GERARDO CONCEPCION vs.
o photographs taken during baptism and in the house of Violetta
CA and MA. THERESA ALMONTE (BIGAMY)
August 31, 2005
 Gerardo and Theresa were married on December 29, 1989 and
after the marriage lived with Theresa’s parents at Fairview, QC.
Almost a year later or on December 8, 1990 Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo.
 The marriage turned to be short-lived because on December
19,1991 Gerardo filed a petition for annulment of his marriage
with Theresa on the ground of bigamy. It was found out that
Theresa married one Mario Gopiao on December 10, 1980, which
marriage was never annulled and that Mario is still alive and is
residing in Loyola Heights, QC.
 The annulment was granted and declared Jose Gerardo as an
illegitimate child. Custody was granted to Theresa but Gerardo
was granted visitation rights.
 Theresa moved for a partial reconsideration of the trial court’s
ruling contending that there is nothing in the law granting
“visitation rights in favor of a putative father of an illegitimate
child.” She further maintained that the surname of the child
should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte following the rule
that the illegitimate shall use the surname of the mother.
 The court denied Theresa’s motion applying the “best interest of
the child” principle.
 CA ruled that the child to be eligitimate child of Mario and
Theresa. Shocked and stunned Gerardo filed this appeal.
SC: The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised,
 Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or
born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy
 Article 167 of the Family Code provides: “The child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.”
 Gerardo cannot invoke Article 166 (1) as he has no standing to
dispute the status of the child. Only Mario, Theresa’s husband, or,
in a proper case, his heirs who can contest the legitimacy of the
child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of
the child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and
Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of her child.
 To rebut the presumption of legitimacy it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have
enabled the husband to father the child. Here, during the period
that Gerardo and Theresa were living together in Fairview, Mario
was living in Loyola Heights which is also in QC. Fairview and
Loyola Heights are only a scant 4 kilometers apart.
ONG V. DIAZ (DNA)
 Jinky, who was already married to a Japanese national Hasegawa
Katsuo, had an affair with Rogelio Ong. They lived together for
about 4 years (January 1994 to September 1998) and had a child
Joanne Rodjin.
 In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned Jinky and Joanne and
stopped supporting the minor alleging that he is not the father of
the child. Subsequently Jinky filed a complaint against Rogelio
because of his continued failure and refusal to give support to the
child and to acknowledge the child as his.
 The heirs, who substituted Rogelio when he died, insisted that the
decision of the appellate court remanding the case to the trial
court for DNA testing analysis be set aside and to declare Joanne
as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa.
 It was established however, that Hasegawa was living outside of
the country and comes home only once a year. No evidence was
shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997
preceding the birth of Joanne Rodjin.
SC: The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child.
 A child born to a husband and a wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate. This presumption of legitimacy of the child,
however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown
by evidence to the contrary.
 With the advancement in the field of genetics, and availability of
new technology, it can be determined with reasonable certainty
whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
testing. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from
a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The
DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is
unique for each person, except for identical twins.
 the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of
DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA. Biological samples include blood, saliva, and
other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
FERNANDEZ VS. CA (BAPTISMAL SPONSOR)
 Violeta Esguerra, single, mother and guardian ad litem of petitioners Claro
Antonio Fernandez and John Fernandez, pointed to Carlito S. Fernandez as
father of petitioners. She claimed that she and Carlito started their illicit
sexual relationship six months after their first meeting sometime in 1983
which resulted to the birth of petitioners. Violetta averred that they were
married in civil rights and claimed it was unknown to her that Carlito was
married until the birth of their child and discovered that their marriage
license was spurious.
o CLB, identifying their father as Carlito Fernandez,
o Baptismal certificate of Claro stating the same,
showing Carlito’s showering of affection to Claro.
o witnesses who contended that Violetta had introduced Carlito at
different times to them as her husband.
 Carlito denied Violetta’s allegations and averred that he only served as a
sponsor in the baptism of Claro. Such claim was corroborated by his
officemate who was also a sponsor of said baptism.
W/N the documentary evidences presented by petitioners are sufficient to prove their
filiations.
 SC: NO.
o Photographs- are far from proofs that private respondent is the
father of petitioner Claro. As explained, he was merely a
sponsor to the baptism; the photo showing Carlito showering his
affection to Claro falls short as evidence to prove paternity.
o Baptismal Cert naming him as father- has scant evidentiary
value because there is no showing that private respondent
participated in its preparation.
o CLB is not also competent evidence on the issue of paternity
because the records do not show that private respondent had a
hand in preparation thereof.
FERNANDEZ V. FERNANDEZ (20 pesos)
 Spouses Dr. Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia were childless. So they
purchased from a certain Miliang a baby boy named as Rodolfo. Jose died
on 1982 leaving his wife and Rodolfo an estate which became the subject
in their execution of deed of extra-judicial partition. On the same day,
Generosa executed a deed of absolute sale to Rodolfo’s son.
 After learning the transaction, the nephews and nieces of the deceased
Jose Fernandez filed an action to declare the extrajudicial partition void ab
initio on the ground that Rodolfo is not the son of the spouses and he
merely took advantage of Generosa’s physical and mental incapacity.
 Rodolfo presented
o baptismal certificate and
o an application for recognition of backpay rights by Dr.
Fernandez stating he’s the son of the latter.
 RTC declared the deeds null and void and found Rodolfo was not
legitimate nor a legally adopted child of the spouses Fernandez. CA
affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
W/N Rodolfo’s filiation can be collaterally attacked in an action for the nullity of the
sale and extrajudicial settlement. W/N Baptismal Certificate is admissible as proof of
filiation.
 HELD: COLLATERAL ATTACK. YES.
o While one’s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action,
this doctrine cannot be applied in the instant case considering
that respondent’s claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not
born to the spouses Fernandez. It is not a situation wherein
they deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncle’s wife.
