Documenti di Didattica
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Republic of the Philippines Caragay refused to vacate the premises, prompting Joson to file with the Municipal
SUPREME COURT Trial Court (MTC) of Balanga, Bataan a complaint for forcible entry, docketed as Civil
Manila Case No. 1343. Eventually, the parties reached a compromise agreement wherein
Caragay and all persons working under him agreed to vacate the property. In a
FIRST DIVISION Decision dated March 4, 1990, the MTC approved the said compromise agreement.
However, Caragay and his workers, including petitioner, failed to comply with the
compromise agreement, hence, the MTC issued a writ of execution.
G.R. No. 143111 June 7, 2007
Thereupon, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Balanga,
LORETO REYES, petitioner, Bataan a petition for injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
vs. against spouses Honorio and Josefina Joson, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. 5825.
SPOUSES HONORIO and JOSEFINA B. JOSON, DOMINADOR MASANGKAY, Initially, the RTC issued a TRO enjoining the MTC from implementing the writ of
and RENATO ROBLES, respondents. execution.
RESOLUTION However, on August 9, 1990, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
injunction for lack of jurisdiction, thus:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ** , J.:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 50 of RA 6657 which divested this court
For our resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated of jurisdiction to try agrarian disputes and conferring upon the DAR the
March 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 417971 reversing the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate Agrarian Reform matters,
Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated this case is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the parties availing
May 2, 1996 and Resolution dated August 12, 1996 in DARAB Case No. 1021 (Reg. themselves of the remedy provided for under RA 6657; the Comprehensive
Case No. 03-029-Bataan ’90). Agrarian Reform Law.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible errors in the appealed Decision, the In the light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that respondent DARAB
same is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Since however, plaintiff-appellee erred in declaring private respondent Reyes as tenant on the fishpond in
Loreto Reyes is already ejected from the fishpond in question, defendants- question. As explained elsewhere, not only is such conclusion contradicted
appellants spouses Honorio and Josefa Joson and the owner they represent, by private respondent’s own averments in the complaint he filed with the
Don Tomas Aguirre, and also their co-defendants-appellants Dominador PARAD but also incompatible with his act of signing the Malibiran lease
Masangkay and Renato Robles and other and any persons proceeding from contract in his capacity as fishpond watcher and not as tenant. To repeat,
them, are hereby ordered to reinstate back the plaintiff-appellee as tenant- the said lease contract expressly referred to private respondent as fishpond
tiller to the fishpond in question immediately and without further delay. The watcher. More importantly, the aforesaid conclusion is not supported by
same defendants-appellants, the owner and other persons proceeding from substantial evidence. Thus, other than private respondent’s mere say-so, no
them are likewise ordered to peacefully vacate the premises of the said evidence was presented to prove his alleged sharing of the produce either
fishpond and surrender to plaintiff-appellee Loreto Reyes the actual and with Caragay, with herein petitioner, with Malibiran and much less with the
physical possession and cultivation/watching of the said land. Plaintiff- owner himself. As aptly said, sharing of harvest is an essential requisite of
Appellee should accordingly share or pay rental from the fish harvests to the tenancy and the absence of any proof thereof negates the existence of such
owner or his representative/attorney-in-fact. The defendants-appellants are relationship (Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 247 [1988]).
likewise ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee the amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as damages and attorney’s fees plus the costs of suit.
Hence, this petition.
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, respondents filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41797. They alleged The fundamental issue for our determination is whether petitioner is an agricultural
therein that the DARAB erred in finding that petitioner is an agricultural tenant. tenant and, therefore, enjoys security of tenure.
On March 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting respondents’ Petitioner contends that since both the PARAD and the DARAB found that a tenancy
petition and setting aside the DARAB’s challenged Decision. The appellate court held: relationship exists between him and respondents, such factual finding is deemed
conclusive.
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The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists status as such has ripened into a bona fide tenant by operation of law. Suffice it to
is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged state that the records of this case fail to show there was a sharing of harvests
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the between petitioner and the owner of the fishpond. Besides, the fact of crop sharing by
understanding when the farmer is installed, their written agreements, provided these itself is not enough to establish tenancy as it is not unusual for a landowner to receive
are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. 3 the produce of the land from a caretaker who sows thereon. 7
The essential requisites to establish a tenancy relationship are: 1) that the parties are Moreover, mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized
relationship is agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the under agrarian laws.8 Occupancy and continued possession do not make one a de
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural jure tenant.9 Tenancy status only arises if an occupant has been given possession of
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural an agricultural landholding for the primary purpose of agricultural production which, in
lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or this case, is significantly absent. Based on the records, petitioner was a mere
agricultural lessee.4 fishpond watcher/caretaker.
