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I. H. JACOB
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
In Leaf v. International Galleries 3 the use of the one word
"warranty " in the plaintiff's pleading would have won him his
case; its omission lost him the case,' although he thereby provided
the occasion, which might not otherwise have arisen, for some very
valuable judgrnents in the Court of Appeal on the question of the
rescission of an executed contract for the sale of goods on the
ground of innocent misrepresentation.
1 Hall v. Eve (1877) 4 Ch.D. 341, at p. 344. James L.J. gave a different version
of this saying in Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Lonsdale (1870) 23 L.T. 794, quoted by
Megarry, Miscellany-at-Law (1955), p. 258.
2 Probably Edward Jacob, Q.C., a Bencher of Lincoln's Inn, and editor of Jacob's
Reports and Jacob and Walker's Reports, Chancery.
3 [1950] 2 K.B. 86.
4 Leave to amend was refused at the trial. The omission to plead an
warranty is not fatal: see Denning L.J. in Shaw v. Shaw [1954] 2 Q.B. 429,
at p. 441.
171
[1955] 1 All E.R. 55, where the particulars stated that no special damage was
alleged in an action for slander; or they may enable a payment into court to be
made, as in Monk v. Redwing Aircraft Co., Ltd. [1942] 1 K.B. 182 (C.A.),
and Phipps v. Orthodox Unit Trusts [1958] 1 Q.B. 314; or they may limit the
amount of the claim; as, e.g., particulars of damage for breach of warranty; or
they may determine whether a party's claim exceeds £200 and so gives him a
right of appeal from the county court on a question of fact, Leslie v. Liverpool
Corporation [1959] 3 All E.R. 898.
24 R.S.C., Ord. 31, r. 12. 25 R.S.C., Ord. 31, r. 1 (proviso).
26 See Prince v. Gregory [1959] 1 W.L.R. 177 (C.A.); Fowler v. Manning [1959]
1 Q.B. 426 (Diplock J.).
27 Whether with or without a jury, see Shordiche-Churchward v. Cordle [1959] 1
W.L.R. 351; or to transfer to the commercial court, or to an official referee or
to the county court, or from one Division of the High Court to another.
28 See Adler v. Dickson [1955] 1 Q.B. 158 (C.A.); Addis v. Crocker [1959] 3
W.L.R. 527 (Gorman J.).
29 See Brett L.J. in Philips v. Phillips (1878) 4 Q.B.D. 127, at p. 133: " 1f parties
were held strictly to their pleadings under the present system they ought not to
be allowed to prove at the trial, as a fact on which they would have to rely in
order to support their case, any fact which is not stated in their pleadings."
This rule is much relaxed nowadays due, as Morris L.J. has said, to " every
reasonable latitude being given to prevent parties being unduly fettered by any
defects in pleading " : Donoghue v. Huyton U. D. C., 1951/78 (C.A.), unreported.
38 See Warrington J. in Re Wrightson [1908] 1 Ch. 789, at p. 799: " The
plaintiffs are not entitled to relief at the trial except in regard to that which is
alleged in the pleadings and proved at the trial."
nucleus around which the whole case revolves throughout all its
stages." The respective cases of the parties can only be considered
in the light of and on the basis of the pleadings; and in this sense,
that the parties may be assumed to have put forward the best case
they have in the best way they can, the pleadings do take a place
of prior importance to the merits of the case. This may sound as
though one is preferring farm to substance, and elevating the
technicalities above and beyond the justice of the case; but inasmuch
as the merits of the case may be said to be revealed by the pleadings,
I do not think this charge is well founded.
It should further be remembered that the court has verg ample
powers of granting leave to amend the pleadings for the purpose of
determining the real questions in controversy between the parties."
While, therefore, it is true that the pleadings act as fetters upon
the parties, binding and circumscribing them closely and strictly to
their own cases as pleaded, either party can apply to the court to
free him from such fetters and to allow him to amend his pleading
so as to put forward his case as he decides. The general principle
is that the court will grant leave to amend, as long as the application
is made bona fide and would not occasion injury or prejudice to the
opposite party which could not be compensated for by costs or
otherwise. 33 Amendments will, of course, be more readily granted
before than at the trial, but in a proper case the court may give
leave to amend at the trial," and even after the close of all the
evidence," and even after judgment. 36 The powers of amendment
31 In the Chancery Division, it is the almost invariable practice for the whole of
the pleadings to be read during the course of the opening of a witness action;
in the Queen's Bench Division, the practice is not so general.
