37. TESORERO v.

MATHAY
GR L-69592
May 8, 1990

Facts: Initially, DALIGHT, the authorized operator of electric light, heat and power service in
the City of Davao, as well as in the municipalities of Panabo, Sto. Tomas and Carmen, all in
the province of Davao del Norte, filed an application for the approval of the appraisal made by
TAMSPHIL. After hearings, BOE issued an Order to constitute a verification and inspection
team. This application was disapproved as TAMSPHIL was disqualified to make such
appraisal and that there were discrepancies going against it integrity.
Two years after, DALIGHT filed another application for approval of the appraisal made by
Asian Appraisal Co. in the amount of P302,109,000.00. Petitioners Tesorero, Diaz and
Dureza, residents of Davao City and are consumers of electricity provided by DALIGHT,
opposed this application.
BOE constituted a team to conduct ocular examination/verification and in Dec. 6, 1983,
approved the amount of P282,024,877.40 as the fair and reasonable value of DALIGHT’s
properties, assets and equipment in the service. Petitioners received a copy of the Decision
on December 19, 1983.
On January 19, 1984 (17 days) filed a Motion for Reconsideration. June 25, 1984 Order denied
the MR.
Apparently not having received the Order denying the MR, petitioners filed a Motion praying
that a hearing be conducted and/or a resolution be issued on their MR. BOE issued Oct 31
Order informing petitioners that their MR had long been denied and furnished them a copy of
the June 25 Order.
Petitioners filed present R45 Petition in their own behalf and on behalf of the more or less
70,000 consumers of Davao City and its environs. Davao City filed a Petition for Intervention
All required pleadings having been filed, the First Division of the SC issued a Resolution giving
due course to the Petition.
Petitioners filed their memorandum instead of briefs; Respondent manifested that they be
allowed to adopt their respective comments as their briefs.

Issue:
Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy in this case.

Ruling:
Certiorari is not the proper remedy but the Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, decided to
disregard technicalities and decide the case on the merits. Certiorari is not the proper remedy
in this case as PD 1206 creating the BOE provides that its decisions/orders are appealable to
the Office of the President within 7 days after the notice or receipt of the same. Subsequently,
the Interim Rules Implementing Sec. 9 of BP129 provides that final decisions, orders, awards
or resolutions of all quasi-judicial bodies other than those specifically excepted are reviewable
by the IAC.
Furthermore, the Dec 6 Order of the BOE was already final and executory when petitioners
filed their MR
BUT “this Court in the broader interests of justice has in a number of cases given due course
to a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is appeal especially where the equities
warrant such recourse and considering that dismissals on technicalities are viewed
with disapproval.” (Emphasis supplied)
Litigations should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on mere
technicalities.
“This case will not only affect herein petitioners who on some points have a good cause
of action but also the more or less 70,000 consumers in Davao City and its environs.”
38. CUCUECO v. CA
GR 139278
October 25, 2004
Facts:
Clement Cucueco entered into a joint venture with Golden "L" Films International (Golden Films)
and its owners, Orlando, Francisco and Diosdado, all surnamed Lapid, to co-produce a movie.
After the shooting, Golden Films, without the knowledge and prior consent of Cucueco, sold the
film to Lea Productions, Inc. (LEA) but LEA failed to pay in full, so Golden Films withheld delivery
of the film. Meantime, Cucueco, upon request of Golden Films, paid SQ Laboratories the
processing fee of the film to facilitate the recovery of his investment and share in the joint venture.
In turn, SQ Laboratories delivered to Cucueco the "master" copy and other copies of the film.
Subsequently, Emilia Blas and the Lapids demanded that Cucueco deliver the film to them but he
refused. He maintains that the sale of the film by Golden Films to LEA is void for lack of consent
on his part, he being a co-owner and co-producer of the film, invoking Section 18 of P.D. 49.

In a joint hearing, the Court finds the evidence sufficient to grant the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. This was challenged by LEA and Emilia Blas in a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals.
In a decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed order with modification in the sense that
the writ of preliminary attachment issued in favor of Cucueco was annulled.
LEA and Emilia Blas pursued the cases up to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on
certiorari. The main issue posed was whether a writ of preliminary injunction may still be issued
after the effectivity of a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court sustained the decision of
the Court of Appeals and denied the petition in a Resolution.
Cucueco filed a motion for summary judgment in alleging that the order of the lower court contains
findings of fact and law, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court correctly rendered the Decision (Summary Judgment) appealed from
and in applying the Doctrine of the "Law of the Case" in the process.

Ruling:
It may appear that the issues raised by respondents indeed involve questions of fact justifying their
resort to ordinary appeal. A closer scrutiny, however, shows that the appeal actually involves purely
questions of law. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given
to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.

SANTOS v. CA
GR 92862
July 4, 1991

Facts:
The private respondent lost in a suit for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. It
appealed to the respondent court and on May 17, 1989, was required to file its brief within 45 days
from notice. The notice was received by its counsel on May 24, 1989.

On December 11, 1989, 201 days from the start of the 45-day reglementary period and after the
expiration of the 10-day period to show cause, the respondent court dismissed the private
respondent's appeal pursuant to Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

It was only after more than a month, on January 17, 1990, that the private respondent roused itself
and filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of its appeal and for the admission of the
appellant's brief. Its counsel alleged that an employee of another client had taken the records of
the case and had returned them only after Christmas of 1989. It also averred that it could not file
the appeal brief on time because of the aborted coup d'etat in December of that year and the
frequent power interruptions in the Makati area, where its office was located.

An opposition was filed by the petitioner, but the motion was granted by the respondent court on
February 21, 1990. In its resolution, it read that the Court has no way to determine the veracity of
the claim of defendant-appellant's counsel that an employee of another client took the records of
the case from his office. The motion filed has no affidavit attached to the same. However, the court
could take judicial notice of the electrical power interruption at Makati as well as the occurrence of
the aborted coup.

In the resolution dated December 11, 1989 dismissing the appeal interposed by defendant-
appellant is hereby RECONSIDERED and the Brief filed is ADMITTED and appellees are given
the reglementary period of forty-five (45) days within which to file appellee's brief.

The petitioner's own motion for reconsideration having been denied, it has come to this Court to
fault the reinstatement of the appeal with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court has fault the reinstatement of the appeal with grave abuse of
discretion.

Ruling:

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not
intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed, to provide for a system under
which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful
confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. The other alternative is the
settlement of their conflict through the barrel of a gun.