Republic of the Philippines Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT SUPREME COURT

Manila Manila
EN BANC
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34431 August 11, 1931
G.R. No. L-35194 August 27, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
FABIAN MONTERA, defendant-appellant. vs.
MARCIANO VENTURA, defendant-appellant.
Eusebio C. Encarnacion for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. Sancho Inocencio for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
IMPERIAL, J.:
The trial judge was right in convicting the accused for the theft of twelve phonograph records
and one flashlight, valued at P30.30, and in considering the accused as an habitual The accused Marciano Ventura appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
delinquent. No consent, express or implied, on the part of the offended party for the accused Rizal convicting him of the crime of estafa and sentencing him to two months and one day
to take the records and flashlight was established. Recidivism was properly taken into of arresto mayor, besides the indemnity and accessory penalties of the law applicable to his
account as an aggravating circumstance, independently of the provisions of the Habitual case, and, as an habitual criminal, to the additional penalty of sixteen years.
Delinquent Law. (People vs. Aguinaldo [1925], 47 Phil., 728.)
The relevant allegations of the information filed by the fiscal are as follows:
The Habitual Delinquent Law, Act No. 3397, is attacked as an ex post facto law in violation of
the Organic Act. This court has heretofore held the Habitual Delinquent Law valid as not
That on or about the 16th day of May, 1930, in the municipality of Makati, Province of
inflicting cruel or unusual punishment. (People vs. Madrano [1928], 53 Phil., 860.) The
Rizal, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused,
present contention is equally unsustainable. Statutes which authorize a more severe Marciano Ventura y Javier (alias Macario Villanueva) (alias Marciano V. del Rosario),
punishment to be imposed upon one convicted of a second or subsequent offense are not
through false representations and pretending himself to be an agent of the firm I.
objectionable upon the ground that they are ex post facto laws. Such statutes, the United
Beck, Inc., received the sum of P21.70 from Adriano Miralles as the first partial
States Supreme Court has said, do not impose any additional punishment for the former
payment for a phonograph case which the said Adriano Miralles purchased from I.
crimes, but simply impose a punishment on future crimes, the penalty therefor being Beck, Inc., through the representation of the herein accused, and once in possession
enhanced on account of the criminal propensities of the accused. of the said sum of P21.70, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
(McDonald vs. Massachusetts [1900], 180 U. S., 311.)
and with intent to defraud the said Adriano Miralles, embezzle and apply to his own
personal use and benefits the said amount of P21.70, to the damage and prejudice of
Conforming, therefore, with the pronouncements of the trial court, except that, as the said Adriano Miralles in the aforesaid sum, equivalent to 107 ½ pesetas.
recommended by the Attorney-General, there must be a modification of the period of
imprisonment, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, it being understood that the That the herein accused is a habitual delinquent under the provisions of Act No. 3397
defendant and appellant is sentenced to two years, four months, and one day
of the Philippine Legislature in that he has been six times convicted of the same
imprisonment, presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P30.30,
crime by virtue of final judgment handed down by competent courts, having been
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the appropriate accessory penalties,
released from jail on September 22, 1929.
and with the costs of both instances; and to an additional penalty of ten years' imprisonment
as an habitual delinquent. So ordered.
Contrary to law.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.
A careful study of the evidence presented at the trial shows that some days before the date
mentioned in the information, the appellant, an acquaintance and friend of the offended party,
had offered to sell the latter a cabinet or gramophone case of the kind sold by I. Beck & Co.
for P21.70. The offended party, who had on a prior occasion bought several gramophone
records of the appellant, told the latter that he had n money at the time, but that he would buy
one as soon as he had the funds. The appellant had passed himself off in all these
transactions as an agent of I. Beck & Co. On May 16, 1930, in the municipality of San Pedro
Makati, Province of Rizal, the offended party, having sufficient funds, sought the appellant
and told him he had decided to buy the cabinet. The appellant then replied that they would
carry through the sale, and delivery would be made shortly. The offended party, not knowing
the appellant very well and being in some doubt, required that the receipt for the price be
made out in the presence of the municipal president of Makati. They went to the office of the
latter and in his presence the offended party delivered to the appellant the sum of P21.70
agreed upon. The municipal president prepared a receipt and required the appellant to sign it.
The receipt was marked Exhibit A by the prosecution and reads as follows:
I hereby acknowledge receipt of the amount of P21.70 from Mr. Adriano L. Miralles,
resident of the barrio of Tejeros, municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, Philippine
Islands, as a deposit for the sale of a gramophone cabinet of the firm I. Beck &
Company, Inc., of which the undersigned is an authorized selling agent.
Makati, Rizal May 16th, 1930.
(Sgd.) MARCIANO VENTURA
Witness:
(Sgd.) MAXIMO PAULINO
It was stipulated that the appellant would deliver the gramophone cabinet to the injured party
on the following day, but neither on that date nor on nay other did he comply with his promise
or return the money he had received, for which reason the offended party was obliged to
institute the instant criminal action.
The appellant assigns the following alleged errors to the judgment appealed from:
I. The court a quo erred in considering Exhibit A as a receipt for deposit of the sale of
one box of phonograph and not as a mere receipt of debt.
II. The court a quo erred in condemning the herein accused-appellant guilty of the
crime charged beyond all reasonable doubt.
Both errors deal with the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution. We have
stated at the beginning that the facts proved establish the appellant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. It cannot be disputed that the latter passed himself off as an agent of I.
Beck & Co. and pretended to be in possession of a cabinet or gramophone case, because of
which, the offended party agreed to purchase it, paying and delivering to the appellant, as in
fact he did, the sum of P21.70. It is likewise beyond question that neither on the date
stipulated nor upon any of the subsequent date did the appellant deliver the article he had
sold, or return the price he had received. With reference to Exhibit a, it is clearly not an
acknowledgment of a debt but that the appellant had received the money as the price of the
article he had sold. It follows that the two errors assigned to the judgment appealed from are
groundless. So far as the evidence of the defense is concerned, the trial court did not err in
refusing to rely upon it, for it has failed to overcome that adduced by the prosecution.
There is a controversy in regard to the additional penalty imposed by the trial court for the
reason that the appellant is an habitual criminal. The record shows that the latter was
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the municipal court of Manila, for the crime
of estafa in the following cases: In No. B-58022 he was convicted on September 16, 1918,
committed to prison on the 20th of that month, and released on January 19, 1919; in No. B-
59787, he was convicted on September 20, 1918, committed to prison on the same day and
released on January 19, 1919; in No. F-56664 he was convicted on September 13, 1927, and
released on June 11, 1928; in No. E-52856 he was convicted on September 17, 1927;
committed to prison on September 13, 1927, and released on June 11, 1928; in No. E-96891
he was convicted on July 15, 1929, committed to prison on July 16, 1929, and released on
September 22, 1929; and in No. E-96892 he was convicted on July 15, 1929, committed to
prison on July 16, 1929, and released on September 22, 1929.
The trial court found the accused guilty simply of estafa and sentenced him to two months
and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessories, indemnity and costs, and as an habitual
criminal held that his first two convictions could not be counted because his conviction and
release took place more than ten years immediately preceding the date on which he was last
found guilty of estafa, and considering only that he had been convicted in the remaining
cases, imposed upon him the additional penalty of sixteen years' imprisonment in accordance
with subsection (c) of section 1, Act No. 3586, amending Act No. 3397.
The defense does not question in his brief the propriety of the additional penalty because, as
theretofore stated, counsel contends that the appellant should be acquitted. But the Attorney-
General contends that in accordance with Act No. 3586, the six prior convictions of the
accused should be taken into consideration, although, following the rule laid down in People
vs. Santiago (55 Phil., 266), and People vs. De la Cruz (G. R. No. 33786, promulgated
February 7, 1931),1 said six prior convictions are to be considered as equivalent to only three.
In accordance with section 1 of Act No. 3586, the appellant's six prior convictions must be
taken into account, since the last, which took place on July 15, 1929, is included within the
ten years next preceding the date on which he was last convicted, that is, February 21, 1931.
This court has so uniformly held whenever the question has been raised. But following the
doctrine laid down in the Santiago and De la Cruz cases, supra, these six prior convictions
must be considered as equivalent to only three, because the accused committed the second
crime before his first conviction, and the fourth before his third conviction, and because the
fifth and sixth crimes were committed on the same day. So that the present conviction being
the fourth sustained by the appellant in this case, the case falls within subsection (b) of
section 1 of that law. With respect to the nature of the crime last committed, the same must Republic of the Philippines
be considered as qualified estafa according to article 536 of he Penal Code. The penalty SUPREME COURT
provided for this crime is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degrees according to Manila
case 1, article 534, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3244; but according to article 536 the
penalty must be raised one degree because the accused has been more than twice a SECOND DIVISION
recidivist, and the proper penalty is arresto mayor in its maximum period to presidio
correccional in its minimum degree, and the medium degree of this penalty is one year and
G.R. No. 70713 June 29, 1989
one day to one year and eight months of presidio correccional.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Wherefore the judgment appealed from is modified and the accused-appellant is sentenced
vs.
to one year and one day of presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the
BARTOLOME GALANG, accused-appellant.
amount of P21.70, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the accessory
penalties of article 58 of the Penal Code, and to the additional penalty of ten years'
imprisonemnt as an habitual criminal, besides the payment of the costs of both instances. So Ponciano C. Lobo for accused-appellant.
ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur. SARMIENTO, J.:

Bartolome Galang was convicted of rape by the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga
and sentenced to suffer "an indeterminate sentence from six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum; to suffer the accessory penalties as provided by law and to
pay the costs." 1

Galang appealed his conviction to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) which found him guilty of the crime charged. Accordingly, the Intermediate
Appellate Court reached the following conclusion:

xxx xxx xxx

We are satisfied that the evidence on record amply supports the appealed
decision.

We, however, find error in the penalty imposed by the Court a quo. The
penalty for the crime of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua (People vs. Gonzales, 58 SCRA 265). Under Par. 1 of
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code in all cases where the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty it shall be applied by the Courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances which may have attended the
commission of the offense (People vs. Amores, 58 SCRA 505, 511).
Ostensibly, therefore, the penalty imposed by the trial Court is below that
prescribed by law which is reclusion perpetua, 2

xxx xxx xxx

Judgment, however, was not entered and the case, with its entire records, was elevated to
this Court for review pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Daniel and other cases. 3
From the records brought to the Court we find that a verified complaint 4 for rape was filed by
Alfredo R. Pangilinan, father of the victim Alona Pangilinan, with the Municipal Court of
Minalin, Province of Pampanga. The complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
That in the afternoon of January 8, 1975 at barrio San Pedro, Municipality of
Minalin, Province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and criminally abused one ALONA PANGILINAN, 6
years old by using physical force and by threatening the latter to take her life
if she will not consent to his carnal desire, forcing the girl to their house and
then ordered her to lie down on the bed and removed her panty thereat and
started his carnal desire by inserting his penis into the vagina of ALONA
PANGILINAN causing her lavia to bleed and got shocked by fear to the
dishonor, and prejudice of the victim, as per Medical Certificate hereto
attached.
All contrary to law.
Minalin, Pampanga, Philippines ...
January 9, 1975
xxx xxx xxx
The findings of fact of the appellate court as recited in its decision are as follows: 5
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence discloses that on the afternoon of January 8, 1975, six-year old
Alona Pangilinan was playing at the family yard at Barangay San Pedro,
Minalin. Bartolome Galang called her and told her to go up to his house
some three houses away from the Pangilinan residence. Alona knew
Bartolome since 1973 because the latter had been performing chores for the
Pangilinan family and taking his meals with them so she acceded and went
upstairs. Bartolome told her to lie down in bed. He removed her underwear
and panty down to her knees and thereafter took off his own pants. He then
went on top of Alona and inserted his penis into her vagina, after which he
pulled up Alona's panty and when the girl was about to leave, he threatened
her with death if she reported the incident to her father. She became
frightened.
The next day, January 9, 1975, while Alona was urinating, her mother
Emiliana noticed blood in her panty. Upon inquiry, Alona revealed what
"Tulo" (referring to Bartolome) had done to her. Shocked by such revelation,
Emiliana told Bartolome's mother about her discovery. Meanwhile, Alona was
taken by her grandmother to the Central Luzon General Hospital at San
Fernando, Pampanga where she was examined by Dr. Gamboa. Alona's
father Alfredo, a peddler by occupation, also learned about what happened to
Alona on the afternoon of January 9,1975. He followed her to the hospital
where he saw her being examined by Dr. Gamboa. The next day, January
10, 1975, he filed a criminal complaint before the Municipal Court of Minalin
(Exhibit "B"). Dr. Julio Gamboa, who examined Alona issued this Medical
Certificate:
January 10, 1976
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT one ALONA PANGILINAN, 6 years of age, child
from Minalin, Pampanga was examined in this hospital on January 9,1975
with the following findings:
I. Mentality-Normal
II. Head and Neck-No evidence of external physical
III. Thorax
Breast)
Nipple) not yet
Areola) developed
IV. Abdomen-Soft, flat, non-tender, no arganomegaly
V. Perineum :
Pubic hair-none
Labia minora and majora not yet well developed
Hymenal opening- admit small finger laceration is a superficial wound at the labia" (Exh. "A") She also attributed
her failure to tell her mother to (sic) the fact that she became frightened
Hymenal laceration-fresh superficial wound when, immediately after being sexually abused and as she was about to
leave the appellant's house, the latter threatened her with death should she
relate the incident to her father or to anyone else. Alona's behavior is
hematoma at the labia
therefore understandable (People vs. Tamayao, 120 SCRA 412; People vs.
Oydoc, 125 SCRA 250). Alona was a six-year old child at the time of the
(SGD) JULIO D. AMBOA M.D. incident and the appellant failed to show why a country girl like her would
impute such a serious crime against him for no reason at all (People vs.
R Flores, 125 SCRA 244; People vs. Ferrer, 124 SCRA 663; People vs.
e Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321).
s
i Appellant further assails the medical finding that Alona was sexually abused
d arguing that her vagina only admits one finger and the laceration is a mere
e superficial wound on the labia; that Alona might have scratched or inserted
n something to relieve itchiness in her vagina; and that the laceration was not
t caused by sexual abuse. We find no merit in this pretense. The fact that the
P victim's vagina admits one finger and that there was only a superficial wound
h in the labia does not negate rape because being of tender age, the
y penetration could only be as deep as the labia. Indeed, even a slight
s penetration, without emission, is sufficient basis for conviction of rape
i (People vs. Bautista, 102 SCRA 438; People vs. Franco, 114 SCRA 737).
c
i
a Appellant asserts that Alona's testimony that she went to the Minalin
Municipal Building only once on January 9, 1975 is contradicted by her father
n
Alfredo's testimony that they went home from the hospital on January 9,
1975 and it was only on January 10, 1975 that he and his daughter went to
p. 6, Records. said Municipal building to file the criminal complaint. Appellant draws the
inference that Alona and her father were not being truthful and that,
Appellant now faults the trial Court in putting too much reliance on the therefore, they do not deserve to be believed.
testimonies of Emiliana Pangilinan and Alona Pangilinan; that Emiliana had
no direct knowledge as to how and when the offense took place, while Alona, This contention is likewise ummeritorious. Alona's testimony that she went to
who was only six years old at the time, is undeserving of credence because the Minalin Municipal Building on January 9, 1975 may be due to her
she made no outcry that there was no .threat before and during the alleged confusion of the dates considering that she was only six years old at the time
incident; and that instead Alona just walked calmly back to her house without of the assault and she took the witness stand two years thereafter. In any
telling her mother about the incident until the next day. event, the confusion as to the date the report was made with the authorities
or the date when her complaint was filed is so trivial and minor that it could
After a careful review of the entire record, We find no merit in the appellant's not detract from her overall credibility (People vs. Reyes, 69 SCRA 476).
contentions. To begin with, the testimony of Emiliana Pangilinan has no
reference whatsoever to the actual incident but merely to the fact that she Finally, appellant insists on his version that he was in school at the Minalin
herself saw her daughter's panty smeared with blood which led her to inquire Academy from morning till afternoon of January 8, 1975. Appellant's alibi
from Alona about it and which finally yielded Alona's revelation that she had deserves no credence. He admitted that he saw Alona at about 12:30 P.M. or
been sexually abused by Galang. at noon of the same day. The act imputed to him could have been made at
noon before returning to school or he could have easily gone home during
Alona's testimony that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her without his vacant period between 3 and 4 in the afternoon considering that, as
her feeling any pain, is adequately explained by the fact that the "Hymenal observed by the trial court, his house is only a short distance to the school. In
 the face of the positive identification made of him by Alona, who had known
him for no less than two years before the incident having performed chores
for her family at their house, appellant's alibi cannot be sustained (People vs.
Boado, 103 SCRA 607; People vs. Terrobias, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court. This is in accordance with the
long established rule that when issues raised are basically factual and essentially involve an
appreciation of evidence the findings of the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, are in
turn binding on this Court in the absence of a misapprehension of facts of grave abuse of
discretion. 6 Moreover, there is the time-honored doctrine, which is applicable here, that
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the issue of
credibility of witnesses, unless certain facts of substance and value have clearly and plainly
been overlooked or neglected and that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
We do not, however, agree with the appellate court that the penalty that should be imposed
upon the accused is reclusion perpetua despite the provisions of Articles 63 and 335 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Born on August 24,1958, 7 the accused was sixteen (16) years, nine (9) months and fourteen
(14) days old at the time of the commission of the offense on January 8, 1975; 8 he was
eighteens 9 (18) years when he took the witness stand on April 15,1977 and twenty (20)
years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision on November 21, 1978. 10
Thus, the trial court correctly found him not to be entitled to the benefit of suspension of
sentence under Article 192, Chapter III of the Youth and Welfare Code [Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 603]. Instead, the court pronounced a judgment of conviction after crediting him
with the privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. That is consonant with our holding in People vs. Verano,
Jr. 11
We are, however, of the considered opinion, in view of the heinousness of the offense and
the tender age of the offended party, who shall live with the stigma of such ravishment all her
life, that the penalty imposed by the trial court should be increased.
The imposable penalty for the offense of rape as provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty which, pursuant to the first paragraph
of Article 63 of the same Code, should generally be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that might have attended the commission of the deed. In fact both
the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals are of the view that pursuant to said provision
the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
Be that as it may, we hold that Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code which is hereunder
quoted in part:
... Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. -When
the offender is a minor under eighteen years and this case is one coming
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 12 of this
Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. x x x
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed but always in the
proper period.
is an exception or limitation of the first paragraph of Article 63 because, first, the said first
paragraph of Article 63 is a general rule; secondly, Article 68 follows, or comes after, Article
63; and thirdly, Article 68 is favorable to the accused. All these grounds are sanctioned by
well known rules of statutory construction which need not be stated here.
Whether or not Article 68 is applicable to this case, notwithstanding the fact that the accused
was not given the benefit of a suspension of sentence under Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended by P.D. No. 1179 (which repealed Article 80), was settled by this Court in the case
of People vs. Garcia. 13 In the said case, the Court was confronted with the issue of whether
or not the therein appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime,
was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance provided in Article 68, paragraph 2, of
the Revised Penal Code. In resolving the issue the Court made the following disquisition:
We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it now
stands and article 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between
granting accused of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance
and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a
reformatory institution. In other words, there is no inconsistency between
sending defendants of certain ages to prison and giving them a penalty lower
than the imposable one on adults under the same or similar circumstances.
Let it be remembered that the privilege of article 68, supra, is not by its
nature inherent in age but purely statutory and conventional, and that this
privilege is granted adult offenders under given conditions.
xxx xxx xxx
A close examination of articles 68 and 80 will disclose that article 68,
according to its main paragraph, is to lay off and watch while the minor is in
the hands of a charitable institution or person mentioned in article 80 trying to
reform him or her. This has to be so because article 68 is a rule for the
application of penalties, and there is no penalty when there is no judgment,
and there is no judgment when the delinquent is in Welfareville or other place
of similar character or entrusted to the care of a private person. However, if
and when the minor turns out to be hopeless or incorrigible, he is returned to
the proper court and the court passes sentence on him or her. In other Verily the accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Hence, the
words, article 80 withdraws, as it were, and sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, absent any other mitigating or
case may be, of article 68 takes control. aggravating circumstance. 14

From this it will be seen that article 68 is not dependent on article 80, nor do
these articles complement each other if by complement is meant that they
are two mutually completing parts so that article 68 could not stand without
article 80. It is more appropriate to say that article 68 merely adjusts itself to
article 80 but is, in all other respects, self-sufficient and independent of the
latter. Parts of one system of penology and working in coordination with each
other, they pursue different ends. It is to be noticed that article 68 falls under
section 2 of Chapter IV entitled "Application of Penalties," while article 80
comes under section 1 of Chapter V entitled "Execution and Service of
Penalties." Two different subjects, these.
It will also be seen that article 68, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and article 80 of
the Revised Penal Code do not function at the same time and are designed
for different purposes. Each has its assigned, separate sphere of action
without in any way intermingling with the other. When article 80 operates,
article 68 keeps out of the way; article 68 steps in when article 80 steps out.
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the accused, the maximum of the penalty to be
imposed upon him shall be the medium period of reclusion temporal, that is from 14 years, 8
months and I day to 17 years and 4 months. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense
which is prision mayor to be applied in any of its period in the discretion of the Court.
Exercising its discretion this Court fixes the minimum period from 10 years and 1 day to 12
years.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED in that the appellant Bartolome
Galang shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant in the sum of Twenty- Five Thousand (P
25,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

