, and this cooling which can be heated from 444 K to 478 K
may remove water from the gas. The cool- (340 °F to 400 °F) in the reconcentrator and
ing process must reduce the temperature to work with gas temperatures up to 322K (120
the lowest value that the gas will encounter °F). Tetra ethylene glycol is more expensive
at the prevailing pressure to prevent further but it can handle hotter gas without high losses
condensation of water. and can be heated in the reconcentrator from
478 K to 494 K (400 °F to 430 °F).
Absorption of Water in Glycols
Adsorption of Water by a Solid
Absorption dehydration involves the use of a
liquid desiccant to remove water vapor from Adsorption dehydration is the process where
the gas. Although many liquids possess the a solid desiccant is used for the removal of
ability to absorb water from gas, the liquid that water vapor from a gas stream. The solid
is most desirable to use for commercial dehy- desiccants commonly used for gas dehydra-
dration purposes are the glycols, particularly tion are those that can be regenerated and,
ethylene glycol, diethylene glycol, tri ethylene consequently, used over several adsorption/
glycol, and tetra ethylene glycol . Water and desorption cycles. The mechanisms of adsorp-
228
tion on a surface exist in two types; physical also functions as a heat exchanger for liquid
and chemical. Chemical adsorbents find a very to and from the reboilers.
limited application in the gas processing. Ad- The glycol is recycled by removing the
sorbents that allow physical adsorption hold absorbed liquid. This is done in the reboiler,
the adsorbate on their surface by the surface which is filled with rich glycol and heated to
forces. For physical adsorbents, solids used boil out the liquids at the temperature of about
in gas dehydration are bauxite ore, consisting 400 K to 450 K (260-350 °F) for a number of
primarily of alumina, silica gels and silica- hours. Usually there is a distillation column
alumina gels, and molecular sieves. Activated on the gas vent to further improve separation
carbon, a widely used adsorbent, possesses no of glycol and other hydrocarbons. For higher
capacity for water adsorption and is therefore capacity, there are often two reboilers which
not used for dehydration purposes, though it alternate between heating rich glycol and
may be used for the removal of certain impu- draining recycled processed glycol.
rities. Bauxite use is also minimal because it On a standalone unit, the heat is supplied
contains iron and is thus unsuitable for sour from a burner that uses covered vaporized
gases. hydrocarbons. In other designs, heating will
be a combination of hot cooling substances
Scrubbers and Reboilers from other parts of the process and electric
heaters, recycling the hydrocarbon liquids to
The separated gas may contain mist and other the third stage separator.
liquid droplets. Drops of water and hydrocar-
bons also form when the gas is cooled in the Heat Exchangers
heat exchanger, and must be removed before
it reaches the compressor. If liquid droplets For the compressor to operate efficiently, gas
enter the compressor they will erode the fast temperature should be low. The lower the
rotating blades. A scrubber is designed to temperature, the less energy will be used to
remove small fractions of liquid from the gas. compress the gas for the given final pressure
There are various types of gas-drying and temperature. However both gas from
equipment available, but the most common separators and compressed gas are relatively
suction (compressor) scrubber is based on hot. When gas is compressed, it must remain
dehydration by absorption in tri ethylene in thermodynamic balance so this ends up as
glycol. The scrubber consists of many levels a temperature increase.
of glycol layers. Heat exchangers of various forms are
A large number of gas traps force the gas used to cool the gas. Plate heat exchangers
to bubble up through each glycol layer as it consist of a number of plates where the gas
flows from the bottom up each section to the and cooling medium pass between alternating
top. Processed glycol is pumped in at the top plates in opposing directions. Tube and shell
from the holding tank. It flows from level exchangers place tubes inside a shell filled
to level against the gas flow as it spills over with of cooling fluid. The cooling fluid is
the edge of each trap. During this process it often pure water with corrosion inhibitors.
absorbs liquids from the gas and comes out When designing the process, it is impor-
as rich glycol at the bottom. The holding tank tant to plan the thermal energy balance. Heat
229
should be conserved e.g. by using the cooling • Non-regenerative, which means that
fluid from the gas train to reheat oil in the oil the materials used in treating the gas
train. Excess heat is dispersed e.g. by seawater are not recovered in these processes.
cooling. However hot seawater is extremely • Regenerative processes with recovery
corrosive, so materials with high resistance as H2S. These include the physical ab-
to corrosion, such as titanium must be used. sorption processes, the amine process-
es, molecular sieves, etc.
Gas Sweetening • Regenerative processes with recov-
ery as elemental sulfur. With grow-
Many natural gases contain hydrogen sulfide ing environmental concerns regarding
(H2S) in concentration ranging from barely sulfur emission, these processes have
detectable quantities to over 30 mole percent. acquired a prominent role in desulfur-
Gases containing H2S or CO2 are classified ization operations.
as sour, and gases free from H2S and CO2
are called sweet. With increasing demands Mercury Removal
to natural gas, natural gases containing H2S
are also being tapped for utilization after Mercury removal is generally based on
purification. Natural gas that is transported molecular sieves. A molecular sieve is a
to the market must meet legal requirements, substance containing a material with tiny
which specify a maximum H2S content less pores to achieve a large surface area, such as
than 4ppm in the gas. These requirements activated carbon. The surface of the material
are justified, since H2S is a toxic gas, and allows certain molecules to bind by surface
its combustion product is sulfur dioxide or tension. The molecules can later be extracted
trioxide. Besides emitting a bad odor at low and the sieve material regenerated by heat-
concentrations, H2S is deadly poisonous and ing, pressure and/or purging with a carrier
it can be fatal in just three to five minutes at gas. A molecular sieve is commonly cyclic
concentrations above 600 ppm. Its toxicity with one active unit and one (or more) units
is comparable to cyanide. Thus, it cannot be in regeneration.
tolerated in the gas being used as a domestic
fuel. Further, H2S is corrosive to all metals Nitrogen Rejection
normally associated with gas transporting,
processing and handling systems, and may Excessive nitrogen is removed by cryogenic
lead to premature failure of most such systems. distillation and higher concentrations are re-
The removal of H2S from natural gas is moved by absorption with lean oil or another
accompanied by the removal of CO2 and special solvent if a smaller fraction is detected.
COS if present, since these have similar acid (See acid gas removal for both principles).
characteristics. Like dehydration processes, Cryogenic removal also permits production of
desulfurization processes are primarily of two helium, if present, as a valuable by-product.
types: adsorption on a solid (dry process), and
absorption into a liquid (wet process). Both NGL Recovery and Treatment
the adsorption and absorption processes may
be of the physical or chemical type. These Remaining NGL is recovered from the gas
processes may also be classified into the fol- stream in most modern plants by a cryogenic
lowing categories: turbo expander based process, followed by a
230
fractionating process. This process leads the design, as will the power requirement of each
cooled NGLs though distillation columns stage. It is often a patented, location-specific
called de-ethanizer, de-propanizer and de- combination of one or two main components
butanizer, to extract ethane, propane and bu- and several smaller ones, together with care-
tane respectively and leave a residual stream ful selection of the compressed pressure and
of pentane and higher hydrocarbons. expanded pressure of the refrigerant, to match
The final step is to remove mercaptans the LNG gas stream.
(smelly organic gases e.g. CH3SH) if present, The pre-cooling stage cools the gas to a
in a sweetening process, based on molecular temperature of about 243 K to 223 K (-22
sieves adsorption orcatalytic oxidization such °F to -58 °F) in the pre-cooling cold box.
as Merox or Sulfrex, where the main difference The cooling element is generally propane,
is in the use of a different type of catalyst. or a mixture of propane, ethane and small
quantities of other gases. The pre-cooling
LNG Liquefaction cold box also cools the cooling medium for
the liquefaction and subcooling stage. The
LNG is a gas transport product. The gas, pri- liquefaction process takes the gas down from
marily methane (CH4), is converted to a liquid 243K (-22 °F) to about 173 K to 148 K(-148
form for the ease of storage or transport. It is °F to -193 °F) typically based on a mixture
produced close to the production facilities in of methane, ethane and other gases. It cools
a LNG liquefaction plant, stored, transported the LNG stream as well as the refrigerant for
in cryogenic tanks on an LNG carrier and the final stage. Sub-cooling brings the gas to
delivered to an LNG regasification terminal final stable LNG state at around 111K (-260
for storage and delivery to a pipeline system. °F). The refrigerant is usually methane and/
LNG processes are generally patented by or nitrogen.
large engineering, oil and gas companies, but
are generally based on a two or three stage Custody Transfer Gas Measurement
cooling process. The actual design varies
considerably with the different processes. The Partners, authorities and customers all calcu-
most critical component is the heat exchanger, late invoices, taxes and payments based on
also called the cold box, which is designed the actual product that is shipped out. Often
for optimum cooling efficiency. Designs may custody transfer also takes place at this point,
use separate cold boxes, or two stages may which means transfer of responsibility or title
combine into one complex common heat from the producer to a customer, shuttle tanker
exchanger. operator or pipeline operator. Although some
Most processes use a mixed refrigerant small installations are still operated with a
design. The reason is that the gas has a heat dipstick and manual records, larger installa-
load to temperature curve that must be closely tions have analysis and metering equipment.
matched to improve stability and efficiency. To make sure readings are accurate, a fixed
The curve tends to show three distinct regions, or movable prover loop for calibration is also
matching the pre-cooling, liquefaction and installed.
sub-coiling stages. The refrigerant gas com- Custody transfer gas measurement is
position will vary based on the individual similar to the oil measurement, but analyzers
231
will measure hydrocarbon content and energy via tank strapping tables (depending on tank
value as well as the pressure and temperature. geometry) and compensated for temperature
The meters are normally turbine and orifice to provide standard volume. Float gauges can
meters or ultrasonic meters. Orifice plates with also calculate density, therefore the mass can
a diameter less than the pipe are mounted in be established.
cassettes. The pressure differential over the Storage LNG at the terminals and on
orifice plate as well as the pressure and tem- LNG carriers is done in cryogenic tanks at
perature are used in standard formulas (such atmospheric pressure or slightly above, up to
as AGA 3 and ISO 5024/5167) to calculate 125 kPa (1.25 bar). The tanks are insulated,
normalized flow. Orifice plates are sensitive but will not keep LNG cold enough to avoid
to a buildup of residue and affect the edges evaporation. Heat leakage will heat and boil
of the hole. Larger new installations therefore off the LNG. Therefore LNG is stored as a
prefer turbine and ultrasonic gas meters. Gas boiling cryogen, which means that the liquid
metering is less accurate than the liquid me- is stored at its boiling point for its storage
tering, typically ±1.0% of mass. pressure (atmospheric pressure) i.e. about
LNG is often metered with mass flow 111K (-260 °F). As the vapor boils off, heat
meters that can operate at the required low from the vaporization is absorbed, cooling
temperature. At various points in the move- the remaining liquid. The effect is called
ment of oil and gas, similar measurements auto-refrigeration. With efficient insulation,
are taken, usually in a more simplified way. only a relatively small amount of boil-off is
necessary to maintain a steady temperature.
Storage Boil-off gas from land based LNG storage
tanks is compressed and fed to natural gas
On most production sites, the oil and gas pipeline networks. On LNG carriers the boil-
is piped directly to a refinery or tanker ter- off gas can be used for fuel. At the receiving
minal. Gas is difficult to store locally, but terminal, the LNG is stored in local cryogenic
occasionally underground mines, caverns tanks. It is re-gasified to ambient temperature
or salt deposits can be used to store gas. On on demand, commonly in the sea water heat
platforms without a pipeline, oil is stored on exchanger, and then injected into the gas
the board storage tanks to be transported by pipeline system.
shuttle tanker. The oil is stored in storage cells
around the shafts on concrete platforms, and Marine Loading
in tanks on floating units. On some floaters,
a separate storage tanker is used. Ballast han- Loading systems consist of one or more load-
dling is very important in both cases to balance ing arms/jetties, pumps, valves and a metering
the buoyancy when the oil volume varies. system. Tanker loading systems are complex,
Onshore, fixed roof tanks are used for crude both because of the volume involved, and
oil storage and floating roof for condensate. because several loading arms will normally
Rock caves are also used for storage. interact with the tanker’s ballast system to
Special tank gauging systems such as level control the loading operation. The tanks must
radars, pressure or float are used to measure be filled in a certain sequence; otherwise the
the level in storage tanks, cells and caves. The tanker’s structure might be damaged due to
level measurement is converted to volume uneven stresses. It is the responsibility of the
232
tanker’s ballast system to signal data to the up to 30,000 signals to and from the process
loading system and to operate the different require a dedicated distributed control system.
valves, while monitoring the tanks on board The purpose of this system is to read values
the ship. from a large number of sensors, run programs
to monitor the process and control valves and
Pipeline Terminal switches in order control the process.
Supervisory control and data acquisition
The gas pipeline is fed from the high pres- (SCADA) is normally associated with telem-
sure compressors. Oil pipelines are driven by etry and wide area communications, for data
separate booster pumps. For longer pipelines, gathering and control over large production
intermediate compressor stations or pump sites, pipelines, or corporate data from mul-
stations will be required due to distance or tiple facilities. With telemetry, the band width
crossing of the mountain ranges. Block valve is often quite low and based on telephone or
stations are placed at regular intervals to limit local radio systems. SCADA systems are often
the potential leakage volume in case of a pipe optimized for efficient use of the available
rupture. band width. Wide area communication oper-
The pipeline terminal includes termination ates with wideband services, such as optical
systems for the pipeline. A pig launcher and fibers and broadband internet.
receiver will be included, to allow insertion of a
pipeline pigging device used to clean or inspect Emergency Shutdown and
the pipeline on the inside. This is essentially Process Shutdown
a large chamber that can be pressurized and
purged to insert and remove the pig or scraper The process control system should control
without depressurizing the pipeline. The pig the process when it is operating within nor-
is often driven by pipeline flow. mal constrains such as level, pressure and
temperature. The emergency shutdown and
Utility Systems process shutdown systems will take action
when the process goes into a malfunction or
Utility systems do not handle the hydrocar- dangerous state. For this purpose the system
bon process flow, but provide some service maintains four sets of limits for a process
to the main process safety as well residents. value. Separate transmitters are provided for
Depending on the location of the installa- safety systems.
tion, many such functions may be available System requirements are set by official
from nearby infrastructure (e.g. electricity). laws and regulations and industry standards
But many remote installations must be fully such as lEC 61508/61511 which set certifica-
self-sustaining and must generate their own tion requirements for process safety systems
power and water. and set criteria for the safety integrity level
of each loop.
Process Control and SCADA
Fire and Gas System
A process control system is used to monitor
data and control equipment on the plant. Very The fire and gas system is not generally related
small installations may use hydraulic or pneu- to any particular process. Instead it divides into
matic control systems, but larger plants with fire areas by geographical location. Each fire
233
Figure 5. Flare (part of author’s private collection

area should be designed to be self-contained
of INA Plc’s facility)
and it should detect fire and gas by several
types of sensors, and control fire protection
and fire fighting devices to contain and fight
fire within the fire area. In the event of fire,
the area will be partially shut-off by closing
ventilation fire dampers. A fire area protection
datasheet typically shows what detection ex-
ists for each fire area and what fire protection
action should be taken in case of an incident.
Power Generation,
Distribution and Drives
Power can be provided from mains power or

from local gas turbines or diesel generator
sets. Large facilities have high power demands,
from 30 MW and up to several hundred MW.
There is a tendency to generate electric power
centrally and use electric drives for large equip-
ment rather than multiple gas turbines, as this
decreases maintenance and increases uptime.
The power generation system on a large
facility usually consists of several gas turbines
diving electric generators, 20-40 MW each. If • Depressurization either in response to
exhaust heat is not needed in the main process, an emergency situation or as part of a
it can be used to drive exhaust steam turbines normal procedure;
(dual cycle) for additional efficiency. • Planned depressurization of subsea pro-
duction flow lines and export pipelines;
Flare and Atmospheric Ventilation • Venting from equipment operating
close to the atmospheric pressure.
Flare subsystems include flare (Figure 5),
atmospheric ventilation and blow down. The The systems are typically divided into a
purpose of the flare and vent systems is to high pressure flare and a low pressure flare
provide safe discharge and disposal of gases systems. The LP system is operated a little
and liquids resulting from: above atmospheric pressure to prevent atmo-
spheric gases such as oxygen flowing back
• Spill-off flaring from the product stabi- into the vent and the flare system thus gen-
lization system ; erating a combustible mixture. With low gas
• Production testing; flow, inert gas is injected at the flare nozzle
• Relief of excess pressure caused by to prevent air ingress.
worsened conditions and thermal Traditionally, considerable amounts of
expansion; hydrocarbons have been more or less continu-
234
ously flared. In these cases, a continuously One function is to provide air to equipment
burning pilot is used to ensure ignition of rooms that are secured by positive pressure.
hydrocarbons in the flare. This prevents potential influx of explosive
Stronger environmental focus has elimi- gases in case of a leak.
nated continuous flaring and the pilot in Also water system, chemicals system and
many areas. Vapors and flare gas are normally telecommunication systems play an important
recovered, and only in exceptional situations role in laying the foundations for a remote
does flaring occur. To avoid the pilot flame, operation, diagnostics and maintenance in
an ignition system is used to ensure safe igni- gathering system functionality.
tion even when large volumes are discharged.
One patented solution is a “ballistic ignition” Main Characteristics of
system which fires burning pellets into the Offshore Gathering Systems
flare gas flow (Devold, 2009).
Many methods are currently used to gather,
Instrument Air separate, store and transport production from
offshore areas, but process units are more
A large volume of compressed air is re- or less similar to previously described units
quired for the control of pneumatic valves used onshore. Production platforms provide
and actuators, tools and purging of cabinets. facilities for the separation of formation
It is produced by electrically driven screw fluids into oil, gas, and water. Depending on
compressors and further treated to be free of the project, the platform may only be used
particles, oil and water. for production as drilling can be conducted
from a separate drilling rig brought along-
The Heat, Ventilation and side. Some platforms are only used to bring
Air Conditioning System the hydrocarbons to surface and directly
export them for processing, whilst some gas
The heat, ventilation and air conditioning platforms may be unmanned during routine
system feeds conditioned air to the equipment production operations. Typically, multiple
and accommodation rooms etc. Cooling and wells are drilled from the platform location
heating is achieved by water-cooled or water/ using directional drilling techniques. In some
steam-heated heat exchangers. Heat may also cases, where field extremities are unreachable
be taken from gas turbine exhaust. In tropic by directional drilling from the fixed loca-
and sub-tropic areas, cooling is achieved by tion or where small reservoirs exist, subsea
compressor refrigeration units. In tropical production units are installed on the seabed
areas, gas turbine inlet air must be cooled to following drilling and the produced hydrocar-
achieve sufficient efficiency and performance. bons are tied into a nearby platform facility
The system is usually delivered as one package, by a system of risers. Following development
and may also include air emissions cleaning. drilling and well completion in readiness for
Some subsystems include: the flow of formation fluids, a “Christmas
tree”, which allows the control of flow to the
• Cool: Cooling medium, refrigeration surface, is placed onto the well head. The oil
system, freezing system. and / or gas are produced by separation of
• Heat: Heat medium system, hot oil the formation fluid mixture into oil, gas and
system. water, or gas and condensates at the platform.
235
Oil is exported from the platform by either support a steel deck (Figure 6). Drilling
pumping into a sub-sea pipeline to shore, to Equipment, production facilities and
a floating storage unit offshore, or directly to accommodation are typically housed
a tanker. Typically, gas is exported through a on the deck.
pipeline. Most fields produce in a predictable • Compliant Towers: Used in water
pattern, called a decline curve, where produc- depths ranging from around 500 m up
tion increases relatively rapidly to a peak, and to 1,000 m and consisting of a narrow,
then follows a long slow decline. Water or gas flexible tower on a piled foundation
injection is often used to maintain reservoir supporting a conventional deck.
pressure and enhance production. • Tension Leg Platforms: Used in water
There are many types of offshore plat- depths of up to about 2,000 m and con-
forms, as: sists of a floating facility moored to the
seabed and fixed in place by anchors.
• Fixed Platforms: Used in water depths Mini tension leg platforms exist that
of up to around 500 m and consisting of are used in water depths of between
steel or concrete legs (jacket) secured 200 m and 1,000 m.
directly to the seabed by steel piles that
Figure 6. Fixed platform (part of author’s private collection of INA Plc’s facility)
236
• Jack-Up Platforms: Used in shallower facilities by pipeline. Also, the production

water up to around 100m and transport- from multi well platforms can be flowed to
ed to location where the legs are low- onshore separation facilities through a sepa-
ered by hydraulic jacks into position to rate pipeline.
support the deck. Permanent drilling-production platforms
• Spar Platforms: Used in water depths are used to drill wells and handle production.
between 500 m and 1,700 m and con- The crude oil, after separation on the platform,
sisting of a cylindrical hull supporting is produced into minimum storage facilities
a floating platform. and piped to shore, towards the treating and
• Floating Production Systems: Ships metering facilities. The gas that is not used is
equipped with processing facilities and either piped to the shore after treatment and
moored on location with a series of compression, or flared offshore.
anchors Old offshore fields produce more water
than oil. The rising water cut increases the
Even though there are many types of plat- force needed to lift a production stream holding
forms, the gathering systems are similar. In- ever less oil, as the pressure in the reservoir
dividual wells flow full stream by submarine declines. Ultimately the natural force isn’t
flow lines to one of flow stations. Each flow enough to lift the water and oil from deepwa-
station is equipped with necessary manifolds, ter fields, which results in the termination of
production and test separators and pumping production if nothing is done. There are two
equipment. Gas is separated from the crude ways to do that: Increase the lift with pumps,
oil at the flow station. The gas is flared and or reduce the load by removing the water on
the crude oil is pumped through submarine the seafloor, disposing it there. Oil companies
gathering lines to the central gathering plat- are turning to subsea processing for financially
form, where the crude oil is metered and challenged projects, looking for ways to make
pumped to onshore facilities through a trans- them profitable (Rassenfoss, 2011).
mission pipeline. Onshore, final separation
is completed and the oil is stored in a large
tank farm. The crude oil producing and han- GATHERING SYSTEMS AND
dling system is highly automated and re- PROCESSING FACILITIES
motely controlled from shore. Crude oil, after RISK ANALYSIS
metering can be pumped through a pipeline
and hose to a permanently anchored storage The main principles of gathering and the most
hulk. From storage hulk crude oil can be often used processing units are previously
pumped through a submarine line to an export described. The significance of their impact
tanker anchored seaward of the hulk. depends upon factors such as production
When operating near land, the crude oil quantities, the number and size of units,
is transported full stream to shore separation types of processing facilities, the amount
facilities instead of being separated offshore. of land disturbed by activities and occupied
Production from several individual wells and/ by the facilities, etc. One of the important
or small multi well platforms can be flowed factors is impact duration. Impacts on the
full stream through gathering lines to a large environment can lead to changes in existing
platform. From that point the crude will flow conditions; the impacts can be direct, indirect
full stream to onshore separation and storage or cumulative. These changes can be found
237
at different ecological levels, and can vary • Airborne particulates from soil distur-
over space and time as they can be either bance during construction and from ve-
positive or negative. Direct impacts refer to hicle traffic;
changes in environmental components that • Particulates from other burning sourc-
result from direct cause-effect consequences es, such as well testing.
of interactions between the environment and
gathering and processing activities. Indirect On offshore facilities, support and supply
impacts result from cause-effect consequences vessels as well as helicopters are included.
of interactions between the environment and The principal emission gases include
direct impacts. Cumulative impacts refer to carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, methane,
the accumulation of changes to the environ- volatile organic carbons and nitrogen oxides.
ment caused by the activities. Environmental Emissions of sulphur dioxides and hydrogen
impacts that could occur during the gather- sulphide can occur and depend upon the
ing and processing would mostly occur from sulphur content of the hydrocarbon and die-
construction and installation activities, daily sel fuel, particularly when used as a power
activities, maintenance and replacement of fa- source. In some cases sulphur content can lead
cility components and also decommissioning to odour near the facility. Ozone depleting
and abandonment activities. Potential impacts substances are used in some fire protection
from these onshore and offshore activities are systems, principally halon, and as refrigerants.
presented below, by the environmental impact Following substantial efforts by technology,
sources or type of affected resource. unplanned emissions have been significantly
reduced and alternative agents for existing and
Air Quality and Climate new developments have been engineered. The
volumes of atmospheric emissions and their
Atmospheric and climate issues are attract- potential impact depend upon the nature of
ing increasing interest from both owners and the process under consideration. Flaring of
government authorities worldwide. In order to produced gas is the most significant source of
examine the potential impacts, it is important air emissions, particularly where there is no
to understand the sources and nature of the infrastructure or market available for the gas.
emissions and their relative contribution to However, where viable, gas is processed and
atmospheric impacts- both local and those distributed as an important commodity. Thus,
related to global issues such as stratospheric through integrated development and providing
ozone depletion and climate change. The of the markets for all products, the need for
primary sources of atmospheric emissions flaring will be greatly reduced. Flaring may
from oil and gas gathering and processing also occur on occasions as a safety measure,
arise from: during start-up, maintenance or upset in the
normal processing operation.
• Flaring, venting and purging gases; Flaring, venting and combustion are the
• Combustion processes such as diesel primary sources of carbon dioxide emissions
engines and gas turbines; from production operations, but other gases
• Fugitive gases from loading operations should also be considered. Air pollution may
and tankage and losses from process cause health effects and reduce visibility.
equipment;
238
Terrain and Soils pathways can damage soils and usable water
resources (both surface and groundwater), if
Potential impacts to soil arise from three seepage and leaching are not contained.
basic sources: Land farming and land spreading have also
been extensively practiced in the past for the
• Physical disturbance as a result of treatment of oily petroleum wastes, and water-
construction; based mud and cuttings. However, there are
• Contamination resulting from spillage potential impacts where toxic concentrations
and leakage; of constituents may contaminate the soil or
• Solid waste disposal; water resources, if an exposure pathway is
• Indirect impact arising from opening present. In the case of mud and cuttings, the
access and social change. most important consideration is the potential
for the waste to have a high salt content.
Potential impacts that may result from a Land farming and land spreading, however,
poor design and construction include soil remain viable treatment options provided
erosion due to soil structure, slope or rainfall. a proper assessment is made, and correct
Left undisturbed and vegetated, soils will procedures are followed. Considerations
maintain their integrity, but, once vegetation include the site topography and hydrology,
is removed and soil is exposed, soil erosion the physical and chemical composition of
may result. Alterations to soil conditions may the waste and resultant waste/soil mixture.
result in widespread secondary impacts such With proper assessment, engineering, design,
as changes in surface hydrology and drainage operation and monitoring, land farming pro-
patterns, increased siltation and habitat dam- vides a cost effective and viable technique
age, reducing the capacity of the environment for waste disposal. Soil contamination may
to support vegetation and wildlife. In addition arise from spills and leakage of chemicals and
to causing soil erosion and altered hydrology, oil, causing possible impact to both flora and
the removal of vegetation may also lead to fauna. Simple preventative techniques such as
secondary ecological problems, particularly segregated and contained drainage systems
in situations where many of the nutrients in an for process areas incorporating sumps and
area are held in vegetation; or where the few oil traps, leak minimization and drip pans,
trees present are vital for wildlife browsing; or should be incorporated into facility design
in areas where natural recovery is very slow. and maintenance procedures. Such techniques
Clearing by operators may stimulate further will effectively remove any potential impact
removal of vegetation by the local population arising from small spills and leakage on site.
surrounding a development. Routine impacts to soil during the produc-
Due to its simplicity, burial or land-filling tion phase are also soil erosion impacts caused
of wastes in pits at drilling and production sites by vehicular traffic.
has been a popular means of waste disposal
in the past. Historically, pits have been used Impact of Produced Water
for burial of inert, non-recyclable materials and Water Resources
and drilling solids; evaporation and storage of
produced water, work over/completion fluids; Produced water is the largest volume aqueous
emergency containment of produced fluids; waste arising from processing operations,
and the disposal of stabilized wastes. However, and some typical constituents may include
the risks associated with pollutant migration in varying amounts inorganic salts, heavy
239
metals, solids, production chemicals, hydro- Other potential impacts to water availabil-
carbons, benzene, PAHs, and on occasions ity and quality during the processing would
naturally occurring radioactive material. The include possible minor degradation of water
environmental impact of produced waters quality resulting from vehicular traffic and
disposed to other receiving waters other than machinery operations during maintenance
ocean is highly dependent on the quantity, or, if improperly conducted, application of
the components, the receiving environment chlorides in dust suppressants or herbicides
and its dispersion characteristics. The extent for vegetation management. A spill or blowout
of the impact can only be judged through an could potentially cause extensive contamina-
environmental impact assessment. However, tion of surface waters or a shallow aquifer.
discharge to small streams and enclosed water
bodies is likely to require special care. Pro- Hazardous Materials and
duced water volumes vary considerably both Waste Management
with the type of gathering and processing and
throughout the lifetime of a field. Frequently Industrial wastes are generated during routine
the water cut is low, early in the production operations. These wastes are typically placed
life of a field. As time passes more water is in containers, characterized and labeled,
produced from the reservoir and may increase possibly stored briefly, and transported by a
to 80 per cent or more towards the end of licensed hauler to an appropriate permitted
field life. Other aqueous waste streams such off-site disposal facility as a standard practice.
as leakage and discharge of drainage waters Impacts could result if these wastes were not
may result in pollution of ground and surface properly handled and were released to the
waters. Impacts may be severe particularly environment. Environmental contamination
where ground and surface waters are utilized could occur from accidental spills of herbi-
for household purposes or where fisheries cides or, more significantly, oil. Chemicals
and ecologically important areas are affected. in open pits used to store wastes may pose a
Indirect or secondary effects on local threat to wildlife and livestock.
drainage patterns and surface hydrology may Sand separated from produced water must
result from poor construction practice in the be disposed of properly, and it is often con-
development of roads and process sites. taminated with oil, trace amounts of metals,
Most produced water is unfit for domestic or other naturally occurring constituents.
or agricultural. If it is disposed of by release During the processing, large volumes of
to the surface without treatment, it can cause scale and sludge wastes can accumulate inside
soil and surface water contamination. The pipelines and storage vessels. These wastes
majority of produced water is disposed of via consist of precipitated sulfate and carbonate
injection in disposal wells or enhanced recov- scales, produced sand, heavy hydrocarbons,
ery wells. Groundwater could be impacted tight emulsions, rust particles, other metals
during the injection of produced water if the and chemicals, and salts. They must be re-
injection well casing integrity is compromised. moved periodically from the equipment for
Regulations govern the disposal of produced disposal. These wastes may be transported to
water and maintenance of injection wells. If offsite disposal facilities. In some instances,
the injection well is not properly completed or they may be disposed of via land spreading,
is poorly maintained over time, aquifers can a practice that entails spreading the wastes
be impacted by the injected produced water. over the surface of the disposal area and
240
mixing it with the top few inches of soil. This from the station. Use of remote telemetry
practice often is done specifically to treat the equipment would reduce daily traffic and
hydrocarbons present in these wastes through associated noise levels within the oil and gas
biodegradation. In some instances, the land field area. The primary impacts from noise
spread area is periodically watered, worked would be localized disturbance to wildlife,
over to remix the soils and increase aeration, recreationists, and residents. Noise associ-
and treated with bio nutrients to further en- ated with cavitations is a major concern for
hance hydrocarbon degradation. landowners, livestock and wildlife.
Produced water can become a significant
waste stream. Regulations govern the disposal Roads and Land Use
of this waste stream; the majority of it is
disposed of by underground injection either Lease roads are constructed and used to sup-
in disposal wells or, in mature producting port various operations. The environmental
fields, in enhanced oil recovery wells (i.e., impact of the construction of a roadway can
wells through which produced water and other have long lasting effects well beyond the
materials are injected into a producing forma- limits of the right-of-way. Existing roads
tion in order to increase formation pressure should be utilized, where feasible, to limit
and production). the extent of new road construction, when
In some locations, produced water may they meet regulatory standards, transporta-
carry naturally occurring radioactive materials tion and development needs, and safety and
to the surface. Proper management of naturally environmental objectives. When it is neces-
occurring radioactive materials bearing in sary to build new roadways, they should be
produced water and solid wastes is critical to developed in an environmentally acceptable
prevent both occupational and public human manner consistent with landowner recommen-
health risks and environmental contamination. dations. Impacts to transportation daily traffic
Typical non-hazardous and hazardous levels, particularly heavy truck traffic, would
wastes routinely generated at offshore facilities be expected to be lower during the production
include general office and packaging wastes, phase compared to the drilling/development
waste oils, oil contaminated rags, hydraulic phase. For the most part, heavy truck traffic
fluids, used batteries, empty paint cans, waste would be limited to periodic visits to a well
chemicals and used chemical containers, used site for work over, formation treatment, and
filters, fluorescent tubes, scrap metals, and collection of produced product or water. The
medical waste, among others. use of pipelines to convey product or produced
water to centralized collection facilities or
Noise plants would reduce the volume of traffic
during the production phase.
The main sources of noise during the gather- Land use impacts during the gathering
ing and processing would include compressor and processing phase would be an extension
and pumping stations including occasional of those that occurred during the drilling and
flaring and vehicle traffic. Compressor sta- development phase. Land use can revert to
tions produce noise levels between 64 and 86 its original uses after decommissioning and
dBA at the station to between 58 and 75 dBA abandonment activities.
at a distance of about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers)
241
Ecological Resources Visual Resources
Adverse impacts to ecological resources could Once production facilities are installed, por-
occur from: tions of well pads, access roads, and pipeline
rights-of-way that are not needed for produc-
• Disturbance of wildlife from noise, ex- tion would be reclaimed; however, much of
traneous light, changes in vegetation the disturbed area would continue to contrast
cover and human activity; with the natural form, line, color, and texture of
• Exposure of biota to contaminants; the surrounding landscape. This would impact
• Mortality of biota from colliding with undisturbed vistas and areas of solitude. The
aboveground facilities or vehicles; aboveground portions of an oil or gas gather-
• Variations in water, air and soil/sedi- ing and processing would be highly visible in
ment quality; rural or natural landscapes, many of which
• Ecological resources may continue to may have few other comparable structures.
be affected by the reduction in habitat The artificial appearance of facilities may have
quality associated with habitat frag- visually incongruous “industrial” associations
mentation due to the presence of facili- for some, particularly in a predominantly
ties and access roads. natural landscape. Any nighttime lighting
would be visible from long distances.
The presence of oil or gas gathering and
processing could also interfere with migra- Health and Safety
tory and other behaviors of some wildlife.
Discharge of produced water inappropriately Possible impacts to health and safety during
onto soil or into surface water bodies can reproduction include accidental injury or death
sult in salinity levels too high to sustain plant to workers and, to a lesser extent, the public.
growth. One notable impact to wildlife is the Health impacts could result from water con-
potential for contact with petroleum-based tamination, dust and other air emissions, noise,
products and other contaminants in reserve soil contamination, and stress associated with
pits and water management facilities. Wildlife living close to gathering and processing.
can become entrapped in the oil and drown, Potential fires and explosions would cause
ingest toxic quantities of oil by preening (birds) safety hazards. Cavitations could ignite grass
or licking their fur (mammals); or succumb fires. Increased or reckless driving by oil or
to cold stress if the oil damages the insula- gas workers would also create safety hazards.
tion provided by feathers or fur. Hyper saline In addition, health and safety issues include
water in evaporation ponds can also cause working in potential weather extremes and
sodium toxicity. If controls are not managed possible contact with natural hazards, such as
effectively, ecological impacts may also arise uneven terrain and dangerous plants, animals,
from other direct anthropogenic influence or insects.
such as fires, increased hunting and fishing In locations where naturally occurring ra-
and possibly poaching. In addition to changing dioactive materials bearing in produced water
animal habitat, it is important to consider how and solid wastes are generated, occupational
changes in the biological environment also af- and public health risks may occur if the wastes
fect local people and indigenous populations. are not properly managed. In particular, work-
ers employed in the cutting and reaming of
242
oilfield pipe, removing solids from tanks and the expanded workforce or that provide proj-
pits, and refurbishing gas processing equip- ect materials, and associated taxes. Potential
ment may be exposed to particles containing impacts on the value of residential properties
alpha-emitting radio nuclides that could pose located adjacent to an oil or gas field would
a health risk if inhaled or ingested. continue during this phase. A well located
Methane seeps into drinking water wells in close proximity to a residence may have a
and under homes has caused health hazards. small adverse effect on property values. This
Plans for all gathering and processing effect could increase as the number of wells
operations should incorporate measures to increases. Landowners who own the mineral
deal with potential emergencies that threaten rights within an oil and gas field would receive
people, the environment or property. However, royalties on any product removed from their
even with proper planning, design and the property that could offset potential impacts
implementation of correct procedures and to property values.
personnel training, incidents can occur such as: During the production phase, impacts to
cultural resources could primarily occur from
• Spillage of fuel, oil, gas, chemicals and unauthorized collection of artifacts and from
hazardous materials; visual impacts. In the later case, the presence
• Oil or gas well blowout; of the aboveground structures could impact
• Explosions; cultural resources with an associated land-
• Fires (facility and surrounds); scape component that contributes to their
• Unplanned plant upset and shutdown significance, such as a sacred landscape or
events; historic trail. Damage to localities caused
• Natural disasters and their implications through off-highway vehicle use could also
on operations, for example flood, earth- occur. The potential for indirect impacts
quake, lightning; (e.g., vandalism and unauthorized collecting)
• War and sabotage. would be greater during the production phase
compared to the drilling/development phase,
Planning for emergency events should due to the longer duration.
properly examine risk, size, nature and po-
tential consequences of a variety of scenarios,
including combination incidents. A variety of CONCLUSION
documents is available to describe risk and
hazard assessment, contingency planning and Although the oil and gas process is indeed
effects of emergency events. complex, the main principles of gathering
and the most often used processing units are
Socioeconomic Impact and described in this Chapter. Like many other
Cultural Resources manufacturing processes oil and gas gather-
ing and processing affect the environment
Direct socioeconomic impacts would include but there are some specifics in the impact on
the creation of new jobs and the associated the environment as described in this chapter.
royalties and taxes paid. Indirect impacts are During the gathering and processing there
those impacts that would occur as a result of is gas emission which includes emission of
the new economic development and would carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, methane,
include new jobs at businesses that support volatile organic carbons and nitrogen oxides.
243
Emissions of sulphur dioxides and hydrogen sional flaring and vehicle traffic. Lease roads
sulphide can occur and depend upon the sul- are constructed and used to support various
phur content of the hydrocarbon. Sometimes operations. Once production facilities are
air pollution may cause health effects and reinstalled, portions of well pads, access roads,
duce visibility. Also gathering and processing and pipeline would continue to contrast with
have impact on terrain and soil, especially in a the natural form, line, color, and texture of
case of contamination resulting from spillage the surrounding landscape. Possible impacts
and leakage. The environmental impact of to health and safety during production include
produced waters disposed to other receiving accidental injury or death to workers and, to
waters is highly dependent on the quantity, the a lesser extent, the public. Health impacts
components, the receiving environment and could result from water contamination, dust
its dispersion characteristics. Industrial wastes and other air emissions, noise, soil contamina-
are generated during routine operations. These tion, and stress associated with living close
wastes are typically placed in containers, to gathering and processing. Potential fires
characterized and labeled, possibly stored and explosions would cause safety hazards.
briefly, and transported by a licensed hauler Cavitations could ignite grass fires. Increased
to an appropriate permitted off-site disposal or reckless driving by oil or gas workers would
facility as a standard practice. Environmental also create safety hazards. In addition, health
contamination could occur from accidental and safety issues include working in potential
spills of herbicides or, more significantly, weather extremes and possible contact with
oil. During the gathering and processing the natural hazards, such as uneven terrain and
noise from compressor and pumping stations dangerous plants, animals, or insects.
is present. Also, the noise is caused by occa-
244
REFERENCES ADDITIONAL READING
Benmebarek, S., & Gray, T. (1996). Risk as- A Regional Case Study, An Assessment of the.
sessment of new added facility at an offshore Environmental Implications of Oil and Gas
gathering/ processing plant. Paper presented Production. A Regional Case Study, Septem-
at the SPE Health, Safety and Environment ber 2008, working draft from www.epa.gov/
in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production sectors/pdf/oil-gas-report.pdf.
Conference. New Orleans, LA.
ANSI/API Spec. 7B-11C (R2008) (1994).
Bull, A. P. I. 75L. (2007). Guidance document Specification for Internal-Combustion Recip-
for the development of a safety and environ- rocating Engines for Oil-Field Service, API,
mental management system for onshore oil Washington D.C., USA.
and natural gas production operations and
API E5 (1997) Environmental Guidance
associated activities. Washington, DC: API.
Document: Onshore Solid Waste Management
Definition of Facility. (n.d.). Retrieved from in Exploration and Production Operations,
www.cdphe.state.co.us/ap/onglinks.asp API, Washington D.C., USA.
Devold, H. (2009). Oil and gas production API RP 12R1 (R2008) (1997). Recommended
handbook. Oslo, Norway: ABB Oil and Gas. Practice for Setting, Maintenance, Inspection,
Operation, and Repair of Tanks in Production
JPT. (1999). Surface production facilities:
Service, API, Washington D.C., USA.
Separating and treating produced oil and
gas. Retrieved from www.spe.org/JPT1999- API RP 2350 (2005). Overfill Protection for
06-surface-prod Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities, API,
Washington D.C., USA.
Nooijen, H., & Clinton, P. (2012). Design of
compressor suction scrubbers. Paper present- API RP 55 (1995), Recommended Practices
ed at the TEKNA-Conference. Oslo, Norway. for Oil and Gas Producing and Gas Processing
Plant Operations Involving Hydrogen Sulfide,
Rassenfoss, S. (2011, August). Growing
API, Washington D.C., USA.
offshore water production pushes search for
subsea solutions. JPT. Background document and technical annexes
for biological effects monitoring (2012),
Stewart, M., & Arnold, K. (1998a). Surface
OSPAR, from www.ospar.org/documents
production operations, volume 1, design of
oil-handling systems and facilities. New York: Bull, A. P. I. 75L (2007). Guidance Document
Elsevier Science. for the Development of a Safety and Envi-
ronmental Management System for Onshore
Stewart, M., & Arnold, K. (1998b). Surface
Oil and Natural Gas Production Operations
production operations, volume 2, design of
and Associated Activities, API, Washington
gas-handling systems and facilities. New York:
D.C., USA.
Elsevier Science.
Transmission and Distribution. (n.d.). Re-
trieved from www.ipt.ntnu.no/~jsg/under-
visning/.../Chap8.TRANSMISSIONAND-
DISTRIBUTION.pdf
245
Euphemio, M., Oliveira, R., Nunes, G., Ca- Stewart, M., & Arnold, K. (1998). Surface
pela, C., & Ferreira, L. (2007) Subsea Oil/ Production Operations, Volume 2, Design of
Water Separation of Heavy Oil: Overview of Gas-Handling Systems and Facilities, Elsevier
the Main Challenges for the Marlim Field— Science, USA.
Campos Basin, Petrobras Offshore Technol-
Surface Production Facilities. Separating and
ogy Conference, Houston, Texas Exemption
Treating Produced Oil and Gas (1999). JPT,
of Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
from www.spe.org/jpt/.../JPT1999_06_sur-
Wastes from Federal Hazardous Waste Regu-
face_prodJP.
lations, EPA, United States Protection Agency
from www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial
Fernando, B., & the Eastern Research Group,
Inc. (2007). Emissions from Oil and Gas
MISSIONS FROM OIL AND GAS Production Axial Line System: Is system of flow lines
Facilities, Final Report from www.tceq.texas. where several wells produce into a common
gov/.../reports/. flow line.
Global Gas Flaring and Venting Reduction Due Diligence: Is a term used for a number
Voluntary Standard (2004), Report No4., of concepts involving either an investigation of
GGFR a business or person prior to signing a contract,
or an act with a certain standard of care. It can
Gruehagen, H., & Lim, D. (2009). Subsea be a legal obligation, but the term will more
Separation and Boosting—An Overview of commonly apply to voluntary investigations.
Ongoing Projects. Jakarta, Indonesia: Asia Gathering System: Is flow line network
Pacific Oil and Gas Conference & Exhibition. and process facilities that transport and control
Manning, F. S., & Thompson, R. E. (1995). the flow of oil or gas from the wells to a main
Oil field Processing of Petroleum: Crude storage facility, processing plant or shipping
oil. Tulsa, Oklahoma: Penn Well Publishing point. There are two types of gathering sys-
Company. tems, radial and trunk line system.
Radial Line System: Is system of flow
Nooijen, H., & Clinton, P. (2012). Design lines emanating from several different well-
of Compressor Suction Scrubbers, TEKNA- heads converge to a central point where facili-
Conference ties are located.
Rahmawati, S. D. (2012) Integrated Field Surface Facility: Is any grouping of
Modeling and Optimization, Thesis for the equipment where hydrocarbon liquids are
degree of philosophiae doctor, Trondheim, processed, upgraded or stored prior to the
Norwegian University of Science and Tech- point of custody transfer; or where natural
nology from www.iocenter.no/lib/exe/fetch. gas is processed, upgraded, or stored prior
php?media=news:phds:finalthesis. to entering the natural gas transmission and
storage source category.
Stewart, M., & Arnold, K. (1998). Surface
Production Operations, Volume 1, Design of
Oil-Handling Systems and Facilities, Elsevier
Science, USA.
246
247
Chapter 12
Activities in Oil and
Gas Processing for
Avoiding or Minimizing
Environmental Impacts
Svijetlana Dubovski
INA Plc, Croatia
ABSTRACT
This chapter provides guidance on activities implementation from designing phase, construction
phase, operational phase, and decommissioning phase of gathering and processing systems.
For each phase, activities that can be implemented to avoid or minimize environmental impact
are described, emphasizing the implementation purpose.
INTRODUCTION compliance with all applicable federal, state,