32 R.s.C., Ord. 28, rr. 1 and 12.
33 See the authorities referred to and applied by Jenkins L.J. in G. L. Baker, Ltd.
v. Medway Building & Suppiies, Ltd. [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1216, at p. 1232 et seq.,
and particularly Tildesley v. Harper (1876) 10 Ch.D. 393.
34 As in Davie v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd. [1956] 1 W.L.R. 233; and see
1. Leavey & Co. Ltd. v. G. H. Hirst & Co., Ltd. [1944] 1 K.B. 24, particularly
observations of Ijord Greene M.R., at pp. 27 28.
-
35 Loutfi v. Czarnikow, Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 823 (Sellers J.); contra Edevain v.
Cohen (1890) 43 Ch.D. 187 (C.A.).
36 Pearlman (Veneers) S.A. (Pty) Ltd. v. Bartels [1954] 3 All E.R. 659; Thynne v.
Thynne [1955] P. 272. In Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v.
Borders [1941] 2 All E.R. 205 the House of Lords held that the Court of
Appeal had wrongly allowed an amendment of the pleadings to add a further
charge of fraud.
1. that it is not easy to express what the issues are with clarity
or precision without stating the whole case of each party;
2. that one party would usually prefer to state his own case
rather than to have the opposite party state it for him; and
3. that alternative, and still more inconsistent, claims or defences
are better left to be raised by the party wishing to put them
forward.
For these reasons, ever since it was made, there has been a
marked reluctance to use the procedure provided by Order 14B for
trial without pleadings; and this reluctance was greatly increased
when, in 1956, the Court of Appeal ruled " that once a plaintiff
exercised his option to apply for trial without further pleadings
under Order 14B, he could not make an application for summary
judgment under Order 14, with which Order 14B had no connection
whatsoever save the similarity of numbers. The result has been
that Order 14B as a procedural device for trial without pleadings
has become virtually a dead letter. Since 1955, a total of only
fifteen writs have been issued under this Order, of which twelve
were issued in 1955.
It should be mentioned that the idea that the plaintiff should
be able to ask for trial without pleadings was not new in 1955. It
had, in fact, been introduced in 1897, when a new Order 18A was
added to the Rules of the Supreme Court. But that Order also
fell into disuse and was annulled in 1917, from which it will be
seen that there is little new under the sun. I would respectfully
suggest that the experiment of trial without pleadings can be said
to have been sufficiently tried and found wanting, and that
accordingly Order 14B ought now to be annulled.
there are no pleadings but, where the facts are contested, affidavits
are filed by bath parties, each of whom can, if necessary, obtain
an order that the deponents attend the trial for cross-examination.
The advantages of this procedure, which is widely used in the
Chancery Division, are said to be that it enables the action to be
determined speedily and at less cost, and that before the trial, each
party knows the whole of the evidence given by the opposite party,
subject to cross-examination.
In relation to proceedings where the only questions for decision
are points of construction or where the very nature of the claim
delimits the issues raised, as where a claim for provision is made
under the Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act, 1938, there are clear
advantages in the procedure by way of originating summons. But
in all other cases, and particularly where there are lik ely to he
contested issues of facts and of the law arising out of the facts as
proved, it seems to me, with great respect, that there are distinct
disadvantages in this procedure leading to trial without pleadings."
Among such disadvantages, the following may be listed :
1. The issues cannot emerge until after the close of the evidence
filed by the parties;
2. The issues can only be defined by analysing the evidence of
the parties, if necessary after the close of the evidence at the
trial;
3. It is difficult as well as artificial to raise by means of affidavits
which are meant to deal with facts only, issues or contentions
which are conclusions arising out of the facts as, for example,
a plea of waiver or of estoppel;
4. Issues may be raised at the trial which have not been raised
in the affidavits, and so take the opposite party by surprise 44
5. Discovery on an originating summons cannot be obtained,
except upon special circumstances being shown 45 ;
I should perhaps deal shortly with two criticisms that are made of
pleadings, the first on account of their casts, and the second on
account of their form.
First, it is said that the casts attributable to pleadings form a
substantial part of the costs of an action, and that any reform of
procedure should start with pleadings, for thereby the casts of
litigation could be substantially reduced. I do not pretend to know
and cannot say what is the precise amount or proportion of costs
which can be said to be attributable to pleadings, but what I do
confidently assert is that without pleadings the costs of litigation
would be much greater than they are with pleadings. In many
instances, by revealing the strength or weakness of their respective
cases through their pleadings, the parties are led to a setdement or
compromise which they might not otherwise make, and thereby
the casts are much reduced or kept down. In many other cases,
the narrowing of the issues by the pleadings, and the consequent
limitation upon the range of discovery and evidence, helps to reduce
the casts. In all cases, the costs of the pleadings are as much a
necessary part of the costs of litigation as are the costs of the
evidence required to prove the case. I, therefore, do not think that
the criticism of pleadings on the ground of their costs has much,
if any, force at all.