It is the minors so situated; it is the selection of who should be committed to

a reformatory school or to the custody of a private person with which article
80 has to do, and no more. Article 80 does not concern itself with what
should be done with minors when they are consigned to jail because of
misbehaviour; much less is it concerned over minors who, after the passage
of Republic Act No. 47, are condemned to prison without having been under
the custody of a benevolent institution or private person like youths between
16 and 18. On the other hand, article 68 is intended for minors who are sent
to jail, a matter foreign to the province of article 80.

xxx xxx xxx

But, as we have indicated, article 68 as well as its predecessor is an

independent provision and has not been merged with article 80 or any other
article of the Revised Penal Code. It is an independent provision inoperative
only during the suspension of the sentence but possessing all the vigor which
article 85 of the Spanish Code had, when the minors are sentenced to jail.

xxx xxx xxx

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3215 October 6, 1949
ALONSO BAGTAS Y ALEJANDRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman for
respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus based upon the following facts:
On various dates between February 18 and May 14, 1948, the petitioner was convicted of
estafa in seventeen criminal cases and sentenced by final judgments of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to an aggregate penalty of 6 years, 4 months, and 26 days of
imprisonment, to indemnify the offended parties invarious sums aggregating P43,436.45, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in each case, and to pay the costs. The most
severe of the seventeen sentences against the petitioner was 6 months and 1 day of prison
correcional plus an indemnify of P8,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and the costs. He commenced to serve these sentences on February 18, 1948.
The petitioner contends:
(a) That under section 70 of the Revised Penal Code the maximum duration of his
sentence cannot exceed threefold the length of time corresponding to the most
severe of the penalties imposed upon him, that is to say, 18 months and 3 days; (b)
That the application of the threefold rule does not preclude his enjoyment of the
deduction from his sentenced of 5 days for each month of good behavior as provided
in paragraph 1 of article 97 of the Revised Penal Code;
(c) That which such deduction his aggregate penalty should be only 15 months and 3
days, and that therefore he should have been discharge from custody on June 3,
1949; and
(d) That the subsidiary imprisonment should be eliminated because article 70
provides that "no other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the
sum total of those imposed equals the said maximum period." 1. We sustain
petitioners contention (a) and (b) above set forth upon the threefold rule provided in
article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 217, and the decisions of this court in numerous cases. (People vs. Garalde,
50 Phil., 823; Torres vs. Superintendent of San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, 58
Phil., 847, and cases therein cited.)
2. The important question to decide here is whether the subsidiary imprisonment should be
eliminated from the penalty imposed upon the petitioner as reduced to thrice the duration of
the gravest penalty imposed on him in accordance with article 70.
The pertinent provisions of said article reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of
the convict's sentence shall not be more than threefold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other
penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those
imposed equals the said maximum period.
Article 100 says that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Article 38 and 39 provide as follows:
ART. 38. Pecuniary Liabilities—Order of Payment. — In case the property of the
offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the
same shall be met in the following orders:
1. The reparation of the damage caused.
2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The costs of the proceedings.
ART. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the
pecuniary liabilities mentioned in paragraphs 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of the next preceding
article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for
each 2 pesos and 50 centavos, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prison correcional or arresto and fine,
he shall remain under confinement until his fine and pecuniary liabilities
 referred in the preceding paragraph are satisfied, but his subsidiary shall not
exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue
for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted
against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen
days, if for a light felony.lawphi1.nêt
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prison coreccional no
subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a
penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the
period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the
same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by
reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from reparation of the damage
caused, nor from indemnification for the consequential damages in case his
financial circumstances should improve; but be shall be relieved from
pecuniary liability as to the fine.
In the case of People vs. Garalde, supra, the accused was sentenced in several cases for the
crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, and his aggregate penalty was
reduced to threefold the most severe of the penalties, which was 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor. The judgment in that case contained the following proviso: "Provided, however, that in
case of insolvency, by analogy, he is not to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, since his
imprisonment would be in excess of thrice the duration of the gravest penalty imposed on
him."
That judgment is invoked by the petitioner herein in support of his contention that he should
not be made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment.
It will be noted, however, that in that case the principal penalty imposed was higher than
prision correcional, and therefore the accused was exempt from subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with paragraph 3 of article 39 hereinabove quoted. That, in our opinion, should
have been the reason stated by the court in that case for exempting the accused from
subsidiary imprisonment.
Subsidiary imprisonment forms part of the penalty and its imposition is required by article 39
in case of insolvency of the accused to meet the pecuniary liabilities mentioned in the first
three paragraphs of article 38; it cannot be eliminated under article 70 so long as the principal
penalty is not higher than 6 years of imprisonment. The provision of article 70 that no other
penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed
equals the said maximum period, simply means that the convict shall not severe the excess
over the maximum of threefold the most severe penalty. For instance, if the aggregate of the
principal penalties is six years and that is reduced to two years under the threefold rule of
article 70, he shall not be required to serve the remaining four years.
In the case of Jose Arlinda vs. Director of Prisons, G. R. No. 47326, this court, by a resolution
dated March 18, 1940, held that the contention of the petitioner that in applying the threefold
rule the court should not have taken into account the indemnity of P498 or its corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment was without merit, "for an indemnity, to all intents and purposes, is
considered a penalty, although pecuniary in character, in Title Three of the Revised Penal
Code, so much so that it is reducible in terms of imprisonment at the rate of one day for each
2 pesos and 50 centavos should the offender turn out to be insolvent (article 39, Revised
Penal Code); that, moreover, the indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an
integral part of the penalty, it being expressly provided by article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable"; that, finally, article 70
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 217, in limiting the
prisoner's penalty to not more than threefold the length of the most severe penalty imposed
upon him, makes no distinction between the principal penalty and subsidiary imprisonment."
We note, however, that in the case just above cited the highest penalty which formed the
basis of the computation under the threefold rule was 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of
imprisonment plus an indemnity in terms or subsidiary imprisonment, namely, 6 months and
19 days, to the principal penalty of 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day and multiplied the sum by 3,
with the result that petitioner's aggregate penalty was fixed at 14 years and 2 months of
imprisonment, instead of multiplying the principal penalty (without the subsidiary
imprisonment) by 3, and requiring the convict to pay the indemnify, for which he should not
have been made to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the fact
that the aggregate of the principal penalties as reduced under article 70 exceeded 6 years of
imprisonment to the principal penalty at the outset for the purpose of applying the threefold
rule, because the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is conditioned on the insolvency of
the convict and the latter is required to serve it only when he fails or is unable to pay the
indemnity.
We hold that the correct rule is to multiply the highest principal penalty by 3 and the result will
be the aggregate principal penalty which the prisoner has to serve, plus the payment of all
the indemnities which he has been sentenced to pay, with or without subsidiary imprisonment
depending upon whether or not the principal penalty exceeds 6 years.
Applying that rule to the instant case, we find that the maximum duration of the principal
penalty which the herein petitioner has to serve under his conviction in the 17 cases in
question is threefold of 6 months and 1 day, or 18 months and 3 days, it being understood
that he shall be required to pay to the offended parties the indemnities aggregating
P43,436.45, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which shall not exceed one
third of the principal penalty. Assuming that the petitioner will not be able to pay the
indemnify, the maximum duration of his imprisonment shall be 18 months and 1 day of Republic of the Philippines
subsidiary imprisonment, or a total of 2 years and 4 days. SUPREME COURT
Manila
It appearing that the petitioner has not yet served his sentence as above reduced, even with
good conduct time allowance, the petition is denied, without any finding as to costs. EN BANC

Moran, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-38332 December 14, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALERIANO DUCOSIN, defendant-appellant.

Alejandra F. Antonio for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

BUTTE, J.:

This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the appellant
of the crime of frustrated murder was referred by the first division to the court in banc for the
proper interpretation and application of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature approved
on December 5, 1933, commonly known as the "Indeterminate Sentence Law". As this is the
first case which has come before us involving the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will be
convenient to set out here some of its provisions.

Section 1 of Act No. 4103 is as follows:

Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by acts of the

Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall
order the accused to be imprisoned for a minimum term, which shall not be less than
the minimum term of imprisonment provided by law for the offense, and for a
maximum term which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law; and where the
offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto, the court
shall sentence the accused to such maximum as may, in view of attending
circumstances, be properly imposed under the present rules of the said Code, and to
a minimum which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment period by said
Code for the offense. Except as provided in section two hereof, any person who shall
have been so convicted and sentenced and shall have served the minimum sentence
imposed hereunder, may be released on parole in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.

Section 2 is as follows:
 This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, sedition or espionage; to those
convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have
escape from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to
those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor to those
already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as
provided in section five hereof.
Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates a "Board of Indeterminate Sentence" to be composed of
the Secretary of Justice as chairman and four members to be appointed by the Governor-
General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. This section describes the
qualifications of the members. Section 4 gives the board authority to adopt rules of
procedures and provides for the compensation of the members.
Section 5 makes it the duty of the board to study the physical, mental and moral record of the
prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and authorizes the board to determine the proper
time for the release of such prisoners. After a prisoner has served the "minimum penalty"
imposed upon on him and the board is satisfied that such prisoner is fitted by the training for
release and that there is a reasonable probability that he will not violate the law again and
that his release "will not be incompatible with the welfare of society", the board may in its
discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole. The board may also recommend
the release on parole of other prisoners previously convicted of any offense than those
named in section 2.
Section 6 provides for the surveillance of prisoners released on parole for a period
"equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final
release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence." Section 7 provides that a
certified copy of the board's order of conditional or final release shall be filed with the court
and with the Chief of Constabulary.
Section 8 provides that any prisoner who violates any of the conditions of his parole, who
violates any law during the period of surveillance for which he has been convicted, shall be
subject to re-arrest and confinement and "shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the
maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison" unless the board grants
a new parole.
Section 9 provides that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall not be
construed to impair the powers given to the Governor-General under section 64 of the
Administrative Code of the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands.
By its terms, Act No. 4103 became the law upon its approval, that is to say, on December 5,
1933.
In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on September 30, 1932, for the crime of
frustrated murder upon the following information:
That on or about the 23rd day of September, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill,
treacherously attack, assault and wound one Rafael Yanguas by then and there suddenly
and without any warning, stabbing the latter with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him several
wounds in different parts of the body, some of which are necessarily mortal, thus performing
all the acts of execution which would produce the death of the said Rafael Yanguas as a
consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of said accused, that is, by the timely intervention of medical assistance.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years and one day
of prision mayor with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs. The
penalty for the crime of murder, under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated felony
is the one next lower in degree to that prescribed for the consummated felony, which in the
present case is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen years and four months. The accused
having pleaded guilty, this extenuating circumstances, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, fixes the penalty within the minimum period, that is to say, from ten years and
one day to twelve years, leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to be served
within said range, i.e., not less than years and one day nor more than twelve years. The
penalty imposed by the trial judge being within its range is correct and therefore is the penalty
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense which this accused has committed.
As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was enacted after this appeal was lodged
in this court, we are now required to revise the sentence imposed upon the appellant and to
bring the same into conformity with Act No. 4103.
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court must now, instead of a single fixed
penalty, determine two penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as the
"maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must serve the minimum penalty before he is
eligible for parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between the
minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the condition
set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part. He must be
sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which is not more than the "maximum" nor
less than the "minimum", as these terms are used in the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
This leads up to the important question: How shall the "maximum" and the "minimum" penalty
be determined?
The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable by the Revised Penal
Code, in accordance with the rules and provisions of said Code exactly as if Act No. 4103,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had never been passed. We think it is clear from a reading
of Act No. 4103 that it was not its purpose to make inoperative any of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. Neither the title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the
part of the Legislature to repeal or amend any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The legislative history of the Act further shows that attention was called to the necessity for
taking care "so as not to bring the provisions of this bill in conflict with the provisions of our
penal laws, especially with those treating with penalties." (Committee Report, House of
Representatives, H-3321, Ninth Philippine Legislature, Third Session.)
The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code:
Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public funds in the amount of
P10,000. No mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present. Under this law
the court may impose on him a maximum sentence not exceeding ten years and
eight months but not less than nine years, four months and one day (see art. 217,
No. 3, Revised Penal Code), and a minimum which shall not be less than four years,
two months and one day (the minimum imprisonment period of prision correccional in
its maximum to prision mayor in its minimum. See article 61, Revised Penal Code).
The court, therefore, may sentence the accused to be imprisoned for not less than
five years nor more than ten years or for not less than seven years nor more than ten
years and eight months, etc.
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the "maximum" is determined in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. In the example given reference is made to
article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the defendant shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty is placed
in the medium degree because of the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that
is to say, anywhere between nine years, four months and one day and ten years and eight
months in the discretion of the court. In the case on appeal here the penalty was imposed in
the minimum of the proper penalty under the Revised Penal Code because of the plea of
guilty, that is to say, between ten years and one day and twelve years in the discretion of the
court. This discretion is in nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in
conformity with the discretion conferred upon it by the Revised Penal Code, might have
assessed the penalty at, let us say, eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act No. 4103
does not require this court to assess the said penalty at 12 years, which is the longest time of
imprisonment within the minimum degree.
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of imprisonment conforms to the provisions
and rules of the Revised Penal Code and is therefore fixed and established as the maximum
of the sentence which shall be imposed upon the appellant.
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred to in Act No. 4103.
Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum which shall not be less than the minimum
imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the
offense." We are here upon new ground. It is in determining the "minimum" penalty that Act
No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the
courts have ever had. The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first,
the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum
imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors and circumstances that
should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the ascertained
limits.
We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said
Code for the offense "to mean the penalty next lower to that determined by the court in the
case before it as the maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by the Revised Penal
Code, see our discussion above). In the example which the Legislature had before it in the
Committee Report above mentioned, the maximum of the sentence was correctly stated to be
the medium degree of prision mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty next
lower is prision correccional in its maximum degree to prision mayor in its minimum degree
(article 61, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code), that is to say, anywhere from four years, two
months and one day to eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply
provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the
penalty next lower." In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the court to fix the
minimum of the penalty anywhere between four years, two months and one day and eight
years. In the example given by the committee they stated that the court might fix the
minimum penalty at five years or seven years.
In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty to the maximum already
determined as aforesaid, is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period, that is to say, from four years, two months and one day to ten years. As
stated, it is in the discretion of the court to fix the time of imprisonment within the said range
without reference to the technical subdivisions of maximum degree, medium degree and
minimum degree, and in this particular the courts are vested as stated with a wider discretion
than they ever had before.
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty, namely, the
considerations which should guide the court in fixing the term or duration of the minimum
period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General,
Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal,
first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. This opens up an almost limitless
field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far
as is humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted
as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting
the social order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be considered are:
(1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general health and
physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct,
environment and mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both
intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7)
his demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner
and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that
section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes — this should be kept in mind in
assessing the minimum penalties for analogous crimes).
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward his
dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and second, his
relationship towards society at large and the State are important factors. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against
the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic
usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore known in these
Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give full effect to the
beneficent intention of the Legislature.
It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment period under Act No. 4103 in the
case before us on this appeal. Unfortunately, as this defendant was convicted before Act No.
4103 became effective, and as we know nothing of his antecedents because his plea of guilty
rendered it unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined to the record before us. He
plead guilty to all of the acts which constitute the crime of murder and only the timely
intervention of medical assistance prevented the death of his victim and the prosecution of
the appellant for murder. He was given the full benefit of the plea of guilty in the fixing of the
maximum of the sentence. With such light as we have received from the record in this case,
we have concluded that a reasonable and proper minimum period of imprisonment should be
seven years, which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to the maximum,
that is to say, within the range from four years, two months and one day to ten years
of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. We
repeat that Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment
in the minimum period of the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.
The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent: that the defendant-appellant is
hereby sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor in its
maximum degree, and to a minimum imprisonment period of seven years, and as thus
modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. With costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27481 July 29, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFONSO OÑATE alias Bukay, defendant-appellant.
BARREDO, J:
Appeal from a judgment of conviction of appellant for murder and imposing upon him the
penalty of "cadena perpetua" (should be reclusion perpetua) of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental in Criminal Case No. 9040, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso
Oñate alias Bukay the dispositive portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution
has established the crime of murder conclusively and beyond reasonable
doubt, it appearing that the killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of Hence, the accused is hereby declared guilty of murder,
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period, and he is hereby sentenced to cadena perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P6,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. (Pp. 11- 12,
Record.)
Even before the trial in the court below, appellant already admitted having killed the offended
party, Peping Ventosa, by proposing to plead guilty to the crime of homicide, but this offer
was rejected by the trial judge. And so, in this appeal, he has assigned only two errors,
namely:
I. The lower court erred in not appreciating the voluntary surrender of the
accused as a mitigating circumstance.
II. The lower court erred in holding that the stabbing of the deceased was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of to qualify the stabbing as murder.
(Page 39, Rec.)
 There is indeed a certification found in page 18 of the record of the homicide, not murder. He stand that in the evening of October 15, 1966, he
proceedings in the trial court which appears to be signed by Lt. Col. Domingo had his companions, together with Jose Ventosa, drunk 'tuba' in a 'sari-sari'
C. Tutaan, Inf. (PC) Provincial Commander, to the following effect: store in Burgos Street, Bacolod City, but Jose Ventosa left without paying for
his drink so he (Oñate) was asked to pay for it by the storekeeper but instead
2 he promised to collect the amount from Jose Ventosa: that while he and his
7 two companions were standing near the corner of Lacson-Burgos Street,
O Bacolod City, shortly after leaving the store, he saw Jose Ventosa walking
c towards the direction of the Provincial Hospitals in front of Funeraria Alisbo in
t Lacson Street, so he asked his companions to approach Jose Ventosa for
o the payment of the "tuba" but his companions refused whereupon he himself
b accosted Jose Ventosa and demanded payment but Ventosa laid hands
e upon him, grabbing him by his collar and pushing him back and forth until he
r fell to the ground, after which Jose Ventosa dipped his hand into his pocket
1 as if to fish for something in his pocket, so, fearing for his life, he drew his
9 knife and stabbed Jose Ventosa.
6
6 This pretension of the accused was roundly denied by the eyewitnesses
Rebecca Sy and Jimmy Tajanlangit. Rebecca Sy stated that she was seated
CERTIFICATION in front of a store next to Funeraria Alisbo for she was selling 'tuba' in the
evening in question when Jose Ventosa came and asked for a glass 'tuba'
but she answered that all her 'tuba' had been consumed whereupon Ventosa
THIS TO CERTIFY that ALFONSO OÑATE a detained prisoner has
turned around and walked towards the direction of the Provincial Hospital;
voluntarily surrendered to this Hq. at about 180800 Oct. 1966. Presently he is
that Ventosa had not gone far when she saw the accused who, without
detained with our PC stockade, Provl. Hqs. Neg. Occ. PC, Bacolod City.
saying a word, placed his hand on the shoulder of Ventosa and stabbed him
However subject will be turned over to Provl. Jail today for safekeeping.
with a knife hitting him in his side in his forehead.
This certification is issued in connection with the request of Pat. Roberto
Jimmy Tajanlangit, one of the two companions of the accused in the evening
Fernandez of Bacolod Police Dept., Bacolod City for whatever purpose
in question, denied that the deceased provoked a quarrel with the accused.
deemed necessary. (Page 18, Record of lower court.)
He stated that when they saw Jose Ventosa the accused asked him and his
companion to approach Jose Ventosa for his unpaid drink but he was afraid
The obvious reason why no mention of this certification was made in the decision of the trial and refused, whereupon the accused himself accosted Jose Ventosa and,
court is because it does not appear that the same was formally offered as evidence by the once close to him, suddenly stabbed the deceased in his right side and
defense. We can overlook such oversight as, anyway, the Solicitor General does not impugn forehead.
the genuineness and truthfulness of the certificate and, in fact, recommends that on the basis
thereof, appellant be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The record shows that the testimony of Rebecca Sy and Jimmy Tajanlangit
have not been impugned not in any manner disproven by the accused. Their
Anent the second assignment of error, it is to be observed that the trial judge, Hon. Jose F. testimonies are free from any material contradiction and the accused has not
Fernandez, deferred consideration of the offer of appellant to plead guilty to the lighter shown any motive whatsoever that these eyewitnesses were impelled by any
offense of homicide until after he heard the evidence of the prosecution, hence it must be malicious or false motive in testifying in the manner they did.
presumed that His Honor carefully weighed all relevant circumstances including the
demeanor of the witnesses who testified before him regarding the sole basic factual issue he
As appellant met the deceased walking along the street
had to decide, namely, whether or not the admitted killing of Peping Ventosa by appellant
appellant suddenly and without any warning pulled out a
was attended by "alevosia" or treachery. After the trial, His Honor concluded as follows:
bolo under his shirt and with full strength trust it upon the
body of Fernandez. Fernandez fled and appellant continued
The accused admits having stabbed Jose Ventosa in the evening of October to chase him and struck him again until he finally fell. Held:
15, 1966, and, announced during the trial that he was ready to plead guilty to There is no doubt that the sudden attack made upon
 Fernandez without any warning was accompanied by
treachery thereby qualifying the killing as murder. People vs.
Dosal, G.R. Nos. L-4215-16." (Pp. 9-11, Record.)
We have read the complete transcript of the proceedings in the trial court and carefully
scrutinized the testimonies of appellant and his lone witness Rogelio Tobola, in the light of
the opposite versions of the eyewitnesses of the prosecution Tajanlangit and Sy. While it
does seem, as contended by counsel for appellant in his brief and in his memorandum in the
court below, rather strange and unnatural that appellant would unceremoniously and
suddenly assault Ventosa only because the latter left the store without paying for the "tuba"
he had drunk, thus causing the storekeeper to try to collect the P0.20 payment therefor from
the appellant and his companions, Tajanlangit and Edmundo Cailo, such apparently unusual
circumstance finds sufficient explanation in the fact that, as was shown by the prosecution
thru the testimonies of three witnesses, namely, Porfirio Arcobillas, a policeman, George
Valencia and Fernando Valencia, appellant is a man prone to resorting to the use of his
bladed weapon, notwithstanding protestations made by him on the witness stand to the
contrary. In other words, there is enough basis in the record for Us to rely on the conclusions
of fact of the trial court as regards the decisive issue of credibility raised by appellant in his
second assignment of error. It is almost trite to reiterate that "time and again, We have held
that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witness and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the results of the case." 1
Appellant capitalizes on some alleged discrepancies in details between the testimonies of the
physician and of Tajanlangit as well as between that of the latter and of the other eyewitness
Rebecca Sy. But apart from the fact that the judge was diligent enough to iron out some of
the apparent discrepancies referred to, the rest of them are related to merely insubstantial
matters, which, as We have uniformly held, lend weight rather than detract from the credibility
of the evidence. 2
There can be no doubt, therefore, as to the guilt of appellant of the crime of murder charged,
qualified by "alevosia." However, he must be credited with mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, for which reason, the Solicitor General recommends that in lieu of the life
imprisonment imposed by the trial court, the appellant be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to eighteen years, two months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In
this connection, in People vs. Pantoja, 25 SCRA 468, it was held that "(t)he penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.)
There being one mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, the penalty-should
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law",
and the sentence actually imposed by the Court was the indeterminate penalty of from 16
years to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
We believe, however, that considering the age of the appellant, as well as other relevant
factors in this case, it would be more in keeping with the spirit and intent of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, which is "to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." (Peo.
vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 117), to be guided instead by Our holding in People vs. Mansala,
Jr. et al., 31 SCRA 401, as follows:
... the penalty imposable upon him is the minimum period of the penalty for
murder (see par. 3, Art. 63, Revised Penal Code), which is reclusion
temporal maximum (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Since the
resulting penalty is neither death nor life imprisonment, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103 as amended). Avelino
Manansala is therefore entitled to an indeterminate sentence, the upper
range of which is reclusion temporal maximum and the lower range — which
is one degree lower than the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code
for murder is anywhere within mayor maximum (10 years and 1 day)
to reclusion temporal medium (17 years and 4 months). The penalty meted
out by the trial court on Avelino Manansala, Jr. — "from 10 years and 1 day
of prison mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal" — is
within the range allowed by law and is therefore correctly imposed."
Besides, the gap between the minimum of fifteen (15) years and the maximum of twenty (20)
years is too short. The law is intended to favor the defendant, particularly to shorten his term
of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental and moral record as
a prisoner, to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence. The law grants the
courts discretion to fix the minimum of the penalty to be imposed, with the limitation that it
must be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the offense committed.
Thus, this Court, in People v. Gonzales, 3 stated:
According to section 1 of Act No. 4225, the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty "shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense" and the penalty for each offense is provided by
the Code without regard to circumstances modifying criminal liability. In other
words, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower should be determined without regard as to whether the basic penalty
provided by the Code should be applied in its maximum or minimum period
as circumstances modifying liability may require. When, however, and this
may be the only exception to the rule - the number of mitigating
circumstances is such as to entitle the accused to the penalty next lower in
degree, this penalty, in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
should be taken as the starting point for the determination of the penalty next
lower.
The determination, however, of the minimum is not a mechanical act of computation, but a individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore
consideration of various factors, keeping in mind the basic purpose of the law. As explained known in these islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the
in People v. Docusin: 4 courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.