and local regulations.
The operators are dedicated to responsible Management leadership and commitment
development of oil and natural gas resources. has to be converted into action by the provision
Responsible development includes good of adequate financial and personal resources
relationships with our neighbors and a com- to ensure that environmental protection mea-
mitment to environmental protection and sures are incorporated in all operations. Each
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch012
Activities in Oil and Gas Processing for Avoiding or Minimizing Environmental Impacts
operating site may need to develop its own also involves taking the necessary steps to
specific objectives, and relevant operational mitigate the risk of incidents that can cause
targets in line with the company’s broader damage to the facility or injuries to workers.
strategic objectives (Rahmawati, 2012). This Risks are mitigated to an acceptable level
should be initiated by the site manager, and and various other aspects such as health and
achieved through a formal communication environmental concerns are considered in
and consultation process that involves staff, these early phases of development.
contractors and local stakeholders. The roles, Although it can be easier to identify hazards
responsibilities, authorities, accountabilities and environmental impact in an existing facil-
and relationships necessary to implement ity after construction is complete, it’s generally
environmental management must be clearly safer and more cost effective to implement
defined for that site. Line staff in all aspects appropriate measures before facilities or
of operational activity should be assigned processes are built. By using this proactive
specific environmental responsibility and approach to safety and environmental protec-
authority within their spheres of control, and tion, engineering controls are put in place in
must be competent to perform their duties the early stages of construction, resulting in
effectively. the mitigation of potentially dangerous or fatal
accidents. In the early phases of conceptual
Activities during the Design Phase design development, several strategies can be
employed to recognize potential risks:
Designing phase starts by creating a few devel-
opment solutions and selecting the best one. • Plans and designs can be compared to
That process requires integration of engineer- similar, existing systems or facilities,
ing, environmental and economic parameters. taking into account what measures
Environmental forces such as wind, waves, were successful, then parlaying them
currents, ice, water depth and soil condition into the safety program;
have great impact on construction. With plat- • People who have experience with simi-
forms and other off shore surface facilities, lar, existing systems can be interviewed
state of the experience level is important. to determine the successes and chal-
The overall basis for designing should be lenges they have realized in their safety
to minimize adverse effects on the environ- program;
ment, consistent with providing an economi- • Plans can be reviewed by a qualified
cal means of unit production using safety by person, that has an engineering and
design. safety background and is capable of
Safety by design is a mechanism for creating designs that ensure compli-
moving the discussion of safety hazards and ance with industry safety regulations,
harmful risks into the design and program- standards and owner’s requirements;
ming phases of construction projects. This • Organizations can provide standards
involves incorporating hazard analysis and or guidelines to consultants and equip-
risk assessments during the design phases of ment manufacturers prior to building
construction or renovation of a facility. This design.
248
Careful implementation of these strategies increases to minimize the need for additional
in the conceptual design phase helps ensure tankage and treating vessels.
successful hazard identification that will serve Surface facilities should be planned to
as the foundation of a safer work environment. utilize the smallest practical surface area
In gathering and system lines design, ap- consistent with safe, prudent, and economic
propriate industry codes should be followed operations. Existing roads and rights-of-way
and design should consider the following: life should be utilized to the maximum extent
of lines; lines environment; nature and quan- possible. The land owner and/or surface ten-
tity of products, impacts on existing facilities, ant should be consulted to consider present
consequences of possible failure; corrosion and future uses of affected and adjacent land.
inhibition measures; optimum location for A site should be selected that minimizes the
blow downs, valves, etc. amount of surface terrain alteration to reduce
In planning gathering and system lines, environmental and aesthetic damages. Cuts
including electrical distribution systems, it is and fills which pose possible landslide or
important to consider the impact that construc- slump problems should be avoided.
tion operations and maintenance activities will It is good to follow proposed consideration
have on people, animals, plants, and the land in designing production facilities.
itself, both surface and shallow subsurface.
The impact on current use, as well as possible • Production-related equipment should
future uses, should be evaluated along with be sized and designed to provide appro-
potential future facilities expansion. Because priate safety and utility. Future devel-
pipelines can be buried, and the surface re- opment and exploration plans should
claimed, long-term surface disturbance as- be considered when sizing equipment.
sociated with pipelines can be avoided. The Where appropriate, the facilities should
placement of pipelines should avoid steep be sized to handle current and future
hillsides and watercourses where feasible. production to minimize retrofitting and
Also, where feasible, pipeline routes should improper use of equipment. Equipment
take advantage of road corridors to minimize should be designed with appropriate
surface disturbance. Also, when clearing is spill control devices, such as high-/low-
necessary, the width disturbed should be kept level indicators or high-/low-pressure
to a minimum and topsoil material should be indicators, to improve safety and pro-
stockpiled to the side of the routes where cuts tection of the environment.
and fills or other disturbances occur during • The anticipated time the equipment is
pipeline construction. Retaining topsoil for expected to remain active should be
replacement during reclamation can signifi- considered. Proper design and instal-
cantly accelerate successful revegetation. lation can minimize future equipment
Initial planning for surface facilities within failures and downtime.
a field should consider future development • Equipment and foundations should be
potential in order to minimize surface dis- designed and installed giving consid-
turbance. When it is practical and economic, eration to adverse natural conditions
central field locations should be considered common to the area, such as floods,
to avoid the use of multiple facilities. Facil- excessive snow and rain, earthquakes,
ity sizing should consider future throughput tornadoes, hurricanes, and dust storms.
249
• Equipment installations should comply tractor has implemented a safety pro-

with industry standards. Air pollution gram that includes a written hazard
control facilities should be installed communication program.
whenever practical, economical, and • The contractor should supply Material
technically feasible. Flaring and vent- Safety Data Sheets for all hazardous
ing should be evaluated based on gas materials brought on site.
volume and composition, safety, eco- • Appropriate inspections should be per-
nomics, and local environmental im- formed during construction to ensure
pact. Pressure requirements for ves- design specifications are met.
sels, lines, and other equipment should
be considered. Any variance from the Upon completion, lines should be inspected
manufacturer’s recommended rates or and pressure tested for possible leaks in ac-
pressures should be evaluated. cordance with state and local codes. Pressure
• Equipment and facilities should be lo- test fluids should be collected and disposed.
cated and designed to minimize the After installation of a new line, all line routes
wastes generated by operations and and rights-of-way should be cleaned up and
maintenance activities. restored to conditions compatible with exist-
• Recyclable products should be used, ing land use, unless other arrangements have
where possible. Bulk storage, recy- been made with the landowner. Disposal of
clable, and reusable containers should all waste should be in accordance with the
be considered to minimize waste. regulations. Line routes and burial depth
Appropriate methods of collecting and should be adequately documented to aid in
recycling or disposing of waste gener- preventing ruptures and/or accidental leaks
ated during construction, operation, during future excavation activities. Crossings
and maintenance of the facility should should be marked.
be considered. Before initiating facility construction the
• Operators should develop waste man- following site preparation steps should be
agement plans. taken:
Activities during the • Soil characteristics should be checked

Construction and Installation to determine the appropriate founda-
tion design for the site;
During the gathering and system lines con- • Size and type of equipment to be used
struction and installation phase it is very during construction should be consid-
important to follow next principles: ered to allow sufficient room to work in
a safe manner;
• Line routes and applicable rights-of- • Adequate culverts and drainage ditches
way should utilize the smallest practi- should be provided as required by the
cal surface area, consistent with pru- local environment;
dent operations. • The open end of lines under construc-
• Unnecessary damage to trees and other tion should be temporarily capped at
vegetation adjoining lease line routes the end of each workday if a line could
should be avoided. be accessible to wildlife.
• If contractors are used to install lines,
the operator should verify that the con-
250
During construction, qualified personnel not required for production operations. The
should perform appropriate inspections to en- portions of the cleared site not needed for op-
sure that design specifications are met. Upon erational and safety purposes are recontoured
completion, equipment and facilities should to a final or intermediate contour that blends
be inspected for possible leaks. If necessary, with the surrounding topography as much as
equipment should be pressure tested in ac- possible. Sufficient level area remains for the
cordance with applicable codes. If fluids are set-up of work over or production stimulation
used to pressure test, collect and dispose of and to park necessary equipment. Where prac-
the fluids should be in accordance with the tical, the operator should spread topsoil over
regulations. Also, X-raying of welds should the entire location and revegetate as closely
be considered in critical areas where extreme as possible to the production facilities, un-
pressure or corrosiveness is anticipated or less an all-weather, surfaced access route or
where potential risk to the local environment turnaround is needed to inspect or operate the
is of great concern. well or to complete workover or stimulation
The qualifications of personnel working on operations. It may be necessary to drive, park
the construction site should be evaluated to and operate on restored, interim vegetation
aid in ensuring the work will be properly per- within the previously disturbed area. This is
formed. Also, consideration should be given acceptable provided damage is repaired and
to requiring contractors to have performance reclaimed following use. To reduce final rec-
bonds should be considered when facilities lamation costs and effort, to maintain healthy,
are to be constructed in environmentally biologically active topsoil, and to minimize
sensitive areas. habitat, visual resource, and forage loss during
All equipment should be installed in the life of a well, salvaged topsoil should be
accordance with the original design of the spread over the areas of interim reclamation
equipment. Any variations from the original rather than stockpiled.
specifications should be evaluated thoroughly Where the topography is flat and it is,
to ensure safety of the operations. therefore, unnecessary to recontour the well
Upon completion of facilities, the original location at the time of final reclamation, the
drawings or schematics should be updated, as operator should set aside sufficient topsoil
required. Changes or modifications from the for reclamation of the small unreclaimed
original design or drawings should be noted area around the wellhead. Any topsoil pile
for future reference. set aside should be revegetated to prevent it
Unused and excess construction materials from eroding and to help maintain its biologi-
should be properly stored or removed from the cal viability. On sloped ground, during final
site upon completion. During construction, reclamation the topsoil and interim vegetation
the site should be kept as clean and free of must be restriped from portions of the site that
debris as possible. are not at the original contour, the well pad
Interim reclamation consists of minimiz- recontoured, and the topsoil respread over
ing the footprint of disturbance by reclaiming the entire disturbed site to ensure successful
to the extent possible all portions of the site revegetation.
251
Activities during the from the use of hot oil, chemicals, and other
Operational Phase treatments that are used to maintain lease
gathering and system lines. Proper main-
After design, construction and installation tenance practices should be exercised with
phase starts operational phase. This is the respect to crossing markers, blow down tanks,
most lasting phase of gathering and processing venting equipment, and corrosion protection
during which is implemented a lot of activi- equipment. Blow down fluids should be col-
ties to minimize or eliminate environmental lected and placed in the production system
impact in the same time. These activities are: to recover hydrocarbons. Waste materials
should be recycled, reclaimed, or disposed.
• Using operating procedures; Pressure tests, profile surveys, and other
• Asset optimization and maintenance means should be considered to meet operating
support; safety requirements. Operating procedures,
• Information management systems; also, should provide for early identification of
• Training simulators; developing corrosion problems, failure-prone
• Risk assessment; equipment, and malfunctions so that correc-
• Compliance assessment review; tive action can be taken before environmental
• Initial due diligence site visit. or safety consequences occur. Frequency of
failure analysis should be considered to aid
Using Operating Procedures in scheduling line replacements. Appropriate
industry codes should be followed with respect
Development of a standard operating proce- to maintenance of records, repairs, report-
dure manual applicable to each major facility ing of leaks, etc. Whenever modifications
should be considered. The manual should are made to existing lines and facilities, the
contain information as to the equipment lo- changes should be considered for evaluation
cated at the facility, safe-operating practices pursuant to management of change principles.
for the equipment, start-up and shutdown Where appropriate, facility drawings should
procedures, and emergency procedures. Also, be updated to show modifications and the
consideration should be given to the analysis superseded drawings should be destroyed.
of failures or malfunctions so that corrective Emergency phone numbers should be posted
action can be taken to minimize future envi- at the entrance to the facility, if located near
ronmental incidents. a populated area.
All applicable personnel (both company Waste and residual management practices
and contractor) should receive training to for production operations should be conducted
provide operation and maintenance in ac- consistent with lease and landowner obliga-
cordance with manual. This training should tions. This should include solid wastes and
include start-up and shutdown procedures, residuals, such as tank bottoms, drilling fluids
normal operating procedures, and emergency and cuttings, liquid wastes and residuals, such
response procedures, in the event of a leak or as produced water and used oil, and gaseous
spill of a hazardous substance. Line routes wastes, such as hydrocarbons and carbon
and facilities should be inspected at intervals dioxide. A sound waste management plan is
dictated by evaluation of exposures and/or important to protect human health and the en-
failures. Appropriate steps should be taken vironment and minimize long-term liabilities
to prevent surface and environmental damage to the operator.
252
The final option for management of a and size of primary and secondary contain-
waste, after source reduction, recycling, and ment necessary.
treatment options have been considered and The type and footage of containment boom
incorporated, is disposal. The operator should installed or stored for deployment will vary
take into consideration the long-term fate of with the type, size, and location of the facility
the waste and its constituents before disposal. and spill potential. This information should
Accidental spills (including oil and salt- be developed for each main area or facility
water) can, besides potentially damaging the and be stated in the facility contingency plan.
environment, create difficult operational, In addition, the contingency plan should list
legal, and public relations problems. It is very where emergency equipment is located. The
important to conduct operations in a manner contingency plan should state the type of
that minimizes the potential for unauthorized chemicals that can be used effectively and
spills. Spill prevention, response, and cleanup list sources and procedures for applying these
procedures should be defined and in place chemicals.
before storing any oil or chemicals on site Cleanup procedures should be developed
or conducting activities that have a potential and included in the facility contingency plan.
for a spill. Up-to-date lists of effective cleanup materials
The best way to avoid adverse effects and equipment and a list of potential con-
of spills is to prevent their occurrence. The tractors who can supply needed assistance
key factors in spill incident prevention are should also be included and maintained in
adequately trained supervisors and field op- the contingency plan.
erating personnel. In the event a spill occurs, Depending on the spill potential at each
it is extremely important for all responsible area, a stock of appropriate cleanup materi-
operating personnel to know how to respond als sufficient to handle small spills should be
quickly and effectively to control, contain, maintained on hand at all times. The amount
and clean up the spill. To ensure this capacity of cleanup material will depend on the time
exists, a contingency plan should be prepared required to obtain more material if the size
for inland areas as well as for areas near wa- of the spill should increase.
ter. The plans should provide utilization of Sometimes training simulators are used to
capabilities of oil spill cooperatives, whenever provide operator training in a realistic plant
advantageous. training environment before ore during op-
Spill plans should address the needs to erational phase. They use the actual control
advise the public about significant releases. and safety applications of the plant, running
The plan should include procedures to advise on operator stations. Plant models simulate
government officials and provide appropri- the feedback from the plant in real time or
ate information and access to the press. In in fast or slow motion. Training simulator
the event a spill occurs, the source of the applications include functions for backup
spill should be stopped, or reduced as much and reload including recreation of historical
as possible, in a safe manner. The spread of information and snapshots. Offsite training
the spilled substance should be controlled facilities are often connected (read only) to
or contained in the smallest possible area to the live plant to give information from the
minimize the adverse effects. Operators should real operating situation.
evaluate the potential for spills and damages
and use this information to determine the type
253
Asset Optimization and larger tasks such as turbine and compressor

Maintenance Program periodic maintenance.
During the operational phase the best approach Information Management System
to maintenance is to have asset optimization
and maintenance program. The mail goal of Some Information management system can be
that program is to reduce costly production used to provide information about the opera-
disruptions end environmental impact by en- tion of gathering and production of the surface
abling predictive maintenance. Recording the facilities. This can be a separate system, or an
maintenance history of an asset and identify- integral part of the control system or SCADA
ing potential problems to avert unscheduled system. Main functions of such a system are:
shutdowns, maximize up-time and operate
closer to plant production prognoses. These • Production monitoring and reporting
activities can be run manually or using some • Safety management
computerized maintenance management sys- • Maintenance
tem. Asset optimization and maintenance pro- • Operator support
gram is based on continues process condition
and structural monitoring (Holiday, 1991). Reports provided by system may be: pro-
Process condition monitoring includes duction overview and prognosis, well tests,
both structural monitoring and condition chemical injection, chemical consumption,
monitoring for process equipment such as laboratory analysis results, alarm and incidents
valves and rotating machinery. For structural statistic and overview, etc.
monitoring the devices as corrosion meters
(essentially plates that corrode, for which Gathering and Processing
that corrosion may be metered), tension force Risk Assessment
meters and free swinging strings should be
used. Condition monitoring of machinery Risk assessment process consists of both iden-
should be generally used for large rotating tifying risk and estimating the probability and
apparatus, such as turbines, compressors, magnitude of potential losses. The likelihood
generators and large pumps. Input devices are and consequences to people, company assets
vibration meters, temperature meters as well and the environment are the main reasons that
as the number of start/stops, running time, prompt the development of a formal man-
lubrication intervals measurement. For other agement process for risk assessment toward
process equipment such as valves, the clos- loss prevention and risk management. Risk
ing times, flow and torque can be registered. is a term that describes the probability that a
A valve which exhibits a negative trend in specified hazardous event will occur and the
closing time or torque has to be diagnosed. severity of the consequences of that event.
Asset optimization and maintenance program Also, hazard represents a potential risk to
support functionality of maintenance, based personnel, property or productivity and need
on input from condition monitoring systems to be measured so that appropriate action can
and a periodic maintenance plan. This will be taken to minimize the size. Risk manage-
allow to schedule personnel and activities, for ment in itself addresses the value judgments
such tasks as lubrication or cleaning, and plan involved in establishing acceptable level of
risk and methods of handling identified risk.
254
Risk assessment is classified here into two successful Environmental Compliance As-
parts, risk estimation and risk evaluation. sessment Review must include:
The former is the estimation and assessment
of the measures of severity and probabilities • Senior Management support and active
including their uncertainties. While the later participation;
is the extra efforts required to decide on the • An audit team having thorough un-
importance of a particular value of risk evalu- derstanding of the environmental
ated which support the value judgment. regulations;
Gathering and processing risk assessment • A formalized process including a writ-
in the workplace has become practice which ten report of findings and corrective
has resulted in a major drop in numbers of actions;
fires, spills etc. incidents recorded per year. • Training of office and field personnel to
In other to attain a minimal or zero incidents, protect them from penalties;
a number of risk assessment program were • Informing Management of the findings
developed. Programs are the base for the and corrective action taken.
development of the information gathered
during a risk assessment, which has several Initial Due Diligence Site Visit
applications and implications. This ranges
from replacing certain equipment, modifica- If one is not involved in designing and con-
tion of existing process, addition of protec- struction phase of gathering and processing
tive devices, developing and implementing it is necessary to visit the facility to assess
procedure for maintaining, monitoring etc. of environmental, social, health, and safety sta-
process in the facility and sometimes used as tus. This involves walking the site, visiting
a feedback to the design engineers for a new all of the production areas, and reviewing the
facility or upgrade. documents. For complex facilities, technical
environmental staff may be needed.
Compliance Assessment Review For understanding the production pro-
cesses, existing pollution controls, and po-
During the operating phase, a good practice, in tential for improvement and cost savings it
order to recognize the influence of gathering is necessary to check:
and processing on the environment, is to do
compliance assessment review. Compliance • Housekeeping, (cleanness of the fa-
assessment review is an internal environmen- cility, are materials stored, etc.)
tal auditing. The auditing process involves Housekeeping is often an important
management, audit team members, supervi- indicator of the capacity and drive for
sors and workers, and provides them with a environmental compliance;
environmental training and monitoring of the • Age and type of equipment;
effectiveness of the environmental program. • Pollution control equipment and the
These auditing programs were aimed at assur- maintenance schedule;
ing legal compliance at the field level. Many • Types of waste produced, where and
of the field regulatory problems resulted from how disposed;
lack of regulatory knowledge and training • Types of liquid effluents, where and
of both the field and engineering staffs. A how disposed;
255
• Develop an understanding of the facil- and graded to conform to the surrounding ter-
ity’s health and safety regime; rain. Closure must also be in accordance with
• Availability and use of personnel pro- any local and/or state regulations. The location
tective equipment; of closed pits should be documented. Materi-
• Content and frequency of employee als removed from pits should be reclaimed,
health and safety training; recycled or disposed. Upon completion of
• History of accidents; abandonment activities, all disturbed surface
• Frequency of health and safety audits. areas should be cleaned up and restored to
conditions similar to the adjacent land or to
Also, developing an understanding of the landowner requirements. Timely completion
history of the site, the facility, and the sur- of final reclamation is as important as the
rounding properties is important in order to initial planning. Incomplete or improperly
understand whether there might be historic executed final reclamation can result in the
contamination, permitting issues, or com- complete loss of a low-impact project opportu-
munity issues. nity. Reclamation becomes significantly more
difficult, more expensive, and less effective
Decommissioning and Abandonment if sufficient topsoil is not salvaged, interim
reclamation is nhot completed, and if proper
Before removal all equipment such as tank- care is not taken to construct pads and roads
age, separation vessels, meter runs, flow lines, in locations that minimize reclamation costs.
and pumps should be purged and flushed, as Restoration of the original landform is a key
appropriate. Whenever possible, materials element in ensuring that the effects of oil and
recovered should be recycled, reclaimed, or gas development are not permanent.
disposed. Tanks, separation vessels, meter Infrastructure associated with formerly
runs, surface lines, pumps, and any other producing leases, including water impound-
exposed surface equipment should be re- ments, power lines, metering buildings, com-
moved. Removal of the associated equipment pression facilities and tank batteries must be
foundations should be considered. Exposed removed and the footprints or lands disturbed
piping segments from surface or subsurface by these facilities and associated foundations
equipment connecting to buried lines should reclaimed unless the surface owner requests
be removed to a depth consistent with sub- that items such as impoundments or water
sequent land use or, preferably, to the depth wells be kept.
of buried lines. Where feasible or where Salvaged topsoil should be respread evenly
desired to limit potential future liabilities, over the surfaces to be revegetated. The top
consideration should be given to removing soiled site should be prepared to provide a
buried lines. Where appropriate, each outlet seedbed for reestablishment of desirable veg-
of any abandoned lines should be permanently etation. Site preparation may include gouging,
sealed. Operators should consider removing scarifying, dozer track-walking, mulching, fer-
all crossing markers and other line markers. tilizing, seeding and planting. In reclamation
Where appropriate, the location of aban- of sites that are not cultivated for agriculture
doned lines should be identified on facility or grazing, seeding and planting should use
maps. All pits and surface impoundments plant species indigenous to the area.
should be properly closed after they are dry and Water breaks and terracing should only be
free of waste; then they should be backfilled installed when absolutely necessary to prevent
256
erosion of fill material and should be removed Additional Measures to Avoid,

when the site is successfully revegetated and Minimize, or Mitigate Offshore
stabilized. Environmental Risk
The decommissioning of offshore facili-
ties occurs when the reservoir is depleted or Measures for Minimizing Air Emissions
the production of hydrocarbons from that
reservoir becomes unprofitable. Parts of All reasonable attempts should be made
the offshore facility, such as platforms, are to maximize energy efficiency and design
treated to remove contaminants and are usu- facilities for lowest energy use. The overall
ally removed, while other production com- objective should be to reduce air emissions
ponents are rendered safe and left in place. and evaluate cost-effective options for reduc-
Wells are plugged and abandoned to prevent ing emissions that are technically feasible.
fluid migration within the wellbore, which Exhaust gas emissions produced by gas or
could contaminate the surface environment. liquid fuels for power and heat generation, or
Internationally-recognized guidelines and for water injection or oil and gas export, can
standards issued by the International Maritime be the most significant source of air emissions
Organization and decisions issued by OSPAR from offshore facilities. During equipment
Convention or similar convention should be selection, air emission specifications should
followed for the decommissioning of offshore be considered. There are different require-
facilities (Benmebarek & Gray, 1996). ments for small sources and sources of more
All surface lines should be removed. Lines than 50 MW. Measures consistent with the
should be purged before removal. Surface and Global Gas Flaring and Venting Reduction
subsurface equipment connected to buried Voluntary Standard should be adopted when
lines should be removed to a depth consistent considering venting and flaring options for
with subsequent land use or, preferably, to the offshore activities. The standard provides
depth of the buried lines. Harmful or hazard- guidance on how to eliminate or achieve re-
ous materials should be displaced from any ductions in the flaring and venting of natural
lines abandoned in place. Where appropri- gas. Continuous venting of associated gas
ate, each outlet of abandoned lines should is not considered current good practice and
be permanently sealed. All crossing markers should be avoided. The associated gas stream
and other line markers should be removed. should be routed to an efficient flare system,
The location of abandoned lines should be although continuous flaring of gas should be
identified on facility maps. Upon completion avoided if alternatives are available. Before
of abandonment activities, all disturbed sur- flaring is adopted, feasible alternatives for
face areas should be cleaned up and restored the use of the gas should be evaluated to the
to conditions similar to the adjacent lands. maximum extent possible and integrated into
production design. Alternative options may
include gas utilization for on-site energy
257
needs, gas injection for reservoir pressure tests. Hydro test water disposal into shallow
maintenance, enhanced recovery using gas lift, coastal waters should be avoided.
gas for instrumentation, or export of the gas The cooling water discharge depth should
to a neighboring facility or to market. An as- be selected to maximize mixing and cool-
sessment of alternatives should be adequately ing of the thermal plume to ensure that the
documented and recorded (Harmony, 1998). temperature is within 3 degrees Celsius of
If none of the options are feasible for the ambient seawater temperature at the edge of
use of associated gas, measures to minimize the defined mixing zone or within 100 me-
flare volumes should be evaluated and flaring ters of the discharge point. Operators should
should be considered as an interim solution, consider mixing desalination brine from the
with the elimination of continuous production- potable water system with the cooling water or
associated gas flaring as the preferred goal. sewage water discharge (Eskijian et al., 2002).
Volumes of hydrocarbons flared should be Gray and black water from showers, toi-
recorded. Methods for controlling and reduc- lets, and kitchen facilities should be treated
ing fugitive emissions should be considered in an appropriate onsite marine sanitary
and implemented in the design, operation, treatment unit in compliance with MARPOL
and maintenance of offshore facilities. The 73/78 requirements. Organic waste from the
selection of appropriate valves, flanges, kitchen should, at a minimum, be macer-
fittings, seals, and packing should consider ated to acceptable levels and discharged to
safety and suitability requirements as well as sea, in compliance with MARPOL 73/78
their capacity to reduce gas leaks and fugi- requirements((MARPOL 73/78; 2009). Wa-
tive emissions. Additionally, leak detection ter pumped into and out of storage during
and repair programs should be implemented. loading and off-loading operations should
be contained and treated before discharge.
Measures for Wastewater Discharges Bilge waters from machinery spaces in off-
shore facilities and support vessels should be
Feasible alternatives for the management and routed to the facility closed drainage system,
disposal of produced water should be evalu- or contained and treated before discharge. If
ated and integrated into production design. treatment to standard is not possible, these wa-
These alternatives may include injection ters should be contained and shipped to shore
along with seawater for reservoir pressure for disposal. Drainage water generated from
maintenance, injection into a suitable offshore precipitation, sea spray, or routine operations,
disposal well, or export to shore with produced such as deck and equipment cleaning and fire
hydrocarbons for treatment and disposal. If drills, should be routed to separate drainage
none of these alternatives are technically or systems on offshore facilities. This includes
financially feasible, produced water should drainage water from process areas that could
be treated before disposal into the marine be contaminated with oil and drainage water
environment. Good practice, for minimizing from non-process areas.
the volume of hydro test water offshore, is to
test equipment at an onshore site before the Measures for Solid and Liquid
equipment is loaded onto the offshore facilities Waste Management
or sending offshore pipeline hydro test water
to shore facilities for treatment and disposal. Waste materials should be segregated offshore
Also the same water can be used for multiple into non-hazardous and hazardous wastes at
258
a minimum, and shipped to shore for re-use, Additional Spill Prevention

recycling, or disposal. A waste management and Control Measures
plan for the offshore facility should be de-
veloped that contains a clear waste tracking Additional spill prevention and control mea-
mechanism to track waste consignments from sures specific to offshore oil and gas facilities
the originating location offshore to the final include conducting a spill risk assessment for
waste treatment and disposal location onshore. offshore facilities and support vessels. Valves,
Efforts should be made to eliminate, reduce, including subsea shutdown valves, leak detec-
or recycle wastes at all times. tion system and Emergency Shutdown System
should be installed to allow early shutdown
Measures for Hazardous or isolation in the event of an emergency.
Materials Management For export pipelines, maintenance programs
should include regular pigging to clean the
Offshore chemicals should be with least hazard pipeline, and intelligent pigging should also be
and lowest potential environmental impact, considered as required. Personnel also should
and lowest potential health impact, should be be adequate trained in oil spill prevention,
selected, whenever possible. Use of chemicals containment and response.
suspected to cause taint or known endocrine
disruptors and ozone depleting substances Occupational Health and Safety
should be avoided. Also chemicals known
to contain heavy metals, other than in trace As described for onshore, occupational health
quantities, should be avoided. and safety issues should be considered as part
of a comprehensive hazard or risk assessment.
Measures for Minimizing The results should be used for health and
Noise Generation safety management planning, in the design of
the facility and safe working systems, and in
At first it is necessary to identify areas sensi- the preparation of safe working procedures.
tive for marine life such as feeding, breeding, Health and safety management planning
calving, and spawning areas. Also offshore should include environmental conditions at
construction activities should be planned to the offshore location, adequate living accom-
avoid sensitive times of the year. When marine modation, protected area at the facility for use
mammals are observed congregating close to by personnel in the event of an emergency, a
the area of planned activities should begin at sufficient number of escape routes, etc. Plan-
least 500 meters away. If marine mammals ning should demonstrate that a systematic and
are sighted within 500 meters of the proposed structured approach to managing offshore
activities should be postponed until they have health and safety will be adopted and that
moved away, allowing adequate time after the controls are in place to reduce risks to as low
last sighting (www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/ as reasonably practical.
Content, 2007). Offshore facilities should be equipped, at a
Soft-start procedures, also called ramp-up minimum, with specialized first aid providers
or slow buildup, should be used in areas of and the means to provide short-term remote
known marine mammal activity. This involves patient care. Depending on the number of
a gradual increase in sound pressure to full personnel present and complexity of the
operational levels. facility, provision of an on-site medical unit
259
and doctor should be considered. In specific In Louisiana, better dehydration systems

cases, telemedicine facilities may be an al- management, including optimization of glycol
ternative option. An alarm system should be circulation rates and installation of flash tank
installed which can to be heard throughout separator condensers enables producers to
the offshore facility. Alarms for fire, gas leak capture up to 90 percent of methane and other
and man overboard should be provided. The emissions. These processes reduce greenhouse
formation of a health and safety committee gas emissions, improve air quality, and recover
for the facility is recommended. Health and substantial gas for on-site use or pipeline sale
safety inductions should be provided to the (www.fe.doe.gov, 2005).
entire workforce prior to mobilization to the Significant amounts of methane are emitted
offshore facilities. to the atmosphere during production, trans-
mission, processing, storage, and distribution.
Unocal Spill Prevention Task Group uses
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS new technology facilitates accurate, efficient
leak detection and measurement by ensuring
Environmental impact of existing gathering equipment and pipeline integrity and timely
systems and surface facilities, as it is described maintenance and repair. These controls cap-
in this Chapter, is mostly recognized, analyzed ture saleable natural gas, create safer work
and activities for minimizing or avoiding places, and protect our environment.
impact are proposed. Implementation of new Replacing or retrofitting devices, or im-
technologies in gathering and processing proving maintenance, can reduce gas emis-
systems can result in positive and negative sions substantially, reducing greenhouse gas
direction on theenvironment. There are some emissions and potentially saving the industry
examples of new approaches in gathering and millions of dollars in lost methane. Chevron
processing with very positive environmental installed a low-bleed retrofit valve kit on
impacts. liquid level and pressure controllers on two
The Scott field experience with improve- platforms. 19 devices were tested on one plat-
ments in gas sweetening, in conjunction with form and 30 devices on another. The retrofits
advanced sulfur recovery technologies, make yielded average reductions in bleed rates of
it possible to practically eliminate noxious more than 90 percent.
emissions and recover nearly all the acid Offshore operations represent over one
gas stream’s elemental sulfur for late sale or quarter of the Nation’s oil and natural gas pro-
disposal. duction. Since the early 1990s, Federal regula-
Successful tests in New Mexico, a new tors and industry have successfully cooperated
freeze-thaw/evaporation process purifies in the development and implementation of
produced waters from oil and gas production recommended practices for voluntary safety
operations by separating out dissolved solids, and environmental management programs
metals, and chemicals. These typically brack- for Outer Continental Shelf operations. Us-
ish waters can be made suitable for beneficial ing that approach, industry is responsible for
use, significantly lowering environmental voluntarily identifying potential hazards in the
risks and furthering resource management. design, construction, and operation of offshore
260
platforms and for implementing specific pro- ing landscape. Possible impacts to health and
cesses to improve safety and environmental safety during production include accidental
protection. These measures are designed to injury or death to workers and, to a lesser
reduce the risk and occurrence of accidents, extent, the public.
injuries, and oil spills. Previously listed environmental impacts
Vapor recovery units succeed in the Austin depend upon factors such as production
Chalk field, can significantly reduce the fugi- quantities, the number and size of units,
tive hydrocarbon emissions vaporizing from sort of processing facilities, the amount of
crude oil storage tanks, particularly tanks land disturbed by activities and occupied by
associated with high-pressure reservoirs, facilities, etc. Sometimes it is not possible
high vapor releases, and larger operations. to environmental impact eliminate, but can
These emissions are typically made up of be reduced to a minimum by implementing
40 to 60 percent methane, along with other adequate activities.
volatile organic compounds and hazardous This Chapter proposes implementation of
air pollutants. some activities from the designing phase to
abandonment phase with a goal of eliminatiom
or minimization of the environmental impact.
CONCLUSION As one of the most important factors in
environmental impact is implemented tech-
Once production facilities are installed, por- nology, this Chapter gives future research
tions of well pads, access roads, and pipeline directions for implementing new technologies.
would continue to contrast with the natural These technologies will help in minimizing
form, line, color, and texture of the surround- of the environmental impact.
261
REFERENCES Rahmawati, S. D. (2012). Integrated field

modeling and optimization. (Doctoral
Benmebarek, S., & Gray, T. (1996). Risk as- Thesis). Norwegian University of Science
sessment of new added facility at an offshore and Technology, Trondheim, Norway. Re-
gathering/processing plant. Paper presented trieved from www.iocenter.no/lib/exe/fetch.
at the SPE Health, Safety and Environment php?media=news:phds:finalthesis
in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Conference. New Orleans, LA. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil
Energy. (2005). Environmental benefits of
Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines advanced oil and gas. Retrieved from www.
for Onshore Oil and Gas Development. (2007). fe.doe.gov
Retrieved from www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.
nsf/Content
Eskijian, M., Heffron, R., & Dahlgren, T. ADDITIONAL READING
(2002). Engineering standards for marine oil
terminal design and maintenance (MOTEMS). API RP 51R (2009). Environmental Protection
Retrieved from www.slc.ca.gov/.../Presenta- for Onshore Oil and Gas Production Opera-
tion www.slc.ca.gov/.../Presentation tions and Leases, API
Harmony, K. (1998). Facility risk assessment Belke, D. U. (1995). Sequential Decision
and risk management in offshore oil & gas Analysis and Risk Analysis for Antarctic
industry. Paper presented at the SPE Asia Pa- Offshore Petroleum Development, SPE An-
cific Conference on Integrated Modelling for nual Technical Conference and Exhibition,
Asset Management. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Dallas, Texas
Holliday, G. H. (1991). Environmental compli- Hopkins, J. (2001). The Practical Application
ance assessment review. Paper presented at of Process Safety Principles To Determine
the International Arctic Technology Confer- and Monitor Asset Integrity of Oil and Gas
ence. Juno, AK. Facilities. Aberdeen, UK: Europe Oil &Gas
Conference and Exibition.
MARPOL. 73/78. (2009). Regulations for the
prevention of pollution by oil. International Horn, T., Bakke, W., & Eriksen, G. (2003).
Maritime Organization. Experience in Operating World’s First Sub-
sea Separation and Water Injection Station
at Troll Oil Field in the North Sea, Offshore
Technology Conference, Houston, Texas
262
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Habitat Change: Is change in the local

