G.R. No.

95697 August 5, 1991

PEREGRINO ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, the Hon. SALVADOR A. MEMORACION, Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BASILAN,
Branch 2, the Hon. EDUARDO F. CARTAGENA and the ESTATE OF WEE YEK SUI alias GREGORIO WEE, represented by
DANIEL WEE, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent Court of Appeals was correct in appreciating that the petition for
review therein filed by herein petitioner involved a complete change of theory. If so, respondent court properly applied Our
ruling in Tible v. Aquino1 that a new theory could not be raised for the first time on appeal for being unfair to the adverse
party.
The factual antecedents are not disputed: Wee Yek Sui also known as Gregorio Wee was the registered owner of a
commercial lot situated at Roxas Avenue, Isabela, Basilan, with an area of 287 square meters as described under TCT No.
T-906. Petitioner Peregrino Rosales was the occupant of a certain portion of this property by virtue of a lease agreement
on a month-to-month basis dated April 13, 1962 with rent at the rate of P50.00 per month. Pursuant to this lease agreement,
Peregrino Rosales constructed a commercial building wherein he established his photography studio, known as Rosales
Studio. On April 3, 1966, Wee died leaving bend as heirs his son, Daniel Wee and widow, Kuaya Ong. His estate through his
son on several occasions requested petitioner to vacate the lot because the heirs wished to put up their own building.
Petitioner refused despite the termination of the term of the lease, Hence, the estate of Wee, herein private respondent, was
constrained to file an action for ejectment against petitioner.2
The present petition is the upshot of what should have been an ordinary ejectment case. However, the procedural
background of this case is a virtual comedy fraught with procedural errors committed by all parties involved, i.e., the
complainant, the defendant and the lower courts. This case presents the classic example of a simple factual background
wittingly or unwittingly made more complicated by ill-prepared counsel and judges who know no better, that it behooves
this Court to make a discussion on the same with the end in view of obviating the repetition of these lapses and for the
guidance of the Bench and Bar.3
In the complaint for unlawful detainer4 private respondent alleged that petitioner occupied the property by virtue of a lease
agreement. However, the substance of the lease agreement was not set forth in the complaint and no copy of the lease
agreement was attached as an exhibit, a violation of Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, the rule on actionable
documents.5 Private respondent also alleged that petitioner stopped paying rent as early as 1979 and prayed for the
recovery of the outstanding rental of P51,660.00 computed at the new rate of P160.00 a month. Additionally, private
respondent prayed for damages for loss of expected income in an amount to be fixed by the court and attorney's fees
equivalent to 30% of the recoverable amount but not less than P10,000.00. In effect, the sum of at least P61,660.00 was
specified as the total amount sought to be recovered by private respondent.
At this point it should be clear that respondent Municipal Trial Court judge erred when he did not motu propriodismiss the
complaint for failure to comply with the rule on actionable documents,6 as he is empowered to do under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, Section 3A of which provides:
SEC. 3. Duty of court upon filing of complaint. — Upon the filing of the complaint, the court, from a consideration of the
allegations thereof:
A. may dismiss the case outright due to lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, failure to state a cause of action, or for any other
valid ground for the dismissal of a civil action; or
B. if a dismissal is not ordered, shall make a determination whether the case falls under summary procedure. In the
affirmative case, the summons must state that the summary procedure under this Rule shall apply. [Emphasis supplied.]
The trial court judge further compounded the mistake when he made a finding that the Rule on Summary Procedure was
applicable in gross disregard of Section 1(A)(1) thereof,7 notwithstanding that the damages and unpaid rentals sought
exceed P20,000.00, and required petitioner to file an answer and not a motion to dismiss.8
Municipal Trial Court judges should well take note of Section 3A of the foregoing rule which, unlike the rules of ordinary
procedure, equips them with the relatively unfettered discretion to immediately dismiss a complaint for any of the grounds
mentioned therein without prior need of an opposing party calling attention thereto. 9 It should also be emphasized that
this section confers on the judge the discretion to dismiss complaints on the lower courts concerned dealing with cases
properly covered both by summary procedure and by regular procedure; in the sequence of events, the ascertainment of
whether or not a case falls under summary procedure is made after an assessment has been done on the formal and
substantive sufficiency of the complaint.
For, indeed, the solution to the problem of overcrowded court dockets need not be limited to the expeditious disposition of
pending cases. An approach should also be conducted from the other end, at the inception or filing of cases. With proper
exercise of the discretion conferred by this powerful tool, not order will the number of cases be trimmed in the short term,
but the long run effect will be an improvement in the quality of questions and issues presented for judicial inquiry and
adjudication. In other words, municipal trial courts, and subsequently the higher courts by way of the hierarchy of appeal
and review, will be asked to resolve each case on the merits of the legal issues presented and no longer on procedural
technicalities. Legal pettifogging would thus be greatly obviated.
Going back to the present case, instead of filing an answer as the appropriate pleading under the rule on summary
procedure, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss10 the complaint where he alleged as grounds, lack of
jurisdiction, lack of cause of action and failure to comply with the rule on actionable documents. Anent the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, petitioner argued that, under the complaint, inasmuch as the demand to vacate was made in 1979, also the
year petitioner allegedly stopped paying rent, the unlawful detainer action was filed beyond the mandatory one-year
period. Private respondent's remedy should have been an accion publiciana. With regard to lack of cause of action,
petitioner contended that his continued stay in the premises was protected by -P.D. No. 20, the rent control law then in
force.
On the other hand, because petitioner did not file the appropriate responsive pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, private respondent moved to declare defendant in default itself, like petitioner's motion to dismiss, a prohibited
pleading under Section 15 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The judgment rendered by respondent Municipal Trial Court recognized and resolved the motion to dismiss filed by
petitoner but addressed only one of the grounds raised therein by petitioner, that of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent
Municipal Trial Court ruled that it had jurisdiction inasmuch as the complaint also alleged that the latest demand was made
barely over a month before the filing of the complaint in 30 January 1990; a copy of said demand letter dated 27 December
1988 was subsequently admitted in evidence and labeled as Exhibit "C". The trial court found in favor of private respondent,
ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and awarded all the damages prayed for by private respondent. The judgment,
however, did not deal with the other grounds raised by petitioner.11
Parenthetically, petitioner argues in the present petition that, notwithstanding it being labeled as a motion to dismiss, said
pleading should have been considered as his answer pursuant to the liberal interpretation accorded the rules and inasmuch
as the grounds involved therein also qualify as defenses proper in an answer. In this instance the Court agrees. Indeed, the
rule on summary procedure was conceptualized to facilitate the immediate resolution of cases such as the present one.
Well-settled is the rule that forcible entry and detainer cases being summary in nature and involving disturbance of social
order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided12 and should not be allowed to override substantial
justice.13 With this premise in mind and having insisted, however erroneously, on its jurisdiction over the case, it certainly
would have been more prudent for the lower court to have treated the motion to dismiss as the answer of petitioner and
examined the case on its merits. As will be shown shortly, the long drawn out proceedings that took place would have been
avoided.
The procedural infirmities did not stop there. Petitioner further revealed his ignorance of the Rules by filing a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court,14 another pleading prohibited under the rule on
summary procedure. Action on the same being unfavorable, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court. Before said
forum, petitioner again committed a blunder: he failed to comply with the order of the court requiring the parties to submit
memoranda and thus was not able to sufficiently argue his appeal.
The Regional Trial Court contributed its fair share to the succession of mistakes when it dismissed the appeal and
affirmed in toto the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court with the finding that no error was committed by the lower court
in applying the rule on summary procedure.15 The Regional Trial Court further ruled that because petitioner failed to deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the lease agreement, the same is deemed admitted. Apparently, the
Regional Trial Court did not consider that said agreement was not properly pleaded in the complaint as an actionable
document.
Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals assigning the following as errors
committed by the lower courts:
1. The respondent estate does not have any legal personality and its alleged representative has no authority to represent
it.
2. The respondents Municipal Trial Court and Regional Trial Court do not have original or appellate jurisdiction over the
case that gave rise to this recourse.
3. The respondent did not have any ground under P.D. No. 20 (as amended by B.P. Blg. 25) to eject the petitioner, thereby
lacking in cause of action.
4. The complaint failed to set forth or attach to itself (sic) [al copy of the supposed lease contract as an actionable document
under Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, although one of the grounds alleged for ejectment was the claimed expiration
of its terms and compliance with this rule was the only chance to determine the matter of expiration of the term since there
was no trial or formal presentation of evidence before any of the respondent courts.
5. The respondent Municipal Trial Court fared to comply with its duty under Section 3 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
6. The demolition of petitioner's building which was ordered right in the decision or judgment (Annex "E") is null and void
for lack of hearing, lack of evidence on petitioner's failure to remove the same, and lack of special order under Rule 39,
Section 14, Rules of Court.16
In its decision, respondent Court of Appeals17 did not discuss any of the foregoing errors assigned by petitioner and denied
due course to the petition solely on the ground that, as claimed by private respondent, the issues raised therein involved a
complete change of theory which could not be made for the first time on appeal, citing Tible v. Aquino.18
Petitioner, therefore, felt constrained to bring this present petition for review mainly on the ground that respondent Court
of Appeals erred in its assessment that petitioner changed his theory oil appeal, In this regard.
The Court finds that the present petition is impressed with merit.
A perusal of the errors assigned by petitioner before respondent court reveals that its assessment is true only in so far the
first assigned error, that is, the issue dealing with the legal personality of the estate of Wee and the authority of his son to
represent it. The other's concern the questions of jurisdiction, of cause of action and the violation of Rule 8, Section 7 of the
Rules of Court, all of which were timely raised before the lower courts. Further, unlike Tiblewhich involves a complete
change of theory, no such change of theory obtains in this case. Petitioner merely added another ground to his list of
assigned errors committed by the lower courts to buttress his contention that the complaint should have been dismissed.
At best, respondent court may have chosen not to deal with said issue on the well settled rule that questions not raised in
the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.19 The real to entertain the petition as to the other validly
raised grounds, however, cannot be justified on the basis of Tiblealone whose application is clearly misplaced. Respondent
Court of Appeals should, therefore, have gone into the merits of the petition for review filed by petitioner.
Having passed upon the first three assigned errors raised by petitioner with respondent court, We now take a look at his
defense of lack of cause of action. He argues that his continued stay on the leased premises is protected by Presidential
Decree No. 20 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 inasmuch as the reason relied upon by private respondent, i.e.,
construction of a bigger commercial building for higher rental income, is not one of those enumerated by the law as grounds
for ejectment. Unfortunately for petitioner, he is mistaken. It is clear from Presidential Decree No. 2020 that the same
pertains only to dwelling units or to land on which dwelling units are located, in other words, residential buildings. On the
other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, entitled an Act Regulating Rentals of dwelling Units or of Land on Which Another's
Dwelling is Located and for Other Purposes, defines the term residential unit as referring to
an apartment, house and/or land on which another's dwelling is located used for residential purposes and shall include not
only buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling places, except motels, motel room, hotels, hotel rooms,
boarding houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for rent, but also those used for home industries, retail stores or other
business purposes if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it principally for dwelling
purposes: Provided, That in the case of a retail store, home industry or business, the capitalization thereof shall not exceed
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00): Provided, further, That in the operation of the store, industry or business, the owner
thereof shall not require the services of any person other than the immediate members of his family.21
In the case of petitioner, it is clear that the building he constructed on the lot of private respondent is devoted purely to
commercial purposes. Petitioner operates Ms photography business therein. Not once has petitioner claimed to use the
Premises also as a place of residence. The lot itself is located in the commercial district of the municipality. This has been
the consistent finding of the lower courts and the same is supported by the representations of petitioner since the
beginning. His stay on the leased lot owned by private respondent is unmistakably not countenanced by the rent control
laws. To allow petitioner to continue occupying the land would be to deny private respondent the effective exercise of
property rights over the same.1âwphi1
To settle this matter once and for all, therefore, the Court finds that petitioner should vacate the land and remove his
improvements thereon at his expense. Back rental outstanding must also be paid by petitioner which shall be computed
with legal interest at the original monthly rate of P50.00 as if the defective complaint brought by private respondent was
not filed at all.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner to vacate the premises and pay back rental at the monthly rate of P50.00
with legal interest. No other pronouncement as to costs. Let copies of this decision be finished all judges of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R.No.118691.April 17, 1997]
ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., Petitioners, v. HON.ANTONIO M.NATINO, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique and ALBERTO MAGDATO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our Decision in this case promulgated on 5 July 1996, we ordered Judge Deogracias K.Del Rosario of the Third Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Patnogon-Bugasong-Valderrama, Antique, and Atty.Marcelo C.Josue to show cause, within ten days
from receipt of a copy of the said decision, why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for gross ignorance of law and
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively.
The following findings in the decision compelled the issuance of this show-cause order on Judge Del Rosario:
It must be noted that despite the effectivity of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure on 15 November 1991, the MCTC
Judge still applied the previous Rule on Summary Procedure in his 15 December 1992 order.While it may be true that this
did not affect the outcome of the case, judges are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and circulars
adopted by this Court which affect the conduct of cases before them.
Moreover, while it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No.262 since
BAYOG's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian relationship between him and MAGDATO, it
should not have refrained from taking cognizance of MAGDATO's Answer.Although filed late, the Answer asserted that the
MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between BAYOG and MAGDATO,
which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued in
MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos.While this assertion, per se, did not automatically divest the MCTC of its
jurisdiction over the ejectment case, nevertheless, in view of MAGDATO's defense, the MCTC should have heard and
received the evidence for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case.And
upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.Verily, if indeed MAGDATO were an agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of
jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of simply adopting a strange theory that
it could not take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of
B.P.Blg.129.Plainly, there is nothing in the said section which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer.The
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, does not provide that an answer filed after the
reglementary period should be expunged from the records.As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default
if a defendant fails to file his answer.It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may
have even be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) of Section 19 thereof, which reads:
SEC.19.Prohibited pleadings and motions. -- The following pleadings, motions, or petition shall not be allowed in the case
covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
...
Worse, in its Order of 20 September 1993, the MCTC ordered MAGDATO "to remove his house...before judgment becomes
final and executory," and the Provincial Sheriff "to demolish and destroy [MAGDATO'S] house on the...land of [BAYOG] in
case [MAGDATO] should fail to remove the same...before judgment against him becomes final and executory.This was
clearly in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.Such
orders of "removal" and "demolition" before the judgment becomes final and executory were obviously intended to render
futile any appeal which MAGDATO could interpose therefrom pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Compounding this palpably oppressive and capricious Order, the MCTC, in its Order of Execution of 16 December 1993,
directed the Provincial Sheriff "to demolish and destroy defendant's [MAGDATO's] home standing in the above-described
parcel of land in case defendant should fail to remove the same therefrom before judgment against him becomes final and
executory." And, in strict obedience to this said order, Sheriff IV Amando S.Lapos, acting for the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff,
accompanied by Edgar Tondares (Sheriff IV), the Barangay Captain of Centro Pojo, members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) of Bugasong, Antique, as security escorts, and BAYOG himself, served on MAGDATO the order of execution on
24 January 1994 and forthwith ejected MAGDATO from the land in question and demolished and destroyed MAGDATO's
house.
This was a clear abuse of authority or misuse of the strong arm of the law.No demolition of MAGDATO's house could have
been validly effected on the day of service of the order of execution.MAGDATO should have been afforded a reasonable
period of time to remove his house, and only after he failed to comply within the given period could a demolition order have
