Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an
Any public officer or employee, or any
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
Independent civil action - one that is brought
distinctly and separately from a criminal case
allowed for consideration of public policy.
Here, the obligation does not arise from a crime, but
from some other act i.e. contract, legal duty.
RULE 111 Prosecution of Civil Action
SECTION 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions.
— (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the (1) offended party waives
the civil action, (2) reserves the right to institute it
separately or (3) institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Instances when the law grants an Independent Civil
Action:
1. Art. 32 – breach of constitutional and other
rights
2. Art. 33 – defamation, fraud, physical injuries
3. Art. 34 – refusal or failure of city or municipal
police to give protection
4. Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2177 – quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
Example:
Due to the A’s reckless imprudence, his jeepney
bumped into another vehicle, causing his passenger
B’s death. While the criminal case is pending or if A
is acquitted, a civil action against the jeepney owner
can be instituted. (Jeepney owner can be held liable
with a passenger for breach of Contract of Carriage).
Art. 32.
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages: (DRWSS-DECSA-CMBIP-HAWP)
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without
due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private
property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and
correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude
in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity
or reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and
unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not
been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether
or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable
from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Example:
A is an employee of B, when A decides to resign, B
did not allow, thereby causing A to render
involuntary servitude. B can be held liable for
damages as B violated A’s constitutional rights.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
a.) Defamation – libel, slander of intrigue against
honor
b.) Fraud - estafa or swindling
c.) Physical injuries – all injuries as long as there
was physical injury.
Two kinds of Torts:
1. One which is done maliciously or
intentionally.
2. Culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict – based on
negligence.
“The independent civil action of damages arising
from physical injuries under Art. 33 may be brought
by the offended party even if he had not reserved the
right to file the same in the criminal case for the same
injuries.
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police
force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to
any person in case of danger to life or property, such
peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily
responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.
- The city or municipality concerned will be
subsidiarily liable in case of the officer’s
insolvency.
- Not applicable to PNP and to National
Government.
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a
criminal offense, charges another with the same, for
which no independent civil action is granted in this
Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace
finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney
refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages
against the alleged offender. Such civil action may
be supported by a preponderance of evidence.
Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant
in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an
information should be presented by the prosecuting
attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the
termination of the criminal proceedings.
- No independent civil action and not related to
tort.
Example:
A alleges that B took his car, A can file for civil case
for damages through preponderance of evidence.
The court may require A to file a bond to pay B in
case if the former’s allegation was found to be with
no grounds. During the pendency of the civil action,
if evidences arised and presented by the prosecuting
attorney, the civil case shall be suspended until
decision of the criminal case has been obtained.
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be
decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules
of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate
and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions
of this Code.
RULE 111 Prosecution of Civil Action
SECTION 6. Suspension by Reason of Prejudicial
Question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action
at any time before the prosecution rests.
SECTION 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. —
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Another requisite in the book:
c. Jurisdiction to try, said question must be lodged in
another tribunal
Prejudicial question – there must be a civil case and
a criminal case, an issue that is raised in the civil
case, but is material/determinative in the criminal
case as the issue will prove the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Now necessary that civil case must be filed against
the criminal case.
Example: Case of bigamy
A forced B, a married woman to marry him, B sued
A for annulment of her marriage to A. A filed to a
case of bigamy against B. On the other hand, B
argued that the annulment for the second marriage
should be decided first as that was a prejudicial
question.
It is a prejudicial question as it will be material for the
determination of B’s guilt or innocence of the crime
of bigamy.
PERSONS
Title 1 – CIVIL PERSONALITY
Persons – any being, natural or artificial, capable of
possessing legal rights and obligations.
Kinds of Persons:
1. Natural – human beings created by God,
through the intervention of parents.
2. Juridical – those created by law (i.e.
corporation, partnership)
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Juridical capacity – fitness to be the subject of legal
relations
Capacity to act – the power to do acts with legal
effect.
Example:
An infant has the judicial capacity to inherit the
properties of his parents, but has no capacity yet to
act, such as to enter into a contract of sales.
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction
are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.
Restrictions of Capacity to Act
a. Minority – below 18, needs parental consent
before he can enter into ordinary contract, if
he entered into contract in his own capacity,
the contract is deemed voidable, means
valid, until subsequently annulled.
b. Insanity – a condition in which a person’s
mind is sick.
Imbecility – feeble-mindedness, or a
condition in which a person thinks like a small
child.
c. State of being deaf-mute - may either be
sane or insane, he may make a will but
cannot be a competent witness to a notarial
will.
d. Prodigality – state of squandering money or
property with a morbid desire to prejudice the
 heirs of a person; incapable of managing
their affairs in cases of bad conduct.
e. Civil interdiction – deprivation of the court of
a person’s right:
1. To have parental or marital
authority.
2. To be the guardian of the person
and property of a ward.
3. To dispose of his property by an
act inter vivos (he cannot donate,
for this is an act inter vivos, but
he can make a will, for this is a
disposition mortis causa.)
4. To manage his own property (the
penalty of civil interdiction is
given to a criminal punished by
imprisonment for 12 years ane
one day or more)
Easement – right to use the property of
another for a specific purpose.
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others,
modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of
these circumstances are governed in this Code,
other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws.
Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious
belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over,
is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases
specified by law.
Art. 38 – restrictions on capacity to act
Art. 39 – includes circumstances that modify
capacity to act.
Family relations – a man cannot marry his mother,
sister or any relative; obligation to give support to his
family and give their children their legitime.
Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property
which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved
it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory
heirs
Alienage – i.e. an alien cannot acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including those residential
in nature, except through hereditary succession;
alien cannot practice law or medicine; cannot be
vote or voted for public office.
Absence – absence of a person for several years
would subject his property to administration by order
of the court although his capacity co act is not
limited.
Married woman – married woman, 18 years of age
or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in
cases specified by law. (Disposition of conjugal
properties, etc.)
NATURAL PERSONS
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following
article.
Personality begins at the moment of conception
(presumptive personality).