environmental conditions in which a particular
Environment: Is the sum of all surround- organism lives. It can occur naturally through
ings of a living organism, including natural droughts, disease, fire, hurricanes, mudslides,
forces and other living things, which provide volcanoes, earthquakes, slight increases or
conditions for development and growth as decreases in seasonal temperature or precipi-
well as of danger and damage. tation, etc. However, it is generally induced
Environmental Impact: Is a change in changes by human activities such as land use
the make-up, working, or appearance of the change and physical modification of rivers or
environment. These changes may be planned water withdrawal from rivers.
or accidental. Occupational Safety and Health: Is a
Environmental Risk: Is actual or potential cross-disciplinary area concerned with pro-
threat of adverse effects on living organisms tecting the safety, health and welfare of people
and environment by effluents, emissions, engaged in work or employment. It may also
wastes, resource depletion, etc., arising out protect co-workers, family members, employ-
of an organization’s activities. ers, customers, and many others who might
be affected by the workplace environment.
263
264
Chapter 13
Transportation Risk Analysis
Dragan Crnčević
INA Plc, Croatia
ABSTRACT
Petroleum is transported across the water in barges and tankers, and on land, using pipelines,
trucks, and trains. Natural gas is moved, mainly, by pipelines. The most common causes of tanker
accidents are: fire/explosions, loading/offloading, structural damage, collision, and grounding.
Pipeline accidents are due to: corrosion, third parties activities, mechanical damage, natural
events, and operational error. Some of the most commonly applied preventive activities that
reduce spills in waterborne transportation are: double-hulled tanker, navigation safety and
radio communications equipment, tanker exclusion zone, etc. The pipeline condition can be
recorded by using various nondestructive measurement techniques or by chemical analysis of
fluid flows. Different types of sensors can be used to locate and determine the size of an anomaly
in the pipeline geometry. Mayor methods for detecting leaks are measuring the hydrodynamic
parameters or registering abnormal conditions in the fluid flow and detecting phenomena in
the immediate vicinity of the pipeline.
INTRODUCTION for petroleum-based products has grown in

every corner of the world. But supply and
Advances in exploration and production demand are rarely concentrated in the same
have helped to locate and recover a supply place. Transportation therefore is vital to
of oil and natural gas from major reserves ensuring the reliable and affordable flow of
across the globe. At the same time, demand petroleum we all count on to fuel our cars,
heat our homes and improve the quality of
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch013
our lives. Pipelines, marine vessels, tank liquids by marine vessel creates a number of
trucks, rail tank cars and so forth are used to special health, safety and fire prevention situa-
transport crude oils, compressed and liquefied tions. These include surging and expansion of
hydrocarbon gases, liquid petroleum products liquid cargo, flammable vapor hazards during
and other chemicals from their point of origin transport and when loading and unloading.
to pipeline terminals, refineries, distributors The economics of operating modern tankers
and consumers. requires them to be at sea for extended periods
Crude oils and liquid petroleum products of time with only short intervals in port to
are transported, handled and stored in their load or unload cargo. This, together with the
natural liquid state. Hydrocarbon gases can fact that tankers are highly automated, creates
be handled, transported and stored in both the unique mental and physical demands on the
gaseous and liquid states and must be com- few crew members used to operate the vessels.
pletely confined in pipelines, tanks, cylinders
or other containers prior to use. The most im-
BACKGROUND
portant characteristic of liquefied hydrocarbon
gases (LHGs) is that they are stored, handled
Much of the oil and gas fields are located in
and shipped as liquids, taking up a relatively
countries far away from industrialized areas
small amount of space and then expanding
where the need for energy growing each day.
into a gas when used. For example, liquefied
This is why large quantities of hydrocarbons
natural gas (LNG) is stored at -162°C, and
have been transported all over world by land
when it is released the difference in storage
and sea. Increased transport increases risks.
and atmospheric temperatures causes the liq-
However, it can be said that the last decade has
uid to expand and gasify. In liquefied form,
been a reduction in accidents and incidents.
the volume of LNG is 600 times less than
What is the cause?
the same amount of natural gas at normal
Whether transported by sea or by land
temperature and pressure.
safety and security of operations is key task.
Because of the large volumes of products
Pipelines and tankers are constructed and
which are transported by pipelines on a con-
operated under strict regulations. During
tinuous basis, there is opportunity for environ-
operations are applied national and inter-
mental damage from releases. Depending on
national laws, conventions and regulations.
company and regulatory safety requirements
New technologies that enhance transportation
and the pipeline’s construction, location,
security are also implemented. Despite the
weather, accessibility and operation, a con-
safety problems that may occur, maritime oil
siderable amount of product may be released
shipping accidents have fallen steadily. The
should a break in the line or leak occur.
number of major oil spills (i.e. over 700 tons)
In addition to the usual maritime working
decreased eightfold between the ‘70s and
hazards, transporting crude oil and flammable
‘00s. These encouraging results were made
265
possible by the combined efforts of states, oil Anyone caught up in the mist would suffocate,
companies and ship owners. In fact, almost because they would not have enough air to
all the oil transported by sea arrives safely breathe. And just to be able to ignite the vapor,
without a hitch (Dhillon, 2007). but even then not always, because natural gas
In recent decades, oil transportation by is flammable if it is in the air between five
pipelines has increased significantly. How- and 15 percent in a concentration lower than
ever, incidents of oil leakage have a decreasing five percent is not enough gas in more than
trend in volume and in the number of leaks. 15 - not enough oxygen . But vaporized gas
Testing and failures simulation is also one would not be difficult to burn, and then it
way to find out more about the effects on produces tremendous heat, much more than
people and the environment. Therefore, efforts the burning of crude oil. Spilled gas would
to study the heat impact of LNG thermal on the quickly burn out and then moved to the fire
people intensified the last few years. The first source, the crack or reservoirs holes. And the
thought that a man comes to mind when he biggest disputes arise about how much LNG
saw the tanker of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is dangerous for the people in his vicinity.
from its huge, mostly spherical tanks is: what Experts polled by the GAO were not unique,
a bomb! The gas is normally associated in the and thought that exposure to heat from just
minds of the explosion. Almost every day in 30 seconds caused severe burns to people at a
the newspaper can be read by the title of “gas distance “from 500 to more than 2,000 meters.”
bottle exploded” (and killed people, destroyed U.S. Sandia National Laboratory (Luketa at
several apartment or house into ruins). If only al., 2008) in his study concluded that the most
10 kilograms of liquid gas can cause the kind probable maximum distance for severe burns
of damage that would happen to “blow up” the about 1,600 meters. Of course, the details
typical gas tanker with 125 000 cubic meters, depend on the environment, wind direction
or 50 million pounds of liquid gas? and speed, the amount of gas escaping, last-
With this apocalyptic picture in front of, ing fire. But the U.S. Government Account-
U.S. Congressmen have asked the state Office ability Office has not yet met those findings.
of Government Accountability Office (GAO) Concerned about them is that different experts
to investigate and report to them on what is and studies, such a different estimate of the
known in the United States and assumed about fire danger zone on an LNG tanker. About
the possible consequences of a possible ter- this data depends on how the governments of
rorist attack on an LNG tanker. all countries importing liquefied natural gas
When some hypothetical terrorists decided seek to protect cities, harbors, beaches and
LNG tanker used as a bomb, you first have waterways from a terrorist attack tanker, but
to liquefied petroleum gas spilled out of the not only intentional, but also against accidental
tank. Spreads along the ground or water, he failures. GAO also believes that experiments
quickly begins to evaporate as mist rises from should be carried out with much more spilled
the ground. Mixed with air and disperses. liquid gas than before.
266
PIPELINES TRANSPORTATION This high pressure, large capacity pipelines

carry hazardous products, and consequently,
Main Characteristics of Pipelines they are designed, constructed and operated
using recognized standards that all have a focus
Transmission pipelines are the main arteries’
on safety. Additionally, these pipelines have
of the oil and gas business; working 24 hours
to satisfy safety regulations in most countries.
per day, seven days a week, continuously sup-
These high standards and regulations ensure
plying our energy needs. They are critically
safe and secure pipelines.
important to most countries’ economies. They
The total length of high pressure trans-
have a long history; pipelines have been used
mission pipelines around the world has been
to transport liquids and gases for thousands
estimated at 3,500,000 km. The ‘split’ is
of years: the Chinese used bamboo pipe to
(Hopkins, 2007):
transmit natural gas to light their capital,
Peking, as early as 400 BC. • ~64% carry natural gas;
The oil and gas are transported in these • ~19% carry petroleum products;
large transmission pipelines to refineries, • ~17% carry crude oil.
power stations, etc., and converted into energy
forms such as gasoline for our automobiles, These systems can be huge; for example,
and electricity for our homes. if you laid the Canadian pipeline system, end
Without pipelines we would not be able to end, it would extend 17 times around the
to satisfy the huge oil and gas needs of our world!
planet. Pipelines are also very safe forms of We now have many types of pipelines in the
transporting energy (Hopkins, 2007). world. The types of oil and gas pipelines can
be summarized as gathering pipelines, trans-
• Pipelines are 40 times safer than rail portation pipelines and distribution pipelines.
tanks, and 100 times safer than road Gathering pipelines is a group of smaller
tanks for transporting energy; interconnected pipelines forming complex
• Oil pipeline spills amount to about 1 network with the purpose of bringing crude
gallon per million barrel-miles, ac- oil or natural gas from several nearby wells to
cording to the USA Association of Oil a treatment plant or processing facility. In this
Pipelines. One barrel, transported one group, pipelines are usually short- a couple
mile (1609 m), equals one barrel-mile, of hundred meters- and with small diameters.
and there are 42 gallons (159 liters) Also sub-sea pipelines for collecting product
in a barrel. In household terms, this is from deep water production platforms are
less than one teaspoon of oil spilled per considered gathering systems.
thousand barrel-miles. Transportation pipelines are mainly long
pipes with large diameters, moving products
(oil, gas, refined products) between cities,
267
countries and even continents. These trans- These operations also include inspecting of
portation networks include several compressor the pipeline. This is accomplished by insert-
stations in gas lines or pump stations for crude ing the pig into pipeline on launcher/launch-
and multiproduct pipelines. ing station (a funnel shaped Y section). The
Distribution pipelines are composed of launcher/launching station is then closed and
several interconnected pipelines with small the pressure (driven flow of the product in
diameters, used to take the products to the the pipeline) is used to push it along down
final consumer. Those are feeder lines with the pipe until it reaches the receiver/receiv-
purpose of distributing gas to homes and ing station. Figure 1 shows construction of
businesses downstream. Pipelines at terminals launcher/receiver station at crude oil pipeline.
for distributing products to tanks and storage Aboveground, underwater and under-
facilities are included in this group ground pipelines, varying in size from sev-
Pipelines are made from high quality eral centimeters to a meter or more in diam-
steel (‘line pipe’ steel), constructed using eter (the Russian system has diameters up to
well-established methods, and operated using 1,422 mm), move vast amounts of crude oil,
procedures developed over many decades. natural gas, LHGs and liquid petroleum prod-
Pigging has been used for many years to ucts. Pipelines run throughout the world, from
clean larger diameter crude oil pipelines. the frozen tundra of Alaska and Siberia to the
Figure 1. Construction of launcher/receiver station at 20” crude oil pipeline (Part of author’s
private collection of INA Plc’s facility)
268
hot deserts of the Middle East, across rivers, European terminals or North Africa to
lakes, seas, swamps and forests, over and Sicily.
through mountains and under cities and towns. • Others are overland, such as those that
The longest pipeline in the world is the make up the Russian network (the lon-
Druzhba pipeline (5,327 km), which passes gest in the world, at almost 160,000 km
through eight countries - Russia, Belarus, long). For safety and security reasons,
Ukraine, Poland, Germany, the Czech Re- these networks are buried underground.
public and Hungary.
There are geopolitical and economic issues Contrary to oil, natural gas is mostly trans-
involved in the building of new oil pipelines. ported by pipeline. This is because for the same
Generally, the oil industry prefers to ship amount of energy, the volume of natural gas
oil by sea because this mode of transport is is 600 times higher than oil, which is liquid.
more flexible. Unlike a pipeline, a ship does This means that it is far too costly to transport
not have to follow the same route, which can natural gas by ship.
therefore be adapted to meet demand. How-
Causes of Possible Accidents
ever, sometimes oil has to travel over land,
for example to landlocked countries. In this
Despite all the measures taken to preserve the
case, it can be easier and less costly to use a
integrity of the pipeline leakage may occur,
pipeline than to transport the oil by road or
and thus more or less environmental pollution.
train. In countries with huge land mass such
Thereby causing leakage affects the size of
as Russia, pipelines are useful to deliver oil
leaks. Not the same, whether the pipeline leak
to ports for exporting by ship.
caused by corrosion millimeter perforated or
Western Europe has pipeline networks that
a relatively large diameter hole in which case
transport crude from ports to refineries located
there is a sudden release of large the amount
further inland. These are also used to send
of oil into the environment. The causes of
the finished product from refineries to large
failure are one of the important parameters
consumer centers (fuel and raw materials for
to be analyzed in leakage databases. Loca-
the petrochemicals industry).
tion of the leak is also an important element
Gas pipelines are the preferred mode of
in the assessment of the impact of leakage
transport for natural gas.
environment. In case of failure in the area of
As their name indicates, gas pipelines
impervious soil will result in a lower impact
are similar to oil pipelines except that they
on the environment then in the case of leakage
transport natural gas. There are two types of
in the aquifer. The cost to repair leaks in the
gas pipeline:
area waterways is several times higher than the
repair of leaks in the soil. The effective clean
• Some are underwater, such as those
spillages of oil, it is very important to know
linking Norwegian gas fields to
how the spread oil and dissolved constituents,
269
volatilization, biodegradation, dilution, the by human error such as failing to observe the
behavior of oil in heterogeneous soil and ef- correct operating instructions.
fects of oil in the soil and groundwater.
In considering how best to avoid pipeline Corrosion
spillages, it is very important to investigate
In the past, corrosion has been the most com-
what are the main causes of failure to be
mon cause of spillage although the quantities
guarded against. The causes of spillage can be
involved are usually small. Pipelines are
divided into few main categories (Dziubinski
subject to two types of corrosion - internal
et al., 2006; CONCAWE,2010):
and external. Crude oils and oil products can
• Mechanical failure; give rise to internal corrosion when corrosive
• Operational failure; products are present usually in combination
• Corrosion; with water. Corrosion can also occur when
• Natural events; pipelines are not in use. External corrosion
• Third party activity. occurs either because the pipeline coating is
found to be inadequate and/or the cathodic
Mechanical Failure protection is inefficient.
Mechanical failures are ruptures and fissures Natural Hazard

that occur when stresses in the system exceed
the allowable stress. They can be caused by Natural hazards are phenomena such as
poor material quality or faulty construction. landslides, flooding, ground subsidence and
Manufacturing defects can occur in the pipe earthquakes.
or fittings, e.g. in the pipe wall or in the lon-
Third Party Activity
gitudinal weld. Poor construction techniques
can generate high residual stress levels in the
The majority of these spillages are caused by
pipeline prior to commissioning. For example,
accidental damage inflicted after construction
the forming of pipe bends, welding techniques
of the pipeline by third party excavation in the
and the handling of materials can all lead to
vicinity of the pipeline. More often than not
unacceptable construction practices if not
the right-of-ways are not clearly marked and
carried out according to the specification of
lines are sometimes broken by bulldozers or
the work.
similar plant machinery possibly with fatal
Operational Failure results. Intentional damage unfortunately is on
the increase and pipelines carrying flammable
Operational failures can be due to overpressure or high value products make ideal targets.
or malfunction of systems such as pressure Surveillance and inspection procedures are
relief or control devices. They are also caused designed to minimize the amount of damage
caused by third parties.
270
As can be seen from Table 1, which pres- Procedure risk identification is usually car-
ent the reported causes of spillages from West ried out in a number of the following steps:
European pipelines and USA pipeline, third identifying or risk identification, determining
party damage was responsible for the largest who may be harmed or that may be affected,
number of spillage. Also, great number of the assessment (evaluation) risk and decisions
spillages was due to corrosion and mechani- about precautionary measures to reduce the
cal failure. probability of occurrence, record on his find-
ings, and the incorporation of new knowledge
Accident Risk Analysis into the existing system and to review and
repeat the procedure if necessary.
The large volumes of products which are trans- For a good understanding of the concept
ported by pipelines on a continuous basis, is of risk management are three important ques-
opportunity for environmental damage from tions (Muhlbauer, 2004):
releases. Risk identification involves careful
consideration of the possible events that may • What can happen?
negatively affect the most commonly observed • How likely is it?
some activity. These may be risks associated • What are the consequences?
with safety and integrity of physical objects,
the risks arising from the environment in The risk assessment is the basis for deci-
which the observed activity takes place and sion-making in different situations, as well as
the financial risks associated with the diversity to predict the consequences of such decisions.
of decision-making. Hazard is defined as a Industrial risk assessment is a careful exami-
potential cause of injury or damage, but the nation of all the potential sources of danger
risk is a combination of several effects and could affect the operation or the system in a
the likelihood that an event will happen. Even simple or complex form. Recommendations
the simplest methods of assessment, such various agencies and international standards
as simple verification of the system provide state institutions are similar. They are mainly
visible results that lead to increased safety. based on statistical data of accidents cases
Table 1. Number of oil spillages by cause
Main causes CONCAWE statistics for 1971-2006, % DOT statistics for 1971-1996, %
Third parties 33 34
Corrosion 30 33
Mechanical failure 25 18
Operational failure 7 2,5
Natural events 4 4,5
Others 1 8
271
by region. They saw many countries have solutions for crossing all obstacles, such as
benefited from the introduction of technical difficult terrain, roads, rivers, railways, etc.
risk assessment methodology of leaks as Special attention is given to the design of cross-
integrated parts of the program analysis risk ing important rivers and stretches of water.
in the oil companies. Underground routes are usually preferred to
Risk management has been defined by above ground routes where possible. Hazard
the USA Office of Pipeline Safety as “a assessments and environmental studies which
comprehensive management decision support assess the effects of, for example, noise, pol-
process, implemented as a program, integrated lution and accidents on the local population,
through defined roles and responsibilities are reviewed in more detail as the system
into the day-to-day operations, maintenance, design develops.
engineering management, and regulatory Mechanical Design: The operating pres-
decisions of the operator” sure can be defined as the pressure required to
maintain a given flow rate through the pipeline
Prevention Activities taking into account the pipeline profile and
the residual pressure at the end of the pipeline.
There are a number of safety precautions The design pressure must be equal to or higher
and procedures in place to minimize the risk than the maximum operating pressure under
of accidents. Prevention activities can be any flow condition, including static pressure
predicted even in the preparation of initial under no flow conditions (pumps running
design studies where defined pipeline route, against closed valves).The minimum wall
mechanical design and protection. Pipeline thickness is calculated (including a safety
design is regulated by strict national and factor) from a knowledge of the pressures,
international standards and specifications type of steel pipe and consideration of other
which are subject to continuous review and factors. These include the ease of handling
updating (API Std. 1160, 2001). In fact, the without damaging pipes, the resistance to
transportation of oil and natural gas is one of stresses imposed during pipeline construc-
the safest ways of transporting energy, mostly tion, and the resistance to deformation under
due to the fact that the infrastructure is fixed, external loads. The thermal stresses are also
and buried underground. During the operation considered, together with hydraulic, mechani-
of the pipeline requires maintenance, control cal and fatigue stresses, in order to ensure that
and monitoring. the maximum allowable stress values are not
Pipeline Route - The choice of pipeline exceeded for the selected wall thickness for
route is an important factor in ensuring the the pipeline.
safety of the public, protection of the environ- Mechanical Protection: Isolation valves are
ment and integrity of the pipeline itself. Soil installed along the pipeline route so that the
studies, topographical surveys and geological pipeline can be quickly divided into sections
information are assessed to obtain technical in the event of an emergency to minimize the
272
available contents that could spill. Various Methods of checking the condition of pipe
Codes of Practice make recommendations on insulation can be indirectly to obtain data on
the spacing of valves, particularly in areas of corrosion attack and changes in the thickness
dense population. In certain circumstances of the outer wall piping. These are Pearson
non-return valves are installed in the place of methods, and so-called Current Pipeline
isolation valves. These valves only permit flow Mapper (PCM).
in one direction and prevent the contents of Measuring external protecting coating:
the pipeline draining back to a rupture point Pearson detection of the insulation pipe caused
in an emergency, thereby reducing any spill- a 40-ies of the last century, but still is used.
age. Overpressure protection devices, such Measurement of exterior insulating coating
as pressure relief valves may be installed at of pipelines using Pearson device achieved
appropriate locations to limit the maximum good results. The basic physical principle
pressure of the pipeline under transient or of his work lies in the fact that the quality of
incorrect operating conditions. transmission of electromagnetic fields leads
Corrosion protection: Corrosion is still an to a function with the quality pipe insulation.
important cause of failure. It can occur either Transmitter, connected to the pipe, the signals
on external or internal surfaces and different are sent to the receiver placed at a certain
prevention methods are used in each case distance. Where the insulation is damaged,
(NACE RP0502-2002, 2002). reducing the resistance between the pipe and
External corrosion: Corrosion is electro- the ground, it is evidenced by the receiver in
chemical in form. When an unprotected pipe a larger spades or stronger signal. Otherwise,
is buried in moist soil conditions, an electric the alignment between the transmitter and
current flows from the metal (the anode) to receiver are going operators in the space of 6
the soil (acting as cathode). The metal from m, which have put the electrodes which take
which the current flows will dissolve in the signals from the ground and transmit them to
surrounding moisture. This is apparent as the receiver cables.
corrosion. There are two ways of preventing Contrary the Pearson method in which
this corrosion, either by isolating the pipeline measurements are made using direct cur-
from the soil with an electrically insulating rent, the Pipeline Current Mapper used by
protective coating, or by cathodic protection low-frequency alternating current. Since this
which ensures that any current flow will be method is developed many years later, and
from the soil to the metal and not vice versa. that in the instrument for the detection of
Though it is possible to use the two methods insulation defects found, Global Positioning
independently, they are commonly used to System - GPS, this method is more commonly
complement one another. If for example the used in practice. At the time the pipeline was
coating has a fault, then the cathodic protec- excavated condition of the insulation can be
tion will protect the line. checked by direct methods such as the deter-
mination of bonding insulation.
273
Catodic protection: Cathodic protection use of magnesium anodes in connection with

(CP) is a proven method of controlling and the pipeline system. The magnesium is buried
reducing corrosion of pipelines, vessels, tanks in the ground within the same electrolyte as
and other structures, located both above and the pipeline. The pipeline and the anode are
below ground. The added expense of installing electrically connected, and as the magnesium
CP systems is usually justified based on pipe corrodes, the pipeline is protected. The mag-
or vessel repair/replacement costs. Corroding nesium should be alloyed to prevent passive
structures have both anodic and cathodic areas. layering. A passive layer is an oxide film that
Electrons naturally flow from the anodic areas forms naturally on the surface of most metals.
through an electrolyte (for example soil) to the This passive layer becomes a protective coat-
cathodic areas and back to the pipe, thereby ing on an anode and prevents further corro-
completing a circuit. Corrosion occurs where sion. If the sacrificial anode does not corrode,
the current discharges from the metal into the protection current is not produced. If this
the electrolyte at anodic areas. By applying happens, the pipeline will begin to corrode.
cathodic protection to a structure, the entire Another form of cathodic protection is an
exposed surface can become cathodic to the impressed current system. In this system, an
environment, thereby mitigating the corrosion. external source, not the galvanic reaction,
Cathodic protection has also been shown to forces the direction of the current. The posi-
be effective in reducing corrosion underneath tive terminal from a power is connected to the
biomass colonies, by impeding their attach- anode and the negative terminal is connected
ment to the steel surface. to the cathode. The pipeline is connected to
In a corrosion cell, current flows from the the negative terminal and consequently be-
anode through the electrolyte to the cathode. comes cathodic. It is very important that the
Cathodic protection methods attempt to con- positive terminal be connected to the ground
trol the direction of the corrosion current. One bed anodes, the material to be corroded. If the
such method is the use of a sacrificial anode. positive terminal is connected to the pipeline,
A sacrificial anode is an anode electrically the pipeline will become anodic and corrode.
connected to the system to be protected. The Several different current sources are available
sacrificial anode will corrode and therefore, for use in impressed current systems. Batteries,
the cathodic system will be protected. The DC engine-generators, and thermo-electric
basic idea is to force certain parts to be ca- generators all provide direct current. Alternat-
thodic or anodic with respect to the other in ing current sources such as a power line may
order to control the current direction. If a be used if a rectifier is used to convert the
sacrificial anode is chosen that is anodic to current to direct current. Alternating current
every metal in the pipeline system, the anode will not provide any protection since the pipe-
will corrode while the pipeline is protected. A line would be anodic or cathodic depending
prime example of a sacrificial system is the on the direction of the current. The biggest
274
advantage in cathodic protection systems is Gas and Oil Sampling: Routine sampling of
its effectiveness. However, in order to provide the gas and oil in pipelines ensures its quality,
effective corrosion protection, the system must and may also indicate corrosion of the interior
be carefully maintained. of the pipeline, or the influx of contaminants.
Preventive maintenance works consist of A common method to detect internal corrosion
the following: visual inspection of all measure- is the monitoring of the quantity of dissolved
ment places (including appliances, boxes and iron in the small quantities of entrained water.
polarization measurement cell), measuring The accuracy of the method is dependent
the potential pipeline - soil, checking for stray on the water pH and the level of iron in the
current and the impact of power facilities, tun- liquid. This method is particularly useful in
ing and optimization of the protection system indicating the level of effectiveness of the
and, by making field measurements annual inhibitors commonly added in oil pipelines.
reports with measurements of the quality It is not used in isolation, but in combination
of cathodic protection. Maintained cathodic with other methods of corrosion monitoring,
protection system is an important indicator as each method complements the other and
of the integrity of the pipeline. provides supporting data on the condition of
Internal corrosion: There are several the pipeline. Another option to assess corro-
methods for checking the internal pipe-wall sion growth is by comparison of two intel-
condition of a pipeline and these include ligence pig surveys. Conventional cleaning
corrosion coupons, application inhibitors, pigs are used to scrape away any deposits that
internal coatings, iron counts, intelligence have accumulated on the interior wall of the
pigs, and frequent use of cleaning pigs to pipeline to reduce pressure loss.
displace any corrosive products including Intelligence pigs: In order to ensure the
water. Various monitoring and inspection efficient and safe operation of oil and natural
tools are used to assess the actual corrosion gas pipelines, pipeline companies routinely in-
growth rate. Internal corrosion growth can be spect their pipelines for corrosion and defects.
assessed using corrosion coupons or probes, This is done through the use of sophisticated
and/or external measurement devices like pieces of equipment known as ‘smart pigs.’
mechanized ultrasonic and field signature Intelligent pigs are robotic devices that are
monitoring. A corrosion coupon is a strip of propelled down pipelines to evaluate the inte-
metal inserted into a pipeline which is then rior of the pipe. Intelligence pigs can test pipe
periodically monitored for corrosion either by thickness, and roundness, check for signs of
electrical methods or by periodical removal corrosion, detect minute leaks, and any other
and weighing. This can be performed with defect along the interior of the pipeline that
the pipeline in service. Unfortunately, the may either impede the flow of gas, or pose
corrosion growth is underestimated when a potential safety risk to the operation of the
these measurement devices are not located pipeline. Sending a pig down a pipeline is
at the worst corrosion spots. fittingly known as ‘pigging’ the pipeline.
275
Intelligence pigs have a wider application in damage. Measurement principles of these

the monitoring of internal pipe walls. Dif- devices are based on ultrasound (“ultrasonic
ferent types of pigs can be used to locate and intelligence pigs”) (Figure 2) or the loss of
determine the size of the anomalies in the magnetic flux (“magnetic intelligence pigs”)
geometry pipeline, such as dents or bulges, (Figure 3).
and locate and determine the size of the re- In magnetic devices, an essential part is a
duction in wall thickness caused by internal pair of permanent magnets in the form of steel
or external corrosion, erosion or mechanical wire overlapping the inner wall of the pipeline,
and between their poles are located sensitive
sensors. Bolting pole permanent magnet on
Figure 2. Ultrasonic intelligence pig (part the pipe wall induces a magnetic field in the
of author’s private collection of INA Plc’s wall of the pipeline. If it encounters a dam-
facility) aged section of pipe wall at this point, partly
interrupted magnetic flux, which is registered
by the sensors. Other parts of this device are
an electronic device for recording and storing
data and a wheeled odometer to measure the
distance traveled.
Intelligence pig that operates on the prin-
ciple of ultrasound allows the measurement
of corrosion damage on outside and inside
walls of the pipeline. This device works on
the principle of rejecting an ultrasonic pulse
from the inner and outer walls of the pipeline.
Device gets a straight wall thickness, and
gaps between the sensor and the inner wall.
If the inner wall is damaged of the pipeline,
then on the basis of reflection of ultrasonic
waves reflected its reduced thickness, while
Figure 3. Magnetic intelligence pig (Adapted from www.tdwilliamson.com)
276
increasing the distance from the sensor to Deposits are removed from the internal
the inner wall. If the outter wall is damaged pipe wall with scraper pigs to reduce pres-
(as evidenced by the loss of metal), then the sure losses in the pipeline. This involves the
reflection of ultrasonic waves also observed testing of valves and the removal of surface
reduction in wall thickness, which suggests impediments to pipeline inspection.
a short distance from the sensor to the outer Surveillance: Carried out regularly to check
wall of the pipeline the general condition of the pipeline route and
Operation: An operating pipeline requires to ensure that no unauthorized work is being
control, maintenance and surveillance. The started near the pipeline and to check that the
control centre monitors the variables through pipeline is not endangered in any other way.
the instrumentation on the pipeline in order Such surveillance can be carried out either
to ensure safe and efficient operation. The from the air or on the ground or both.
control room is the nerve centre of a pipeline. Aerial Patrols: Planes are used to ensure
The essential instrumentation on the pipeline no construction activities are taking place too
is linked to the control room by cable and/or close to the route of the pipeline, particularly
telemetry. The increasing power of computer in residential areas. Unauthorized construction
systems available to pipeline operators enables and digging is the primary threat to pipeline
ever more sophisticated pipeline supervision safety.
and control. Current technology enables Pipeline Markers: Signs on the surface
pigs and product parcels to be tracked; leak above pipelines indicate the presence of un-
detection on pumping pipelines by mass/ derground pipelines to the public, to reduce the
volume balance or dynamic modeling is be- chance of any interference with the pipeline.
coming increasingly reliable and accurate.
Monitoring of pressure (and temperature) Leak Detection Methods
also ensures a leak detection capability for a
Although spillages are in fact very rare, leak
pipeline that is shut in. The instrumentation
detection systems are installed to detect and
monitors variables such as pressures, flow
locate a leak as soon and as accurately as pos-
and temperatures in the pipeline and external
sible (Zhang, 1993; API 1130, 2002). What-
conditions such as ground movement and air
ever the failure causes, the consequences are
temperature. Maintenance is conducted on a
almost always the same. These are primarily:
planned formal basis. Routine inspection and
maintenance is carried out to ensure that the
• Loss of life and property;
pipeline is in mechanically sound condition
• Environmental cleanup costs;
and operating at optimum efficiency. Regular
• Payment of fines and damages;
surveys are undertaken to check for corrosion
• Bad image company:
and remedial work is carried out if necessary.
• Possible fines and legal suits
All instruments and cathodic protection sys-
tems are checked for correct operation.
277
Today in the world there are a number of Leakage or fluid flow through the hole in
methods and techniques based on different the pipeline due to expansion and changes in
principles. The market offers a large number flow direction causes a variety of changes in
of leak detection devices and monitoring the steady flow. With leaks will expand the
systems. Many are very similar and differ sound waves at a rate that depends on the
only in the technical performance of different physical properties of fluids in pipes (http://
vendors. They differ in commercial names, www.wavealert.com, 2013). Acoustic detec-
physical principles, and applications. From tors detect these waves, or failure and the
over 300 methods available on the market time of their travelling to the sensor and can
today is summarized view only those that are also locate leaks. Leak detection in pipelines
applicable to detect pipeline leakage. Refer- using acoustic emissions technology is based
ences are grouped and systematized in several on the principle that escaping liquid creates
ways depending on the source (Martin, 1998; an acoustic signal as it passes through a per-
Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation, foration in the pipe. Acoustic sensors affixed
1999). One of the displays is appropriate to to the outside of the pipe monitor internal
distinguish between three main groups: pipeline noise levels and locations. These data
are used to create a baseline “acoustic map”
• Monitoring of characteristic signals of the line. When a leak occurs, the resulting
generating by a leak; low frequency acoustic signal is detected and
• Monitoring hydrodynamic parameters analyzed by system processors. Deviations
of fluid; from the baseline acoustic profile would sig-
• Surrounding environmental monitoring. nal an alarm. The received signal is stronger
near the leak site thus enabling leak location.
Each of the groups incorporates a number Acoustic sensing can be applied externally to
of methods of monitoring which observe and buried pipelines by using steel rods driven into
follow the related physical phenomena. the ground to conduct the sound to a sensor
mounted on the rod. The rods are inserted at
Monitoring of Characteristic
intervals along the pipeline. Furthermore, the
Signals Generated by a Leak
pipeline leaks in this group of methods can
Methods of this group observe and record the be detected by using devices equipped with
accompanying effects caused by the leakage acoustic detector (“intelligence pig”). Liquid
and can be divided in: escaping under pressure through a defect in
the pipeline wall generates ultrasonic noise.
• Negative pressure wave; This noise can be measured and recorded by
• Wave alert; a pig propelled through the pipeline by the
• Acoustic reflectometric; normal flow of the product. Even small leaks
• Ultrasonic leak detection pig. can be detected and located with a good level
278
of accuracy. This method will not alert the the conditions of the process, and in particu-
operator immediately the leak occurs nor will lar stationary flow conditions. In the case of
it indicate the size of it. The technique is used unsteady flow conditions required are very
instead for locating and assessing suspected sophisticated programs and equipment as more
leaks, or conversely, to confirm the integrity costly equipment and makes it susceptible to
of the line. the application. Monitoring hydrodynamic
parameters of fluid can run the following
Monitoring of Hydrodynamic methods:
Parameters
• Volume balance;
Methods of the second group are based on • Automatic volume balance;
the monitoring and measurement of hydrody- • Modified volume balance;
namic parameters of the process or registering • Mass balance;
abnormal condition in the process fluid flow. • Real time transient model;
All parameters in the process flow at both ends • Statistical analyses;
of the pipeline in specific known the bulk, • Pressure/flow monitoring;
mass, hydrodynamic and thermodynamic • Hydraulic test;
equilibrium (http://www.vistaleakdetection. • Temperature compensated volumetric
com, 2013). Disruption caused by the failure test.
of the process distorts the equilibrium states
and indicates the leakage. The advantage of Surrounding Environmental Monitoring
these methods is that they are measuring de-
vices commonly existing standard processes. The third group method is the most numer-
These are mainly pressure transducers and ous and widely spread in the application. It is
temperature, flow meters (for more complex based on detection of the appearance of the
systems and viscometers and densitometers) fluid in the immediate vicinity of the pipe.
that are otherwise necessary for the process The basic method principle is oversees the
to take place. Using devices Remote Terminal ground (below, above and around the pipe),
Units (RTUs) collects data from the measur- groundwater, vadose zone, corridors and in-
ing device. The whole system is controlled by door areas at risk of leaks. A very large range
SCADA, which collects and processes data of parameters and measurement techniques
from the sites, and subjects them to a specific are implemented in this group. There can be
mathematical or statistical analysis. The re- found the simplest examples, visual screening
sult is a programmable alarm and procedures pipeline route or the use of canine olfaction
(shut-down). Communication between these odorant fluids. There are, however, in this
devices can be accomplished radio, satellite group of very sophisticated methods using
and often dial-up connection. For this group thermography, electro sensitive cables, optical
it is necessary to a perfect knowledge of all cables and osmotic diffusion tubes. Thus, the
279
diffusion tubes are also used for this purpose. small contamination in the immediate vicinity
Principle of this method is to use tubes that of pipeline. Some of these methods allow for
selectively permeable vapor and hydrocarbon the timely detection and exact location of the
gases. The pipes are laid in the immediate en- leak. The main disadvantage of most meth-
vironment of controlled pipelines or facilities. ods of this group is that they are the chosen
In case of failure, as soon as the diffusion tube sensors buried piping must pass during the
encircled saturated hydrocarbon, the interior construction of pipelines. On old pipelines,
is in that zone filled with steam or gaseous subsequently burying is an additional cost.
phase. Extruding content diffusion tubes, Environmental monitoring which surrounds
through continuous analyzer receives the data the pipeline includes (Novačić, M., Crnčević,
on which the hydrocarbon as well as the loca- D., 2001):
tion for leaks. A similar method is application
of fiber optic sensing cables. Leak detection • Visual observations;
sensor application of fiber optic cable used to • Tracers;
the notion that chemical or physical reaction • Electro-chemical sensing cables;
bothers transmission of light through optical • Fiber optic cables;
fibers. Fiber optic sensors typically consist of • Diffusion hoses;
a core (glass) and trim (polymers). In contact • Capacitance probe;
with contaminants there are changes in prop- • Metal oxide semiconductor (MOS);
erties lining, which reflects the change in the • Light detector and ranking (LIDAR);
intensity of the light signal through an optical • Biosensors;
fiber. This resulted in the identification of • SCAPS LIF detectors;
pollutants in space monitoring. Some of the • Hydrocarbon detection sensors;
methods are in the experimental stage of the • Product solubility sensors;
application for the detection of leakage. Most • Radio frequency attenuation;
often applied to very different purposes, e.g., • Product permeability detectors;
radars (ground penetrating radar). They reveal • Refractive index of liquid detectors;
the soil pipe, mines, geological structure etc. • Geochemical survey;
The use of radar for detecting leakage showed • Gas chromatography;
high precision but with difficulty when it is • Ground penetrating radar;
wet, clay layers (http://www.tracerresearch. • Temperature sensing cable;
com, 2013). • Sniffer tube.
Most methods of this group are suitable
for remote alarm or automatic locking pro- TRANSPORTATION BY TANKERS
cess since all measured or observations to
have electrically output. The advantage of Another key to maintaining the flow is the
this group over other monitoring methods global fleet of oil tankers, now numbering
described above, the higher the sensitivity to around 3,500. Though these vessels are of
280
widely varying size and quality, the one • The US and the rest of North and South
consistent trend throughout the business America via the Cape of Good Hope;
100-year history has been toward larger and • Asia via the Malacca Strait between
larger vessels. Today, more than 400 “very Sumatra and Malaysia (this route leads
large crude carrier” (VLCC) class tankers, to Japan and China, where oil demand
carrying over one million gallons of oil each, has grown significantly since 2000);
handle about one-third of the world’s tanker • Europe via the Suez Canal. Larger tank-
volume. As size has increased, the cost of ers cannot take this route because the
shipping has fallen to roughly 5-10% of the Suez canal is too narrow. These tankers
price per barrel. The world’s first oil tankers pass the Cape of Good Hope to reach
appeared in the late 19th century and carried European ports. Thus, large oil tanker
kerosene for lighting, but the invention of the takes 2 weeks to one month to reach
motor car fuelled demand for oil. During the Western Europe from OPEC coun-
Second World War, the standard oil tanker was tries (Organization of the Petroleum
the T2, 16,400 tones deadweight, but tankers Exporting Countries) in Africa, South
grew rapidly in size from the 1950s onwards. America, the Arabian Peninsula.
The first 100,000-tone crude oil tanker
was delivered in 1959 to cover the route from Moreover, oil freight transiting through the
the Middle East to Europe round the Cape of Panama canal has increased considerably due
Good Hope (thereby avoiding the Suez Canal to growing demand in Asia.
which had been temporarily closed following
Main Types of Tankers
political conflicts in 1956). Shippers saw
economies of scale in larger tankers and by
In addition to the two main types of oil tank-
the mid-1960s, tankers of 200,000 tones dead-
ers, crude and product tankers, there are some
weight- the Very large crude carrier had been
subcategories of oil tankers in use today. Tank-
ordered (http://gisis.imo.org/Public, 2013).
ers are divided by type of cargo transported.
Tankers Route Oil tanker: It is tanker for the carriage of
crude-oil.
Tankers often follow the same routes be- Product tanker: Tanker for the carriage of
tween producing and consuming countries. refined products derived from crude oil (gaso-
Refined petroleum products (gasoline, diesel, line, Diesel oil, jet fuel) from the refineries.
and kerosene) are mainly transported within Shuttle tanker: It is tanker ship for the car-
Europe, between Europe and Asia, Europe riage of crude-oil directly from the offshore
and the US. The most frequented routes for oil fields to terminals or refineries.
crude oil start in the Middle East. They pass Tankers for the carriage of condensed
through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait or the Strait gases: Tanker which carriages the gases kept
of Hormuz, the world’s main oil shipping in the liquid state due to high pressures or to
lane. After this, they travel to:
281
very low temperatures, in tanks with highly the worlds ports. The term ULCC describes
efficient insulation. tankers which range from 300/500,000 dwt.
More relevant cargo types: They are mainly used for long haul operations
LNG (liquefied natural gas) tanker: It is between The Gulf and the Far East, Europe
tanker which carriages mainly methane with and North America, discharging their cargo
temperatures that can reach –163 ºC. at terminals especially constructed to handle
LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) tanker: such large vessels. VLCC’s are vessels rang-
Tanker which carriages the gases with a low ing from between 150/299,000 dwt and are
boiling point (-44 to 0°C) and high vapor employed on similar routes to ULCC’s but
pressure. They are carried at environment their relatively smaller size allows for greater
temperature in pressurized tanks independent flexibility. They can discharge at many ter-
from the ship’s hull, or at reduced tempera- minals within the Mediterranean, North West
tures, at atmospheric pressure. Examples: Europe, West Africa, etc. They also have the
propane, butane, propylene, butylenes. advantage of being able to transit the Suez
Canal in ballast condition.
Typical Sizes Oil Tankers
Suezmax
While no standardized system for the classifi-
cation of oil tankers exists; the fleet is typically Suezmax are midsized tankers with displace-
divided into several major categories based on ment between 120,000 and 200,000 dwt.
carrying capacity. These categories are Ultra Suezmax tankers offer the relative economies
Large Crude Carrier (ULCCs) and Very Large of scale that can be achieved with VLCCs;
Crude Carrier (VLCCs), Suezmax, Aframax, however, their slightly smaller size offers
Panamax and Handysize tankers. To benefit increased versatility and access to a majority
from economies of scale charterers typically of the world’s ports. Suezmax tankers primar-
charter the largest possible vessel that can be ily operate in the Atlantic Basin delivering
accommodated in a particular voyages arrival cargoes from West Africa, the North Sea, and
and discharge ports. The main categories of the former FSU.
vessels are:
Aframax
Ultra Large Crude Carrier (ULCCs) and
Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCCs) Aframax vessels are mid-size tankers with dis-
placement between 80,000 and 120,000 dwt.
These are the largest vessels in the world Widely considered to be the work horses of
tanker fleet: Cape of Good Hope and Asia. The the fleet, their size makes them ideally suited
large carrying capacity of ULCCs and VLCCs to operate in areas of lower crude production
make them attractive to traders, however, this or where draft and size restrictions prevent
large size limits their access into some of the use of larger vessels.
282
Panamax and Handysize Product tankers can also be sub-divided

