INTRODUCTION TO LAND OWNERSHIP

AND REGISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Atty. Pedro Jose F. Bernardo

This text is for limited and exclusive use, and is

intended only for the class in Land Titles and
Deeds taught by Atty. Bernardo at the FEU – La
Salle Joint MBA-JD Program. It is still a work-in-
progress. Unauthorized copying and distribution is
strictly prohibited.
 PART I
INTRODUCTION TO LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

I. The Regalian Doctrine and the Constitution

THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

The Regalian Doctrine is the foremost legal principle introduced in the political
system upon the Spanish Conquest of the Philippine Islands in 1521. This
doctrine assumes that the King, as the Head of State, has the supreme power
over the land, waters, and of the country under jurisdiction. Thus, by virtue of
discovery and conquest of the Philippine Islands, the King of Spain acquired
exclusive dominion over the Islands.

As adopted in our republican system of government, however, this medieval

concept of jura regalia has been stripped of its royal overtones: ownership is
vested in the State. Such ownership, according to the case of Lee Hong Hok v.
David, reflects the capacity of state to own or acquire property and is
understood under the concept of dominium. Thus, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution provides: “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or time, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State.”

Lee Hong Hok v. David

G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972

DOCTRINE: Imperium distinguished from dominum. The government

authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the
concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; and its
capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this
term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their
disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

FACTS: Petitioners Lee Hong Hok et al. claim that the Torrens Title of
Respondent David over the disputed land (which is part of the Naga
Cadastre) should be declared null and void. The CA found no legal
justification for nullifying the right of David over the disputed land
arising from the grant made in his favor by appropriate public officials.

David had acquired lawful title over said land. The Director of Lands
awarded him an order for issuance of a sales patent pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application. Subsequently, on the basis of such
order, the Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an OCT was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Naga City in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: WON the State can dispose of lands which have not passed into
private ownership.

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HELD: In this case the land in question is not private property as the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
have always sustained the public character thereof for having been
formed by reclamation.

It is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons

without any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or
any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.

In the case at bar, a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT was issued in
favor of respondent David by competent public officials. He had
acquired the grant and title legally. The notices regarding the auction
sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to
David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer
of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his
deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land
since 1938.

(The first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII says that “all lands of the
public domain x x x and other natural resources are owned by the
state,”)

A grant by the government through duly competent public officials

cannot be disregarded on the premise that land not passing into private
ownership may not be disposed of by the state.

In discussing the concept of jura regalia, the Supreme Court said:

“2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright

rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between the
government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately
embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or
acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further.
The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of
dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands
held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural
resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during
the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the existence
of res publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v.
Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier
decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held
from the Crown . . ." That was a manifestation of the concept of jura
regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership
however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof.
What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive
discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v. Murciano,
decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated in the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias in these words: "We having acquired
in sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions
not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that

3
 all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration
not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable
increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for
tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and
giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free
and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish."

It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government that "as

to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the
sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, . . ." They continue to
possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant. Where,
as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot
was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public
land is undeniable. What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director
of Lands finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever
that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or
their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government
or by possessory information title or by any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public
domain." For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title
from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The
most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right
or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present
controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been
acquired by any private person from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public
domain." To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.”

The application of Regalian Doctrine on the ownership by the State of the

public domain therefore implies that any person claiming ownership of a
portion of the public domain must be able to show title from the state
according to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title. Thus, all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.

Collado v. Court of Appeals

390 SCRA 343

DOCTRINE: All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private

ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land, alleging that they had occupied the land
since time immemorial and that their possession had been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The court rendered a decision

4
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners, holding that petitioners had
adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the
Lot. On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared
the decision of the trial court null and void. It cited the Regalian
Doctrine, enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8),
and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), which states that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private
respondents herein, bears the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.In
the case at bar, private respondents failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for has been segregated from the bulk
of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be
alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description signed by the
officer in charge of the survey division in the Bureau of Lands
categorically stated that the survey was inside “Marikina Watershed”.
The main thrust of petitioners’ claim over the Lot is that “all Presidential
proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights.” They claim that
the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed
by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable
and disposable.

HELD: The Court finds the petition bereft of merit. It was erroneous for
petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable. The term “public land” referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.” The 1987
Constitution prohibits the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain. Watershed Reservation is a
Natural Resource.

It can therefore be concluded that petitioners did not acquire private

rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating
the same as a watershed reservation. An imperfect title may be derived
from old Spanish grants or a continuous, open and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his
application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141. The petitioners were
unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the
failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under the
original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under
the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.

At the same time, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then,

the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period
of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be
counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section
48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and
disposable public agricultural land.

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 A positive act of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land
which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed
reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant
case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such
Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.

Evidence on record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show

clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title.

Pangkatipuran v. Court of Appeals

379 SCRA 621

DOCTRINE: Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance an application for
judicial confirmation and registration of title to certain lots. The Court of
First Instance promulgated a decision confirming petitioners’ title to the
property. The Official Certificate Title was issued in the name of the
petitioners. Republic of the Philippines filed with the Intermediate
Appellate Court an action to declare the proceedings and titles derived
therefrom as null and void, to direct the register of deeds to annul said
certificates of title, and to confirm the subject land as part of the public
domain. The Court of Appeals set aside the June 15, 1967 decision of the
court a quo and ordered that the subject lot be reverted back to the
public domain.

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title.

Evidence on record showed that at the time of filing of the application

for land registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the
disputed land in the name of petitioners, the same was timberland and
formed part of the public domain. Based on a wrong concept of what is
forest land, the court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners
based on the Republic’s failure to show that the land is more valuable as
forest land than for agricultural purposes.

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 There was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as
disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the
forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. Declassification of
forest land is an express and positive act of Government. It cannot be
presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived.

Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land registration court

did not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings had or
judgment rendered therein is void and is not entitled to the respect
accorded to a valid judgment.

(Petitioners’ contention that the Republic is now barred from questioning

the validity of the certificate of title issued to them considering that it
took the government almost eighteen (18) years to assail the same is
erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription does not run against
the State. The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by petitioners
cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial
property of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable
and indisposable.)

LIMITATIONS ON THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

By virtue of the State’s power of ownership over the public domain, it could
thereby exercise its rights of ownership, which include the power to exploit,
develop and alienate such natural resources. The Constitution, however,
provides for specific limitations to such power. These are enumerated in
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII.

Because we are now only concerned with the Constitutional limitations on the
power of the State to dispose of lands of the public domain, we note the
following specific provisions:

“SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain . . . are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. . .”

“SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,

forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of
the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant.

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 Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.”

Thus, with reference to the Regalian Doctrine, these provisions provide that
while no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government, only alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain may nonetheless be subject of such grant. Furthermore,
the grantees of such land, even if alienable, must similarly comply with the
citizenship requirements prescribed by the Constitution.

It must also be noted that notwithstanding the application of the Regalian

Doctrine, the colonizers applying the doctrine did not intend to strip the natives
of their ownership of lands already belonging to them. This was the ruling in
the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909), where
the Supreme Court said: “when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the
land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest and never have been public land.” Consequently, such land, if not
owned by the State at the time of the Spanish conquest, could not have been
ceded by Spain to the United States through the Treaty of Paris, and later, to
the Philippine Government by the time of the Commonwealth.

The doctrine of immemorial possession set forth in Cariño was also recognized
in the opinion defending the constitutionality Republic Act No. 8371 or
Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA). In the case of Cruz v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000, Republic Act No. 8371 said was
assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived the state of
ownership over lands of public domain and natural resources contained
therein. The votes were deadlocked at 7-7 which meant that the validity of the
IPRA was upheld. The opinion defending the validity of the IPRA held that
ancestral domain and ancestral lands are private and belong to the indigenous
people.

Cariño v. Insular Government

41 Phil. 936

FACTS: An Igorot applied to the Philippine court for registration of a

certain parcel of land. The plaintiff and his ancestors held the land since
time immemorial. The Philippine government opposed such application
saying that there is no prescription against the crown, and even if there
was, the land is not registered therefore it is public land by virtue of the
Decree of June 25, 1880 which required registration for good title; and
because of such the U.S. is the owner of the property by succeeding
Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris.

ISSUE: WON the land is public or not.

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 HELD: It is not public. In this case, every presumption must be in favor of
the individual and against the government. Therefore, it can be “proper
and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.” With
this, it can be inferred that immemorial possession is an exception from
the Regalian Doctrine because it is considered private land even before
the Spaniards came, “when the regalia doctrine was introduced into the
Philippines by colonizers, the colonizers did not intend to strip the
natives of their ownership of lands already belonging to them.”

With regards to the Decree of June 25, 1880, it intended to correct the
wrongful occupation by Filipinos of land belonging to the crown. There is
no evidence that the possession of the petitioner is wrongful.

Cruz v. Executive Secretary

347 SCRA 128

FACTS: RA 8371 was assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it

deprived the State of its ownership over lands of the public domain and
the natural resources in them. RA 8371 defined what are ancestral
domains and ancestral lands.

HELD: The vote was 7-7 which meant that validity was upheld. The
opinion defending constitutionality held the following: (1) ancestral
domain and ancestral lands are not part of lands of the public domain.
They are private and belong to indigenous people. Section 5 commands
the state to protect the rights of indigenous people. Cariño v. Insular
Government recognized native title held by Filipinos from time
immemorial and excluded them from the coverage of jura regalia. (2)
The right of ownership granted does not include natural resources. The
right to negotiate terms and conditions over natural resources covers
only exploration to ensure environmental protection. It is not a grant of
exploration rights. (3) The limited right of management refers to
utilization as expressly allowed in Section 2, Article XII. (4) What is given
is priority right, not exclusive right. It does not preclude the State from
entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing
agreements with private entities.

The opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the following:
(1) the law amounts to an abdication of state authority over a significant
area of the country’s patrimony; (2) it relinquishes full control of natural
resources in favor of indigenous people; (3) the law contravenes the
provision which says that all natural resources belong to the state.

In addition, Philippine jurisprudence has also recognized that aside from lands
held by person through immemorial possession, properties of the State, even if
administered by the Spanish colonizers, are also not considered public land. It
was not the King of Spain who was the owner of ecclesiastical property during
the time of the Spanish occupation; these lands were owned by the Roman
Catholic Church. Therefore ecclesiastical property was never public land and
could not have been transferred to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of
Paris.

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 Barlin v. Ramirez
7 Phil. 41

FACTS: Barlin appointed Ramirez to administer Church property. When

the former asked the latter to return the said property, the latter
refused. He said that the property belongs to the State, and the same is
granted to him by the State.

ISSUE: WON Barlin should return the said property?

HELD: Yes, he should return the said property. First, he is stopped by

recognizing that the said property was only entrusted to him. Second
the land belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. Since it belonged to the
Roman Catholic Church, it was never public and therefore it was not
included to the property ceded by Spain to the U.S. by virtue of the
Treaty of Paris.

Roman Catholic Church v. Municipal of Tarlac

9 Phil. 450

FACTS: Prior to the Revolution, the Church and cemetery is controlled

and administered by the Roman Catholic Church. The said properties
where destroyed during the revolution. On January 10, 1903, by virtue of
the circular, the Insular Government conveyed the land to the
Independent Filipino Church for the purpose of administration in favor of
the Municipality of Tarlac. The Roman Catholic Church seeks to get the
property back. The respondent said that the RCC only administered the
property but does not own it because it belongs to the State.

ISSUE: WON the property involved belonged to the State.

HELD: No, it belongs to the Church. As it was held in Barlin v. Ramirez,

even though the property is administered by the Spanish government it
belonged to the RCC and therefore private property. It could not have
been part of the lands ceded to the U.S. by Spain. And because it is not
part of the property ceded, it is not a property of the State and cannot
by conveyed by it.

Friar lands were also an exception to the Regalian Doctrine because they are
private lands at the time Spain ceded to the United States the Philippine
Islands and by the time they were purchased by the government they were
patrimonial property.1

II. Lands of the Public Domain

The term “public lands” refer to such lands of the public domain as are subject
to alienation and disposal by the State in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 141, of the Public Land Act. It does not include all lands of government
ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement. Accordingly, “government land” and “public
1
Jacinto v. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853.

10
land” are not synonymous terms; the first is more extensive and embraces not
only the second by also other lands of the government already reserved to
public use or subject to private right.2

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

As already set forth above, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain as (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber, (3)
mineral and (4) national parks. The classification is descriptive of the legal
nature of the land and not of what it looks like. Furthermore, under Section 2,
Article XII, alienable lands of the public domain under the Constitution are
limited only to agricultural lands.

This is reflected in Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Public Land
Act. While the Public Land Act generally deals only with alienable lands of the
public domain,3 it nonetheless provides the following specific provision:

SECTION 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary

of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands
of the public domain into —

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

Notably, the power to classify lands of the public domain is vested in the
President. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,4 the Supreme Court,
applying the foregoing provision, ruled that “the classification of public land is
an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and
not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the lands remain as
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. This should be so under time honored Constitutional precepts. This
is also in consonance with the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in the land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.”

Such classifications, however, must be categorical: that is, land is either

completely agricultural or completely mineral or completely forest or park.5 A
land cannot have a mixed classification. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,6 “the
Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself

2
NARCISO PEÑA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES 17 (1997). [hereinafter PEÑA, NATURAL
RESOURCES].
3
See Section 2 of the Public Land Act.
4
129 SCRA 689
5
BERNAS, COMMENTARY supra note 13, at 1145.
6
160 SCRA 228 (1988).

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cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical: the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural.”

Furthermore, the Court ruled in Director of Lands v. Judge Aquino,7 that the
classification of land does not change when the nature of the land changes. A
positive act of the executive is nonetheless needed. Anyone who claims that
the classification has been changed must be able to show the positive act of
the President indicating such positive act.

Director of Lands v. Aquino

192 SCRA 296

FACTS: Abra industrial Corporation sought to register a “limestone-rich

70 hectar land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectars of which allegedly belongs to
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. The lower court gave due course
to the application. It ruled that although part of the land is within the
forest reserve the Bureau of Forestry “offered no objection to exclude
the same area from the forest reserve.” The Director Lands contends
such ruling as incorrect.

ISSUE: WON the Lower Court is correct in granting the application for
registration.

HELD: No, The lack of objection on the part of the Bureau of Forestry is
of no moment because the classification of lands is privilege given only
to the President. Without any positive act from him, a land cannot be
classified nor re-classified.In the present case, there was no positive act
whatsoever from the executive department classifying such land an
alienable or disposable. Therefore, the application for registration must
be denied because the land involved cannot be alienated because it is
Forest Land.

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals

211 SCRA 869

FACTS: Respondents tried to register a certain parcel of land. They have

used the said land for raising livestock for many years. The government
opposed stating the land is classified as a forest land.

ISSUE: WON the registration proper.

HELD: No. The power to classify lands of public domain resides in the
executive department. And if there is proof the executive department
that such land is classified as a forest land therefore the burden of proof
is upon the applicant to show that the involved land is already classified
as alienable. In the present case, the applicant failed to show such
proof. The Court also held that the word “timber” land in the Public Land
Act is the same as “forest” land in the Constitution. And even if the land

7
G.R. No. 31688, December 17, 1990.

12
 does not look like a forest it is still forest land as long as it is classified as
such.

It should also be stressed, however, that, by virtue of the Regalian Doctrine,

the power of the executive to classify lands of the public domain is only a
delegated power by the Philippine legislature. Thus, under Section 6 of the
Public Land Act, both the President and Congress are empowered to declare
what public lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

In addition to the power to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timer, mineral lands and, through the Nipas Act, national parks, the
President also has the power to declare otherwise alienable or disposable lands
as reservations, for town sites and for other public and semi-public purposes.8
The effect of such reservation is that such land, while alienable, cannot be
transferred to public individuals, and must be held by the State, either through
the national government or a corresponding local government unit.

THE PUBLIC LAND ACT AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF ALIENABLE LANDS

OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Public lands, or those lands of the public domain which are open to disposition
and alienation, are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land
Act. Passed into law in 1983, the Act sought to codify all laws relating to public
lands then existing at the time of its enactment. Thus, Section 2 of the Public
Land Act provides for the law’s coverage:

SECTION 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of

the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be
governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be
understood or construed to change or modify the administration
and disposition of the lands commonly called "friar lands" and
those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become
the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which
administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at
present in force or which may hereafter be enacted.

Excepted from the Act were timber and mineral lands, which were to be
governed by special laws, as well as “friar lands”9 and those which, being
privately owned, have reverted back to the government.

Friar lands, which are different from lands owned by the Church, are those
lands of certain haciendas which were acquired by the government from
religious orders/corporations or organizations in 1902. However, even though

8
See Title V of the Public Land Act.
9
Friar lands, which are different from lands owned by the Church, are those lands of
certain haciendas which were acquired by the government from religious
orders/corporations or organizations in 1902. However, even though they were bought by
the Philippine Government they are not considered public lands (Act 1120).

13
they were bought by the Philippine Government they are not considered public
lands.10

Notably, once public lands acquired under any of the methods provided by the
Public Land Act, these are no longer to be governed by the provisions of the
said Act. Thus, it was held that where part of the public lands has been legally
appropriated or acquired by a private individual, the same shall be deemed
segregated from the mass of the public lands and no law or proclamation
thereafter made or issued relating to public lands shall operate upon it
inasmuch as the subject of such free-hold or private land is not embraced in
nor covered by the title of said Act.11

Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are further classified as (a) Agricultural, (b) Residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) Educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public uses.

SECTION 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition,

the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be
classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are
destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture

and Commerce, shall from time to time make the classifications
provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar
manner, transfer lands from one class to another.

It should be stressed that while Section 9 classifies agricultural land separate

from residential, commercial, educational, reservations, etc., all lands
enumerated under the said provision all correspond to agricultural land as
understood within Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution as open to alienation
or disposition. The classification under Section 9, therefore, is for purposes of
administration and disposition, according to the purpose to which said lands
are especially adapted. But notwithstanding this classification, all of said lands
are essentially agricultural lands which may be alienated.

MODES OF DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS

10
WHEREAS, the said lands are not "public lands" in the sense in which those words are
used in the Public Land Act, Number Nine Hundred and twenty-six, and cannot be acquired
or leased under the provisions thereof, and it is necessary to provide proper agencies for
carrying out the terms of said contracts of purchase and the requirements of said Act of
Congress with preference to the leasing and selling of said lands and the creation of a
sinking fund to secure the payment of the bonds so issued (Act 1120).
11
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, GR No. 40399, 40 Phil. 883 (1990).

14
As we have learned under the Regalian Doctrine, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government. In other words, it is indispensable that there be a showing of a
title form the state. One claiming “private rights” must prove that he has
complied with the Public Land Act which prescribes the substantive as well as
the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands.12

Furthermore, only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or

concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
public uses, nor appropriated by the government, nor in any manner become
private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized
by the Act or any valid law may be claimed or which, having been reserved or
appropriated have ceased to be so. In the absence of such classification, the
land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition.13 In Menguito v. Republic,14 it was held that unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.

A. Agricultural Lands

Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as

follows, and not otherwise:15

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Homestead Settlement

By homestead is meant the home, the house and the adjoining land where the
head of the family dwells; the home farm; the fixed residence of the head of a
family, with the land and buildings surrounding the main house.16 Technically,
and under the modern homestead laws, it is an artificial estate in land, devised
to protect the possession and enjoyment of the owner against the claims of his
creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and forced sale, so long
as the land is occupied as a home.17

12
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 19.
13
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 20.
14
348 SCRA 128 (2000).
15
Section 11, Public Land Act.
16
Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 825, 43 Am. Rep. 388.
17
Buckingham v. Buckingham, 8 Mich. 89, 45 N.W. 504.