The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the It was for the of giving substance to the purpose of the law that this Court, in previous cases
more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum of murder where there was one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstances,
imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors and had usually imposed upon the accused an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years
circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the and one (1) day of prison mayor an minimum of the penalty, to either seventeen (17) years or
minimum penalty within the ascertained limits. eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as the maximum of the penalty. 5 The minimum of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor was set obviously to give sufficient incentive
xxx xxx xxx for the culprit to rehabilitate himself morally and socially to "redeem the individual for
economic usefulness and other social ends."
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum
penalty, namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the Likewise, pursuant to Pantoja, the indemnity of P6,000 awarded by the trial court should be
term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the increased to P12,000.
basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction appealed from is affirmed, but the penalty
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness' (Message of the imposed is modified, and appellant Alfonso Oñate is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, Vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a months and two (2) days of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of Jose Y. Ventosa in
member of society. This opens up an almost limitless field of investigation the amount of P12,000, and to pay the costs.
and which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is
humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall no be Castro, CJ., Fernando, Teehankee, Antonio, Muñoz-Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Martin,
standardized but fitted " far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be
are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his
general health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and
personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and
criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral;
(6) his proclivities and for usefulness or injury to society (7) his demeanor
during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the
manner and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the gravity
of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts grave crimes - this
should be kept in mind in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for
analogous crimes).

In considering the criminal as a member of society his relationship, first, d his

dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and
second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are important
factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and
other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
Republic of the Philippines 11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount
SUPREME COURT of P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court.
Manila
xxx xxx xxx
SECOND DIVISION
On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A Fadera filed a motion to cancel
petitioner's probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and
a supplemental motion alleging petitioner's commission of another crime for which at that
G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999 time he was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a
comment recommending that the petitioner be allowed to continue with his probation and that
RONALD SORIANO, petitioner, he be required instead to submit a program of payment of his civil liability.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. RODOLFO V. TOLEDANO, Presiding Judge of the On June 20, 1994, the trial court denied the prosecutor's motion and directed petitioner to
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Third Judicial Region, Iba Zambales; THE submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him.
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, Third Judicial Region, Iba, Zambales; Ms. NELDA DA
MAYCONG, Suprvising Parole and Probation Officer and Officer-in-Charge, Zambales Thereafter, probation officer Nelda D. Maycong received information that petitioners father
Parole and Probation Office; and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. who owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Daluyong, received P16,500.00
as insurance payment. This amount was not turned over to the heirs of Daluyong and Da
Maycong considered this a violation of the terms and conditions of the probation. She
submitted a manifestation to the trial court praying that the petitioner be made to explain his
non-compliance with the court's order of June 20, 1994, or that be cited for contempt for such
QUISUMBING, J.:
non-compliance. Da Maycong also asked that petitioner be made to submit a program of
payment as soon as possible. The trial court granted his prayers in an order dated August 15,
This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 1994. Petitioner was once again ordered to submits his program of payment. Petitioner
35550, 1 which upheld the trial court's orders holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his instead filed a motion for reconsideration explaining that he did not receive a copy of said
probation. order on June 23, 1994 but failed to notify petitioner. Thus, the latter failed to comply with
said order.
The fact of the case are as follows:
On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of court
Petitioner Ronald Santiago was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to for his failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The court
homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993. 2 His likewise revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve
application for probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and conditions the sentence originally imposed upon him. According to the trial court, among the violation
imposed by the trial court were the following: 3 committed by petitioner as regards his probation are his failure to (1) meet his responsibilities
to his family, (2) engage in a specific employment, and (3) cooperate with his program of
xxx xxx xxx supervision.

7. He shall meet his family responsibilities.
8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change
employment without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall
pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. He claimed
that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess
of, jurisdiction in holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his probation. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that petitioner's "stubborn unwillingness" to comply
with the orders of the trial court "shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a wrong." 4

xxx xxx xxx According to the Court of Appeals:

 Where probation was approved and probationer has proven to be
unrepentant and disrespectful and even showed clear defiance to two lawful
court orders, as in the case of herein petitioner, the court is not barred from
revoking the same. 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition for review, in which petitioner makes the following assignment of errors.
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was deliberate
refusal on the part of petitioner to comply with his orders dated June 20,
1994 and August 15, 1994 and subsequently declaring petitioner in
contempt.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he
earlier issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that petitioner failed to
satisfy the award of civil indemnity for the heirs of the accident victim.
3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he
earlier issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that the latter violated the
conditions of his probation three times.
Petitioner asserts that he had no intention to ignore the orders of the trial court. The court's
order of June 20, 1994 was received by his counsel who, however, did not notify petitioner.
Petitioner says that his "former counsel's irresponsible delay (in informing him of the order)
should not prejudice him." 7
He explains that his non-compliance with the order to submit a program of payment of his
civil liability is, ultimately, due to his poor financial condition. He only relies on his parents for
support. He claims that it is impossible for him to formulate a payment program because, in
the first place, he is in no position to comply with the same.
Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order to continue to avail of the
benefits of probation is to violate the constitutional proscription against unequal protection of
the law. He says only moneyed probationers will be able to benefit from probation if
satisfaction of civil liability is made a condition.
Petitioner contends that his enjoyment of probation should not be made to depend on the
satisfaction of his civil liability. He invokes the separate opinion of Justice Isagani A. Cruz
in Salgado v. Court of Appeals, 8 particularly Justice Cruz' reservation about the validity of
imposing satisfaction of civil liability as a condition for probation such an imposition is in the
nature of an amendment of the decision of the trial court in the criminal case against him,
which cannot be allowed since the decision is already final and executory. He further invokes
the majority decision in Salgado and asserts that "any program of payment of civil liability
must take into consideration the needs and capacity of petitioner." 9
Petitioner claims that his failure to meet his responsibilities to his family and to engage in
gainful employment is not deliberate but is due to his poverty. He adds that his being
unskilled, with a criminal record to his name, does not exactly enhance his chances for
6 employment.
Finally, petitioner cites our decision in Baclayon v. Mutia: 10
. . . Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and
each case should be judged on its own merits — on the basis of the
problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the
probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead
unrealistic terms. 11
In his comment, the Solicitor General asks for the dismissal of the petition. The only issue to
be resolved according to him is whether or not petitioner has violated the terms and
conditions of his probation warrant its revocation. The Solicitor General argues that petitioner
has committed violations, thus justifying the trial court' s revocation of the grant of probation.
He further points out that our ruling in Salgado is inapplicable to the case of petitioner since
what was involved in Salgado was a program of payment already imposed upon petitioner
therein. In this case, however, it is petitioner who is being asked to submit his own program of
payment and he had not submitted any such program:
The only issue for us to resolve in this case is whether or not the revocation of petitioner's
probation is lawful and proper.
Petitioner asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court requiring him to
submit a program of payment was not deliberate. To our mind, his refusal to comply with said
orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice of both orders, although the notice of
the order of June 20, 1994 came belatedly. He has, up to this point, refused to comply with
the trial court's directive, by questioning instead the constitutionality of the requirement
imposed and harping on his alleged poverty as the reason for his failure to comply.
Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Note that payment of the civil liability is not made a condition precedent to
probation. If it were, then perhaps there might be some basis to petitioner's assertion that
only moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits of probation. In this case, however,
petitioner's application for probation had already been granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability
was not made a requirement before he could avail a probation, but was a condition for his
continued enjoyment of the same.
The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a condition
for probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by
law. It is a consequence of petitioner's having been convicted of a crime, 12 and petitioner is
bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or not he is placed under probation.
We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial court with a
program of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the
reason why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment.
Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position to formulate a program of
payment that fits his needs and capacity.
Petitioner blames his former counsel's "irresponsible delay" in informing him of the trial court's
order to come up with a program of payment for his failure to make such a program.
Petitioner wants to take exception to the rule that notice to counsel is notice to client.
We find no reason to make an exception in this case. Petitioner's counsel has not been
shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioner's rights. 13 Moreover, we
note that petitioner later on discovered that such a court order was received by his counsel.
He could have endeavored to comply with the order then. In the June 20, 1994 order, he was
given 10 days from receipt of the order within which to comply. The same period was given
him in the order of August 15, 1994. Petitioner does not claim that he failed to receive notice
of the latter order. In fact, he submitted a motion for reconsideration of said order, but still
without the required program of payment.
No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The trial
court could not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to comply with its orders.
Nor did it abuse gravely its discretion in issuing said orders. Hence, we are in full agreement
with respondent appellate court's decision as well.
Moreover, petitioner's continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along with his
prayer for the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from his probation order,
creates the impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability. This he
cannot do. He cannot escape payment of his civil liability, with or without a program of
payment.
Petitioner's reliance on Salgado is misplaced. In that case, the trial court itself formulated the
manner by which Salgado was to satisfy his civil liability. He was able to comply for a few
months. When he started skipping his payments, his victim sought the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce full payment of the civil liability. The trial court granted this motion and it
was sustained by the Court of Appeals which ruled that the program of payment amounted to
an amendment of the decision of the trial court ordering payment of civil liability but without a
program of payment. Since the trial court's decision had already become final, it can no
longer be amended by imposing a program of payment, in installments, of the civil liability.
We held in Salgado, that the program of payment is not an amendment of the decision of the
trial court because it does not increase or decrease the liability and the obligation to pay is to
be fulfilled during the period of probation.
Unlike in Salgado, herein petitioner was being asked to make a program of payment. But he
failed to do so. Hence, in this case, there is yet no program of payment to speak of, because
of petitioner's stubborn refusal and delay as well as failure to abide by the trial court's orders.
Petitioner's reliance on Baclayon is likewise misplaced. In that case, what was being assailed
as an unrealistic condition was the trial court's requirement that petitioner therein, a teacher
convicted of Serious Oral Defamation, refrain from exercising her profession. This condition
was deemed unreasonable because teaching was the only profession she knew and it
appeared that she excelled in teaching. No unrealistic condition similar to the one
in Baclayan has been imposed upon petitioner herein.
As regards the other violations committed by petitioner, the question of whether or not
petitioner has, indeed, violated the terms and conditions of his probation is evidently a factual
one which had already been passed upon by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight, more so when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 14 as in this case.
Besides, petitioner himself admits in his petition that he is unemployed and only depends on
his parents for support. He can barely support his family. 15 Petitioner ought to be reminded of
what is incumbent on a probationer, including those requirements that the trial court may set.
As Section 10 of the Probation Law states:
Sec. 10. Conditions of Probation. — . . .
The court may also require the probationer to:
(a) Cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) Meet his family responsibilities;
(c) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said
employment without the prior written approval of the probation officer
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
xxx xxx xxx 16
Clearly, these conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down by
statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the
petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the
purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of
an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for
the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a
prison sentence. 16a Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting
probation, pursuant to the Probation Law:
Sec. 11. Effetivity of Probation Order. — A probation order shall take effect
upon its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the
consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of
the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another
offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he
was placed on probation."16b (Emphasis supplied.)
Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion
of the trial court. 17 Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be imposed by
the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the
power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
Moreover, having admittedly violated the terms and conditions of his probation, petitioner
cannot now assail the revocation of his probation. Regrettably, he has squandered the
opportunity granted him by the trial court to remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer
the consequences of those aforecited violations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 35550 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81337 August 16, 1991
RICHARD V. PETRALBA, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision* of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on October 5, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 9390 entitled "The
People of the Philippines vs. Richard V. Petralba" convicting herein petitioner of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated December 15, 1987 denying the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
Abstract from the records are the following facts:
Herein petitioner Richard V. Petralba was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal
Treasury of Alcoy Cebu on October 23, 1 979. Fourteen (14) months after designation,
petitioner's cashbook balance was audited by Auditors Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores.
He was found short of P28,107.00, Petitioner, theretofore, was charged with, and convicted
of, 31 counts of "Malversation of Public Funds," "Illegal Use of Public Funds" and
"Falsification of Public Documents." Petitioner was granted probation and continued his
function as Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu, from December 23, 1980 until he was
succeeded by Mrs. Lilia Suico on March 15, 1981.
Petitioner's cash and accounts from the period of December 23, 1980 to March 15, 1981
were audited by Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana. Petitioner was found short in the amount of
P50,447.06 which was arrived at as follows:
GENERAL INFRASTRUCTURE TRUST Treasurer then designated as the Officer -in- Charge of the Municipal Treasury of
Alcoy Cebu, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
FUND FUND FUND SEF TOTAL misappropriate the amount of P29,098.19 representing various receipts and
collection and, therefore, public funds, which he had custody or control by reason of
Balance last examination
12/23/80 P 10,336.91 P 302.07 P35,513.48 P145.86 P46,298.32 the duties of his office and for which he was accountable, and despite repeated
demands for him to produce or restitute the amount, failed and still fails to do so, to
ADD: Re-receipts, the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount aforestated.
collections withdrawalsDec.
24-31, 1980 P 1,264.22 P -- P -- P -- 1,264.22
In violation of Article 217 of the Revised (Penal) Code.
January, 1981 12,515.04 12,515.04

February, 1981 23,479.07 23,479.04 (Rollo, "Information," pp. 21-22)

March, 1981 4,418.65 _________ ________ ________ 4,418.65
During the pre-trial inquest, the parties stipulated and agreed on the following facts:
41,676.98 -- -- -- 41,676.98

Total P52,013.89 P 302.07 P35,513.48 P 145.86 P87,975.30 (A) The accused admits that he had been appointed Deputy Provincial and Municipal
LESS:Disbursements: Treasurer of Alcantara, Cebu as shown by Exh. A;
Dec. 24-31, 2,962.93 P -- 764.40 P -- 3,727.23
(2) That on October 23, 1979, he was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal
1980 Treasury of Alcoy Cebu and acted as such until March 15,1981 as shown by Exh. B
January, 1981 4,041.94 1,769.84 3,383.98 -- 9,195.76
(3) Accused also admits that on March 15, 1981 the office of the accused as Officer-
February, 1981 5,019.00 1,768.84 16,402.71 -- 23,191.55
in-Charge of the Municipal Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu was turned over to Mrs. Lilia
March, 1981 293.60 1,000.00 120.00 -- 1,413.60 Suico;
12,317.47 4,539.68 20,671.09 -- 37,528.24
(4) That accused admits that after the turn-over of the office to Suico the statement of
Balance as of March 15, his cash accountability was prepared and signed by him as shown in Exh. C and C-1;
1981 (Date of turnover) P39,696.42 P(4,237.61) P14,842.39 P145.86 P50,447.06
(pp- 106-107, Rollo)
(5) Accused admits that on November 5,1981 COA Examiners Leticia Trazo and
Flora Pacana conducted an examination on the cash and accounts of his (sic) as
On December 4,1981, the Trazo Team sent a letter (Exhibit "H") to the petitioner demanding shown by the Reports of Examination for General Funds marked Exh. D, Trust Funds
the turnover of the latter's cash accountability. marked Exh. E, Infrastructure Funds as Exh. F and Special Educational Funds
marked as Exh. G and that certified the findings of the COA examiners as reflected in
Vouchers amounting to P43,468.84, which were previously allowed by Auditors Constantino said report and his signatures already marked as Exhs. D-1, F-1 and G-1;
Alagar and Rene Flores, were presented by petitioner to Auditors Trazo and Pacana. Only
the amount of P21,348.87 was allowed reducing the petitioner's accountability to only (6) Likewise, accused admitted that on December 7, 1981, a letter of demand was
P29,098.19 while the remaining vouchers amounting to P22,119.97 were disallowed for want served on and received by him as reflected in Exh. H, as shown by his signature
of administrative approval. acknowledging receipt thereof;