been issued by the court, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In his Comment filed on 12 August 1996, Judge Del Rosario explains that in his honest understanding and interpretation of
Section 5 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in relation to Sections 6 and 19(e) of the said rules and Section 36 of
B.P.Blg.129, and defendant-respondents answer which was filed few days late was deemed never filed, and, therefore, the
court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, should render judgment as would be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint.But, despite plaintiffs-petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 10 February 1993 he rendered
judgment only after more than seven months, or on 20 September 1993.This indicates that the said order was not issued
with haste.
He also calls the attention of this Court to the following allegation in plaintiffs-petitioners Answer to Counterclaim with the
the MCTC:
4.That, since 1975 until August 31, 1987 defendant used to be a lessee of plaintiff Alejandro Bayog's on another parcel of
land....
According to him Magdatos failure to deny the said allegation amounted to an admission that he has nothing at all to do
with the parcel of land described in...the complaint in Civil Case No.262.Thus, the claim of tenancy is false and a sham.
The respondent Judge admits his misgivings in his Order of 20 September 1993, especially with reference to the phrase
before judgment become final and executory.He avers that the said phrase was never meant to be; as a matter of fact, the
Order of Execution was issued only on 16 December 1993, long after the Order of 20 September 1993 had indeed become
final and executory.IT IS JUST MOST UNFORTUNATE that the sheriff executed literally the said Order.At any rate, his Order
of 20 September 1993 is the product of what he honestly believed to be right and just under the circumstances.
We find unsatisfactory the above explanation of Judge Del Rosario.The fact remains that, in his orders dated 15 December
1992 and 20 September 1993, he applied the previous Rule on Summary procedure despite the effectivity of the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure on 15 November 1991 yet.
That he never meant his order of 20 September 1993 to be executed before the judgment became final and executory is a
lame excuse, which no rational mind can accept.He explicitly ordered Magdato to remove his house standing on Bayogs lot
before judgment became final and executory.To carry out that order, he also directed the Provincial Sheriff to demolish and
destroy Magdatos house in case Magdato should fail to remove the same before judgment against him becomes final and
executory.He reiterated this command in no uncertain terms in his Order of Execution of 16 December 1993 when he
directed the Provincial Sheriff to demolish and destroy Magdatos house Magdato failed to remove the same before judgment
against him becomes final and executory.He cannot then be allowed to make the sheriff who enforced his order as a
scapegoat.He knew, or ought to know, that his order could not be executed before the finality of the judgment and that the
removal or destruction of Magdatos house could only be done after Magdato has failed to remove it within a reasonable
period of time.
We have time and again stated that judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules.We have reminded them that under Canons 4 and 18 of he Canons of Judicial Ethics, they are required
to be studious of the principles of law and to administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law.(Estoya
v.Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1, 21 [1994]).
Judges of trial courts, either of limited or general jurisdiction, should never forget that they are in the forefront in the sacred
task of administering justice.Any decision or order causing injustice or resulting in oppression or failure of justice would
have a negative effect in the Judiciary itself.Judges must not allow this to happen.Judge Del Rosario must then be held
responsible for what he did in this case.
As to Atty.Marcelo C.Josue, it appears that he has not complied with the order of this Court for him to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.He must then be
also required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in failing to comply with the said order.
WHEREFORE, for ignorance of procedural laws resulting in abuse of authority and oppression, Judge Deogracias K.del
Rosario of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderrama, Antique, is hereby FINED in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) and WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
For his failure to comply with the 5 July 1996 Decision of this Court requiring him to explain his apparent violation of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.Marcelo C.Josue is hereby further DIRECTED to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt of court and to SUBMIT his compliance with the decision of 5 July 1996, both within
a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be immediately served on Judge Deogracias K.del Rosario and Atty.Marcelo C.Josue.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 116695. June 20, 1997]
VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA, Petitioners, v. HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch
XXIV, RTC, Iloilo City; HON. JOSE R. ASTORGA, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City;
and SUSANA GUEVARA, represented by her attorney-in-fact, ROSALIE GUEVARA, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally to allow the admission of an answer filed out of time due to
alleged oversight?
This is the main legal question raised in this petition for review assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 24,1 which dismissed a special civil action for certiorari and injunction filed by herein petitioners. The
dispositive portion of the assailed RTC Decision reads:2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE premises considered, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is denied and, with
respect to the merits, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed.
Double costs against petitioners.
Facts
The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court are undisputed and admitted as correct by the
parties. A complaint for forcible entry3 was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara and
Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons
was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary
period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him.
On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. 4 On
September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.5 On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner
submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer,6 which was attached thereto. Two days later,
petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC
denied the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution.7 On October 27, 1993, the MTCC also denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.8 Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC9 issued a decision10 resolving the
complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents.
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City,11 Branch 24, praying mainly that the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and to conduct further
proceedings in the civil case for forcible entry. As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed Decision12 dismissing the petition. Respondent Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr.,
ratiocinated:13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides, among
others, as follows:
Sec. 36 - Summary Procedures in Special Cases x x x The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures applicable
to such cases in order to achieve an expeditions (sic) and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical
rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral
testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.
Pursuant to the aforequoted legislative mandate, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure, the
pertinent provisions of which, as related to the issues raised in this case, are hereunder set forth -
II - Civil Cases
Section 3 - Pleadings
A. (P)leadings allowed - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints, compulsory counter-claims and cross-
claims pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto
xxx
Section 5 Answer - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and
serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
Section 6. Effect of Failure to answer - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided,
the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
xxx
Section 19. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
xxx
The foregoing should underscore quite clearly the reality that the ten-day-period to file an answer reckoned from the date
of the receipt of the summons is mandatory and no reason of any kind is acceptable to operate as an excuse. The rule is
explicit. It is addressed more, being one of procedure, to counsels than to litigants. Counsels, therefore cannot assert the
validity of their clients cause to evade the mandate of the law.
Accordingly, the Court cannot fault the respondent judge [referring to Judge Jose R. Astorga] in acting the way he did in Civil
Case No. 130 (93) taking into account the admitted facts and circumstances.
Hence, this petition directly filed before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners submit for resolution the following questions of law:14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings to be applied STRICTLY or LIBERALLY.
II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Petitioners argue that the technical rules of procedure must yield to the higher interest of justice. Petitioners explain that
they filed the motion for extension of time to file an answer, a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure,
because of oversight. That was why immediately upon receipt of the denial of that motion, petitioners filed their motion to
admit answer which was later verified and had to be amended. All these (actions) were done in a period of five (5) days
from the lapse of the reglementary period to file an answer.15 Furthermore, petitioners contend that no prejudice to private
respondent has been claimed or alleged by reason of the delay in filing an answer.16 Petitioners also argue that their defense
in the action for forcible entry is based on substantial grounds, because they were in prior physical possession of the
premises subject of the action and that their houses have long been standing on the land in question because the land on
which said houses are standing are (sic) the common properties of the parties.