15
To qualify for a homestead settlement, the applicant must show that he is a
citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or is the head of a
family, and does not own, or has not received by gratuitous allotment from the
government, more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines. Such
homestead settlement must not exceed twenty-four hectares of agricultural
land of the public domain.18 In order to be entitled to a land grant, the
applicant is required to cultivate and improve at least 1/5 of the land
continuously since the approval of the application and has resided therein for
at least one year in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a
municipality adjacent to the same.19

Should the applicant comply with the foregoing obligations, he shall acquire a
vested right to the land, and will be entitled to receive a final deed of
conveyance called a homestead patent. The execution and delivery of the
patent, after the right to a particular parcel of land has become complete, are
the mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with that duty. Even without a
patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense,
unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is still in the
government. Such land may be conveyed or inherited. No subsequent law can
deprive him of that vested right.20

The Supreme Court has held that once a homestead applicant has complied
with all the conditions essential to a government grant, he acquires not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the government. Thus, where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual
physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land, the possessor is deemed to have already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title to be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts – an application
therefore being sufficient under the Public Land Act.21

As explained in Lahora v. Dayanghirang,22 where disposable public land is

granted by the government by virtue of a public land patent (like homestead,
sales or free patent), the patent is recorded and the corresponding certificate
of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought
within the operation of the Property Registration Decree, entitled to all the
safeguards of a veritable Torrens title. In other words, upon expiration of one
year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.

18
Section 12, Public Land Act. Note, however, that under Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, “Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares,
or acquire more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.”
19
Section 14, Id.
20
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 15, at 21-22.
21
Mesina v. Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960, 108 Phil. 251.
22
37 SCRA 346 (1971).

16
In Pajomayo v. Manipon,23 it was held that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act is registered, the certificate of title issued
by virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued
through judicial registration proceedings. This principle is applicable to
certificates of title issued by virtue of other land patents under the Public Land
Act.

Sale

Agricultural lands may also be disposed of through sale in favor of any citizen
of the Philippines over 18 years of age or the head of a family, but not to
exceed twelve hectares.24 The sale is required to be made through seal public
bidding whereby the land sought to be purchased shall be awarded to the
highest bidder, but the applicant may equal the highest bid.25 The purchase
price may be paid in full upon the making of the award or in not more than ten
equal annual installments from the date of the award. It is required that the
purchaser shall have not less than one-fifth of the land cultivated within five
years from the date of the award, and before any patent is issued, he must
show actual occupancy, cultivation and improvement of at least one-fifth of the
land until the date of final payment.26

In addition to the foregoing obligations, the grantee is also not permitted to

convey or encumber any of his rights over the land to any person, corporation,
or association without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and
National Resources. This limitation shall subsist for a period of ten (10) years
from the title is granted to the patentee. Notably, any sale or encumbrance
made in violation of the provisions of this section shall be null and void, and
shall procedure the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the
property and all rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase
price made to the government shall be forfeited.27

Lease

Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any corporation or association
of which at least sixty per centum of the capital stock or of any interest in said
capital stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippines, may lease any tract
of agricultural public land available for lease under Chapter VI (Lease) of the
Act.28 Pursuant to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private corporations
may lease alienable lands of the public domain for a period not exceeding 25
years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000
hectares. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than 500 hectares, or
acquire no more than 12 hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.29

23
39 SCRA 676 (1971).
24
Supra note 137.
25
26
Sections 22, 26 and 28, Public Land Act.
27
Section 29, Id.
28
Sec. 33, Ibid.
29
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 15, at 24-25.

17
It shall be an inherent and essential condition of the lease that the lessee shall
have not less than one-third of the land broken and cultivated within five years
after the date of the approval of the lease. However, in case the land leased is
to be devoted to pasture, it shall be sufficient compliance with this condition if
the lessee shall graze on the land as many heads of cattle as will occupy at
least one-half of the entire area at the rate of one head per hectare.30

Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title

Under the Public Land Act, persons already in possession of alienable lands of
the public domain may, by the mere passage of time or failure to obtain title
through no fault of their own, be constituted owners of the said parcels of land,
subject to the qualifications and limitations set forth therein.

Thus, when an applicant conforms to all the requisites of confirmation

prescribed under the Public Land Act, he obtains the right to a grant without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The application for
confirmation becomes a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.31

Susi v. Razon
48 Phil. 424 (1925)

Petitioner Susi has been in open, continuous, adverse and public

possession, personally and through his predecessors, of a certain parcel
of land since 1880. Then the Director of Lands sold the said land to the
respondent by virtue of an application for purchase filed on August 15,
1914. The court ruled that by the time the respondent filed his
application for purchase the petitioner has already possessed the land
for thirty-four years, the petitioner already had a right over the land. By
that time ,the land ceased to be public and therefore removing it from
the disposition of the Director of Lands therefore making the sale
between the Director of Lands and Razon invalid.

Confirmation of imperfect title over alienable lands of the public domain may
be achieved judicially, or through administrative confirmation via the issuance
of free patents.

i. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title

The Public Land Act, and subsequent amendments thereto,32 enumerate the
following requirements necessary for the judicial confirmation of imperfect
title:

(1) The land sought to be registered must form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.

30
Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act No. 141.
31
Herico v. DAR, 95 SCRA 437 (1980).
32
Republic Act No. 3872, Presidential Decree No. 1073, Republic Act 9176.

18
The current state of law requires that the land sought to be registered must be
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. As provided in Presidential
Decree No. 1073, which amends Section 48(b) and (c) of the Act:

“Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and (c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the application himself or thru his
predessessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Thus, lands classified as forest or timber lands, mineral lands and lands within
national parks are excluded. This is due to the rule in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution, limiting alienable and disposable public lands only to
agricultural lands. The rule on confirmation of imperfect title does not apply
unless and until the land classified as, say, a forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.33 There must be a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or statute.34 Hence, the applicant must secure a
certification from the government that the land applied for by the applicant is
alienable and disposable.35

It must be noted, however, that Republic Act No. 3872, which amended Section
48 of the Public Land Act on 18 June 1964, added a new sub-section thereto
which recognized the right of cultural minorities to seek judicial confirmation
even over lands which were not considered alienable or disposable. This right
was limited by Presidential Decree No. 1073 which, as earlier mentioned,
reiterated that only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain may be
the subject of judicial confirmation. Notwithstanding the enactment of
Presidential Decree No. 1073, however, the Supreme Court affirmed in
Republic v. Court of Appeals36 that members of cultural minorities were entitled
to apply for judicial confirmation between 18 June 1964 through the enactment
of Republic Act No. 3872, until 25 January 1977 when Presidential Decree No.
1073 was issued.

While the present state of the law requires that only alienable and disposable
land of the public domain may be the subject of judicial confirmation
proceedings, there is authority to hold that the land subject of the claim of
ownership must be alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the
application for registration of title, and not for the entire period of possession.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit:37

33
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 193 (2000).
34
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ceniza, 392 SCRA 190 (2002).
35
Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 (1991).
36
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, August 21, 1991.
37
G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442

19
 “… the phrase “since June 12, 1945” qualifies its antecedent
phrase “under a bona fide claim of ownership.” Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located. Hence, what the law merely
requires is that the property sought to be registered is “already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.” In other words, it is not necessary
that the land be first classified as bona fide claim of ownership
could start. “If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate
its exclusive prerogative over the property.”38

(2) The applicant must be a Filipino citizen, who must have, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, possessed and occupied the land in
the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945

Aliens are barred from applying for the benefits of Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act 141 for they are barred by the Constitution from owning
alienable lands of the public domain. In Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,39 a
Chinese national was denied from applying for judicial confirmation because he
was a foreign national.

Similarly, the constitution limits ownership of lands of the public domain to

individuals and not corporation, even if they be Filipino corporations. Thus,
corporations are also prohibited from applying for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over public lands. The exception to this rule, however, is found
in the case of Susi v. Razo,40 where the Supreme Court allowed a Filipino
corporation to apply for judicial confirmation. The reason is because
compliance with all the requirements for a Government grant, i.e., possession
in the manner and for the period required by law, the land ipso jure ceased to
be public land and became private property. Thus, provided that the Filipino
corporation’s predecessor-in-interest had been in possession and occupation
thereof in the manner and for the period prescribed by law as to entitle him to
registration in his name, the ban against corporations acquiring lands of the
public domain does not apply.41

38
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 121, at 72.
39
75 Phil. 890 (1946).
40
48 Phil. 424 (1925).
41
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Veneer & Plywood co.,
Inc., 146 SCRA 509 (1986).

20
It must also be underscored that acquisition of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain through judicial confirmation of imperfect title may be
considered an exception to the general rule about prescription running against
properties of the State provided in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which
provides:

Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.

(3) The application must be filed before 31 December 2020.

Under the original provisions of the Public Land Act, actions for judicial
confirmation were only allowed until 31 December 1938. Subsequent enacts
extended this period until the most recent legislation, which sets the deadline
at 21 December 2020 (Republic Act No. 9176). The filing of the application
within the foregoing time period, however, is not a jurisdictional requirement,
only a time limitation. Thus, an application filed beyond the foregoing period,
but not objected to by the State either in a Motion to Dismiss or Answer, does
not prevent the Court from granting such application.42

ii. administrative confirmation of imperfect title: Free Patents

Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act, any natural born citizen of the
Philippines who does not yet own more than 12 hectares of agricultural land
may apply for a free patent, provided that he, by himself, or by his
predecessors-in-interest, has continuously occupied and cultivated agricultural
land of the public domain for at least thirty (30) years since 4 July 1945. In lieu
of continuous cultivation, it may be sufficient for the applicant to show that he
has paid real estate taxes on the property for the same period and that the
same has not been occupied by any other person.43 The land grant,
conformably with the Constitution, cannot exceed 12 hectares.