Actual personality – really commences at birth.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered
born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had
an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is
not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours
after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Two kinds of Children:
1. Ordinary – with intra-uterine life of at least
seven months (mere birth is sufficient).
2. Extraordinary – with intra- uterine life less
than seven months (the child must have lived
for at least 24 hours after its complete
delivery from the maternal womb).
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by
death.
The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by
law, by contract and by will.
Civil personality is extinguished by death.
Civil interdiction merely restricts capacity to act.
Effect of death is determined by:
A. Law – if a person be made a voluntary heir in
the will of another and he dies before the
testator, he cannot be represented by his
own heirs.
B. Contract
C. Will
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more
persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, whoever alleges the death
of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the
same time and there shall be no transmission of
rights from one to the other.
That except for purposes of succession, when two
persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck,
battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died
first, and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, the survivorship is
determined from the probabilities resulting from the
strength and age of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
RULE 131
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the
older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is
deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty,
the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex
be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if
the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other
between those ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived.
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for
public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for
private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that
of each shareholder, partner or member.
Private corporation – begins to exist as a juridical
person from the moment a certificate of
incorporation is granted to it. Certificate is issued
upon filing the articles of incorporation with the SEC.
Art. 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more
persons bind themselves to contribute money, property,
or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing
the profits among themselves.
Two or more persons may also form a partnership
for the exercise of a profession.
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2
of the preceding article are governed by the laws
creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general
application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships.
Nationality – place of incorporation
A corporation has a legal personality separate and
distinct from those who run or operate it.
This means that, in general, the corporation’s
liabilities are its own, not those of its directors, officer
and employees.
A corporation even if incorporated here, cannot
acquire right to acquire land and natural resources,
unless 60% of its capital is Philippine-owned.
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess
property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and
bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the
laws and regulations of their organization.
Rights:
1. To acquire and possess property of all kinds.
2. To incur obligations.
3. To bring civil or criminal actions.
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations,
institutions and other entities for public interest or
purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their
property and other assets shall be disposed of in
pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If
nothing has been specified on this point, the property
and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes
for the benefit of the region, province, city or
municipality which during the existence of the
institution derived the principal benefits from the
same.

56. H was married to a wealthy woman, W. Without
any justifiable cause, W abandoned H and left for the
US where she secured a decree of absolute divorce.
Later, she got married again. Is there a right now for
H to proceed against her for moral damages on the
ground that her acts are contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy?
ANS: Yes, H has a right to proceed against W for
moral damages on the ground that the acts of the
latter are contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy. In Tenchaves vs. Escano (15 !A 355,
17 SCRA 674), a case with a factual setting similar
to of the above problem, the SC held that the acts of
the wife in not plying with her wifely duties, deserting
her husband without justifiable cause, leaving for the
US in order to secure a decree ) solute divorce, and
finally getting married again are acts which titute a
willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy for :h No. 10 of Art. 2219 of the NCC
authorizes an award for moral ages.
57. X, a Chinese married to Y, became a close friend
l and B because of the similarity of their family name,
the pretext of teaching C, a daughter of A and B, how
ray the rosary, he was able to win the love of the
young and as a result, the two (2) conducted a
clandestine love ir. When A learned of the love affair,
the latter told X that nust never see C again. The
affair, however, continued, later, C, who had been
sent by her parents to live with brothers and sisters
in Quezon City, disappeared, sequently, A and B
brought this action to recover moral Lages against X
based on Arts. 21 and 2219 of the NCC. the action
prosper? Reasons.
ANS: Yes, the action will prosper. In Cecilio Pe, et
al. vs. Alfonso > SCRA 200), a case with similar
facts, the Supreme Court held the defendant has
committed an injury to C’s family in a manner rary to
morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated ?t. 21 of the NCC and for which moral
damages may be recovered ir Art. 2219 of the same
Code. The circumstances under which .ed to win C’s
affection cannot but lead to any other conclusion .
that it was he who, through an ingenious scheme or
trickery, ced the latter to the extent of making her fall
in love with him. he pretext of teaching her how to
pray the rosary, he was able equent the house of
plaintiff. Because of this clever strategy, he able to
win the love of the young girl and to have illicit
relations her. The wrong he has caused her and her
family is indeed measurable considering that he is a
married man. Verily, he has nitted an act which is
actionable under Art. 21 of the NCC.
58, V and W, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954
as the big day. On September 2, V left a note for his
bride-to-be postponing the wedding on the ground
that his mother was opposed to the wedding.
Thereafter, he was not heard of again.
Subsequently, W brought an action against V for
moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees
basing her action on Arts. 21, 2208, 2219 and 2232
of the NCC. Will the action prosper?
ANS: Yes, the action will prosper. Ordinarily, a mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the
erring promissor must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC.
When breach of promise to marry is actionable
under Art. 21 of the NCC, such as in the instant case,
moral damages may be awarded under Art.
2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may
also be awarded under Art. 2232 of said Code. Since
exemplary damages maybe awarded, attorney’s
fees may also be awarded under Art. 2208 of said
Code. (Wassmer us. Velez, 12 SCRA 648.)
59. The complaint alleges that: (1) from December
1957, M courted W, both being of adult age; (2) M
expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for W who also in due time reciprocated; (3)
in consideration of M’s promise of marriage, W
consented and acceded to M’s pleas for carnal
knowledge; (4) regularly until December 1959,
through his protestations of love and promise of
marriage, M succeeded in having carnal access to
W, as a result of which the latter conceived a child;
(5) due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, she had to
resign her job; (6) due to defendant’s refusal to
marry her, as promised, she has suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock and social humiliation. Is W entitled to
moral damages?
ANS: The fact stands out that for one year, from
1958 to 1959 the plaintiff, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such uct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly,
there is voluntariness and mutual passion; for had
the plaintiff been believed, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, art- ersuasions
and wiles of defendant, she would not have again ed
to his embraces, much less for one year without
exacting r fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have hort all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not into fulfill his
promises. Hence, no case is made under Art. 21 of
STCC. There can be no possible basis, therefore, for
an award of il damages to W. (Tanjanco vs. CA, 18
SCRA 994J
60. “A” courted “B,” a beautiful 25-year old girl.