Citing Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray that the provisions in the Rule on Summary Procedure
regarding prohibited pleadings and the period for filing an answer be given liberal interpretation. Petitioners concede that
said provisions appear to be couched in mandatory language. They contend, however, that other similarly worded
provisions in the Rules of Court have nonetheless been liberally applied by this Court to promote substantial
justice.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that the provisions in question have to be strictly construed in order to
avoid delay, considering that the Rule on Summary Procedure is aimed at inexpensive, expeditious and summary
determination of cases.19 Private respondent adds that the petition can also be dismissed on the ground of violation of
Revised Circular 28-91 on forum shopping, because three (3) months after the rendition of the assailed Decision, a petition
for quieting of title and partition, and damages, involving the same parcel of residential land (Cadastral Lot No. 709 x x x ),
was filed xxx docketed as Civil Case No. 21618, by (Petitioner) Victoria Guevara-Gachon (x x x), Patricio Guevara (father of
Petitioner Alex Guevara), Lilia Guevara-Doreza and Fe Guevara-Burgos against herein private respondent. Private
respondent contends that the subsequent case is the appropriate forum where ownership of the property in question may
be threshed out.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As observed at the outset, the issue to be resolved is whether, under the undisputed facts of this case, the Rule on Summary
Procedure may be liberally construed in order to allow the admission of petitioners answer which unquestionably was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
Preliminary Matter
It bears noting that petitioners filed directly before this Court a petition for review assailing the RTC Decision. This remedy
is allowed under paragraph 2 of Circular 2-9021 which provides:
Section 2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. -- Except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed
is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only
by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended,22 this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the
Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners ask the Court to interpret a provision of the Rule on Summary Procedure. This is a pure question of law that
may be properly raised in this petition for review.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Interpretation of the Period
The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as follows:
Section 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and
serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
Section 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided,
the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
xxx
Section 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
The word shall ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 23 This, however, is
not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire
provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the
other.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases.26 For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of
motions for extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.
Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure
shall be non-extendible.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,28 and this rule should equally apply
with full force in forcible entry cases where the possession of the premises at the start is already illegal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word shall in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory
character of the challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule
on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as
petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers -- the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this
light, petitioners invocation of the general principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
Other than a plea for the liberal interpretation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, petitioners do not provide an adequate
justification for the admission of their late answer. Oversight, which they candidly cite as the reason for their filing a motion
for extension of time to file an answer, is not a justification. Oversight, at best, implies negligence; at worst, ignorance. The
negligence displayed by petitioners is clearly inexcusable; ignorance of so basic a rule, on the other hand, can never be
condoned. In either case, the directory application of the questioned provision is not warranted.
Petitioners also cite Rosales vs. Court of Appeals29 and Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 but these cases do
not support their position.
In Rosales vs. Court of Appeals,31 this Court applied the Rule on Summary Procedure liberally when the defendant, instead
of filing an answer, filed within the reglementary period a pleading labeled as a motion to dismiss. In treating the motion
to dismiss as an answer, the Court ruled:32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Parenthetically, petitioner argues in the present petition that, notwithstanding its being labeled as a motion to dismiss, said
pleading should have been considered as his answer pursuant to the liberal interpretation accorded the rules and inasmuch
as the grounds involved therein also qualify as defenses proper in an answer. In this instance the Court agrees. Indeed, the
rule on summary procedure was conceptualized to facilitate the immediate resolution of cases such as the present one.
Well-settled is the rule that forcible entry and detainer cases being summary in nature and involving disturbance of social
order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to override substantial justice. With
this premise in mind and having insisted, however erroneously, on its jurisdiction over the case, it certainly would have
been more prudent for the lower court to have treated the motion to dismiss as the answer of petitioner and examined the
case on its merits. As will be shown shortly, the long drawn out proceedings that took place would have been avoided.
Furthermore, the said case did not involve the question of extension in the period for filing pleadings under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
In Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 this Court allowed the notice to vacate, served upon the tenant, by
registered mail instead of personal service as required by the Rules of Court. We thus ruled:34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they
involve a disturbance a social order which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue reliance on technical
and procedural rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate analysis, it matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed,
so long as the lessee or his agent has personally received the written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his
attorney, a messenger or even a postman. The undisputed facts in the instant case show that the Manila Times Publishing
Company, through its manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc. was the new owner of the subject building;
that on October 18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him to leave the premises but petitioner refused
to receive the letter; that a second demand on January 12, 1981 elicited the same reaction; that a final demand dated
November 16, 1981 was sent to petitioner by registered mail which he again refused. And even on the supposition that
there was no personal service as claimed by petitioner, this could only be due to petitioners blatant attempts at evasion
which compelled the new landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot countenance an unfair situation where
the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by the unwarranted delay resulting from the obstinate refusal of the
defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid demand.
In both cases, there was substantial compliance with the law, something that cannot be said of herein petitioners.
Second Issue: Forum-Shopping
Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by pursuing the present ejectment suit,
notwithstanding the pendency of an action for quieting of title involving the same property and parties. We are unable to
find basis for this charge.
For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances; and the
actions must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.35 Suffice it to say that an action for quieting of title
and partition has a different cause of action than that in an ejectment suit. As private respondent herself contended,
ownership of a certain portion of the property which is determined in a case of partition does not necessarily mean that
the successful litigant has the right to possess the property adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the only issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by
any of the party litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from
the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a partys possession, provided that he has in his favor
priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.36 It has even been ruled that the institution of a separate action for
quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution of the summary remedy of
ejectment.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Double costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226 January 31, 2000
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-315-MTJ)
GLORIA LUCAS, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS, MeTC, Branch 9, Manila, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a verified complaint1 dated May 20, 1997, complainant Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion relative to Civil
Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment".
Complainant, who was the defendant in the aforecited case, alleged that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued an Order2dated
February 26, 1997 granting the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Order3 dated January 13, 1997, which dismissed
the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference.
Complainant averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that a motion for
reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. She
added that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the case is governed by
the Rules on Summary Procedure,4 the judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause
an injury to complainant.
Further, complainant alleged that the actuations of the respondent is in blatant disregard of the established rules on