On July 30, 1984 herein petitioner, Richard V. Petralba, was charged with Malversation of (7) Accused admits that COA Examiners Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana were duly
Public Funds, in violation of Article 217, Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows: authorized to conduct an examination of the cash and accounts of the accused as
shown by Exh, 1;
That on the 5th day of November, 1981 and for some time prior thereto, in the
Municipality of Alcoy Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a Deputy Provincial and Municipal
 (8) That accused admits that he was originally found short in the amount of
P50,447.00 as shown by Exh. J, however, after he submitted vouchers which were
allowed, his shortage was reduced to P29,098.19 as shown by Exhs. J-1 and K ;
(9) That accused denies that up to the present he has not yet paid the amount of
P29,098.19, and which he will explain on the witness stand.
(Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 24-24)
In view of the admission of the petitioner that he was short of P29,098.19, the prosecution
waived the presentation of testimonial evidence. Instead, it offered its documentary evidence,
marked as Exhibits "A" to "K", and rested its case. The petitioner presented testimonial and
documentary evidence.
The respondent Court found that the vouchers disallowed by the Trazo team in the amount of
P22,119.19 were either supported by invoices or receipts or duly signed by respective
payees. Thus, the amount of P6,978.22 out of the P29,098.19 remained unaccounted for.
The respondent Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Richard V. Petralba guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds described in and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, Appreciating in favor of the
accused the mitigating circumstance of Voluntary Surrender, there being no
aggravating circumstance adduced and proven by the prosecution, the accused
should be, as he is, hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of, from Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Ten (10) Years and One (1)
Day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law to pay a
fine in the sum of P6,978.22, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; to indemnify the government
in the aforesaid sum of P6,978.22; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner dated December 15,
1987. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I Going now into the civil liability of the accused, be it noted that he claimed that no shortage
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY AUDITED AND
WHETHER EXHIBITS "10" TO "11-M" WERE INCLUDED IN THE SETTLEMENT OF
THE ACCOUNT OF THE PETITIONER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS ADDUCED EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THAT THE MISSING FUNDS WERE NOT PUT TO HIS PERSONAL USE.
On August 10, 1989, while this case was pending before Us, petitioner's counsel filed a
manifestation that his client, Richard V. Petralba, had died, evidenced by a death certificate
dated July 10, 1989. (Rollo, Annex "A" of Manifestation, p. 173).
Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, death of the convict extinguishes criminal
liability. In view of the fact that one of the juridical conditions of penalty is that it is
personal. Actio personalis moritur cum persona; actio peonalis in haeredem non datur nisi
forte ex damno locupletior haeres factus sit. (A personal right of action dies with the person.
A penal action is not given against an heir, unless, indeed, such heir is benefited by the
wrong.)
Criminal liability does not only mean the obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment
penalties but it also includes the liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties. Pecuniary
liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. (Art.
89(l), Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar, petitioner Richard V. Petralba died pending
appeal and before any final judgment therein. Hence, the death of Richard V. Petralba
extinguished his personal and pecuniary (such as the fine) liabilities.
Though the death of an accused-appellant during the pendency of an appeal extinguished his
criminal liability, his civil liability survives. Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily
mean that the civil liability is also extinguished. In People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA 410, and
in People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, We ruled that only the criminal liability (including
the fine, which is pecuniary but not civil) of the accused is extinguished by his death, but the
civil liability remains. The claim of the government for the civil liability survives Petralba but
only if the offense can be proved.
The Supreme Court continues to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the petitioner's possible
civil liability for the money claims of the government arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, in much the same way as when no criminal action had been filed. No separate
civil action need be instituted (People v. Senday-diego supra).
ever occurred because:
1. The discrepancy between Exhibit "4" prepared by the accused and Exhibit "H"
prepared by the Trazo team casts doubt on the veracity of the latter. Petitioner's total
 collection for the month of January, 1981 in Exhibit "4" appears to be P13,515.04
while Exhibit "H" indicates a collection of P12,515.04, or a difference of P 1,000.00.
For the month of February, 1981 petitioner's collection, as reflected in Exhibit "4", is
P21,532.36, while Exhibit "H" indicates a collection of P23,479.07, or a difference of
P 1,946.71.
2. The respondent Court failed to include Exhs. "11" to "11-M" representing the
amount of P6,835.48 to settle the account of petitioner.
The above allegations are devoid of any merit.
Exhibit "4" was prepared by the petitioner to apprise Suico of his transactions from January 1,
1981 to March 15,1981. Due to the in veracity of Exhibit "4", an audit was performed, the
result of which is listed in Exhibit "H". Evidently, Exhibit "4" is self-serving and unreliable and,
therefore, cannot prevail over the official findings of the Trazo team contained in Exhibit "H".
Besides, petitioner himself acknowledged and signed the official findings of the Trazo team.
He is estopped from impugning the veracity of Exhibit "H".
Equally baseless is the claim of the petitioner that Sandiganbayan did not consider his Exhibit
"l1 " to "l1-M". It is admitted by petitioner that Exhibit "l1 " to "l1-M" were among the vouchers
listed in Exhibits "2-A" and "2-B" allowed by the Alagar team and by the Trazo team.
(Memorandum for the accused, p. 11). Auditor Alagar declared that Exhibits "2-A" and "2-B"
were taken into account during his audit. (Decision of Sandiganbayan, p. 7, Rollo, p. 58).
Thus, the amount appearing in Exhibit its "11" to "11-M" was included in the amount of
P22,119.97 allowed by the Trazo team in reducing the original unaccounted amount of
P50,447.06 to P29,098.19. (Exhibit "8-B").
Petitioner alleges that Exhibit "2", indicating a total of P10,296.47, should total
P10,371.47.1âwphi1 His argument is based on the non- inclusion of the amount of P75.00.
However, a perusal of Annex "B" of petitioner's Reply (Rollo, p. 126) indicates that the name
of creditor opposite the amount of P75.00 was erased, and the same was not presented by
petitioner as part of his Exhibit "7". Thus, the Trazo team did not commit any abuse of
discretion in their failure to credit P75.00.
Petitioner was able to explain the amount of P22,119.97 out of the shortage of P29,098.19,
but he failed to explain the remaining balance of P6,978.22, thereby giving rise to the
conclusion that he had spent such amount for his personal use.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the estate of the deceased petitioner is hereby sentenced to
indemnify the government in the amount of P6,978.22. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 135457 September 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and
TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and
"Ka Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch
52, in Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr.
alias 'Ka Django,' 'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka
Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging them of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in the
Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence
and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack,
assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which
directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one
Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de
parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted
considering the substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10)
armed companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had
with them a person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's
house be extinguished and Malto complied.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot.
When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was
hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the
accused direct his companions to carry away the dead man.
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went
back to his place, together with the military, on March 29, 1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa
and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka
Django", as he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military. She, however,
replied that they were only seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in
attending to their farm and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in
their locality.
After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted
by the New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and
looked for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that
they saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he
was being maltreated by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an
NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose
Patriarca, Jr.
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands
of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as
belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo,
used to print his name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that
accused is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting
the victims in the three criminal cases filed against him.
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing the
following penalty:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka
Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the
death of Alfredo Arevalo and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and as regards Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose
Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted.
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his period of
detention.
"With cost de-oficio.
"SO ORDERED."1
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error allegedly
committed by the trial court:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF
REBELLION.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation
No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All
Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other
Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and
Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the
National Amnesty Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the Notice of Resolution of the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated November 17, 1999 which states:
"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22 October 1998. 2
'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR. JOSE NARRA
PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.
'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit
Pampropaganda and participated in the following armed activities:
'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol,
Sorsogon on 14 February 1986;
'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay Godon,
Donsol, Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
 'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang, Gurang, Donsol,
Sorsogon in 1987;
'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay Boroan,
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case
No. 2672 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon;
'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the community,
at Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case
No. 2665 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon;
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his misconducts at San
Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in which a case of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 2664 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the CHDF at
Sitio Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at Barangay
Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case
No. 2663 was filed against him.
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local
Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It
thus recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to
approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under
Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed
above, provided they were committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June
1988. Let a Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes
final. It shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this
Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within
said period.'"3
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission,
wrote the following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"
"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the attached copy of
RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was
accused of the following cases:
"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of the province, the
opportunity to take whatever action you may deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This
grant of amnesty shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt
of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party
within said period.
"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."4
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty
Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was
filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC. 5
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there
has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party.6
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724
dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N.
therefor and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.10
of their political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws,
including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at
proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault;
resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person; tumults and Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both
other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,12 are ordered DISMISSED.
utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and
The release of Jose N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon
explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
is likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without
leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various
crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this
Articles of War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other decision.
crimes for personal ends."1âwphi1
SO ORDERED.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
offended, by some breach, the law of nations.7 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he
is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though
he had committed no offense.8

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

In the case of People vs. Casido,9 the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:

"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty
of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives
the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration 1 assailing the Decision dated
September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and
September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot
revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in
its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for
the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence
thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos.
28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-
231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal
Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal
prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable
cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the
information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the
absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the
aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution
and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new
complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326
or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to
whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the
Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2) whether the offenses
for which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.
Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid
proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute
Resolution5 dated February 10, 2004 which reads:
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ
Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 143618-
41, entitled "Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First
Division, et al.)" promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders
issued by this Court on June 8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accused’s
motion to quash the informations in these cases; that in particular the above-
mentioned Decision ruled that the herein informations may be quashed because the
officer who filed the same had no authority to do so; and that the said Decision has
become final and executory on November 29, 2002, these cases are considered
DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the archives.
The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan6 where petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June 8, 2000 in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the
preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his arraignment
for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000.7 In annulling and setting aside
the aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held that:
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form,
as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the certification in the
information was found inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the required
certification was absent. Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party.
The defect cannot be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An
invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal
proceedings.8
In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioner’s Motion to Quash and
directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because the informations were
filed by an unauthorized party, hence void.
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus:
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution;
exception. – An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds
specified in section 3(g) and (i)10 of this Rule.
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or
double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the
same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals11 that:
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the
former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient
because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not
have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be
pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar in petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. x x x. 12
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant
cases was not a violation of petitioner’s right to be informed of the charges against him. It is
of no moment that the cases investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers
as those cases which have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal
Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record
keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding
to the date and time of filing a case.
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was
merely for reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket
numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.13
Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-referred
preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan14 when
we categorically declared therein that:
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly
terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be
recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary
investigation was based on our ruling that the right to a preliminary investigation is a
substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioner’s right was violated when the
preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer
without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our directive should be
strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to
due process.15
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first resolve the
question of whether this Court may validly take cognizance of and resolve the
aforementioned issue considering that as we have said in the assailed Decision, "this case
has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations against the petitioner"16 and that
"it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to determine whether
the offense charged has already prescribed."17 We reconsider our stance and shall rule in the
affirmative.
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before he enters
his plea, move to quash the complaint and information18 on the ground that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished,19 which ground includes the defense of prescription
considering that Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of
those grounds which totally extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a
trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of
prescription.
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases have
prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the
period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.21
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his
Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his
tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15
years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador22 that:
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by
B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for
offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer
prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019
as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the
amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot
be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten
(10) years from January 6, 1976.23
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the
same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the
petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15
years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs
the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the
rule on the running of the prescriptive period as follows:
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed
preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof;"
or as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and until institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment." (Emphasis supplied)25
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the
discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto26 this Court already took note that:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986
EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the
government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time
the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to
question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an
exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.27
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until
April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.
We disagree.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender
from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can
only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption
of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an
omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof,
because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not,
in the guise of the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however
after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert
into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature
would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.28
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in
1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when
the Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses
have already prescribed.
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." However, there is no such proceeding
instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the
offenses charged against him.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted without jurisdiction
and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary investigation of cases not falling
within its competence.30 This Court, in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to
remove the possibility of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioner’s
cases in the Sandiganbayan to take"31declared invalid –
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed
to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of
jurisdiction of said offenses.32
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the informations filed
with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 considering that the same were
subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In granting petitioner’s plea, this Court held, thus:
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured by
conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all
and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.34
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with
the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled. In
contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the
prescriptive periods.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is
filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case
of People v. Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal
mayor for purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of
prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that the filing of a
complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of
prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus,
the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the offenses charged
against the petitioner could not have prescribed because the latter was absent from the
Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period did not run from the
time of discovery on May 8, 1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "[t]he term of prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago."
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that –
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to [special laws],
unless the latter should x x x provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the
supplementary application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the
prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should
run only after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC
applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934,
starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various
provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the
matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-
settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the Majority
Opinion and argues that –
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution
by the simple expedient of escaping from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x An accused
cannot acquire legal immunity by being a fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction
unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the
detriment of the State’s ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of
cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should not encourage individuals
facing investigation or prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine
jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion
unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice.
With all due respect, we beg to disagree.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or
in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No.
3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice
Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that –
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC
applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934,
starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various
provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the
matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-
settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to
special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the
special law are silent on a particular matteras evident from the cases cited and relied upon in
the Dissenting Opinion:
In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that
the defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,38 this Court applied the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who was
found guilty of multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Revised
Penal Code to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under RA No.
8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined
therein although it referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime
of illegal recruitment.
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the absence
of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive period is
more apparent than real.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as
early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines "special acts" as "acts
defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code".
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,40 this Court was categorical in ruling that –
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised
Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special
laws, Act No. 3326 applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents
the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the
foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the
accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive
period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in
the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.41
Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the Philippines as a
ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have
been expressly provided in Act No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform
Act of 1997 where the legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that –
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code – All
violations of any provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty persons and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called "gap"
in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation of the prescriptive period for
violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be
applied in cases where the accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would
supplement Act No. 3326.
This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to
special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of "special law" as
contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.
In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to interpret the term
"special laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined
and penalized by the Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus –
This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is used in
article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal
Code (article 7) have the meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same
is generally used? x x x It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales,"
as used in the Penal Code (article 7) is not used with this general signification: In
fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a general
law. A careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the phrase "leyes
especiales" was not used to signify "special laws" in the general signification of that
phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply says, in effect, that when a crime is made
 punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject to
the provisions of said code.43
Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the
same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the contemporaneous application of the
two laws. The Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the
Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does
not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and
directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws only
suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of
statutory construction dictate that special legal provisions must prevail over general ones.
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reservations about the effects of ruling that the
absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running of the prescriptive
period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret the law. To go beyond that and to question the
wisdom or effects of the law is certainly beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we
have already explained –
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an
omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof,
because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not,
in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however
after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert
into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature
would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission. 44
Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in
favor of the accused only relates to the following issues: (1) retroactive or prospective
application of laws providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the
nature of the felony committed vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the
reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle
cannot be utilized to support the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the prescriptive period in a
special law continues to run while the accused is abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally
provides the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs while the accused is
outside of Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes
supports this conclusion. In the old but still relevant case of People v. Moran,45 this Court
extensively discussed the rationale behind and the nature of prescription of penal offenses –
"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes
of limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of
limitation in civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different.
In civil suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between
two contending parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there is no
intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other;
there is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions, of construction
are to be made. But it is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the
State. Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to
prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution.' The
statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the
offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and
resume his immunities as a citizen and that from henceforth he may cease to
preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.
Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition
and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out
proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys
proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in
instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to
public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of
memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt,
and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They
are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact
vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence
that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the
liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the
liberality of the State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive
periods cannot simply be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this
endowment must be directly and expressly sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any
doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on prescription. The
exceptions to the running of or the causes for the interruption of the prescriptive periods may
and should not be easily implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented from
operating or may only be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law.
In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law
on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be
adopted. The said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on
 prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state
in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed
the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as follows:
The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied,
but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over
the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and
resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease
to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted
out. Hence, it is that statues of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor
of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to
all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute
is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive
periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.47
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant
case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As
a consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982
prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged
offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May
8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his
counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the
State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos.
28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-
231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case
Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Azcuna, J.J., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17616 May 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FELIPE ABUY, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio J. Calvento for defendant-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
On April 1, 1959, Felipe Abuy was charged in the Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with
the crime of "trespass to dwelling" (Crim. Case No. 6751), in an information which reads:
That on or about February 21, 1959, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously enter the dwelling of Ruperto Carpio without his
knowledge or consent.
Contrary to law.
On arraignment, the accused Abuy pleaded not guilty, and the case was thereafter tried.
When the case was called for continuation of trial on November 5, 1959, the prosecution
moved for the dismissal of the case, on the ground that the evidence so far presented by it
would not sustain the accused's conviction of said crime charged. The motion was granted by
the court.
Subsequently, on November 13, 1959, the accused Abuy was charged before the same
Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with the crime of "unjust vexation" (Crim. Case No. 7201)
under the following information:
That on February 21, 1959, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused with intent to cause vexation upon
Nicolasa B. de Magadia, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
embrace, and take hold of her wrist, thereby causing vexation upon her person; that
there being present the aggravating circumstance that it was committed in the
dwelling of said Nicolasa B. de Magadia.
 Contrary to law.
On November 19, 1959, the accused Abuy filed a motion to quash the above information for
"unjust vexation", on the ground that said offense "has already prescribed". To this motion,
the prosecution filed its answer (opposition) on December 23, 1959. On May 14, 1960, the
court granted said motion to quash, in an order which partly states:
The record of this case show that on February 21, 1959, on the complaint of
complainant Michaela B. de Magadia, the Prosecuting Officer, Special Counsel
Vicente Largo filed an information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6751, for
Trespass to Dwelling, against the accused Felipe Abuy. This case for Trespass to
Dwelling called for trial when the accused aided by the same counsel that appeared
for him in Criminal Case No. 7201, for Unjust Vexation, when arraigned pleaded not
guilty to the crime of Trespass to Dwelling. On the day when Criminal Case No. 6751,
was called for continuation of the trial on November 5, 1959, the Prosecuting Officer,
Special Counsel Vicente Largo, moved for the dismissal of the information charging
Felipe Abuy of Trespass to Dwelling, on the alleged ground that the evidence so far
presented by the prosecution would not sustain the conviction of the accused of the
crime of Trespass to Dwelling, which motion was duly granted by the Court, ordering
the acquittal of the accused with costs de oficio, ordering further the cancellation of
the bail bond filed by the accused for his provisional liberty.
Subsequent to the dismissal, rather the acquittal of the accused Felipe Abuy of the
crime of Trespass to Dwelling on motion of the prosecuting officer, Special Counsel
Largo, another information charging the same accused Felipe Abuy acquitted of the
crime of Trespass to Dwelling with the crime of Unjust Vexation, the present case to
which the motion to quash, was filed by the defense attorney, on the ground of
prescription.
The Court, taking into consideration the above findings of fact together with the
motion to quash filed by the defense attorney and the opposition filed by the Special
Counsel, the arguments advanced by the counsels on the motion and opposition to
the motion to quash, and the additional oral arguments, taken by the Court
Stenographer at the time of the formal hearing conducted by this Court on the motion
and opposition to the granting of the motion to quash, believes that the crime of
Unjust Vexation, for which the accused is presently charged under Criminal Case No.
7201, filed after the said accused based on the same facts complained by
complainant Michaela de Magadia, for which the accused Felipe Abuy was charged
and wherein he was acquitted on motion of the prosecuting officer in the first case of
Trespass to Dwelling which after dismissal of the same, the accused is now again
charged of Unjust Vexation which crime this Court believes had already prescribed
as provided for under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 5 of
Article 89 and Article 91 of the same Code and, therefore, the motion to quash the
information filed under Criminal Case No. 7201, for Unjust Vexation is hereby
granted, ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 7201, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
From this order, the prosecution appealed to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City.
On July 30, 1960, said court denied the appeal, in an order of this tenor:
ORDER
The appeal in this case taken by the City Attorney's Office being unmeritorious and
unfounded, the same is hereby DENIED and let the records of this case be returned
to the court of origin.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
There is no merit in the People's appeal. There can be no question that the crime of "unjust
vexation" (Art. 287 [2], Revised Penal Code) is a light offense (Art. 9[3], id.) and, therefore,
prescribes in 2 months (Art. 90[6], id.). Now, the information dated November 13, 1959
charging appellee Abuy with said offense, expressly alleges that he committed it "on
February 21, 1959" on the person of Nicolasa (Michaela) B. de Magadia." According to Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription of an offense "shall commence to
run upon the day on which the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their agents". From February 21, 1959 to November 13, 1959 (date of filing of the
information) is 6 months and 20 days, far beyond the 2-month prescriptive period of said
offense. In the circumstances, appellee Abuy correctly moved to quash said information, and
the Municipal Court properly granted the same. The Court of First Instance, on its part,
committed no reversible error in dismissing the prosecution's appeal from said quashal by the
Municipal Court, for being "unmeritorious and unfounded".1äwphï1.ñët
The prosecution argues, however, that the offense of "unjust vexation" had not yet prescribed
when it filed the information (Crim. Case No. 7201) against appellee Abuy, on November 13,
1959, reasoning thus:
The acts complained of occurred on February 21, 1959. The information for trespass
to dwelling against the accused was filed on April 1, 1959, 39 days after (p. 1, mun.
court folder). The filing of the information for trespass to dwelling on April 1, 1959
interrupted the running of the two-month prescriptive period (Art. 91, Rev. Penal
Code).
After the municipal court of the City of Zamboanga dismissed the case on November
5, 1959 on motion of the prosecution (p. 17, mun. court folder), it was only then that
the prescriptive period commenced to run again.
 The information for unjust vexation was received by the Municipal court of the City of
Zamboanga on November 13, 1959, 8 days after the dismissal of the information for
trespass to dwelling was handed down by the court.
Adding the 30 days which had elapsed prior to the filing of the information for
trespass to dwelling with the 8 days, prior to the filing of the information for unjust
vexation, the aggregate total of 47 days would still be shy of the 2-month prescriptive
period allowed by law for the latter crime.
This contention of the prosecution is not in accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that, "The period of prescription . . . shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him (accused)". The "complaint or information" or "such
proceedings" mentioned in the law must be the proper information or complaint
corresponding to the offense committed in order that "such proceedings" thereunder may
interrupt the prescriptive period. Here, the first information was trespass to dwelling
committed against Ruperto Carpio, the elements of which as described in the information are,
the prosecution expressly admits (see appellant's brief, page 8), entirely different from the
elements of the other offense of unjust vexation against Nicolasa B. de Magadia charged in
the second information. There is nothing in the two informations to show that the two offenses
are related to each other except that they were committed by the same accused on the same
date and within the jurisdiction of the same court. The one, in fact, is not a bar to the other.
Consequently, the filing of the one does not interrupt the prescriptive period as to the other.
Neither is the other contention of the prosecution tenable — that the municipal court should
not have discharged the accused but should have committed him to answer to the proper
offense, as there appears to have been a mistake in charging the correct offense. (Sec. 12,
Rule 115, Rules of Court). In the first place, the fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case, not
because of an alleged mistake, but because the evidence so far presented by him would not
sustain the accused's conviction of the crime charged in the information. Secondly, even if
the intention was to subsequently charge the accused with unjust vexation, since the offense
has clearly prescribed, it would not be proper to further commit the accused to answer to the
proper charge where this is no longer available.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 84363 March 4, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MATEO ALILIN y BISAVILLA, RAFAEL COLINA y TUDTUD, DANILO JUNTILLA y DE LA
CALSADA and ROLANDO PARILLA, accused, MATEO ALILIN y BISAVILLA, accused-
appellant.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Following classified information that drug addiction had crept into the Sabang District in
Ormoc City, preying on the youth mostly, the PC NARCOM confidential agents launched
'Operation Lechon" (for marijuana) in early April of 1986. They not only conducted
surveillance but also circulated among the youth and befriended them so they could identify
the drug pushers who operated in that area.
On April 27, 1986, NARCOM agents S/Sqt. Cesar
Maroto, Sgt. Luis Alfiler, Pfc. Vicente Brazil, CIC
Elmer Feliciano, policewoman Linda Porcadilla, and another NARCOM confidential agent met
at the NARCOM office in Ipil, Ormoc City, to plan a "buy-bust" operation to be staged in front
of the two-storey house of Porcadilla in the heart of the Sabang District at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of the next day. Porcadilla, who is a resident of the place and a native of Ormoc
City, knew almost everyone in the neighborhood. According to the plan, Sgt. Cesar Maroto
and Policewoman Linda Porcadilla would stay on the second floor of the policewoman's
house, overlooking the site of the operation. Both had earlier been provided with telescopes
and hand-held radio sets. The raiding team, composed of Sgt. Luis Alfiler, Pfc. Brazil, CIC
Feliciano and another confidential agent who would pose as purchaser of marijuana from a
targeted drug pusher, was posted at the corner of Burgos Street near Porcadilla's
house. They were inside a white Ford Fiera and were also provided vith hand-held radio sets.
The two groups were to be in close contact through their radio sets and, as agreed, the
password would be: "Go, go go!" As soon as Sgt. Maroto would give that signal, Sgt. Alfiler's
team in the Ford Fiera would immediately swoop down on the drug pushers. The team
members prepared P 70.00 of marked money by taking down the serial numbers of two five-
peso hills, one ten-peso biil and one fifty-peso bill.
In accordance with that plan, Sgt.Maroto secreted himself in Porcadilla's house at 2:00
o'clock in the early morning to avoid being seen.
Before 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 28, 1986, Sgt. Alfiler and his companions posted
themselves on Burgos Street aboard their motor vehicle to await the password.
From his vantage location, Sgt.Maroto saw the NARCOM confidential agent arrive in front of
Porcadilla's house at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The appellant, Mateo Alilin y
Bisavilla and his companions, Rafael Colina and Danilo Juntilla, allegedly approached the
agent. Policewoman Porcadilla who was watching beside Sgt. Maroto, recognized them and
identified them by their names. The three men talked with their "customer" who gave the
marked money to Alilin. Alilin whistled psst! upon hearing which Rolando Parilla came out of
a neighbor's house, carrying a package which he gave to Juntilla who handed it to the
confidential agent. Promptly, S/Sgt. Maroto (who had been describing the proceedings over
his hand-held radio) gave the password to strike and arrest.
Sgt. Alfiler and his team rushed to the scene straightaway and surrounded the appellant and
his three companions. In the commotion that ensued, Parilla was able to escape but Alilin,
Juntilla, and Colina were arrested. The team recovered from Alilin's pocket P20 consisting of
one ten-peso bill and two five-peso bills. The marked fifty-peso bill was not recovered (pp. 14,
34-35, tsn, October 13, 1986). The package containing twenty-eight (28) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes was also confiscated (pp. 17-18, tsn, October 13, 1986), and duly receipted for by
Sgt. Alfiler, who gave the receipt to the appellant (p. 40, tsn, October 13, 1986). Nothing was
found on the persons of Rafael Colina and Danilo Juntilla (p. 41, tsn, October 13, 1986).
During the investigation that followed, the NARCOM agents learned from the appellant and
his co-accused, Juntilla and Colina, that the source of their marijuana was a certain Boy
Ramoneda. A laboratory examination conducted by the PC crime laboratory on April 28, 1986
and the Chemistry Report (No. NB 77-86) issued by forensic chemist Liza Sabong revealed
that the cigarette sticks were all positive for marijuana.
Alilin, Colina, Juntilla, and Parilla were charged in the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City,
Branch XII, in Criminal Case No. 2862-0 for violation of Section 4, Art.II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act (Republic Act 6425, as amended). The information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of April, 1986, at around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, in Sabang District, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused MATEO ALILIN y Bisavilla,
RAFAEL COLINA y Tudtud, DANILO JUNTILLA y de la Calsada and
ROLANDO PARILLA, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell twenty-eight (28) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, thus violating
Section 4 of Article II, Republic Act 6425. (p. 4, Rollo.)
Upon arraignment, Alilin, Juntilla, and Colina all pleaded not guilty. Parilla has remained at
large.
As against the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Sgts. Alfiler and Maroto, Alilin told the
court that P40, (not P20 as claimed by the prosecution) in bills and some P10 in coins were
taken from his possession. This is corroborated by the other defense witnesses, Danilo
Cuizon, the accused Rafael Colina y Tudtud and Danilo Juntilla, as well as the prosecution's
"Receipt for Property Seized" (Exh. D-2) which states that two (2) twenty-peso bills were
taken from Alilin's possession.
Defense witness Ramon Mabitad, barangay secretary, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of April 28, 1986, he saw Alilin walking casually, followed by an armed person,
who called Alilin's attention and pointed to something on the ground. Mabitad heard the man
say: "Pick it up!" and when Alilin was about to do so, the armed man boxed Alilin on the
breast and brought him to Erlinda Porcadilla's house. The witness testified that Alilin was
alone when arrested and that he never saw either Tudtud (Colina), or Juntilla with Alilin as he
walked.
Witness Manuel Quizon testified that he and his brother, Victorino Quizon, were arrested by
NARCOM agents at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 28, 1986 at his mother's
house. The arresting officer left them there for a short while and later came back with Rafael
Tudtud (Colina). All of them were then brought to Linda Porcadilla's house where they saw
Danilo Juntilla and Mateo Alilin. They were searched and various items were allegedly taken
from their persons, but no marijuana.
These testimonies contradicted the claim of the prosecution that a buy-bust operation was
conducted. It appears that what happened was that the NARCOM agents rounded up and/or
arrested persons in Sabang Beach, Ormoc City, whom they suspected to be users or dealers
of marijuana.
After trial, a decision was rendered on November 17, 1987, finding Mateo Alilin guilty as
charged. The court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P30,000, plus costs. Juntilla and Colina were acquitted.
Alilin comes before this Court on appeal, alleging that the trial court erred:
1. in not holding that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because:
a. the twenty-eight sticks of marijuana cigarettes were not formally offered in
evidence;
b. the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were not clear and convincing; and
c. the confidential agent was not identified nor presented on the witness
stand;
 2. in not holding that the marijuana sticks were not recovered from him; 4. Why was the pack of mirijuana sticks not presented at the trial?