Because Vs” persistence and repeated promises to
marry her, she mitted her body to him. After “A” had
satisfied his lust, he ime indifferent to the girl. Finally,
he refused to comply i his promise notwithstanding
her demands. “B” filed iction against “A” for moral,
temperate and exemplary lages, alleging that she
had been seduced by defendant’s e promises to
marry her, and that she suffered “social liliation,
mental anguish,' besmirched reputation, mded
feelings and moral shock.” Is “B’s” action tenable?
son. (1982)
ANS: “B’s’'' action is tenable. It must be observed
that “A’s” are clearly willful in character and, at the
same time, contrary lorals, good custom and public
policy. Under the NCC, she is tied to moral,
temperate and exemplary damages. Of course, it -t
be noted that breach of promise to marry is not
actionable. 5 is well-settled. But then, it must also be
noted that “B’s” action tunded not on “A’s” breach of
his promise to marry but on the or quasi-delict
committed by him. It is clear that everything , he did,
including his promise to marry “B,” were done
precisely me purpose — to satisfy his lust. Under the
NCC, such acts are onable.
[Note: The above answer is based on Art. 21 of the
NCC in relation to pertinent provision of the Code
under the law on damages. If the bar candidate
bases his or her answer on Tanjanco vs. CA, 18
SCRA 994, supra, he or she should properly be
credited, provided that the conditions set forth in said
case are presented.)
61, Are interferences with the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of a neighbor or any other
person actionable?
ANS: Yes they are actionable. This is clear from Art.
26 of the NCC, which provides:
“Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:
“(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
“(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
“(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from
his friends;
“(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition ”
62. The wife of a doctor ransacked her husband’s
clinic and seized documents consisting of private
correspondence between her husband and his
alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, her husband’s passport, and
photographs, for use in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which she had filed against him. Are the documents
admissible in evidence?
ANS: No. The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband’s infidelity) who is the party against, whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception is if there is a lawful order or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or right to privacy as
an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
lable to him or to her. (Zulueta vs. CA and Martin,
G.R, No. 383, February 26, 1996, S.C. 2nd Div., J.
Mendoza.)
63. Is alienation of affection, actionable? Explain.
ANS: Yes, the actionable character of this tort is now
recognized Lrt. 26 of the NCC. According to No. 2 of
this article, meddling i or disturbing the family
relations of another shall produce a se of action for
damages, prevention and other relief. Among the lily
relations protected is the relation between husband
and wife; sequently, any willful interference with
such relation resulting he alienation of the affection
of the husband or the wife, whether h interference
constitutes a criminal offense or not, would be ficient
to produce a cause of action for damages.
64. Is the refusal or neglect of a public employee to
"form his official duty actionable? Explain.
ANS: Yes, the refusal or neglect of a public
employee to perform official duty is actionable. This
is clear from the provision of Art. of the NCC.
However, in order that a public employee may be d
liable under this article, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) There must be a refusal or neglect of public
servant or ployee to perform his official duty; in other
words, there must be lfeasance, not malfeasance or
misfeasance;
(2) The refusal or neglect must be without just cause;
(3) The duty must be ministerial, not discretionary;
and
(4) The plaintiff must have suffered some material or
moral is as a result.
65. Under Art. 32 of the NCC, any public officer or
em- oyee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly istructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or im> lirs the rights and liberties of another
person is liable to e latter for damages. Suppose that
the public officer hap- ms to be a judge and the
obstruction, violation or impairment was effected
while he was exercising his functions as a judge, can
he be held liable for damages?
ANS: As a general rule, he cannot be held liable.
This is clear from the provision of the last paragraph
of Art. 32 of the NCC, which declares that “the
responsibility set forth is not demandable from a
judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.”
(Note: In Aberca, et ah vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590, the
SC ruled:
“It is obvious that the purpose of Art. 32 of the NCC
is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished
rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution. Its
message is clear. No man may seek to violate those
sacred rights with impunity. In times of great
upheaval or of social and political stress, when the
temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the
words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the
law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic
rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to the transient needs or imperoua
demand of the ruling power. The rule of law must
prevail, or else liberty will perish.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs
complaint, the respondents postulate the view that
as public officers, they are covered by the mantle of
state immunity from suit for acts done in the
performance of official duties. We find respondents’
invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit
totally misplaced. The cases invoked by
respondents actually involved acts done by officers
in the performance of official duties within the' ambit
of their power. The fact that respondents as
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
were merely responding to their duty cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving
commission untramelled by any constitutional
restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights
and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the constitution.)
66. ABC, Inc. has the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official Boy Scout uniforms and supplies.
ABC, Inc. was informed that DEF was selling Boy
Scout paraphernalia. XYZ, an employee of ABC,
Inc., together with constabulary men, entered DEF’s
store and seized the Boy Scout paraphernalia
therein without a warrant. ABC, Inc. filed a complaint
for unfair competition against DEF. The complaint
was dismissed by the Provincial Fiscal. DEF then 3d
an action for damages. Is ABC, Inc. liable for
damages ;hough it did not actually participate in the
unlawful seizure?
ANS: Yes, ABC, Inc. may not have actually
participated in i search, but it was indirectly
responsible therefor. As early as ; case of Lim vs. De
Leon (66 SCRA 299), the SC allowed for ; recovery
of damages for violation of constitutional rights and
srties from public officer or private individual under
Art. 32 of the 1C. The wrong may be civil or criminal
where malice or bad faith lot necessary. Art. 32
speaks of an officer and employee or person ectly or
indirectly responsible for violation of the
constitutional hts and liberties of another. It is not the
actor alone who must swer for damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 compasses
within the ambit of its provisions those directly as
well indirectly responsible for its violations. (MHP
Garments, Inc. vs. , 236 SCRA 227, citing Aberca
vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590.)