procedure, and it is an instance where the doctrine of IPSA LOQUITOR may once again may be applied by the Court to
discipline judges.
On June 18, 1997, respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint. In her Comment 5dated
September 16, 1997, she admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration even if the same is a prohibited motion
in an ejectment case. She explained, however, that it was granted in the interest of justice.
In her Comment, respondent stated:
The Order subject of this complaint is the Order dated January 13, 1997 dismissing the complaint for ejectment for failure
of the plaintiff to appear for preliminary conference and more importantly her lawyer, Atty. Jose Suing, who was duly
empowered to appear for preliminary conference by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney.
Immediately upon learning the said order of dismissal and awarding of attorney's fees, Atty. Suing filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on January 17, 1997 (Annex "A") stating that he failed to appear due to a sudden excruciating stomach
pain. He further stated that his Secretary called the Court but to no avail until finally the call came through and she was
informed that the case was dismissed. Over the objection of the defendant that the Motion for Reconsideration was a
prohibited pleading which this Presiding Judge is fully aware of under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the Motion for
Reconsideration was nonetheless granted in the interest of justice. The question is poised. Are the actuations of judges to
be governed strictly by the Rule on Summary Procedure despite their belief in good faith that in special cases, its observance
would result in a miscarriage of justice? This Presiding Judge does not think so. Judges are supposed to responsible Public
Officials and should be able to perceive and discern circumstances which might lead to miscarriage of justice, thus, negating
the very purpose and essence of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Rule on Summary Procedure is not a straight jacket
and it is believed it was never meant to be that. This is the reason why we have in the Rules of Court Section 5 (g) of Rule
135 which is one of the inherent powers of the Court, that is, to amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice. Ignorance of the law, to the mind of the undersigned, is the act of a judge in taking
legal steps or adopting procedure unknowingly aware that they are contrary to established Rules which should be known
to the judge. This Presiding Judge in this particular case was fully aware of the Rule on Summary Procedure. She fully knew
that the Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading but she still considered it because to deny it would result in
a miscarriage of justice. It was not a capricious, whimsical and despotic act when viewed in the light of this
circumstance.1âwphi1.nêt
With respect to the allegation that the charge of ignorance of the law was compounded by the failure to issue a writ of
execution, it bears stressing that the Order dated January 13, 1997 never gained finality because the plaintiff was able to
file the Motion for Reconsideration within the fifteen (15) day period, that is, on January 17, 1997. But even if it is argued
validly that the Motion for Reconsideration being a prohibited pleading did not interrupt the running of the period of appeal,
still the said Order did not gain finality as far as defendant Gloria Lucas is concerned because as the record shows, it was
she who received the Order, not her lawyer, Atty. Sulit.
The complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation after the case was docketed as an administrative matter. On August 25, 1997, OCA in a Memorandum,
submitted the following findings:
After a careful perusal of the records of the case, we find that respondent Judge Fabros abused her discretion in granting
the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent Judge Fabros maintained that she could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law as she knows that a motion
for reconsideration of judgment is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She explained that although there is already a
judgment dismissing the case, she granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration in the interest of justice since the
reasons stated in the motion for reconsideration are meritorious.
Respondent failed to realize that the first duty of the court is to apply the law and that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation. Although her intention was good, this could not free her from liability.
Respondent should have denied the motion since the plaintiff had other judicial remedies like appeal.6
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for grave
abuse of discretion. The Court, however, finds this recommendation without factual and legal basis.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.1âwphi1 Thus,
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
xxx xxx xxx
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by
the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks
reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case."7 Here, the order of dismissal
issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a
judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited
pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed
no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration
subject of the present complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Amelia A. Fabros is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80739 August 20, 1992
GRACIA R. JOVEN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL A. PATRON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 59, Lucena City,
Roberto Paguia & Fernando Lasala, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner was the registered owner of three parcels of land which she mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank of
the Philippines. Upon the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage due to her failure to pay her loan, the properties were
sold at public auction to DBP as the biggest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued and annotated on the certificate of title
on November 17, 1982.
After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption having been made by the petitioner, DBP sold the subject
properties to Roberto Paguia, one of the herein private respondents, through a deed of sale executed on December 17, 1985.
On January 30, 1986, Paguia took possession of the properties through his representative, Fernando Lasala, the other
private respondent.
Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City (raffled later
to Branch 55) for the annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure. Named as defendants were DBP and the private
respondents. Later, when her application for preliminary injunction and restraining order was denied, she lodged with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc complaint against the private respondents for forcible entry with a prayer
for writ of mandatory injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 155.
In a decision dated May 14, 1986, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But on May 29, 1986, the petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was granted. In a resolution dated July 11, 1986, 1 the private respondents were
ordered to: 1) immediately restore and deliver possession of the subject properties to the petitioner; 2) render to the
petitioner an accounting of all the fruits and products gathered from said property from the time they took possession
thereof until they vacate the same; and 3) reimburse the petitioner the total cost of such accounting.
This resolution was reversed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 59, 2 which held that the court a
quo had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case because of the issue of ownership raised therein and that, assuming such
jurisdiction, the decision had already become final and executory when the resolution dated July 11, 1986, was rendered.
The petitioner elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the assailed decision in toto. 3
She is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari, contending that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the ejectment case and that the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry on the subject premises
for occupying the same without judicial authorization.
The petition has merit:
The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry on the
principal ground that a question of ownership was involved therein. This view does not jibe with the following observations
from Chief Justice Moran based on a consistent line of decisions from this Court: 4
It would be a mistake to suppose that an action involves a question of title merely because the plaintiff may allege in his
complaint that he is the owner of the land. Just as the plaintiff may introduce proof of his title in order to show the character
of his (sic) prior possession, so be may allege ownership in himself as a material and relevant fact in the case, and the
insertion of such an allegation in the complaint cannot by any possibility place the cause beyond the jurisdiction of the
magistrate's court, provided it otherwise sufficiently appears that what the plaintiff really seeks is the restoration of
possession as against an intruder who has seized the property within the period of one year. Much less can the defendant
in such an action defeat the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court by setting up title in himself. In this connection it should
be borne in mind that the factor which defeats the jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace is the necessity to
adjudicate the question of title. The circumstance that proof of title is introduced at the hearing or that a claim of ownership
is made by either or both of the parties is not material
This ruling is embodied in Sec. 33, (2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which vests municipal courts with:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; Provided, that when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership should be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for forcible entry in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-
Sampaloc, the case for annulment of the mortgage and foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves recovery of ownership,
was already being litigated in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Even so, the municipal court could, pending final
adjudication of that case, exercise its jurisdiction to determine the right of possession (only) over the subject properties in