3. in holding that the money seized from him were marked money and not his 5. Why was the poseur-buyer not identified nor presented as a witness?
own; and
We need not belabor the settled doctrine in criminal procedure that the prosecution must rely
4. in holding that the evidence of the defense, compared to that of the on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. It must
prosecution, is "vacillating and flimsy" and that appellant's denial of the overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence which the accused enjoys, and must
commission of the offense charged is not corroborated by the other defense prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
witnesses.
The prosecution's evidence in this case leaves much to be desired. The unexplained gaps in
There is merit in the petition. the evidence make us unable to conclude that the guilt of the accused has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Considering the severity of the penalty for drug-pushing, which is
Peddlers of prohibited drugs are "agents of destruction and deserve no less than the imprisonment for life, the Court hesitates to inflict it upon the appellant on the basis of the
maximum penalty" (People vs. Bati, 189 SCRA 97). In view of the severity of Republic Act dubious evidence in this case.
No. 6425, to sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside. The appellant Mateo
Alilin is ACQUITTED of the crime charged with costs de oficio.
However, the illegal sale of marijuana which merely requires proof of the consummation of
the selling transaction (People vs. Dekingco, 189 SCRA 512; People vs. Marcos, 185 SCRA SO ORDERED.
154) would be impossible to establish when the price paid (the marked money) is not
recovered from the alleged seller, the goods sold (the marijuana sticks) are not produced Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Medialdea, JJ., concur
before the court, and the poseur-buyer is not presented at the trial. The absence of those
elements of the transaction leaves a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence which is fatal to the
case (People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220). The identity of the poseur-buyer is vital when
the accused, as in this case, denies having sold marijuana to anyone (People vs. Ale, 145
SCRA 50). The failure to present the poseur-buyer engenders a well-grounded belief that he
does not exist, or, that his evidence is being willfully suppressed because it will be adverse if
produced (Rule 131, Sec. 5[e], Rules of Court).

We have scrutinized the records of this case to ascertain whether or not the quantum of proof
is sufficient to conviuct the appellant, and the following questions regarding the so-called
"buy-bust" operation remain unanswered.

1. Why was the marijuana "recovered from Alilin" contrary to the declaration of the
prosecution witnesses that it was given by Rolando Parilla to Juntilla who handed it over to
the unnamed poseur-buyer?

2. If the marked bills amounting to P70 were indeed given to Alilin, why was the fifty-peso bill
not found in his possession, despite the circumstance that he had no time to run and hide the
money when the trap was sprung?

3. Why did the prosecution witnesses testify that P20 in marked P10 and two P5 bills were
"recovered from Alilin's pocket" although the receipt (Exh. D-2) showed that two P20 bills (or
P40) were seized from him?
Republic of the Philippines CONTRARY TO LAW.
SUPREME COURT
Manila The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 and assigned to Branch 83
of the said court. On 2 March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging
THIRD DIVISION prescription of the offense as ground therefor. She contended that by the petitioner's
admissions in his testimony given on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled
"Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia," and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on 16 October 1991, the petitioner discovered the commission of the
G.R. No. 119063 January 27, 1997 offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),4 the
period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, since bigamy was
punishable by prision mayor,5 an afflictive penalty6 which prescribed in fifteen years pursuant
JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner, to Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its
vs. discovery by the petitioner.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ADELA TEODORA P.
SANTOS, respondents.
The private respondent quoted7 the petitioner's testimony in Civil Case No. 90-52730 as
follows:

Q No, no, just answer. What did you learn from her
DAVIDE, JR., J.: (Eugenia) about the private respondent?

The issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the A That she has been married previously in case I don't know
trial court's order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on it. But she said she has been previously married, in fact I
prescription. saw her husband — Rey, a few days ago and they said,
"Baka magkasama pa silang muli."
On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the (Quezon City Prosecutor's Office
an "Affidavit of Complaint"1 charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos xxx xxx xxx
alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085,
and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant
A'ITY. EVANGELISTA:
City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his
action to bigamy.2
Q When did Eugenia R. Balingit told [sic] that private
After appropriate proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992 with respondent was already married to another man?
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of (Quezon City an information,3 dated 15 November 1991,
charging the private respondent with Bigamy allegedly committed as follows: A That was when I told her that we are Separating now. I
told her in tagalog, "na maghihiwalay na kami ni Delia
ngayon." "Ang unang tanong niya sa akin, "si Rey ba ang
That on or before the 2nd day of February, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines,
dahilan," ang alam ko po, Rey ang dating boyfriend niya,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
kaya ang sabi ko, "hindi po, Mario, ang panga!an,"
accused, being previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO
napabagsak po siya sa upuan, sabi niya, "hindi na
QUIROCA, and without the said marriage having been dissolved, (or before
nagbago."
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which Q When was that when you came to know from Eugenia
marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989, to the damage and prejudice of the Balingit, the judicial guardian, that private respondent was
said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions already married to another man when she married you?
of the Civil Code.
 A That was when the affair was happening and I found out.
Q What year?
A 1974.8
The portion of the complaint filed on 16 October 1991 before the CSC which the private
respondent alluded to, reads as follows:
5. At the time the respondent married the herein complainant she never
informed him that she was previously married to a certain REYNALDO
QUIROCA" on December 1, 1951 wherein she used the name of "ADELA
SANTOS" which was part of her true name "ADELA TEODORA P. SANTOS"
as per her genuine Baptismal Certificate issued by the Parish of San
Guillermo, Bacolor, Pampanga, a copy of the said Baptismal Certificate is
hereto attached as ANNEX "D";
6. . . .
7. These facts were discovered only by the herein complainant in the year
1974 where they separated from each other because of her illicit relations
with several men continued use of her alias name "DELIA", without proper
authority from the Courts; and committing a series of fraudulent acts; her
previous marriage to a certain "Reynaldo Quiroca" is evidenced by a
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, a copy of which is
hereto attached as ANNEX "F",9
In its 29 June 1992 order,10 the trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the
criminal case, ruling in this wise:
This court believes that since the penalty prescribed under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code for the offense of bigamy is prision mayor, which is
classified as an afflictive penalty under Article 25 of the same Code, then
said offense should prescribe in fifteen (15) years as provided in Article 92 of
the Code. The complainant having discovered the first marriage of the
accused to one Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one
Eugenia Balingit, the offense charged has already prescribed when the
information was filed in this case on November 15, 1991. The argument
presented by the prosecution that i was difficult for the complainant to obtain
evidence of the alleged first marriage, hence, the prescriptive period should
be counted from the time the evidence was secured will not hold water.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides, thus:
"The period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered. . . ."
it did not state "on the day sufficient evidence was gathered,"
thus this Court cannot change the requirements of the law.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above order on 26 August 1992, 11 to which he
filed "numerous" supplements thereto, focusing on the private respondent's many trips
abroad which the petitioner claimed suspended the running of the prescriptive period. These
trips were enumerated in the certification12 issued by Associate Commissioner Ramon M.
Morales of the Bureau of Immigration (BID), which reads as follows:
This is to certify that the name GARCIA/DELIA/S. appears in the Bureau's
files of Arrivals and Departures as having the following travel records:
Departed for HKG on 06/03/77 aboard PR
Arrived from HKG on 07/02/77 aboard PA
Arrived from SYD on 07/09/77 aboard PR
Arrived from GUM on 06/14/80 aboard PA
Arrived from MEL on 07/17/81 aboard PR
Arrived from TYO on 05/20/83 aboard PA
Departed for HKG on 09/22/83 aboard PR
Arrived from SIN on 09/28/83 aboard PR
Departed for TYO on 04/30/84 aboard PA
Arrived from SFO on 07/03/84 aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 11/19/84 aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 08/05/85 aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 11/1 7/86 aboard UA
Arrived from LAX on 12/12/87 aboard UA
Departed for LAX on 11/30/87 aboard UA
Departed for CHI on 11/14/88 aboard UA
The trial court disallowed reconsideration of its 29 June 1992 order, finding "no
urgent or justifiable reason to disturb or set [it] aside." As to the sojourns abroad of
the private respondent as shown in the certification, the trial court held that the same
"is not that kind of absence from the Philippines which will interrupt the period of
prescription of the offense charged. . ."13
The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R.
CR No. 14324. He contended therein that: (a) the trial court erred in quashing the information
on the ground of prescription; and (b) the counsel for the accused was barred from filing the
motion to quash the information against the accused.14 As to the first, the petitioner argued
that bigamy was a public offense, hence "the offended party is not the first or second
(innocent) spouse but the State whose law/policy was transgressed." He tried to distinguish
bigamy from private offenses such as adultery or concubinage "where the private
complainant is necessarily the offended party," thus, the prescriptive period for the former
should commence from the day the State, being the offended party, discovered the offense,
which in this case was on 28 August 1991 when the petitioner filed his complaint before the
Prosecutor's Office. The petitioner added that the "interchanging use" in Article 91 of the RPC
of the terms "offended party," "authorities," and "their agents" supports his view that the State
is the offended party in public offenses.
Additionally, the petitioner referred to the general rule stated in People v. Alagao15 "that in
resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or information[,] the facts alleged in the
complaint or information should be taken as they are." The information in this case mentioned
that the bigamy was discovered in 1989. He admitted, however, that this rule admits of
exceptions, such as when the ground for the motion to quash is prescription of the offense,
as provided in Section 4 of the old Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Nonetheless,
he advanced the view that this exception is no longer available because of the implied repeal
of Section 4, as the amended Rule 117 no longer contains a similar provision under the rule
on motions to quash; and that granting there was no repeal, the private respondent failed to
introduce evidence to "support her factual averment in her motion to quash," which is
required by Rule 117. He further asserted that the factual bases of the motion to quash, viz.,
the petitioner's testimony in Civil Case No. 90-52730 and his complaint filed with the CSC are
not conclusive because the testimony is hearsay evidence, hence inadmissible, while the
complaint is vague, particularly the following portion quoted by the private respondent:
7. These facts where discovered only by the herein
complainant in the year 1974 when they separated from
each other because of her illicit relations with several men
continued use of her alias name "DELIA", without proper
authority from the Courts; and committing a series of
fraudulent acts; her previous marriage to a certain "Reynaldo
Quiroca" is evidenced by a certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila, a copy of which is hereto attached
a ANNEX "F";
The petitioner alleged that the phrase "These facts" in said paragraph 7 does not
clearly refer to his discovery of the private respondent's first marriage. Moreover, he
doubted whether the term "discovered" in the said paragraph was used in the sense
contemplated by law. At best, the petitioner theorized, the discovery only referred to
the "initial, unconfirmed and uninvestigated raw, hearsay information" which he
received from Balingit.
Finally, the petitioner reiterated that the prescriptive period was interrupted several times by
the private respondent's numerous trips abroad.
As regards his second contention, the petitioner argued that the counsel for the private
respondent had already stated that he represented only Delia S. Garcia and not Adela
Teodora P. Santos. Consequently, the private respondent's counsel could not ask for the
quashal of the information in favor of Adela Teodora P. Santos alias Delia Santos. The
petitioner opined that the counsel for the private respondent should have sought a dismissal
of the case in favor of Delia Garcia alone.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and concluded that
the petitioner discovered the private respondent's first marriage in 1974. Since the
information in this case was filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or eighteen years after the
discovery of the offense, then the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. 16 It further
held that the quashal of an information based on prescription of the offense could be invoked
before or after arraignment and even on appeal,17 for under Article 89(5) of the RPC, the
criminal liability of a person is "totally extinguish[ed]' by the prescription of the crime, which is
a mode of extinguishing criminal liability." Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if not
pleaded as a defense.18
Undaunted, the petitioner is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari to annul and
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and to compel the respondent court to remand
the case to the trial court for further proceedings. He submits the following assignment of
errors:
I
BIGAMY IS A PUBLIC OFFENSE, CONSEQUENTLY,
PRESCRIPTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN COUNTED FROM
THE TIME THE STATE DISCOVERED ITS COMMISSION;
II
A MOTION TO QUASH CANNOT ALSO GO BEYOND
WHAT IS STATED IN THE INFORMATION;
III
BY THEMSELVES, THE FACTUAL BASES OF THE
MOTION TO QUASH ARE NOT ALSO CONCLUSIVE;
IV
ASSUMING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTED IN
1974, SAID PERIOD HOWEVER WAS INTERRUPTED
SEVERAL TIMES.
We notice that except for the first two pages of the petition, the deletion of a few paragraphs,
the substitution of the term "petitioner" for "appellant," and the deletion of the contention on
the' counsel for the private respondent being barred from filing a motion to quash, the herein
petition is a reproduction of the Appellant's Brief filed by the petitioner with the Court of
Appeals. Verily then, the instant petition is a rehash of an old tale. However, the Court of
Appeals failed to sufficiently address several issues raised by the petitioner, most probably
prompting him to seek redress from this Court.
We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. The Office of the Solicitor General was the last to submit a
Memorandum for the public respondent. Both the private and public respondents ask for the
dismissal of this petition and the affirmance of the challenged decision.
Petitioner's position is untenable. Denial then of this petition is all it merits.
We shall take up the assigned errors in seriatim.
I the "offended party" who suffered "damage and prejudice . . . in such amount as may be
It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to state, as the petitioner
does, that only the State is the offended party in such case, as well as in other public
offenses, and, therefore; only the State's discovery of the crime could effectively commence
the running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC provides that "[t]he
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. . . ." This rule makes no distinction
between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the
"offended party, the authorities, or their agents."
Article 91 does not define the term "offended party." We find its definition in Section 12, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court as "the person against whom or against whose property, the
offense was committed.19 The said Section reads as follows:
Sec. 12. Name of the offended party. — A complaint or information must
state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which
such person has been or is known, and if there is no better way of identifying
him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the
commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly
liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that [e]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."20 Invariably then, the private
individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
This conclusion is strengthened by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with a criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. . . .
It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the
offended parties depending on the circumstances.21
The petitioner even admits that he is the offended party in Criminal Case No. (Q-92-27272.
The information therein,22 which he copied in full in the petition in this case, describes him as
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code."23
The distinction he made between public crimes and private crimes relates not to the
discovery of the crimes, but to their prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in relation
to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this matter.
II
The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is
palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alaga,24 which he cites, mentions the exceptions to
the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old
Rule 117, viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His additional claim
that the exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the
former Section 4,25 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after
its revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of the said Section 4 ever
took place. While there is no provision in the new Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a
motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the
former Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section 2 reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Foms and contents. — The motion to quash shall be in writing signed
by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal
grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those
stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. (3a, 4a,
5a). (underscoring supplied for emphasis)
It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal
grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among
the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that
facts outside the information itself may be introduced to grove such grounds. As a matter of
fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the ground invoked is that the allegations
in the information do not constitute the offense charged. Thus, in People v. De la Rosa,26 this
Court stated:
 As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive
allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any period.
offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said
allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of
held in the case of People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14324 is AFFIRMED.
alleged in the information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution may
be invoked in support of the motion to quash. Former Chief justice Moran
Costs against the petitioner.
supports this theory.27
SO ORDERED.
In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court, without objection on the part of the
prosecution, allowed the private respondent to offer evidence in support of her claim that the
crime had prescribed. Consequently, the trial court, upon indubitable proof of prescription, Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
correctly granted the motion to quash. It would have been, to quote De la Rosa, "pure
technicality for the court to close its eyes to [the fact of prescription) and still give due course
to the prosecution of the case" — a technicality which would have meant loss of valuable time
of the court and the parties.