 PROOF OF FILIATION FAILED.
o BC Although it may be considered as a public instrument, it is
only an evidence to prove the administration of sacrament on
the date stated therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements and declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk.
o family portrait DID NOT offer sufficient proof of filiation.

 application for recognition of backpay,
 o the public document contemplated in Art. 172 FC refer to
written admission of filiation embodied in a public document
purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as
obtaining in this case wherein the public document was
executed as an application for the recognition of backpay.
 Petitioner Rodolfo is NOT a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and
not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-
judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa
and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned.
LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO (DONATION OF JOSE)
 Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. Alleging that Jose had
fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his
 Santiago sisters sued Jose for recovery of title, ownership, and possession
against herein petitioner Ida Lagabala to recover from her 1/3 portion of
said property pertaining to Jose but which came into her possession upon
Jose’s death.
o Respondents (sisters) alleged that Jose’s share in the property
belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the only
legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate without issue.
They claimed that the deed of sale of the property executed by
their brother to petitioner is a forgery.
 Petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida Lagabala but Ida Santiago
and that she is the daughter of Jose, thus she is entitled to his share in the
subject property. She argued that the purported sale was in fact a
donation to her.
 RTC ruled in favor of Ida
 CA reversed
o BC of Ida Lagabala presented by respondents showed that Ida
was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife.
W/N petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she is the daughter
of Jose Santiago.
 NO.
 Art. 263 of the CC refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his
wife.
o the present case is not one impugning petitioner’s
legitimacy but for recovery of title, possession and thus
outside the scope of Art. 263’s proscriptive periods.
 BC plainly states that Ida was the child of spouses Leon Lagabala
and Cornelia Cabrigas. Therefore, this certificate is proof of filiation of
Ida. If the BC presented in evidence is not hers,
o then she should have presented hers considering that she
has presented her Baptismal Certificate.
o Besides, Bap Cert is not a proof of the parentage of the
baptized person. This document can only prove the
identity of the one baptized, the date and place of her
baptism, the identities of the baptismal sponsors and the
priest who administered the sacrament, nothing more.
o Further, petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same
birthdate as Ida Lagabala. The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere
coincidence. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner
cannot inherit from him through intestate succession. Clearly, there
is no valid sale in this case; Jose did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof
belonged to his sisters. Neither may the purported deed of sale be a
valid deed of donation.
o ITR that listed her as filer’s daughter is insufficient to prove filiation,
The entries made in an income tax return only shows that income tax
has been paid and the amount thereof.
o Use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
LOCSIN vs. JUAN LOCSIN, JR.
 Juan Locsin, Jr. herein respondent, filed with the RTC a petition praying
that he be appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased Juan Locsin, Sr.
o Alleged that he is acknowledged natural child of the deceased
and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
o machine copy of his CLB found in the bound of the volume of
birth records in the office of the LCR.
o LR officer as witness.
o photograph showing him and his mother in front of a coffin
bearing Juan Locsin, Sr.’s dead body as claim that he and his
mother have been recognized as family members of the
deceased.
 The heirs of Juan Locsin, Sr, herein petitioners filed an opposition averring
o He is neither a child not an acknowledged natural child of Sr.
o CLB is spurious and adduced CLB found in the CRGeneral,
Metro Manila indicating that the birth of the respondent was
reported by his mother
o No signature of the late juan locsin.
 RTC found the CLB and photograph sufficient proof of illegitimate filiation.
 CA affirmed.
As between the original certificate of live birth issued in the place where the
alleged birth took place and a certified true copy issued by the civil registrar
general but has entries different from the one issued by the local civil
registrar, which copy must prevail?
 BIRTH RECORD.
o Since the records of birth cover several decades and
come from all parts of the country, to merely access
them in the civil registry general requires expertise. To
locate one single record from the mass, a regular
employee, if not more has to be engaged.
o It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro
Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957
birth record originating from the local civil registry of
Iloilo City.
 PHOTOGRAPH with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C.
Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we
recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage
and sanction fraudulent claims.
o Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before
a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming
the estate of the deceased.
BERNABE vs. ALEJO
Late fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered da son with his secretary, herein plaintiff
appellant Carolina Alejo on 1981. Spouses Bernabe died in 1993 leaving Ernestina
as the sole heir.
 Carolina, on behalf of their child Adrian, filed a complaint praying that
Adrian be declared acknowledged as illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe
and be given his share of the deceased’s estate, which is being held by
Ernestina.
 RTC dismissed the complaint citing Art. 175 of FC
o the action must be instituted during the lifetime of the parent,
o hence, the death of Fiscal Bernabe has barred the action and
since the father has not recognized by writing or action, it
should have been bought during his lifetime to give him the
opportunity to affirm or deny the filiation.
 CA reversed.
ISSUE: The child was born in 1981. The alleged father died in 1993. May the
child be allowed to prove his filiation despite the clear provision of Art. 175
of the Family Code which requires that if the action to establish illegitimate
filiation is based on the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172 the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent?
HELD: YES
 The child should be allowed to prove his filiation as he was born in
1981, and therefore, his rights are governed by Art. 285 of the
Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within
4 years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
 -Art. 285 is a substantive law, as it gives the child the right to file
his petition for recognition within 4 years after attaining the age of
majority.
 The Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an
action for recognition because the right had already vested prior
to its enactment.
 The rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are
applicable to spurious children. Our overriding consideration is to
protect the vested rights of minors who could have filed suit, on
their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. The State
as parens patriae should protect a minor’s right.
DELA ROSA V. VDA DE DAMIAN
One of those claiming the estate of the late spouses Rustia, is Guillerma Rustia who
acted as an intervener and sought recognition on 2 grounds.
o 1st, compulsory recognition:
o through the open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child and
o 2nd, voluntary recognition
o through authentic writing
o the report card that identified Guillermo Rustia, named
Guillerma as one of the children.