67. Can a police officer who refuses or fails to render
[ or protection in case of danger to life or property,
be held liable?
ANS: Yes, he can be held liable. According to Art. 34
of the NCC, len a member of a city or municipal
police force refuses or fails ender aid or protection to
any person in case of danger to life, or perty, such
peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and city or municipality shall be subsidiarily
responsible therefor.”
68. J (a) When the accused in a criminal action is
[uittecl, can a civil action for damages for the same
act or ission still be instituted by the aggrieved party?
(b) What are the different instances where the NCC
ints to the injured party a right to institute a civil
action damages based on an act or omission which
constitutes riminal offense but is entirely separate
and independent m the criminal action?
ANS: (a) This question requires a qualified answer.
If the uittal of the accused is on the ground that his
guilt has not been ved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action to recover damages based on the same
act or omission may still he instituted. (Art. 29, NCC.)
On the other hand, if the acquittal is on the ground
that he did not commit the offense charged, or what
amounts to the same thing, if the acquittal proceeds
from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist,
the subsequent institution of a civil action to recover
damages is, as a general rule, no longer possible.
(See Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000.)
There are, however, two (2) exceptions to this rule.
They are: first, where the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony (Arts. 31, 2177, NCC.);
and second, where the law grants to the injured party
the right to institute a civil action which is entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action. fArfs.
32, 33, 34 and 2176, NCC.)
(b) The injured party has a right to institute a civil
action to recover damages which is based on an act
or omission which constitutes a criminal offense but
is entirely separate and independent from the
criminal action in the following cases: first, where the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony (Art.
31, NCC.), and second, where the law expressly
grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil
action which is entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action. (Arts. 32, 33, 34, NCC.) The second
may be subdivided as follows:
(1) Interference by public officers or employees or by
private individuals with civil rights and liberties (Art.
32, NCC.);
(2) Defamation (Arts. 33, NCC.); (3) Fraud (Ibid.);
(4) Physical injuries (Ibid.); and
(5) Refusal or neglect of a city or municipal police
officer to render aid or protection in case of danger
to life or property. (AH. 34, NCC.)
69. 1 What are the exceptions to the rule provided
by the NCC that once the criminal action has been
commenced, the civil action for damages arising
from the offense charged shall be suspended until
the final termination of the criminal action? (1988)
ANS: The exceptions are as follows:
(1) Where the civil action is based on an obligation
not arising l the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such as when the s of the civil action is culpa
contractual, culpa aquiliana, etc. s. 31, 2177, NCC.)
(2) Where the law grants to the injured party the right
to itute a civil action which is entirely separate and
independent l the criminal action, such as when the
action is based on: (a) rferences by public officers or
employees or by private individuals i civil rights and
liberties; (b) defamation; (c) fraud; (d) physical ries;
or (e) refusal or neglect of a city or municipal police
officer 3nder aid or protection in case of danger to
life or property. (Arts. 33, 34, NCC.)
(3) Where the question to be resolved in the civil
action is udicial to the criminal action. (Art. 36, NCC.)
70. What is meant by a “civil action based on an
igation not arising from a criminal offense” under Art.
31 he NCC?
ANS: We all know that obligations may arise from
law, tracts, quasi-contracts, criminal offenses, or
quasi-delicts. (Art. '7, NCC.) Therefore, when Art. 31
of the NCC speaks of a civil ion based on an
obligation not arising from a criminal offense, it Lply
means a civil action based on an obligation arising
from the r, a contract, a quasi-contract, or a quasi-
delict.
71. A, a passenger in a bus operated by X Co.,
suffered “ions injuries as a result of an accident. An
information s filed against B, driver of the bus, for
serious physical uries through reckless imprudence.
He was, however, quitted on the merits of the case
because according to the Igment of acquittal, he was
not negligent. Subsequently, A stituted an action
against X Co. to recover damages. Will 3 action
prosper? Reasons. (1988)
ANS: If A can prove the negligence of B by
preponderance of dence, the action will prosper. He
can still recover damages from ) operator of the bus
even if the driver had been acquitted in the minal
action because it is clear that the action to recover
damages is based on culpa contractual and not on
the act or omission complained of as a felony.
(Bernaldez vs. Bohol Land Trans. Co., 7 SCRA 276.)
According to Art. 31 of the NCC, when the civil action
is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
72. While delivering gasoline to a certain service
station, A and B, employees of X Co., left their truck
without setting its parking brake. As a consequence,
the vehicle continued to move, resulting in the
burning of the house of C. The two (2) were
subsequently charged with the crime of arson
through reckless imprudence, but were acquitted
because negligence was not proved. C then brought
an action against X Co. to recover damages. The
latter, however, contends that since A and B had
already been acquitted in the criminal case,
therefore, it cannot now be held liable. Is this
correct? Reasons.
ANS: The defendant’s contention is not correct. The
basis of the present action is a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana. Under the law, when the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
(Art. 31, NCC.) This precept is confirmed by Art.
2177 of the NCC which declares that responsibility
arising from a quasi-delict is entirely separate and
distinct from civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. It is, of course, well- settled
that in culpa aquiliana, the liability of an employer for
a quasi-delict committed by an employee is direct
and primary. (Arts. 2176, 2180, NCC; Standard
Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan, 107 Phil. 109.)
73. What is meant by “independent civil actions”
under Arts. 32, 33 and 34 of the NCC?
ANS: The so-called “independent civil actions” under
Arts. 32, 33 and 34 of the NCC refer to the civil
actions based on certain criminal offenses, such as:
(a) interferences by public officers or employees or
by private individuals with civil rights or liberties; (b)
defamation; (c) fraud; (d) physical injuries; or (e)
refusal or neglect of city or municipal police officer to
render aid or protection in case anger to life or
property. According to the Code, such civil action 11
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall lire only a preponderance of evidence.
74. In independent civil actions, when the NCC
declares t-the civil action shall proceed
independently of the minal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance evidence, does that
mean that the civil action is no longer fed on the
criminal offense but on some other source of igation,
such as a tort or quasi-delict? Explain.