the ejectment case.
The private respondents also contend that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for
forcible entry because; a) under Section 19 par. (2) of BP 129, as amended, the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein; and b)
under Section 1, par. A (1) of the Rule on Summary Procedure, cases of forcible entry and detainer involving the question
of ownership are expressly excluded from the summary jurisdiction of the municipal court.
Curiously, however, they also insist that an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129 and that the petitioner is now estopped from assailing the
applicability of that Rule.
There is no question that under Section 1, par. A (1), of the said Rule, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer except where the
question of ownership is involved or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed
P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint. *
However, it is incorrect to say that the question of ownership was involved in the ejectment case filed by the petitioner
simply because she alleged in her complaint that she was the original owner of the subject properties. That the petitioner
instituted a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage is not a valid reason either for defeating the summary
remedy of ejectment. On the contrary, it only bolsters the conclusion that the ejectment case did not involve the question
of title as this was the subject of the annulment case before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The Rule on Summary
Procedure was clearly applicable because the ejectment case involved only the restoration of possession of the subject land
and not its ownership.
The respondent court also sustained the ruling of the Regional Trial Court that the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not stop the running of the reglementary period to appeal because such
motion was a prohibited pleading under Section 15 (c) ** of the Rule on Summary Procedure. Its conclusion was that the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court had already lost jurisdiction to issue the resolution dated July 11, 1986, because the decision
sought to be reconsidered had then become already final and executory.
We do not agree. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not err in holding that the motion for reconsideration was not
covered by the prohibition under Section 15 (c). The motion prohibited by this section is that which seeks reconsideration
of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case. 5 The decision dismissing the petitioner's
ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the merits. Review thereof could therefore be sought by
the petitioner through her motion for reconsideration and this motion, which was not pro forma, had the effect of
suspending the running of the period to appeal.
Now, on the issue of possession:
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, provides that in case of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the
court *** may issue as a matter of course a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser even during the redemption period,
provided that a proper motion has been filed, a bond is approved, and no third person is involved.
Section 6 of the Act provides that where an extrajudicial sale is made, "redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as
these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act."
Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, which in turn were replaced by Sections 29 to 31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 35 provides that "if no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee,
is entitled to a conveyance and the possession of property, . . . The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser
or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
debtor."
To give effect to his right of possession, the purchaser must invoke the aid of the courts and ask for a writ of possession. He
cannot simply take the law into his own hands and enter the property without judicial authorization. 6We have consistently
held that he need not bring a separate and independent suit for this purpose. 7 Nevertheless, it is essential that he ask for
and be granted a writ of possession in order that he may be legally installed in the property he has bought.
Section 63 (b) of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, requires that in case of non-redemption,
the purchaser at a foreclosure sale shall file with the Register of Deeds either a final deed of sale executed by the person
authorized by virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed of mortgage or his sworn statement attesting to the
fact of non-redemption. The Register of Deeds shall thereupon issue a new certificate in favor of the purchaser after the
owner's duplicate certificate shall have been previously delivered and canceled.
In F. David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 8 this Court held:
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed
during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property
and can demand it at any time following the consolidation ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer
certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he
has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption
period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed
owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the
court. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, there is no showing that after the lapse of the redemption period without the petitioner having redeemed
the lands, DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership of the subject properties. Neither has it filed with the
Register of deeds a final deed of sale or a sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption. The circumstance that
the properties are still in the name of the petitioner shows that DBP has also not yet obtained a new certificate of title in its
name. And neither does it appear that DBP, on the basis of its purchase of the lands at the foreclosure sale, ever secured a
writ of possession to authorize its entry into the said lands.
Not having done any of these, DBP had as yet not acquired any perfected right of possession that it could transfer to the
private respondents. And as the petitioner continued in actual possession of the subject premises, she could undoubtedly
maintain an action for forcible entry against the private respondents when, not being armed with a court order or a writ of
possession, they simply entered and took possession of the subject lands.
The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de
facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In
affording this remedy of restitution, the statute seeks to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which might
ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy. Another purpose is to discourage those persons who, believing themselves
entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their
claims. 9
Under Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, there is forcible entry when one in physical possession of a land or building
is deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The words "by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter
upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To constitute the use of "force" as
contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even
necessary that he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding
the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. 10
It is noted that the petitioner instituted the action for annulment of mortgage on December 3, 1985, while the deed of sale
in favor of the private respondent was executed on December 17, 1985. Paguia cannot say that when he took possession of
the subject land on January 30, 1986, he was acting in good faith. Neither can be claim that he had no knowledge of the
pendency of that litigation because he was in fact one of the defendants in that case. In any event, the fact that the titles
were still in the name of the petitioner should have warned him of the need to ascertain the status of the properties before
he took possession of them.
The private respondents also assert that the institution of the ejectment case resulted in the splitting of a single cause of
action into two, one for the recovery of ownership and possession and the other for recovery of possession de facto.
In Drilon vs. Gaurana, 11 this Court held:
It is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action (Rule 2, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court)
and if two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded
in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court). However, a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action has
an entirely different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is involved in a forcible entry case is
merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the
issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city
or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution
of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto (De la Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520 [1984]).
While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the two actions, the issues involved and the reliefs prayed for
are not the same. In the annulment suit, the issue is the validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale
whereas the issue in the ejectment case is whether, assuming the mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, the private
respondents have the right to take possession of the property. In the former case, the relief prayed for is recovery of
ownership of the subject land while in the latter it is restoration of possession thereof to the petitioner. Hence, the municipal
court had jurisdiction to try the ejectment case while the annulment suit was being litigated in the regional trial court.
The contention that the petitioner was forum-shopping must also be rejected. As an injunction cannot be a substitute for
the other suits for recovery of possession, 12 such as an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and accion publiciana,
denial of the injunction did not bar the petitioner from availing herself of the more appropriate remedy, to wit, the action
for forcible entry. 13
In sum, the respondent court erred when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring that the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner. We find that it had.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban, Sampaloc dated
July 11, 1986, in Civil Case No. 155 is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127480. February 28, 2000.]