ISSUE: W/N Guillerma can still claim compulsory acknowledgement from Guillermo
Rustia.
HELD: NO
ACTION PRESCRIBED. There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status
of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo
Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which
she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.
o Furthermore, any judicial action for compulsory acknowledgment has dual
limitation: t
o he lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative father.
On the death of either, an action for compulsory recognition can
no longer be filed.
o In this case, Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed upon the death of Guillermo
Rustia on 1974.
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION FAILED. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent.
o This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the
father to be his.
o Did Guillerma’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo qualify as authentic writings
under the Civil Code? Unfortunately not.
o The report card did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia.
The fact that his name appears there, as her parent/guardian
holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
o Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa which was published
in the SUNDAY TIMES on September 2, 1972, that published
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law.
What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the
original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of
Guillermo himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original
signed manuscript was fatal to Guillerma’s claim.
TEOFISTO VERCELES vs. POSADA
Posada, a young lass from a barrio in Catanduanes, was impregnated by Verceles,
the mayor of Pandan, Catanduanes.
o Verceles denied fathering the child.
o he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada and
that it was Clarissa Posada who placed his name on the birth
certificate as father without his consent.
o Clarissa, on the other hand, presented as evidence
letters sent to her by Verceles starting from the very time that
o
she missed her menstruation and 3 other handwritten letters, 2
of which were in his letterhead as mayor of Pandan.
o pictures Verceles gave her of his youth and as a public servant,
all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
o P2,000 pocket money and another P2,000 for her delivery.
Clarissa’s testimony was corroborated by her mother.
ISSUE: W/N the child is petitioner’s illegitimate child.
HELD: YES.
o the letters of petitioner are declarations that lead nowhere but to the
conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias
(Ninoy) in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters
vis the annotation at the back of petitioner’s fading photograph as a youth
is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion
that they were all written by one and the same person, petitioner, as found
by the courts a quo.
o ADMISSION of his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters
between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy.
o The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which
establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172(2) of the FC. The letters
are not just grounds for compulsory recognition but in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. In
addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates,
letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
DELA CRUZ V. GRACIA (unsigned autobiography)
 21 y/o petitioner LENIE and then 19 y/o DOMINIQUE cohabited; Jenie got
pregnant, and lived in Dominique’s parents; Dominique died
 APPLICATION OF REGISTRATION of child’s birth using Dominique’s
surname ‘Aquino’ proof submitted:
o CLB
o AUSF w/ Autobiography (unsigned)
o Affidavit of Acknowledgment by Dom’s father; all attested that
Dom had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and
paternity is not questioned
 LCR denied Jenie’s application for registration; the child cannot use the
surname of the father because he was born out of wedlock and the father
died before the birth of the child and has no more capacity to
acknowledge his paternity
 LENIE invokes Art. 176
o Illegitimate may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by the father through
 CLB or
 when an admission in a public docu or private
handwritten instrument.
 Provided, that the father has the right to institute an
action before the courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime xxx
o Recognition made in any of these documents, is in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of child’s paternity; no JA
needed (De Jesus v. Dizon)
W/N the unsigned handwritten statement of deceased father of minor can be
considered as a recognition of a paternity which would entitle the minor to use his
father’s surname.
 OSG- mere recognition of pregnancy, not paternity
 SC: Art. 176 does not explicitly state the need of signature but IMPLIED.
 It must be read in conjunction with other provisions (Art. 175: same way
and on the same evidence as Art. 172 of legitimate children (2) private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.)
 SUBSTANTIALLY SATISFIES REQUIREMENTS
o Death 2 mos. prior to child’s birth
o Autobiography and facts from testimonial evidence of Jenny
o Corroborated by Dom’s father and his father whose hereditary
rights could be affected by registration of questioned
recognition
o Pedigree:
 Relationship
 Family genealogy
 Birth, marriage, death
 Dates and places where facts occurred
The private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence; it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
NEPOMUCENO V. LOPEZ (unsigned handwritten note)
 Petition and recognition of Support filed by for Lopez who was born out of
extramarital affair of her mother and Nepomuceno.
 Lopez said Nepomuceno did not affix his signature in BC but nevertheless
obligated himself to give financial support through a letter for 1,500
beginning Aug. 15, 1999
 Nepomuceno countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father
and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note due to NPA
threats
 RTC: treated the note as ‘contractual support’ granted Respo’s prayer for
pendent lite support. Rested her case
o RTC on Pet’s demurrer: CLB was not prima facie evidence of
her filiation as it did not bear his signature. DISMISSED.
o CA: reversed. Lopez is illegitimate child of Pet. He paid the
hospital bills and committed to provide financial support; that
Pet acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his
handwritten undertaking
o Pet: no explicit statement in documentary evidence presented
that he admits filiation
W/N there is clear and convincing evidence of Nepomuceno’s paternity through 172
(2) ‘private handwritten instrument and signed by parent concerned’ which would
entitle Lopez for support as illegitimate daughter
 SC: The action for support has to determine filiation being lodged on the
obligation to support found in Art. 195 in rel 194 (4) parents of illegitimate
children and the leg/illeg of the latter.
 NO. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever about filiation to
petitioner. In establishing filiation, the putative father must claim the
filiation himself and must be written by the father.
 Therefore, it is beyond ambit of 172(2) which admits its competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the party concerned.
o No signature in Handwritten Note
o No signature in BC
o Consistent denial of paternity, nor contemporaneous actions
GOTARDO V. BULING(breach of promise to marry)
 Divina Buling filed for compulsory recognition and support pendent lite,
petitioner is father of child Gliffze; She was a casual employee of PCIB
while Gotardo is accounting supervisor; he courted her, sent greeting
cards on Valentines day, birthday, special occasions; reciprocal love. They
had sex, result- Gliffze. Petitioner was happy and they planned to get
married but Gotardo backed out. Suit ensued.