into two main tonnage groups; the larger
These tankers are primarily used for both carrying products in quantities between
the transportation of crude oil and petroleum 26,000 and 50,000 tones, whilst the smaller,
products. Panamax tankers have displacement so-called ‘Handy Size’ loads between 12,000
between 50,000 and 80,000 dwt and trade in and 25,000 tones.
short haul. Handysize tankers have displace- Clean cargo tanks characterized by:
ment between 50,000 and 10,000 dwt. They
primarily carry finished petroleum products as • No structural elements inside the cargo
their smaller size makes them less economic space (double skin);
for the transport of crude. • Corrugated bulkheads (transverse and
longitudinal);
Shuttle Tankers • Cargo tanks painted or internally
coated.
Generally they are conventional tankers
equipped to be moored to a discharge buoy at Each cargo tank is provided with a segre-
deep sea. They load cargo directly from the oil gated cargo system including a submersible
field, where it is stored in reservoirs, where pump and its own cargo line to the manifold,
generally the sulphur is removed. It is required on deck. The number of possible cargo seg-
a great maneuvering capability in comparison regations on board is equal to the number
with the traditional tankers, and generally are of cargo tanks. Typically these tankers are
equipped with dynamic positioning systems. smaller than the crude oil tankers, with dwt
Tanker can be easily identified by the raised less than 70,000 t.
compartment at the bow and ramp to handle
the cargo hose. Typically, a shuttle tanker as Oil Tankers
120,000 dwt and a service speed of about 16
knots, higher that conventional tankers. Oil tankers are tanker ship for transport of
liquid cargo which all cargo space divided
Product Tankers longitudinal and transverse watertight bulk-
heads to tight compartments, called tanks.
Carry refined oil products that can be classi- Loading and unloading liquid cargo tanks
fied into 2 main groups: of oil tankers have some special system of
pipelines and pumping equipment. Oil tank-
• White products (diesel oil, gasoline, jet
ers generally have from 8 to 12 tanks. Each
fuels, kerosene, lube oils, etc.);
tank is split into two or three independent
• Black products (fuel oils, residual
compartments by fore-and-aft bulkheads. The
products).
tanks are numbered with tank one being the
forward most.
283
A cofferdam is a small space left open be- Tanker Oil Spills

tween two bulkheads, to give protection from
heat, fire, or collision. Tankers generally have Main cause of oil spills are:
cofferdams forward and aft of the cargo tanks,
• Fire/explosion;
and sometimes between individual tanks. A
• Loading/offloading;
pump room houses all the pumps connected
• Structural damage;
to a tanker’s cargo lines. Some larger tankers
• Allisions/collision;
have two pump rooms. A pump room generally
• Grounding.
spans the total breadth of the ship. A major
component of tanker architecture is the design
The International Tanker Owners Pollu-
of the hull or outer structure. A tanker with a
tion Federation (ITOPF) database contains
single outer shell between the product and the
information on approximately 10,000 oil
ocean is said to be single-hulled. Most of new
spills from tankers, in the period 1970-2011,
tankers are double-hulled, with an extra space
combined carriers and barges, some 81% of
between the hull and the storage tanks. There
which were less than seven tones (Figure 4).
are hybrid designs such as double-bottom and
The average number of large oil spills
double-sided combine aspects of single and
(more then 700 tones) during the 2000s was
double-hull designs. All single-hulled tank-
just an eighth of that during the 1970s. This
ers around the world will be phased out by
dramatic reduction has been due to the com-
2026, in accordance with the International
bined efforts of the oil/shipping industry and
Convention.
governments (largely through the IMO) to
Figure 4. Numbers of large spills (over 700 tones) 1970-2011 (Adapted from www.itopf.com)
284
improve safety and pollution prevention. The bodies recognized a need for continuous im-
total amount of oil spilled each year varies provement in environmental performance, and
considerably, with a few very large spills be- many new regulations have been introduced
ing responsible for a high percentage of the over the last two decades. Some of the more
total annual quantity. significant regulatory actions include: (1)
During the period 1970-2011, 50% of larger double hull requirements for cargo tanks and
spills (more than 700 tones) occurred whilst subsequently for fuel tanks, (2) cargo tank
the vessel was underway in open water and subdivision requirements intended to mitigate
18% whilst underway in inland or restricted outflow in the event of a collision or ground-
waters. The main causes of larger spills were ing, (3) requirements for the coating of ballast
allisions/collisions (29%) and groundings tanks and the tops/bottoms of cargo tanks to
(33%). Other significant causes include hull minimize corrosion, (4) new structural design
failures and fire/explosion (from www.itopf. rules common across classification societies,
com, 2013). and (5) requirements for enhanced surveys to
maintain structural integrity.
Transport Safety The rules and regulations applied for the
design and construction of oil tankers are
Whether oil travels by sea or by land, the safety primarily developed by the International
and security of operations is key task. Every Maritime Organization (IMO) and the clas-
oil company sets its own quality, safety and sification societies (IMO, 2002; IMO, 2006).
security criteria for maritime shipping. These IMO is an agency of the United Nations,
criteria include: charged with developing a regulatory frame-
work that promotes maritime safety and
• The tanker’s construction conditions
environmental protection. Most of IMO’s
and features;
regulations pertaining to tanker design and
• Tanker condition and maintenance;
construction are contained in the International
• Crew recruitment, training, and
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SO-
management;
LAS) and the International Convention for the
• Planning routes and the journey itself.
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL
73/78, 2009 and subsequent amendments).
Ship owners are responsible for ensuring
IMO regulations focus on the arrangements
that their ships meet these criteria. Indepen-
and outfitting of the vessel as it pertains to
dent certification organizations inspect ships
safety and environmental performance. For
on a regular basis and issue sailing permits.
example, these regulations cover load line
The grounding of the Exxon Valdez was a
(freeboard) requirements, intact and damage
watershed event, triggering fundamental
stability, firefighting and lifesaving equip-
changes in the way oil tankers are managed,
ment. In 2006 IMO adopted regulations on
operated and maintained. The regulatory
285
the coating of ballast tanks, and requirements anchor in their waters. The United States
for coating cargo tanks on new buildings will passed a law in 1990 to phase out single-hull
become effective in 2013. tankers by 2015. The deadline was later moved
Classification societies develop technical up to 2010. The International Maritime Or-
rules and guides for the design and construc- ganization (IMO), a United Nations agency
tion of ships, perform plan review to confirm that regulates global shipping, also has called
that the design is in conformance with their for the eradication of single hulls by 2010.
rules, and survey vessels during construction A mandatory design feature on newly
and trials (commissioning). The classification built oil tankers; double-hull construction
societies also perform periodic surveys dur- means the ship has two hulls, one inside the
ing the life of the vessel to verify continued other. This offers an extra layer of protection
compliance with the rules and regulations. against damage that might otherwise result
From time to time, oil companies also appoint in catastrophic oil spills.
specialized inspectors to make sure ship own-
ers comply with regulations. Oil companies Inert Gas Systems
share the information gathered by inspectors
It is not just fire which is dangerous, in certain
in a computer database such as SIRE (Ship
circumstances a single spark can cause a di-
Inspection Report Exchange), set up in 1993.
saster, for even tanks which contain no oil are
Before choosing a tanker for shipping crude,
filled with flammable gas which can explode
the oil company checks all the information
unless proper procedures are followed. The
available on it. If It may also exclude ships
normal method is to fill these tanks with inert
that are too old and that have received negative
(non-explosive) gas from the ship’s boiler flue:
inspection reports, or turn down a crew that it
it is cleaned and then pumped into the empty
believes has not received sufficient training.
tanks, or into the spaces left above the oil in
Some of the most important measures of
loaded tanks. An inert gas system is required
preventing accidental pollution are: double
on all new tankers and most existing tankers
hull, inert gas systems, equipment duplica-
of 20,000 dwt and above.
tion and protective location of segregated
ballast tanks. Equipment Duplication
Double Hull
IMO has introduced several measures over the
years which are designed to ensure that, in the
The United States and various international
event of mechanical failure, the ship can still
bodies have established deadlines for imple-
be controlled. SOLAS makes it necessary for
mentation of the double-hull design. In 2007,
essential parts of the steering gear of tankers
the European Union (EU) made it mandatory
to be duplicated. As with other ships, much
for ships carrying heavy oils to be double-
of the navigational equipment of tankers must
hulled to use ports in EU nations or to drop
also be duplicated
286
Protective Location of The first commercial contract for the import

Segregated Ballast Tanks of LNG into Japan was signed in 1967 and
after that, Japan became the leading power in
The 1978 MARPOL Protocol introduced LNG import. Until this day, Japan remains the
the concept known as protective location of biggest importer with a total import of one
segregated ballast tanks. This means that the third of the world’s LNG.
ballast tanks (which are empty on the cargo- The basic design options were standard-
carrying leg of the voyage and only loaded with ized by the 1970s, and these have continued
water ballast for the return leg) are positioned with few major changes other than to increase
where the impact of a collision or grounding capacity. The size of the LNG carriers was
is likely to be greatest. In this way the amount standardized to 125,000 m3 to 138,000 m3.
of cargo spilled after such an accident will be Until 2000, the number of LNG carriers was
greatly reduced. The 1983 MARPOL amend- relatively constant, around 120 ships. After
ments ban the carriage of oil in the forepeak that, there was a great boom and expansion
tank - the ship’s most vulnerable point in the in LNG carriers and today, over 300 LNG
event of a collision. carriers are sailing in the world. The size and
the capacity have also increased and today,
TRANSPORTATION BY the so-called Q-max (260,000 m3) and Q-
GAS CARRIERS flex (215,000m3) are in use. There are more
than 300 LNG carriers currently in operation
Shipping LNG by sea began in the 1950s as worldwide.
a result of significant pressure to make use
of newly discovered gas reserves and to dis- Gas Carrier Types
continue flaring of what might otherwise be
Gas carriers can be grouped into six different
a useful product.
categories according to the cargo carried and
The first commercial transport of LNG took
the carriage condition, i.e.:
place in February 1959. This was the trans-
port on the LNG carrier “Methane Pioneer”
1. Fully pressurized ships;
(capacity of 5,000 m3) from Lake Charles in
2. Semi-refrigerated/semi-pressurized
the USA to Conveys Island in Great Britain.
ships;
The “Methane Pioneer” was followed by the
3. Semi-pressurized/fully refrigerated
carriers “Methane Princess” and “Methane
ships;
Progress” (each of a capacity of 27,400m3)
4. Fully refrigerated LPG ships;
which had their first passage in February 1962.
5. Ethylene ships;
“Methane Princess” “retired” in 1997 after
6. LNG carriers
27 years of use, not due to the state of the
carrier but due to the fact that using such an
old carrier is not cost-effective.
287
Ship types a), b) and c) are most suitable for sure, but at the cost of the addition of refrig-
the shipment of smaller size cargoes of LPG eration plant and tank insulation. Tanks on
and chemical gases on short-sea and near-sea these ships are constructed of steels capable
routes whereas ship type (d) is used extensively of withstanding temperatures as low as –10°C.
for the carriage of large-size cargoes of LPG They can be cylindrical, conical or spherical
and ammonia on the deep-sea routes. in shape.
Fully Pressurized Carriers Semi-Pressurized/Fully

Refrigerated Carriers
These ships are the simplest of all gas carriers
in terms of containment systems and cargo- Constructed in the size range 1,500 to 30,000
handling equipment and carry their cargoes m3, this type of gas carrier has evolved as
at ambient temperature. Type C tanks - pres- the optimum means of transporting the wide
sure vessels fabricated in carbon steel with a variety of gases, from LPG and VCM to
typical design pressure of 17.5 barg, corre- propylene and butadiene, found in the busy
sponding to the vapor pressure of propane at coastal gas trades around the Mediterranean
45oC, must be used. Ships with higher design and Northern Europe. Like the previous two
pressures are in service: 18 barg is quite com- types of ship, SP/FR gas tankers use Type
mon - a few ships can accept up to 20 barg. C pressure vessel tanks and therefore do not
No thermal insulation or reliquefaction plant require a secondary barrier. The tanks are
is necessary and cargo can be discharged us- made either from low temperature steels to
ing either pumps or compressors. Because of provide for carriage temperatures of -48ºC
their design pressure the tanks are extremely which is suitable for most LPG and chemical
heavy. As a result, fully pressurized ships tend gas cargoes or from special alloyed steels or
to be small with maximum cargo capacities aluminum to allow the carriage of ethylene
of about 4,000 m3 and they are used to carry at –104º C. The SP/FR ship’s flexible cargo
primarily LPG and ammonia. handling system is designed to be able to load
from, or discharge to, both pressurized and
Semi-Refrigerated Carriers refrigerated storage facilities.
These ships are similar to fully pressurized Fully Refrigerated LPG Carriers
ships in that they incorporate Type C tanks - in
this case pressure vessels designed typically Fully refrigerated (FR) ships carry their car-
for a maximum working pressure of 5-7 barg. goes at approximately atmospheric pressure
The ships range in size up to 7,500 m3 and and are generally designed to transport large
are primarily used to carry LPG. Compared quantities of LPG and ammonia. Four different
to fully pressurized ships, a reduction in tank cargo containment systems have been used
thickness is possible due to the reduced pres- in FR ships: independent tanks with double
288
hull, independent tanks with single side shell to 30,000 m3. This gas is normally carried
but double bottom and hopper tanks, integral fully refrigerated at its atmospheric pressure
tanks and semi-membrane tanks, both these boiling point of –104°C. If Type C pressure
latter having a double hull. The most widely vessel tanks are used, no secondary barrier
used arrangement is the independent tank is required; Type B tanks require a partial
with single side shell with the tank itself a secondary barrier; Type A tanks require a
Type A prismatic free-standing unit capable full secondary barrier and because of the
of withstanding a maximum working pres- cargo carriage temperature of – 104ºC the
sure of 0.7 barg. The tanks are constructed hull cannot be used as a secondary barrier,
of low-temperature steels to permit carriage so in this case a separate secondary barrier
temperatures as low as –48°C. FR ships range must be fitted. Thermal insulation and a high
in size from 10,000 to 100,000 m3. capacity reliquefaction plant are fitted on this
A typical fully refrigerated LPG carrier type of vessel. As mentioned, many ethylene
would have up to six cargo tanks, each tank carriers can also carry LPG cargoes thus
fitted with transverse wash plates, and a increasing their versatility. Ballast is carried
centre line longitudinal bulkhead to improve in the double bottom and wing ballast tanks
stability. The tanks are usually supported and a complete double hull are required for
on wooden chocks and are keyed to the hull all cargoes carried below –55°C whether the
to allow expansion and contraction as well tanks are of Type A, B or C.
as prevent tank movement under static and
dynamic loads. The tanks are also provided LNG Carriers
with anti-flotation chocks. Because of the low
LNG carriers are specialized vessels built
temperature carriage conditions, thermal insu-
to transport large volumes of LNG at its at-
lation and reliquefaction plant must be fitted.
mospheric pressure boiling point of –163°C.
The FR gas carrier is limited with respect to
LNG carriers are fitted with independent cargo
operational flexibility.
tanks or with membrane tanks.
However, cargo heaters and booster pumps
All LNG ships have double hulls throughout
are often used to allow discharge into pressur-
their cargo length, which provides adequate
ized storage facilities. Where Type A tanks
space for ballast; the membranes have a full
are fitted, a complete secondary barrier is
secondary barrier, the spheres a drip-pan type
required. The hold spaces must be inerted
protection. Another characteristic common to
when carrying flammable cargoes. Ballast
all is that they burn the cargo boil-off as fuel
is carried in double bottoms and in top-side
(permitted with methane cargo, being lighter
tanks or, when fitted, side ballast tanks.
than air at ambient temperature - but not pro-
Ethylene Carriers pane or butane which are heavier than air).
During the development of technology
Ethylene ships tend to be built for specific transportation of liquefied natural gas, there
trades and have capacities ranging from 1,000 have been many experimental structural con-
289
tainer, but industry was soon excluded from Figure 5). The hull is designed to support the
the application of complex and demanding massive tanks. Self-supporting means that the
projects so they can maintain two types of container walls over in full loads that occur
containers: an independent, self-supporting inside the tank due to pressure, and indepen-
and membrane tanks. dent means that are built independently of the
hull and the hull is only for downloading their
Cargo Tank Types weight. Their maximum design pressure is 0.7
barg in the vapor space. In practice, however,
Cargo tank types are categorized as following such operating pressure usually is maintained
below 0.25 barg. They are divided into three
• lndependent tank (Type A, B and C)
types: type A, B and type C.
• Membrane tank (Tank type GT No96,
Technigaz Mark III tanks, and GTT Type A tanks require a full secondary bar-
(CSI) Tanks) rier because the stress analysis is not precise in
this design. Tanks of this type are constructed
Independent Tanks (Self-Supporting) primarily of flat surfaces and were built into
ships Methane Princess and Methane Prog-
Self-supporting, independent tanks are heavy, ress, and made them, as well as ships, the
solid structure, designed to withstand pres- company Conch (http://shipbuildinghistory.
sures in the transport of liquefied natural com/today/highvalueships/lngactivefleet.
gas. They can be shaped prism or sphere (see htm, 2013). Both ships had problems with
Figure 5. Spherical tank construction (Adapted from www.bmtmarinerisk.com)
290
leakage of liquefied gas during testing. Be- semi-pressurized tankers it can also be used
fore mentioned problems plus another total for fully refrigerated carriage, provided ap-
failure in constructing a third larger ship are propriate low temperature steels are used in
terminated developments of this design. tank construction. Type ‘C’ tanks are designed
Type ‘B’ tanks are divided into prismatic and built to conventional pressure vessel codes
and spherical (Moss tanks). These types of and, as a result, can be subjected to accurate
tanks are subjected to more rigorous stress stress analysis. Furthermore, design stresses
tests. Therefore, a type B tank requires only a are kept low. Accordingly, no secondary bar-
partial secondary barrier in the form of a drip rier is required for Type ‘C’ tanks and the hold
tray. This type of containment system is the space can be filled with either inert gas or dry
subject of much more detailed stress analysis air and for fully pressurized tankers normal
compared to Type ‘A’ systems. These controls air may be allowed.
must include an investigation of fatigue life
and a crack propagation analysis. The most Membrane Tanks
common arrangement of Type ‘B’ tank is a
The concept of the membrane containment
spherical tank. This tank is of the Kvaerner
system is based on a very thin primary barrier
Moss design. Because of the enhanced design
(membrane - 0.7 to 1.5 mm thick) which is
factors, a Type ‘B’ tank requires only a partial
supported through the insulation. Such tanks
secondary barrier in the form of a drip tray.
are not self-supporting like the independent
The hold space in this design is normally
tanks. Membrane containment systems must
filled with dry inert gas. However, when
always be provided with a secondary barrier
adopting modern practice, it may be filled
to ensure the integrity of the total system in
with dry air provided that inerting of the space
the event of primary barrier leakage. The
can be achieved if the vapour detection system
membrane is designed in such a way that ther-
shows cargo leakage. A protective steel dome
mal expansion or contraction is compensated
covers the primary barrier above deck level
without over-stressing the membrane itself.
and insulation is applied to the outside of the
There are two principal types of membrane
tank. The Type ‘B’ spherical tank is almost
system Tank type GT No96 and Technigaz
exclusively applied to LNG tankers; seldom
Mark III Tanks, in common use both named
featuring in the LPG trade.
after the companies who developed them and
Type ‘C’ tanks are normally spherical or
both designed primarily for the carriage of
cylindrical pressure vessels having design
LNG. In both membrane systems, boil-off of
pressures higher than 4 barg. The cylindri-
0, 15% is guaranteed although in reality its
cal vessels may be vertically or horizontally
quantity is much smaller. Until 2000, there
mounted. This type of containment system
were only a few membrane ships but due to
is always used for semi-pressurized and fully
their significant flexibility and changes in the
pressurized gas carriers. In the case of the
291
LNG spot market, in the past few years they There have been three major grounding
have “surpassed” spherical ships in number. incidents, but none resulted in loss of cargo.
This type of ship is mostly produced in South The robust design of the ships and cargo tanks
Korea, but China has “produced” three mem- and the LNG industry’s extraordinary atten-
brane LNG carriers in the past three years tion to safety details have collectively served
(Huang et al., 2007). After the union between to prevent the release of cargo and to facilitate
Gaz Transport and Technigaz in 1994, a third this noteworthy safety record.
type of membrane-type carriers, GTT (CSI) Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is composed
Tanks emerged. The two basic concepts of of mostly methane and is a cryogenic liquid
GTT technology are the Mark III and No. 96 at approximately -162ºC. When vaporized,
System, and the third one is a combination its flammability range is between approxi-
of these two and is appropriately named CSI mately 5% and 15% by volume, i.e. a mixture
(Combine System One). The membrane-type with air within this range of concentrations
ships were developed during the 1960s, and is flammable. Thus, in addition to possible
both concepts use a thin flexible metal “mem- damages due to its cryogenic temperatures,
brane” which is in contact with the cargo. The LNG spills are associated with hazards such
system has the characteristics of a sandwich as pool fires and ignition of drifting vapour
where the cargo presses on the membrane; the clouds. In its liquid state, LNG is not ex-
insulation material presses on the membrane plosive, and LNG vapour will explode only
and in the end, everything leans on the ship’s if ignited in a mixture with air within the
inner hull. flammability range and within an enclosed
or semi-enclosed space. Natural gas may also
Risk of Gas Carriers Operation present an asphyxiation hazard. LNG is not
toxic and will not be persistent if spilled in a
An LNG carrier is a tank designed for trans- marine environment. LNG weighs less than
porting liquefied natural gas. First, it is the water, thus LNG spilled on water will float.
ship with all the risks of shipping: grounding, When handling LNG risks coming from its
collision, natural events, etc. Secondly, it is a three characteristics: dispersion, flammable
tank containing the cryogenic gas with all its and extremely low temperatures.
hazardous properties.
The LNG shipping industry has an excel- LNG Spill
lent safety record. Since the first cargoes of
LNG were shipped on a regular commercial A spill of LNG on water evaporates about
basis in 1964, over 56,000 shipments have five times faster than on land because of the
been made without a single incident of LNG higher heat transfer rates associated with the
being lost through a breach or failure of the water and a tendency for the water not to
ship’s tanks. completely freeze. The high heat capacity
and the circulation of the water at the surface
292
usually inhibits significant ice formation. the LNG are important factors in predicting
Depending upon the quantity spilled and the whether or not an RPT will take place. Work
conditions, LNG has a tendency to spread and has also been performed to examine the impact
form a pool on the water surface because it is of an RPT on the LNG ship and pier structure.
insoluble. This pool of LNG will evaporate Measured overpressures are insufficient to
and create a vapour cloud which expands, cause more than minor damage either to the
begins to dilute, and moves with the ambi- ship or pier.
ent wind conditions. The actual size, rate Small spills of LNG have occurred onto the
of expansion, movement of a vapour cloud decks of LNG carriers during the loading and
unloading process. The cold of the LNG has
depends upon incident-specific conditions. A
caused the carbon steel deck plates to crack in
first approximation is that the size of the LNG some cases. Fire hoses and deck water sprays
pool will increase until the vapour generation are used to warm the spill area and increase the
rate equals the LNG release rate. If ignition evaporation rate of the LNG.
sources are not present when the part of the Unlike deck plates, LNG tanks within a
vapour cloud that is within flammable limits ship are made of metals which do not crack
(5-15% natural gas in air), then no fire will or become brittle in the presence of cryogenic
occur (www.GIIGNL.org, 2013). temperatures. All LNG carriers have two sys-
Some LNG spills on water may have a tems to prevent leakage from the LNG tanks. If
Rapid Phase Transition (RPT). This is essen- one tank fails for whatever reason, the LNG is
tially a flameless overpressure caused by the held safely by the secondary protection system.
very high transient rates of heat transfer from LNG tank types are designed to leak before
the water to the LNG. This causes the LNG failure, thereby allowing the crew to empty
to change from the liquid to the gas phase so the affected tanks before significant damage
quickly that a rapidly expanding vapour cloud can take place (Woodward & Pitblado, 2010).
is generated. The cloud can expand so quickly The LNG tanks and insulation spaces
that a sonic boom and localized overpressure are kept free of air to prevent any leak from
is created. creating a flammable mixture. The tanks
The RPT “explosion” phenomenon for themselves always contain liquid LNG and
LNG on water has been observed in a number some LNG vapor above the liquid.
of situations and has been studied extensively The insulation spaces on membrane ships
in both laboratory and large-scale tests. While are filled with nitrogen (an inert gas) and
this phenomenon is spectacular to observe at monitored continuously for the presence of
large-scales tests, the actual energy release methane (flammable vapor). If an LNG spill
is modest. An RPT is a very unpredictable does not ignite, it poses an asphyxiation or
phenomenon and the exact circumstances of freezer – burn risk to personnel very near the
its formation remain unclear. The temperature spill, for example, on unloading platforms or to
of the water and the actual composition of emergency response personnel. Direct contact
293
with metal at cryogenic temperatures can dam- falls as the liquid vaporizes. After a time,
age skin tissue more rapidly than exposure to metal which is not cooled by liquid becomes
cold vapor. For asphyxiation, the LNG vapors exposed to the fi re; the metal becomes hot
must dilute the oxygen concentration in the and weakens and may then rupture. This can
breathing zone of people below 15% oxygen happen even if the relief valve is operating
for impaired behavior, below 10% for nausea correctly. A pressure vessel is designed to
and vomiting or below 6% oxygen for death. withstand the relief valve set pressure, but
Appropriate protective clothing mitigates the only at the design temperature conditions. If
exposure risk to cryogenic burns, but this the metal has its temperature raised, it may
does not mitigate against a cryogenic vapor lose it strength sufficiently to rupture.
inhalation hazard. Recommendations are
available for personal protective equipment Sandia Reports
for particular tasks, including breathing air
The Sandia National Laboratories report from
apparatus.
2004 (Hightower et al., 2004) concluded that
Boiling Liquid Expanding the most significant impacts to public safety
Vapor Explosion exist within 500 m of a spill, with much lower
impacts at distances beyond 1,600 m even for
The acronym BLEVE means Boiling Liquid very large spills. Because of the increasing
Expanding Vapour Explosion, which is the size and capacity of many new LNG carri-
sudden release of a large mass of pressurized ers, the Department of Energy requested that
flammable liquid to the atmosphere. A pri- Sandia assess the general scale of possible
mary cause is if an external flame impinges hazards for a breach and spill from newer
on the shell of a pressurized tank above the LNG carriers with capacities ranging up to
liquid level, weakening the shell and resulting 265,000 m3. According to the research and
in sudden rupture. A fuller definition explains analyses presented in Sandia’s 2004 LNG
the mechanism (Mannan, S., 2005): When report, was reassessed emerging accidental
a vessel containing liquid under pressure is and intentional threats and then conducted
exposed to fire, the liquid heats up and the detailed three-dimensional breach analyses
vapor pressure rises, increasing the pressure in for several new large capacity (up to 265,000
the vessel. When this pressure reaches the set m3) LNG carrier designs. Based on the es-
pressure of the relief valve, the valve operates. timated breach sizes, breach locations, and
The liquid level falls as the vapor is released LNG carrier configurations, was estimated
to the atmosphere. The liquid is effective in LNG spill rates and volumes and conducted
cooling that part of the vessel wall which is thermal hazard and vapor dispersion analyses.
in contact with it, but the vapor is not. The The results include analysis of the hazards
temperature in the proportion of the vessel of potential LNG spills at both near-shore
wall which has the benefit of liquid cooling and offshore facilities and operations, which
294
should help improve the understanding of the mometer wells and gauging devices. LNG
range of hazards for different marine LNG is shipped as a cryogenic gas in insulated
import options. tank truck and rail pressure tank cars. Pres-
sure tank trucks and rail tank cars for LNG
RAILROAD TANK CARS transport have a stainless steel inner reservoir
TRANSPORTATION suspended in an outer reservoir of carbon
steel. The annular space is a vacuum filled
Railroad tank cars are constructed of carbon
with insulation to maintain low temperatures
steel or aluminum and may be pressurized
during shipment. To prevent gas from ignit-
or unpressurized. Modern tank cars can hold
ing back to the tanks, they are equipped with
up to 171,000 l of compressed gas at pres-
two independent, remotely controlled fail-safe
sures up to 40 bar. Non-pressure tank cars
emergency shut-off valves on the filling and
may be individual units with one or multiple
discharge lines and have gauges on both the
compartments or a string of interconnected
inside and outside reservoirs.
tank cars, called a tank train. Tank cars are
LPG is transported on land in specially
loaded individually, and entire tank trains
designed rail tank cars (up to 130 capacity) or
can be loaded and unloaded from a single
tank trucks (up to 40 capacity). Tank trucks
point. Both pressure and non-pressure tank
and rail tank cars for LPG transport are typi-
cars may be heated, cooled, insulated and
cally uninsulated steel cylinders with spherical
thermally protected against fire, depending
bottoms, equipped with gauges, thermometers,
on their service and the products transported.
two safety relief valves, a gas level meter and
All railroad tank cars have top- or bottom-
maximum fill indicator and baffles.
liquid or vapour valves for loading and un-
Rail tank cars transporting LNG or LPG
loading and hatch entries for cleaning. They
should not be overloaded, since they may sit
are also equipped with devices intended to
on a siding for some period of time and be
prevent the increase of internal pressure when
exposed to high ambient temperatures, which
exposed to abnormal conditions. These de-
could cause overpressure and venting. About
vices include safety relief valves held in place
700 LNG tank trucks are in service worldwide.
by a spring which can open to relieve pres-
BLEVE can only occur in a road tanker under
sure and then close; safety vents with rupture
specific circumstances:
discs that burst open to relieve pressure but
cannot reclose; or a combination of the two • A fire is ignited beneath or impinging
devices. A vacuum relief valve is provided on the road tanker;
for non-pressure tank cars to prevent vacuum • The insulation around the vessel fails to
formation when unloading from the bottom. prevent heat reaching the LNG;
Both pressure and non-pressure tank cars • The fire burns sufficiently long that the
have protective housings on top surrounding LNG begins to boil;
the loading connections, sample lines, ther-
295
• The LNG boils so vigorously that between the walls should also be tested for
valves installed to relieve the increas- liquid or vapor.
ing pressure are unable to cope, and Tank trucks have either hatches which
pressure within the tank rapidly rises; open for top loading, valves for closed top- or
• The upper part of the shell not in con- bottom-loading and unloading, or both. All
tact with LNG becomes weakened by compartments have hatch entries for cleaning
overheating; and are equipped with safety relief devices to
• The tanker may then rupture with an mitigate internal pressure when exposed to
intense, localized overpressure and fire. abnormal conditions. These devices include
safety relief valves held in place by a spring
which can open to relieve pressure and then
TANK TRUCKS close, hatches on non-pressure tanks which
pop open if the relief valves fail and rupture
Petroleum products and crude oil tank trucks
discs on pressurized tank trucks. A vacuum
are typically constructed of carbon steel, alu-
relief valve is provided for each non-pres-
minum or a plasticized fibreglass material,
surized tank truck compartment to prevent
and vary in size from 1,900-l tank wagons to
vacuum when unloading from the bottom.
jumbo 53,200-l tankers. The capacity of tank
Non-pressurized tank trucks have railings
trucks is governed by regulatory agencies, and
on top to protect the hatches, relief valves
usually is dependent upon highway and bridge
and vapour recovery system in case of a roll-
capacity limitations and the allowable weight
over. Tank trucks are usually equipped with
per axle or total amount of product allowed.
breakaway, self-closing devices installed on
There are pressurized and non-pressurized
compartment bottom loading and unloading
tank trucks, which may be non-insulated or
pipes and fittings to prevent spills in case of
insulated depending on their service and
damage in a rollover or collision.
the products transported. Pressurized tank
Transportation of petroleum products by
trucks are usually single compartment, and
motor vehicle or railroad tank car is regulated
non-pressurized tank trucks may have single
by government agencies throughout most of
or multiple compartments. Regardless of the
the world. Agencies such as the US DOT have
number of compartments on a tank truck,
established regulations governing the design,
each compartment must be treated individu-
construction, safety devices, testing, preven-
ally, with its own loading, unloading and
tive maintenance, inspection and operation
safety-relief devices. Compartments may be
of tank trucks and tank cars. Regulations
separated by single or double walls. Regula-
governing railroad tank car and tank truck
tions may require that incompatible products
operations typically include tank pressure and
and flammable and combustible liquids car-
pressure relief device testing and certification
ried in different compartments on the same
before being placed into initial service and at
vehicle be separated by double walls. When
regular intervals thereafter.
pressure testing are compartmented, the space
296
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS ment Accountability Office (GAO) studies.