If the applicant is a member of a national cultural minority and has

continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land whether disposable or not
since July 4, 1955, he shall also be entitled to a free patent not exceeding 12
hectares..44

Similar to applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, all application

for free patents must be filed before 31 December 2020, in accordance with
Republic Act No. 9176. Also, the land subject of possession must, at least at
the time of the application, be classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.

Special patents
42
Director of Lands v. Danao, 96 SCRA 161 (1980).
43
C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 782, Sec. 44.
44
C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 3872, Sec. 44.

21
Aside from the foregoing land patents enumerated under the Public Land Act,
special patents may also be issued over lands formerly reserved or considered
inalienable. These patents are generally issued upon the “promulgation of a
special law or act of Congress or by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources as authorized by an Executive Order of the President” and, in
themselves, already provide for the reclassification of the land.45

Special patents may be granted to Non-Christian Filipinos46 so long as the

Secretary of Local Government has certified that “the majority of the non-
Christian inhabitants of any given reservation have advanced sufficiently in
civilization.” After which, “the President may order that the lands of the public
domain within such reservation be granted to them” pursuant to the provisions
of the Public Land Act.47 Special patents involving lands sold under the
provisions of Article 60 and 70 of the Public Land Act may likewise be issued to
authorize concession of lands of the public domain for educational, charitable
or any of the like purposes.48 Furthermore, they also may be issued in favor of
the owner of the landed estate acquired by the Government. Republic Act No.
926 authorizes the President to convey public lands and other properties of a
public nature as payment for the acquisition of such estates.49

Emancipation patents

Emancipation patents are patents issued pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos.

27 and 266 in furtherance of the government’s policy of agrarian reform.
Unlike the land patents enumerated under the Public Land Act, emancipation
patents do not cover lands of the public domain, but instead, private
agricultural lands. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the provisions of Presidential Decree
Nos. 27 and 266 have generally been superseded.50

B. Sale or Lease of Public Lands for Residential, Commercial or Industrial

Purposes.

Under Chapter IX of the Public Land Act, lands intended for residential,
commercial, industrial and similar productive purposes may be disposed of by
sale or lease thru public bidding, generally following the procedure prescribed
for agricultural lands. The land or the right to lease is acquired also in a public
auction thru bidding. The difference, however, lies in the fact that where in
agricultural sales, the auction sale is thru sealed bidding with the applicant
enjoying the right to equal the highest bid, the auction sale of residential,
commercial and industrial lands is thru oral bidding – where the applicant has

45
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 15, at 55.
46
AMADO D. AQUINO( LAND REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS 149 (200). [hereinafter AQUINK, LAND
REGISTRATION]
47
C.A. 141, Sec. 84.
48
Supra note 193.
49
ALUINO, LAND REGISTRATION , supra 193, at 150.
50
Supra note 200.

22
to outbid the other bidders in order to be successful bidder. In other words, the
applicant does not have preferential right, unless he is an applicant who has
introduced improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him by
the Bureau of Lands, in which case he has the right to a sealed bidding.

Lands disposable for residential, commercial or industrial purposes are

classified as:

a. Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filing, or other

means
b. Foreshore
c. Marshy land or lands covered with water bordering upon the
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers.

The conditions of the sale are as follows:

a. The purchaser shall enter the land and introduce suitable

improvements thereon within six (6) months, and complete such
improvements not later than 18 months from the date of the
award.
b. The purchaser shall pay the purchase price of the land in ten (10)
equal annual installments.

In case of lease, the rental shall be 3% of the value of the land plus 1% of the
value of the improvements. Every ten (10) years, the land and improvements
shall be reappraised but the rental shall not be increased by more than 100%
every ten years.

The duration of the lease is 25 years renewable for another 25 years at the
government’s option.

Under R.A. No. 730 direct or negotiated sale of public land may be resorted to
if: (a) the applicant has occupied the same and has in good faith built a
residential house thereon where he lives, (b) he is not the owner of any
residential lot, and (c) the land is not needed by the government for any public
purpose.

Development of the laws governing foreshore/reclaimed areas

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 is the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. Under this law,
the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of the
Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. This law allowed
the reclamation of the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State,
or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons.51 It also provided that the
reclaimed land from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the
reclamation, provided the government issues the necessary permit and did not
reserve ownership over such land.

51
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, seb. 5.

23
Act No. 1654 was enacted by the Philippine Commission on May 18, 1907,
which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. This act mandated that the
government should retain title to, and exercise control and disposition of, all
reclaimed lands. Private parties could lease these lands only if they were no
longer needed for public use. Public bidding for the lease of these lands was
also prescribed.

Act No. 2874 also known as the Public Land Act, was approved by the
Philippine Legislature in Nov. 29, 1919. It authorized the lease, but not the
sale, of reclaimed lands of government to corporations and individuals. Under
this law, the Governor-General was authorized to: (1) classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands (2) declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession and (3) to classify further such lands into
government, reclaimed, foreshore, marshy, and other classes of lands. It also
limited alienable lands to those which have been officially delimited and
classified. The land must first be declared not necessary for public use before
allowing lease to private parties.52

Commonwealth Act No. 141 also known as the Public Land Act, was passed by
the National Assembly which also authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. C.A. No.
141 continues to be the general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. Under this law, the President had the
same powers as those of the Governor-General under Act No. 2874 except that
the President is not authorized, under this law, to reclassify reclaimed lands
into non –agricultural lands. The sale of lands of public domain was likewise
prohibited, only lease was allowed subject to the same conditions prescribed in
Act No. 2874. The government could sell to private parties only those
agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as disposable
lands of the public domain.

State policy prohibits the sale of these lands, as they are part of public
dominion intended for public use. This state policy has been embodied in the
1935 , 1973 as well as in the 1987 Constitution. Since then and until now, the
only way the government could sell government reclaimed areas to private
properties is through a legislative enactment allowing such sale. The reason
behind this requirement is that government units and entities should not just
turn around and sell these lands to private properties in violation of
constitutional or statutory limitations.

C. Disposition of Public Lands for Educational, Charitable and Similar

Purposes

Lands under this category may be disposed of by the Government in favor of a

province, city, municipality or other branches of the Government in the form of
donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any form.

52

Aat No. 2874, secs. 6, 7, 8, 56 and 58.

24
Such lands may also be sold or leased to qualified private persons for the
purpose of founding a cemetery, church, college, school, university or other
educational institutions for educational, charitable or philantrophical purposes
or scientific research. The Secretary of the DENR has the discretion to sell the
land without auction and to waive the condition requiring cultivation.

D. Townsite Reservations

The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and

Natural Resources, may, if public interest so requires, issue a proclamation
reserving lands for townsite purposes to found a new town.

Procedure:

a. Survey of the exterior boundaries of the site

b. Drafting the proclamation
c. Signing of the proclamation
d. Transmittal of copies of the proclamation to the Director of Lands
and the Register of Deeds
e. Filing of compulsory registration proceedings to settle and
adjudicate private claims within the townsite
f. Subdivision of the land according to development plans
g. Sale of residential lots by oral bidding to the highest bidder

Reservations of Public and Quasi-Public Purposes

The President also has the power to designate by proclamation any tract or
tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic
of the Philippines or any of its branches or of the inhabitants thereof, of for
quasi-public uses or purposes when public interest requires it, including
reservations for highways, rights-of-way for railroads, hydraulic power sites,
irrigation systems, communal pasture or legua communales, public parks,
public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen’s village and other
improvements for public benefit.

Preferential Rights of Actual Occupants

If, before the delimitation and survey of a tract of public land and before its
classification as alienable and disposable, such land shall be actually occupied
by a person other than the applicant, the Director of Lands shall inform the
occupant of his preferential right to apply for the land and shall give him 120
days’ time in which to file the application or apply for the concession by any of
the forms of disposition authorized by this Act, if such occupant is qualified to
receive a concession under this Act.

Legal Restrictions and Encumbrances

Homestead and Free Patent grants are subject to the following restrictions:

25
a. Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches,
units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the
date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from
and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land
may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations.

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years

and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which
approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.

b. Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by
the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from
the date of the conveyance.

c. Sec. 120. Conveyance and encumbrance made by persons belonging to

the so-called "non-Christian Filipinos" or national cultural minorities,
when proper, shall be valid if the person making the conveyance or
encumbrance is able to read and can understand the language in which
the instrument or conveyance or encumbrances is written.
Conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate non-Christian or
literate non-Christians where the instrument of conveyance or
encumbrance is in a language not understood by the said literate non-
Christians shall not be valid unless duly approved by the Chairman of
the Commission on National Integration.

d. Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the
Secretary of Natural Resources, and solely for commercial, industrial,
educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way, no
corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right,
title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land granted under
the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act or to
any permanent improvement on such land.

The provisions of Section 124 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding,

any acquisition of such land, rights thereto or improvements thereon by
a corporation, association, or partnership prior to the promulgation of
this Decree for the purposes herein stated is deemed valid and binding;
Provided, That no final decision of reversion of such land to the State
has been rendered by a court; And Provided, further, That such
acquisition is approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources within six
(6) months from the effectivity of this Decree.

e. Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions
of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall

26
 encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public
domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines
authorized therefor by their charters.

Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any portion thereof

originally acquired under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale
provisions of this Act, or any permanent improvement on such land,
shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or
any permanent improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when
the area of said land, added to that of his own, shall exceed one
hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease
made in violation hereof, shall be null and void.

E. Lands not susceptible of private ownership

The following properties cannot be the subject of private ownership, and

therefore, cannot be registered in the name of a private person. Thus, i a
person obtains title under the Torrens System which includes lands which
cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not by virtue of said
title become the owner of the land illegally included thereon. Those titles are
void ab initio and any title issued over non-disposable lots, even in the hands
of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. 53

Property of public dominion

Article 419 of the Civil Code provides that the following are properties of public
dominion:

(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.