ANS: The civil action is still based on the criminal
offense lough it may also be considered as a civil
action based on a tort quasi-delict provided that the
complaint expressly so declares, s is due to the fact
that the civil action is completely separate 1
independent from the criminal action and the fact
that the act amission complained of as a felony may
also be considered as a t or quasi-delict at the same
time.
75. Distinguish the procedure in independent civil
tions based on criminal offenses under Arts. 32, 33
and 34 the NCC, from the procedure in civil actions
which are not lependent, based on other criminal
offenses.
ANS: The procedure in independent civil action may
be itinguished from the procedure in other civil
actions which are t independent in the following
ways: r
(1) In civil actions which are not independent, if the
civil action commenced ahead of the criminal action,
upon the institution of e latter, the former is
suspended. In independent civil actions the tion
continues until it is terminated.
(2) If the criminal action is commenced ahead of the
civil tion and the injured party reserved his right to
institute a civil tion separately, normally, such injured
party shall have to wait r the termination of the
criminal action before he can institute the /il action.
In independent civil actions, he can institute the
action en during the pendency of the criminal action.
(3) If the criminal action is commenced without any
reserva- Dn by the injured party of his right to
institute a eivil action separately, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, and so, if the accused is
acquitted in that he did not commit the offense
charged, normally, the injured party can no longer
institute a civil action to recover damages. In
independent civil actions, it might still be possible for
the offended party to bring a civil action against the
offender provided that he bases it on an obligation
arising from the law, or on a contract, or on a quasi-
contract, or a quasi-delict. (Arts. 31, 2177, NCC.)
76. Can the civil case (on account of fraud) proceed
independently of the criminal case for estafa without
having reserved the filing of the civil action?
ANS: Yes, under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, effective Dec. 1, 2000, there is no more
need for a reservation of the right to file the
independent civil actions under Arts. 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the NCC. According to Justice Herrera, the
reservation and waiver referred to in Sec. 1 of Rule
111 pertains only to the civil action for the recovery
of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
The changes in the Revised Rules pertaining to
independent civil actions which became effective on
December 1, 2000 may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules
of procedure. (DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative,
Inc. vs. Velez, G.R. No. 129282, November 29,
2001.)
77. Can the subsidiary liability of an employer for
libel committed by his employee be proceeded
against thru an independent civil action under Art. 33
of the NCC pending the resolution of the criminal
case?
ANS: No. Art. 33 of the NCC contemplates an action
against the employee in his primary civil liability. It
does not apply to an action against the employer to
enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such
liability arises only after conviction of the employee
in the criminal case or when the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal
action and found to have committed the offense in
the discharge of his duties. Any action brought
against the employer based on its subsidiary liability
before the conviction of employee is premature.
(International Flavors and Fragrance I.], Inc. vs.
Argos, et al., G.R. No. 130362, September 10,
2001.)
78. Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
viction extinguish his civil liability?
ANS: It depends.
(i) The civil liability of the accused will not be
extinguished ases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries.
The claim for civil liability survives, notwithstanding
the death he accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of Lgation other than delict.
Art. 1157 of the NCC enumerates the er sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise: jaw;
b) Contracts; c) Quasi-Contracts; d) Quasi-delicts.
When civil liability survives, an action for recovery
therefore y be pursued, but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and jject to the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure of 2000. (People Bayotas,
236 SCRA 239.)
(ii) The civil liability of the accused will be
extinguished if 3 civil liability arises directly from and
based solely on the offense nmitted or on the act
complained of (e.g., rape).
Sec. 4, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules in Criminal
Procedure of 00 more specifically provides the
following:
“Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death
of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the
civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of
this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may
be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may
be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for
the deceased without requiring the appointment of
an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
(Emphasis supplied)
“The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.
“A final judgment entered in favor of the offended
party shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case
shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil
action the offended party may file against the estate
of the deceased.”
79. Rogelio Bayotas was convicted for the crime of
rape in Roxas City. Pending appeal of his conviction,
Bayotas died. Consequently, the SC, in its resolution
of May 20,1992, dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to
file its comment with regard to Bayotas* civil liability
arising from his commission of the offense charged.
The Solicitor General relied on the case of People
vs. Sendaydiego (81 SCRA 120) expressing the
view that the death of the accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged.
In its opposition, the counsel for the accused,
invoking the ruling of the CA in People vs. Castillo
and Ocfemia, (November 4,1959,56 O.G. No. 23, p.
4045), adopted by the SC in several cases, claims
that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root
in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if the accused should die before final
judgment is rendered.
Decide on the case.
ANS: After re-examining the jurisprudence which
has evolved from the Castillo case to the
Sendaydiego case, the SC reverted to the old ruling
and held that:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwith- nding the death of the accused, if the same
may also be predied on a source of obligation other
than delict. (L. Villegas vs. CA, I. No. 82562, April
11,1997.)
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
No. 2 >ve, an action for recovery therefore may be
pursued but only by y of filing a separate civil action.
This separate civil action may enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate ;he
accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the ne is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
feiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and or to its extinction, the private
offended party instituted together irewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on ?
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the minal case, conformably with
provisions of Art. 1155 of the NCC, at should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible forfeiture right
by prescription.
Applying the above set of rules to the case at bench,
it was Id that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal bility and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, ., rape.
(People vs. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007,
September 2, 94.) This ruling was reiterated in
Mansion Biscuit Corp. vs. CA}
R. No. 94713, November 23,1995.)
80. X, a passenger in a jeepney owned by A and
driven t B, was injured when the jeepney collided
with another epney owned by C and driven by D.
Both B and D were ibsequently charged with the
criminal offense of serious lysical injuries through
reckless imprudence, (a) Since the ;tion for recovery
of damages may be based either on culpa ‘iminal
(Arfs. 200, et seqRevised Penal Code) or on culpa
mtractual (Art. 1759, NCC) and culpa aquiliana (Arts.