Based on these studies will be provided making
Due to the growing needs of the world’s oil more quality regulations to protect the envi-
and gas production is increasing every year. ronment and people. About 71% of Earth’s
Almost 2/3 of the known conventional oil and surface is covered by water. To a large space
gas reserves are located in the Russian confed- that will be the development of technology
eration and the Middle East region where the research certainly increasingly exploited.
long distance between the reservoirs and final There are transportation challenges which
consumption markets is the major obstacle in should be fulfilled especially for remote and
efficient exploitation of the resources. Hence offshore reserves. While the option for trans-
the need to keep increasing the network of oil porting oil is limited to pipeline and tanker
and gas pipelines as well as a fleet of tank- transportation, there are options to utilize
ers. Increasing transport capacity increased offshore and remote natural gas production
potential risks and incidents. It is improving and transport it to markets or to another lo-
and preventive measures activities, making the cation for further processing or utilization.
task of national and international organiza- Volume reduction options as an alternative
tions as well as the owner of the pipeline and to pipeline then have to be considered next,
tanker fleet. Application of new technologies followed by true conversion alternatives
for these purposes is certainly one of the main where the “methane” molecule is chemically
drivers to improve preventive measures and converted into another liquid products. These
activities. Do now applied technology, such technologies are called gas-to-liquids or GTL.
as SCADA systems, leak detection systems, Although GTL is used more for conversion
intelligence pig technology increased safety of of gas to middle distillates such as naphtha,
transport of oil and gas pipelines. It is impera- kerosene, diesel and gasoline, it is alternatively
tive that technology be applied to all pipelines used for other gas conversion technologies
and are continuously improved. One of the such as methanol and dimethyl ether (DME)
serious problems of pipeline infrastructure production.
is ageing. A very large part of the oil and gas
pipeline system in the USA and Russia is over
40 years old or at the end of its design life. It’s CONCLUSION
a big engineering challenge. How will solve
the problem of rehabilitation: applying some Every day millions of barrels of oil must
of the newer technologies, inserting flexible be transported from their origin in oilfields
composite pipe in the old existing pipelines, around the world, moved to refineries in many
or simply decommissioning? countries, and distributed to consumer. Tank-
The LNG technology is necessary to com- ers by the thousands ply the seas, shipping the
plete the experiments SANDIA and Govern- majority of the world’s internationally traded
297
crude oil from producing to consuming na- operational phase. The greatest number of ac-
tions. Pipelines and trains handle much of the tivities required by national and international
rest, moving oil and gas overland and some- organizations: API, ANSI, DOT, CONCAWE,
times underground from oil fields to ports, IMO. There have been the conventions of
often across international borders. Liquefied which the MARPOL one of the most important
gas is transported by specially constructed conventions of sea protection. For instance, the
vessels, offshore or on land. International Convention of Safety of Life at
In this Chapter the causes of accidents Sea (SOLAS) includes special requirements
during transportation are presented. Conse- for tankers. Fire safety provisions, for example,
quences of accidents are leakage, exposure are much more stringent for tankers than for
and fire. Pollution vary from small spills to ordinary dry cargo vessels, since the danger
catastrophic accidents as in the case of some of fire on board ships carrying oil and refined
famous tanker accidents. No matter what products is greater. In addition to a variety of
kind of scale for accidents they can have a big regulations that prescribe preventive action to
environmental impact. prevent or reduce the risk of accident during
In case leakage of oil in soil it is possible shipping, significant role had the develop-
that it comes in contact with groundwater. One ment of certain types of technology such as,
liter can contaminate a huge amount of ground SCADA system, communication technology,
water and the recovery of water is impossible. smart pig, new leak detection methods, etc.
What does oil in the sea, clearly illustrated by Some of new technologies are applied on
the following data: only 8 g of oil is enough ships, especially on oil and LNG tankers.
to contaminate 1 m3 sea. One m3 discharged These ships are simultaneously processing
oil depletes oxygen from 400.000 m3 sea! units. For this it requires special training of
To avoid or minimize environmental im- specialized personnel on these ships. For all
pact of oil and gas transportation it is very before mentioned reasons it is necessary to
important to implement appropriate activi- increased transportation security and this
ties from designing phase, construction and chapter contribute to it.
298
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1993 International Conference on Pipeline
Infrastructure II, ASCE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explo-
Mannan, S. (Ed.). (2005). Lees loss prevention sion (BLEVE): Is an explosion caused by the
in the process industries. Elsevier Publishers. rupture of a vessel containing a pressurized
liquid above its boiling point.
MARPOL. 73/78 (2009). Regulations for Boiling Point: Is the temperature at which
the Prevention of Pollution by Oil, Annex I the vapor pressure of a liquid equals that of the
of MARPOL 73/78, International Maritime atmosphere above its surface; this temperature
Organization varies with pressure.
Mazzucchelli, L., Pizzorni, D., Comini, A., Crude Oil: Basic raw material pumped
& Scanarotti, N. (2002). Rap Project: An In- from the earth. There many different grades
novative Approach To The Risk Assessment of vrude, each containing various vapors,
Of Pipeline, SPE International Conference liquids and solids. This crude is changed at a
on Health, Safety and Environment in Oil refinery into products.
and Gas Exploration and Production, Kuala Cryogenic Liquids: Liquefied gases
Lumpur, Malasya that are kept in their liquid state at very low
temperatures and have a normal boiling point
Simic, Z., Mikulicic, V., & Vukovic, I. (2007).
below -238 degrees Fahrenheit (-150 degrees
Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for
Celsius) normally stored at low pressures. All
Infrastructure Risk Modeling, Computational
cryogenic liquids are gases at normal tempera-
Models of Risks to Infrastructure. Amsterdam:
ture and pressure. These include methane,
IOS Press.
oxygen, nitrogen, helium and hydrogen.
301
Environmental Impact: Is a change in SCADA: An acronym for Supervisory

the make-up, working, or appearance of the Control and Data Acquisition, the technology
environment. These changes may be planned that makes it possible to remotely monitor and
or accidental. control pipeline facilities.
Inert Gas: Is a gas (e.g. nitrogen) or mix- Secondary Barrier: Is the liquid-resisting
ture of gases, containing insufficient oxygen outer element of a cargo containment system
to support combustion makes it possible to re- designed to afford temporary containment of
motely monitor and control pipeline facilities. any envisaged leakage of liquid cargo through
Primary Barrier: Is the inner element the primary barrier and to prevent the lowering
designed to contain the cargo when the cargo of the temperature of the ship’s structure to
containment system includes two boundaries. an unsafe level. Types of secondary barriers
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): A SCADA are more fully defined in the 1MO Codes.
system component, typically installed at a field
site, that gathers process data from instruments
for transfer to the MTU.
302
303
Chapter 14
Oil and Gas Storage
Tank Risk Analysis
Katarina Simon
ABSTRACT
Storage tanks are widely used in the oil refinery and petrochemical industry in storing a multi-
tude of different products ranging from gases, liquids, solids, and mixtures. Design and safety
concerns have become a priority due to tank failures causing environment pollution as well as
fires and explosions, which can result in injuries and fatalities. The chapter illustrates different
types of crude oil and oil product storage tanks as well as the risks regarding the storage itself.
Considering that the natural gas, in its gaseous state, is stored in underground storages like oil
and gas depleted reservoirs, aquifers or salt caverns, and there are numerous publications and
books covering the subject in detail, this chapter only illustrates the storage of liquefied natural
gas and the risks posed by its storage.
INTRODUCTION and safe storage facilities. Storage tanks are

located at the ends of feeder lines and gathering
In oil and gas industry the movement of crude lines, along truck pipelines, at marine load-
and refined oil products from the places of ing and unloading facilities and in refineries,
origin to the various markets would not be terminals and bulk plants.
possible without the existence of economic Oil produced from the early wells was
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch014
stored in whisky barrels. Barrels, although
Oil and Gas Storage Tank Risk Analysis
unsuitable for storage use because of leaking, Terminals are storage facilities which gen-
remained in use for a long time due to their erally receive crude oil and petroleum products
ease of transportation and were eventually by trunk pipeline or marine vessel. Crude oil
replaced by steel ones. The measurement of and petroleum product terminals are designed
the oil volume is often expressed in barrels to receive and dispatch crude oil and petroleum
(1 bbl=0,159 m3) precisely because of such products to refineries, other terminals, bulk
practices. With the ever growing need for oil, plants and consumers by pipelines, railroad
the storage tank sizes increased with time. tank cars and tank trucks. Tanks should ideally
Today, crude oil is commonly stored in large be located alone, but storage tanks are often
aboveground atmospheric vertical cylindri- grouped in tank farms. Within tank farms,
cal storage tanks at oil fields, terminals and individual tanks or groups of two or more
refineries where storage tanks are typically tanks are usually surrounded by a catchment
installed with similar or identical vessels in area in the form of a retaining wall, known
a group. as a bund or dike. Bunds would normally be
At the oilfield, when the oil is brought to constructed from earth or preferably concrete
the surface under high pressure conditions it and should be largely impervious to liquid
is passed through either a two (where the as- and capable of withstanding hydrostatic and
sociated gas is removed and any oil and water hydrodynamic pressures to which they could
remain together) or a three phase separator be subjected. Whenever tanks share a com-
(where the associated gas is removed and the mon bund, intermediate walls up to half the
oil and water are also separated). The remain- height of the main bund walls and no more
ing low pressure oil is then directed to a storage than 0,5 metres high should be provided to
vessel where it is stored for a period of time control small spillages from one tank affect-
before being transported off-site. The remaining another. Bund floors should drain to a
ing hydrocarbons in the oil are released from single location complete with sump for the
the oil as vapours in the storage vessels. At the regular removal of water from rainfall or
oil fields produced crude oil is usually stored firewater testing. Drains should normally be
in fixed roof storage tanks while stabilised oil kept closed, with the drain isolation valve
and oil products at terminals and refineries situated outside the bund. Bunds are normally
are stored in floating roofs tanks. Within the designed to hold 110% of that of the largest
European Union (EU) the specification for the tank, the excess height notionally to prevent
design of such tanks is covered by the British stored liquid surging over the top of the bund
Standard BS EN 14015:2004 (2005) which is in the event of a catastrophic failure of the
generally equivalent to American Petroleum primary containment. This allowance has
Institute (API) standards, API 650 (Welded proved to be inadequate as, even with storage
steel tanks for oil storage, 2007) and API 620 volume excess, large quantities of liquid can
(The design and construction of large, welded, still overtop bunds as discussed by Thyer and
low-pressure storage tanks, 2002). Jagger (2002) and Atherton (2005).
304
Natural gas can be stored in gaseous or the moment: a gauge that enabled the em-
liquefied state. The natural gas in gaseous ployees to monitor the filling operation; and
state will be stored in underground storages an independent high-level switch which was
(depleted oil or gas reservoirs, aquifers or salt meant to close down operations automatically
caverns). By converting natural gas to lique- if the tank was overfilled. So there was no
fied natural gas (LNG) it can be economically means to alert the control room staff that the
transported over the oceans and great distances tank was filling to dangerous levels and as
from the places where it is produced to those a consequence over 300 tons of petrol over-
where it is in demand. Currently, the liquefied flowed from the top of the tank. As a result, a
natural gas trade, accounting for the bringing vapour cloud formed which ignited causing a
to markets of some 30% of the world’s natu- massive explosion and a fire that lasted three
ral gas (BP Statistical Review, 2013), would days (Herbert, 2010). Some bizarre incidents
not be able without the development of large are also possible like a case in Texas when
scale cryogenic storage units at both export a 24-year-old man and a 24-year-old woman
and import terminals. Liquefaction of natural were critically injured in an explosion and fire
gas also provides the opportunity to store the after smoking on a catwalk over oil storage
fuel for use during high consumption periods tanks along state highway. Three of the six
close to demand centres. storage tanks caught fire and exploded thus
inducing a loud explosion. Luckily, it seems
that the tanks had very little crude oil in them
BACKGROUND at the time of the explosion (http://www.
heavy.com/news/2013/01/massive-explosion-
The storage of crude oil and petroleum product
sparked-by-2-smokers-on-top-of-oil-tank/).
creates the potential for leaks or accidentally
From the above mentioned examples, the
releases from tanks, pipes, hoses, and pumps
presence of a risk is evident. Thus it is crucial
during loading and unloading of products.
to clearly define the causes and consequences
The storage and transfer of these materials
of the tank damages. Possible storage tanks
also poses a risk of fire and explosion due
accident can be: spills, gas releases, fire and
to the flammable and combustible nature of
explosions. The most common failure causes
the materials stored. Basic requirements for
for fixed and floating roof tanks according to
tank design and construction are mandated
Argyropoulos et al. (2012) are operational
by various industrial codes and standards but
errors, equipment or instrument failure and
the risk of an accident, although minimal, is
maintaince errors while lightning and static
present. There are many examples of storage
electricity can causing fluid or vapour ignition
tank accidents. One of the often mentioned is
if flammable vapours are present.
storage tank explosion at the Hertfordshire Oil
In the article prepared by Chang & Lin
Storage Limited part of the Buncefield (2005).
(2006) the analysis of 242 tank accidents oc-
The accident was caused by operational error
curred in industrial facilities in last 40 years
because two level gauges were inoperable at
305
was presented. The analysis has shown that STORAGE TANKS

accidents occurred most frequently at petro-
Oil Storage Tanks
leum refineries (116 cases or 47.9%). The
second most frequently involved place were
Atmospheric oil storage tanks (Figure 1) come
terminals and pumping stations (64 cases,
in a range of sizes, from small to truly gigantic
26.4%) and finally only 25.7% of accidents
and can be constructed as aboveground, in
occurred in petrochemical plants (12.8%), oil
ground and belowground. The aboveground
fields (2.5%), and other types of industrial
tank is usually easier to construct, costs less,
facilities (10.3%). Crude oil, gasoline and oil
and can be built in far larger capacities than un-
products such as fuel oil, diesel, etc. were major
derground storage tanks. In shape they are most
contents. The atmospheric external floating
usually of vertical cylindrical form, but also
roof tank was the most frequently damaged
come in horizontal cylindrical, spherical and
storage tank type while the atmospheric cone
rectangular forms. Vertical cylindrical storage
top tank was the second most frequent type.
tank can be constructed as the open top tank,
Both types were used extensively for the
fixed roof tank, external and internal float-
storage of crude oil, gasoline, and diesel oil.
ing roof tank. According their construction
Fire and explosion together accounted for
tanks can be those with single walls, double
85% of total cases. Oil spill and toxic gas/
walls and insulated tanks. Temperatures range
liquid release were the third and the fourth
from high temperature heated storage tanks
most frequent consequence while the tank
through to -163°C for the storage of liquefied
body distortion and the worker’s falling only
natural gas. According the internal pressure
occurred a few times.
the tanks can be atmospheric or low-pressure
Renni et al., (2010) state that one of most
tanks. By far the most common type of tank
frequent cause of accidents in chemical fa-
is the atmospheric tank. Although called at-
cilities caused by natural events is lightning
mospheric, these tanks are usually operated at
strikes. Author’s analysis has shown that in
internal pressures slightly above atmospheric
91% recorded cases, lightning caused accident
pressure while low pressure in the context of
in oil and gas facilities (mainly oil refiner-
tanks means tanks designed for a higher pres-
ies) and the petrochemical sector, including
sure than atmospheric tanks. These tanks are
storage sites and tank farms. In 485 recorded
designed to operate from atmospheric pressure
accidents, storage tanks were most frequently
up to 1.0342 bar (15 psig) (Myers 1997; Long
affected by lightning impact (59.6% or 289
& Garner, 1998).
cases). The atmospheric tanks, and in particu-
Figure 1 illustrates various types of storage
lar floating-roof tanks, are the most vulnerable
tanks commonly used for crude oil and oil
equipment while only 3 out of 289 accidents
products storage.
involved pressurised storage tanks.
306
Figure 1. Tank types
Generally, for crude oil and oil products as well as ambiental temperature changes. At
storage only fixed and floating roof tanks are the production site, where fixed roof tanks
used. Open top tanks shall not be used for oil are often used, flashing losses occur when
or oil product storage but may be used for fire crude oils or condensates flow into a storage
water/ cooling water. vessel from a processing vessel operated at
a higher pressure. Typically, the larger the
Fixed Roof Tanks pressure drop, the more flash emissions will
occur in the storage stage. Temperature of
Fixed roof storage tanks (Figure 2) are typi- the liquid may also influence the amount of
cally cylindrical in shape and can be either flash emissions. The volume of gas vapour
horizontal or vertical in orientation. In gen- emitted from a storage vessel depends on
eral, tank has vertical cylinder shell made of many factors. Lighter crude oils flash more
a painted steel and fixed cone-shaped roof hydrocarbons than heavier crude oils. In stor-
that is welded to each other. Fixed roof tanks age vessels where the oil is frequently cycled
can be divided into cone roof and dome roof and the overall throughput is high, working
types. They can be selfsupported or rafter/ losses are higher. Additionally, the operating
trusses supported depending on the size. Main temperature and pressure of oil in the separator
disadvantage of the fixed roof tank is the loss dumping into the storage vessel will affect the
of product vapour into the atmosphere because volume of flashed gases coming out of the oil.
of usual tank operation (filling and empting) The composition of the vapours from storage
307
Figure 2. Fixed roof storage tank
vessels varies, and the largest component is construction of external floating roof there is
methane, but also includes ethane, butane, a rim seal that covers the space between the
propane and other flammable components. floating roof and the tank shell. Floating roofs
To minimize emissions of volatile or- are provided with legs which may be set in
ganic compounds into the atmosphere fixed high or low positions depending on the type
roof tanks may be fitted with internal floating of operation. Legs are normally maintained in
roofs. This can be done when tank is built or the low position so that the greatest possible
it may be retro-fitted at later date. amount of product can be withdrawn from the
tank without creating a vapour space between
Floating Roof Tanks the top of the product and the bottom of the
floating roof. In both type constructions, the
Floating roof tanks are used for volatile liquid floating roof consists of a deck, fittings, and
hydrocarbons such as crude oil and “white” rim seals, and typically involves a pontoon
light products (jet, diesel and gasoline) storage and double-deck system. The roof rises and
and during normal tank operation the majority falls with the liquid level in the tank to mini-
of the vapour stays under the roof. mize volatile organic compounds emissions.
In floating roof tanks the roof floats di- An internal floating roof storage tank is a
rectly on the top of the product. Floating roof combination of the above two types of tanks,
tanks may have external and internal floating as the tank consists of a conical roof with the
roofs. The former has no fixed roof while he addition of the internal floating roof or pan
latter has both a fixed and a floating roof. In that floats directly on the fuel surface.
308
The type and nature of the stored product tention or lack of training. According
is most important criteria in type storage tank Marsh Ltd. (2011) in the USA overfill-
selection. ing of atmospheric storage tanks occurs
In the process of the tank design following once in every 3300 filling operations.
factors must be considered: • Tank rupture: Can be caused by cor-
rosion, foundation problems, shell dis-
• Operation needs - influencing tank tortion or buckling, sabotage, extreme
capacity weather conditions, earthquake.
• Type and properties of the stored fluid • Piping rupture or crack: Very often
• Construction materials (corrosion) cause of leaks and spills. According
• Foundation Myers perhaps the most significant
• Tank loadings (influence of internal leaks have resulted from pressurized
and external factors) underground piping.
• Tank venting
Basic input data in every risk analysis is
During the tank design process factors like frequency of the specific event. The frequency
actual site-specific conditions, local regula- describes the number of times that certain
tions, required operating life, space available, accidents will happen in a particular type of
potential for fires and explosion and finally unit per year. It can be estimated by perform-
cost considerations, should also be evaluated ing historical analyses or using event trees.
and considered. Storage tank accident frequency data is most
often estimated on the historical data of tank
Oil Storage Tanks Risk Analysis failures and depends on the used database. It
is illustrated by the frequency of catastrophic
Oil Tank Spills
failure of the tanks used for the storage of
Leaks and spills from storage tanks have had hazardous liquid. According to Thyer et al.
great impact on the way tanks are regulated (2002) this frequency is 5,0 x 10-6 per tank
and will be regulated as well as upon the de- year while frequency determined in publica-
sign, maintance and operation of tanks. There tion of International Association of oil and
are numerous causes of tank leaks and spills. gas producers (2010) is 3.0 x 10-6 per tank
Some of them can be caused by: year. In both cases, probability of catastrophic
failure of a crude oil storage tank appears to
• Tank overfilling: Can be caused by op- be quite remote. The probability of the minor
erational or human error. Operational failure (hole and leak) which may result in
error can be result of failed equipment minor oil spill will be relatively more. That
(for example: level indicators, wrong is illustrated by the estimated frequencies of
setting or failure of valves) while hu- leak for atmospheric storage tanks shown in
man error can resulted from lack of at- Table 1.
309
Table 1. Atmospheric storage tank leak frequencies (International Association of oil and gas
producers, 2010)
Type of tank Type of release Leak frequency

(per tank year)
Floating roof Liquid spill on roof 1.6x10-3
Sunken roof 1.1x10-3
Fixed/floating roof Liquid spill outside tank 2.8x10-3
Tank rupture (Catastrophic failure) 3.0x10-6
Fire and Explosion direct strike, indirect lightning currents that

induce secondary sparks, or by the disruption
Whenever hydrocarbons are present in closed of control systems and electrical circuitry.
containers such as storage tanks, the potential Direct lightning strikes can severely damage
exists for release of liquids and vapours. These structures due to thermal heating. If flam-
vapours could mix with air in the flammable mable vapours are present, immediate ignition
range and, if subjected to a source of ignition, can occur. There are many other sources of
cause an explosion or fire. Fire and explo- ignition as welding/cutting operations, circuit
sion hazards may result from the presence of shortcuts, use of non explosion-proof motor
combustible gases and liquids, oxygen, and and tools, transformer sparks, adjacent open
ignition sources during loading and unloading flames or remains of smoking, escalation
activities, and/or leaks and spills of flammable from another unit (domino effect), previous
products. Possible ignition sources include accident caused by energy/fuel transportation
sparks associated with the build up of static lines and sabotage. Potential fire scenarios that
electricity, lightning and open flames. Light- can be developed in a tank accident are rim
ning is a major accident initiator. A survey of seal fire, spill on roof fire, full surface fire,
industrial accident databases showed that up bund fire, pontoon explosion and boilover.
to 5% of industrial accidents were triggered The most severe are the full surface fire and
by natural events which impact industrial boilover. If open-top floating roof storage
facilities that process or store hazardous sub- tanks are out of round or if the seals are worn
stances. Analysis of the accidents at storage or not tight against the tank shells, vapours can
and processing activities initiated by natural escape and mix with air, forming flammable
events conducted by Renni et al. (2010) is mixtures. In such situations, when lightning
shown that in 61% of recorded cases accident strikes, fires may occur at the point where the
were triggered by lightning strikes. Lightning roof seals meet the shell of the tank. Such type
was also found to be the most frequent cause of fire named rim seal fire is considered as
of failure in the set of storage tank accidents the most frequent fire cause for floating roof
analysed in the study of Chang and Lin (2006). tanks containing petrol, crude oil and kerosene
Lightning can interact with tank structure by (Argyropoulos et al., 2012). Existence of an
310
effective grounding system is indispensable ments are becoming more rigorous. The exist-
for every tank and for tank farm must be coming laws regarding such practices determine
bined with lightning conductors positioned at the risks and attempt to minimize those same
sufficient height and distance from the farm. risks.
However, several accidents suggest that this
type of protection often is not sufficient. Data Liquified Natural Gas Storage Tanks
about large atmospheric storage tanks fires can
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas
be finding in LASTFIRE bases – a consortium
that is cooled below 160 °C. It is a mixture
of international oil companies reviewing the
of hydrocarbons, ranging from methane
risks associated with fires in storage tanks
to butane, with approximately 85 to 95%
and developing the best industry practice to
methane. The properties of LNG vary with
mitigate the risks. The base is updated in 2010
composition, which depends on the location
and gives a valuable data about floating stor-
of the gas reservoir. The produced natural gas
age tank fire accidents and its consequences.
may contain many other materials including
Data from the LASTFIRE base are often used
water vapour, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and
in estimation of the frequencies of different
helium, some of which must be removed for
types of fire/explosion. Atmospheric Storage
liquefaction.
tank fire frequencies are shown in Table 2.
In its liquefied state, natural gas takes up
The data presented confirms that the rim
1/600th of the space, making it much easier
seal fire mostly occurs around storage tanks
to ship and store when pipeline transport is
with floating roof, while the occurrence of
not feasible. In liquid state natural gas is not
fires in other storage tanks is significantly
combustible. LNG weighs slightly less than
less. Because of detrimental impact of tank
half as much as water, so it floats on fresh
spills on the environment and the negative
or sea water. However, when LNG comes in
perception of such incidents by public, storage
contact with any warmer surface such as wa-
tank design, control and maintance require-
ter or air, it evaporates very rapidly (“boil”),
Table 2. Atmospheric storage tank fire frequencies (International Association of oil and gas
producers, 2010)
Type of fire Floating roof tank Fixed roof tank

(per tank year) (per tank year)
Rim seal fire 1.6x10-3
Full surface fire on roof 1.2x10-4
Internal explosion&full surface fire 9.0x10-5
Internal explosion without fire 2.5x10-5
Vent fire 9.0x10-5
Small bund fire 9.0x10-5 9.0x10-5
Large bund fire (full bund area) 6.0x10-5 6.0x10-5
311
returning to its original, gaseous volume. As terminal where is again pumped into the
the LNG vaporizes, a vapour cloud resembling cryogenic tank. There are several different
ground fog will form under relatively calm designs of refrigerated storage tanks. Three
atmospheric conditions. The vapour cloud most common used types of LNG storage tanks
is initially heavier than air since it is so cold, are (Huang et al. 2007; Long& Garner, 1998):
but as it absorbs more heat, it becomes lighter
than air, rises, and can be carried away by • Single containment tank (Figure 3)
the wind and when concentration of gas is • Double containment tank (Figure 4)
between 5% and 15% it can ignite. At defined • Full containment tank (Figure 5).
concentration, an explosion can occur if gas
is ignited in confined space. If not confined, The cryogenic tank is a tank within a tank,
the gas will burn until there is no longer suf- with insulation between the walls of the tanks.
ficient fuel and/or air to maintain needed ratio. The inner tank, in contact with the LNG, has
Liquefied natural gas has a positive safety to be made of material suitable for cryogenic
records. There were a few storage and plant temperatures and is usually made of 9%
accidents to date and only 15 marine acci- nickel steel. The hydrostatic head of the LNG
dents (8 with and 7 without spills). None of impose a load on the tank and determines the
the marine accidents resulted in cargo fires, thickness of the inner tank side walls. All
explosions or fatalities. tanks must be designed in accordance with
After liquefaction process, liquefied natural international LNG codes (EMMUA 147, EN
gas is pumped into a cryogenic storage tanks 1473).
at atmospheric pressure until a transport vessel Single containment tanks. These are a
loading. After loading in vessel containment single primary container and an outer shell
system, LNG is transported to the receiving divided by isolation layer. The primary con-
Figure 3. Single containment tank
312
Figure 4. Double containment tank
Figure 5. Full containment tank
tainer made of 9% nickel – steel is required metal wall both built of materials suitable for
to meet the low temperature ductility require- cryogenic temperatures. Single containment
ments for storage of the product while the tanks require larger land areas for LNG stor-
outer tank generally made of carbon steel, age facilities because of the larger potential
serves primarily to retain insulation and spill area of the dike impoundment. Single
vapour and is not designed to contain LNG containment tank shall be surrounded by a
due to leakage from the primary tank. Tank dyke to contain any leakage in the unlikely
has a flat metallic bottom and a cylindrical event of tank failure. The dikes are designed
313
to contain 100 percent to 110 percent of tank container composed of concrete is 1 m to 2 m

volume and are usually low structures made of distance from the primary container and sup-
earth, reinforced earth or reinforced concrete. ports the outer roof. The secondary contain-
Impoundments not only limit the spread of an ment shall be capable both of containing the
LNG spill, they reduce the surface area of the refrigerated liquid and of controlled venting
liquid pool, thereby decreasing and controlling of the vapour resulting from product leakage
the size of the vapour cloud. The construction after a credible event.
of this tank type remains most economical. The majority of LNG storage tanks built
The safety records of the onshore LNG recently around the world are designed as
facilities around the world demonstrate that double or full containment tanks.
the primary containment of the LNG tanks Membrane tank. This tank type is utilized
is safe, because secondary spill containment for the storage of liquefied natural gas during
systems installed around all of the tanks, have the transportation with ships. However, there
never been required to hold liquid. However, are similarly constructed tanks used for the
due to safety reasons, the construction of stor- storage of the liquefied natural gas on land
age capacity for LGN consists of constructing and on the gravity based storage systems.
double or full containment tanks. These tanks are designed and constructed
Double containment tanks. These tanks so that the primary container, constituted
are designed and constructed so that both the by a stainless steel corrugated membrane, is
inner self supporting primary container and capable of containing both the liquefied gas
the secondary container are capable of inde- and its vapour under normal operating con-
pendently containing the refrigerated liquid ditions. Such tanks located on land have the
stored. The primary container contains the concrete secondary container, which supports
refrigerated liquid under normal operating the primary container and should be capable
conditions. The secondary container or wall of containing all the liquefied gas stored in the
is intended to contain any LNG leakage from primary container and of controlled venting
the inner container but is not intended to con- of the vapour resulting from product leakage
tain any vapour resulting from this leakage. of the inner tank. The vapour of the primary
To minimise the pool of escaping liquid, the container is contained by a steel liner which
secondary container should be located at a forms with the membrane an integral gastight
distance not exceeding 6 m from the primary containment. The action of the liquefied gas
container. acting on the primary container (the metal
Full containment tanks. In this tank type membrane) is transferred directly to the pre-
the primary (inner) container contains the stressed concrete secondary container through
LNG under standard operating conditions but the load bearing insulation.
both self supporting primary and the second- Modern storage tanks have no side or bot-
ary container are capable of independently tom penetrations. All penetrations, including
containing the stored LNG. The secondary those for LNG send out, are through the roof.
314
This design substantially reduces the amount temperature, and density of the LNG along
of LNG spilled in the unlikely event of a rup- the entire height of the liquid column.
ture or leakage in the send out piping. LNG’s cryogenic temperatures, dispersion
characteristics and flammability characteris-
LNG Storage Risk tics are the causes of hazards.
The LNG, due to its coldness, can directly
Sources of LNG hazards connected to stor- cause injury or damage although momentary
age tanks are spills and rollover. The most contact on the skin can be harmless. However,
serious hazard with LNG is the unplanned the prolonged contact can result in severe
release from storage tank and contact with an freeze burns. On contact with certain metals
ignition source. Release can occur by failure LNG can cause immediate cracking. Although
of the container or valves. Experts agree that not poisonous, exposure to the center of a
the risks posed by shipping, loading and off- vapour cloud could cause asphyxiation due to
loading of the LNG are greater than risks the absence of oxygen. LNG vapour clouds can
posed by the land-based storage facilities. As ignite within the portion of the cloud where
the containment opportunity for water spills the concentration of natural gas is between 5
is limited, the spilled LNG disperses faster and 15 percent (by volume) mixture with air.
in the ocean than on land. In addition, due to Without ignition source LNG vapour cloud
the ocean’s heat, the LNG vaporizes rapidly will simply dissipate into the atmosphere. An
on water. ignited LNG vapour cloud is very dangerous,
Rollover occurs under certain conditions because of its tremendous radiant heat output.
as stratified LNG comes to equilibrium. According to Woodword & Pitblado (2010),
Stratification occurs when liquid of a differ- there are four types of fires in general and of
ent composition than that which is already LNG fires in particular:
in the tank is introduced into the tank. If
rollover occurs, pressure inside the storage 1. Pool Fire and Trench Fire: A fire burn-
tank may rise to excessive levels. The tanks ing over a pool of liquid fuel.
are equipped with safety vent valves that are 2. Jet Fire: A narrow, long turbulent jet,
designed to keep the pressures from rising like a blowtorch.
to levels that could cause structural damage. 3. Flash Fire: A flame front that moves
However, when these valves operate, LNG is through a vapour cloud.
vented to the atmosphere at an uncontrolled 4. Fireball: A nearly spherical, rising, burn-
rate, which is an additional safety concern. ing mass of vapour or flashing liquid.
In both cases, the real danger is the potential
ignition of vapour cloud. The detection of the Pool fire: A consequence of LNG spill and
development of “rollover” conditions in mod- a vapour cloud forming and its ignition is the
ern LNG storage tanks is possible through the most dangerous type of hazard. The damage
use of instruments that monitor the pressure, to life and property is extensive and takes
place at a distance far from the actual fire
315
itself. The evaporating natural gas above the vapour cloud ignition, numerous research
pool burns quickly as the flame burns back projects intend to clarify and create a greater
towards the evaporating pool until all of the understanding of the causes and the conse-
fuel is consumed. quences of the fires.
An LNG jet fire: occuring when the liquid
is released under pressure through an orifice
CONCLUSION
or a crack and is ignited - has a limited reach
that is less than 50 m. As such, it is confined
The data presented suggests that the ac-
to the location of the LNG processing plant.
cidents of greater proportions resulting in
Disabling the buildings and the process
serious fatalities and damage related to the
equipment, jet fires generate high heat fluxes
storage of oil and, especially the LNG, oc-
and burn through most objects given enough
cur rarely. However, when they do occur, the
exposure time.
consequences are usually severe in a form
A jet fire requires a pressurized release that
of a loss of human lives. The establishment
can occur in process plants but is not typically
of the accident risks connected to storing is
a threat to the public. An LNG spill on land
therefore important for the procedure defini-
or on water results in a wind driven vapour
tions, defining of the control time intervals
cloud caused by a rapidly evaporating pool.
and the maintenance of the storage capacity.
Contact with an ignition source results on
Regardless of the storing location - on the oil
an ignition, resulting in a flash fire. Burning
field, terminal or refinery - safety procedures
downwind, the flash fire burns faster along the
and safe work practices should be established
premixed (diluted by air) edges. A flash fire
and implemented, and personnel training or
is inherently transient, and exposure normally
education provided. These should include,
lasts no more than a few tens of seconds.
as a minimum, information concerning the
While fatal to people inside the fire, the total
basics of hydrocarbon fire ignition, control
radiation reaching an object near a flash fire
and extinguishment, hazards and protection
is substantially lower than that from a longer
from exposures to toxic substances, emergency
- lasting pool or jet fire the same distance
response actions, and normal physical and
away. A flash fire likely does not produce
climatic hazards associated with this activity.
secondary ignition or burns to people outside
Storage tank should be regularly inspected
of the flaming region. Appearing in spherical
for corrosion, erosion, settling or other vis-
shapes, fire balls rise while burning. Often
ible damage to prevent loss or degradation
they appear as a result from the rupture of a
of product. Tank pressure/vacuum valves,
bursting pressure vessel or from the ignition
seals and shields, vents, foam chambers, roof
of a large accumulation of flammable vapours
drains, water draw-off valves and overfill de-
at atmospheric pressure.
tection devices should be inspected, tested and
Due to a small number of accidents regard-
maintained on a regular schedule, including
ing the leakage of the storage tanks and the
removal of ice in the winter. Where flame ar-
316
restors are installed on tank vents or in vapour should be maintained in a safe condition, free
recovery lines, they have to be inspected and of ice, snow and oil. Leaking tanks and piping
cleaned regularly and kept free of frost in the should be repaired as soon as possible. The
winter to ensure proper operation. Valves on use of victaulic or similar couplings on piping
tank outlets which close automatically in case within diked areas which could be exposed to
of fire or drop in pressure should be checked heat should be discouraged to prevent lines
for operability. Dike surfaces should drain from opening during fires.
or slope away from tanks, pumps and piping The physical and chemical properties of
to remove any spilled or released product to LNG are such that risks and hazards are well
a safe area. Dike walls should be maintained understood and incorporated into technology
in good condition, with drain valves kept and operations. LNG storage safety increases
closed except when draining water and dike with the construction of a great number of
areas excavated as needed to maintain design double and full containment tanks as the stan-
capacity. Stairways, ramps, ladders, platforms dards, while codes and regulations that apply
and railings to loading racks, dikes and tanks to the LNG industry further ensure safety.
317
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the spread of fire in one area to another, and and filled and as a result of an increase in
temperature.
321
322
Chapter 15
CO2 Underground Storage
and Wellbore Integrity
Borivoje Pasic
ABSTRACT
Geologic storage is the component of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in which the carbon
dioxide (CO2) is disposed in the appropriate underground formation. To successfully inject CO2
into the subsurface to mitigate greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the CO2 must to be trapped
in the subsurface and must not be allowed to leak to the surface or to potable water sources
above the injection zone. For the purposes of risk assessment, a priority is to evaluate what
would happen if CO2 migrated unexpectedly through the confining unit(s), potentially resulting
in undesirable impacts on a variety of potential receptors. One of the main risks identified in
geological CO2 storage is the potential for CO2 leakage through or along wells. To avoid leak-
age from the injection wells, the integrity of the wells must be maintained during the injection
period and for as long as free CO2 exists in the injection zone.
INTRODUCTION drilled for this purpose. Geologic storage

is also known as geologic sequestration or
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is becoming geosequestration. The CO2 for the geologic
a critically important part of global warming storage is not removed from the atmosphere but
mitigation efforts, and this trend is expected comes from industrial facilities that emit large
to continue, with more and more wells being amounts of CO2 such as coal power stations,
petroleum refineries, oil and gas production
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch015
facilities, iron and steel mills, cement plants
CO2 Underground Storage and Wellbore Integrity
and various chemical plants. The large-scale Framework (United States Environmental
underground storage of CO2 has the potential to Protection Agency, 2008) and the CO2QUAL-
play a key role in reducing global greenhouse STORE Guideline for Selection and Quanti-
gas emissions. Typical underground storage fication of Sites and Projects for Geological
reservoirs would lie at depths of 1 km or more Storage of CO2 (Det Norske Veritas, 2009).
and contain 10 or even 100x106 tones of CO2. They all recognize that the primary issue
To date, the technology as a whole has only to be assessed and demonstrated for CCS sites
been deployed at a few pilot sites around the is long-term containment. However, they all
world: Sleipner field in Norway, Weyburn field also recognize the importance of assessing the
in Canada, In Salah field in Algeria (Gallo potential for environmental impacts should
et al., 2002; Jimenez & Chalaturnyk, 2002). there be any leaks.
These projects have demonstrated successful One key component of a risk assessment is
operational experience with the injection of identifying potential leakage pathways (e.g.,
CO2 into the subsurface at rates of approxi- faults, wells, fractures). This identification is
mately 1 x 106 metric tons of CO2 per year. then integrated with the Measurement, Moni-
According to the International Energy Agency toring, and Verification (MMV) program and
(IEA), by the year 2050, 5x109 tons of CO2 per includes, if injected CO2 migrates toward an
year could be avoided through CO2 capture identified pathway, approaches to mitigate
and storage, representing a 16% contribution the risk of negative impacts upon the surface,
to the reduction of global emissions needed a Underground Sources of Drinking Water
to limit climate disruption. (USDW), or outside the project footprint
An important component of a CCS project or to implement remediation measure. One
is risk assessment. A comprehensive risk as- method for ensuring this needed integration
sessment is needed early in the project, but is to link the models used for risk assessment
risks should be continually assessed, and up- and the subsurface models that are developed
dated throughout the project. The importance and informed by MMV (Forbes et al., 2008).
of assessing the potential for environmental A lot of literature is published with the aim
impacts from CO2 storage is recognized by cer- of assessing the risk of CO2 storage (Benson
tain regulations, such as the European council et al., 2002; Vendrig et al., 2003; White et
directive on storage (Directive 2009/31/EC, al., 2003)
2009) and the OSPAR Guidelines for Risk As- Various methodologies are currently be-
sessment and Management of Storage of CO2 ing applied to risk assessment of geological
Streams in Geological Formations (OSPAR, CO2 storage and only some of them will be
2007), and other sources of guidance such as mentioned here (Le Guen et al., 2008; Forbes
the United States Environmental Protection et al., 2008; Le Guen et al., 2009).
Agency (US EPA) Vulnerability Evaluation
323
STORAGE SITE SELECTION • Water-alternating CO2 injection for