As noted by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee,
the aforequoted Section 2 of the new Rule 117 on "factual and legal grounds" of a motion to
quash is based on the De la Rosa case.28

III

The petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of the private respondent's motion to
quash are inconclusive. The petitioner cannot be allowed to disown statements he made
under oath and in open court when it serves his purpose. This is a contemptible practice
which can only mislead the courts and thereby contribute to injustice. Besides, he never
denied having given the pertinent testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it was not
clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia Balingit disclosed to him was that entered
into by the private respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to whom the private
respondent was first married; what is relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed
of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent.

Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast doubt on the meaning of his statements in his
sworn complaint filed before the CSC. We find no hint of vagueness in them. In any event, he
has not denied that he in fact discovered in 1974 that the private respondent had been
previously married.

Finally, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several trips abroad as
enumerated in the certification of the Bureau of Immigration, and cites the second paragraph
of Article 91 of the RPC, viz.: "[t]he term of prescription shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine Archipelago." We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips
abroad did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief,
and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were
made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and. even if the aggregate number of
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154579 October 8, 2003
MA. LOURDES R. DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 2001 and the subsequent Resolution dated August 1, 2002 denying the
motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 145 in Criminal Case No. 96-1226,2 finding herein petitioner,
Ma. Lourdes de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft.
The Information filed on July 9, 1996 reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of February, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and without the consent
of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away several pieces of jewelry valued at
₱4,600,000.00 belonging to one Jasmine Gongora, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforementioned amount of ₱4,600,000.00.3
After due hearing, the trial court rendered its judgment on December 11, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been sufficiently established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court hereby finds the accused MA. LOURDES DE GUZMAN GUILTY
of the present charge of THEFT and committed without aggravating circumstance charged
nor mitigating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences
her to suffer the minimum penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN (10)
DAYS of prision correccional, and the maximum penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of
reclusion temporal, as well as the penalties accessory thereto.
The Court further finds the accused MA. LOURDES DE GUZMAN civilly liable and orders her
to pay the private offended party, JASMINE GONGORA the sums of FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P4,640,000.00) representing the value as proven
of the stolen jewelries; FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) in moral
damages and TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) as reasonable attorneys
fees and litigation expenses.4
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but reduced the award of damages, to wit:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, We AFFIRM the decision appealed from with the
MODIFICATION that the award for actual damages is reduced to P1,500,00 and moral
damages to P100,000. The award for attorney’s fees is DELETED.5
Hence, this petition filed on September 24, 2002, raising the same issues in the CA that the
decision of the trial court was tried and decided by a biased judge; and that the judgment of
conviction was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment.1awphi1.nét
On January 30, 2003, counsel for the petitioner filed a Manifestation informing the Court that
the petitioner passed away on January 13, 2003.6 The death of the petitioner resulted from a
vehicular accident, as indicated in the Certificate of Death attached thereto. 7
At issue now before the Court is the effect of petitioner’s death on the instant petition.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code clearly provides that:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally extinguished;
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
…
The issue as to whether an action on the civil liability can survive and proceed against the
estate of the deceased has been settled in the case of People v. Bayotas 8 where it was held
that:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.9 1awphi1.nét
The pecuniary liabilities adjudged against the petitioner are undeniably ex delicto. The
petitioner was ordered to pay actual damages, which is the value of the pieces of jewelry
allegedly taken from the private complainant in the amount of P1,500,000, as modified by the
Court of Appeals; and moral damages of P100,000 for the fear and trauma caused to the
complainant because of the petitioner’s intrusion into her bedroom. These civil liabilities arose
from the crime of Theft and are based solely on said delict.
Although both the trial and the appellate courts found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, she had the right to appeal her case to this Court of last resort and challenge the
findings of the two courts below. The judgment of conviction was pending review until her
untimely demise. It has, therefore, not yet attained finality. Thus, pursuant to Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is incumbent upon the Court to dismiss the instant petition for review.
The Court is dismissing the case because there is no longer a need to continue with the
review of the appeal. The lower court’s decision has thus become ineffectual. 10
Needless to state, the civil liability attendant to the crime which includes the restitution of
personal or real property11 is also extinguished. A substitution of heirs in petitioner’s stead is
no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. In view of the death of the petitioner, the
appealed decision is SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 126780 February 17, 2005
YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The primary question of interest before this Court is the only legal issue in the case: It is
whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its
guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its
employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids
such waivers.
Before this Court is a Rule 45 petition for review of the Decision1 dated 19 October 1995 of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision2 dated 16 December 1991 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, of Manila, finding YHT Realty Corporation, Brunhilda Mata-Tan
(Tan), Erlinda Lainez (Lainez) and Anicia Payam (Payam) jointly and solidarily liable for
damages in an action filed by Maurice McLoughlin (McLoughlin) for the loss of his American
and Australian dollars deposited in the safety deposit box of Tropicana Copacabana
Apartment Hotel, owned and operated by YHT Realty Corporation.
The factual backdrop of the case follow.
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used to stay at
Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Tan. Tan
befriended McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important people,
accompanying him in visiting impoverished street children and assisting him in buying gifts for
the children and in distributing the same to charitable institutions for poor children. Tan
convinced McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where Lainez, Payam
and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel while Lainez and
Payam had custody of the keys for the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of
McLoughlin's booking at the Tropicana where he started staying during his trips to the
Philippines from December 1984 to September 1987.3
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He
rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he
registered at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of the
procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box
could only be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered
guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. When a
registered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the
management who then would assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist
him in opening the safety deposit box with the two keys.4
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: Fifteen Thousand US
Dollars (US$15,000.00) which he placed in two envelopes, one envelope containing Ten
Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) and the other envelope Five Thousand US Dollars
(US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00) which he also placed in
another envelope; two (2) other envelopes containing letters and credit cards; two (2)
bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit box.5
On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin opened his
safety deposit box with his key and with the key of the management and took therefrom the
envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the envelope containing Ten
Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and his credit
cards.6 McLoughlin left the other items in the box as he did not check out of his room at the
Tropicana during his short visit to Hongkong. When he arrived in Hongkong, he opened the
envelope which contained Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00) and discovered upon
counting that only Three Thousand US Dollars (US$3,000.00) were enclosed therein. 7 Since
he had no idea whether somebody else had tampered with his safety deposit box, he thought
that it was just a result of bad accounting since he did not spend anything from that
envelope.8
After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana on 18 December 1987 and left for
Australia. When he arrived in Australia, he discovered that the envelope with Ten Thousand
US Dollars (US$10,000.00) was short of Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000). He also
noticed that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box
upon his return to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet. 9
When McLoughlin came back to the Philippines on 4 April 1988, he asked Lainez if some
money and/or jewelry which he had lost were found and returned to her or to the
management. However, Lainez told him that no one in the hotel found such things and none
were turned over to the management. He again registered at Tropicana and rented a safety
deposit box. He placed therein one (1) envelope containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars
(US$15,000.00), another envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars
(AUS$10,000.00) and other envelopes containing his traveling papers/documents. On 16
April 1988, McLoughlin requested Lainez and Payam to open his safety deposit box. He
noticed that in the envelope containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), Two
Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00) were missing and in the envelope previously containing
Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), Four Thousand Five Hundred Australian
Dollars (AUS$4,500.00) were missing.10
When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who
admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. 11 McLoughlin
went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had
stolen McLoughlin's key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of
Lopez, Payam and Lainez.12 Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to
McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.13
McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident. Lopez got in
touch with Tan and arranged for a meeting with the police and McLoughlin. When the police
did not arrive, Lopez and Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at Tropicana and thereat,
Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note dated 21 April 1988. The promissory note
reads as follows:
I promise to pay Mr. Maurice McLoughlin the amount of AUS$4,000.00 and US$2,000.00 or
its equivalent in Philippine currency on or before May 5, 1988.14
Lopez requested Tan to sign the promissory note which the latter did and Lopez also signed
as a witness. Despite the execution of promissory note by Tan, McLoughlin insisted that it
must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. However, Lopez
refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box
entitled "Undertaking For the Use Of Safety Deposit Box,"15 specifically paragraphs (2) and
(4) thereof, to wit:
2. To release and hold free and blameless TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any
liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the said deposit box for any cause
whatsoever, including but not limited to the presentation or use thereof by any other person
should the key be lost;
...
4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE in favor of TROPICANA APARTMENT
HOTEL upon giving up the use of the box.16
On 17 May 1988, McLoughlin went back to Australia and he consulted his lawyers as to the
validity of the abovementioned stipulations. They opined that the stipulations are void for
being violative of universal hotel practices and customs. His lawyers prepared a letter dated
30 May 1988 which was signed by McLoughlin and sent to President Corazon Aquino. 17 The
Office of the President referred the letter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which forwarded
the same to the Western Police District (WPD).18
After receiving a copy of the indorsement in Australia, McLoughlin came to the Philippines
and registered again as a hotel guest of Tropicana. McLoughlin went to Malacaňang to follow
up on his letter but he was instructed to go to the DOJ. The DOJ directed him to proceed to
the WPD for documentation. But McLoughlin went back to Australia as he had an urgent
business matter to attend to.
For several times, McLoughlin left for Australia to attend to his business and came back to
the Philippines to follow up on his letter to the President but he failed to obtain any concrete
assistance.19
McLoughlin left again for Australia and upon his return to the Philippines on 25 August 1989
to pursue his claims against petitioners, the WPD conducted an investigation which resulted
in the preparation of an affidavit which was forwarded to the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Said
affidavit became the basis of preliminary investigation. However, McLoughlin left again for
Australia without receiving the notice of the hearing on 24 November 1989. Thus, the case at
the Fiscal's Office was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mcloughlin requested the
reinstatement of the criminal charge for theft. In the meantime, McLoughlin and his lawyers
wrote letters of demand to those having responsibility to pay the damage. Then he left again
for Australia.
Upon his return on 22 October 1990, he registered at the Echelon Towers at Malate, Manila.
Meetings were held between McLoughlin and his lawyer which resulted to the filing of a
complaint for damages on 3 December 1990 against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez,
Payam and Tan (defendants) for the loss of McLoughlin's money which was discovered on 16
April 1988. After filing the complaint, McLoughlin left again for Australia to attend to an urgent
business matter. Tan and Lopez, however, were not served with summons, and trial
proceeded with only Lainez, Payam and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.
After defendants had filed their Pre-Trial Brief admitting that they had previously allowed and
assisted Tan to open the safety deposit box, McLoughlin filed an Amended/Supplemental
Complaint20 dated 10 June 1991 which included another incident of loss of money and jewelry
in the safety deposit box rented by McLoughlin in the same hotel which took place prior to 16
April 1988.21 The trial court admitted the Amended/Supplemental Complaint.
During the trial of the case, McLoughlin had been in and out of the country to attend to urgent
business in Australia, and while staying in the Philippines to attend the hearing, he incurred
expenses for hotel bills, airfare and other transportation expenses, long distance calls to
Australia, Meralco power expenses, and expenses for food and maintenance, among
others.22
After trial, the RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
US$11,400.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of ₱342,000.00, more or less,
and the sum of AUS$4,500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of ₱99,000.00,
or a total of ₱441,000.00, more or less, with 12% interest from April 16 1988 until
said amount has been paid to plaintiff (Item 1, Exhibit CC);
2. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱3,674,238.00
as actual and consequential damages arising from the loss of his Australian and
American dollars and jewelries complained against and in prosecuting his claim and
rights administratively and judicially (Items II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, Exh.
"CC");
3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱500,000.00
as moral damages (Item X, Exh. "CC");
4. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱350,000.00
as exemplary damages (Item XI, Exh. "CC");
5. And ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay litigation expenses in the
sum of ₱200,000.00 (Item XII, Exh. "CC");
6. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱200,000.00
as attorney's fees, and a fee of ₱3,000.00 for every appearance; and
7. Plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found that McLoughlin's allegations as to the fact of loss and as to the amount
of money he lost were sufficiently shown by his direct and straightforward manner of testifying
in court and found him to be credible and worthy of belief as it was established that
McLoughlin's money, kept in Tropicana's safety deposit box, was taken by Tan without
McLoughlin's consent. The taking was effected through the use of the master key which was
in the possession of the management. Payam and Lainez allowed Tan to use the master key
without authority from McLoughlin. The trial court added that if McLoughlin had not lost his
dollars, he would not have gone through the trouble and personal inconvenience of seeking
aid and assistance from the Office of the President, DOJ, police authorities and the City
Fiscal's Office in his desire to recover his losses from the hotel management and Tan.24
As regards the loss of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000.00) and jewelry worth
approximately One Thousand Two Hundred US Dollars (US$1,200.00) which allegedly
occurred during his stay at Tropicana previous to 4 April 1988, no claim was made by
McLoughlin for such losses in his complaint dated 21 November 1990 because he was not
sure how they were lost and who the responsible persons were. But considering the
admission of the defendants in their pre-trial brief that on three previous occasions they
allowed Tan to open the box, the trial court opined that it was logical and reasonable to
presume that his personal assets consisting of Seven Thousand US Dollars (US$7,000.00)
and jewelry were taken by Tan from the safety deposit box without McLoughlin's consent
through the cooperation of Payam and Lainez. 25
The trial court also found that defendants acted with gross negligence in the performance and
exercise of their duties and obligations as innkeepers and were therefore liable to answer for
the losses incurred by McLoughlin.26
Moreover, the trial court ruled that paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "Undertaking For The Use Of
Safety Deposit Box" are not valid for being contrary to the express mandate of Article 2003 of
the New Civil Code and against public policy.27 Thus, there being fraud or wanton conduct on
the part of defendants, they should be responsible for all damages which may be attributed to
the non-performance of their contractual obligations.28
The Court of Appeals affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower court except as to the
amount of damages awarded. The decretal text of the appellate court's decision reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED but modified
as follows:
The appellants are directed jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff/appellee the following
amounts:
1) ₱153,200.00 representing the peso equivalent of US$2,000.00 and
AUS$4,500.00;
2) ₱308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sidney [sic] to
Manila and back for a total of eleven (11) trips;
3) One-half of ₱336,207.05 or ₱168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana
Apartment Hotel;
4) One-half of ₱152,683.57 or ₱76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon Tower;
5) One-half of ₱179,863.20 or ₱89,931.60 for the taxi xxx transportation from the
residence to Sidney [sic] Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the
eleven (11) trips;
6) One-half of ₱7,801.94 or ₱3,900.97 representing Meralco power expenses;
7) One-half of ₱356,400.00 or ₱178,000.00 representing expenses for food and
maintenance;
8) ₱50,000.00 for moral damages;
9) ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
10) ₱200,000 representing attorney's fees.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.29
Unperturbed, YHT Realty Corporation, Lainez and Payam went to this Court in this appeal
by certiorari.
Petitioners submit for resolution by this Court the following issues: (a) whether the appellate
court's conclusion on the alleged prior existence and subsequent loss of the subject money
and jewelry is supported by the evidence on record; (b) whether the finding of gross
negligence on the part of petitioners in the performance of their duties as innkeepers is
supported by the evidence on record; (c) whether the "Undertaking For The Use of Safety
Deposit Box" admittedly executed by private respondent is null and void; and (d) whether the
damages awarded to private respondent, as well as the amounts thereof, are proper under
the circumstances.30
The petition is devoid of merit.
It is worthy of note that the thrust of Rule 45 is the resolution only of questions of law and any
peripheral factual question addressed to this Court is beyond the bounds of this mode of
review.
Petitioners point out that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove the fact of prior
existence of the dollars and the jewelry which had been lost while deposited in the safety
deposit boxes of Tropicana, the basis of the trial court and the appellate court being the sole
testimony of McLoughlin as to the contents thereof. Likewise, petitioners dispute the finding
of gross negligence on their part as not supported by the evidence on record.
We are not persuaded.
We adhere to the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court that the fact of
loss was established by the credible testimony in open court by McLoughlin. Such findings
are factual and therefore beyond the ambit of the present petition.
The trial court had the occasion to observe the demeanor of McLoughlin while testifying
which reflected the veracity of the facts testified to by him. On this score, we give full
credence to the appreciation of testimonial evidence by the trial court especially if what is at
issue is the credibility of the witness. The oft-repeated principle is that where the credibility of
a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great respect is accorded to the evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court.31 The trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.32
We are also not impressed by petitioners' argument that the finding of gross negligence by
the lower court as affirmed by the appellate court is not supported by evidence. The evidence
reveals that two keys are required to open the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. One key is
assigned to the guest while the other remains in the possession of the management. If the
guest desires to open his safety deposit box, he must request the management for the other
key to open the same. In other words, the guest alone cannot open the safety deposit box
without the assistance of the management or its employees. With more reason that access to
the safety deposit box should be denied if the one requesting for the opening of the safety
deposit box is a stranger. Thus, in case of loss of any item deposited in the safety deposit
box, it is inevitable to conclude that the management had at least a hand in the
consummation of the taking, unless the reason for the loss is force majeure.
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had
custody of the master key of the management when the loss took place. In fact, they even
admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening McLoughlin's safety
deposit box.33 This only proves that Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person aside from
the registered guest had access to the safety deposit box. Yet the management failed to
notify McLoughlin of the incident and waited for him to discover the taking before it disclosed
the matter to him. Therefore, Tropicana should be held responsible for the damage suffered
by McLoughlin by reason of the negligence of its employees.
The management should have guarded against the occurrence of this incident considering
that Payam admitted in open court that she assisted Tan three times in opening the safety
deposit box of McLoughlin at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the latter was still
asleep.34 In light of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is undeniable that without the
acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the opening of the safety deposit box, the
loss of McLoughlin's money could and should have been avoided.
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made its employees
believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him most of the time. The evidence
on record, however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the
management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of McLoughlin will not exculpate the
petitioners from liability in the absence of any showing that he made the management believe
that Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have access to the safety deposit box. Mere
close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant such conclusion considering
that what is involved in the instant case is the very safety of McLoughlin's deposit. If only
petitioners exercised due diligence in taking care of McLoughlin's safety deposit box, they
should have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan considering that the latter had
been observed opening McLoughlin's safety deposit box a number of times at the early hours
of the morning. Tan's acts should have prompted the management to investigate her
relationship with McLoughlin. Then, petitioners would have exercised due diligence required
of them. Failure to do so warrants the conclusion that the management had been remiss in
complying with the obligations imposed upon hotel-keepers under the law.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their obligations,
are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of paying
damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it
is presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard
for the victim to prove the negligence of such employer.35 Thus, given the fact that the loss of
McLoughlin's money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicana's employees in
allowing Tan to open the safety deposit box without the guest's consent, both the assisting
employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana, should be
held solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.36
The issue of whether the "Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box" executed by
McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for resolution in this
petition. Notably, both the trial court and the appellate court found the same to be null and
void. We find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus:
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the
effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the
hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles
1998 to 200137 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy
precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like
the common carrier's business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their
persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in
turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation
in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers
on guests for their signature.
In an early case,38 the Court of Appeals through its then Presiding Justice (later Associate
Justice of the Court) Jose P. Bengzon, ruled that to hold hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for
the effects of their guests, it is not necessary that they be actually delivered to the innkeepers
or their employees. It is enough that such effects are within the hotel or inn.39 With greater
reason should the liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing items are taken
without the guest's knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel
itself, as in this case.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "undertaking" manifestly contravene Article 2003 of the New
Civil Code for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in the
contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause whatsoever.40 Evidently, the
undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of
the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees.
The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss
of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by servants or employees
of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from
any force majeure.41 It is the loss through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper from
liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was done
with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify the same as force majeure.42
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article 200243 which exempts the hotel-keeper
from liability if the loss is due to the acts of his guest, his family, or visitors. Even a cursory
reading of the provision would lead us to reject petitioners' contention. The justification they
raise would render nugatory the public interest sought to be protected by the provision. What
if the negligence of the employer or its employees facilitated the consummation of a crime
committed by the registered guest's relatives or visitor? Should the law exculpate the hotel
from liability since the loss was due to the act of the visitor of the registered guest of the
hotel? Hence, this provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not guilty of concurrent
negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the loss. A depositary is
not responsible for the loss of goods by theft, unless his actionable negligence contributes to
the loss.44
In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the safety deposit box was shared not only
by the guest himself but also by the management since two keys are necessary to open the
safety deposit box. Without the assistance of hotel employees, the loss would not have
occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurrent negligence in allowing Tan, who was not
the registered guest, to open the safety deposit box of McLoughlin, even assuming that the
latter was also guilty of negligence in allowing another person to use his key. To rule
otherwise would result in undermining the safety of the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the
management will be given imprimatur to allow any person, under the pretense of being a
family member or a visitor of the guest, to have access to the safety deposit box without fear
of any liability that will attach thereafter in case such person turns out to be a complete
stranger. This will allow the hotel to evade responsibility for any liability incurred by its
employees in conspiracy with the guest's relatives and visitors.
Petitioners contend that McLoughlin's case was mounted on the theory of contract, but the
trial court and the appellate court upheld the grant of the claims of the latter on the basis of
tort.45 There is nothing anomalous in how the lower courts decided the controversy for this
Court has pronounced a jurisprudential rule that tort liability can exist even if there are
already contractual relations. The act that breaks the contract may also be tort. 46
As to damages awarded to McLoughlin, we see no reason to modify the amounts awarded by
the appellate court for the same were based on facts and law. It is within the province of
lower courts to settle factual issues such as the proper amount of damages awarded and
such finding is binding upon this Court especially if sufficiently proven by evidence and not
unconscionable or excessive. Thus, the appellate court correctly awarded McLoughlin Two
Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00) and Four Thousand Five Hundred Australian dollars
(AUS$4,500.00) or their peso equivalent at the time of payment,47 being the amounts duly
proven by evidence.48 The alleged loss that took place prior to 16 April 1988 was not
considered since the amounts alleged to have been taken were not sufficiently established by
evidence. The appellate court also correctly awarded the sum of ₱308,880.80, representing
the peso value for the air fares from Sydney to Manila and back for a total of eleven (11)
trips;49 one-half of ₱336,207.05 or ₱168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana;50 one-
half of ₱152,683.57 or ₱76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon Tower; 51 one-half of
₱179,863.20 or ₱89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation expenses from McLoughlin's
residence to Sydney Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the eleven (11)
trips;52 one-half of ₱7,801.94 or ₱3,900.97 representing Meralco power expenses; 53 one-half
of ₱356,400.00 or ₱178,000.00 representing expenses for food and maintenance.54
The amount of ₱50,000.00 for moral damages is reasonable. Although trial courts are given
discretion to determine the amount of moral damages, the appellate court may modify or
change the amount awarded when it is palpably and scandalously
excessive.l^vvphi1.net Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant at the
expense of a defendant.l^vvphi1.net They are awarded only to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of defendants' culpable action.55
The awards of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱200,000.00 representing attorney's
fees are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
19 October 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners are directed, jointly and severally, to pay
private respondent the following amounts:
(1) US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment;
(2) ₱308,880.80, representing the peso value for the air fares from Sydney to Manila
and back for a total of eleven (11) trips;
(3) One-half of ₱336,207.05 or ₱168,103.52 representing payment to Tropicana
Copacabana Apartment Hotel;
(4) One-half of ₱152,683.57 or ₱76,341.785 representing payment to Echelon
Tower;
(5) One-half of ₱179,863.20 or ₱89,931.60 for the taxi or transportation expense
from McLoughlin's residence to Sydney Airport and from MIA to the hotel here in
Manila, for the eleven (11) trips;
(6) One-half of ₱7,801.94 or ₱3,900.97 representing Meralco power expenses;
(7) One-half of ₱356,400.00 or ₱178,200.00 representing expenses for food and
maintenance;
 (8) ₱50,000.00 for moral damages; SECOND DIVISION