2176,
seq., NCC), must X select his cause of action, or
may he avail ; both causes of action simultaneously
or successively? (b) uppose that in the criminal case,
B and D were acquitted on le ground that the real
cause of the accident was the fact that a sand-and-
gravel truck, owned by E and driven by F, bumped
C’s jeepney from behind, may X still proceed against
A and C for recovery of damages based on culpa
contractual and culpa aquiliana?
ANS: (a) X may select his cause of action or he may
avail of both causes of action simultaneously or even
successively. It is now beyond cavil that the act of B.
and D gives rise to at least two (2) separate and
independent liabilities. They are: first, the civil liability
arising from crime (culpa criminal); and second, the
liability arising from civil negligence (culpa
contractual and culpa aquiliana). These two (2)
concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that
exoneration from one does not necessarily result in
exoneration from the other. Adjectively and
substantively, they can be prosecuted separately
and independently of each other, although Art. 2177
of the NCC precludes recovery for damages twice
for the same negligent act or omission. Thus, should
there be varying amounts awarded in two (2)
separate cases, the plaintiff may recover in effect
only the bigger amount. If the plaintiff had already
been ordered paid an amount in one case, and in the
other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall
be entitled in the second case only to the excess
over the one fixed in the first case. But if he has
already been paid a bigger amount in the first case,
he may not recover anymore in the second case,
(Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Padua vs. Robles, 66
SCRA 485.)
(b) X cannot proceed against A and C for recovery
of damages. Whether we look at the case from the
point of view of criminal negligence or of civil
negligence or of independent civil actions, the end
result would be the same. A and B cannot be held
liable. The fact from which any possible liability of
either A or C has already been declared by final
judgment is inexistent.
(Note: This answer is based upon Mendoza vs.
Arrieta. Theoretically, however, under both Arts. 31
and 2177 of the NCC, X may proceed against A and
C regardless of the consequences of the criminal
action. As a matter of fact, this was the rule applied
in Elcano. Is there a conflict then between Elcano
and Mendoza? We do not think so. In Mendoza,
what the SC merely declared is the fact that whether
we look at the case from the point of view of criminal
negligence or civil negligence or independent civil
actions, the end result would be the same. To allow
the complainant to proceed against the defendant
would be a pure exercise in futility.)
81. (a) Is there any exception to the rule regarding
ependent civil actions?
(b) B was charged by A with the criminal offense of
ious physical injuries. During the trial, A was
represented a private prosecutor. There was no
reservation of the ht to institute a separate civil
action. After trial, the court Ldered a decision
acquitting B of the offense charged. Can iow institute
a civil action against B to recover damages
iccordance with Art. 33 of the NCC?
ANS: (a) Yes, there is an exception. According to the
SC in Roa De la Cruz (107 Phil. 8) and Azucena vs.
Potenciano (5 SCRA ), when the offended party not
only fails to reserve the right to a separate civil action
but intervenes actually in the criminal : by appearing
through a private prosecutor for the purpose of
)vering indemnity for damages thereon, a judgment
of acquittal s a subsequent action.
•(b) A cannot institute an action against B to recover
tiages in accordance with Art. 33 of the NCC. True,
the rule is that :ases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries, an independent 1 action may be
brought by the injured party, and that according he
decided cases, a reservation of the right to institute
a separate I action is not necessary, nevertheless,
the act of the offended ty in intervening in the
prosecution of the criminal case by ►earing therein
through a private prosecutor will be deemed to be
aiver of the civil action if he failed to make a
reservation therefor. a vs. De la Cruz, supra.)
82. Are the above answers still applicable?
ANS: It is submitted that they are still applicable
insofar as the .1 liability arising from the crime (culpa
criminal) but not insofar ;he civil liability arising from
the quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana). It st be observed
that the act of B gave rise to two (2) separate and
ependent liabilities — the civil liability arising from
crime and civil liability arising from quasi-delict.
These two (2) liabilities so distinct and independent
from each other that exoneration ii one does not
result in exoneration from the other. Therefore, ;he
above problem, although A can no longer institute an
action against B for recovery of damages under Art.
33 of the NCC, he may still institute said action under
Art. 2177 of the same Code.
83. (a) What is a prejudicial question? What are its
eleihents? What is its effect upon a criminal action?
(1988)
(b) An information for bigamy was filed against A
upon complaint of B alleging that without his
previous marriage having been dissolved, he
contracted a second marriage with the latter. A, in
turn, brought an action against B for the annulment
of their marriage on the ground of violence and
intimidation. Subsequently, he filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case on the
ground that the issue involved in the civil case is a
prejudicial question. The judge denied the motion. Is
this correct?
ANS: (a) A prejudicial question is a question which
arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal,
(People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Jimenez vs.
Averia, 22 SCRA 1380.) The following are the
elements: They are: first, that it must be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case; and second,
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal. (Ibid.) Please note, however, that
Sec. 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure of 2000 more specifically provides for the
following:
“Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question —
The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.”
Its effect upon a criminal case is to suspend it if one
has already been commenced. (Art. 36, NCC.) This
is, of course, the reverse of the ordinary rule of
procedure. The reason for this is that the resolution
of the question is determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
(c) The order of the court denying the motion is not
correct. A prejudicial question is one which arises in
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. In order to be
prejudicial, it is therefore, necessary that the
question must be determinative of the case before
the court and that jurisdiction to try the same must
be lodged in another court. These requisites are
present in the case at bar. Should the question for
annulment of the second marriage prosper on the
ground that A’s consent thereto was obtained by
means of force and intimidation, it is obvious that his
act was involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for bigamy. (Zapanta vs. Montesa, 4
SCRA 510. To the same effect — Merced vs. Diez,
109 Phil. 155.)
(Note: Attention must be called to the case ofPrado
vs. People [133 SCRA 602]. In this case, speaking
through Justice Melencio-Herrera, the SC held that
for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the
civil, the following requisites must be present: [1] the
civil case, involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; [2] in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and [3]
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal. However, attention must likewise
be called to the aforequoted Sec. 7, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000.)
84. Is the resolution of the civil action for specific
performance, recovery of overpayment ofand
damages, a preju- icial question sufficient to warrant
the suspension of the rial of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. 22?