AND CHARACTERISATION production enhancement;
• Injection of CO2 into a previously pro-
The basic concept of CO2 storage is to pre- ducing reservoir (depleted oil and gas
vent CO2 emissions being released into the reservoirs);
atmosphere by injecting it into deep porous • Sequestering CO2 into a deep saline
geological formations so that it remains per- aquifers that is independent of any oil
manently trapped. For a carbon storage method or gas development;
to be effective, CO2 must be stored for several • Sequestering CO2 into deep unmine-
hundred or thousands of years. The majority able coal beds (often thin and therefore
of locations that are being considered for CO2 uneconomic);
injection and sequestration are typically found • Storage in salt caverns, etc.
in areas that have a history of oil, natural gas,
and/or coalbed methane production. This is Storage sites need to be chosen carefully
due to value-added opportunities such as on the basis of their geological characteristics.
Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), enhanced For safe storage the storage site must have:
gas recovery (EGR), and Enhanced Coal Bed (1) a good reservoir at a depth of greater than
Methane (ECBM) recovery (Bellarby, 2009). about 800 meters (where CO2 will be in the
There also exists a greater knowledge base for dense or ‘supercritical’ phase under typical
saline formations that lie either above or below subsurface conditions of temperature and
oil and gas reservoirs due to well logging and pressure); (2) a geological trap; (3) a good
exploration activities. As a result of human seal above the reservoir (typically mudrock
activity, these formations are typically punc- or salt, usually hundreds of meters thick);
tured by a significant number of wells from and (4) a geologically stable area. In the case
both exploration and production. No matter of an aquifer, the reservoir salinity must be
how impermeable an overlying cap rock is, sufficiently high as to be unusable as a future
the sealing integrity may be compromised by source of drinking water.
the presence of wells. Diffusion through the Site screening in many cases can be ex-
cap rock is normally less of a concern than ecuted with existing well control, seismic
fracturing or fault-related leakage (Jimenez data, and/or literature published in the course
& Chalaturnyk, 2002). There are a number of earlier oil and gas exploration and devel-
of different types of CO2 injection scheme opment. The various criteria are considered
(Ennis-King & Paterson, 2002; Gallo et al., important in the evaluation potential CO2
2002; Nezhad et al., 2006; Bellarby, 2009): storage site such as technical, economic, com-
mercial, organizational and political because
• Injection of CO2 into a producing res- of their potential to add short and long-term
ervoir either to promote oil production risk to the storage project
(Enhanced Oil Recovery – EOR) or to
sequester the CO2;
324
In the case of insufficient data (especially models of storage performance, together

data provided by wells) the operator may with plans for monitoring and risk mitiga-
elect to drill additional wells in order to find tion. These models examine geochemical
suitable storage sites that can accommodate and geomechanical processes to simulate and
planned volumes of supercritical CO2. The test a range of scenarios covering injection
success of these wells will be determined by rates, fluid displacement, CO2 trapping, and
the permeability (k) and height (h) product containment performance.
within suitable formation for supercritical A geological formation shall only be se-
CO2 storage. The number of wells required lected as a storage site, if under the proposed
depends upon the site specifics environment, conditions of use there is no significant risk of
project risks and uncertainties that need better leakage, and if no significant environmental
constraint, and the presence of previous well or health risks exist.
and seismic data to control and calibrate the When assessing the performance of a stor-
geological predictions (Jenvey et al., 2008). age system it is useful to consider relevant Fea-
Choosing the best storage site is the best tures, Events and Processes (FEPs), which are
way to manage the uncertainties and minimize affecting the evolution of the storage system
the risks associated with CO2 storage. There (Quintessa, 2010). A generic FEP database has
is a range of methods, based around risk been produced and can be freely accessed at
assessment, for screening geological basins www.quintessa.org/CO2fepdb/. The features
and comparing different sites. The first step include a list of parameters, such as cap rock
is collecting the available data, rank the sites, porosity, a number of wells and reservoir
and select candidates for further characteriza- permeability. Events are processes like seis-
tion. Some considerations include capacity mic events and well blowouts. The processes
(Will the site hold as much CO2 as needed?), are physical and chemical processes such as
injectivity (Can we fill the store at the required geomechanical or geochemical processes
rate?) and containment (Will the stored CO2 and multi-phase flow behavior (Wildenborg,
remain safely in place?). Once selected, the 2013). A methodological framework for
site has to be characterized in detail using screening and ranking potential geological
proprietary (risk-based) detailed evaluation sites based on their posed leakage risk has
techniques, tailored to the special needs of been developed (van Egmond, 2006). This
CO2 storage. The geological structure of the framework has been applied to several Dutch
site may be imaged from the surface using onshore aquifer traps and nearly depleted gas
seismic data or other technologies. Wells can fields. The application showed that an evalua-
be drilled and rock properties investigated tion and ranking of prospective sites with very
using logging tools. Rock and fluid samples limited site specific characterization data can
can be taken for laboratory measurements. be accomplished based on the potential CO2
Injectivity can be assessed using fluid flow leakage risk.
testing. The results are integrated to produce
325
The injection of CO2 in deep geologi- Storage Mechanisms and

cal formations involves many of the same Storage Security
technologies that have been developed in
Once underground, a variety of mechanisms
the oil and gas exploration and production
keep the supercritical CO2 securely stored.
industry. Well-drilling technology, injection
Four different storage mechanisms have been
technology, computer simulation of storage
distinguished: (1) structural/stratigraphic (or
reservoir dynamics and monitoring methods
physical) trapping, (2) solubility trapping, (3)
from existing applications are being developed
residual trapping, and (4) mineral trapping
further for design and operation of geological
(Figure 1). Structural/stratigraphic trapping is
storage (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
the most important CO2 storage mechanism
Change, 2005). Once injected into the storage
during an injection process of several ten of
formation, the fraction retained depends on
years. The other three mechanisms are likely
a combination of physical and geochemical
to be of a possible quantitive contribution on
trapping mechanisms.
larger time scales.
Figure 1. Trapping mechanisms of CO2 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2005)
326
Structural traps are formed by a folded or These trapping processes take place over
fractured rock, whereas stratigraphic traps are many years, and lead to immobilization of
formed by changes in a rock type caused by injected CO2 at different rates from days to
variations in the deposited setting. Fluid mi- years to thousands of years, but in general,
gration is happening very slowly and over geologically stored CO2 becomes more se-
long distances. Carbon dioxide remains under curely trapped with time (Figure 1). The
the sealing formation and on the longer term best estimates of leakage rates by geologists
dissolves in the formation water. Physical are well below levels that would cause any
trapping to block the upward migration of significant increase in atmospheric CO2 or
CO2 is provided by a layer of shale and clay risk to public safety. The studies of geologic
rock above the storage formation. This im- storage test sites suggest leakage rates of less
permeable layer or sealing formation is known than 1 percent over thousands of years (Imbus
as the “cap rock”. Additional physical trapping et al., 2006).
can be provided by capillary forces that retain
CO2 in the pore spaces of the formation but Carbon Dioxide and its Behavior
under Reservoir Conditions
one or more sides of the formation remain
open, allowing for lateral migration of CO2
Carbon dioxide is colourless and nearly odour-
beneath the cap rock.
less, but toxic. At concentrations of about 5%
Solubility trapping is in progress when CO2
by volume, CO2 in the air causes dizziness,
dissolves in the formation water and once CO2
confusion and breathing and hearing difficul-
is dissolved it no longer exists as a separate
ties. Above around 8%, CO2 leads to a loss of
phase and buoyant forces are eliminated.
consciousness after exposures of between 5 to
Residual CO2 trapping takes place when
10 min (Bellarby, 2009). CO2, being denser
CO2 dissolves and becomes trapped in the
than air, will also follow terrain downhill.
water in the pore space of the rock minerals
Carbon dioxide has 30 to 40% less density
(residual water) after the displacement of
and 5 to 10 times less viscosity than forma-
formation brine by CO2. Besides, small drop-
tion brine under typical subsurface conditions
lets of supercritical CO2 will become trapped
(Ennis-King & Paterson, 2002).
within the pore space by the surface tension
Under most reservoir conditions, CO2 does
between the formation water and the CO2.
not behave like a gas, but more like a low-
Mineral trapping is the result of chemi-
viscosity liquid. This will affect the injection
cal reactions between the CO2 and the rock
performance (in the tubing and near wellbore
minerals to form a solid mineral structure.
area). In geologic storage, CO2 is injected at
It is the most permanent form of geological
sufficiently high pressures (>7.3 MPa) and
storage, but it is relatively slow, and could
temperatures (> 31 ºC) and it becomes a su-
take a thousand of years or longer.
percritical fluid below 800 m (Onan, 1984).
Supercritical fluids take up much less space
327
and diffuse better than either gases or ordinary CARBON DIOXIDE INJECTION
liquids through the tiny pore spaces in storage WELL DESIGN
rocks (Price & Smith, 2008). The supercritical
The technologies for drilling and equipping
CO2 compresses further as the depth increases,
CO2 injection wells are well developed.
increasing the amount that can be stored in the
American Petroleum Institute published a
same volume of rock. High pressure at suf-
number of Specification and Recommended
ficient depths (i.e., greater than 800 meters)
Practices for Casing and Tubing, and Well
maintains the supercritical fluid state.
Cements such as: API Specification 5CT –
Except at very high pressures, CO2 is less
Specification for Casing and Tubing, API RP
dense than most subsurface fluids, but it is
5C1 – Recommended Practices for Care and
denser than hydrocarbon gases such as meth-
Use of Casing and Tubing, API RP 10B-2 –
ane. It will therefore naturally migrate to the
Recommended Practice for Testing Well Ce-
top of oil or water bearing structures due to
ments, API Specification 10A – Specification
buoyancy and spread laterally beneath the res-
on Cements and Materials for Well Cementing,
ervoir cap rock. This is important as this CO2
API RP 10D-2 – Recommended Practice for
will then potentially interact with wells and
Centralizer Placement and Stop Collar Test-
completions at the top of the reservoir. Over
ing, and API Specification 11D1 – Packers
time, carbon dioxide will tend to gradually
and Bridge Plugs.
dissolve in formation water, and then slowly
Most aspects of drilling and completing
sink, being denser than unsaturated water by
such wells are similar or identical to that of
around 1% (Ennis-King & Paterson, 2002).
drilling and completing a conventional gas
In both of these processes CO2 can come into
(or other) injection well or a gas storage well,
contact with existing wells and change the
with the exception that much of the downhole
physical and chemical properties of cements
equipment (e.g. casing and tubing, safety
under deep-well conditions (e.g., elevated
valves, cements, blowout preventers) must
pressure, temperature and salinity).
be upgraded for high pressure and corrosion
Carbon dioxide also has the potential to be
resistance. The well is completed at the surface
corrosive when mixed with water. The well
by installing a wellhead and “Christmas Tree”
needs to maintain its integrity for the life of the
that sits on top of the wellhead and is an as-
project since the goal of geological sequestra-
sembly of valves, pressure gauges and chokes.
tion (GS) is the long term storage of carbon
Devices are connected to the “Christmas
dioxide. An improperly constructed well can
Tree” that allow the monitoring of pressure,
lead to loss of well integrity that could lead
temperature, and injection rates (Figure 2).
to carbon dioxide or formation fluid leakage
The combined wellhead has casing annulus
from the wellbore and into USDWs (Gasda
valves to access all annular spaces to measure
et al., 2004; Gasda et al., 2005).
the pressure between the casing strings and
between the casing and production tubular.
328
Figure 2. Typical CO2 injection wellhead
329
Above the Christmas tree a CO2 injection valve be designed to withstand the maximum an-
is mounted and an access valve for running ticipated stress in each direction – axial direc-
wirelines from the top. tion (tensile, compressive) or radial (collapse,
The typical components of an injection burst), and include a safety factor. The loading
well that are relevant to maintaining me- in each of the stress directions should be
chanical integrity and to ensuring that fluids compared to the strength of the material in
do not migrate from the injection zone into that direction. The loadings correspond to the
USDWs are the casing, tubing, cement, and burst, collapse, and tensile strengths of the
packer (Figure 3). The well components should material.
Figure 3. Schematic of a CO2 injection well
330
Casing injection zone. A safety valve/profile nipple

can be used to isolate the wellbore from the
An injection well typically consists of one or formation to allow the tubing string to be
more casings. Leaks in the casing can allow replaced. The injection will be conducted
a fluid to escape into unintended zones or through the perforated casing. In the base case
allow fluid movements between zones. The there is no stimulation method used, but hydro
construction materials selected for the casing fracturing may be an option. Using acids to
and the casing design must be appropriate improve injectivity is not recommended be-
for the fluids and stresses encountered at the cause of the possible damage to the cement
site-specific down-hole environment. Carbon sheath and casing.
dioxide in combination with water forms car-
bonic acid, which is corrosive to many materi- Packer
als. Native fluids can also contain corrosive
elements such as brines and hydrogen sulfide. A packer is a sealing device which keeps fluid
In CO2 injection wells, the spaces between the from migrating from the injection zone into
long string casing and the intermediate casing, the annulus between the long string casing
and between the intermediate casing and the and tubing. The tubing and retrievable packer
surface casing as well as between the casings are set on above the injection zone to ease the
and the geologic formation are required to be changing of the tubing if pitting is identified
filled with cement, along all casings. during regular inspections. A packer must
also be made of materials that are compatible
Tubing with fluids which it will come into contact.
The tubing is placed inside the long string Construction Requirements

casing from the ground surface down to the
injection zone. The injected fluid moves All new CO2 injection wells have to be cased
down the tubing, out through the perfora- and cemented to prevent the migration of flu-
tions in the long string casing, and into the ids into or between underground sources of
injection zone. The tubing ends at a point just drinking water. The casing and cement used
below the packer. The space between the long in the construction of each newly drilled well
string casing and tubing must be filled with a has to be designed for the life expectancy of
noncorrosive packer fluid. The tubing forms the well. In determining and specifying cas-
another barrier between the injected fluid and ing and cementing requirements, the follow-
the long string casing. It must be designed to ing factors have to be considered: (1) depth
withstand the stresses and fluids with which of the injection zone; (2) injection pressure,
it will come into contact. The tubing and long external pressure, internal pressure, axial
string casing act together to form two levels loading, etc.; (3) hole size; (4) size and grade
of protection between the carbon dioxide of all casing strings (wall thickness, diameter,
stream and the geologic formations above the nominal weight, length, joint specification,
331
Table 1. Mandatory technical requirements for

and construction material); (5) corrosiveness
CO2 injection well (National Energy Technol-
of injected fluids and formation fluids; (6)
ogy Laboratory, 2009)
lithology of injection and confining zones; and
(7) type and grade of cement. The following Technical Requirements for CO2 Injection Well (Class VI)
information concerning the injection zone has Siting Extensive site characterization needed,
including well logs, maps, cross-sections,
to be determined or calculated for new wells: USDW locations, determine injection
(1) fluid pressure; (2) fracture pressure; and zone porosity, identify any faults, and as-
sess seismic history of the area.
(3) physical and chemical characteristics of the Fluid Movement No fluid movement to a USDW.
formation fluids. Appropriate logs and other Area of Review Determined by computational model and
tests have to be conducted during the drilling (AoR) reevaluated during project duration.
and construction of new wells. Mandatory Two layers of corrosion-resistant casing

required and set through lowermost
Construction
technical requirements for CO2 injection well USDW. Cement compatible with subsur-
face geology.
are presented in Table 1.
Injection pressures may not initiate or
propagate fractures into the confin-
Cement ing zone or cause fluid movement into
USDWs. Quarterly reporting on injection,
injected fluids and monitoring of USDWs
Operation
Cement is important for providing structural within the AoR. Must report changes to
facility, progress on compliance schedule,
support of the casing, preventing contact of lose of mechanical integrity, or noncom-
pliance with permit conditions. Permit
the casing with corrosive formation fluids, valid for 10 years.
and preventing vertical movement of carbon Mechanical Continuous internal integrity monitoring
dioxide. Some of the most current research Integrity Test and annual external integrity testing.
(MIT)
indicates that a good cement job is one of the
Analyze injectant. Continuous tempera-
key factors in effective zonal isolation. The Monitoring ture and pressure monitoring in the target
formation. Plume tracking required.
proper placement of the cement is critical, as
50 day notice and flush well. Must be
errors can be difficult to fix later on. Failing Closure plugged to prevent injectant from con-
to cement the entire length of casing, failure taminating USDWs.
Post-closure site care for 50 years or until
of the cement to bond with the casing or Proof of
proof of non endangerment to USDWs
Containment
formation, not centralizing the casing during and Post-
demonstrated. (No-migration petition
demonstration; fluids remain in injection
cementing, cracking, and alteration of the ce- Closure Care
zone for 10 000 years).
ment can all allow migration of fluids along Periodically update the cost estimate for
well plugging, post injection site care and
the wellbore. If carbon dioxide escapes the site closure, and remediation to account
injection zone through the wellbore because for any amendments to the area of review
and corrective action plan. Environmental
Financial
of a failed cement job, the injection process Responsibility
Protection Agency (EPA) is also propos-
ing that the owner or operator submit an
must be interrupted to perform costly reme- adjusted cost estimate if the original dem-
dial cementing treatments. In a worst case onstration is no longer adequate to cover
the cost of the injection well plugging,
scenario, failure of the cement sheath can post-injection site care, and site closure.
result in the total loss of a well. During the
332
injection phase, cement will only encounter wells. It is thus crucial to study how such ce-
dry CO2. However after the injection phase ment behaves at depth in CO2-rich fluids and
and all the free CO2 around the wellbore understand the chemical interactions between
is dissolved in the brine, the wellbore will injected CO2 and existing cements that could
be attacked by carbonic acid (H2CO3). The potentially lead to leakage. The properties of
carbonic acid will only attack the reservoir Portland cement are determined by the miner-
portion of the production (long string) casing, alogical composition of the Portland cement
therefore special consideration of CO2 cement clinker (Table 2). The total content of minor
needs only to be considered for the reservoir, compounds such as calcium oxide (CaO),
the primary seal and a safety zone above the magnesium oxide (MgO), potassium oxide
reservoir. Regular cement should be placed (K2O), sodium oxide (Na2O), titanium dioxide
over the CO2-resistant cement. However since (TiO2), Manganese (III) oxide (Mn2O3) and
two different cement slurries will be used, a sulfur trioxide (SO3) is normally under 5%.
CO2-resistant cement that is compatible with When Portland cement is mixed with water,
regular Portland cement has to be used to pre- its compounds form hydration products. The
vent flash setting. The cement must be able main products formed by the cement hydra-
to maintain a low permeability over lengthy tion process are calcium silicate hydrate gel
exposure to reservoir conditions in a CO2 injec- – C-S-H and calcium hydroxide - Ca(OH)2.
tion and storage scenario. Long-term carbon C-S-H is a semi-amorphous gel-like material
sequestration conditions include a contact of that comprises approximately 70 wt % of the
set cement with supercritical CO2 (>31 ˚C hydrated cement and is the primary binding
at 7,3 MPa) and brine solutions at increased material. Ca(OH)2 is crystalline and comprises
pressure and temperature and decreased pH roughly 15 to 20 wt % of the hydrated cement
(Kutchko et al., 2007). (Nelson & Guillot, 2006).
Portland cement is thermodynamically
Degradation of Wellbore unstable in CO2-rich environments and can
Cement Due to CO2 Injection degrade rapidly upon exposure to CO2 in the
presence of water (Onan, 1984). As CO2-
Portland cement systems are used convention-
laden water diffuses into the cement matrix,
ally for zonal isolation in oil or gas production
the dissociated acid (H2CO3) reacts with the
Table 2. Mineralogical composition of Portland cement clinker
Oxide Composition Cement Notation Common Name Concentration

(wt %)
3CaO∙SiO2 C3S Alite 55 - 65
2CaO∙SiO2 C2S Belite 15 - 25
3CaO∙Al2O3 C3A Aluminate 8 - 14
4CaO Al2O3 Fe2O3
∙ ∙ C4AF Ferrite phase 8 - 12
333
free calcium hydroxide and the calcium- as hydrated lime or portlandite) in the ce-
silicate-hydrate gel. The reaction products are ment causing carbonation of Ca(OH)2 (Eq.
soluble and migrate out of the cement matrix. 2a) and/or decomposition of calcium silicate
Eventually, the compressive strength of the hydrate gel, the main binding component in
set cement decreases and the permeability hydrated cement, into calcium carbonate and
and porosity increase leading to loss of zonal an amorphous silica (Equation 2b):
isolation (Gaurina-Medjimurec, 2010).
There are mainly three different chemical Ca(OH)2 + H2CO3→CaCO3 + 2H2O (2a)
reactions involved in cement-CO2 interaction:
C-S-H and/or crystalline phases + H2CO3 →
(1) formation of carbonic acid, (2) carbonation CaCO3 + SiO2 (gel) + H2O (2b)
of calcium hydroxide and/or cement hydrates,
and (3) dissolution of calcium carbonate The carbonation reactions cause densi-
(CaCO3) which are shown below (Onan,1984; fication, leading to increased hardness and
Bellarby, 2009; Santra et al., 2009): reduced permeability thereby decreasing CO2
diffusion and up to 6% volume expansion,
1. Formation of Carbonic Acid which can lead to development of micro to
macro cracks in extreme cases. The rate at
Carbon dioxide diffuses into the capillary which cement degradation occurs depends
pores of the cement which contain, to some primarily on temperature, but also on cement
extent, water and dissolves in it to form car- type, cement composition, water/cement ratio,
bonic acid as shown in Equation 1: moisture content, CO2 partial pressure, and
CO2 + H2O→H2CO3 (1)
porosity/permeability (Kutchko et al., 2007;
Santra et al., 2009). Carbonation is extremely
Depending on temperature, partial pressure fast in the early days but later slows down
of CO2, and other ions present in water (such drastically because of the time dependant
as salt, etc), forming of carbonic acid causes reduced porosity/permeability caused by the
lowering in pH value. initial carbonation itself (Santra et al., 2009).
Moderate degrees of carbonation can be ben-
2. Carbonation of Calcium Hydroxide and/ eficial to cement porosity, permeability, and
or Cement Hydrates strength; extensive carbonation can result in
the loss of cement structural integrity (Carey
When carbonic acid comes in contact et al, 2007).
with hydrated cements, corrosion can occur.
Conventional Portland cement will react 3. Dissolution of CaCO3
with dissolved carbon dioxide and revert to
calcium carbonate (the reverse reaction to It is a long-term phenomenon and happens
the manufacturing of cement). Carbonic acid only when the set cement is surrounded by
reacts with calcium hydroxide (also named
334
liquid water containing dissolved CO2 (Equa- increased the degree of reaction regardless of
tion 3): the carbonation conditions used.
The carbonation front is reported by Barlet-
CaCO3 + H2CO3→Ca(HCO3)2 (3) Gouedard et al. (2006 and 2009) to progress
at 5 to 6 mm over 3 weeks under specific
The effects of this reaction are increased
laboratory conditions, with the front slowing
porosity/permeability and loss of overall
over time as diffusion through the carbonated
mechanical integrity, leading to inefficient
cement reduces the feed of acidic water.
or even potential loss of zonal isolation in
Kutchko et al. (2007) conducted experi-
extreme cases (Santra et al., 2009). In a long-
ments to assess the durability of cements in
term scenario where the dissolution of CaCO3
wells penetrating candidate formations for
to Ca(HCO3)2 is unavoidable, Portland cement
geological sequestration of CO2. Cement
with higher pozzolanic content wherein the
samples were prepared using Class H Portland
total amount of CaCO3 formed is much lower
cement and a water-to-cement ratio of 0.38.
after carbonation will face less-severe effects
Cement was allowed to cure 28 days under
of dissolution simply because there is less
different condition (A: 22 ºC, 0.1 MPa; B:
CaCO3 to dissolve either by CO2 or H2CO3
22 ºC, 30.3 MPa; C: 50 ºC, 0.1 MPa; D: 50
(Santra et al., 2009).
ºC, 30.3 MPa) in a 1% NaCl/brine solution
For over three decades, mostly labora-
in a high-pressure vessel to simulate well
tory based studies have indicated that pure
cement in contact with a deep saline aquifer.
Portland-cement-based formulations could
Portland cement cured under each condition
fail to maintain zonal isolation over a long
was subsequently exposed to a brine solu-
period of time.
tion saturated with CO2 at 50ºC, 30.3 MPa
Onan (1984) studied the effects of super-
in a high-pressure vessel. At this temperature
critical CO2 on present cement, as well as the
and pressure, the CO2 is supercritical. These
influence of carbonation on the early stages
experiments showed a significant variation
of the cement hydration process. He con-
in the initial degradation (9 days of expo-
cluded that after prolonged exposure to CO2
sure) based on the curing conditions. The
under supercritical conditions, the hydration
high temperature (50ºC) and high pressure
products formed in the hydration of Portland
(30.3 MPa) curing environment increased
cement undergo decomposition into calcium
the degree of hydration and caused a change
carbonate and a siliceous residue. Cement
in the microstructure and distribution of the
samples exposed to the lower extremes (tem-
Ca(OH)2 phase within the cement. Cement
perature and pressure) of a supercritical CO2
cured at sequestration conditions proved to
environment exhibited greater reactivity under
be more resistant to carbonic acid attack and
dynamic conditions as compared to static
it exhibited a shallower depth of degradation
conditions, while increasing CO2 pressure
(0.22 mm) than cement cured at 22ºC and 0.1
MPa (0.59 mm). This is likely due to smaller,
335
more evenly distributed Ca(OH)2 crystals and 13.79 MPa) the cement samples with the
that provide a uniform and effective barrier increasing amount of pozzolanic substitutions
to CO2 attack. (up to 50%) were less affected by the CO2,
Carey et al. (2007) investigated the im- and the depth of carbonation during a period
pact of CO2 – cement interactions on cement of up to 15 days is directly proportional to
performance by collecting wellbore samples the amount of pozzolanic supplement. After
from the world´s second oldest continuous 90 days of CO2 treatment (at 93.3 ºC and
CO2-flooding operation (since 1972), the 13.79 MPa) carbonation slows down drasti-
SACROC Unit, located in West Texas. The cally because of the time dependant reduced
coring operation recovered samples of cas- porosity/permeability caused by the initial
ing and cement. The casing was in excellent carbonation itself.
conditions and showed little evidence of cor- Several approaches have been adopted to
rosion. The SACROC samples consisted of help reduce detrimental effects of carbonation
neat Portland cement exposed to CO2 in the (Santra et al., 2009): (a) reduce the amount
subsurface at 54ºC and 18 MPa for 30 years. of Portland cement by incorporating filler,
The recovered cement had air permeability (b) reduce porosity/permeability, (c) add
in the tenth of a μm2 range and thus retained reactive supplementary materials to reduce
its capacity to prevent a significant flow of the Ca(OH)2, as well as changing the C-S-H
CO2. There was evidence, however, for CO2 composition to a more CO2-resistive one.
migration along both the casing-cement and Certain mismatching between the research
cement-shale interfaces. A 0.1 to 0.3 cm lab tests results and actual field measurements
thick carbonate precipitate occurs adjacent implies the necessity of further investigation
to the casing. The CO2 producing this de- and standardization of CO2 resistance-testing
posit may have traveled up the casing wall devices, conditions and procedures.
or may have infiltrated through the casing
threads or points of corrosion. The cement
WELL INTEGRITY ASSESMENT
in contact with the shale (0.1 to 1 cm thick)
was heavily carbonated. The CO2 causing this
One of the main CO2 injection candidates
reaction originated by migration along the
may be new wells, or old wells that are active,
cement-shale interface where the presence
closed or abandoned. In all cases, it is critical
of a filter cake may have provided a fluid
to ensure that the long-term integrity of the
pathway. Santra et al. (2009) studied the role
storage wells is kept; in others words wellbore
of pozzolanic substitution (silica fume and fly
integrity is one of the key performance criteria
ash) and concluded that, before CO2 treatment,
in the geological storage of CO2.
addition of either silica fume or fly ash, the
Underground gas storage operations and
amount of Ca(OH)2 still present in cement
CO2 sequestration in aquifers relay on both
either decreases or completely disappears.
proper wellbore construction and sealing
After 15 days of CO2 treatment (at 93.3 ºC
function of the cap rock. The potential leakage
336
paths are the migration CO2 along the wellbore the most likely route for the leakage of CO2
due to poor cementation and flow through from geologic carbon sequestration. Aban-
the cap rock. The permeability and integrity doned wells are typically sealed with cement
of the cement will determine how effective it plugs intended to block vertical migration of
is in preventing leakage. The integrity of the fluids. In addition, active wells are usually
cap rock is assured by an adequate fracture lined with steel casing, with cement filling
gradient and by sufficient cement around the outer annulus in order to prevent leakage
the casing across the cap rock and without a between the casing and formation rock.
micro-annulus. Several potential leakage pathways can
occur along active injection well (Figure 4a)
Well Integrity and/or abandoned well (Figure 4b). These
include leakage: through deterioration (cor-
Well integrity has been identified as the biggest rosion) of the tubing (1), around packer (2),
risk contributing to leakage of CO2 from un- through deterioration (corrosion) of the cas-
derground storage sites. Wellbore represents ing (3), between the outside of the casing
Figure 4. Possible leakage pathways in an active CO2 well (a) and abandoned well (b)
337
and the cement (4), through deterioration of Mechanical Integrity

the cement in the annulus (cement fractures)
(5), leakage in the annular region between Mechanical integrity is a key concept related to
the cement and the formation (6), through the the performance of an injection well, and the
cement plug (7), and between the cement and prevention of injected fluid movement into or
the inside of the casing (8). between USDWs or other zones. Mechanical
The permeability and integrity of the ce- integrity of the well is achieved by ensuring
ment in the annulus and in the wellbore will that each of the components of the well are
determine how effective the cement is in constructed with appropriate materials and
preventing fluid leakage. The cement must are functioning together as intended. Typi-
be able to maintain a low permeability over cal corrosion resistant materials include 316
lengthy exposure to reservoir conditions in a stainless steel, fiberglass, or lined carbon steel
CO2 injection and storage scenario. Long-term for casing and tubing. Casing and tubing can
carbon sequestration conditions include con- be lined with glass reinforced epoxy, plastic,
tact with supercritical CO2 and brine solutions or cement. If lined casing or tubing is used,
at increased pressure and temperature and care is recommended during installation to
decreased pH (Kutchko et al., 2007). avoid damaging the lining (Meyer, 2007).
The greatest risk for the escape of CO2 may Other metal parts such as packers and valves
come from other wells, typically for oil and can be nickel plated or made of other high
gas, which penetrate the storage formation. nickel alloys (Table 3).
Such wells need to be properly sealed in order
to ensure that they do not provide pathways
for the CO2 to escape into the atmosphere. Table 3. Materials of construction for CO2
Planning for geologic storage must take such injection wells (Meyer, 2007)
wells into account. The escaping of CO2 Component Materials of construction
through water wells is much more unlikely Upstream Metering & 316 SS, Fiberglass
Piping Runs
since water wells are usually much shallower
Christmas Tree (Trim) 316 SS, Nickel, Monel
than the storage formation.
Valve Packing and Seals Teflon, Nylon
In injection wells, the presence of CO2 may
Wellhead (Trim) 316 SS, Nickel, Monel
lead to corrosion on those parts coming in Tubing Hanger 316 SS, Incoloy
contact with CO2 which normally means the Tubing GRE (Glass Reinforced Epoxy)
production tubing and part of the production lined carbon steel,
IPC carbon steel, CRA
casing below the packer. Corrosion may be
Tubing Joint Seals Seal ring (GRE)
limited by: the selection of high alloy chro- Coated threads and collars (IPC)
mium steels, resistant to corrosion, and by ON/OFF Tool, Profile Nickel plated wetted parts, 316
Nipple SS
inhibitor injection, if using carbon steel casing.
Packers Internally coated hardened rub-
ber of 80-90 durometer strenght
(Buna-N),
Nickel plated wetted parts
338
The selection of materials has to be made External Mechanical Integrity

by considering the characteristics of the in-
jected fluid, planned well life, and probabil- External mechanical integrity is defined as
ity that the pipe comes into contact with the absence of significant leakage outside of
reservoir water (D’Alesio et al., 2011). the casing. Maintaining external mechanical
Maintaining mechanical integrity helps integrity helps to ensure that the injected
prevent the well and wellbore from becoming carbon dioxide, which tends to be more
conduits for fluid migration out of the injection buoyant than native formation fluids, does
zone. There are two aspects of mechanical not migrate upwards from the injection zone
integrity: internal and external. after it has been injected; therefore helping to
ensure zonal isolation of the injected carbon
Internal Mechanical Integrity dioxide. The main construction component
ensuring external mechanical integrity is the
Internal mechanical integrity is defined as set cement. Properly emplaced cement should
the absence of significant leaks in the casing, both prevent fluid movement by sealing the
tubing, or packer. These well components space between the casing and the formation,
act as the main barriers preventing contact and protect the well casing from stress and
between the injectate (the injected carbon corrosion.
dioxide stream) and the surrounding geologic The absence of significant fluid movement
formations through which the well has been into an USDW through vertical channels
drilled and constructed. Ensuring that these adjacent to the injection well bore is demon-
components are constructed properly with strated through the use of (1) the results of
appropriate materials and that they remain a temperature log, (2) noise log, (3) Oxygen
undamaged when subject to stresses or cor- Activation Log (OAL), (4) the results of a
rosive (and other) operational conditions may Radioactive Tracer Survey (RTS) (when the
prevent carbon dioxide from moving out of the injection zone is separated from the lowermost
well bore during injection (National Energy USDW by a single confining layer), or (5)
Technology Laboratory, 2009). The pressure cementing records (Ultrasonic well logging;
applied during an internal mechanical integ- Cement Bond Log – CBL) demonstrating the
rity test should be limited to prevent casing presence of adequate cement to prevent fluid
ballooning that could create cement defects. migration into USDWs.
The absence of significant leaks in the D’Alesio et al. (2011) has been carried out
casing, tubing, or packer is demonstrated well integrity assessment, as a part of ENI Ex-
through the use of (1) the Standard Annulus ploration and Production (E&P) GreenHouse
Pressure Test (SAPT), (2) the Standard An- Gases (GHG) project launched in 2004 in
nulus Monitoring Test (SAMT), and (3) the order to comply with the Kyoto protocol and
Radioactive Tracer Survey (RTS). the Italian Legislation about the reduction of
CO2 emissions. They have been developed and
339
implemented as operational methodology for tablished according to Sustained Casing Pres-

three Italian fields with the aim of verifying sure (SCP) and Maximum Allowable Pressure
and, if necessary, reinstating their structural (MAP) as: low (SCP < 50% MAP), medium
integrity. Well integrity assessment process (SCP = 50 to 100% MAP), and high (SCP >
includes comparison between the Sustained MAP). According to the NORSK Standard
Casing Pressures (SPSs) measured in the D-010 they use terms “primary barrier” (the
annuli and the relevant Maximum Allowable production tubing, packer and safety valve)
Pressures (MAPs) to estimate how close each and “secondary barrier” (the cement outside
drilled well in selected fields is to losing its the producing casing, the production casing
safety conditions (well integrity assessment) and the wellhead valves) instead of internal
(Figure 5). The criteria for the classification and external mechanical integrity.
of the annular space criticalities have been es-
Figure 5. Well integrity assessment process (after D’Alesio, 2011)
340
The methodology requires gathering all should occur. Risk assessment involves the
available data including: (1) list of all wells identification (or qualification) and quantifi-
(active, plugged and abandoned), (2) construc- cation of hazards, including the probability of
tion and operational data of existing wells features, events and processes that can result
(fracture gradient of formation, drilling and in undesirable impacts on human health and
completion fluid characteristics, wells “as the environment.
built” characteristic and operations, collapse Risk is generally defined as the product or
and burst resistance of tubing and casing), (3) combination of the probability (likelihood) of
construction and abandonment related data occurring a failure event (cause, hazard) and
of the plugged and abandoned wells, and (4) the magnitude of its impact or the severity of
historical pressure values measured in each the consequences.
annular space. The uncertainties of the system can be
On the basis of gathered data, the applied converted into the term of probability and the
methodology consists of five steps: (1) calcu- quantitative CO2 leak mass assessed into the
lation of the MAP of each annular space, (2) term of severity (Le Guen et al., 2009). Any
preliminary classification of the criticality of viable site for storing CO2 will most likely
each SCP well on the basis of the compari- include some number of identified hazards.
son between the highest historical pressure When appropriately characterized and man-
value measured in its annular spaces and the aged, the hazards for most sites will not present
relevant MAPs, (3) execution of diagnostic a substantial leakage risk (Intergovernmental
tests (including pressure-bleed off and build Panel on Climate Change, 2005). The risks
up performance, interference tests, flow- associated with the hazards identified should
sampling analysis, well-log analysis, monitor- also influence measurement, monitoring, and
ing of fluid level, pressure test) to define size verification (MMV) strategies for a given site.
and location of leakage in the critical wells, Risk assessments should (Forbes et al.,
(4) risk analyses and final classification of 2008):
the wells criticality levels, and (5) selection
of the most appropriate remedial actions to • Examine (encompass) the potential for
reinstate the integrity of each well. leakage of injected or displaced fluids
via wells, faults, fractures and seismic
events, and with a focus on the fluids’
RISK ASSESSMENT potential impacts on the integrity of the
OF CO2 STORAGE AND confining zone and endangerment to
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
human health and the environment;
• Address the potential for leakage dur-
Facilities for the geological storage of carbon
ing operations, as well as over the long
dioxide (CO2) will be designed to prevent any
term;
leakage back to the surface. However, it is im-
• Help identify priority locations and ap-
portant to be able to assess the consequences
proaches for enhanced MMV activities;
of any leakage in the unlikely event that it
341
• Provide the basis for mitigation/reme- 1. First, the GS system has characterized
diation plans for response to unexpect- in terms of the injected CO2 stream, the
ed events; confining system, the injection zone, and
• Inform operational decisions, includ- a series of geologic attributes that could
ing setting an appropriate injection influence (i.e., increase or decrease) the
pressure that will not compromise the vulnerability of the GS system to unan-
integrity of the confining zone; ticipated migration, leakage and undesir-
• Include site-specific information, such able pressure changes (first column).
as the terrain, potential receptors, prox- 2. An approach is then provided for defining
imity of USDWs, faults and the poten- the spatial area that should be evaluated
tial for unidentified borehole location for adverse impacts associated with
within the project footprint; unanticipated migration, leakage, or
• Include non-spatial elements or non- undesirable pressure changes (middle
geologic factors (such as population, column).
land use, or critical habitat) that should 3. Potential impact categories and associ-
be considered in evaluating a specific ated key receptors are then identified,
site. including human health and welfare, the
atmosphere, ecosystems, groundwater
US EPA has developed a Vulnerability and surface water, and the geosphere
Evaluation Framework (VEF) for geologic (last column).
sequestration of carbon dioxide (United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). The An extensive program of modeling, moni-
conceptual VEF model is shown in Figure 6. toring and verification activities was deployed
The vulnerability assessment incorporated at a set of active storage sites worldwide
in the VEF was developed to systematically including Sleipner, In Salah, Ketzin, Wey-
identify those conditions that could increase burn, K12-B and Snřhvit (Wildenborg, et al.
the potential for adverse impacts from geo- 2013). At Sleipner 16 years of CO2 injection,
logic sequestration, regardless of likelihood monitoring and performance assessment
or broad applicability. It is not a quantitative, indicate that CO2 has been contained within
probabilistic risk assessment tool. Vulner- the storage reservoir with negligible pressure
ability assessment examines conditions that increase. At Snřhvit downhole monitoring and
lead to increased or decreased susceptibility 4D seismic confirm retention of CO2 in the
to consequences, whereas risk assessment reservoir albeit with a higher than expected
measures the probability and severity of pressure response. The extensive monitor-
consequences. The conceptual approach to ing and verification program at In Salah has
the VEF shown in Figure 5 has the following shown that the CO2 is currently contained
components (United States Environmental within the storage complex. At Ketzin a very
Protection Agency, 2008): comprehensive deep- and shallow-focused
342
Figure 6. Vulnerability Evaluation Framework (VEF) conceptual model (United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 2008)
research monitoring program has tested a large but also, via accurate measurement of time-
number of tools and performance assessment shifts at top reservoir level, for providing a
methods. Again, no migration out of the stor- robust upper bound on the maximum amounts
age complex has been detected. At Weyburn, of CO2 that could have migrated into the over-
4D seismic has proved its worth not just for burden. Results confirm that no CO2 from the
imaging plume development in the reservoir oil reservoir has been detected at surface. All
343
investigated storage sites were well managed Releasing of CO2 from storage to atmo-
and did not have a negative impact on humans sphere reduces the benefit of storing it and can
or the environment (Wildenborg et al., 2013) pose higher risks with increasing concentra-
Time lapse seismic and pressure monitoring tions. Clearly, the more CO2 that is stored, the
appeared to be the key in verifying the per- greater the potential that leakage from geologic
formance of the storage sites. sinks could result in adverse environmental
The risks due to leakage from storage of and atmospheric impacts.
CO2 in geological reservoirs fall into two broad With regard to local risks, there are two
categories: (1) global risks and (2) local risks. types of scenarios in which leakage may
Global risks involve the release of CO2 that occur (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
may contribute significantly to climate change Change, 2005).
if some fraction leaks from the storage forma- In the first scenario, injection well failures
tion to the atmosphere. With regard to global or leakage up abandoned wells could create
risks, based on observations and analysis of a sudden and rapid release of CO2. This type
current CO2 storage sites, natural systems, of release is likely to be detected quickly and
engineering systems and models, the fraction stopped using techniques that are available
retained in appropriately selected and man- today for containing well blowouts. Hazards
aged reservoirs is very likely („Very likely” associated with this type of release primarily
is a probability of 90 to 99%) to exceed 99% affect workers in the vicinity of the release
over 100 years, and is likely to exceed 99% at the time it occurs, or those called in to
over 1000 years. Similar fractions retained are control the blowout. Containing these kinds
likely for even longer periods of time, as the of releases may take hours to days and the
risk of leakage is expected to decrease over overall amount of CO2 released is likely to
time as other mechanisms provide additional be very small compared to the total amount
trapping. In addition, if CO2 leaks out of a injected. These types of hazards are managed
storage formation, local hazards may exist for effectively on a regular basis in the oil and gas
humans, ecosystems and groundwater. industry using engineering and administrative
Local risks include: public/workforce controls. In the second scenario, leakage could
safety, environmental impacts, impacts to occur through undetected faults, fractures or
water, oil, gas or other resources, assets, through leaking wells where the release to
ground displacement/induced seismicity. The the surface is more gradual and diffuse. In
elevated concentrations of CO2 could lead this case, hazards primarily affect drinking-
to health effects to human and animals and water aquifers and ecosystems where CO2
negatively influences the ecosystems. These accumulates in the zone between the surface
effects depend on the concentration and dura- and the top of the water table. Groundwater
tion of exposure time (Benson et al., 2002). can be affected both by CO2 leaking directly
into an aquifer and by brines that enter the
344
aquifer as a result of being displaced by CO2 Leakage Rate

during the injection process. There may also
be acidification of soils and displacement of A maximum leakage rate of approximately
oxygen in soils in this scenario. Additionally, 0.001 to 0.01% per year of stored CO2 per
if leakage to the atmosphere were to occur in annum has been suggested as being accept-
low-lying areas with little wind, or in sumps able. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
and basements overlying these diffuse leaks, Change (IPCC) assessed 0.001% per year as
humans and animals would be harmed if a likely for well-designed storage; this leakage
leak were to go undetected. Humans would be rate was the benchmark for the risk assessment.
less affected by leakage from offshore storage Also, it has been proposed that leakage rates of
locations than from onshore storage locations. 0.01% per year be established as a performance
requirement for geologically sequestered CO2
Health and Ecological Effects (White et al., 2003). A leakage rate of 0.01%
per year would ensure that 90% of the CO2
Humans, flora and fauna experience virtually would remain underground over a 1000 year
no adverse effects when exposed to concentra- time period. Leakage rates of less than 0.1%
tions of CO2 below 1% (10,000 ppm). Car- per year to the atmosphere are needed to
bon dioxide can pose adverse health effects ensure effective climate abatement by CCS.
for humans when exposure concentrations Leakage rates of more than 1% per year are
are elevated. When humans are exposed to unacceptable (Benson & Hepple, 2005).
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 between
3% and 5%, they experience respiratory rate Leakage Pathways
increase, and physical discomfort such as
headache and dizziness may occur. When A key component of a risk assessment is
the CO2 concentration is above 5%, physi- identifying potential leakage pathways. The
cal and mental capacities are impaired, and injected CO2 could migrate upwards if (1) CO2
loss of consciousness can occur. Exposure to gas pressure exceeds capillary pressure and
more than 10% CO2 can result in rapid loss of passes through silstone, (2) free CO2 leaks
consciousness, possible coma, or death. Gen- from silstone into upper aquifer up fault, (3)
erally, a concentration of CO2 greater than 7 CO2 escapes through “gap” in cap rock into
to 10% in air would cause immediate dangers higher aquifer, (4) injected CO2 migrates up
to human life and health. Plants, insects, and dip, increases reservoir pressure and perme-
soil organisms have a higher tolerance than ability of fault, (5) CO2 escapes via poorly
humans to elevated CO2 concentrations. In plugged new or old abandoned wells, (6)
general, only a few microbes, invertebrates, natural flow dissolves CO2 at CO2/water in-
insects and fungi can survive in CO2 concen- terface and transports it out of closure and (7)
trations in excess of 20% (Benson et al., 2002; dissolved CO2 escape to atmosphere or ocean.
Vendrig et al., 2003).
345
Remedial Measures injection wells for ensuring worker safety and