 Gotardo denied paternity claiming discrepancies in dates of their sexual
intercourse and conception of child; inconsistent testimonies
 RTC: Dismissed. Insufficiency of Evidence
 CA reversed. Discrepancies were due to mistake in appreciating the
question of counsel, ordered to recognize Gliffze
W/N the CA committed error
 NO.
 Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but
also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in this case), or inheritance.
 o Burden of proof of paternity is in the one who alleges it (Ong v.
Diaz)
o 4 significant procedural aspects
 Prima facie case
Affirmative defenses
 
 Presumption of Legitimacy
 Physical Resemblance
 Prima Facie: when a woman declares supported by corroborative proof
that she had sexual relations with the putative father; then burden of proof
shifts to the father. (Herrera v. Alba)
o In this case, Rodulfo, her uncle corroborated her testimony
 Affirmative Defenses:
o Incapability due to impotency
o Mother had sexual relations w/ other men
 Petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and
insinuations of promiscuity; his denial cannot overthrow the respondent’s
clear and categorical assertions
PERLA V. BARING (seaman; cohabitation, 15y/o son)
 Antonio Baring landed a job as seaman and abandoned his child Randy
with his common law spouse for 2 years, Mirasol.
 Mirasol Perla averred that they were sweethearts and when she got
pregnant he promised to support her
o CLB and BC indicating Antonio as father and testified he
supplied the info.
o Randy, 15 y/o testified that he was at a vacation in his Aunt’s
house and Antonio promised for support.
o Witness neighbor corroborated
 Antonio, now married, denied having fathered Randy but admitted that he
knew of Mirasol
o He did not have a hand in preparation of CLB
o Hilot’s daughter: Her mother told her that the child has no
acknowledged father and was left to her Mother but Mirasol
took the child away when he was 5 years old
 RTC: Granted. No bad faith or ill-will on part of Randy and Mirasol;
admission of sexual intercourse; child as witness
 CA upheld: Certified true copies of illegitimate filiation CLB; baptismal cert.
While they do not bear signature of Antonio, they are proofs that Amntonio
is the known father
W/N the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy
 SC: NO.
o Failure to establish Illegitimate filiation
o Art. 172
 CLB, Admission in PD, or PWI signed
 Open & Continuous possession of legitimacy or ROC
o Art. 175 –illegitimate means to establish filiation same as
legitimate
o CLB w/o signature has no probative value; no hand in
preparation
o Testimony of Randy about 1994 cannot be considered as an
open and continuous possession; there must be manifest
intention to consider child as his which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. It was only one instance, not continuous,
spontaneous, and uninterrupted.
o BC- lack of participation, not proof of parentage, inadmissible
as proof of filiation and cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence
o Admission of Sexual Encounters –Mirasol must rely on the
strength of her evidence, not the weakness of defense
SALAS V. MATUSALEM(loose morals)
 Anabelle Matusalem claimed that Narciso Salas is the father of her son;
that he, then 56, made her believe he was a widower, rented an
apartment where they lived, but when she refused to give her the child to
Salas’ family after Salas’ confession of having sired an illegitimate child,
they were abandoned and left to friend’s and relative’s mercy.
 Narciso countered and described Anabelle a woman of loose morals
having borne her first child out of wedlock. That she was again pregnant of
another child, and that out of altruism he shouldered the expenses.
 RTC ordered monthly support
 CA affirmed:
o ROC; testimony about apartment, etc. even absence of CLB
W/N filiation of the child was duly established according to 175 in relation to 172
and therefore entitled for support.
 SC: NO
o CLB is not competent evidence of paternity w/o father’s hand in
preparation for the certificate; neither can it be taken as public
instrument and has no probative value
o BC can only be considered as evidence of administration of
sacraments on the date specified; not necessarily competent
evidence as to the veracity of entries therein
o Handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill, photographs- have
scant evidentiary value; letters were not signed by Narciso and
contained no statements of admission, although they were
authentic, not qualified in 172.n
o Testimonies by themselves are insufficient to establish
paternity
AGUILA V. SIASAT (SSS)
 Alfredo Aguilar & Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died, intestate without debts.
 Rodolfo Aguilar filed a case for mandatory injunction against Edna Siasat
alleging that he is the sole heir; the titles were missing but found in
Siasat’s possession; thus he asked that it be surrendered to him
o School records Aguilar are his parents
o ITR which stated that Candelaria is his mother
o SSS of Alfredo, as public instrument subscribed and made
under oath during his employment which bears his signature
and thumbmarks and indicates that Rodolfo was his son and
dependent
o Employment Sheet where it was indicated that he is his son
o Certificate of his Marriage where it is declared that the spouses
are his parents
o Employment Recommendation Letter
o Certification issued by LCR Bacolod of destruction of records
o Testimonies
 Edna claimed that he is not the son of the spouses but a mere stranger
who was raised; not a natural nor adopted child; that since Alfredo
predeceased his wife, Candelaria inherited the conjugal share of Alfredo;
that upon death of Canderlaria, her brother and sister inherited her estate
and the subject tiles were not stolen but entrusted to her for safekeeping
by Candelaria, who is her Aunt.
o Testimony of Aureas who stated that she does not know
petitioner, that he knows of Rodolfo, but denies petitioner as
son of spouses
o Affidavit that Candelaria is the sole heir of her husband
W/N SSS E-1 acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by
Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son is public document that satisfies
the requirement of Art. 172(2) to establish petitioner as son of spouses
SC: YES
o SSS FORM satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the spouses; by itself, it constitutes ‘admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.’
o CA erred when it treated document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; it is
an express recognition.
Tamargo vs. CA,
On October 20, Adelberto, then 10 years old shot Jennifer Tamargo which caused her
death. Macario Tamargo, adopting parent of Jennifer filed a complaint for damages
along with petitioner spouses Celso Tamargo, natural parents.