(9) ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and G.R. No. 113433 March 17, 2000

(10) ₱200,000 representing attorney's fees. LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner,

vs.
With costs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE
ADVINCULA, respondents.
SO ORDERED.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., no part. This is a petition for review 1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to
annul and set aside the Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
1992 and January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order dated April 7,
1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due course to petitioner's
appeal from the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the
petitioner of the subsidiary indemnity arising from the offense committed by his truck driver.

The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:

On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and
double physical injuries. 4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.

The information against him reads:

The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Double Homicide and
Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of Marikina, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a dump truck with plate no.
NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to
traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and
precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck
in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a result of which said
dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following
vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto
Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota
Corona with plate no. NAL — 138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage
in the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by
Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount d) an
automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto
 thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with
plate no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount; that due to the strong impact caused by the collision, the
driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y
Poblete were hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2
passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical injuries which required
medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days which incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time and Dominador Legaspi
Jr. sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less
than nine days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.
Contrary to law.
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991, which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four
(4) months, as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of Danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for the latter's death, P31,614.00,
as actual and compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning
capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
the costs of suit. 5
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment
became final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused
Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito
Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special Appearance
and Motion for Reconsideration" 6 praying that the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be
reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary
liability for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit on
September 16, 1991 . 7 Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal 8 on September 25, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the subsidiary civil
liability 9 of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and
dismissed Basilio's appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. 10 The other
directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction
of the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991. 11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari 12 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar as
the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992,
directing the issuance of a writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court,
petitioner claimed he was not afforded due process when he was found subsidiary liable for
the civil liability of the accused Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992, disposing
as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE COURSE
and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and effect. 13
A motion for reconsideration 14 was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This was
denied in a Resolution 15 dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I. . . . IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS
REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED
APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE PROMULGATION.
II. . . . IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A
PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FILE A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY
AGAINST HIM.
III. . . . IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DAY IN
COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
IV. . . . IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AUXILIARY
RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE JUDGEMENT OF
CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE EMPLOYER".
V. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN ABUSE OF
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. 16
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner against
the trial court. To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final and executor
when accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration concerning civil
liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of preliminary
injunction?
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to prove
the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused. Nor that,
alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee at the time of
the incident. While these assertions are not moved, we shall give them due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. 17 This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award
is made. 18 However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee
relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties;
and 4) that said employee is insolvent. 19
In Vda. De Paman vs. Señeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the
drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that
the alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case, he is not
heard as to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held:
To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this
Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Señeris (supra) to hear and decide in
the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the
passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of
the subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution
of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. 20
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an
accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One, during the criminal
proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both
instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due
process. 21
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck
that was involved in the incident. 22 Further, it was the insurance company, with which his
truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in
their contract. 23 Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge,
through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee
relationship. 24 With the convict's application for probation, the trial court's judgment became
final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it found that
petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal
proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to
intervene at the appropriate time.
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of
judgment.1âwphi1 Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the
motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an
opposition thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there
was no employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not
discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the incident. 25 In addition,
counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on December 3, 1991, and December 9,
1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for execution. 26 This
was set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not appear.
Consequently, the court ordered in open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It
was only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioner's counsel filed a counter-manifestation 27 that
belatedly attempted to contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the civil
liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for
execution of the subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with
petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent
appellate court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court.
Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11108 June 30, 1958
CHUA HAI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
ONG SHU, respondents.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for petitioner.
German Lee for respondent Ong Shu.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Certiorari against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr.
presiding, ordering the return to the complainant in criminal case No. 34250, People vs.
Roberto Sotto, of 100 sheets of galvanized iron roofing which had been sold by the accused
in said case to petitioner herein, Chua Hai. The order is as follows:
Counsel for the complainant in this case seeks the return of the 700 sheets of
galvanized iron now with the Manila Police Department which form part of the
hardware materials involved in this case. Chua Hai, one of the persons who
purchased from the accused one hundred (100) pieces of the said galvanized iron
sheets, opposes the said motion on the ground that the question of ownership should
be determined in the proper proceedings, claiming that he has a valid title to the 100
pieces, having bought them from the accused Roberto Soto on February 1, 1956.
Roberto Soto is presently at large, his arrest having been ordered by this Court on
June 13, 1956, for failure to appear for trial.
Considering the provisions of Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code, the said 700
sheets, except five of them which are to be retained for purposes of evidence, are
hereby ordered returned to the complainant, subject, however, to the condition that
the complainant post a bond in an amount equal to twice the value of 100 sheets in
favor of Chua Hai who has a claim of ownership to the said 100 sheets, and without
prejudice on the part of said Chua Hai to file the corresponding action on the matter
of ownership thereof by virtue of his purchase from the herein accused.
From the facts alleged in the pleadings presented in this case, we gather the following: On
January 31, 1956, Roberto Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware, owned by Ong Shu,
700 corrugated galvanized iron sheets and 249 pieces of round iron bar for P6,137.70, and in
payment thereof he issued a check drawn against the Security Bank and Trust Company for
P7,000.00, without informing Ong Shu that he had no sufficient funds in said bank to answer
for the same. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. Soto sold 165 sheets in Pangasinan and 535 sheets in Calapan, Mindoro. Of those
sold in Pangasinan, 100 were sold to petitioner Chua Hai. When the case was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Roberto Soto, for estafa, the offended party filed a
petition asking that the 700 galvanized iron sheets, which were deposited with the Manila
Police Department, be returned to him, as owner of the Youngstown Hardware. Petitioner
herein opposed the motion with respect to the 100 sheets that he had bought from Soto.
Notwithstanding the opposition, the court ordered the return of the galvanized iron sheets to
Ong Shu. Petitioner then presented a motion to reconsider the order, alleging that by the
return thereof to the offended party, the court had not only violated the contract of deposit,
because it was in that concept that petitioner had delivered the 100 sheets to the Manila
Police Department, and that said return to Ong Shu amounted to a deprivation of his property
without due process of law. It is also claimed that Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code,
under whose authority the return was ordered, can be invoked only after the termination of
the criminal case and not while said criminal case is still pending trial.
The court having given no heed to these protests on the part of the petitioner, the latter
brought the present petition to this Court alleging that the order of the respondent judge
constitutes a deprivation of petitioner's property without due process of law, violating the
contract of deposit under which the sheets were delivered to the police department of the City
of Manila, and determining the respective rights of petitioner and respondent Ong Shu
without a previous trial of the criminal case — all of which constitute a grave abuse of
discretion and excess of jurisdiction. In answer to the petition, it is claimed that as respondent
Ong Shu is the owner of the property, he has the right to recover possession thereof even if
said property appears to have fallen into the possession of a third party who acquired it by
legal means, provided that said form of acquisition is not that provided for in Article 464 of the
Civil Code (where property has been pledged in a monte de piedad established under
authority of the Government) ; that even if the property was acquired in good faith, the owner
who has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the
same unless a person in possession acquired it in good faith at a public sale. (Art. 559, Civil
Code of the Philippines). It is also claimed that under the provisions of Article 105 of the
Revised Penal Code, under which restitution is made by a return of the thing itself whenever
possible, the galvanized iron sheets in question should be returned to the offended party, the
owner, and that there is no provision of law requiring that the criminal case must first be
finally disposed of before restitution of the goods swindled can be ordered returned to the
owner. In answer to the allegation that petitioner has been deprived of his property without
due process of law, it is alleged that same is without foundation because the petitioner was
given ample time to be heard. As to the claim that the galvanized iron sheets in question
were deposited with the Manila Police Department, it is argued that the delivery to the Manila
Police Department was by virtue of the order of the court, because the said sheets, were the
subject of or are the instruments of the commission of the crime of estafa, and the court had
the power to order the return thereof to the owner after it had satisfied itself of the ownership
thereof by the offended party. It is also alleged in defense that petitioner's rights, if any, are
sufficiently protected by the bond that the court has required to be filed.
We find the case meritorious, since petitioner's good faith is not questioned. To deprive the
possessor in good faith, even temporarily and provisionally, of the chattels possessed,
violates the rule of Art. 559 of the Civil Code. The latter declares that possession of chattels
in good faith is equivalent to title; i.e., that for all intents and purposes, the possessor is the
owner, until ordered by the proper court to restore the thing to the one who was illegally
deprived thereof. Until such decree is rendered (and it can not be rendered in a criminal
proceeding in which the possessor is not a party), the possessor, as presumptive owner, is
entitled to hold and enjoy the thing; and "every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said
possession established by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court."(Art.
539, New Civil Code).
The decision of the court below, instead of conforming to Arts. 559 and 539 of the Civil Code,
directs possessor to surrender the chattel to the claimant Ong Shu before the latter has
proved that he was illegally deprived thereof, without taking into account that the mere filing
of a criminal action for estafa is no proof that estafa was in fact committed. Instead of
regarding the possessor as the owner of the chattel until illegal deprivation is shown, the
court below regards the possessor of the chattel not as an owner, but as a usurper, and
compels him to surrender possession even before the illegal deprivation is proved. We see
no warrant for such a reversal of legal rules.
It can not be assumed at this stage of the proceedings that respondent Ong Shu is still the
owner of the property; to do so it take for granted that the estafa was in fact committed, when
so far, the trial on the merits has not even started, and the presumption of innocence holds
full sway.
In the third place, the civil liability of the offender to make restitution, under Art. 105 of the
Revised Penal Code, does not arise until his criminal liability is finally declared, since the
former is a consequence of the latter. Art. 105 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, can not
be invoked to justify the order of the court below, since that very article recognizes the title of
an innocent purchaser when it says:
ART. 105. Restitution — . . .
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third
person who has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the
proper person who may be liable to him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the
third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action
for its recovery. (R.P.C.) (Emphasis supplied)
The last paragraph of Article 105 plainly refers to those cases where recovery is denied by
the civil law, notwithstanding the fact that the former owner was deprived of his chattels
through crime. One of these cases is that provided for in Art. 85 of the Code of Commerce:
ART. 85. — La compra de mercaderias en almacenes o tiendas abiertas al publico
causara prescripcion de derecho a favor del comprador respecto de las mercaderias
adquiridas, quedando a salvo en su caso los derechos del propietario de los objetos
vendidos para ejercitar las acciones civiles o criminales que puedan corresponderle
contra el que los vendiere indebidamente. (Civ. 464)
Para los efectos de esta prescripcion, se reputaran almacenes o tiendas abiertas al
publico:
1.º Los que establezcan los comerciantes inscritos.
2.º Los que establezcan los comerciantes no inscritos, siempre que los almacenes o
tiendas permanezcan abiertos al publico por espacio de echo dias consecutivos, o
se hayan anunciado por medio de rotulos, muestras o titulos en el local mismo, o por
avisos repartidos al publico o insertos en los diarios de la localidad.
Notwithstanding the claim of some authors that this Art. 85 has been repealed, the fact is that
its rule exists and has been confirmed by Article 1505 of the new Civil Code:
ART. 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by a person
who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with
consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell.
Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Purchases made in a merchant's store, or in fairs, or markets in accordance with
the Code of Commerce and special laws. (C.C.)
But even if the articles in dispute had not been acquired in a market, fair or merchant's store,
still, so far as disclosed, the facts do not justify a finding that the owner, respondent Ong Shu,
was illegally deprived of the iron sheets, at least in so far as appellant was concerned. It is
not denied that Ong Shu delivered the sheets to Soto upon a perfected contract of sale, and
such delivery transferred title or ownership to the purchaser. Says Art. 1496:
ART. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the
moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or
in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from
the vendor to the vendee. (C.C.)
The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to 1) That the acquirer and possessor in good faith, of a chattel or movable property is entitled
revest in the seller until and unless the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved to be respected and protected in his possession, as if he were the true owner thereof, until a
pursuant to Article 1191 of the new Civil Code. competent court rules otherwise;

And, assuming that the consent of Ong Shu to the sale in favor of Sotto was obtained by the 2) That being considered, in the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith
latter through fraud or deceit, the contract was not thereby rendered void ab initio, but only cannot be compelled to I surrender possession nor to be required to institute an action for the
voidable by reason of the fraud, and Article 1390 expressly provides that: recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor;

ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court.
They are susceptible of ratification. (C.C.)
Agreeably to this provision, Article 1506 prescribes:
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not
been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods,
provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's
defect of title. (C.C.)
3) That the filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through
estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant
disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor; and
4) That the judge taking cognizance of the criminal case against the vendor of the possessor
in good faith has not right to interfere with the possession of the latter, who is not a party to
the criminal proceedings, and such unwarranted interference is not made justifiable by
requiring a bond to answer for damages caused to the possessor.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Criminal Case No. 34250, dated July 31, 1956, is hereby revoked and set aside, as
issued in abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Costs against appellant Ong
Shu.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

Hence, until the contract of Ong Shu with Sotto is set aside by a competent court (assuming
that the fraud is established to its satisfaction), the validity of appellant's claim to the property
in question cannot be disputed, and his right to the possession thereof should be respected.

It is no excuse that the respondent Ong Shu was required to post a redelivery bond. An
indemnity bond, while answering for damages, is not, by itself alone, sufficient reason for
disturbing property rights, whether temporarily or permanently. If the invasion is not
warranted, the filing of a bond will not make it justifiable.

Questions of ownership and possession being eminently civil in character, they should not be
settled by exclusive reference to the Revised Penal Code. If Ong Shu has reason to fear that
petitioner Chua Hai may dispose of the chattels in dispute and thereby render nugatory his
eventual right to restitution, then the proper remedy lies in a civil suit and attachment, not in
an order presuming to adjudicate in a criminal case the civil rights of one who is not involved
therein.