to detect leakage. Surface-based techniques
Once leakages are detected, some remedia- may also be used for detecting and quantifying
tion techniques are available to stop or control surface releases. High-quality baseline data
them. Depending on the type of leakage, these improve the reliability and resolution of all
techniques could involve standard well repair measurements and will be essential for detect-
techniques or the extraction of CO2 by inter- ing small rates of leakage. Since all of these
cepting its leak into a shallow groundwater monitoring techniques have been adapted from
aquifer. Techniques to remove CO2 from soils other applications, they need to be tested and
and groundwater are also available, but they assessed with regard to reliability, resolution
are likely to be costly. Experience will be and sensitivity in the context of geological
needed to demonstrate the effectiveness and storage. All of the existing industrial-scale
ascertain the costs, of these techniques for projects and pilot projects have programmers
use in CO2 storage. to develop and test these and other monitoring
techniques. Given the long-term nature of CO2
Monitoring and Verification
storage, site monitoring may be required for
very long periods.
Monitoring is a very important part of the
Le Guen et al. (2008 & 2009) proposed a
overall risk management strategy for geo-
quantitive performance and risk assessment
logical storage projects. It is essential in as-
methodology associated with well integrity
sessing whether injected CO2 is behaving as
within CO2 geological storage and applied it
expected, whether any migration or leakage
to a synthetic case based on an existing well.
occurs, and whether any identified leakage is
The methodology is based on a systematic
damaging the environment or human health.
and functional approach. The concept of the
Standard procedures or protocols have not
function of each well component with re-
been developed yet but they are expected to
spect to the zonal isolation and their failure
evolve as technology improves, depending
modes is central to the performance and risk
on local risks and regulations. However, it is
analysis. The methodology gathers different
expected that some parameters such as injec-
steps to go through for risk quantification and
tion rate and injection well pressure will be
for recommending risk mitigation actions to
measured routinely. Repeated seismic surveys
ensure the well integrity performance (Table
have been shown to be useful for tracking
4). The main steps are: (1) data collection and
the underground migration of CO2. Newer
interpretation, (2) static model of the well, (3)
techniques such as gravity and electrical
dynamic model, (4) consequence grid, (5) risk
measurements may also be useful. The sam-
mapping, and (6) recommendation.
pling of groundwater and the soil between
In the first step, all relevant data are col-
the surface and water table may be useful for
lected (source: drilling and cementing reports,
directly detecting CO2 leakage. Carbon diox-
cement and corrosion logs, well comple-
ide sensors with alarms can be located at the
346
Table 4. Risk matrix dedicated to well integrity
Frequency level
Risk=Probability x Severity 1 2 3 4 5 6
Probability
Loss of injected CO2
Severity levels ≤0,00001 ≤0,0001 ≤0,001 ≤0,01 ≤0,1 ≤0,1
over 1000 years
1 Minor ≤0,05% 1 2 2 3 3 4
2 Low ≤0,01% 2 2 3 3 4 4
3 Serious ≤0,25% 2 3 3 4 4 5
4 Major ≤0,5% 3 3 4 4 5 5
5 Critical ≤0,1% 3 4 4 5 5 6
6 Extreme >1% 4 4 5 5 6 6
tion design documents, production history, degradation, casing corrosion due to CO2)
workover reports, geological profile etc.), and associated kinetics to the static model.
checked and interpreted in order to make the Such kinetics comes from the mechanical
well description (well trajectory, completion and chemical interactions between geological
details) and the characteristics of its compo- formations, the different fluids (brines, CO2
nents (metallurgy of tubulars and packers, etc.) and the well components (cement, casing
cement composition and properties). After steel etc.). The lack of knowledge on “exact”
data collection and interpretation, a func- in situ conditions and long term effect are
tional analysis and a static model of the well considered by studying the impact of these
are performed. The physical environment of parameters on the CO2 migration along the
the well (geology) is also included in the de- wellbore through a sensitivity study. Boundary
scription of the overall system because it can (initial and limit) conditions (hydrostatic and
interact with the well components and have reservoir pressure, temperature, flow/no flow
a negative impact on hydraulic isolation. It conditions etc) are based on the geological
encompasses: (1) specific formations located environment of a well).
above the CO2 reservoir and the cap rock, (2) A “scenario” approach is then introduced
subsurface fluids, (3) shallow subsurface or to account for uncertain parameters. To build
soils, (4) sea floor and sea water in case of a scenario, system parameters are set to a
an offshore well, (5) surface in case of an on- given value within defined ranges. There-
shore well, and (6) atmosphere. Uncertainties fore, each scenario corresponds to a possible
about well components integrity are assessed state of the system. The probability of the
and interpreted in terms of ranges of values scenario depends on the probability of each
distributed according to probabilistic lows. parameter to be equal to the selected value.
After static model of the well has been Then all identified and relevant scenarios
performed, a dynamic model is built by (in this case 1296 possible failure scenarios
combining degradations phenomena (cement were studied) are simulated in order to quan-
347
tify the CO2 migration along the wellbore the cap rock have to maintain sufficient integ-
over a time period. The key outputs for each rity over a long time period. The expectation
scenario are (Le Guen et al., 2009): (1) the is that appropriately selected and managed
CO2 mass leakage towards a sensitive zone storage sites will retain the injected CO2
(surface, aquifer(s) etc) vs. time and (2) the for thousands of years, and that leaks to the
associated CO2 leakage pathways along the atmosphere are unlikely. For the purposes of
wellbore. Carbon dioxide mass that escapes risk assessment, a priority is to evaluate what
out reservoir along the wellbore is then con- would happen if CO2 migrated unexpectedly
verted into a severity level by assessing the through the confining unit(s), potentially
impact vs. a set of specific stakes relevant to resulting in undesirable impacts on a variety
the project (health, safety, performance of the of potential receptors e.g. human populations,
confinement, financial). ecosystems, groundwater or other resources,
This connection is ensured by using a and relevant aspects of the wider environment.
consequence grid initially defined with the Among the major risks identified to CO2
stakeholders involved in the CO2 storage geological storage, wells are often considered
project. The consequence grid enables to link to be the weakest spots with respect to CO2
the result of simulations to severity levels via confinement in the injection zone. Because of
the criteria defined by the stakeholders. By that, well integrity considerations should be
crossing both severity and probability of each present during all phases of well life including
scenario, a risk level can be estimated. Once design phase, drilling, completion, injection,
all risk levels are quantified, they populate workover (service) and abandonment. Both
a risk matrix. Severities higher than 5 and existing and new wells must be fully evalu-
criticality values (frequency level + sever- ated and tested for integrity because there are
ity level) higher than 8 are not considered many different possible leakage pathways.
acceptable. Black line presents possible the It is necessary to examine the condition of
Risk Acceptance Limit. the casing and the cement and identify any
annuli or defects that exist within the well.
There is no one tool or method capable of
CONCLUSION looking at all of these features at the same
time, so a suite of measurements must be
Facilities for the geological storage of carbon
run to analyze the integrity of a well. These
dioxide (CO2) have to be designed to prevent
measurements can be acquired using wireline
any leakage back to the surface. However, it
tools such as caliper and ultrasonic tools to
is important to be able to assess the conse-
measure the integrity of the casing, sonic and
quences of any leakage in the unlikely event
ultrasonic tools to measure the integrity of the
that it should occur. In order to have the safe
well cement, and tools to sample the casing,
underground storage of carbon, the injection
cement, formation, and formation fluid. The
wells as well as any well penetrating through
348
choice of well equipment and materials must the use of acid resistant cement is highly
be carefully considered to achieve the desired recommended. Monitoring is essential in as-
integrity. CO2 corrosion may be limited by: sessing whether injected CO2 is behaving as
the selection of high alloy chromium steels, expected, whether any migration or leakage
resistant to corrosion, and by inhibitor injec- occurs, and whether any identified leakage is
tion, if using carbon steel casing. In addition, damaging the environment or human health.
349
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Risk: The product of the likelihood (prob-
CO2 Leakage: Migration of injected CO2 ability) and the consequence (impact) of a
from injection zone through wells, faults or specified hazard (event) being realized; refers
cap rock. to the vulnerability, proximity or exposure
Geologic CO2 Storage: Storage of CO2 in to hazards, which affects the likelihood of
subsurface formations for a long term. adverse impact.
Hazard: A potentially damaging physical Risk Assessment: The overall process
event, phenomenon or human activity that of risk identification, risk analysis and risk
may cause the loss of life or injury, property evaluation.
damage, social and economic disruption or Storage Site: A defined volume within a
environmental degradation. geological formation used for the geological
Injection Well Mechanical Integrity: storage of CO2 and associated surface and
There is no significant leak in the casing, tub- injection facilities.
ing, or packer (internal MI) and no significant
357
358
Chapter 16
Petroleum Industry
Environmental
Performance and Risk
Lidia Hrncevic
ABSTRACT
The petroleum industry holds long- and short-term environmental risks. Besides production
fluids, all petroleum industry activities involve either use of fluids, which contain abundant
substances, or waste generation, both associated with potential risk to the environment. The
principal environmental risk associated with the petroleum industry is the risk of fluid spill/
emission to the environment. Although in recent decades the risk analysis methodologies have
matured, to date there is still no universally accepted methodology for environmental risk as-
sessment in petroleum industry. In this chapter, the petroleum industry’s environmental incident
history and statistics are presented. The environmental impact of the petroleum industry’s ac-
tivities, its extent, and trends are analyzed. The overview of pollution sources with associated
environmental risk is given along with the analysis of the causes and consequences of incidents
in the petroleum industry.
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4777-0.ch016
Petroleum Industry Environmental Performance and Risk
INTRODUCTION (1999) defines the risk as the “probability of

loss” including the hazard and the concepts
All petroleum industry’s activities hold the of vulnerability and exposure (Olita et. al.,
potential for a variety of impacts on the en- 2012) where vulnerability is a measure of
vironment’s components: soil, water, air and the sensitivity of a specific ecosystem to a
consequently all living species. Since different given hazard.
activities in different ecosystems and condi- Petroleum industry poses a long and short-
tions may result in significant variations in the term environmental risk. Besides production
extend of a potential impact, the potential for fluids, that pose significant environmental
oil and gas operations to cause environmental risk (if found uncontested in environment),
impact has to be addressed on a case- by- all petroleum industry activities (oil and gas
case basis. The assessment of the potential exploration, production, processing, storage
impacts and resulting mitigation measures is and transportation) involve either use of flu-
commonly carried out through Environmental ids, that contain abundant and diverse toxic
Impact Assessment Study (EIA). Estimation chemicals, or waste generation, all associated
and quantification of the probability of an with a potential risk to the environment. The
unwanted consequence of a particular activ- imperative of contemporary petroleum in-
ity’s impact on the environment in a specific dustry practice is to understand those risks,
time period (the environmental risk) is done evaluate it and quantify, in order to use the
by Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA). best available technical and technological
The environmental risk assessment is based solutions to design facilities and/or processes
on calculating the probability for an ecosys- to prevent or mitigate it.
tem to come to contact or to receive a dose The principal environmental risk associ-
of pollutant. Though the first application of ated with petroleum industry is primary seen
risk analysis to petroleum industry was done as the risk of fluid (production, operating
in 1960 by Caryson (Yanting & Liyun, 2011), or waste) spill, discharge or emission to the
environmental risk is a relatively recent con- environment. An important part of protecting
cept, which has quickly become an important the environment, and thus minimizing the
consideration in environmental assessment of risk, is ensuring that there are as few spills,
the new projects, facility and process design discharges or emissions as possible. Along
and overall petroleum sector management. with the mentioned best available techniques
A number of definitions of environmental and technologies applied to control the risk,
risk have been proposed. Most commonly other, indirect, risk restrictive clauses are the
environmental risk is defined as the product introduction of new and strict regulations, both
of the probability (or frequency) and con- on national and international level resulting
sequence (Weiner & Matthews, 2003). The with high fines, stringent operating codes and
consequences are adverse effects on different high costs of cleanup/restoration processes (20
components of the environment. Crichton – 200 $/l of spilled oil depending on type of
359
oil and location (Fingas, 2001). Even though Recently it has become a common practice
petroleum industry’s incidents, resulting with by several authors to use modeling tools to
large releases of fluids, rarely occur, they study oil trajectories for planning or oil spill
attract particular public and media attention hazard estimates purposes.
resulting with global awareness of the risks and In order to quantify the environmental risk
consequences they cause to the environment, form either a specific facility or process or
so it is important to identify the sources, size from a complete oil/ gas field, a number of
and the frequency of these releases. steps are required. These are (Dumitran &
Although in recent decades the risk analy- Onutu, 2010, Woods et. al., 1991):
sis methodologies have matured and there is
already a range of methods of risk assessment 1. Characterization of the main sources of
with different focus, advantages and disadvan- the adverse impacts on the environment
tages, to the date there is still no universally (facilities and activities);
accepted methodology for environmental risk 2. Identification of cases which may lead
assessment in petroleum industry. If there is to adverse impacts on the environment
an adequate data base of previous identical or (pollution causes);
similar events, environmental risk assessment 3. Identification of the types of substances
of petroleum industry activities is commonly that may cause adverse impacts on the
done by the analysis of former reported spill environment (pollutants);
data for a specific area. However, if there are 4. Estimation of the frequency of the cases
no sufficient or available data to determine which may lead to adverse impacts on
the extents of risks, some of analytical meth- the environment;
ods for accidental risk are used (Table 1). In 5. Scenarios for the exposure to the pollut-
1975 the Department of Interior (DOI) of the ant (receptors submitted to risk and spill
United States of America (USA) developed consequences);
the OSRA (Oil Spill Risk Analysis) model. 6. Quantification of the impact on the en-
This model is used for the analysis of possible vironment (environmental risk).
oil spill impact from offshore oil and gas
operations (Price et. al. 2003). On basis of In this chapter the petroleum industry’s
historical spill patterns, meteorological (wind environmental incidents history and statistics
intensity) and oceanographic (ocean currents) will be presented. Also the environmental
data the model enables estimations of oil spill impacts of petroleum industry’s activities,
occurrence probability and probability of oil its extend and trends will be analyzed. The
slick contact with biological and economic overview of pollution sources with associated
resources in outer continental shelf of the environmental risk will be given along with
USA. It is not designed for use in “real time”. the analysis of the causes and consequences
The OSRA model summarizes the results of incidents in petroleum industry.
of thousands of spill trajectory simulations.
360
Table 1. Risk analysis methods for accident risk (Andersen & Mostue, 2012)
Method Type Description

Quantification of technical reliability,
FMEA/FMECA, PDS Technical reliability analysis
Input to quantitative risk analysis
FTA, ETA, Consequence Identification of effects of accident loads by the use of
Consequence analysis
and escalation models models of physical phenomena
Identification and analysis of hazards based on quantita-
QRA/TRA Quantitative risk analysis
tive data
Human factor methods for analysis of human actions
HTA Task analysis and decisions.
Basis for human reliability analysis
Quantification of the probability of human errors in
HRA Human reliability analysis work process.
Input to quantitative risk analysis
Analysis of the effect of organizational and management
BORA Organizational risk analysis
factors in relation to quantitative risk analysis
MANAGER, MA-
CHINE, SAM, I- RISK, Identification and analysis of possible unwanted events;
Qualitative risk analysis
ORIM OMT, WPAM, qualitative assessment
PHA
SWIFT, HAZOP, HA-
ZID, JSA, FAM, STAMP
Systemic model based analysis Analysis of the resilience of socio- technical systems
based risk analysis or
hazard analysis
Verification and validation of human, technical and
CRIOP Verification analysis
organizational conditions
Legend: FMEA- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FMECA: Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis
PDS: Reliability and Availability of Computer based Safety System
FTA: Fault Tree Analysis
ETA: Event Tree Analysis
QRA: Quantitative Risk Analysis
TRA: Total Risk Analysis
HTA: Hierarchical Task Analysis
HRA: Human Reliability Analysis
BORA: Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis
MANAGER: Management Safety Systems Assessment Guidelines in the Evaluation of Risk
MACHINE: Model of Accident Causation using Hierarchical Influence Network
SAM: System- Action- Management
I-RISK: Integrated Risk
ORIM: Organizational Risk Influence Model
OMT: A model for quantifying barrier performance related to major risk hazards
WPAM: Work Process Analysis Model
PHA: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
SWIFT: Structured What If Technique
HAZOP: Hazard and Operability Analysis
HAZID: Hazard Identification
JSA: Job Safety Analysis
FRAM: Function Resonance Analysis Method
STAMP: System Theoretic Accident Model and Process
CRIOP: Crisis Intervention in Offshore Production
361
OIL SPILL TRENDS ers Pollution Federation (ITOPF) oil spills are
generally divided by size into three categories:
Looking back in the past, recorded environ- spills less than 7 tonnes, 7 – 700 tonnes and
mental accidents that happened during petro- spills greater than 700 tonnes (www.itopf.
leum industry’s activities are primarily asso- com, 2013).
ciated with crude oil or petroleum products Even with the best practices applied,
inland or, more frequent, offshore spills. An with the significant use of oil and petroleum
“oil spill” as such is defined as discrete event products in everyday life, frequent occurrence
in which oil is discharged though neglect, by of oil/petroleum products spills of different
accident or with intent over a relatively short proportion, ranging from few liters to several
time. It does not include an event in which oil thousands of tonnes, can be henceforth ex-
leaks slowly over a long period of time, nor pected. The ten worst oil spills, in terms of the
does it include operational spillage allowed volume spilled, that happened to the date are
by international or national regulations or that shown in Table 2. Most of the spills are rela-
occur over a relatively long period of time tively small and cause localized impacts, but
(such as >5 ppm oil discharge in refinery occasionally large spills occur and cause tre-
effluents) even if those discharges violate mendous environmental and socioeconomic
pollution regulations (Schmidt Etkin, 2001). damages. The damage caused by an oil spill is
According to The International Tanker Own-
Table 2. Ten worst oil spills (http://earth.tryse.net//oilspill.html; 2013)
Oil spilled
Oil spill Date Location Type Cause
(103 t)
21. Jan 1991 –May
Gulf War oil spill 546 -1 500 Persian Gulf Oil wells War
1991
BP Deepwater 20 Apr 2010 – 15
400 – 700 Gulf of Mexico Oil wells Blowout
Horizon Jul 2010
3 Jun 1979 – 23 Mar Drilling error,
Ixtoc I oil well 454 – 480 Gulf of Mexico Exploratory oil well
1980 blowout
19 Jun 1979 – 2 Aug
Atlantic Empress 276 – 287 Trinidad & Tobago Oil tanker Ship collision
1979
Fergana Valley 2 Mar 1992 – May
259 – 285 Uzbekistan Oil well Blowout
oil spill 1992
700 nautical miles Explosion, fire,
ABT Summer 260 28 May 1991 Oil tanker
off Angola sank
4 Feb 1983 – May War, tanker – plat-
Nowruz oil field 250 – 260 Persian Gulf Oil well
1985 form collision
Saldanha Bay South
Castillo de Bellver 254 5 Aug 1983 Oil tanker Fire, broke in two
Africa
Portsall Rocks, Brit- Ran around in bad
Amoco Cadiz 223 – 229 16 Mar 1978 Oil tanker
tany, France weather
Chevron Texaco Waste product
165 – 171 1972 – June 1992 Ecuadorian Amazon Drilling operations
Amazon oil spill dumping
362
not necessarily proportional to spill size. The tanker Sea Star (1972, Oman), the tanker
location itself and the type of oil spilled play Metula (Chile, 1974), the tanker Jakob Maersk
the crucial role in determining the degree of (1975, Portugal), the tanker Urquiola (1976,
environmental and socioeconomic damage. Spain), the tanker Hawaiian Patriot (1977,
Naturally, the bigger the accident, namely Hawaii), the tanker Amoco Cadiz (1978,
the greater amount of oil spilled, the bigger France), the tanker Atlantic Empress (1979,
public attention, the greater impact, but also Trinidad & Tobago), the tanker Indepen-
the greater data base of the event. denta (1979, Turkey), the tanker Castillo de
As already mentioned, most of the spills Bellver (1983, South Africa), the tanker Od-
are relatively small (72% of the spills are 0.003 yssey (1988, Canada), the tanker Exxon
to 0.03 tonnes or less) with the share of 0.4% Valdez (1989, Alaska), the tanker ABT Sum-
in total spillage. The largest spills make 0.1% mer (1999, Angola), the tanker Sea Empress
of the incidents but involve 60% of the total (1996, UK), the tanker Prestige (2002, Spain),
amount spilled (Fingas, 2011). Most of the the tanker Hebei Spirit (2007, Republic of
largest oil spills have been related to oil trans- Korea) etc. Perhaps the most significant, in
portation by tankers (marine environment) or terms of having the biggest impact on passage
pipelines (inland and marine environment). of oil spill prevention and liability legislation
Tanker oil spills dominated the global oil spill and international conventions, was the tanker
stage until 1990s when large pipeline and oil spill Exxon Valdez, which happened in
facility spills occurred. In period from 1970 Prince William Sound, Alaska on March 24th
to 2012 almost 6 million tonnes (5.75×106 t) 1998.
of oil was spilled in tanker accidents all over Oil spill occurrences and the total amount
the world (www.itopf.com, 2013). The of oil spilled have decreased significantly
tanker accident that for the first time turned over the last 30 years, especially last decade,
the public eye to the problem of oil spill pol- even though there was increase in both marine
lution on an international level was the Torey (tanker) and pipeline transportation of oil
Canyon tanker accident that happened near and petroleum products. The average number
the Scilly Isles off the western coast of the of worldwide large oil spills (>700 tonnes)
United Kingdom in 1967 (119×103 t of oil records considerable decrease from 1970s,
spilled (www.itopf.com, 2013). The Torrey with average of 25 spills per year, to just 3.7
Canyon spill was not the first oil tanker spill, spills per year nowadays (Psarros et. al., 2011).
but it was the biggest spill to the date and the Considering the global oil spillage rates the
environmental damage caused by the spill decrease was from about 635×103 t/yr in 1960s
was even more magnified by the application and 1970s to about 300×103 t/yr nowadays
of inadequate and toxic cleanup methods (Fingas, 2011). Consistent with the reduction
(inadequate sinking agents and toxic first- in the number and volume of worldwide oil
generation dispersants). Since 1967 there was spills, the number and volume of tanker oil
a number of significant tanker oil spills- the spills also show a remarkable reduction. The
363
Figure 1. Number of large tanker oil spills in period 1970 - 2012 (www.itopf.com, 2013)
biggest reduction was observed from 1970s tion covering the pollution of the marine
to the 1980s. The number of average annual environment by ships from operational and
large tanker oil spills (>700 t) decreased from accidental causes (www.imo.org, 2013). It
24.6 spills per year in the 1970s to only 3.3 currently contains six technical Annexes.
spills per year in the 2000s (Figure 1) and the Annex I covers the regulations for the preven-
quantities of oil spilled in tanker accidents tion of pollution by oil. The 1992 amendments
decreased from about 320×103 t/yr in 1970s to Annex I made it mandatory for all new oil
to only about 21×103 t/yr in 2000s (www. tankers to have double hulls and brought in a
itopf.com, 2013). phase- in schedule for existing tankers to fit
There are several reasons that influenced double hulls (www.imo.org, 2013). MARPOL
the decrease of the global oil spill trends. The contains a set of prescriptive technical and
adoption of The International Convention for operational regulations, but there is also an
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, opening for acceptance of alternative design
modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL of tankers (regulation 13F(5) of Annex I)
73/78), as response to a spate of tanker ac- (Vanem et. al., 2008). Some of other reasons
cidents in 1976 – 1977, being the most im- of the decrease of the global oil spill trends
portant one. MARPOL (short from “Marine are the increase of cleanup costs and environ-
Pollution”) is the main international conven- mental damage liability.
364
Spill statistics are collected by a number of the type of a facility or a stage in petroleum’s
organizations and agencies both on national “life cycle”, pose a potential source of pollu-
and international scale around the world. The tion. Their role as a potential pollution source
data collected on an international level have is even more amplified if all working fluids
to be taken with certain precaution due to and solids used, as well as associated wastes
different reporting practices, particularly in generated, are considered. Along with the
minimum spill amounts/volumes that must be environmental changes, these activities also
reported, between different jurisdictions and induce social, cultural and economic changes.
organizations. The accuracy of it is particu- The principal environmental risk associ-
larly questionable for spills from particular ated with petroleum industry is primarily
remote regions, small size spills and spills seen as the risk of pollutant spill, discharge
from non- vessel sources. Also, comparing oil or emission to the environment. Beside dan-
spill statistics from different databases can be ger of accidental spills and leaks, oil and
misleading because different data collecting gas exploration and production also hold a
methods are used. In most of the cases of oil potential of blowouts. A substance is con-
spill the most difficult fact to determine or sidered a pollutant if it has perceived to have
estimate is the volume of oil spilled, unless an adverse impact on the components of the
it is a case of a vessel or tank storage oil spill environment. The pollutants occur in form
in which the exact volume of oil is know even of liquid, solid, gaseous, aerosol and noise
before the accident. discharges and emissions.
The spill history data are used to generate
statistics to estimate the average spill size in Sources of Pollution in
Petroleum Industry
specific conditions for a specific area. In order
to discern trends and devise spill scenarios,
During oil and gas exploration and produc-
with the final goal to identify and rank high-
tion there are several pollutants that pose a
risk areas, besides historical spill data the data
real threat to the environment, either through
on potential spill sources have to be complied.
accidental, intentional or permitted release.
These are (The E&P Forum, UNEP, 1997;
SOURCES AND CAUSES Rana, 2008):
OF POLLUTION IN
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1. Drilling fluids (muds), cuttings and well
treatment chemicals;
All petroleum industry’s activities (explo- 2. Produced water;
ration, production, processing, storage, 3. Process, cooling, wash and drainage
transportation and refining) with its related water;
facilities and processes, due to the fact that 4. Emissions of adverse gases;
they primarily involve dealing with highly 5. Produced hydrocarbons (oil and gas);
environmentally damageable substance- oil, 6. Sewerage, sanitary and domestic wastes.
gas or petroleum products, depending upon
365
The type and the volume of the pollutant ous specific functional characteristics. In view
depend on the stage of the exploration and to their potential environmental impact due
production process. In the early phases of ex- to their composition the water-based drilling
ploration (aerial surveys and seismic surveys) fluids are least toxic, with toxicity rising from
all the activities are temporary and short-term synthetic-based fluids to oil-based fluids.
in the environment. Principal pollutants during On their way back from the well, after their
seismic operations are noise and waste, which usage, drilling fluids contain certain amount of
are small in volume and mainly associated borehole cuttings. The volume of this drilling
with camp activities. waste ranges from 1,000 – 5,000 m3 per well
Drilling operations usually last from few (Rana, 2008). After separating cuttings from
weeks (exploratory drilling) to one to several drilling fluid, the fluid is used again, and the
months depending on situation. The main pol- cuttings, as solid drilling waste, are treated
lutants during drilling operations are drilling in appropriate way. After the treatment, on
fluids (muds) and borehole cuttings. Besides land they are usually deposited by burial in
air and water, and air/water, air/polymer pits or by land spreading, and during offshore
combinations, there are basically three types activities cuttings are usually discharged to the
of drilling fluids used in drilling operations: water body. Drilling cuttings have a complex
water-based drilling fluid, oil-based drill- composition depending, among other factors,
ing fluid and synthetic-based drilling fluid. mainly on type of rocks drilled, drilling re-
Among the three, water- based drilling fluids gime, composition of drilling fluid used and
are most frequently used due to their inexpen- drilling fluid-cuttings separation technology.
siveness and simple composition. Its main Drilling muds may enter the environment
components are clay (usually bentonite) and by being directly discharged into a body of
water, which make this kind of drilling fluid, water (usually water-based muds in case of
compared with other two, also the most en- offshore drilling), seeping into groundwater
vironmental friendly one. Oil-based drilling or surface water from land-based impound-
fluids are primarily composed of diesel oil ments, accidental release from onshore or
while the base fluid of synthetic-based mud offshore holding facilities (Rana, 2008). If
is synthetic oil. All drilling fluids, beside their found uncontained in the environment, drill-
main components, contain certain additives ing fluids will primarily have impact on water
(weighting agents as barium sulfate (barite), and terrestrial ecosystems. Ocean discharges
calcium carbonate (chalk) or hematite, poly- of water-based muds and drilling cuttings
mers, oxygen, scavengers, various thickeners affect species diversity (primarily benthic
e.g. xanthan gum, guar gum, glycol, carboxy- organisms) up to 100 m, and oil- based muds
methylcellulose, polyanionic cellulose (PAC), and cuttings up to 800 m from the discharge
then, deflocculants, lubricants, shale inhibi- point (The E&P Forum, UNEP, 1997).
tors, fluid loss additives, biocides, surfactants, Produced water (brine) is the main type of
emulsifying agents, etc.) which provide vari- waste resulting from production operations.
366
Its main constituents are inorganic salts (min- 1. Combustion emissions which include
eralization of produced water may reach up combustion of fuels in energetic units
to 300 g/l (Rana, 2008), heavy metals, solids, (internal combustion engines, turbines,
production chemicals (corrosion inhibitors, generators, pumps, heaters etc.) and
descalers, biocides, dispersants, emulsion constant or periodical flaring (burning
breakers, acids etc.), hydrocarbons (oil, gas, of associated gas and excessive amounts
benzene, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons- of hydrocarbons during start-up, produc-
PAHs) and occasionally radionuclides (natu- tion, maintains, well testing or upset in
rally occurring radioactive material, NORM). normal processing operation, as well
The volume of produced water depends upon as burning of gas from storage tanks
the type of production (oil or gas production), and pressure controlling equipment).
type of production formation and type of pro- In spite the fact that some countries
duction methods applied (primary, secondary prohibit flaring of oil associated gases
or tertiary production method) and it varies it remains the main source of emissions
throughout a lifetime of a production fields in the upstream activities of petroleum
(usually low at the beginning of the produc- industry. The combustion emissions
tion with the increase in volume towards the comprise mainly of carbon dioxide (CO2)
end of field life). Industry practice is to treat with certain amounts of nitrous oxide
produced water and then dispose it by rein- (N2O), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile
jection back into the reservoir. In some cases, organic compounds (VOC), polycyclic
after the treatment, produced water is directly organic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and sulfur
released to surface water body. In case of spill, compounds (carbon disulfide (CS2) and
leakage or blowout untreated produced waters, carbonyl sulfide (COS).
due to their hydrocarbon and salt content, pose 2. Venting emissions, which include
a threat to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems releases of gas through vents due to
(principally soil and surface and underground operational or security reasons. These
water). The primary environmental impact of are principally methane (CH 4) and
other aqueous wastes, such as process, cool- carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions with
ing, wash and drainage water, is also on soil small quantities of non-methane volatile
and surface and underground water. organic compounds (NMVOC), sulfur
Emissions of adverse gases occur in dif- oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).
ferent ranges at all stages of all petroleum The main sources of venting emissions
industry activities. The main types of emis- are storage tanks, pumps and pressure
sions that take place in petroleum industry controlling equipment (if gas is not
are (Hrncevic, 2008): flared) i.e. all pressurized processing
equipment, but also some processes in
367
which this kind of emissions is a direct high potential of fluid spill or leak. Even
result of chemical transformations (gas though spills and leaks of all working fluids
dehydration process, sour gas treatment are possible, the majority of environmental
processes etc.) accidents in petroleum industry are caused by
3. Fugitive emissions include emissions, spills and leaks (or, in a case of exploration
mainly of methane (CH4) and other vola- and production, also blowouts) of hydrocar-
tile organic compounds, from pressurized bons (crude oil, gas and petroleum products).
equipment due to leaks through valves, Considering specific type of activity, most
pipe connections, mechanical seals, or of environmental accidents are related to
related equipment. Fugitive emissions accidental spills, leaks and blowouts during
also occur at evaporative sources such as production and transportation.
waste water treatment ponds and storage The most common causes of oil spills are
tanks. equipment failures, operational errors, mate-
rial failure, corrosion, weather-related events
The primary sources of petroleum industry (storms or floods), earthquakes, human errors
activities impact on air (atmosphere) are (The and recently terrorism. Pipe leaks are the most
E&P Forum, UNEP, 1997): common cause of spills representing 22% of
total causes with more than 65% of them being
1. Flaring, venting and purging gases; in petroleum sector (Rana, 2008).
2. Combustion processes; Drilling and production spills, as already
3. Fugitive gases; mentioned, if it is not a case of, previously
4. Airborne particulates (from burning mentioned working fluids leaks or spills, are
sources, vehicles and soil disturbance usually associated with unexpected blowouts
during construction operations). of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons from the
well. On average 7 out of every 1,000 ex-
The volumes of atmospheric emissions ploratory wells will result in blowout (Rana,
and their potential impact depend upon the 2008). In case of a well blowout environmental
nature of the process under consideration. The impact is expected on all components of the
primary environmental impact of the emis- environment.
sions is on air (atmosphere) with a potential In storage facilities the risk of crude oil/
through precipitates, after interactions with petroleum products spill or leak exists espe-
atmospheric components and solar radiation, cially during loading/offloading operations or
of secondary impact on soil and underground severe weather conditions. Since most of the
and surface water. oil storage tanks contain containment areas
around the tank, it is expected that most of the
Causes of Pollution in
Petroleum Industry spill will be retained. Principal environmental
impact of crude oil/petroleum products storage
All petroleum industry activities are, apart tanks both, during normal activities or in a
from emissions, also characterized by the case of a spill (if there is a containment around
368
the tank), is on air (during normal activities and surface and underground water, while, in
there are venting emissions and during the spill case of gas pipeline failure, most significant
there are emissions of spilled fluid due to its impact is on air (atmosphere). Gas pipeline
volatility). If there is no containment around failures, compared to oil pipelines, pose an
the storage tank, during crude oil/ petroleum additional risk to the environment because
product spill or leak from the tank, environ- of the hazardous nature of methane (CH4),
mental impact on organisms, soil, surface and which carries the risk of fire and explosion.
underground water and air is expected. Marine oil pipeline hold environmental impact
Oil is transported by a variety of means on ocean ecosystems.
within the production field, from the produc- There is general misconception that oil
tion field to refineries and further to final spills from tankers are the primary source
consumers. Transport of oil from the produc- of oil pollution in the marine environment,
tion site to the consumers can involve up to however these spills make up less than about
10 – 15 transfers between different modes of 5% of all oil entering marine environment
transportation such as pipelines, tank vessels (Fingas, 2001). Half of the oil pollution in
(tank ships, tank barges), tank trucks and rail- marine environment comes from land-based
cars, each potentially a source of oil spill or sources usually from waste water. Consider-
leak. Even though there was much of progress ing the volumes involved and frequencies
in technology of pipeline construction and of worldwide tanker transportation, tanker
utilization, pipeline failures are still the most accidents occur relatively rarely with varia-
common cause of oil spill/ leak in petroleum tions in number of such events and volumes
transportation sector. Depending on the cause of oil spilled differing from year to year. The
and nature of pipeline damage (crack, rupture main causes of big tanker accidents (> 700t)
or other), pipeline is either a source of small in period 1970 - 2012 are respectively: 33%
and long-term leakage or an abrupt blowout. grounding, 29% collision, 13% structural
The most common causes of pipeline spills failure (hull failure), 12% fire/explosion, 4%
are respectively: 81% corrosion, 7% third equipment failure and 9% of causes is unknown
party involvement, 6% mechanical failure, (www.itopf.com, 2013). There are several
4% natural hazards and 2% operational causes hazards identified that hold the potential risk
(www.concawe.eu, 2013). The potential spill of possible tanker accident. These are (Michel
volumes form pipelines are highly variable, et. al., 1994; Donovan & Owen, 1976):
depending on the pipeline diameter, flow rate,
distance between shut- off valves and type of 1. Areas of high currents or wave con-
control and leak detection system applied. ditions: Narrow channels with strong
Principal environmental impact of oil pipeline tidal currents, river-entrance bars, river
failures, regardless whether the pipeline is crossing and harbor entrances where
under - or above ground, is on organisms, soil tides, waves and river currents can
369
create conditions hazardous for tanker Spills from refining facilities are usually
operations. restricted to legal discharges of effluents. The
2. Congested traffic routes: Ports en- effluents consist of wastewater containing low
trances, narrow straits or bridges pose concentrations of diluted oil. The effluents are
increased risk of collision. generally discharges in rivers or coastal areas,
3. Draft constraints: The areas of de- depending on the location of the refinery. The
creased maneuverability for deep-draft exact environmental impact of the effluents is
vessels and shoaling zones indicate in- difficult to define, since refineries are usually
creased risk of spill due to groundings located in industrial zones characterized with
or collision. more than one environmental impact source,
4. Bottom substrate: Groundings are more but, due to high legislative restrictions, they
likely to result in a discharge in areas with are considered to be low and localized. The
rocky substrates than in softer substrates total amount and toxicity of aqueous effluent
such as sand or mud. discharges from oil refineries have decreased
5. Lightering: Some tankers, due to their over the last 40 years due to implementation
size or draft limitations, sometimes of improved technological solutions (air cool-
offload their cargo at sea or in anchorage. ing, recirculation of cooling water, improved
6. Seasonal considerations: Time of the wastewater treatment systems etc.) (Fingas,
year dictates weather conditions, water 2011).
surface conditions, sensitivity of a par- Since there is known volume of oil involved
ticular area, and sometimes the type of in spills from storage and transport facilities,
cargo carried. Three parameters have the best way to determine potential spill risk
been identified as being critical for tanker from these facilities is to determine the worst-
transportation. These are wind, fog and case discharge scenario. The worst- case
sea state, each of them occurring at dif- discharge scenario presumes that all of the
ferent levels of intensity and in different volume of fluid contained in storage facility
combinations. or transport mean is released into the environ-
Compared to marine transportation, the ment under adverse weather conditions.
potential spill volumes from road and railway Oil spills involve many types of oil ranging
oil transportation is relatively small. The data from different types of crude oil to variety of
on road and railway oil transportation are petroleum products. Beside its impact on the
rather difficult to obtain because of a large environment, the composition of oil also de-
number of transport companies, many possible termines its physical and chemical properties
traffic routes and poor information on types, (density, viscosity, surface tension, pour point,
frequencies and volumes of oil transported in flash point, solubility), which then influence
this was in general. In case of the spill, spills the behavior of oil in the environment and
from tank trucks often end up on pavements consequently the selection of remediation
and don’t directly impact soil and water bodies. methods. In order to classify crude oils petro-
370
leum industry often characterizes crude oils from 40 to 65 °C), less evaporative (up
according to their geographical origin (Saudi to 2/3 of the spill volume will evaporate),
Light Crude, West Texas Intermediate, Ven- with low to moderate viscosity (spread
ezuela crude etc.). Even though this is a com- rapidly into thin slicks) and moderate to
mon practice and a good way to distinguish high acute toxicity to biota (depending
different kinds of crude oil, because different upon type and concentration of aromatic
oils from different geographical locations will compounds in the water- soluble frac-
naturally have different and unique proper- tion). Their specific gravity is 0.8 to 0.85
ties, this kind of crude oil characterization (slick will float on water surface except
does not give the complete insight into fate under turbulent mixing conditions). In
and impacts if oil in case of an oil spill. That case of onshore spill this kind of oil will
is why crude oils are commonly divided into coat and penetrate substrate and causing
five general types (Michel et. al. 1994, http:// some subsurface pollution.
oilprice.com, 2013 Fingas, 2011): 3. Medium oils/ intermediate oil prod-
ucts: In this category are North Slope
1. Very light crude oils/very light oil crude, South Louisiana crude, intermedi-
products: In this category are gasoline, ate fuel oils, lube oils. These oils tend
light virgin naphtha, heavy virgin naph- to be moderately volatile (flash point
tha, petroleum ether, petroleum spirit > 52 °C), with low evaporation rates
and petroleum naphtha. These oils tend (1/3 of the spill volume will evaporate),
to be highly volatile and highly flam- moderate to high viscosity and variable
mable (flash point near 40 °C) with high acute toxicity to biota (dependent upon
evaporation rates (complete removal by amount of light fractions). Their specific
evaporation can be expected within few gravity is 0.85 – 0.9 (slick will float on
days), low viscosity (spread rapidly to water surface except under turbulent
a thin sheen) and high acute toxicity to mixing conditions). These types of oils
biota (due to high-water solubility and can form stable emulsions. In case of
ability to penetrate cellular membranes). onshore spill this kind of oil will coat
Their specific gravity is less than 0.8 and penetrate porous surfaces and caus-
(float on water). They don’t tend to adhere ing heavy subsurface pollution.
to surfaces. In case of onshore spill this 4. Heavy Crude Oils/residual oil prod-
kind of oil will penetrate porous surfaces ucts: In this category are Venezuela
and cause subsurface pollution. crude, San Joaquin Valley crude, heavy
2. Light crude oils/ medium (diesel- like) marine fuels and Bunker C. These oils
oil products: In this category are kero- tend to be slightly volatile (flash point
sene, jet fuels, marine diesel, West Texas > 65 °C), with very low evaporation
crude and Alberta crude. These oils tend rates, high viscosity (very viscous to
to be moderately volatile (flash point semi- solid) and low acute toxicity to
371
biota (due to low- water solubility). Their American Petroleum Institute’s (API) study
specific gravity is 0.95 to 1.0. These types from 2005 (“Potentially Polluting Wrecks in
of oils form stable emulsions. In case of Marine Waters” commissioned in association
onshore spill this kind of oil will slightly with IMO, US Coast Guard, USEPA, IPIECA,
penetrate substrate. Minerals Management Service and NOAA),
5. Very heavy residual products: Similar which covered tankers of at least 150 gross
properties as heavy crude oils/ residual registered tons (GRTS) carrying oil and non-
oil products expect their specific gravity tank vessels of at least 400 GRTS that carried
is >1.0 (will not flow on water surface). oil as fuel/bunkers, there are at least 8,569
recorded vessel sinkings worldwide of which
There are two types of potential oil spill 1,583 were tankers and 6,986 were non-tank
sources that, although they are generally out- vessels. It is estimated that these shipwrecks
side the realm of petroleum industry itself, contain 2.5 to 20.4×106 t of oil (Fingas, 2011).
have to be considered when analyzing oil Identification of potential sources of pol-
spills. These are natural oil seepages and seep- lution, their placement on maps with com-
ages from sunken shipwrecks. Oil seeps are bination of maps of the past spills is a good
natural springs from which liquid and gaseous practice to indentify and rank high- risk areas.
hydrocarbons leak out of sea bass or ground
into the environment. Some of the authors
consider natural oil seeps to be single most ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND
important source of oil entering the ocean. The
CONSEQUENCES OF OIL SPILL
estimated volumes of oil from natural seeps
are 0.2 to 6.0×106 t (Fingas, 2011). All the activities conducted in the environment
Sunken ships also act like natural seeps. tend to have some impact on the environment
Both of the sources release oil randomly in i.e. its components (air, soil, water and biodi-
relatively small amounts over a longer period versity). Environmental impact of petroleum
of time with occasional releases of larger industry activities ranges from very low to very
quantities that can have the same environ- high primarily depending on type of activity,
mental impacts as tanker oil spills, with the pollution prevention and control techniques
exception that most of the oil contained in applied and the sensitivity of the environment
sunken shipwreck’s reservoirs is heavy oil in which these activities are conducted. The
which would most likely form tar balls rather most widespread and dangerous consequence
than larger slicks. Another difference between of petroleum industry activities impacts is
natural oil seeps and these “artificial seeps” pollution. Pollution is, as already mentioned
is that in case of a shipwreck oil will not be previously, due to handling with adverse
necessarily discharged (depending on vessel substances, potentially associated with all
integrity and condition, age, depth, water the activities throughout all stages of oil and
temperatures and type of soil). According to gas production, form exploration to refining.
372
Environmental Impacts of vegetation ruination (causing possible erosion