All the above elements must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship. The As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, there is no evidence to prove
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, a cultivator or a petitioner’s claim he is a tenant on the subject fishpond. His bare assertions are
planter thereon, a de jure tenant. It is only when an individual has established his insufficient. To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is
status as a de jure tenant that he is entitled to security of tenure and would thus come substantial, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
under the coverage of existing tenancy laws.5 adequate to support a conclusion.10
Here, consent on the part of the landowner to a tenancy arrangement is clearly At any rate, we find it imperative to state that Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known
absent. The right to hire a tenant is a personal right of the landowner. Indeed, there is as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, has abolished the agricultural share tenancy.11
no proof that Tomas Aguirre, the owner of the fishpond, hired petitioner as a tenant.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Courtof Appeals in CA-
Our ruling in Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals6 is relevant, thus: G.R. SP No. 41797 dated March 13, 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
petitioner.
Respondent Mamerto Venasquez claims that he has been tenant and
overseer of the landholding in question from 1950 up to 1974, while the other SO ORDERED.
private respondents declare in their respective affidavits (Exhs. "A", "B" and
"C") that they were taken in as tenants by Venasquez in his capacity as
overseer of the petitioner landowner.
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that if that was the case, he might as well not deliver anymore. Thus, from 1967 up to which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to
1976, Macaya did not deliver any palay. pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both.
On January 31, 1974, Manotok Realty, Inc. executed a "Unilateral Deed of Thus, the essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties are the
Conveyance" of the property in favor of Patricia Tiongson, Pacita Go, Roberto Laperal landholder and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4)
III, Elisa Manotok, Rosa Manotok, Perpetua M. Bocanegra, Filomena M. Sison, the purpose is agricultural production; and 5) there is consideration (Agustin, Code of
Severino Manotok, Jr., Jesus Manotok, Ignacio S. Manotok, Severino Manotok III and Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, 1981, p. 19). As
Fausto Manotok.
xxx xxx xxx
Sometime in 1974, Macaya was informed by the Manotoks that they needed the
property to construct their houses thereon. Macaya agreed but pleaded that he be All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy
allowed to harvest first the planted rice before vacating the property. relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant, as
However, he did not vacate the property as verbally promised and instead expanded contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant, This is so because
the area he was working on. unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is
not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
In 1976, the Manotoks once more told Macaya to vacate the entire property including Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. ...
those portions tilled by him. At this point, Macaya had increased his area from three
(3) hectares to six (6) hectares without the knowledge and consent of the owners. As The key factor in ascertaining whether or not there is a landowner-tenant relationship
he was being compelled to vacate the property, Macaya brought the matter to the in this case is the nature of the disputed property.
Department (now Ministry) of Agrarian Reforms. The Manotoks, during the
conference before the officials of the Department insisted that Macaya and his family Is the thirty-four (34) hectare lot, of which the six (6) hectares occupied by the private
vacate the property. They threatened to bulldoze Macaya's landholding including his respondent form a part, against agricultural land? If not, the rules on agrarian reform
house, thus prompting Macaya to file an action for peaceful possession, injunction, do not apply.
and damages with preliminary injunction before the Court of Agrarian Relations.
From the year 1948 up to the present, the tax declarations of real property and the
The sole issue to be resolved in the present petition is whether or not a tenancy annual receipts for real estate taxes paid have always classified the land as
relationship exists between the parties. The Court of Agrarian Relations found that "residential". The property is in Balara, Quezon City, Metro Manila, not far from the
Macaya is not and has never been a share or leasehold tenant of Severino Manotok correctly held by the trial court:
nor of his successors-in-interest over the property or any portion or portions thereof
but has only been hired as a watchman or guard (bantay) over the same. On
Macaya's appeal from the said decision, the respondent appellate court declared the University of the Philippines and near some fast growing residential subdivisions. The
existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship and ordered Macaya's reinstatement Manotok family is engaged in the business of developing subdivisions in Metro
to his landholding. Manila, not in farming.
Since what is involved ed is agricultural tenancy, we refer to Republic Act No. 1199 as The trial court observed that a panoramic view of the property shows that the entire
amended by Republic Act No. 2263. Section 3 thereof defines agricultural tenancy as: 34 hectares is rolling forestal land without any flat portions except the small area
which could be planted to palay. The photographs of the disputed area show that
flush to the plantings of the private respondent are adobe walls separating expensive
xxx xxx xxx looking houses and residential lots from the palay and newly plowed soil. Alongside
the plowed or narrowed soil are concrete culverts for the drainage of residential
... the physical possession by a person of land devoted to subdivisions. The much bigger portions of the property are not suitable for palay or
agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the even vegetable crops.