Secondly, it is said that pleadings nowadays are cast in a
specialised and standardised form and are expressed in rather
formalistic and technical language, which prevents or hinders the
emergence of the true issues in the case. It must be remembered
that those whose task is to read and understand the pleadings are
familiar with the standard forms and the language used, and it is
to them, indeed, that the pleadings are addressed, so that there is
little room for misunderstanding. It is very seldom these days that
the language of a pleading has itself to be construed; and in such
1. General denial
At common law, the plea of the general issue, while it had the
advantage of closing the pleadings and thereby bringing about an
earlier trial, had the overwhelming disadvantage of concealing what
were the real questions in controversy between the parties. As
Cotton L.J. said 46
"The old system of pleading at common law was to conceal
as much as possible what was going to be proved at the trial."
The transformation in the system of pleadings brought about
by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 was to require the parties
46 Spedding v. Fitzpatrick (1888) 38 Ch.D. 410, at p. 414 (C.A.), and he added
that " under the present system it is our duty to see that a party so states his
case that his opponent will not be taken by surprise."
harm is done by it; but quite aften a general denial may conceal
some of the facts on which the defendant relies to escape liability
or may confuse the issues by denying facts which if dealt with
separately could only have been admitted. In such a case, the
result is that the general denial does not reveal, but tends to
conceal, what are the real issues between the parties.
I will give one example since there is little space to develop
the matter fully. In an action for negligence, the defendant is
not bound to plead inevitable accident 50 ; but it is enough if he
simply denies the negligence as alleged or at all. He can under
such a general denial lead evidence at the trial as to facts designed
to show that the accident happened without any negligence on his
part. Those facts, which he need not plead, will in general be
unknown to the plaintiff, who could well be taken by surprise at
the trial.
I think the general denial or general traverse is out of keeping
with the basic object of pleadings, which is to reveal the real issues
between the parties, and I would respectfully urge that its use
should be limited only to the cases in which it is intended simply
to put the plaintiff to proof of his case. It should not be permitted
either where the defendant is proposing to rely on facts which have
not already been pleaded, or where he is denying collectively a
number of facts, some of which, if dealt with individually, would
have to be admitted or not put in issue. The court should have
power, wherever it considers it necessary or desirable for the fair
disposal of the case or for saving costs, to order the defendant to
clarify a general denial or traverse.
the case relied on, he should himself be prepared to state the nature
of the case relied on by him, and such statements should be
exchanged. It may well be that such statements will contain the
evidence or some of it relied on by the parties; but as the parties
will have exchanged such statements, there will be no opportunity
for either of them to tamper witti witnesses or to manufacture
evidence to contradict the evidence of the opposite party, which are
said to be the grounds why a party is not bound today to discover
the evidence of the case.
4. Interrogatories
Interrogatories have very largely fallen into disuse, due, as I
think, to a misconception of their truc function, and also to lack of
skill and confidence in their use. The real object of interrogatories
is to obtain admissions, either to assist a party to prove his case or
to destroy the case of his opponent." In this way, they help to
remove from the realm of dispute questions as to which there is
no real issue. The power to administer interrogatories is at present
limited to such interrogatories as the court considers " necessary
either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving
casts." 59 I think such powers ought to be extended to such inter-
rogatories also which the court considers " desirable for disposing
"
fairly of the case or for saving costs. This extended power will
enable interrogatories to be more widely used; and while no one
suggests that any case should be tried on affidavits, made in answer
to interrogatories, the' more extended grant of interrogatories will
bring a large number of cases to an earlier end, and narrow the real
issues in dispute in a great many more, to the advantage of all
parties concerned.
further think that the whole of any interrogatories adminis-
tered and the answers thereto should always be placed before the
court, as part of the record. At present a party administering
CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude by recalling what Sir William Holds-
worth has said about the importance of pleadings under the old
system in the development of the law and the lawyers. He said " :
" Firstly, it [the system of pleading] had a principal share
in introducing our modern view as to the binding force of
decided cases, and it ensured the success of this method of
developing the law. Secondly, it has helped the lawyers to
build up a logical doctrine on the foundation of the forms of
action. Thirdly, the searching technical learning which it
imposed, gave to the best lawyers a very complete mastery of
the principles of the common law, to which was due in no
small degree the success with which they have from age to age
developed and adapted them to the needs of the age."