Summing up, we hold:

SECOND DIVISION
One (1) Ring with Diamond ---- 5,000.00

G.R. No. 146584 July 12, 2004

with the total value of P655,000.00, belonging to Jovita Rodriguez y Cruz, which he
ERNESTO FRANCISCO y SPENOCILLA, petitioner, knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
vs. crime of robbery or theft.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Contrary to law.3

The petitioner was arraigned, with the assistance of counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial forthwith ensued.
DECISION
The Case for the Prosecution

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 19110 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 22, finding petitioner Ernesto Francisco guilty of violating Presidential
Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
corresponding to the latter, and to pay the corresponding value of the subject pieces of
jewelry.
The Indictment
The petitioner was charged of violating P.D. No. 1612 under the Information filed on June 23,
1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:
Jovita Rodriguez was a resident of Barangay Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal. 4 She was
engaged in business as a general contractor under the business name J.C. Rodriguez
Contractors. Macario Linghon was one of her workers. She and her husband, the former
Municipal Mayor of Rodriguez, Rizal, acquired several pieces of jewelry which were placed
inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Jovita hid the key to the cabinet
inside the room. The couple and their son resided inside a compound. They hired Pacita
Linghon, Macario’s sister, as one of their household helpers us sometime in February
1989.5 Pacita swept and cleaned the room periodically. Sometime in May 1991, she left the
employ of the Rodriguez family.
Sometime in the third week of October 1991, Pacita contacted her brother Macario, who
resided in Sitio Baloongan, Barangay Paltok, Meycauayan, Bulacan,6 and asked him to sell
some pieces of jewelry. She told Macario that a friend of hers owned the jewelry. 7 Macario
agreed. He then went to the shop of petitioner Ernesto "Erning" Francisco located at Pacheco
Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan,8 which had a poster outside that said, "We buy gold."
Macario entered the shop, while Pacita stayed outside. Macario offered to sell to Ernesto two
rings and one bracelet. Ernesto agreed to buy the jewelry for P25,000, and paid the amount
to Macario. He also gave Macario P300 as a tip.9

That in or about the month of November 1991, in the municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Ernesto Francisco y Spenocilla, with intent to gain for himself, did
then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess and acquire
from one Pacita Linghon y Liza, not the owner, several pieces of jewelry, to wit:
Sometime in November 1991,10 Pacita asked Macario anew to sell a pair of earrings. He
agreed. He and a friend of his went to the shop of Ernesto and offered to sell to Ernesto the
pair of earrings for P18,000. The latter agreed and paid Macario the amount. Ernesto gave
a P200 tip to Macario. After these transactions, Macario saw the petitioner in his shop for
about five to six more times and received some amounts.11

One (1) pair of earrings (Heart Shape)
One (1) White Gold Bracelet
One (1) Diamond Ring
--- P 400,000.00 Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was asked to be a principal sponsor at a wedding. She
was shocked when she opened the locked cabinet containing her jewelry, and found that the
---- 150,000.00 box was empty. She noticed that the lock to the cabinet was not broken. Among the pieces of
jewelry missing were one pair of diamond heart-shaped earrings worth P400,000; one heart-
---- 100,000.00 shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with diamond stones
worth P150,000; and one ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She suspected that
it was Pacita who stole her jewelry. She was, however, occupied with her business ventures
that she had little time to gather evidence and charge Pacita.
On August 19, 1992, Jovita filed a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother
Adoracion Linghon with the Counter-Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. She stated that she owned several jewels, viz: one (1) heart-
shaped pair of earrings with diamond worth P400,000; one (1) heart-shaped ring with
diamond worth P100,000; one (1) white gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000;
and, one (1) ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She also averred that Pacita had
stolen the pieces of jewelry, and that she and her mother Adoracion disposed of the same.
A team of police investigators, including PO1 Santiago Roldan, Jr. of the Counter-Intelligence
Group, invited Pacita and Adoracion to Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation in
connection with Jovita’s complaint. Pacita arrived in Camp Crame without counsel and gave
a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold Jovita’s jewelry.
On August 23, 1992, Pacita gave a sworn statement to PO1 Roldan, Jr., admitting that she
sold one pair of heart-shaped earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-
shaped diamond ring, and one ring "with big and small stones" to "Mang Erning" of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, for the total price of P50,000 to cover the cost of her father’s
operation and for food. When asked about the full name of the person to whom the jewelry
was sold, Pacita replied that she knew him only as "Mang Erning."
Pacita accompanied a group of five police officers, which included SPO1 Dremio Peralta and
PO1 Roldan, Jr. to the shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the
"Mang Erning" who had purchased the jewelry from her. The policemen alighted from their
vehicle and invited the petitioner for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon his insistence, the
petitioner was brought to the police station of Meycauayan, Bulacan. When they were at the
police station, the petitioner, in the presence of SPO4 Valdez, offered an amount of P5,000 to
the policemen as a bribe, for them not to implicate him in the case. PO1 Roldan, Jr. rejected
the offer.12 They again invited the petitioner to go with them to Camp Crame, but the
petitioner refused and demanded that the policemen first secure a warrant for his arrest
should they insist on taking him with them.13
Nevertheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft in the Regional Trial Court of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76.14 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2005. Adoracion
was also charged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1992. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
Meanwhile, Jovita succeeded in convincing Macario to testify against the petitioner, assuring
him that he would not be prosecuted for violation of P.D. No. 1612. Macario agreed to testify
against the petitioner.
PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta executed a joint affidavit on their investigation.
On September 1, 1992, Jovita executed a sworn statement in the office of the police station
of Meycauayan, Bulacan, charging the petitioner of buying stolen jewelry worth P655,000.15 A
criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1612 was filed in the
Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-13841.
During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario testified that they sold a set of
earrings, bracelet and two rings to the petitioner for P50,000 at his shop in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. According to Pacita, she found the jewelry belonging to Jovita while she was
cleaning the room in the house, and that she brought the jewelry home.16 The court found
probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for his arrest.
On June 23, 1993, an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor with the RTC
charging the petitioner with violating P.D. No. 1612.
In the meantime, on August 20, 1993, judgment was rendered by the RTC of San Mateo,
Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, finding Pacita guilty of theft and
Adoracion guilty of fencing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable doubt. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases,
as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 2005, finding accused Pacita Linghon y Liza GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, as defined and penalized under Art. 308 in
relation to Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing her to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of Nine (9) years and Four (4) months of prision mayor as
minimum to Eighteen (18) years, Two (2) months and Twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal as maximum, to return to complainant Jovita Rodriguez the unrecovered
stolen pieces of jewelry subject of this case and if restitution is not possible, to
indemnify the said complainant in the amount of P1,300,000.00; and to pay the costs.
2. In Crim. Case No. 1992, finding accused Adoracion Linghon y Liza GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of PD 1612, otherwise known as
the Anti-Fencing Law, and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12)
years of prision mayor; to indemnify complainant Jovita Rodriguez in the amount
of P45,000.00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.17
The Case for the Petitioner
The petitioner testified that he was a resident of Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. He had a
shop located at Pacheco Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, where he bought and sold
jewelry. He had been in this business since 1980.18 He did not transact with Pacita regarding
Jovita’s missing jewels.19 In fact, he did not even know Jovita and met her only during the
preliminary investigation of the case before the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He, likewise,
denied knowing Pacita Linghon, and claimed that he first saw her when she accompanied
some policemen in civilian clothes to his shop, where he was thereafter invited to Camp
Crame for investigation.20 He saw Pacita again only during the preliminary investigation of the
case.21 The petitioner also averred that he had no transaction with Macario of whatever
nature.22
The petitioner further testified that when the policemen in civilian clothes approached him in
his shop, they asked who "Mang Erning" was, as the sign in his shop carried such name.
When he responded to the question, the policemen identified themselves as members of the
police force. The petitioner then gave them his full name.23 When the policemen invited him
for questioning, he refused at first. Eventually, he agreed to be interrogated at the municipal
hall, where the policemen insisted on bringing him to Camp Crame. He told them that he
would go with them only if they had a warrant of arrest.24 He denied ever offering any bribe to
the policemen.25
On November 29, 1995, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1612. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Pres.
Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the
latter.
2. Ordering the accused to pay to private complainant Jovita Rodriguez the
corresponding value of the subject items of jewelries (sic):
one (1) pair of earrings, heart P400,000.00
shaped
one (1) white gold bracelet 150,000.00
one (1) diamond ring 100,000.00
one (1) ring with diamond 5,000.00
TOTAL VALUE P655,000.00
with 6% interest on all amounts due from the filing of the information on June 23,
1993 until said amounts have been fully paid.
SO ORDERED.26
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals contending that:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE ALL HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING ON THE CONTRADICTING
TESTIMONY (sic) OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF A
PROSECUTION WITNESS AS TO THE ALLEGED ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S
OFFER OF BRIBE WITHOUT SHOW OF MONEY.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.27
On December 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.28
The Present Petition
In the present recourse, petitioner Ernesto Francisco asserts that:
The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1612,
otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the conflicting testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, all of which consisted of hearsay evidence. 29
The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt. He avers that the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the
jewelry subject of the charge, and that Macario sold the said pieces of jewelry to him. He,
likewise, posits that the prosecution failed to present Pacita as its witness to prove that she
stole the pieces of jewelry and sold the same to him, and to adduce in evidence the jewelry
allegedly sold to him. He contends that the testimonies of Macario and PO1 Roldan, Jr., on
his investigation of Jovita’s complaint for theft, are hearsay evidence. The appellant argues
that assuming that Macario sold the subject jewelry to him, Macario had no personal
knowledge that the same belonged to Jovita. The petitioner avers that the testimony of
Macario, the principal witness of the prosecution, is inconsistent on substantial matters;
hence, should not be given credence and probative weight.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the prosecution
was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged. It asserts that the first element was
proved through Pacita’s conviction for theft in Criminal Case No. 2005; the second element
was shown to exist with moral certainty via the testimony of Macario identifying the petitioner
as the one who bought the subject pieces of jewelry, corroborated by the testimony of PO1
Roldan, Jr.; and, the third element was proven by evidence showing that the petitioner had
been in the business of buying and selling jewelry for a long period of time, and that he had
the expertise to know the correct market price of the jewelry he purchased from Macario and
Pacita. The OSG asserts that the petitioner must have been put on his guard when the
subject pieces of jewelry worth P655,000 were sold to him for only P50,000.30 It contends that
the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses referred to by the
petitioner were minor, and could not be made as a basis to disregard the trial court’s findings
of facts, which are entitled to great respect and credit.31
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft
has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission
of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells
or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything
of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the
part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.32 Fencing is malum prohibitum,
and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession
by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property.33 The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It
is merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to
prove the crime of fencing.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the requisite
quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject
jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of her then employer. Jovita testified on her
ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the
cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Branch 76, in
Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not constitute proof against him in this
case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. There is no showing that the said decision
in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already final and executory when the trial court rendered its
decision in the instant case.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution
proved the same beyond reasonable doubt based on the testimony of Jovita during the trial in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that Pacita had confessed to Jovita that she sold some
of the jewelry to the petitioner; the joint affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their
investigation of the complaint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said
investigation; the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the testimonies of
Pacita and her brother Macario during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-
13841 before the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the transcripts of the stenographic notes
taken during the proceedings; the supplemental sworn statement of Pacita on August 23,
1992 in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and, the testimony of Macario before the trial court.
However, we find and so hold that –
First. Jovita’s testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita had confessed to
her that she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in evidence
against the latter to prove the truth of the said admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner
was not a party in the said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only parties to a
case are bound by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment of said case.34 Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in the said criminal cases
during the trial in the court a quo. The prosecution did not present Pacita as witness therein
to testify on the admission she purportedly made to Jovita; hence, the petitioner was not able
to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is that the acts or declarations of a person are not
admissible in evidence against a third party. 35
Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-
13841, as well as her supplemental affidavit, is, likewise, inadmissible against the petitioner
since Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. The petitioner was, thus, deprived of his
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine a witness against him.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on August 23, 1992, Pacita pointed to the
petitioner, while the latter was having a drinking spree, as the person who bought the subject
jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence against the petitioner. It is, likewise,
corroborative of the testimony of Macario. However, such testimony is admissible only to
prove such fact - that Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold the
subject jewelry; it is inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacita’s declaration to the policemen,
that the petitioner was the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It must be stressed that
the policemen had no personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more importantly, Pacita did
not testify in the court a quo. Indeed, the petitioner was deprived of his right to cross-examine
Pacita on the truth of what she told the policemen.
Court
q According to you, you were "nalilito" but you gave the correct answer, you are not
"nalilito" here but you gave the wrong answer. Bakit ganoon, sabi mo nalilito ka roon
(sic) pero ang sagot mo pala tama. Dito hindi ka naman nalilito, bakit mali. Bakit ka
nalilito eh tama iyong P25,000.00. Hindi ka nalilito, mali ang sabi mo.

Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary investigation of a Because I am scare[d] here that’s why I gave the wrong answer.
Criminal Case No. 92-13841 is admissible in evidence against the petitioner since he testified
for the prosecution and was cross-examined on his testimony during the preliminary
q You better think about it.
investigation.
a I was confused, Sir.37
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner purchased the jewelry
from Macario and Pacita are the following: the testimony and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.;
and, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary investigation and trial in the court a quo. The testimonies of Macario are even contrary to the averments of the Information, that the
petitioner received the said jewelry from Pacita.
Although the well-entrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient on
which to anchor a judgment of conviction, it is required that such testimony must be credible Assuming, for the nonce, that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry from Macario, there is
and reliable.36 In this case, we find the testimony of Macario to be dubious; hence, barren of no evidence on record that the petitioner knew that they were stolen. Significantly, even
probative weight. Macario did not know that the jewelry was stolen. He testified that his sister Pacita told him
before he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that they belonged to a friend of hers.
Macario admitted when he testified in the court a quo that his testimony during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841 and his testimony in the court a quo Atty. Lerio
were inconsistent. He even admitted that some portions of his testimony on direct
examination in the court a quo were inconsistent with his testimony on cross-examination and Q At that time you and your sister sold those jewels to "Mang Erning" did … do you
on re-direct examination. These admissions are buttressed by the records of the case, which know already [that] it was Mrs. Rodriguez who is the owner of those jewels?
show that such inconsistencies pertained to material points and not merely to minor matters.
Thus, during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841, Macario admitted A No, Sir, I do not know.
that on October 10, 1991, he and his sister Pacita sold two rings and one bracelet to the
petitioner for P25,000, while in November 1991, he and Pacita sold a pair of earrings to the Q And who do you know was the owner of that jewels and that time you and your
petitioner for P25,000. On direct examination in the court a quo, Macario testified that he and sister sold those jewels to "Mang Erning"?
Pacita sold the earrings to the petitioner in May 1992, not in November 1991, and only
for P18,000. On cross-examination, Macario testified that he and his sister Pacita went to the
A According to my sister, it is (sic) owned by a friend of hers.
petitioner’s shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan and sold the subject jewelry on both occasions. On
further cross-examination, Macario changed his testimony anew, and declared that he sold
the jewelry to the petitioner for P18,000 and not P25,000; only to change his testimony again, Court
and declare that he sold the jewelry for P25,000. However, Macario testified during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841 that when he transacted with the Q How did you come to know of this "Mang Erning?"
petitioner for the second time, he was with a friend, and not with his sister Pacita. On redirect
examination, Macario declared that in October 1991, he and Pacita sold four (4) pieces of A Only at that time when we brought the jewels.
jewelry, namely, two rings, one bracelet and a pair of earrings, contrary to his testimony on
direct examination. He also testified that he and his sister sold the earrings in November Q But previous to that, do you know him?
1991. Because of the contradicting accounts made by Macario, the court made the following
observations:
A No.38
Macario learned, after the case against Pacita had already been filed in the trial court, that
the jewelry was, after all, owned by Jovita. However, he failed to inform the petitioner that the
said jewelry was stolen. Following is the testimony of Macario:
Atty. Lerio
Q When you learned that those jewels were owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, did you, if at
all, informed (sic) "Mang Erning" about it?
Court
Q No basis, when did you come to know that the jewels belong to Mrs. Rodriguez?
A In 1992, when my sister already had a case.
Q What did you do when you come (sic) to know about that?
A I was not able to do anything but just to help my sister with her case and also to
help the case of Mrs. Rodriguez.
Atty. Lerio
Q After that, after knowing that these jewels are (sic) owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, was
there any occasion where you (sic) able to inform "Mang Erning" that those jewels
were owned by Mrs. Rodriguez?
A No more, I have no more time.39
The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the petitioner should have known which
pieces of jewelry were stolen, considering that Macario was selling the same for P50,000
when the said pieces stolen from Jovita were alleged to be worth P655,000. This is so
because the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove the value of
the said stolen articles. The prosecution relied solely on the bare and uncorroborated
testimony of Jovita, that they were worth P655,000:
Atty. Lerio
Q Now, will you tell this Court some of those jewels which you own?
A I own several jewels and the one (sic) in question are: 1-pair of earrings, diamond
heart-shaped P400,000.00; 1-ring, heart-shaped diamond worth P100,000.00; 1-
bracelet, white gold full of stones, diamond worth P150,000.00; 1-diamond ring with
small stones worth P5,000.00. So, all in all, the jewelry is (sic) worth P665,000.00.40
When asked by the trial court to declare the present market value of the stolen jewelry, Jovita
merely declared:
Atty. Lerio
Q Now again, when did you acquire those jewels if you can still remember?
A I remember several years ago when my husband is (sic) alive.
Court
Q Please tell the court, [is] the market value of the jewels the same today?
A No, that is (sic) the market value several years ago.
Q So, can you explain [if] the market value, more or less, [is] the same today?
A No. The price, if we will appraise now, is much bigger.41
When required by the petitioner, through counsel, to bring to the court any receipts reflecting
the price of the pieces of jewelry to show that she purchased the same, Jovita answered that
she had no such receipts. Thus:
Court
Q You bought it from [a] private person?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Bernal
Q What then is your proof that you bought these jewelries (sic) from a private
person?
Atty. Lerio
That was already answered, Your Honor. She said, no receipt.42
In People v. Paraiso,43 we cited our ruling in People v. Marcos44 that an ordinary witness
cannot establish the value of jewelry, nor may the courts take judicial notice of the value of
the same:
 …[A]nd as we have ruled in the case of People vs. Antonio Marcos, an ordinary
witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can only take judicial
notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry is not a matter of public
knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of
receipts or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving valuation made by
the prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for the stolen jewelry. 45
It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that
the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from
which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him
were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of
the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for
the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will fix
the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v. Dator:46
In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed
the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the attendant
circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes, this
Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen
property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to
theft involving the value of P5.00.47
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19110 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED
of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46432 May 17, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TEODORICO MARTIN, defendant-appellant.
Demetrio B. Encarnacion for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
The appellant Teodorico Martin was sentenced in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the
crime of abduction to the penalty of fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, having commenced to serve this sentence on January 17, 1917. On February 5,
1923, after having served eight years , one month and seventeen days, leaving still unserved
six years, six months and fourteen days, he was pardoned on condition that he should not
again be found guilty of any crime punishable by the laws of the Philippines. Subsequently
the appellant was tried for the crime of attempted robbery in band with physical injuries and
sentenced, by final judgment dated October 27, 1932, to pay a fine of 330 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The appellant is charged with a violation of the condition of his pardon for having committed
the crime for which he was sentenced on October 27, 1932. The Court of First Instance of
Rizal, which took cognizance of this case, found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty which was remitted in the pardon, namely, six years, six months and fourteen days
of reclusion temporal.
It is the alleged that the Court of First Instance of Cavite, and not that of Rizal, had jurisdiction
to take cognizance of this case. We find no merit in this contention. While the Court of First
Instance of Cavite was the one which imposed on the appellant the penalty of which he was
subsequently pardoned, nevertheless the violation of the conditions of that pardon, which is
the subject matter of the present prosecution, took place in the Province of Rizal. The present
proceeding is not a continuation or a part of the former one. It is a new proceeding, complete
in itself and independent of the latter. It refers to other subsequent facts which the law (art.
159 of the Revised Penal Code) punishes as a distinct crime the penalty for which is not
necessarily that remitted by the pardon.
The prescription of the violation is another defense put up by the appellant. He contends that
this violation being punished with prision correccional in its minimum degree which should be
imposed in its medium period, that is, from one year, one month and eleven days to one year,
eight months and twenty days (art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code), it prescribes after four
years under section 1 of Act No. 3585. This Act provides:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in

such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for
offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ..

We likewise find no merit in this defense. In the first place, the penalty prescribed for the
violation is not that of prision correccional in its minimum grade, but the penalty remitted by
the pardon. Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision

correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict, who, having
been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such
pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of
his original sentence.

In the case at bar the penalty remitted was six years, six months and fourteen days, or more
than six years. The appellant's contention that there should be deducted from this remitted
penalty the allowance of time provided in article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, is unsound.
This allowance is given in consideration of the good conduct of the prisoner while serving his
sentence. Not having served this remitted penalty, there is no reason for the allowance,
namely, the good conduct of the appellant while serving his sentence. The penalty imposable
for the violation being more than six years, this does not prescribe after four years, but after
eight, under the aforesaid Act No. 3585 the pertinent portion of which has been quoted.

Moreover, the violation in question is penalized by the Revised Penal Code (art. 159
aforesaid), which is not a special law, and the prescription thereof, as regulated by article 90
of the same Code, is ten years.

Wherefore, the period of eight years not having elapsed from the time appellant was found
guilty of the crime of attempted robbery in band with injuries by final judgment rendered on
October 27, 1932, nor from the time he committed this crime on October 27, 1930, the
violation of the conditions of his pardon with which he is charged, has not prescribed either
Act No. 3585 or under the Revised Penal Code.

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.