These properties are parts of the public domain and are outside the commerce
of men and are therefore, not subject to private appropriation. These
properties, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale.

All other properties of the State, which are not of the character mentioned
above, form part of its patrimonial property. Property of public dominion, when
no longer needed for public use or for public service, shall also form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.

According to Article 5 of the Water Code of the Philippines, the following belong
to the State as well: (1) rivers and their natural beds; (2) continuous or
53
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 30.

27
intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the
bed themselves; (3) natural lakes and lagoons; (4) all other categories of
surface waters such as water flowing over lands, water from rainfall whether
natural, or artificial, and water form agriculture run-off, seepage and drainage;
(5) atmospheric water; (6) subterranean or ground waters and; (7) seawater.

Article 6 of the same Code provides that even the following waters found in
private lands belong to the state: (1) continuous or intermittent waters rising
on such lands; (2) lakes and lagoons naturally occurring on such lands; (3) rain
water falling on such lands; (4) subterranean or ground waters and; (5) waters
in swamps and marshes.

Forest lands

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution, do not
necessarily refer to a large tract of wooden land or an expanse covered by
dense growth of trees and underbrush.54 The fact that the disputed land “is not
thickly forested” and, in any event, it has been in the actual possession of
many persons for many years, it was already “private land” which is better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
Furthermore, the mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral
within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the
other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals, which it is more valuable for
the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural
purposes.55

The power to convert a land which forms part of public forest into private
property is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development and beyond the power of the registration court.56 Possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property.

Ankron v. Government of the Philippines

40 Phil. 10

Facts: An action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the

Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its purpose was
to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel
of land with the following description:

That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north, the
exact description and extension of which does not appear, has been
cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years prior to the date of
this decision.

54
Naguit, G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005.
55
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 14213, Aug. 23, 1919, 40 Phil.
10.
56
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lastimado, 89 SCRA 648 (1979); Director of Lands v.
Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 (1975); Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals and Gallo, 153 SCRA
351 (1987).

28
That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by Moros,
Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and that they lived
thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion of the land
which was not planted or cultivated was used as pasture land whereon
they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses;

That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of hemp,
some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling house, various
laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin (storehouse of wood, a
galvanized iron and other buildings and improvements on said land.

The appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be registered in

accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the reason that
they are manglares. That question is not discussed in the present brief.
The appellant, however., refers the court to his discussion of that
question in the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep.,
560). By reference to the argument in the brief in the case, it is found
that the appellant relied upon the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1148
in relation with section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second Administrative
Code). Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall
include all unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age." Said
section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of this
chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated,
all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all
forest reserves of whatever character."

HELD: Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the

registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public
agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that it
appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for registration
must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is public forestry land or
public mineral land, the petition for registration must be denied. Many
definitions have been given for "agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral"
lands. These definitions are valuable so far as they establish general
rules. In this relation we think the executive department of the
Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in view
especially of the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148,
define what shall be considered forestry lands, to the end that the
people of the Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a
continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products." (Sec. 8,
Act No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and definitely
define what lands are forestry, occupants in the future would be greatly
assisted in their proof and the courts would be greatly aided in
determining the question whether the particular land is forestry or other
class of lands.

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-

General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that
a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land.
There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of
the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral"
lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to

29
 say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that
it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than
it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to
show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some
mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid
growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case
must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard
for its present or future value for one or the other purposes.

The courts, however, has the right to presume in the absence of

evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
therefore, be a matter of proof.

Watersheds

A watershed is “an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a
boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds.”57 Protection
of the watersheds is an “inter-generational responsibility”. Watershed
reservation is not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or
alienation.58

Mangrove swamps

Section 4 of the Philippine Fisheries Code defines mangroves as “a community

of intertidal plants including all species of trees, shrubs, vines and herbs found
on coasts, swamp or border camps. It is now settled that mangroves are
forestal, not alienable agricultural land and are, therefore, not subject to
disposition.59

Mineral lands

DENR defines mineral land as “any area where mineral resources are found”
and mineral resources as “any concentration of mineral /rocks with potential
economic value.”60 Ownership by a person of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered does not give him the right to extract or utilize the
said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals
belong.61

National parks

57
Sta. Rosa Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 367 SCRA 175 (2001).
58
Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343.
59
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-32266, Feb. 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598.
60
Sec 4(aj) and (an), DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, as amended.
61
Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa, G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160
SCRA 228.

30
Lands reserved for a national park, as well as those within the protected areas
under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act, like the
Bataan Natural Park, are inalienable are cannot be registered.62

Military or naval reservation

Lands inside a military or naval reservation cannot be the object of

registration. It was held in Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association,
Inc.,63 that a military reservation, like the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation or
a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore,
not registrable, unless it is reclassified and declared as disposable and
alienable public land.
Foreshore lands and reclaimed lands64

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate Corporation,65

“foreshore land” has been invariably defined as “that strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide” or “that part of the land adjacent to the sea
which is alternatively covered by the ordinary flow of the tides.”

Republic. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 103882, November 25, 1998

Facts: Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on June
22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered
cities and municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:

Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered

cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation
by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper
and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899, the

Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of
Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City,
empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation
contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said
Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which
authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim
foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.
Certain portions of the said lands are submerged lands

On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement for
the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City.

62
Cham v. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, August 16, 2005.
63
G.R. No. 156951, Septempber 22, 2006.
64
OSWALDO D. AGCAOLI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE AND RELATED LAWS (LAND TITLES AND DEEDS) 225-
235, (2006 ed.). [hereinafter AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE]
65
299 SCRA 199 (1998).

31
 The Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint questioning
subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit "P") on the
grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the
commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899
with regard to the phrase “foreshore lands”

Issue: WON the lands in dispute are considered “foreshore lands” and
cannot, therefore, be alienated

HELD: The CA ruled erroneously when it opinioned that under RA 1899,

the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As can be
gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the
respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of
"foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against the
recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to
the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. So also, resort to extrinsic aids,
like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the
language of the law being plain and unambiguous. Then, too, opinions of
the Secretary of Justice are unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake
or omission in the law. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Words
and Phrases, "Foreshore")

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part
of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin
of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide
usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary)

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so

doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the coverage
thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it
should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could
only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term "foreshore
lands.

Submerged lands

Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the
Constitution, “waters. . . owned by the State” forming part of the public domain
and consequently inalienable. These areas, after reclamation, can be classified
as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural
resources that the State can alienate. Thereafter, the government may declare
these lands no longer needed for public service and therefore, alienable and
disposable lands open disposition.66

Republic Act 4850 was passed on June 22, 1957 which authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. On

66
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152.

32
January 11, 1973, Presidential Decree No. 3-A was issued, repealing all laws on
reclamation of areas under water and vesting solely in the government the
power to reclaim lands.

On February 4, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1084 was issued, creating the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) which was renamed as Philippine Reclamation
Authority in 2004. It authorized PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged
areas of the public domain. It also empowers PEA to hold lands of public
domain even in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute.
Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of public
domain.

Executive Order 525 was issued on 1979 which designated PEA as the national
government’s implementing arm to undertake “all reclamation projects of the
government” which “shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity. Under such contract,
reclamation services rendered to PEA by private parties shall be compensated.
PEA becomes primarily responsible for “integrating, directing, and coordinating
all reclamation projects and on behalf of the National Government.”

However, reclaimed areas do not automatically become alienable or disposable

upon acquisition by the PEA. Two official acts are needed before reclaimed
lands become alienable lands of public domain. First, there must be a
classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition; and second, there must be a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service. Absent these two official acts, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.

Nevertheless the requirement of a legislative enactment allowing the sale of

reclaimed disposable lands still applies to reclaimed areas of the PEA. The
PEA’s power is further subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of public domain.

However, in a May 6, 2003 Resolution, the court clarified that “reclaimed lands
of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation
for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property…[and] may be
sold…to private properties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
corporations.”67

Lakes

Republic Act No. 4850 prescribes that lands located at and below the
maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public lands which
form part of the bed of the said lake.68 Areas forming part of the Laguna de Bay
are neither agricultural nor disposable lands of the public domain.

67
BERNAS, PRIMER, supra note 11 at 457.
68
Sec. 41, par. 11, Republic Act No. 4850, An Act Creating the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Prescribing its Powers, Functions and Duties, Providing Funds Therefor, and for
other purposes.

33
Navigable rivers

If the land forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river, the
decree and title in the name of the applicants would not give them any right or
title to it. Like the rest of the non-disposable properties, a land registration
court has no jurisdiction over navigable rivers and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title thereof in favor of a private applicant. Ownership of a
navigable stream may not be acquired under a free patent and the issuance of
the corresponding certificate of title does not change its public character.69 It is
part of public property and cannot be acquired by adverse possession.70

Creeks

A creek has been defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. Under the Civil Code, a creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.71 It is only
after the government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.72
Constructions of a creek which prevent the water from flowing or convert it into
a fishpond do not alter the nature of the creek as a public property.73

Reservation for public and semi-public purposes

The Public Land Act prescribes that a tract or tracks of land of the public
domain may be designated by the President as reservations for the use of the
Republic of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, in accordance with the regulations prescribed for this purpose. Until
again declared alienable by the President, under Section 83 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 or by proclamation, these lands remain part of the pubic domain
and shall not be subject to disposition.

The President may likewise reserve other lands, the use of which is not
otherwise declared by law, for settlement or public use. He shall also have the
power to reserve from sale or disposition any land belonging to the private
domain of the government, or any of the friar lands, the use of which is not
otherwise declared by law. These lands shall thereafter remain directed to the
public use designated by the President.74

Pursuant to Section 9 of the Public Land Act, the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
“shall from time to time make the classification provided for in this section, and
69
Mateo v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-21024, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 796.
70
Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557.
71
An Act to ordain and institute the Civil Code of the Philippines [Civil Code] arts. 420(1)
and 502(1).
72
Celestial v. Cachopero, G.R. No. 142595, October 15, 2003.
73
Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 455 (1918).
74
Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987.