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of
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The trial court noted that in a letter dated April 12, 1977, the City Engineer of Quezon Under these definitions, may Macaya be considered as a tenant and Manotok as a
City certified on the basis of records in his office that the property in question falls landholder? Significant, as the trial court noted, is that the parties have not agreed as
within the category of "Residential I Zone." to their contributions of the several items of productions such as expenses for
transplanting, fertilizers, weeding and application of insecticides, etc. In the absence
The respondent court ignored all the above considerations and noted instead that the of an agreement as to the respective contributions of the parties or other terms and
appellees never presented the tax declarations for the previous year, particularly for conditions of their tenancy agreement, the lower court concluded that no tenancy
1946, the year when Macaya began cultivating the property. It held that while the relationship was entered into between them as tenant and landholder.
petitioners at that time might have envisioned a panoramic residential area of the
disputed property, then cogonal with some forest, that vision could not materialize due On this matter, the respondent Appellate Court disagreed. It held that:
to the snail pace of urban development to the peripheral areas of Quezon City where
the disputed property is also located and pending the consequent rise of land values. ... Whether the appellant was instituted as tenant therein or
As a matter of fact, it found that the houses found thereon were constructed only in as bantay, as the appellees preferred to call him, the inevitable fact
the 70's. is that appellant cleared, cultivated and developed the once
unproductive and Idle property for agricultural production. Appellant
Whatever "visions" the owners may have had in 1946, the fact remains that the land and Don Severino have agreed and followed a system of sharing
has always been officially classified as "residential" since 1948. The areas the produce of the land whereby, the former takes care of all
surrounding the disputed six hectares are now dotted with residences and, expenses for cultivation and production, and the latter is only
apparently, only this case has kept the property in question from being developed entitled to 10 cavans of rice per harvest. This is the essense of
together with the rest of the lot to which it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants leasehold tenancy.
rice or corn on a residential lot in the middle of a residential subdivision in the heart of
a metropolitan area cannot by any strained interpretation of law convert it into It should be noted, however, that from 1967 to the present, Macaya did not deliver
agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian reform program. any cavans of palay to the petitioners as the latter felt that if Macaya could no longer
deliver the twenty (20) cavans of palay, he might as well not deliver any. The decision
On this score alone, the decision of the respondent court deserves to be reversed. of the petitioners not to ask for anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that there
was no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such
Another requisite is that the parties must be landholder and tenant. Rep. Act No. 11 relationship be implied from the facts as there was no agreed system of sharing the
99 as amended defines a landholder — produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at which time, Macaya was
also planting rice, there was no payment whatsoever. At the most and during the
limited period when it was in force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the
Sec. 5(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, lessee for a fixed price leases the property while the lessor has no responsibility
who, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no agreement as to the
or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for a sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items. The private
consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system, or a respondent, however, has long stopped in paying the annual rents and violated the
price certain under the leasehold tenancy system. agreement when he expanded the area he was allowed to use. Moreover, the
duration of the temporary arrangement had expired by its very terms.
On the other hand, a tenant is defined as —
Going over the third requisite which is consent, the trial court observed that the
Sec. 5(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the property in question previous to 1946 had never been tenanted. During that year,
aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates Vicente Herrera was the overseer. Under these circumstances, coupled by the fact
the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's that the land is forested and rolling, the lower court could not see its way clear to
consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the sustain Macaya's contention that Manotok had given his consent to enter into a verbal
landholder under the share tenancy system or paying to the tenancy contract with him. The lower court further considered the fact that the amount
landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the of ten (10) cavans of palay given by Macaya to the owners from 1957 to 1964 which
leasehold tenancy system. was later increased to twenty (20) cavans of palay from 1964 to 1966 was grossly
disproportionate to the amount of taxes paid by the owners. The lot was taxed as
residential land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no intention on the part of
the owners to devote the property for agricultural production but only for residential
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purposes. Thus, together with the third requisite, the fourth requisite which is the (b) Exhibit "9" adopted and marked as Exhibit "L" for plaintiff
purpose was also not present. (Macaya):
The last requisite is consideration. This is the produce to be divided between the Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya
landholder and tenant in proportion to their respective contributions. We agree with ang TATLONG (3) kabang palay bilang
the trial court that this was also absent. kapupunan sa DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang
palay na kanyang tulong sa pagbabayad ng
As earlier stated, the main thrust of petitioners' argument is that the law makes it amillaramiento para sa taong 1963 ng lupang ari
mandatory upon the respondent Court of Appeals to affirm the decision of the Court of ng Manotok Realty, Inc. na nasa Payong,
Agrarian Relations if the findings of fact in said decision are supported by substantial Quezon City, na kanyang binabantayan
evidence, and the conclusions stated therein are not clearly against the law and samantalang hindi pa ginagawang SUBDIVISION
jurisprudence. On the other hand, private respondent contends that the findings of the PANGTIRAHAN.
Court of Agrarian Relations are based not on substantial evidence alone but also on a
misconstrued or misinterpreted evidence, which as a result thereof, make the c) Exhibit "10" adopted and marked as Exhibit "N" for plaintiff
conclusions of the Court of Agrarian Relations clearly contrary to law and (Macaya):
jurisprudence.
Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya
After painstakingly going over the records of the case, we find no valid and cogent ang DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang palay na
reason which justifies the appellate court's deviation from the findings and kanyang tulong sa pagbabayad ng
conclusions of the lower court. It is quite clear from the 44-page decision of the trial amillaramiento para sa taong 1964 ng lupang ari
court, that the latter has taken extra care and effort in weighing the evidence of both ng Manotok Realty Inc., na nasa Payong,
parties of the case. We find the conclusions of the respondent appellate court to be Quezon City, na kanyang binabantayan
speculative and conjectural. samantalang hindi pa ginagawang SUBDIVISION
PANG TAHANAN.