CONCHITA L. ABELLERA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JULIETO P. TABIOLO, as Judge, RTC, Quezon City,
Branch 106, and SPS. BELTRAN and NICERITA ACEBUCHE using assumed names SPS. BELTRAN & NICERITA
ABELLERA, Respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 26, 1996, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City, and its resolution, dated November 19, 1996, denying the motion for
reconsideration.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Since 1968, petitioner Conchita L. Abellera and her "adoptive" 2 parents, Roberto and Virginia Acebuche, had resided in a
semi-bungalow house at No. 571 A. Bonifacio St., Brgy. Bagong Silang, Quezon City. In 1990, petitioner became a beneficiary
of said lot under the urban housing program of the Quezon City government. 3 Sometime thereafter, she went to Samar for
vacation and left the house and lot to the care of her elder brother, private respondent Beltran Acebuche. When she returned
in 1991, private respondents refused to vacate the house despite petitioner’s demands, the last of which was made in April
1993. As attempts to mediate the dispute between the siblings at the barangay level failed, petitioner sued private
respondents for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 35, Quezon City.

On the basis of the position papers and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the MeTC, on December 24,
1993, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which provides: 4

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Conchita L. Abellera ordering defendant
spouses Beltran and Nicerita Acebuche a.k.a. Beltran and Nicerita Abellera and all persons claiming rights under them to
vacate the premises identified as Block 18, Lot 9 located at No. 571 A. Bonifacio St., Bgy. Bagong Silang, Quezon City and to
turn-over possession thereof to Plaintiff herein. Defendants are likewise ordered to pay the following:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

1) the amount of P3,000.00 per month computed from December 23, 1990 representing the reasonable compensation for
their use and occupancy of the premises in question until the same is completely vacated by defendants and all persons
claiming rights under them;

2) the amount of P5,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and

3) the cost of suit.

Private respondents appealed and the case was assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City, presided by
Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo. Pending appeal, the decision of the MeTC was executed and fully satisfied as private respondents
failed to file a supersedeas bond. On February 22, 1994, the court required the parties to file their memoranda, which
petitioner did on April 15, 1994. On April 18, 1994, private respondents moved for a new trial, but this was dismissed by
the court on April 26, 1994 for failure to prosecute. 5 On May 27, 1994, private respondents moved for admission of
additional evidence consisting of a Contract to Sell between them and the Quezon City government, dated March 3, 1994,
involving the lot in dispute and receipts for payment of said lot for the months of March and April 1994. 6 This motion was
submitted for resolution on May 31, 1994. 7 After private respondents filed their memorandum on July 5, 1994, the court
directed the parties to attend a preliminary conference which was held on July 26, 1994.

After said conference, the court issued the following order: 8

When the clarificatory conference was called, the court was confronted with documents presented by both parties. On the
side of [Abellera], a document certifying that she is an awardee of the lot in question was shown. [Acebuche], on the other
hand, is also presenting a document showing that the deed of sale was executed in [his] favor covering the same lot by the
city government of Quezon City.

In the face of this conflict, it is the sense of the court that the two parties, who issued these documents, should be summoned
to the court for further clarificatory hearing, which for that purpose is set on August 2, 1994, at 8:30 a.m.

Send appropriate subpoena immediately.

As it turned out, seven "clarificatory" hearings 9 were held by the court, during which the parties, in compliance with the
court’s directive, presented testimonial evidence in support of their documentary proofs. At the hearing on August 13, 1994,
on motion of private respondents, the court ordered the deputy sheriff to conduct an ocular inspection of the disputed
property. The deputy sheriff, after conducting an inspection, submitted a report to the court on October 14, 1994. 10

On December 15, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the MeTC, the pertinent portion of which
states: 11

All told and painstakingly reviewed, sedately examined and objectively analyzed, this Court is inclined to believe that the
plaintiff/appellee cannot claim any right over the property in question, since there is no evidence on records to show that
she has any interest thereon, not even any right being transferred to her. A fortiori, plaintiff’s claim that defendants-
appellants are unlawfully withholding possession of subject premises in violation of her rights and interest as occupant and
owner of the property in question, cannot be accorded the court’s conformance, as the evidence on record does not sustain
that claim.

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the decision rendered by
the Court a quo, and in lieu thereof, another is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the ground that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it, in effect,
conducted a trial de novo and ordered an ocular inspection of the property. Before the court could act on her motion,
however, petitioner filed, on February 14, 1995, a motion seeking the inhibition of Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo. Her motion was
granted and the case was raffled to Branch 80 of the court, presided by Judge Agustin S. Dizon. In his order dated March 17,
1995, Judge Dizon declared all pending incidents in the case submitted for resolution. 12

Again, before the new judge could resolve her motion for reconsideration and other incidents in the case, Petitioner, on
April 4, 1995, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals raising substantially the same grounds cited in her motion
for reconsideration. 13

On January 26, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states: 14

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Motion To Allow Restoration of Possession filed by
defendants/private respondents is GRANTED. As prayed for, an order is hereby issued directing herein plaintiff/petitioner
to allow defendants/private respondents to occupy the subject lot and directing plaintiff/petitioner to peacefully turn over
possession to defendants/private respondents.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Hence, this appeal. Petitioner alleges that —

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS
APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE COVERED BY THE REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE TO CONDUCT CLARIFICATORY HEARINGS AND ALLOW A PARTY TO SUBMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SITTING AS AN
APPELLATE COURT TO ISSUE AN ORDER FOR THE CONDUCT OF AN OCULAR INSPECTION.

The petition is partly meritorious.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Regional Trial Courts could not, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
hear the case de novo in the guise of clarificatory hearings, during which additional evidence was presented by the parties
and an ocular inspection was conducted. It held: 15

The extent of jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court on appeal is established as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Section 22, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 —

SECTION 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. — Regional Trial Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision
of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which may give
it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will
warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. (Emphasis ours).