34
may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to
another.”75

NOTE: CAN BE REGISTERED AND BROUGHT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF PD1529

(consistent with the fact that technically, it is alienable), BUT REGISTERED IN
THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT.

III. Private Lands

A. Distinction between Lands of the Public Domain and Private Lands

According to Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,

“Sec. 7 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands

shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.

Our ancestors acquired and physically possessed and held lands which they
considered belong to them. Nobody bothered them. Upon the Spanish
conquest and occupation of the Islands, all lands within the territory of the
Philippine Islands automatically belonged to the Crown of Spain. And, the land
and property laws of Spain, ipso jure, took effect therein. This is the Regalian
Doctrine.76

The Crown Lands were distributed to the inhabitants in accordance with the
laws of Spain, principally the laws of the Indias (Recopilacion de las Leyes de
Indias),77 and became lands of private ownership or private lands.

This transformation transpired once more during the American Occupation of

the Philippine Islands in 1898, by way of (1) State Grant – the Homestead
Patent; (2) Sale – the Sales Patent; and (3) Administrative and Judicial
Confirmation of Imperfect title –the Free Patent. All Free Patent were available
as they are now, under the Public Land Act.78

Agricultural lands of the public domain are deemed alienable and disposable
and by the foregoing methods of land acquisition, public lands ceased as such
and became private lands of the purchaser, or occupants and possessors.79

Therefore, private land, may be as it has been, defined as “any land of private
ownership.” This includes both lands owned by private individuals and lands
which are patrimonial property of the state or of municipal corporations.80
Property of private ownership includes (1) the patrimonial property of the

75
Republic v. Octobre, 123 SCRA 698 (1966).
76
Piñero v. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386 (1974).
77
Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 (1908).
78
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 168.
79
Id.
80
BERNAS, PRIMER, supra note 11, at 469.

35
State, and (2) “property belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively.”81 Most of these private lands emanated from private agricultural
lands that had been, or may still be, sold or granted by the State to individual
citizens, associations and corporation qualified “to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain and subject to the limitations provided by law.82

Private property and patrimonial property

Private property connotes ownership of an “immovable” or real property,

and/or a “movable” or personal property. As abovementioned, it specifically is
comprised of all property that belongs to private persons, natural or juridical,
either judicially or collectively. And real property is described in the Civil Code
as (1) the “immovable” or property which consists principally of land; (2) those
“movables” as the buildings, trees plants, statues or other objects placed on
land that reveals the “intention to have them permanently attached to the
land”; and (3) the real rights over the immovable property.83

Property ownership, or land of private ownership and private property are

synonymous. It also means, and includes the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities. These are property of public dominion that
are no longer intended or needed: (1) for public use; (2) for public service; or
(3) for the development of national wealth. Some of these are rivers shores,
banks, ports fortresses, roads and street, parks and others.84

A stone fort on land by the sea, constructed since time immemorial as a

defense against the Moro invasion, that had not been used for many years for
that purpose became private or patrimonial property of the State.85
San Lazaro Estate in Manila on which stood the San Lazaro Hospital is private
or patrimonial property of the State under Articles 340 and 345 of the Spanish
Civil Code (now Articles 421 and 425 of the Civil Code).86

Friar lands are patrimonial property of the State under Act No. 1120 and
Commonwealth Act no. 141. In 1906, the Philippine Commission headed by
Governor William H. Taft proposed the purchase of Friar Lands, belonging to
the Dominica, Augustinian and Recoletos Mission. The Philippine Bill of 1902
authorized the purchase of friar lands to be sold to actual occupants and
settlers. Accordingly, Governor Taft proceeded to Rome in 1903, and
purchased form the highest ecclesiastical authorities 410,000 acres of Friar
Lands at $7,230,000. Sometime in 1938, the Philippine Government bought
another Friar Land, a “big run-down Riceland,” the Buenavista Estate, near
Manila at $1,500,000 from San Juan de Dios Hospital.87

81
CIVIL CODE, art. 425.
82
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 80.
83
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 169.
84
Id.
85
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VOL. II 32
(1963).
86
Id. at 34.
87
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 170.

36
In Cruz v. Secretary,88 the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act or IPRA was assailed
as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprives the State of its ownership
over lands of the public domain and the natural resources in them. The vote of
the Supreme Court was equally divided, 7-7. The opinion defending
constitutionality held the following: (1) Ancestral domain and ancestral lands
are not part of lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to
indigenous people. Cariño v. Insular Government89 recognized native title held
by Filipinos from time immemorial and excluded from the concept of jura
regalia. (2) The right of ownership granted does not include natural resources.
The right to negotiate terms and conditions over natural resources covers only
exploration to ensure environmental protection. It is not a grant of exploration
rights. (3) The limited right of management refers to utilization as expressly
allowed in Section 2, Article XII. (4) What is given is priority right, not exclusive
right. It does not preclude the State from entering into co-production, joint
venture, or production sharing agreements with private entities.

On the other hand, the opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held
the following: (1) the law amounts to abdication of the authority over a
significant area of the country’s patrimony; (2) it relinquishes full control of
natural resources in favor of indigenous people; (3) the law contravenes the
provision which says that all natural resources belong to the state.

Classification of private lands

The phrase “private lands” or “lands of private ownership” have been defined
in our jurisprudence as those lands of the public domain: (1) That are, or has
been in the possession of occupants and their predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial.90 (2) That had been awarded to an applicant with (a) Sales
or Homestead Patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 19-32), or Title
issued by virtue of the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754; or (b) Free Patent
under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 47-56); (c) Title by Composition with
the State pursuant to the Maura’s Royal Decreed; (4) Possessor Information
issued under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1893 after the composition or
confirmation of imperfect title held by the occupant with claim of ownership.
Private lands may be classified in the same manner as those of public lands.91

B. Constitutional Restrictions

As a general rule, only the following may acquire private lands pursuant to
Section 7:

(1) Filipino citizens and

(2) Corporations or associations incorporated in the Philippines, at
least 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens as defined
in Section 2.

88
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000.
89
212 U.S. 449.
90
Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 936 (1909).
91
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW supra note 1, at 184-185.

37
Exception to the rule

However, by exception the following may also acquire private lands:

(1) Aliens, but only by hereditary succession.

(2) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost Philippine
citizenship but only under the terms provided in Section 8, Article
XII which states that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7
of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship maybe a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.”92
(3) Foreign states may acquire land but only for embassy and staff
residence purposes.

In Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, the Court held to extend the exception to

testamentary succession for otherwise the provision will be for naught and
meaningless.93 Another jurisprudential exception is when an alien acquires land
by hereditary succession, such alien cannot renounce the right to inherit in
favor of one who is not qualified.94 In the case of Moss v. Director of lands, the
Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution provided that until final
withdrawal of the United States, Americans and American Corporations enjoyed
the same civil rights as Filipino citizens and could therefore acquire private
lands until July 4, 1946.95

As mentioned previously, private land means any land of private ownership.

This includes both lands owned by private individuals and lands which are
patrimonial property of the State or of municipal corporations.96 In the case of
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, the term “private agricultural lands” meant any
private land that was neither timber nor mineral land.97 Again, the capacity to
acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. This is because aliens were disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain (since the 1935 Constitution), aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, were also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The prohibition applies even to a regime of conjugal partnership
in marriage. Thus, an alien spouse in a conjugal partnership does not have the
right to give or not to give consent in the disposition of the land.98

Exception for former Filipino Citizens:

“Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 7 of this article, a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to the
limitations provided by law.”

92
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 470.
93
111 SCRA 704.
94
Halili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998.
95
80 SCRA 269.
96
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1157.
97
79 Phil. 461.
98
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1158.

38
A 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution created another exception in
favor of a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship. He
or she may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as
the Batasang Pambansa may provide. This now embodied in Sec. 8. The 1987
provision, however, not longer contains the phrase “for use by him as
residence.”99

A Filipino corporation can acquire land

Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution makes the capacity to acquire private land
dependent on capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private
corporations can “hold” lands of the public domain only by lease. They are thus
not in the same position as aliens who cannot even lease land of the public
domain.100 By analogy, Filipino Corporations, as a creation of the legislature
(The Corporation Code, Batas Pambansa 68) also has Filipino citizenships as a
juridical person. It is also one of the expressed powers of a corporation as
provided by Sec. 36 to wit:

“(g) To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease,

pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and personal
property, including securities and bonds of other corporations, as
the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may
reasonably require.101

In contrast with public lands

The term “public lands” refer to such lands of the public domain as are subject
to alienation and disposal by the State in accordance with the Public Land Act.
The phrase “public land” was held to be equivalent to “public domain”. It does
not by any means include all lands of government ownership, but only so much
of said lands as are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement by
homestead and other similar laws. Accordingly, “government land” and “public
land” are not synonymous terms; the first is more extensive and embraces not
only the second by also other lands of the government already reserved to
public use or subject to private right.102

The rules for the disposition of lands of the public domain are the ff:103

(1) Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated. All
others are inalienable and may be developed and utilized only
according to the rules established in Sec. 2 of the Constitution.

99
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1166.
100
Id. at 1161.
101
The Corporation Code, §36, ¶ g
102
Supra note 30.
103
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1145-1146.

39
 (2) Only public corporations and qualified individuals may acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Corporations can hold
alienable land of the public domain only by lease.

(3) Private corporations are allowed to lease no more than one

thousand hectares.