It bears re-emphasizing that from 1946 to 1956, there was no agreement as to any
system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get anything from d) Exhibit "11" adopted and marked as Exhibit "M" for plaintiff
the harvest and private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free (Macaya):
from any charge or expense. The situation was rather strange had there been a
tenancy agreement between Don Severino and Macaya. Tinanggap namin kay Ginoong Teodoro Macaya
ang DALAWAMPUNG (20) kabang ng palay na
From 1957 to 1964, Macaya was requested to contribute ten (10) cavans a year for kanyang tulong sa pagbabayad ng
the payment of the realty taxes. The receipts of these contributions are evidenced by amillaramiento para sa taong 1965 ng lupang ari
the following exhibits quoted below: ng Manotok Realty, Inc., na nasa Payong,
Quezon City, na kanyang binabantayan
(a) Exhibit "4" adopted and marked as Exhibit "K" for plaintiff samantalang hindi pa ginagawang SUBDIVISION
(Macaya): PANG TAHANAN.
Ukol sa taon 1961 From the above-quoted exhibits, it clearly appears that the payment of the cavans of
palay was Macaya's contribution for the payment of the real estate taxes; that the
nature of the work of Macaya is that of a watchman or guard (bantay); and, that the
Tinanggap naniin kay G. Teodoro Macaya ang services of Macaya as such watchman or guard (bantay) shall continue until the
sampung (10) cavan na palay bilang tulong niya property shall be converted into a subdivision for residential purposes.
sa pagbabayad ng amillaramiento sa lupa ng
corporation na nasa Payong, Q.C. na kaniyang
binabantayan. The respondent appellate court disregarded the receipts as self-serving. While it is
true that the receipts were prepared by petitioner Perpetua M. Bocanegra, Macaya
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nevertheless signed them voluntarily. Besides, the receipts were written in the
vernacular and do not require knowledge of the law to fully grasp their implications.
Furthermore, the conclusion of the respondent appellate court to the effect that the
receipts having been prepared by one of the petitioners who happens to be a lawyer
must have been so worded so as to conceal the real import of the transaction is highly
speculative. There was nothing to conceal in the first place since the primary objective
of the petitioners in allowing Macaya to live on the property was for security purposes.
The presence of Macaya would serve to protect the property from squatters. In return,
the request of Macaya to raise food on the property and cultivate a three-hectare
portion while it was not being developed for housing purposes was granted.
We can understand the sympathy and compassion which courts of justice must feel
for people in the same plight as Mr. Macaya and his family. However, the petitioners
have been overly generous and understanding of Macaya's problems. For ten years
from 1946 to 1956, he lived on the property, raising animals and planting crops for
personal use, with only his services as "bantay" compensating for the use of another's
property. From 1967 to the present, he did not contribute to the real estate taxes even
as he dealt with the land as if it were his own. He abused the generosity of the
petitioners when he expanded the permitted area for cultivation from three hectares to
six or eight hectares. Mr. Macaya has refused to vacate extremely valuable residential
land contrary to the clear agreement when he was allowed to enter it. The facts of the
case show that even Mr. Macaya did not consider himself as a true and lawful tenant
and did not hold himself out as one until he was asked to vacate the property.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines On the other hand, the petitioners aver that they acquired the landholding of 4,000
SUPREME COURT square meters from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) after it had been foreclosed
Manila by virtue of a deed of sale executed between Bonifacio Hilario and the PNB. The
former owner Corazon Pengzon testified that she owned only two lots-Lot 427-B with
SECOND DIVISION an area of 841 square meters and Lot 427-C with an area of 899 square meters with
a total area of 1,740 square meters. The other 2 lots were owned by Ruben Ocampo
and Juan Mendoza. She further testified that in 1964 at the time of the partition of the
G.R. No. 70736 March 16, 1987 property, she declared the property for classification purposes as "bakuran" located in
the Poblacion and had no knowledge that there were other things planted in it except
BONIFACIO L. HILARIO and EDUARDA M. BUENCAMINO HILARIO, petitioners, bananas and pomelos.
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SALVADOR On November 27, 1981, the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in determining
BALTAZAR, respondents. whether or not respondent Baltazar is the tenant of the petitioners ruled that the land
in question is not an agricultural landholding but plain "bakuran," hence, Baltazar is
Bonifacio L. Hilario for petitioners. not a tenant on the land.
Alberto Mala, Jr. for private respondent. On January 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals, however, remanded the case to the lower
court for further proceedings on the ground that the findings of the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) were not supported by substantial evidence.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: In compliance with the order of the Court of Appeals, the CAR admitted additional
evidence.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision declaring
Salvador Baltazar a leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure on a parcel of land On December 19, 1983, the CAR admitted the petitioners' third party complaint filed
consisting of 1,740 square meters. with leave against the Philippine National Bank (PNB) which states that in the event
that judgment would be rendered against them under the original complaint, the PNB
must contribute, indemnify, and reimburse the spouses the full amount of the
On January 13, 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of judgment.