Prior to the incident, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the minor on 1981 which
was granted on November 1982.
Natural parents contend that the adopting parents were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority has shifted to the adopting parents from the moment
the successful petition for adoption was filed.
o PD 603 (sec. 36)
 A decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be
effective as of the date of the original petition is filed
o In relation to 39
 Effect of adoption. Dissolves authority vested in the
natural parents except where the adopter is the
spouse of the surviving parent
Tamargo contends that since the child was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not yet ceased by mere filing and granting of adoption.
ISSUE: W/N the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may
be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
SC: We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a
time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of
the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents could have arisen since the adopted child was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.”
o PD 603 Sec. 35
 Trial custody of 6 mos. for final grant of petition to
assess emotional readiness and adjustment for legal
union
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC
Minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene were the children of Amelia and the late Manuel
Ramos. After Manuel’s death, the children were left under the custody of their
paternal grandmother because Amelia left for Italy. When the paternal grandmother
died, the children were taken cared of by a paternal uncle.
Landingin, the 57-year old aunt and sister of the late Manuel and an American citizen
residing in Guam, now desires to adopt the 3 children. In her petition, she alleged
 that the mother of the children had abandoned them and had not
communicated with her children neither with her in-laws.
 Amelia has already remarried and has 2 children with her 2nd husband.
That petitioner and her other siblings were the ones financially supporting
the children.
 She is already a widow and living alone because all her children are
already married and are gainfully employed.
 They have given their consent in writing to the adoption, and also
promised to help her in supporting the children financially.
 Likewise, the paternal uncle where the children are currently staying also
signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in
petitioner’s custody.
 The Child Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Pagbilao stated
that the surviving parent consented to the adoption as evidenced by the
Affidavit of Consent executed by the children’s mother Amelia as the
mother came home on May 2, 2002 and stayed for 3 weeks.
 The minors likewise, consented to the proposed adoption.
 Pagbilao then recommended that the children be adopted by petitioner.
During the trial however, Landingin failed to present Pagbilao as witness and also
failed to adduce documentary evidence that, indeed, Amelia assented to the
adoption.
W/N petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of the
biological mother?
W/N the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by petitioner’s children sufficiently
complies with the law? and
W/N petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees?
SC:
Section 9 of RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) provides:
Whose consent is necessary to the adoption:
X x x x.
(b) The biological parents of the child, if known x x x .
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interest of the child.
Clearly, the written consent of the natural parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption.
In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia to the
adoption.Petitioner’s argument that her consent is no longer necessary because she
left for Italy and never came back, hence, Amelia had abandoned the children and it
was just by twist of fate that after 12 years Amelia was on vacation and was able to
meet Pagbilao, must be rejected.
If, as claimed, that the biological mother had abandoned them, she should have
adduced the written consent of the children’s legal guardian. Merely permitting the
child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others does not constitute
abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
Here, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine, the eldest of the 3,
to prove that Amelia abandoned them. The Home Study Report tends to show
otherwise. Elaine during the interview said that “in serious problems she already
consult her mother and petitioner-aunt.” And while petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing for most of their needs and education, Amelia
would also send financial support ranging from P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 a month
through her parents and share P3,000.00 to P5,000.00 thereof with the children.
Thus, Amelia left for Italy without intention of abandoning her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave
the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or
relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing her children to her now
deceased mother-in-law.
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s report and the joint affidavit of
consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise,
failed to prove.
As to her financial capacity, the Report stated that petitioner is 57 years old,
employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of
around $1,000.00 per month. That she owns her house at Quitugua Subd., Yigo,
Guam but the same is still being amortized. Given these limited facts, it is doubtful
whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing
the 3 children in the US. While she claims that she has the financial support and
backing of her children, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation
between the former and the latter. Moreover, no proof was adduced to prove her
allegation that her children and siblings are willing to support the minors herein.
IN RE: LIM and MICHAEL JUDE LIM
Michelle was given to the spouses Lim in 1977 while Michael was delivered in 1983.
They were only about 11 days old when they were given to the spouses Lim who had
them registered as if they were their own children. They were reared and cared for
and were sent to exclusive schools and used the surname “Lim” in all their school
records and documents. In 1988, the husband died and the surviving spouse
entered into another marriage with an American citizen, Olario.
Monina (the surviving spouse) then filed two separate petitions to adopt the children
by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998 to those individuals who simulated the birth of the child. Both children, who are
already of legal age, gave their consent including Michelle’s husband to the adoption.
Olario likewise executed an affidavit of consent for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael.
FC denied the petition because inasmuch as Monina has remarried, her petition
should have been jointly filed with her new husband.
ISSUE: Whether Monina, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
SC: It is undisputed that at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petition by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. The law is explicit.
 Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads
o “Husband and wife shall jointly adopt subject to the exceptions.
The word “shall” means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule is to insure harmony between the spouses.
Neither would the exceptions apply.
1st the children are not the legitimate children of the petitioner or of her husband;
2nd the children are not the illegitimate children of the petitioner ; and
3rd, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
There are also certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. None of the qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. Neither are
the requirements on residency and certification waivable as the children are not
relatives within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or Olario.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation- that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age-emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of
the effects of legal adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered
the legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child as provided
for under Article 174 of the Family Code. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with
respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled such as support and successional rights.
While petitioner insists that joint adoption is no longer possible because Olario has
filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner before the Los Angeles
Superior Court, the filing of said case is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree
of dissolution of marriage. until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between Monina and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
LAHOM V. SIBULO
Dr. Diodado Lahom & Isabelita adopted the latter’s nephew Jose Sibulo at age of two.
LCR of Naga changed the surname of Jose.
 Isabelita moved to rescind the adoption on 1998 when RA 8552 already
took effect.