(4) The congress shall determine by law, the size of lands of the
public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased
and the conditions therefor.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that the acquisition of public agricultural
lands by purchase is governed by Chapter V (Sale). Any citizen of the
Philippines of lawful age of the head of a family may purchase any tract of
public agricultural land not to exceed twelve hectares104 which shall be sold
thru sealed bidding. The land shall be awarded to the highest bidder, but the
applicant may equal the highest bid. The purchase price may be paid in full
upon the making of the award or in not more than ten equal annual
installments from the date of the award. It is required that the purchaser shall
have not less than one-fifth of the land cultivated within five years from the
date of the award, and before any patent is issued, he must show actual
occupancy, cultivation and improvement of at least one-fifth of the land until
the date of final payment.105

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila

79 Phil. 461

FACTS: Krivenko bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate, Inc., in

December of 1941, the registration of w/c was interrupted by the war. In
May 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but it was denied
on the ground that Krivenko is an alien. Krivenko then brought the case
to the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta. The court rendered
judgment sustaining the refusal.

HELD: The 1935 Constitution classified lands namely as agricultural,

timber and mineral since this was the basic classification existing in laws
and jurisprudence at that time. The phrase “public agricultural lands”
includes residential lot & their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. To
construe this phrase as not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but also
other forms of “public agricultural lands”.

Director of Lands v. Lood

124 SCRA 460

FACTS: Quezon City Development & Financing Corp filed an application

with the CFI of Rizal, seeking the registration of title under Act. 496,
claiming to be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land in Taytay,
Rizal. The Director of Lands, filed an opposition, on the ground that the

104
PHIL. CONST. art. 12, § 3
105
Public Land Act, § 22, 26 & 28

40
 applicant has no sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the
same by composition title from the Spanish Govt or by possessory
information title pursuant to Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. The CFI
ruled that the applicant has a registrable title over the parcel of land.

HELD: The applicant, being a juridical person, is disqualified to apply

subject property for registration. Limiting the mode of acquisition of
corporations, by purchase, but not by homestead, free patent or judicial
confirmation, does not offend the Constitution. Corporations were never
intended to acquire lands by such modes. Further, corporations, as
product of statutory action, the legislative can define the powers of a
corporation.

C. Modes of Acquisition

The conveyance of public land by the government to a private individual is

generally known as a public grant. How the government makes such grant is
well illustrated by what actually took place in the Philippines after its discovery
by Magellan in 1521. It was held by the discovery and conquest of the entire
Philippine territory became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. With this as basis, the Spanish government began to handle
the direct distribution of public lands to settlers, vassals and other people by
the issuance of royal grants and concessions in varied forms.

It seems but only logical that tile to land must emanate from some source for it
cannot just issue forth from nowhere. And consistent with the general tendency
observed in different countries, the government or head of state is vested with
such power to make public land grants according to existing statutes.

Republic v. Lee
197 SCRA 13

FACTS: On June 29, 1976, Lee filed before the CFI of Pangasinan, an
application for registration in her favor of a parcel of land at Magaldan,
Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, filed an opposition, alleging that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired the
land under any of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for
the acquisition of title. The CFI rendered judgment confirming the title of
the applicants over the said parcel of land pursuant to the Land
Registration Law.

ISSUE: WON public land can be acquired by a private person without any
grant.

HELD: No public land can be acquired by private persons without any

grant, express or implied, for government. A grant is conclusively
presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 or prior
thereto.

41
(1) Acquisition by Public Grant106

The Spanish Government, during their colonial rule, issued Royal Grants as title
to the lands, to discoverers, settlers, vassals, and other people in varied forms.

During the Commonwealth Government, the Public Land Act was passed and
by virtue thereof public agricultural lands were distributed to citizens under
certain conditions specified therein. These lands so distributed became
ultimately the property of the distributees.

In, Aureus v. Secretary of Agriculture & Commerce,107 it was held that the mere
filing by an individual of an application for a permit to occupy a piece of public
land does not create an obligation on the part of the administrative officer
concerned to grant his application. If it does, the Director of Lands or the
Secretary of Agriculture, will be a mere robot of every such applicant. It is
discretionary in the said officials to grant or not to grant such application.
While in Luzuriaga v. Director of Lands,108 it was held that when a municipality
has used a land from time immemorial for recognized public purposes based
upon a public necessity, which purposes and necessity were formerly
recognized by the Government as a basis for a grant of land to a municipality,
a grant from the State in favor of the municipality is presumed.

Proof of acquisition from the state

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the government, it is indispensable that there be a showing of
title from the State. One claiming rights must prove that he has complied with
the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural
requirements for acquisition of public land. 109

Private Grants of Land Titles

The transfer of title to land by the owner himself or his duly authorized
representative to another by mutual consent is recognized by law. Consent of
the grantor is an essential element. To give effect to the transfer, a deed of
conveyance must be executed to be followed by its registration at the Registry
of Deeds.110

(2) Prescription

Land ownership and other real rights or obligations may be acquired through
the lapse of time, in the manner and action laid down by law.111 All things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Thus, the peaceful and adverse possession of land that is

106
PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND, supra note 199, at 15.
107
85 Phil. 1.
108
24 Phil. 193.
109
PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND, supra note 199, at 16.
110
Id. at 17.
111
CIVIL CODE, art. 1106.

42
continuous and uninterrupted for a certain period of time may be converted
into ownership of the land.112 However, property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.113

The claim of ownership114 must be in the concept of owners, adverse, public

and peaceful.115 Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.116
The law fixes ten (10) years by ordinary prescription, that is, without need of
title and good faith,117 and thirty (30) years by extraordinary prescription,
without need of title and good faith.118

For ordinary prescription, the following requisites must concur: (1) Capacity to
acquire by prescription; (2) the object must be susceptible of prescription; (3)
The possession must be in concept of owner, public, peaceful, continuous and
uninterrupted; (4) The possession must be in good faith; (5) The possession
must be by virtue of a just title; and (6) The period of possession must be 4
years if the object is movable or ten years if it is immovable.

In extraordinary acquisitive prescription, the following must concur: (1)

Capacity to acquire by prescription; (2) The object must be susceptible of
prescription; (3) The possession must be in the concept of owner, public,
peaceful, continuous, and uninterrupted; and (4) The period of possession must
be 8 years if the object is movable or 30 years if it is immovable.119

The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.120 In its negative aspect, it consists in the ignorance of
the possessor of any flaw which would invalidate his title or mode of
acquisition.121

For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right.122 Its requisites are: (1) It must be just;
(2) it must be true; (3) it must be valid; (4) it must be proved.123 Actual
possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. The
general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under
112
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 53.
113
CIVIL CODE, art. 1113.
114
Supra note 246.
115
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION , supra note 3, at 17.
116
DESIDERIO P. JURADO, COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS 653 (7 th rev. ed,
1980). [hereinafter JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS].
117
CIVIL CODE, art. 1137.
118
CIVIL CODE, art. 1496.
119
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 656-657.
120
CIVIL CODE, art. 1127.
121
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 657.
122
CIVIL CODE, art. 1129.
123
CIVIL CODE, arts. 1117, 1130-1131.

43
claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is
not in the adverse possession of another.124 However, the period of possession
in acquisitive prescription may be interrupted naturally, civilly, or by express or
tacit recognition by the possessor of the ownership.125 In extinctive
prescription, interruption may occur (1) when they are filed before the court,
(2) when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and (3)
when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.126 With
such conversion, property may now fall within the contemplation of “private
lands” under Section 14(2), and may be registered even if the possession
commenced on a date later than the date of enactment of the Property
Registration Decree.127

Such does not preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced after the abovementioned
date, considering Section 14(2) of the Decree which governs and authorizes
the application of “those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.” While as a rule, prescription
does not run against the State, the exception is where the law itself expressly
provides. An example is said Section 14 (2) which specifically allows qualified
individuals to apply for the registration of property, ownership of which he has
acquired by prescription under existing laws.128 However, a property registered
under the provisions of P.D. 1529 is not subject to prescription. Also,
prescription is unavailing not only against his hereditary successors because
the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and
are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-
interest.129

Moreover, it was held that “a person’s possession of a parcel of land covered

by a TCT cannot render nugatory the right of the holders of a certificate of title.
The reason is that prescription does not run against registered land. A title,
once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open, and notorious
possession. Moreover, in asserting ownership by donation, petitioners were in
effect assailing the title of respondents. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked, the issue on its validity can only be raised in an action expressly
institute for that purpose.”130 A possessor of land who may not be the owner,
after a lapse of a certain period prescribed in the law, may assert ownership
thereof as against anyone except the true owner or one with a better title
based on an earlier possession which he had not abandoned. Adverse
possession or prescription does not run against private lands brought under the
operation of the Torrens system, nor against public land except where the law
expressly so provides.131

124
Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175 (1918).
125
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 657.
126
CIVIL CODE, ART. 1155.
127
G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005.
128
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE, supra note 121, at 657.
129
Simeona Barcelona, et al. v. Hilarion Barcelon and the Honorable Court o Appeals, 100
Phil. 251 (1956).
130
Ong, et al. v. Sps. Cabucos, 356 SCRA 786 (2001).
131
PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 199, at 15-16.

44
For purposes of prescriptive possession, there is just title (mode) when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property thru any of the modes
allowed by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. These are
enumerated in Titles 1 to 5, Book III of the Civil Code, namely; (a) occupation,
(b) intellectual creation, (c) law, (d) donation, (e) succession (testate or
intestate), (f) in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition, and (g)
prescription.132

In computing for prescription, the present possessor may complete the period
necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or
predecessor-in-interest. It is presumed that the present possessor who was
also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession during
the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary.133 Possession in
wartime, when the civil courts are not open, shall not be counted in favor of
the adverse claimant.134

Prescription does not run between husband and wife. Even though there be a
separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlement or by judicial
decree. Neither does prescription run between parents and children during the
minority or insanity of the latter, and between guardian and ward during the
continuance of the guardianship.135

While prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-owner as long as he

expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, it may take place where it
is clearly shown that the co-owner has repudiated the co-owership, and that
the other co-owners were appraised of the repudiation.136

Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already

obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed to
have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which
imply the abandonment of the right acquired.137

Laches should not be confused with prescription. Laches is different from, and
applies independently of, prescription. While prescription is concerned with the
fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a
matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim
to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of
the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is
not. Laches apllies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is
based on a fixed time; laches is not.138

(3) Accretion

132
CIVIL CODE, art. 712.
133
CIVIL CODE, art. 1138.
134
CIVIL CODE, art. 1136.
135
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 654.
136
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION , supra note 3, at 19.
137
CIVIL CODE , art. 1112.
138
Heirs of Batiof Lacamen v. Heirs of Laman, 65 SCRA 605 (1975).