ANS: No. For a civil action to be considered
prejudicial to a riminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings ntil the final
resolution of the civil, the following requisites must
be resent: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those pon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (2) in the esolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or inocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and (3) iris diction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.
The issue in the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
22 is whether the accused knowingly issued
worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for
specific performance, overpayment and damages is
whether the debtor overpaid his obligations to his
creditor. If after trial in the civil case, the debtor is
shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not
follow that he cannot be held liable for the bouncing
checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
to support the checks is itself an offense. (Sabandal
vs. Tongco, G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001.)
85. A, B and C are the heirs of X and Y who left a
parcel of land. A was able to obtain a title over the
lands, so B and C filed an action for declaration of
nullity of the title and partition. They occupied a
portion of the land without A’s knowledge and
consent. Hence, they were sued for violation of P.D.
772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law.
Before they were arraigned, they moved to suspend
the criminal action on the ground of a prejudicial
question.
Is a partition case a prejudicial question to a criminal
case for violation of P.D. 772?
ANS: The motion should be granted on the ground
of a prejudicial question.
In the criminal case, the issue is whether B and C
occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but
to A and against the latter’s will. Whether or not the
land they occupied belongs to them is the issue in
the civil case they previously filed for the nullity of A’s
title and for partition.. The resolution, therefore, of
this question would necessarily be determinative of
B’s and C’s criminal liability for squatting. In other
words, whatever may be the ultimate resolution will
be determinative of the guilt or innocence of B and C
in the criminal case. Surely, if B and C are co-owners
of the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of
squatting because they are much entitled to the use
and occupation of the land as A. Ownership is, thus,
the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the
civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must
in the meantime be suspended. Prior to amendment,
Sec. 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure of 2000 provides that the two (2) jntial
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil
action )lves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines ither or not the
criminal action may proceed. (Apa vs. Fernandez,
No. 112381, March 20,1995, 242 SCRA 509, 513.)
86. A, under duress, married B, During the pendency
he case for annulment filed by A, B married C. The
Fiscal, >n the complaint of C, prosecuted B for
bigamy. Can B cessfully interpose a prejudicial
question to suspend the >secution of the bigamy
charge? Give reasons.
ANS: B cannot successfully interpose a prejudicial
question to pend the prosecution of the bigamy
charge. As held by the SC in pie vs. Aragon (94 Phil.
257), where the nullity of the marriage ue to the fault
of the party who is accused of bigamy, such party ?
not avail himself of his own malfeasance in order to
defeat the on based on his criminal act. Otherwise,
if he is permitted to do that would violate the principle
that in order to obtain redress, a son must go to court
with clean hands.
87. A was charged with bigamy at the instance of his
t wife, B. Subsequently, his second wife, C, filed an
action the annulment of her marriage to A on the
ground of ce and intimidation. By way of defense, A,
in turn, filed a rd-party complaint against his first
wife, B, for annulment their marriage on the ground
of force and intimidation. ;er, he filed a motion to
suspend the criminal case on the >und that the
question to be resolved in the civil case is judicial to
the question of bigamy in the criminal case. 5 court
denied the motion. Is this correct?
ANS: The denial of the motion is correct. The
situation here aarkedly different from the situation in
the cases of Merced vs. z and Zapanta vs. Monteza.
Here, when the accused was indicted bigamy, the
fact that two (2) marriage ceremonies had been
tracted appeared to be undisputable. This was
followed by the iplaint filed by the second spouse for
annulment of the marriage ;he ground of violence
and intimidation. It was only later on when as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against his first spouse for annulment of
their marriage on the ground of force and
intimidation. As a matter of law, parties to a marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of a competent court and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration,
the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. (Landicho vs. Relova, 22 SCRA 731.)
88. The husband filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
of his wife. In her answer the wife alleged it was her
husband who abandoned the conjugal home and
lived with another woman. The wife filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage against her husband and
his mistress. In order to forestall the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the husband filed a motion to defer
criminal proceedings including the issuance of the
warrant. He argued that the case for concubinage
should be suspended until after the petition for nullity
of marriage is decided, in order to avoid two (2)
conflicting decisions. According to him, the trial court
in the civil case might declare the marriage as valid
by dismissing the complaint for concubinage, but in
the criminal case, the trial court might acquit him
because the evidence shows his marriage is void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Is this
argument tenable?
ANS: No, because even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in concubinage. Parties
to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration, the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before his marriage is judicially declared void,
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. (Beltran vs. People, G.R. No. 137567,
SC, 2nd Div., J. Buena, June 20, 2000.)
61
Book I PERSONS
Title I CIVIL PERSONALITY (Arts. 37-47)
1.Define persons.
ANS: In its juridical sense, a “person” may be
defined as a being, ’sical or moral, real or juridical
and legal, which is susceptible of its and obligations,
or of being the subject of legal relations. (2 ichez
Roman 110.)
2. How are persons classified? Distinguish one from
other.
ANS: Persons are classified into natural and juridical
persons. • two (2) may be distinguished from each
other as follows:
(1) A natural person or human being has physical
existence, >reas a juridical person exists only in
contemplation of law.
(2) A natural person is the product of procreation,
whereas a dical person is the product of legal fiction.
3. What is meant by “juridical capacity” and “capacity
to act”? Distinguish one from the other. (1996)
ANS: “Juridical capacity" is the fitness to be the
subject of .1 relations, while “capacity to act” is the
power to do acts with .1 effect. (Art. 37, NCC.) The
union of both is what is known as [ civil capacity.”
They may be distinguished from each other as iws:
(1) Juridical capacity is inherent in every natural
person, and therefore, is not acquired, whereas
capacity to act is not, and therefore, is acquired.
(2) The former is lost only through death, whereas
the latter may be lost through other means or
circumstances.
(3) The former cannot be limited or restricted,
whereas the latter can be limited or restricted by
certain circumstances.
(4) The former can exist without the latter, but the
existence of the latter always implies that of the
former. (Art. 37, NCC; 2 Sanchez Roman 112-113.)