Agrarian Relations, Branch VI at Baliuag, Bulacan alleging that since January, 1955
he had been in continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land with an
area of about 2 hectares situated in San Miguel, Bulacan, which was previously On the basis of the parties' and their witnesses' affidavits containing detailed
owned by one Socorro Vda. de Balagtas; that on or about December 27, 1980, and narrations of facts and documentary exhibits which served as their direct testimonies
thereafter, the spouses Hilario began to threaten him to desist from entering and pursuant to PD 946, the CAR found that there was no tenancy relationship existing
cultivating a portion of the aforesaid land with an area of 4,000 square meters and between Baltazar and the former owner, Corazon Pengzon. The dispositive portion of
otherwise committed acts in violation of his security of tenure; that the Hilarios were the decision reads:
contemplating the putting up of a fence around the said portion of 4,000 square
meters and that unless restrained by the court, they would continue to do so to his WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff not
great irreparable injury. to be a tenant on the landholding described in the complaint and
ordering his ejectment therefrom.
Baltazar claims that he became a tenant of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas on the
latter's two-hectare landholding located at San Juan, San Miguel, Bulacan by virtue of The third-party complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (pp.
a "Kasunduan" executed between them on January 8, 1979, He states that he 25- 26, Rollo)
erected his house and planted "halaman," the produce of which was divided at 70-30
and 50-50 (sic) in his favor. After the death of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas, he Again, respondent Salvador Baltazar appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
allegedly gave the share pertaining to the landowner to her daughter Corazon Court (IAC).
Pengzon. It was only in December, 1980 that he came to know that a portion of the 2
hectares or 4,000 square meters is already owned by the Hilarios.
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The IAC, however, reversed the decision of the CAR and held that: subject landholding or after the death of your
mother how did you —
... [T]he decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and another
one entered declaring plaintiff-appellant ii leasehold tenant entitled Q ... administer this landholding in 1963, 1964,
to security of tenure on the land in question consisting of 1,740 1965, 1966, etc?
square meters. Costs against defendants-appellees. (p. 31, Rollo)
A What I did is to fix the title of ownership, sir.
Consequently, the spouses Hilarios filed this petition for review making the following
assignments of errors: COURT:
Salvador Baltazar claims: that he is working on the land in question pursuant to a Q What was the purpose of his visit and your
"kasunduan" executed between him and Socorro Balagtas. The contract covers a meeting in this landholding?
two-hectare parcel of land. The disputed landholding is only 4,000 square meters
more or less, although Baltazar claims that this area is a portion of the two hectares in
the contract. He testified that sometime in 1965, he relinquished 1.5 hectares of the A Sometimes when he visits our place he tens us
two hectares subject of the "kasunduan" to Nemesio Ocampo, Juan Mendoza, Miguel that there are some bananas to be harvested and
Ocampo and Miguel Viola and what remained under his cultivation was 1/2 hectare sometimes there are other fruits, your Honor.
owned by Corazon Pengson. He stated that when Socorro Balagtas died, no new
contract was executed. However, he insists that the old contract was continued Q You mean to say he stays in this subject
between Corazon Pengson and himself. (Rollo, p. 23). landholding consisting of 7,000 square meters?
This claim is controverted by the testimony of Corazon Pengson herself which we A After the survey it turned out-
quote as follows:
A . . . that he is occupying another lot which I
Q After the death of your mother in 1965, what learned that property does not belong to us, Your
step, if any, have you taken, regarding this Honor.
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Q what was your arrangement regarding his stay From the foregoing, it is clear that Coraz•n Pengson did not give her consent to
in that landholding which you don't own? Baltazar to work on her land consisting of only 1,740 square meters. We agree with
the CAR when it said:
A He said that he had a contract with my late
mother which I don't know; in order not to cause The law accords the landholder the right to initially choose his
any trouble because I will be bothered in my tenant to work on his land. For this reason, tenancy relationship can
business, I told him to continue, Your Honor. only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder
through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. So the
Q What do you mean when you- mere cultivation of the land by usurper cannot confer upon him any
legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of
security of tenure of the law (Spouses Tiongson v. Court of
COURT: Appeals, 130 SCRA 482) (Ibid)
(continuing) And in the case of Tuazon v. Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 484), this Court had the
occasion to explain:
. . .told him to continue?
xxx xxx xxx
A What I mean to say is that he can stay there
although I don't understand the contract with my ... Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what
mother, Your Honor. the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship.
The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
Q Was he paying rentals for his stay in that lot? installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided
these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
A No, Your Honor (T.S.N., pp. 15-19, hearing of important."
August 5, 1981).
The respondent court ruled that the fact that the land in question is located in the
Corazon Pengson further explained that she did not receive any share from the poblacion does not necessarily make it residential.
produce of the land from 1964 up to the filing of the case and she would not have
accepted any share from the produce of the land because she knew pretty well that The conclusion is purely speculative and conjectural, We note that the evidence
she was no longer the owner of the lot since 1974 when it was foreclosed by the bank presented by the petitioners sufficiently establishes that the land in question is
and later on purchased by the spouses Hilarios. residential and not agricultural.