45
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited.139 It is the act by which
the land bordering a stream or other body of water increases its area by the
gradual deposit of soil or seaweeds by the current of the river or other natural
process.140

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that “to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.” As a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code, there are three requisites which must concur
before an accretion is said to have taken place:

(a) The accumulation of soil or sediment must be gradual and

imperceptible;
(b) That it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
and
(c) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the rivers.141

These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to owners
of lands adjoining he banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current waters.142 Alluvion is the soil deposited
on the estate fronting the river bank.143

In order to acquire land by accretion, there should be a natural and actual

continuity of the accretion to the land of the riparian owner.144 The requirement
that the deposit should be due to the effects of the current of the river is
indispensable. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. 145 A riparian
owner then does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works
expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion.146 There must be
evidence to prove that the addition to the property was made gradually
through the effects of the current of the river.147

In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was
sudden or that it occurred though avulsion, the presumption is that the change
was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion.148 Acts of possession
exercised over bordering land are always understood legally to cover that
portion added to the property by accretion.149 One must prove his claim by a
preponderance of evidence.150

139
Navarro v Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997.
140
PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 39.
141
Navarro, G.R. No. 68166.
142
PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 35.
143
Navarro, G.R. No. 68166.
144
PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 35.
145
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION , supra note 3, at 109.
146
Republic v Court of Appeals and Tancinco, GR No. L-61647, October 12, 1984
147
NOBLEJAS, supra note 285.
148
Hodges v Garcia, G.R. No. L-12730, Aug. 22, 1960.
149
Cortes v City of Manila, G.R. No. L-4012, March 25, 1908
150
65 C.J.S. 183

46
The fact that the accretion to one’s land used to pertain to another’s estate,
which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude the former
from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the
owners of the banks. Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on
running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not
affected by the Property Registration Decree.151

Riparian owners are unquestionably owners of the alluvial deposits on their

lands caused by the current of the river, and the area within the boundaries
thereof prevail over that which the title shows.152 The reason behind the law
giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river
is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the
location of his land. 153

Accretion does not become automatically registered land just because the lot
which received such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a
piece of land is one thing, registration under the Torrens System of ownership
is another.154 As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens
system.155

Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and,
therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons.
Since the land is foreshore land or property of public dominion, its disposition
falls under the exclusive supervision and control of the Lands Management
Bureau. Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the legislature, to the effect that land is no longer
needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation
or ownership. The adjoining registered owner of foreshore land cannot claim
ownership thereof by right of accretion.156

(4) Reclamation157

This method suggests the filling of submerged land by deliberate act and
reclaiming title thereto. In the Philippines, there is no law, express or implied
which grants to owners of adjacent upland the right to fill the adjacent land
under water. Reclaimed lands may however, be declared by the government as
property of the adjoining owners and as such increment thereto only when it is
no longer necessary for public use. Reclamation projects may be undertaken
for the establishment of residential, commercial or industrial sites, construction

151
Hodges, G.R. No. L-12730.
152
Government of the Philippines v. Abaja, 52 Phil. 261 (1928).
153
Cortes, G.R. No. L-4012.
154
Grande v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652 (1962)
155
Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 73465, September 7, 1989
156
Ignacio v. Director of Lands, GR. No. L-12958, May 30, 1960.
157
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION , supra note 3, at 42.

47
or extension of roads, wharves or piers, airfields, parks, playgrounds, plazas,
market places, etc.

Republic Act No. 2264, entitled “AN ACT AMENDING THE LAWS GOVERNING
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY CREATING THEIR AUTONOMY AND REORGANIZING
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS”, does not expressly authorize local governments
to undertake or carry out reclamation projects. However, such authority is
believed to be included in the general authority granted local governments to
undertake and carry out “any public works projects.” This view is grounded on
Section 12 of said Act.158

The reclamation projects in Manila Bay and the coastal municipalities

extending from Pasay City to Cavite City are being undertaken pursuant to the
authority granted by R.A. 2264 to local governments.

Under R.A. 1899, the National Government granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities, the authority to carry out at their own expense, the
reclamation by dredging, filling, and other means of any foreshore lands
bordering on them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities or
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Minister of Finance, the
Minister of Public Works and Highways. Any and all such lands reclaimed will
become property of the respective municipalities and chartered cities; but the
new foreshore along the reclaimed areas shall continue to become property of
the National Government.

(5) Voluntary Transfer

A private grant is the usual means by which title to land is transferred by the
owner himself or his duly authorized representative. Here the consent or
cooperation of the grantor is an essential element. This transfer is given effect
by the voluntary execution of deed of conveyance in certain prescribed form,
completed by the recording or registration thereof in a public office. The
purpose of such registration is to serve public notice at least constructively and
thereby legally bind third persons. Under the Torrens system, it is the
registration that is the operative act to convey the land and affect title thereto.
In other words, the legal title to the land does not pass until the conveyance
shall have been duly registered or made of public record.159

Filamore called this transfer Tradition. Tradition is the act of delivering the
thing sold to the buyer or vendee by (a) turning over material possession of the
thing sold, or (b) symbolic transfer of ownership thereof.160 The former
158
R.A. No. 2264, Sec. 12 provides that “the implied power of a province, a city or
municipality shall be liberally construed in its favor, and that any fair and reasonable doubt
as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government
and it shall be presumed to exist.” It also provided that the general welfare clause shall be
liberally interpreted in case of doubt so as to give more power to local governments in
promoting the economic condition, social welfare and material progress of the people in
the community.”
159
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION , supra note 3, at 20.
160
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 53.

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transfers actual and physical control over the buyer, while the other is done by
executing a public instrument. Filmore said that, according to Melquiades J.
Gamboa, the requisites of tradition are: “(1) the transferor is the owner of the
property transferred and has the capacity and intention to grant; (2) the
transferee has the capacity to acquire the property; (3) there is justa causa or
valid means of transfer such as the contract of sale, barter or legacy; and (4)
the actual transfer of possession to the transferee is manifested by some
outward act.”161

(6) Involuntary Alienation

This method of transfer does not require the consent or cooperation of the
owner of the land, and, in fact, is usually carried out against his will. For the
more common forms of involuntary alienation, we have them in connection
with judgments of the courts in expropriation or condemnation proceedings.
Land is forcibly acquired by the state through the exercise of eminent domain,
or by way of escheat or forfeiture. It may also be confiscated, seized or
attached, and subsequently sold at public auction to the highest bidder. We
have the execution sale by the sheriff to satisfy a money judgment, the tax
sale to satisfy unpaid taxes and penalties, the auction sale by a public officer in
foreclosure of mortgage. Some authorities even consider the sale of property
under special order of the court for and in behalf of a minor or a person under
legal disability as falling within the category of involuntary alienation in the
same way as a sale by judicial administrator or executor of an estate of a
decedent. Under this mode of acquiring land, the purchasers are generally
subject to the rule of caveat emptor.162

(7) Testate and Intestate Succession

Transfer of title by testate or intestate succession is governed by the Civil Law.

Title to land is acquired by descent in case an heir succeeds the deceased
owner in intestacy or by reasons of certain relationship which entitles him to
succeed by operation of law. To be an heir, it requires a certain degree or
relationship with the decedent.

A landowner may execute his last will and testament designating his heir and
legatee who shall receive the respective portions of his estate pursuant to law.
163

The testator cannot dispose of that portion of his estate called Legitime which
is reserved for his compulsory heirs, namely: the legitimate children or
descendants, legitimate parents and ascendants, his widow; acknowledged
natural children, and natural children by legal fiction as well as illegitimate
children. 164

161
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 54.
162
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION , supra note 3, at 299.
163
CIVIL CODE, arts. 884-914.
164
CIVIL CODE, arts. 886-887.

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When a person dies without a will, or the will does not institute an heir to the
property or the testator, or no one succeeds under the will, intestate
succession shall take place.165 Under this system, his legitimate children and
descendants succeed him, followed by his parents, mother and father, who
inherit in equal shares; or when they are both dead, the illegitimate children, or
acknowledged natural children, the natural children by legal fiction and
adulterous children succeed in this order. Finally, the State inherits when the
ascendants and descendants of the testator do not exist.166

Professor Gamboa summarizes the order of intestate succession, thus: (1)

legitimate children and their descendants; (2) legitimate parents and
descendants; (3) illegitimate children and their descendants; (4) surviving
spouse without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters; (5) collateral
relatives within the fifth (5th) degree; and (6) the State.167

In Austria v. Reyes 168 the Supreme Court enunciated that testacy is favored
and doubts are resolved on the side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate.
Furthermore, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided
and the wishes of the testator allowed prevailing, that we could even vary the
language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.

Succession by Devise

One succeeds by devise when he acquires land from one who may not be a
relative, if he is named by the latter in his last will and testament to succeed as
such. Even a stranger may acquire title by devise if appropriate disposition
has been made in his favor by the testator in the latter’s will. Where the heirs
entitled would so prefer, title to land under this method may formally be
transferred without proceeding in court. Under the provisions of Rule 74,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, they may agree upon an extrajudicial
settlement or partition of the estate of the decedent, provided there are no
debts left by him which remain unsettled.

165
CIVIL CODE, art. 968.
166
Arts. 963-1014, ibid.
167
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 19, at 204.
168
31 SCRA 754 (1970).

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