4. What are the circumstances which modify or limit
capacity to act?
ANS: The following circumstances, among others,
modify or limit the capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of
these circumstances are governed in the NCC, other
codes, the rules of court, and in special laws.
Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious
belief or political opinion.
A married woman, 18 years of age or over, is
qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases
specified by law. (Art. 39, NCC.)
5. What is meant by status?
ANS: The status of a person is the legal condition or
class to which one belongs in society. (1 del Viso 32;
2 Sanchez Roman 110.)
6. What is meant by civil personality?
ANS: Civil personality is merely the external
manifestation of either juridical capacity or capacity
to act. Consequently, it may be defined as the
aptitude of being the subject of rights and
obligations. (2 Sanchez Roman 114-147.)
7. When does civil personality begin in natural
persons?
ANS: Birth determines personality, but the
conceived child shall be considered bom for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following cle.
(Art. 40, NCC.) This provision of the NCC is now
superseded Art. 5 of P.D. No. 603, which declares
that the civil personality he child shall commence
from the time of his conception, for all poses
favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Art.
41 of NCC.
For civil purposes, the foetus is considered bom if it
is alive at time it is completely delivered from the
mother’s womb. However, le foetus had an intra-
uterine life of less than 7 months, it is not med bom
if it dies within 24 hours after its complete delivery a
the maternal womb. (Art. 41, NCC.)
8. Juana gave birth to a child who died 10 hours after
complete delivery. Did the child acquire personality?
ANS: The child acquired a personality, unless it had
an intra- •ine life of less than 7 months. According to
the NCC, “for civil poses, the foetus is considered
born if it is alive at the time it is pletely delivered from
the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus an intra-
uterine life of less than 7 months, it is not deemed l
if it dies within 24 hours after its complete delivery
from the emal womb.” (Art. 41, NCC.)
9. W, pregnant wife of M, went to A’s medical clinic
for rtion without the knowledge of her husband.
When the er learned of the abortion, he brought an
action against ising his claim upon the provision of
Art. 2206 of the NCC, ch enumerates the damages
recoverable in case of death sed by a crime or quasi-
delict. Will the action prosper? sons. (2003)
ANS: The action will not prosper. Art. 2206 of the
NCC refers amages recoverable in case of death
caused by a crime or a d-delict. It cannot, therefore,
be applied to the case at bar. The on is evident. Only
one with a juridical personality can die. Here unborn
child never died because it never acquired a juridical
onality. Art. 40 of the NCC expressly limits the
provisional onality of a conceived child by imposing
the condition that the I should be subsequently bom
alive. In the instant case, the I was not alive when
separated from its mother’s womb. (Geluz A, 2
SCRA 801.)
10. Elated that her sister who had been married for
5 years was pregnant for the first time. Bianca
donated P100,000.00 to the unborn child.
Unfortunately, the baby died one hour after delivery.
May Bianca recover the P100,000.00 that she had
donated to said baby before it was born considering
that the baby died? Stated otherwise, is the donation
valid and binding? Explain. (1999)
ANS: The donation is valid and binding, being an act
favorable to the unborn child, but only if the baby had
an intra-uterine life of not less than 7 months and
provided there was due acceptance of the donation
by the proper person representing said child. If the
child had less than 7 months of intra-uterine life, it is
not deemed bom since it died less than 24 hours
following its delivery, in which case the donation
never became effective since the donee never
became a person, birth being determinative of
personality.
11. (a) How is civil personality extinguished?
(b) What is the effect if there is a doubt as to which
of two (2) persons, who are called to succeed each
other, died first?
(c) What are the presumptions on survivorship under
the Rules of Court?
(d) When is the presumption given in Art. 43 of the
NCC applicable? How about the presumptions on
survivorship? Illustrate.
ANS: (a) Civil personality is extinguished by death.
(Art. 42, NCC.)
(b) If there is a doubt, as between 2 or more persons
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the
same time and there shall be no transmission of
rights from one to the other. (Art. 43, NCC.)
(c) The presumptions on survivorship under the
Revised Rules of Court are those provided for in
Rule 132, Sec. 5(jj). They are as follows:
“When two (2) persons perish in the same calamity,
such as a wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not
shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is presumed from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and age of the sexes
according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of 15 years, the older
is presumed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of 60 years, the
younger is presumed to have survived;
3. If one be under 15 and the other above 60, the
former is presumed to have survived;
4. If both be over 15 and under 60, and the sexes be
different, the male is presumed to have survived; if
the sexes be the same, then the older;
5. If one be under 15 or over 60, and the other
between these ages, the latter is presumed to have
survived.”
(d) The presumption given in Art. 43 of the NCC is
applicable e following requisites are present: 1st,
there is no proof as to ;h of 2 persons died first; and
2nd, they are called to succeed l other. The
presumptions on survivorship, on the other hand,
applicable if the following requisites are present: 1st,
there is >roof as to which of 2 persons died first; 2nd,
they must have during a calamity; and 3rd, they are
not called to succeed each r. Thus, if A and B, father
and son, died during a conflagration, there is no
proof as to who of them died first, Art. 43 of the NCC
jrtainly applicable. There shall, therefore, be no
transmission lccessional rights from one to the other.
However, if there is no tionship between the two (2)
other than, let us say, contractual, l as when A, a
wealthy bachelor of 40, merely insured his life for
>00,000 with B, a young woman of 21, as
beneficiary, evidently, presumptions on survivorship
are then applicable. In other is, A is presumed to be
the survivor.

12. How are juridical persons classified?

ANS: The following are juridical persons:

(1) The state and its political subdivisions (Art. 44,
NCC.);
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for
public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law (Ibid.);
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for
private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that
of each shareholder, partner or member (Ibid.);
(4) The Roman Catholic Church. (Barlin vs. Ramirez,
7 Phil. 41; Roman Catholic Church vs. Placer} 11
Phil. 315.);
(5) The estate of a deceased person. (Limjuco vs.
Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragante, 80 Phil. 776.)