Section 21(d), Interim Rules of Court —

SECTION 21. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts. —

(d) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt by the parties of the notice referred to in the preceding paragraph, they may
submit memoranda and/or briefs, or be required by the regional trial court to do so. After the submission of such
memoranda and/or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the regional trial court shall decide the case
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
have been filed. (Emphasis ours)

Section 45, Republic Act No. 6031 —

Section 45 . . . "Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted
from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested: Provided, however, That if the case was tried in a city or municipal court before the latter became a court of
record, then on appeal the case shall proceed by trial de novo." (Emphasis ours)

Thus, there can be no trial de novo. The appellate court must decide the appeal on the basis of the records and
memoranda/brief (Herrera, Oscar M. Remedial Law, Volume Two-Civil Procedure, Rules 24-56, 1990, p. 216, citing R.A.
6031, Section 22 (d), B.P. 129, Rule 21 (d), IRC).

Nevertheless, it ruled that petitioner was estopped from claiming that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction as she
herself had participated in the trial de novo and failed to object, through counsel, to the issuance of the order to conduct an
ocular inspection. 16

Indeed, although Regional Trial Courts should decide cases on appeal on the basis solely of the record of the proceedings
in Municipal Trial Courts and other courts of equal rank, nonetheless, the principle of estoppel may bar a party from
questioning the reception of additional evidence, as in this case. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 17 this Court
ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[A] party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean v. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease v. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. LOUIS etc. v. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659.) And in Littleton v. Burgess, 16 Wyo.
58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon the principle stated in Sibonghanoy, we hold that petitioner cannot be permitted to question at this stage the
reception of additional evidence and ocular inspection of property after she participated but eventually lost in what she
now calls the irregular proceedings of the trial court. During the seven hearings conducted by Branch 106 of the RTC,
Quezon City, petitioner presented no less than seven witnesses in addition to several documentary evidence to support her
case. Afterwards, on September 15, 1994, she filed her Formal Offer of Exhibits 18 followed by a Supplemental
Memorandum on September 26, 1994. 19 The order to conduct ocular inspection was likewise made in open court, the
presence of petitioner’s counsel. 20 It was only after the court rendered its ruling on December 15, 1994, reversing the
lower court, that petitioner, in her motion for reconsideration, questioned for the first time the authority of said court to
conduct the hearings and ocular inspection. 21

We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal.
For, indeed, the case was not with said court on appeal but on a petition for certiorari. Thus, the appellate court’s jurisdiction
was only to pass upon the validity of the orders of the RTC in the conduct of clarificatory hearings and ocular inspection.
Since the RTC has yet to act on private respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal, this matter should have been left
for resolution by the trial court, not by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 26, 1996, is AFFIRMED insofar as it denies petitioner’s
petition for certiorari, but REVERSED insofar as it grants private respondents’ motion to be placed in possession of the
disputed property.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtua| |aw |ibrary

A.M. No. MTJ-93-860 December 21, 1993
ELPIDIO SY, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE EMELITA HABACON-GARAYBLAS, in her capacity as presiding Judge of
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, Respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
In a sworn complaint dated July 1, 1993, Elpidio Sy charged Judge Emelita Habacon-Garayblas of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 7, Manila with gross ignorance of the law, partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order,
in relation to Civil Case No. 131430-CV, and ejectment case entitled "System Realty Development Corporation vs. Maria P.
Garcia." Complainant is the duly authorized representative of the System Realty Development
Corporation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On June 16, 1992, respondent rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff in said case (Annex "A") and on August 20, 1992,
she issued a writ of execution (Annex "C"). A Notice to Vacate was served on defendant on
August 21, 1992, giving her three days within which to leave the subject premises (Annex
"D").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
According to complainant, when Sheriff Samuel Caballes was about to enforce the writ of execution, respondent whimsically
and illegally stopped the implementation thereof by issuing an Order dated August 24, 1992, directing the sheriff "to hold
in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Execution issued by the Court dated August 20, 1992" (Annex "E"). The basis
of the order was an unverified Manifestation filed by one Dr. Peter B. Flores, who claimed to be the occupant of the subject
premises (Annex "F").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Complainant alleged that respondent maliciously and unlawfully refused to lift the questioned Order despite several
motions and pleadings to lift the same (Annexes "G", "G-1", "G-2", and "G-3"). Complainant even filed a petition
for mandamus on October 13, 1992, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila to compel respondent to implement
the writ of execution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In her comment dated August 19, 1992, respondent explained that her actions were justifiably taken to enable her to
judiciously resolve the issues of whether Dr. Flores was claiming rights under the defendant in Civil Case
No. 131430-CV and whether the writ of execution may be enforced against him. Thus, respondent issued an order dated
September 12, 1992, setting the Manifestation for hearing on October 12, 1992 and directing the sheriff to hold in abeyance
the implementation of the writ of execution. On October 13, 1992, the day following the hearing, complainant filed the
petition for mandamus.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent averred that the Regional Trial Court, acting on the petition for mandamus, issued an order directing her to
elevate the records of the case to said court. She also noted that the complainant filed a motion for withdrawal of the petition
for mandamus on July 19, 1993, which motion had not yet been acted upon. Neither have the records of the case been
returned to respondent's sala.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We find respondent's explanation satisfactory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As admitted by complainant, possession of the subject premises was claimed by Dr. Peter B. Flores, a third party or stranger
to the ejectment case. Thus, respondent's act of suspending the implementation of the writ of execution was justified under
the doctrine laid down in Sta. Ana v.Suñga, 54 SCRA 36, 44 [1973]:
There may be cases when the actual possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the parties to the action, or his bona-
fide possession may be disputed, or where it is alleged, as in the instant case, that such possession has been taken in
connivance with the defeated litigant with a view to frustrating the judgment. In any of these events, the proper
procedure would be to order a hearing on the matter of such possession and to deny or accede to the enforcement of a writ
of possession as the finding shall warrant. But in the absence of any such hearing or any proceeding of similar character,
every person in the actual possession of the land has a right to be respected therein (Art. 446, Civil Code) and his ejectment
would constitute a deprivation of a property right without due process of law (citing 2 Moran Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 36).
The fact that the manifestation filed by Dr. Flores was unverified does not militate against respondent taking cognizance
thereof. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. The court may order the
correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the end of justice may
thereby be served (Villarica v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96085, March 16, 1992, First Division, Minute
Resolution).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Complainant also cannot fault respondent for not resolving the several motions to lift the questioned Order dated August
24, 1992. Respondent could not take action on the motions because complainant filed a petition for mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court on October 13, 1992 to compel respondent to lift the questioned order. As a consequence of said filing
the records of the case were taken out in respondent's hands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Complainant failed to show that respondent acted with bad faith, illegal motive and evident partiality in issuing the order
suspending the implementation of the writ of execution and in not acting on the motions filed by
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent is DIRECTED to take action
and resolve WITH DISPATCH the cases subject of this complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.