 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 deleted the right of the adopters to rescind
the decree of adoption
o Sec. 19 Grounds for Rescission
 If a minor or if over 18 years of age but is
incapacitated
 Repeated physical & verbal maltreatment by
adopters
 Attempt of the life of Adoptee
 Sexual Assault
 Abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations
o Not subject to rescission by adopters, but they may disinherit
the adoptee for causes provided in Art. 919 in CC.
 o Proscription in RA 8552 should not retroactively apply to cases
where the ground for rescission of adoption vested under the
regime of the Art. 348 of the CC and Art. 192
 Jose moved for dismissal
o No jurisdiction; cause of action in view of RA 8552
 RTC:
o Has jurisdiction, being a family court
o Grounds prescribed. having been known for more than 5 years
prior to the filing
May the subject adoption decreed on 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after effectivity of RA 8552? If yes, has it prescribed?
SC: NO. Yes
 The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action.
 Law governing at the time the petition was filed (Rep. v. Miller)
o Having been instituted after 8552’s effectivity, it cannot be
pursued.
o Even before the passing of statute, the action to rescind is
subject to the 5yr bar rule under Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right after the lapse of said period.
o A person has no vested right in statutory privileges. Adoption is
merely a right created by statute.
DE ASIS vs. CA
 The mother filed an action for recognition and support. The putative father
denied paternity and instead filed a counterclaim.
 The parties agreed to dismiss the case in a manifestation, provided the
alleged father would no longer pursue his counterclaim.
 Subsequently, the mother filed another case against the alleged father
again, for support and recognition.
 The putative father moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
res judicata.
SC: Such manifestation does not bar the mother from filing a subsequent case for
support on behalf of the same child against the same defendant because such
manifestation and the agreement to dismiss the case on condition that the
defendant will not pursue the counterclaim constitute a form of renunciation as they
severed the vinculum that gives the child the right to claim support from the putative
parent.
 THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE SUPPORT CAN NEITHER BE RENOUNCED
nor transmitted to a third person. To allow renunciation or transmission or
compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow
either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden.
 IT CANNOT BE COUNTENANCED. An agreement for the dismissal of a
complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of
the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise that cannot be
countenanced.
-If paternity is at issue in a case, its existence or absence must be judicially
established and cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. The admission
may be binding upon the respondent, such admission is at most evidentiary and does
not conclusively establish lack of filiation.
GAN vs. REYES
 Apprehensive that she would be unable to send her 3-year old daughter to
school, she wrote Gan demanding support for their “love child”.
 Gan denied paternity of the child.
o Since the child’s birth certificate indicated her father as
“UNKNOWN”, then there is no legal basis for the claim for
support.
 Gan was declared in default and was ordered to recognize the child
Francheska Joy as his illegitimate child and to support her. A writ of
execution was issued citing as reason the child’s immediate need for
schooling.
 Meanwhile, Gan appealed the judgment of the CA. He then filed a petition
for certiorari insisting that
o judgment sought to be enforced did not yet attain finality.
o reason that he should be allowed to prove his defense of
adultery.
SC: There is no evidence to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it
was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. The Rules of Court
clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support
are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
This is an exception to the general rule,
 GR: taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment. The
aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all
judgments for and makes no distinction between those that are the
subject of an appeal and those that are not.
 To consider then petitioner’s argument that there should be good reasons
for the advance execution of judgment would be to violate the clear and
explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
 In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the
paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the
poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support
until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to
slip away.
 Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery
when it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother of the
child.
 The money and property adjudged for support and education should and
must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait for
the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered
because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because
of lack of funds.
o One cannot delay such funds for support and education for the
reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the
accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and
repair the damage caused.
MANGONON vs. CA
 Ma. Belen Mangonon and Federico Delgado were civilly married. The
marriage however, was subsequently annulled due to absence of the
required parental consent under Article 85 of the Civil Code.
 7 months after the annulment, Mangonon gave birth to twins Rica and
Rina. Federico totally abandoned them and Mangonon had to rely upon
her 2nd husband for assistance.
 Demands made upon Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, the latter
being generally well known to be financially well-off, were unheeded.
 Petitioner then filed, for and in behalf of the twins a petition for declaration
of legitimacy and support with application for support pendente lite before
the RTC of Makati.
o As legitimate children and grandchildren, the twins are entitled
to general and educational support under
 Articles 174 (2) and 195
(b) in relation to Articles 194 (1) and (2) and 199

 (c) of the Family Code.
 Mangonon argued that
o in case of default on the parents’ part, the obligation to provide
support falls upon the grandparents of the children;
o thus, Federico, or in his default, Francisco should be ordered to
provide general and educational support in the amount of
US$50,000.00, more or less, per year.
 Francisco stated in his answer that
o CLB of twins do not bear the signature of Federico
1st establish their legitimacy as “there is no basis to claim
o
support until a final and executory judicial declaration has been
made as to the civil status of the children.”
o Whatever good deeds he may have done to the twins were
founded on pure acts of Christian charity.
o And assuming that he could be held liable for support, he has
the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the support or
receiving and maintaining in the dwelling here in the Philippines
the person claiming support.
o He further posits that because petitioner and the twins are now
US citizens, they cannot invoke the Family Code provisions on
support because “laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(Article 15, NCC).”
 Federico, on the other hand, alleged
o he left for abroad and stayed there for a long time “within the
1st 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding March 25,
1976 (birth of the twins)” and that
o he only came to know about the birth of the twins when the
latter introduced themselves to him 17 years later. He did not
tell them that he could not be their father in order not to
antagonize them.
The trial court said that,
 “the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied.
o constant communication with their grandfather Francisco.
o Francisco admitted having written several letters to Rica and
Rina. In said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof,
Francisco wrote the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He
therefore was very well aware that the twins bear the surname
Delgado.
o Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as “Lolo Paco” or
“Daddy Paco”. In his October 13, 1989 letter he said, “as the
grandfather, am extending a financial help of US$1,000.00.”