Petroleum Industry and changes in surface hydrology), emis-
sions, vibrations and noise. Site preparation
During seismic operations the main sources of has significant footprint on the environment,
potential environmental impacts are seismic which affects all environments’ components
equipment, base camps and vessel activi- (humans, terrestrial, aquatic and atmospheric
ties. Principal impact of seismic equipment systems and biosphere) through removal of
is noise, which temporarily affects humans vegetation and surface soil, causing possible
and wildlife on the location. Base camps also erosion and changes in surface hydrology
pose a short-term impact by noise and light and drainage patterns, then loss of habitat,
on local environment (humans, biosphere noise, vibrations and emissions from used
and atmosphere). Base camps through their equipment, aesthetic visual intrusion and
activities leave a certain ecological footprint possible land use conflict. These impacts are
(vegetation is cleared leading to possible usually restricted to abidance of site prepara-
erosion and changes in surface hydrology, tion activities.
immigration of labour, waste creation and Main potential impacts during drilling op-
discharges, etc.) which in different ranges erations are discharges, emissions and waste
affects all components of the environment. production, which affect all environments’
Potential long-term impact from the camps components (humans, terrestrial, aquatic and
is through construction of new access routes. atmospheric systems and biosphere) through
Offshore seismic activities, beside noise noise, vibrations and emissions from transport,
from seismic equipment, which causes short- equipment used on drilling rig well test op-
term disturbances to marine organisms, also erations and flaring, liquid discharges (muds,
temporary impact the environment through wash and drainage water), disposal of solid
emissions (from vessel engines), discharges waste (drilling cuttings), spillages and leak-
(bilges, sewage, etc) and interference with ages, sanitary waste disposal and water supply
other resource users (e.g. fishery). requirement. As in case of site preparation
The main sources of environmental impacts activities, all these impact are restricted to
from drilling activities are access roads, site drilling period. Depending on location, drill-
preparation operations (drilling site prepara- ing operations usually also have significant
tion and camp construction), drilling and socio-economic and cultural impact due to
decommissioning. The environmental impact interactions with local population (immigra-
of using access roads is mainly short-term af- tion, impact on local infrastructure- employ-
fecting all the components of the environment ment, education, roads, services, hunting,
(humans, terrestrial, aquatic and atmospheric fishing etc).
systems and biosphere), however this impact Offshore drilling operations, due to dis-
can become permanent if new access roads charges to ocean (muds, cuttings, wash water,
are constructed. The impact is manifested as drainage and kitchen waste) and emissions,
373
cause changes in sediment, water and air and volume, weather and site conditions and
quality. Primary impact of these activities in different ecosystems. Spilled oil varies
is on benthic and pelagic organisms. These widely in its composition from crude oils
operations also cause interference with other to refine products. Once released into the
resource users (e.g. fishery). environment oil is subjected to numerous
After decommissioning, if it is conducted chances in composition, thus also changes
in a proper way, all the stated impact should of physical and chemical properties. This
be eliminated. Improper decommissioning is known as “weathering”. These changes
can result in soil and water pollution, erosion include the following processes: evapora-
and changes in surface hydrology, impacts tion, emulsification, dispersion, dissolution,
on biodiversity, changes in land use and loss oxidation and biodegradation. Most of these
of habitat. processes play important role in reducing the
Principal sources of production activities’ concentration of spilled oil in the environment.
environmental impacts are access roads, site Considering previously mentioned, determin-
preparation, production operations and de- ing the impacts of oil spill is very complex.
commissioning. The impacts resulting from Spilled oil impact on the environment is often
access roads, site preparation and decom- demonstrated as the dose- toxicity- exposure
missioning are the same as in case of drilling ratio (Fingas, 2011).
with the exception in duration of the impacts,
namely all of the impacts in this case are Oil impact = Dose × Toxicity × Exposure (1)
long-term.
The absence of one or more factors in Equa-
Potential impacts of oil and gas production
tion1 can amplify or negate another factor.
- discharges, waste generation and emissions
The above equation holds all the necessary
potentially have long- term impact on all the
information that have to be considered during
components of the environment (humans,
oil spill analysis and cleanup. Dose (volume
terrestrial, aquatic and atmospheric systems
of oil spilled) and exposure (what can be done
and biosphere). These impacts have potential
to contain/ divert/ collect spilled volume) can
effects on biota, wildlife, habitats, biodiversity,
be relatively easily determined. The problem
water, soil and air quality. They also pose
lies in toxicity. Namely, toxicity is defined
increased risk of soil, water and air pollution
as “the degree to which a substance is able
from spills and leakages.
to damage an exposed organism” (Fingas,
Consequences of Oil Spill 2011). Determining oil toxicity is rather dif-
ficult due to the fact that oil is not a single
Each oil spill is a unique event in terms of substance but a complex mixture of many
impacts and damages because each spill oc- substances. It is more difficult to determine
curs under different circumstances of oil type the toxicity of chemical mixture than a pure
374
chemical, because each component displays will cause death of 50% of tested population
its own toxicity, and components may interact within a specific period of exposure time.
to produce enhanced or diminished effects. In assessing potential effects of a sub-
Hydrocarbons that are most often associated stance and risk that the substance poses to
with toxic effects are aromatic hydrocarbons. the environment, besides LC50, there are
In this group there are hydrocarbons that several other expressions that characterize
consist of single and multiple benzene rings. concentration of a substance used, like pre-
Monocyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (MAHs) dicted environmental concentration (PEC),
include so called BETEX compounds (ben- predicted no-effect concentration (PNEC),
zene, toluene, ethyl benzene and xylenes), no-observed effect concentration (NOEC) and
which are highly volatile and relatively wa- lowest observed effect concentration (LOEC).
ter- soluble. BETEX compounds are mostly If the PEC exceeds the PNEC there is a risk
found in light crude oils and light petroleum of environmental damage in proportion to the
products. Hydrocarbons that consist of mul- PEC/PNEC ratio, which stands as a measure
tiple benzene rings are known as polycyclic of probability that harm will occur (UNEP/
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). These com- IPCS, 1999).
pounds have been identified as carcinogenic, Individual responses of organisms to a
mutagenic, and teratogenic. particular toxic substance differ widely. Ev-
Toxicity is manifested through acute and ery organism, depending on its sex, age and
chronic effects mutually differing in time span general physical state, is characterized with its
of toxic effect manifestation after organisms’ own threshold dose value. A threshold dose is
exposure to the toxic substance. Namely, acute the lowest dose at which there is an observ-
toxic effects manifest within a short period of able effect. Threshold value in a population
time in relation to the organisms’ life time, usually follows a Gaussian distribution. The
while it will take much longer for chronic ef- effect of a dose of toxic substance depends on
fects to be observable. Toxic substances are the exposure pathway. The exposure pathway
usually identified when associated adverse determines the biochemistry of the substance
effects are noticed. In most cases the first in- in the organisms, thus the same substance may
formation that a particular substance is toxic have different effects depending on whether it
is its’ association with an unusual number of is ingested, inhaled or absorbed through the
deaths. Standard measures of acute toxicity skin (Weiner & Matthews, 2003).
are LD50 (mg of toxic substance per kg of body The relationship between the dose of a
weight) or LC50 (ppm, mg/m3, mg/l), which toxic substance and the organisms’ response
stand for “lethal dose” or “lethal concentra- can be expressed by the dose-response curve
tion”. Lethal dose/concentration is a dose/ (Figure 2).
concentration of the toxic substance which
375
Figure 2. Different types of dose- response curves (Weiner & Matthews, 2003)
Some characteristic features of the dose- 5. Exposure Time and Time vs. Dosage
response curve are (Weiner & Matthews, a. Time needed for toxic substance to
2003): react.
6. Synergism
1. Threshold a. Phenomena when two or more toxic
2. Total Body Burden substances enhance each others’
a. If an organism is simultaneously effects.
exposed to several different sources 7. LC50 and LD50
of a toxic substance the concentra- 8. Hormesis
tion of the substance in organism is a. Some substances have beneficial
then a sum of all the quantities of effect in small doses but harmful
the substance from all the sources. in large ones.
3. Physiological Half- Life (PHL)
a. PHL of a toxic substance is the time Oil can affect organisms in many ways
needed for an organism to eliminate depending on the exposure pathway (physical
50% of internal concentration of exposure, ingestion, absorption, adsorption
the substance through metabolism or through food chain), the exposure location
or other normal physiological (water surface, shorelines or land), sensitivity
function. of an organism, organisms’ recovery potential,
4. Bioaccumulation and Bioconcentration it’s tenancy to avoid oil, possibility of helped
a. Bioaccumulation occurs when a rehabilitation (some animals can be caught
substance is concentrated in one and some can’t) and age (young specimens are
organ or type of tissue of an organ- more sensitive than old ones). The sensitiv-
ism. Bioconcentration occurs with ity varies with species, season and weather
movement up the food chain. conditions. The ability of an organisms or
376
ecosystem to return to the state they were organisms, marine mammals, marine plants,
before exposure to oil spill is specified by intertidal fauna and birds.
the recovery potential. The time needed for Concerning fish, the most vulnerable to oil
an organism/ ecosystem to recover ranges spill are species whose habitats are close to wa-
from couple of days to several years. The ter surface, sea shore or sea floor. The effects
most common consequences of organisms’ of an oil spill on fish are mostly sub-lethal and
exposure to oil spill are loss of habitat, changes primarily manifested through toxic effects of
in feeding and reproductive behavior, tainting aromatic hydrocarbons. Lethal concentrations
phenomena (fish and bivalves) and general are rarely found in open seas however such
behavioral changes such failure to take care concentrations can occur in confined waters
of their offspring. like bays and estuaries, directly under or in
Pollution of soil with oil or oil products the vicinity of the spill.
will result in: changes of some soil proper- Plankton (phytoplankton and zooplankton)
ties (e.g. sorption properties or soil reaction), are very sensitive to hydrocarbons. Relatively
changes of soil microbial diversity, disabled low hydrocarbon concentrations will affect
transport of water and nutrients, disturbance plankton, but plankton occurs in enormous
of carbon-nitrogen ratio and transition from numbers and lost individuals are relatively
oxidation to reduction conditions resulting quickly replaced. Plankton is at the bottom
with secondary pollution with metal oxides of aquatic food chain and hydrocarbons taken
and changes in pH values of ground water. by plankton are passed up the food chain af-
It is difficult to determine the full impacts fecting higher life forms.
and consequences of an oil spill in marine en- Benthic organisms (organisms that live
vironment because, along with the complexity on the sea floor) are usually divided into im-
of weathering processes, many physical and mobile (benthic infauna- fauna within bottom
biological processes in the marine and coastal sediments and benthic epifauna - fauna on
environment are still poorly understood. The top of bottom sediments) and mobile benthic
factors that affect toxicity of hydrocarbons organisms (starfish, gastopods, sea urchins,
in aquatic environment are salinity and tem- amphipoda and isopods) (Fingas, 2001).
perature of water, abudance of food and the These organisms are usually killed when large
general health of species. There is no evidence amounts of oil accumulate on the sea floor.
of aquatic organisms’ tendency to bioaccu- This happens in case of oil sedimentation
mulate hydrocarbons. Over a certain period due to increase of oil specific gravity (result
of time (up to one year) they tend to “purify” of the weathering processes) or as a result of
themselves and lose the hydrocarbons they oil adsorption onto solid particles (e.g. sand
have taken. There are seven general groups of particles). Benthic organisms are particularly
organisms under threat in case of oil spill in endangered in shallow areas of near- shore
aquatic environment:fish, plankton, benthos environments. Oil spills usually affect benthic
organisms on sub-lethal level causing changes
377
in growth (slow growth, deformity of body much more vulnerable because oil remains
parts), changes in molting times, occasional directly under ice.
anomalies in organ development, smaller Direct consequence of emissions from
brood sizes and changes in feeding practice petroleum industry is contribution to green-
(Fingas, 2001). house effect and overall global climate change.
Marine mammals, which come to contact Even though petroleum industry is one of
with oil spill, usually suffer from heat lost greenhouse gases emission intensive indus-
(their fur loses waterproofing), eye irritation tries (beside direct greenhouse gas emissions
and lost of buoyancy. Especially sensitive to (CO2, CH4 and N2O) with oil and gas produc-
oil spills are marine mammals covered with tion, petroleum industry is also characterized
fur, like polar bears or otters, because they, with high-energy intensity and final products
by grooming themselves, ingest oil resulting with high emission potentials) contribution of
in death or severe illness. petroleum industry’s emissions (less than 1.5
Intertidal fauna includes mobile organ- Gt CO2eq/yr) (Hrncevic, 2008) to total global
isms (crabs, snails and shrimp) and immobile greenhouse gas emissions, which at the mo-
barnacles and mussels and sedentary limpets, ment amount more than 30 Gt CO2eq/yr, are
periwinkles and tube worms (Fingas, 2001). relatively low.
These organisms, besides being the most
vulnerable to oil spill, are also very sensitive
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
to shoreline cleanup methods (e.g. washing).
ASSESSMENT OF PETROLEUM
Marine plants include a wide range of plant INDUSTRYS’ ACTIVITIES
families and algae. Most affected marine plants
by an oil spill are intertidal algae, macroalgae Risk is the category that is perceived very dif-
(kelp and fucus) and sea grasses. Intertidal ferently- e.g. the risks associated with nuclear
algae, which are an important food source for waste transport are usually perceived as far
intertidal fauna, usually are the first biota that greater than the risks associated with crude oil
recovers after the spill. or petroleum products transport even though
Oil spill effects on birds manifest through the latter are considerably larger. In general,
loss of insulation and buoyancy (oiled feath- the risk perception is influenced by the knowl-
ers), ingestion of oil or oiled pray, which, edge about the risk, whether the risk is under-
depending on oil concentration, results with taken (or perceived as undertaken) voluntarily
death or rarely gastrointestinal dysfunction, and the estimated perceived benefits of the
liver problems, pneumonia and behavioral activity the considered risks are associated
disorders. with. Environmental risk assessment, even
In case of an oil spill that occurs under though it is done rather in a similar way as, for
ice, epontic organisms (microscopic plants instance, human health risk assessment, differs
and animals that live under ice) have similar from risk assessments in other disciplines. The
reactions to hydrocarbons as plankton, but are assessment becomes even more complex if it
378
is case of petroleum industry activities, due to where:

possible exposure pathways and identification
of all environmental components at risk with R= Risk of an oil spill, tonnes of oil spilled/
their integral constituents and it is usually ship year
difficult to perceive all the consequences of F= Frequency
an activity. Since there is still no universally C= Consequence
accepted methodology for petroleum industry x, y= Position coordinates
activities risk assessment, the best one can t= Time component
expect to achieve is a general estimation of
The consequence in that case can be defined
the level of risk by means of analogy with
as (Edie, 2007):
similar systems.
As already mentioned, risk is defined as the C=S×I (4)
probability of an adverse effect in a specific
period of time. The environmental risk assess- where:
ment is based on calculating the probability
for an ecosystem to come to contact with a S= Expected spill size, m3
dose of a toxic substance. Environmental risk I= Impact of 1 tonne of oil
is usually described by the following equation
(Dumitran & Onutu, 2010): Expected spill size combines probability of
an oil spill accident with the expected outflow
RISK = Probability × Severity (2) (Edie, 2007):
Probability is often confused with frequen- S=P×O (5)

cy, because frequencies are used to estimate
O = α × β × Dwt (6)
probabilities in risk assessments. Probability
is dimensionless number and is always less
where:
or equal to 1. A probability of 1 means that
the event has a 100% chance of occurrence. P= Probability of an oil spill accident
Depending on how the frequency is defined, O= Expected outflow, m3
it has dimensions and can have value larger α= Expected outflow rate given as a percent-
than 1. age of the tank content volume (depended
The biggest risk related to petroleum indus- on accident type)
try activities is the risk of an oil spill during β= Volume of cargo or bunker oil, m3
transportation. Following the analogy with Dwt= Vessel deadweight tonnage
the Equation (2), this risk of tanker oil spill
can be defined as (Edie, 2007): The spill impact (I) per tonne oil depends
on the type of oil and on the affected area’s
R(x,y,z) = F(x,y,z) × C(x,y,z) (3)
vulnerability to oil spill (Edie, 2007):
379
I=E×T (7) tions and maintenance practice. The number

of tanker spills depends on the number and
where:
size (deadweight) of tankers and the frequency
and length of marine transport. The number
E= Environmental sensitivity index
of loading spills is proportional to the number
T= Oil type significance index
of loading operations and their duration.
Methods used to estimate the frequency Spill frequency is determined by a Poisson
and the size (with associated consequences) process. This means that the probability of a
of an oil spill include both quantitative and spill in specific time frame is proportional to
qualitative techniques. Quantitative risk as- the amount of exposure in this time frame and
sessment takes into account the dangers and that it is not affected by the last occurrence
consequences based on so called SMART of a spill. The Poisson distribution has two
indicators (SMART- specific, measurable, parameters; the contemplated exposure and the
available, relevant and timely) estimating intensity. The intensity of the Poisson process
the size of such consequence and the prob- is the mean spill rate. This is an uncertain quan-
ability. Qualitative risk assessment is based tity lying between zero and infinity. Before
on research of three factors: “threat/source” examining the spill data, which are in many
(equipment and specific pollutants generated cases unavailable, the nature of the intensity
from it), “path of action” (pollutant’s migra- variable can be suitably characterized with the
tion pathways to the receptor) and “target/ gamma distribution with parameters equal to
receptor” (components of the environment zero. The parameters of gamma distribution
which are affected by harmful effects of the are determined by the data concerning num-
pollutant). bers of spills observed and observed exposure.
To quantify the probability of oil spill the The exposure variable is taken to be the volume
number of spill is quantitatively related to the of oil handled. Given a contemplated exposure
type and level of activities which may affect the of “t” units, the distribution of the number of
number of spills. The number of drilling and future spills “n” can be determined. For each
production spills is likely to be proportional to “n” the distribution is the probability of “n”
the number of wells drilled and in production. spills given each possible value of intensity
The number of process spills depends, among multiplied by that value of intensity summed
other things, on the number of processing over all possible intensity values (Equation 8)
units, valves, pumps, flares, operators and the (Donovan & Owen, 1976).
volume of oil processed. The number of crude
oil storage tanks is likely to be proportional to
(n + ν − 1) ! t τ
n ν
p (n / t, ν, τ ) = n +ν
(8)
the number and size (volume of oil contained) n ! (ν − 1) ! (t + τ )
of the tanks. The number of pipeline spills is
a function of many factors: pipeline diameter, where:
age, degree of burial, location, facility opera-
380
ν= Number of spills observed of petroleum industry has improved. Namely

τ= Observed exposure the environmental expenditures of petroleum
t= Contemplated exposure companies have increased and the world-
n: Number of spills over facility lifetime wide total spill discharges have decreased.
Nowadays it could be said that environmental
Assessment of the environmental risk from management techniques have successfully
either a specific facility or process or from a integrated into all segments of upstream opera-
complete oil/gas field involves several steps. tional procedures and activities. Since petro-
These are (Dumitran & Onutu, 2010, Woods leum industry, regarding its activities, which
et. al., 1991): are environmentally intensive, takes up special
public attention, great emphasis has been put
1. Hazard identification; on quality environmental system based on
2. Hazard assessment; effective management with systematic ap-
3. Risk estimation; proaches and adequate mechanisms which
4. Risk assessment; have to ensure compliance with present, as
5. Environmental risk management. national as the global, environmental policies
and regulations. Nevertheless, accidents with
Each step includes a structured series of adverse environmental impact still happen.
stages in a number of steps that determine the Petroleum industry has a long and short-
data needed for the final evaluation. Steps and term environmental risk. Along with produc-
their main stages are presented in Figure 3. tion fluids, that pose significant environmental
Each identified hazard should be classified risk (if found uncontested in environment),
according to the level of risk to the environ- all petroleum industry activities involve ei-
ment. The relations of frequencies and con- ther use of fluids, that contain abundant and
sequences of the identified hazards are then diverse toxic chemicals, or waste generation,
presented in so called risk assessment matrix both associated with a potential risk to the
(Figure 4, Table 3). environment. The principal environmental
risk associated with petroleum industry is
CONCLUSION seen primary as the risk of fluid (produc-
tion, operating or waste) spill/ emission to
Principles of environmental protection were the environment.
initiated and became embedded in petroleum Oil spill occurrences and the total amount
business for more than 80 years, but it is only of oil spilled have decreased significantly
few decades ago that environmental protection over the last 30 years, especially last decade,
started to be seen as an integral part of sus- even though there was increase in both marine
tainable development approach. There are at (tanker) and pipeline transportation of oil and
least two indicators serving the fact that, over petroleum products. Even though incidents,
the decades, the environmental performance resulting with large releases of fluids in pe-
381
Figure 3. Environmental risk assessment steps (Dumitran & Onutu, 2010, Woods et. al., 1991)
troleum industry, occur rarely, it is important a variety of technological measures and regu-
to identify the sources, size and the frequency latory restrictions, better industry practices
of these releases. Oil spill can be minor in its in proper planning and design, incidents in
impacts but public or political interest and petroleum industry can occur and the risk for
media coverage may elevate perceived impact significant environmental damage remains,
to much higher level. Despite significant however, the consequences of these incidents
progress in reducing spills/ emission through can be minimized, mitigated or even avoided
382
Figure 4. Example of risk assessment matrix (Pinceratto & Casey, 1998, Dumitran & Onutu,
2010, Woods et. al., 1991)
Table 3. Assigning environmental consequences (Pinceratto & Casey, 1998)
Negligible No measurable or detectable damage to the components of the environment

Minor Minor damages (0-25% of ecosystem damaged); localized impact; less than 1 year needed for the environ-
ment to recover
Moderate Localized environmental impact (25-50% of ecosystem damaged); less than 5 year needed for the environ-
ment to recover
Major Major environmental damage (50-75% of ecosystem damaged); 5 to 10 years needed for the environment
to recover
Critical Massive environmental damage (75-100% of ecosystem damaged); more than 10 years needed for the
environment to recover
if proper risk-based measures and monitor- This has resulted with significant reduction
ing, including use of modern technologies of the number of environmental accidents.
are implemented. To the date there is still no universally ac-
Environmental impact of petroleum indus- cepted methodology for environmental risk
try activities ranges from very low to very assessment in petroleum industry. If there is
high primarily depending on type of activity, an adequate data base of previous identical or
pollution prevention and control techniques similar events, environmental risk assessment
applied and the sensitivity of the environ- of petroleum industry activities is commonly
ment in which these activities are conducted. done by the analysis of former reported spill
Petroleum industry has been proactive in the data for a specific area. However, if there are
development of technologies, operational no sufficient or available data to determine the
practices and management systems in general extents of risks, the combination of qualitative
targeted at minimizing environmental impact. and quantitative methods is used.
383
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410
About the Contributors
Davorin Matanovic is a full time professor at the Faculty of Mining, Geology, and Petroleum
Engineering, University of Zagreb in Croatia. He holds the Master Engineer (ME) degree in
Petroleum Engineering, Master of Science (MS) in Chemical Engineering, and PhD in Petroleum
Engineering. His current major study and specialization is well completion and workover, but
he also teaches drilling technique, well stimulation, and technical risk analysis. As an ex-oilfield
engineer working for INA-Naftaplin, Comp., he gained practical experience as a drilling engi-
neer, earning the state engineer certificate. Apart from the oilfield and teaching experience, he
is an editor in chief of The Mining, Geology, and Petroleum Engineering Bulletin, member of
the Croatian Academy of Engineering, etc. He is the author of four books and numerous papers.
Nediljka Gaurina-Medjimurec is a professor at the Faculty of Mining, Geology, and Pe-

troleum Engineering at University of Zagreb, specializing in drilling, drilling fluids, wellbore
stability, cementing, and environmental protection in petroleum engineering. She holds a BS
and PhD degree in petroleum engineering from the University of Zagreb, and MS degree in
petroleum engineering from the University of Belgrade. She is a certified petroleum engineer.
She has published over one hundred technical and scientific papers. She was head of Petroleum
Engineering Department from 1996-1998, and Vice Dean for Finance and Administration of
Faculty of Mining, Geology, and Petroleum Engineering from 2005-2009. She is a member of
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), Croatian Academy of Engineering (HATZ), and Croatian
Academy of Science and Art (HAZU) – Scientific Council for Oil.
Katarina Simon is a Professor at the Petroleum Engineering Department of the Faculty

of Mining, Geology, and Petroleum Engineering University of Zagreb. She has held the PhD
title from the same University since 2000. Her area of interests are Oil and Gas Processing and
Transportation as well as Directional Drilling. She was the Head of PE Department from 2005
to 2007. Currently she is a main researcher and a collaborator on a few scientific and profes-
sional projects in petroleum engineering.
***
Marin Cikes is associate professor at the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Mining, Geology,
and Petroleum Engineering, Petroleum Engineering Department, Zagreb, Croatia. He lectures
Petroleum Production Engineering, Well Test Analysis, and Well Stimulation at the graduate and
postgraduate courses of the petroleum engineering study. He was also working in the national
oil company INA, in the period from the 1973 until 2001, as a project engineer for production
operations, especially for hydraulic fracturing. He holds PhD degree, MS, and BS degree in
petroleum engineering from University of Zagreb.
Svijetlana Dubovski is a Chief Expert for Gathering and Transportation Systems in Croatia,
INA Plc., Production and Field Development Sector. After graduating in 1989, she has worked
in INA at different positions. From 2009 to 2012, she was managing Gathering and Processing
Technology Business Unit. In 2008, she earned her PhD at Faculty of Mining, Geology and
Petroleum Engineering University of Zagreb, Croatia. She is member of Croatian Society of
Petroleum and Geology Engineers, Croatian Metrological Society, and the Scientific Council
for Crude Oil of Croatian Academy of Science and Arts. In addition, she is member of Techni-
cal Committees 28 and 513 in State Office for Standardization and member of Team Winners
Silver Medal for Pipeline Leak-detection System at 8th Croatian Exhibition of Innovations in
2000. During her career, she has published a number of professional papers.
Lidia Hrncevic has 13 years of working experience in research and development in field of
environmental protection in petroleum industry. She graduated from Faculty of Mining, Geol-
ogy, and Petroleum Engineering, University of Zagreb in 2000 (obtained Master’s Degree in
Petroleum Engineering), and at the same faculty in 2008, she obtained her Ph. D. degree. From
2000 to 2009, she worked at the same Faculty as a teaching assistant. In 2009, she was elected
Assistant Professor. She is author and co-author of more than 40 scientific and professional
papers and co-worker in 30 research projects and studies in the field of environmental protec-
tion in petroleum engineering and energetics.
Sonja Koscak Kolin is assistant at the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Mining, Geology,
and Petroleum Engineering, Petroleum Engineering Department, Zagreb, Croatia. She lectures
Petroleum Production Engineering, Well Test Analysis, and Well Stimulation at the graduate
and postgraduate courses of the petroleum engineering study. She holds MS degree and BS
degree in petroleum engineering from University of Zagreb.
411
Zdenko Kristafor is a Graduated Petroleum Engineer from the University of Zagreb, master
of technical sciences in Petroleum Engineering (MSc) from University of Belgrade, and PhD in
Petroleum Engineering from University of Zagreb. He has specialized in Drilling Engineering,
Offshore Activities, Well Control, and Well Planning. He was also a member of scientific or
technical committee at several international conferences; member of panel of judges in student
paper contest (PhD division) at EUROPEC 2000 and Offshore Europe 2009, author of 60 scientific
and professional papers. Professionally, he was a Dean of the Faculty of Mining, Geology and
Petroleum Engineering, University of Zagreb, Head of Postgraduate Studies, Head of Petroleum
Engineering Department, Head of the Administration Unit and Invigilator for International Well
Control Forum (Crosco Well Control Training Centre). In addition, he is am member of the
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), Scientific Petroleum Council of Croatian Academy of
Sciences and Arts (HAZU), Member of Croatian Society of Energy (HED), Croatian Associa-
tion of Petroleum Engineers and Geoscientists (HUNIG).
Bojan Moslavac is a teaching assistant and PhD student at the Faculty of Mining, Geology,
and Petroleum Engineering, University of Zagreb in Croatia. His current major study and spe-
cialization is well completion and workover, but he also teaches well stimulation and technical
risk analysis as well. As an ex-oilfield engineer working for KCADeutag and Crosco-Integrated
Drilling and Well Services, he gained practical experience in drilling and workover operations.
Apart from the oilfield experience, he attended some worldwide conferences and exhibitions
and is a co-author of few textbooks and scientific papers.
Borivoje Pasic is senior research assistant at Petroleum Engineering Department at the Faculty
of Mining, Geology, and Petroleum Engineering (University of Zagreb), where he is engaged
in teaching process. He holds a PhD degree in petroleum engineering. During past six years
at the faculty, Borivoje Pašić has been actively engaged in class performance relating drilling,
drilling fluids, and wellbore stability, and was involved in certain projects. As an SPE member,
in 2010 he won ‘’Young Member Outstanding Service and Contribution to the Industry’’ award.
Borivoje Pašić is an author/co-author of 24 scientific and professional papers.
Andrew K. Wojtanowicz is a Texaco-Endowed Environmental Chair and Professor in the

Craft and Hawkins Petroleum Engineering Department at the Louisiana State University and
has co-authored over 200 publications and 8 books addressing environmental and productivity
aspects of petroleum technology. A United Nations expert in drilling engineering and registered
petroleum and environmental engineer in Louisiana, he was the 1992-93 Conoco Environmen-
tal Fellow, 2003-04 SPE Distinguished Lecturer, and served two terms as Editor-in Chief of
ASME Transactions Journal of Energy Resources Technology from 2000 to 2011. Wojtano-
wicz received the 1996 Special Meritorious Award for Engineering Innovation, the SPE 2003
Health Environment and Safety Award, and the SPE 2008 Distinguished Achievement Award
for Petroleum Engineering Faculty.
412
413
Index
A D
ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practi- Decision Matrix 7, 104-106, 109, 112, 114
cable) 1, 9, 22, 97 Differential Sticking 47, 49-51, 53, 59, 65-
Axial Line System 246 66, 72
Dogleg 54, 72
B Due Diligence 246, 255
Blowout Preventers 103, 117, 131, 138, Dynamic Positioning (DP) 105, 114
205, 328
E
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
(BLEVE) 301 Environmental Impact 219, 238, 240-241,
Boiling Point 232, 282, 289, 301 244, 247-248, 252, 254, 259-261, 263,
Bullheading 200-201, 217 298, 302, 341, 358-359, 366-370, 372-
373, 381, 383
C Environmental Risk 16, 164, 257, 263, 358-
Casing Head 137, 153, 155, 163, 166, 169- 360, 365, 378-379, 381-383, 387
172, 175-176, 201 Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD) 74,
Christmas Tree 134, 140-141, 143, 153- 94
154, 235, 328, 330
F
Clay Minerals Hydration 26, 33, 46
Close Vicinity 114 Fiber Lost Circulation Material 94
CO2 Leakage 322, 325, 346, 348, 357 Filter Cake 32, 47, 49-52, 72, 74, 77, 336
Coal-Bed Methane 198 Fishing 48-49, 66-67, 72, 202, 209-210,
Coiled Tubing 13, 199-200, 202-204, 206, 242, 373
211, 217 Flake Lost Circulation Material 95
Crude Oil 232, 237, 261, 265-268, 281, Flowback 187-188, 198
283, 296, 298, 301, 303-310, 321, 362,
368-371, 378, 380 G
Cryogenic Liquids 301 gas emissions 257, 260, 323, 378
Crystalline Swelling 33, 46 gas migration 155, 168, 170, 173, 175-176
Index
Gathering System 134, 141, 218-220, 235, Oil Toxicity 374, 387
246 Osmotic Swelling 33, 46
Geologic CO2 Storage 357
Gunk Plug (Or Diesel-Oil Plug) 95 P
Gunk Squeeze 95 Packer 136-137, 140-141, 143, 145, 153,
158, 160, 200, 202, 210, 330-331, 337-
H
340, 357
Habitat Change 263 Packer Fluid 137, 153, 331
Hydraulic Fracturing 76, 181-183, 187, Pack Off 55-56, 60, 72
190-191, 198, 202 Permeability 31-32, 35, 50, 73, 75-76, 79,
85, 170, 183, 190, 198, 325, 333-338,
I 345
Inert Gas 234, 286, 291, 293, 302 Permit-to-Work 104, 112, 114
Injection Well Mechanical Integrity 357 Person-in-Charge 107-108, 112, 114
Petroleum Industry 1-2, 4, 12-15, 17, 23-
K 24, 39, 47, 66, 74, 102, 163, 219, 358-
Key Seat 53-54, 72 360, 362, 365, 367-368, 370, 372-373,
378-379, 381-383, 387
L petroleum wells 155-156
Pill 52, 72, 83, 85, 95
Liqufied Natural Gas 321
Pollutant 239, 359, 365-366, 380, 387
LNG Storage Tank 321
Portland Cement 333-336, 357
Lost Circulation (Lost Returns) 95
Primary Barrier 86, 103, 118, 123, 134,
Lost Circulation Material 80, 94-95
138, 140, 200-202, 291, 302, 340
Lost Circulation Zone 81, 95
Proppant 198, 202, 204
M
R
Macondo 252 115-116, 119, 126, 131
Radial Line System 246
Managed Pressure Drilling Systems (MPD)
Receptor 357, 380
123, 131
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 302
Mechanical Earth Model (MEM) 46
Resilience Based Early Warning Indicator
Mechanical Sticking 47, 53, 72
(REWI) Method 125, 131
Mitigation 22, 88, 111, 210-211, 248, 322,
Risk Management 1-2, 6, 15, 22, 102, 119,
325, 346, 357, 359
211, 254, 271-272, 346
Mud Weight Window 38, 46
Rock in-Situ Stress 46
O
S
Occupational Safety and Health 263
Safety Valve 117, 134, 136, 140, 145, 154,
Oil Spill 97, 100, 116, 126, 253, 259, 306,
156, 200, 202, 210, 331, 340
309, 360, 362-365, 369, 371-372, 374,
SCADA 233, 254, 279, 297-298, 302
377-382, 387
414
Index
Secondary Barrier 103, 124, 134, 138, 200- Tubing Hanger 140-141, 145, 154, 200, 210
201, 210, 288-291, 302, 340 Tubing Head 133, 154, 210
Seepage Loss 95
Shale 24, 26, 31-36, 38-39, 46, 54-55, 79, V
85, 181-183, 185-188, 191, 193, 198, Vapours 304-305, 307, 310, 316, 321
327, 336, 366 Vugular Rock 95
Shale Swelling 46 Vulnerability 5, 7, 22, 323, 342-343, 357,
Shear Rams 122, 126, 131, 206, 208 359, 379
Sidetrack 48, 57, 72
Simultaneous Operations 96-101, 103-112, W
114 Wait on Cement 116, 118, 126, 131
Snubbing Unit 199, 206-208, 211, 217 Wellbore Instability 23-27, 31-32, 34, 36-
Spotting Fluid 51-52, 58, 72 37, 39, 46-48, 54, 60, 66
Storage Site 324-325, 357 well cementing 328, 357
Storage Tank 303-306, 308-311, 315-316, Well Integrity 116, 119, 134, 140, 164, 166,
321, 369 200-202, 209, 212, 217, 328, 336-337,
Stuck 47-56, 58-67, 72, 74, 161, 199-200 339-340, 346, 348
Surface Facility 24, 246 Wireline 37, 39, 48, 59-60, 141, 143, 199-
sustained casing pressure 155, 157-159, 200, 208-210, 217, 348
166-167, 340 Workover 7, 23-24, 74, 96, 103, 133, 140,
T 170, 199-202, 206, 211, 217, 251, 347-
348
Tank Farm 237, 311, 321
Thief Zone 73-74, 79, 81-82, 95 Z
Tight Sands 198 zonal isolation 74, 137, 202, 332-335, 339,
Total Lost Returns 95 346
415

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INTRODUCTION ponents acting. Also that will help to select

Figure 1. Illustration of the hazard identification process (Brandsæter, 2002)

Figure 3. Flow diagram of risk analysis

Figure 4. Flow diagram of risk management process

Table 1. Risk matrix

happen in Company in company year in one

1 Slight Slight Slight LOW

Figure 6. F-N curve with criteria for societal risk determination

Figure 7. Framework for risk tolerability (Dumitran & Onutu, 2010)

REFERENCES Engel, S. P., & Mackey, P. (2001, March).

INTRODUCTION production department (petroleum engineers,

caused by wellbore collapse or convergence etc. may be a result of wellbore instability

Table 1. Indicators of wellbore instability (McLellan, 1996)

Direct indicators Indirect indicators

Table 2. The causes of wellbore instability (McLellan, 1994)

Uncontrollable (Natural) Factors Controllable Factors

Figure 1. Stress redistribution around the wellbore wall during drilling

developed in a certain well: shear (collapse) of different lithology. Mechanical wellbore

τrθ = τrz = 0 (11) During drilling, drilling mud is circulated

Table 3. Shear and tensile failure types (Pasic et al., 2007)

Failure type Geometry and Orientation

Table 4. The categorization of peak-strength criterion (McLean & Addis, 1990)

Criterion Principal stresses used for defining of wellbore stability criterion

Table 5. Shale clasifications (O´Brein & Chenevert, 1973)

Class Shale Clay content Characteristics

Chemical Osmosis properties, shale properties (e.g. pore throat

Hydraulic Flow drilling fluid flow due to overbalance pressure.

REFERENCES Chenevert, M. E., & Osisanya, S. O. (1989,

INTRODUCTION too. If this risk is not appropriately managed

where: differential pressure (Figure 2b). In highly

Spotting Fluid Spotting fluids need to be in place as

Figure 4. Key seating (a) and reaming (b)

Table 1. Stuck pipe causes and recommended freeing methods

Causes Steps to free stuck pipe

x - Independent variable A neural network is a powerful data model-

Figure 6. Position of three day drilling (Shoraka et al., 2011)

REFERENCES Castillo, H., Turner, D., & Smalley, E. (2008).

Robson, R. I. (2012, October). Comparison Filter Cake: The residue deposited on

INTRODUCTION bbl/hr) to a complete loss of returns. When

sealing fractures with various materials using LOST CIRCULATION

Figure 1. Potential zones of lost circulation

Table 1. Excessive downhole pressures causes

Mechanical forces Hole conditions Mud properties

is created or opened by an imposed pressure, of induced formation fractures are always

Type of formation Identifying features

loss is accompanied by a notable change in the information is needed to make decisions,

Table 3. Classification of mud loss according to its severity

Severity of loss Rate of loss Type of formation

For electronic access to this publication, please contact: eresources@igi-global.com.

τrθ = τrz = 0 (11) During drilling, drilling mud is circulated

p100 (T ) = pa (T ) (5) When the well stops flowing, the point of