We note the CAR's finding: As we stated in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals (supra) "the key factor in ascertaining
whether or not there is a landowner-tenant relationship in this case is the nature of the
Tenancy relationship is indivisible. The two-hectare land subject of disputed property."
plaintiff's alleged contract with Socorro Balagtas having been
parcelled into seven (7) and possession thereof The records show that the disputed property, only 1,740 square meters in area, is
relinquished/surrendered in 1965 results in the termination of actually located in the poblacion of San Miguel, Bulacan not far from the municipal
plaintiff's tenancy relationship with the previous owner/landholder. building and the church. It is divided into two lots-Lot 427-B with an area of 841
Such being the case, he cannot now claim that the landholding in square meters and Lot 427-C with an area of 899 square meters. Two other lots
question consisting of 4,000 square meters, more or less, is being which the respondent claims to cultivate as "tenant" were originally owned by Ruben
cultivated by him under the old contract. The owner thereof Ocampo and Juan Mendoza, not Corazon Pengson, through whom the respondent
Corazon Pengson has no tenancy relationship with him (plaintiff). traces his alleged tenancy rights.
(p. 25, Rollo)
Page 11 of 17
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Respondent Baltazar is a full-time government employee working in the Bureau of SO ORDERED.
Plant Industry.
The disputed lots were acquired at a foreclosure sale from the Philippine National
Bank. They were purchased as residential lots and the deed of sale describes them
as "residential." The inspection and appraisal report of the PNB classified the land as
residential. The declaration of real property on the basis of which taxes are paid and
approved by the Acting Provincial Assessor of Bulacan classifies the land as
residential. The tax declarations show that the 841 square meter lot is assessed for
tax purposes at P25,236.00 while the 899 square meter lot is assessed at
P26,920.00. The owner states that the land has only bananas and pomelos on it. But
even if the claim of the private respondent that some corn was planted on the lots is
true, this does not convert residential land into agricultural land.
The presumption assumed by the appellate court, that a parcel of land which is
located in a poblacion is not necessary devoted to residential purposes, is wrong. It
should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed
residential or commercial or non-agricultural unless there is clearly preponderant
evidence to show that it is agricultural.
The respondent court also failed to note that the alleged tenant pays no rental or
share to the landowners. Baltazar made a vague allegation that he shared 70-30 and
50-50 of the produce in his favor. The former owner flatly denied that she ever
received anything from him,
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) The
parties are the landholder and tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The
purpose is agricultural production; and (4) There is consideration; have not been met
by the private respondent.
Page 12 of 17
Agra Cases 2nd
Republic of the Philippines thereof to said plaintiff for the latter's personal cultivation, subject to
SUPREME COURT the provisions of Section 25 of R.A. 3844; and
Manila
2. Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims of the parties. 3
THIRD DIVISION
On appeal by private respondent Pastora San Miguel, the Court of Appeals modified 4
G.R. No. 79416 September 5, 1989 said judgment with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay
her the amount of P 1,376.00. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. 5
FERNAN, C.J.: Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and Gabriel,
Ponciano, Tiburcio, Beatriz, Generosa, Silveria, Leonardo, Felomena, Encarnacion
The issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari certified to us by the Court of and Leonila all surnamed Bonifacio, as children and heirs of Olimpio Bonifacio,
Appeals in its resolution dated November 28, 1986 in CA-G.R. SP No. 10033 as
1
moved for the execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 before the
involving a pure question of law is phrased by petitioners, thus: respondent Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued on
February 20, 1986 and on March 6, 1986, the Deputy Sheriff submitted his Report
(Partial Delivery of Possession), stating in part that except for a portion thereof
WHETHER OR NOT, THE FAVORABLE JUDGMENT OBTAINED occupied by the house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter refused to vacate, he
BY THE DECEDENT IS INHERITED BY THE COMPULSORY had delivered the land subject matter of the action to Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving
HEIRS, THEREBY VESTING TO THE LATTER, ALL THE RIGHTS wife of Olimpio Bonifacio.
CONFERRED BY THE JUDGMENT TO (sic) THE DECEDENT. 2
Thereafter, private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of
The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin to the complaint execution. This was opposed by petitioners who in turn sought the issuance of a writ
filed on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio Bonifacio before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, of demolition and an order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for
Fifth Regional District, Branch I-A of Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking the ejectment of allegedly re-entering the subject land.
private respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land
situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-27298. The ground relied upon therefor was personal cultivation under Section 36 After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15,
(1) of R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code (CAR Case 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:
No. 2160-B'68).