SC:
The pertinent provision is Article 199 of the FC; “
 Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall
devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (SDAB)
The spouse;
The descendants in the nearest degree;
The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
The brothers and sisters.
Tolentino explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more
closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to
shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon
to provide support do not have the means to do so.
 There being prima facie showing (letters from GP) that Mangonon and
Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, they are primarily charged to
support their children’s college education. In view however of their
incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support shall be borne by
Francisco.
 Under Article 199 of the FC, as the next immediate relative of the twins, is
tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It
having been established that he has the financial means to support the
twins’ education, he, in lieu of Federico should be liable for support
pendente lite.
 While respondents have the option under Article 204 “to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has the right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral
or legal obstacle thereto.”
In this case, Francisco cannot avail himself of the 2nd option.
o Prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship
between Francisco and the petitioner and daughters was quite
pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them
expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for
another’s well being. The photographs presented a seemingly
typical family celebrating kinship. All these, however, are things
of the past.
o With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one
another, the relationships had been affected. Particularly
difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial
relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see the
twins moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who disowned them.
LIM vs. LIM
Spouses Cheryl and Edward and their 3 children live with Edward’s parents, and his
grandmother. Edward is receiving P6,000.00 from their family business. Cheryl, on
the other hand, had no steady source of income.
 In 1990, Cheryl together with her 3 children left her in-laws house after a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with in-house midwife
of his grandmother in what the court described as “a very compromising”
situation.
 She then sued Edward together with his parents and grandparents for
support.
 RTC ordered Edward, his parents and grandparents to provide support in
the amount of P40,000.00. P6,000.00 from Edward while the balance of
P34,000.00 shall be borne by his parents subject to the subsidiary liability
of the grandparent.
o The court held that Edward’s parents (petitioners in this case)
and his grandmother Chua Giak were jointly liable with Edward
because of the latter’s “inability to x x x to give sufficient
support x x x.”
 The petitioners argued before the CA
o While Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions
its effects by providing that that legal support should be “in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family”
o Article 194 of the Civil Code as amended by the FC.
their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority,
conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the
children’s minority. At the time Cheryl sued for support, Cheryl
and Edward exercised parental authority over their children
hence, the obligation to support ends with them.
SC: While parental authority under Title IX pertains to parents, passing to ascendants
only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support
passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s
inability to provide sufficient support.
 CHERYL IS UNABLE to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound.
 AMOUNT OF SUPPORT BY EDWARD IS INSUFFICIENT to meet respondents’
basic needs.
 This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children
shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree,
both in the paternal and maternal line (Cheryl’s family had already been
giving support to respondents) following the order established in Article
199 of the FC.
 To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction
the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of
children because of paternal inability to give adequate support even if the
ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
 However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their
descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives by
blood of lower degree.
 Hence, only the children of Cheryl and Edward are entitled to receive
support from their grandparents.
 Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her
husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
 Petitioners’ wish to exercise the option under Article 204 is unavailable. It
will force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her
husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as
indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper
for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence
amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the
exception clause of Article 204.
CHERRYL DOLINA v. GLENN VALLECERA
 In the complaint for violation of RA 9262, Dolina added a prayer for
financial support from Vallecera for their supposed child.
 Vallecera opposed the petition as Dolina’s action was essentially one for
financial support rather than for protection against woman and child
abuses.
SC: To be entitled to legal support one first establish the filiation of the child, if the
same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her
son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have
proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial
action for compulsory recognition.
If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.
In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their
filiation must be duly proved.
While the Court is mindful of the best interest of the child in cases involving paternity
and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits
cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.
LIM-LUA V. LUA
Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Danilo
- Prayed for support pending litigation for her and their children 500k citing
huge earnings of Danilo
RTC granted
- 213 FC, support is demandable from the time the plaintiff needed the said
support but is payable only from the date of the judicial demand. Retroacts to
the time of filing of judicial demand. (7mos. x 250k=1, 750, 000). The monthly
support is w/o prejudice to any decrease/increase thereof as circumstances
may warrant.
Respondent
- Petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering she does not maintain
for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being according
to family’s social and financial standing.
- Disallowing deductions would result to unjust enrichment, making him pay for
the obligation twice.
- That the groceries and Volkswagen and BMW are considered as advances for
support in keeping w/ the financial capacity.
Petitioner
- CA erred to have allowed the deduction of the value of 2 cars and the
maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items were not
indispensable to the sustenance of the family or keeping them alive.
SC: CA’s decision reversed
- Support pendent lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for declaration
of nullity/annulment of marriage are guided by the rule on provisional orders.

Espiritu vs. CA
-The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a
ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor
child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion
must always be the child’s interests.
-In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by
the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under 7
years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by “compelling
reasons.”
-Either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody but it is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of
either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
Santos, Sr. vs. CA
242 SCRA 407
-The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of parents’ death,
absence, or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
-The legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents despite the latter’s
demonstrated love and affection. Wealth, too, is not a deciding factor.
-The father’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism. It cannot, however, be construed as abandonment.
3) Eslao vs. CA
266 SCRA 317
-When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
LAXAMANA vs. LAXAMANA
September 3, 2002
The results of the psychiatric evaluation submitted to the trial
court states that “ Reymond Laxamana is not yet considered completely cured (of his
drug dependency) even though his drug urine test for “shabu” was negative.”
Likewise the children aged 14 and 15 when asked whether they like to be with their
father but they said that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that
their father is no longer a drug dependent. The trial court then awarded custody of
the children to their mother. Is the court correct?
While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are
inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The psychiatric evaluation
that he is not yet “completely cured” may render him unfit to take custody of the
children but there is no evidence to show that he is unfit to provide the children with
adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and
development. While the children were asked as to whether they like to be with their
father but there was no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of
the children.