WHEREFORE, the implementation of the writ of execution of the
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered therein on September 18, 1970 by Decision dated September 18, 1970 made by the Sheriff of this
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio: Court, per directive contained in our Order of February 18, 1986, is
hereby declared null and void; the "Motion for Demolition" filed by
plaintiff is hereby denied; and, the "Petition for Contempt" likewise
1. Granting authority to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject denied.
defendant PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in
question situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan with an area of two
(2) hectares, more or less, and consequently, ordering said SO ORDERED. 7
Page 13 of 17
Agra Cases 2nd
Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
Appeals, which as stated earlier, was certified to us pursuant to Section 9 (3) of Batas executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
Pambansa Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5 (2) [e], Art. X of the 1973 Constitution and
Rule 50, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160- school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes . . . .
B'68 can no longer be executed as said action is purely personal in character and
therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs. They Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when
assert that CAR Case No. 2160-B'68, being an ejectment case and not one of those the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of
specifically provided by law to be purely personal, survives the death of a party. his immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law clearly did not intend to limit
Furthermore, as under Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the Rules of Court, a judgment is the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the
binding not only upon the parties but also on their successors-in-interest, petitioners exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly then, the right
are entitled to enforce the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68. of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the
landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation
Private respondent, on the other hand, places stress on the fact that the action under likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members.
consideration is not an ordinary ejectment case but an agrarian case for the ejectment
of an agricultural lessee. She theorizes that the right being asserted in the action is The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members
personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him. She further contends evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was
that the non-substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the proceedings (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In this
taken after his death null and void. She also points to certain supervening events regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding
which allegedly prohibit execution of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68, to wit: with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law
the amendment of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 by R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the engaged in "personal cultivation."
promulgation of P.D. No. 27.
Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term
Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 as more "personal cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a right
than an ordinary ejectment case. It is, indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to
an agricultural lessee, which in the light of the public policy involved, is more closely the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.
and strictly regulated by the State. This factor, however, does not operate to bar the
application to the instant case of the general rule that an ejectment case survives the
death of a party. 8 Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family
members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the
landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 not being a purely personal right of
Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and
ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term successors-in-interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in
gave the impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed only if CAR Case No. 2160-B'68.
and when the landowner-lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding;
thereby giving use to a bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained
exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal right alone. A reading Rules of procedure make it the duty of the attorney to inform the court promptly of his
of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 however readily demonstrates the fallacy of this client's death, incapacity or incompetency during the pendency of the action and to
interpretation. Said section provides: give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative. In case of a party's death, the court, if the action survives, shall then
9
order upon proper notice the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and to
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — be substituted for the deceased within a period of 30 days or within such time as may
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender be granted.10
Private respondent's challenge against the proceedings held after Olimpio Bonifacio's
death cannot therefore be heeded.
Neither can private respondent derive comfort from the amendment of Section 36 (1)
of R.A. 3844 by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 and the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. In
11 12
Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34586, April 2, 1984,128 SCRA 519, we
categorically ruled that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied
retroactively under the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless
otherwise provided therein.
There being no cogent reason to nullify the implementation of the writ of execution in
CAR Case No. 2160-B'68, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
having done so. The writ prayed for should issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution dated July 15, 1986
is hereby SET ASIDE. The immediate execution of the decision in CAR Case No.
Page 15 of 17
Agra Cases 2nd
Republic of the Philippines The officer-in-charge of the NLRC Sub-Regional Office in Dipolog City who
SUPREME COURT investigated the case submitted the following findings which were adopted by the
Manila Labor Arbiter
FIRST DIVISION The record would show that the respondent, Atty. Roque Su, Jr., is a resident of 976-
A Gerardo Avenue Extension, Lahug, Cebu City and at the same time an employee in
G.R. No. 85611 April 6, 1990 the government up to the present, while the land wherein the complainant herein was
employed by the respondent as overseer of the land since 1957 up to and until his
termination from the service sometime in September 1981 without just cause or
VICTORIANO ZAMORAS, petitioner, causes duly authorized by law and after due process. That to prove that complainant
vs. was the overseer of the land owned by the respondent are the sworn declaration of
ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS the three witnesses, namely: Vicente Amor, Narcisa Arocha, and Wilfredo Bernaldes
who are presently working as tenants of the respondent. That the three witnesses
testified that they knew the complainant personally who has been working as
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: overseer of the land because it was through him, the complainant, that they were
allowed to work and/or occupy the land as tenants ever since up to the present. In
fact, they further declared that they do not know personally the owner of the land and
The issue in this petition is whether, upon the established facts, the petitioner was an
besides, they have not seen personally the said owner as their dealing were directly
employee or tenant of the private respondents.
done thru the complainant. That they always received their share of the produce from
the complainant for every two months up to 1981.
The petitioner, Victoriano Zamoras, was hired by the respondent, Roque Su, Jr., in
1957 as overseer of his coconut land in Asenario, Dapitan City. Zamoras was
xxx xxx xxx
charged with the task of having the land titled in Su's name, and of assigning portions
to be worked by tenants, supervising the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the
land, the harvesting of coconuts and selling of the copra. As compensation, Su paid It is very clear in the evidence of record that complainant was an employee of the
Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third (1/3) of the proceeds of the respondent. This fact is even admitted by the respondent in his answer by way of
sales of copra which normally occurred every two months. Another one-third of the controverting the claim of the complainant. (pp. 44-45, Rollo.)
proceeds went to the tenants and the other third to Su. This system of sharing was
regularly observed up to September, 1981. As the coconut plantation yielded an On July 30, 1986, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that Zamoras, as
average harvest of 21,000 nuts worth P18,900, based on the current market price of overseer of the respondent's plantation, was a regular employee whose services were
P3 per kilo, Zamoras' share amounted to P6,300 every two months. necessary and desirable to the usual trade or business of his employer. The Labor
Arbiter held that the dismissal of Zamoras was without just cause, hence, illegal. The
In May, 1981, Su informed Zamoras in writing that he obtained a loan from the other private respondents were ordered to reinstate him to his former position as overseer
respondent, Anita Su Hortellano, and that he authorized her to harvest the coconuts of the plantation and to pay him backwages equivalent to P31,975.83 in the event that
from his property "while the loan was outstanding" (p. 8, Rollo). Su sent Zamoras a he opted not to be reinstated or that his reinstatement was not feasible.
letter dated May 29, 1981 informing him that he was being laid-off temporarily until Su
could obtain a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines with which to pay The private respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission,
Anita. However, Zamoras was not allowed anymore to work as overseer of the alleging that the Labor Arbiter erred:
plantation. Without his knowledge and consent, Hortellano harvested the coconuts
without giving him his one-third share of the copra sales.
1. in disregarding respondents' evidence (a financial report showing the
yearly copra sales from 1973 to 1977), proving that complainant's one-third
On August 8, 1983, Zamoras filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of share of the copra sales amounted to P5,985.16 only and not P6,300 per
Labor and Employment in Zamboanga City a complaint against Roque Su, Jr. and harvest;
Anita Su Hortellano for illegal termination and breach of contract with damages of not
less than P75,600 as his uncollected share of the copra sales from September 15,
2. in not holding that the complainant can no longer be reinstated for he is
1981 to August 1983.
already dead; and
Page 16 of 17
Agra Cases 2nd
3. in not finding that no employer-employee relationship existed between the The element of personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm household,
parties. essential in establishing a landlord-tenant or a lessor-lessee relationship, is absent in
the relationship between Su and Zamoras (Co vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 390; Graza vs. CA,
On September 16, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision reversing the Labor Arbiter. It 163 SCRA 39), for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Su's plantation either by
held that "the right to control test used in determining the existence of an employer- himself or with the help of his household.
employee relationship is unavailing in the instant case and that what exists between
the parties is a landlord-tenant relationship" (p. 32, Rollo), because such functions as On the other hand, the following circumstances are indicative of an employer-
introducing permanent improvements on the land, assigning portions to tenants, employee relationship between them:
supervising the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the plants, and deciding
where and to whom to sell the copra are attributes of a landlord-tenant relationship, 1. Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut
hence, jurisdiction over the case rests with the Court of Agrarian Relations. plantation.
Zamoras filed this petition, assailing the NLRC's decision. 2. His duties were specified by Su.
There is merit in the petition. 3. Su controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He
determined to whom Zamoras should sell the copra produced from the
The NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Su and plantation.
Zamoras is not supported by the evidence which shows that Zamoras was hired by
Su not as a tenant but as overseer of his coconut plantation. As overseer, Zamoras 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of the copra
hired the tenants and assigned their respective portions which they cultivated under sales every two months as compensation for managing the plantation.
Zamoras' supervision. The tenants dealt directly with Zamoras and received their one-
third share of the copra produce from him. The evidence also shows that Zamoras,
aside from doing administrative work for Su, regularly managed the sale of copra Since Zamoras was an employee, not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC, not the Court of
processed by the tenants. There is no evidence that Zamoras cultivated any portion of Agrarian Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamora's complaint for
Su's land personally or with the aid of his immediate farm household. In fact the illegal dismissal (Art. 217, Labor Code; Manila Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC,
respondents never raised the issue of tenancy in their answer. 154 SCRA 368; Jacqueline Industries Dunhill Bags Industries, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.,
69 SCRA 242).
Under Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1199, a tenant is "a person who by himself, or with
the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is reversed and a new one is entered, declaring
or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing Zamoras to be an employee of respondent Roque Su, Jr. and that his dismissal was
the produce with the landholder or for a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in illegal and without lawful cause. He is entitled to reinstatement with backwages, but
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 because he is dead and may no longer be reinstated, the private respondents are
SCRA 276). Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical possession by a person ordered to pay to his heirs the backwages due him, as well as his share of the copra
of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the sales from the plantation for a period of three (3) years from his illegal dismissal in
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his September, 1981, plus separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Costs against the
immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the private respondents.
harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, whether in produce or
in money, or both" (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199; 50 O.G. 4655-56; Miguel Carag vs. CA, et SO ORDERED.
al., 151 SCRA 44).
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is
consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there
is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between
landlord and tenant (Antonio Castro vs. CA and De la Cruz, G.R. L-34613, January
26, 1989; Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. CA, 142 SCRA 138).
Page 17 of 17