In controversies involving the care, custody, and control of their minor
children, the contending parties stand on equal footing before the court who shall
make a selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if over 7 years
of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the
court is not bound by such choice if the parent chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole
and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of
the child concerned taking into account the respective resources as well as the social
and moral situations of the opposing parents.
mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. Loran, on the other
JOYCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V hand, argued that under the law, he and Marie have shared custody and parental
authority over their son. That at times that Marie is out of the country as required of
her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of
Is a mother allegedly a lesbian unfit to have custody over a child below seven years of
their son and not the maternal grandparents.
age?
SC: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld
SC: The convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions
from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the FC, Loran and Marie
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
Antonette have joint parental authority over their minor son and consequently, joint
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has
interest of the child shall be a primary consideration. The principle of “best interest of
yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
the child” pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support,
parent, both parents are entitled to the custody of their child. In this case, Loran’s
personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his son, hence, the remedy of
has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the
habeas corpus is available to him.
welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are
In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme
mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all
on the children’s well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and
the moral and social situations of each parent, other factors may be considered to questions regarding the care and custody of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.
ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the physical, educational, social
Article 213 of the FC deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
and moral welfare of the children.
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can
As a general rule a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of
raise it as a counterargument for Loran’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for
children under the age of 7. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be
preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a
ignored, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. The so-called “tender-
father from seeing or visiting his child under 7 years of age.
age presumption” under Article 213 may be overcome only by compelling evidence of
the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. CA 527 SCRA 380 (July 11, 2007)
her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
Spouses Franklin and Agnes have a 4-year old daughter named Simone.
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
Their problem started when Agnes wanted to stay in Makati while Franklin would like
the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
to stay in their conjugal home in Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. One day,
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relationship as the
Agnes went to Boracay, asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under
bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation. He later however, discovered
certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling
that neither Agnes nor their daughter would be coming back to Boracay. He then filed
reason to deprive her of custody.
a petition for habeas corpus for Agnes to produce Simone. The CA granted joint
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental
custody of the minor child to both parents.
neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been
SC: The CA committed grave abuse of jurisdiction when it granted joint
unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.
custody of the minor child to both parents.
To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral
The Convention of the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions
lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
offending spouse from exercising parental care.
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
The so-called “tender age presumption” under Article 213 of the FC may
SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA
be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is
declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
Loran and Marie Antonette are the parents of Lorenzo Emmanuel. They lived with
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
Marie’s parents. Due to in-law problems, Loran suggested that they transfer to their
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
own house but Marie refused so he, alone, left the house and was, later on,
diseases. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of
prevented from seeing his son.
caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench
He then instituted a petition for habeas corpus and custody. Ordered to
the child from the mother’s custody.
show cause why Lorenzo Emmanuel should not be discharged from restraint Marie
moved for the reconsideration of the order which the court denied. She went to the
HERALD DACASIN vs. SHARON
CA which the affirmed the denial of the lower court.
Sharon, Filipino, married to an American, Herald, obtained a decree of divorce from
an Illinois court. The court awarded to Sharon sole custody of their daughter
On certiorari, she contended that there was no evidence at all that thhje 3-year
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
Lorenzo was under restraint and no evidence of maternal unfitness to deprive the
Subsequently, the parties executed in Manila an agreement for the joint custody of
mother Marie of her son of tender years. That the writ is unwarranted considering
their daughter and chose the Philippine courts as the exclusive forum to adjudicate
that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering further that the law
disputes arising from the agreement. Sharon, in fact undertook to obtain from the
presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby negating any notion of such mother
Illinois court an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004,
illegally restraining her own son.
Herald sued Sharon for alleged violation of the agreement as the latter exercised sole
custody over Stephanie.
She maintains that Loran had the burden of showing a compelling reason but failed
SC: At the time the parties executed the agreement on January 28, 2003, 2 facts are
to present even a prima facie proof thereof. Accordingly, the proper remedy is an
undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under 7 years old (having been born on September
action for custody and not habeas corpus as the latter is unavailable against the
21, 1995); and (2) Sharon and Herald were no longer married under the laws of the
US because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for
spouses separated in fact or in law is also undisputed: “no child under 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother x x x. (Article 213 (2) FC)”. This award of sole
parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy
consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. The
agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between them
over their minor child under 7 years old contravenes Philippine law.
The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated
because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together.
However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the
law if the child is below 7 years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. The
separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the
maternal custody of children below 7 years anymore than they can privately agree
that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or
afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under 7 as
these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive
maternal custody regime under the 2nd paragraph of Article 213.
The rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements
the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the visitation and other
privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with regime of sole maternal
custody under the 2nd paragraph of A. 213 which merely grants to the mother final
authority on the care and custody of the minor under 7 years of age, in case of
disagreements.
- Default custodial regime or mandatory maternal custody regime – 2nd
paragraph of A. 213 of the FC vesting on the mother sole custody of a child under 7
years of age.
- Default standard on child custody proceedings - the best interest of the
child.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10165 – THE FOSTER CARE ACT OF 2012
- CHILD- refers to a person below 18 years of age, or one who is over 18 but unable
to fully care of or protect oneself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of physical or mental disability or condition.
- Child with Special Needs – refers to a child with developmental or physical
disability.
- Foster Care – the provision of planned temporary substitute parental care to a child
by a poster parent.
- Foster Placement Authority (FPA) – the document issued by the DSWD authorizing
the placement of a particular child with the foster parent. The Foster Family Care
License is renewable every 3 years unless earlier revoked by the DSWD.
Matching – the judicious pairing of a child with foster parent and family members
based on the capacity and commitment of the foster parent to meet the individual
needs of the particular child and the capacity of the child to benefit from the
placement.
WHO MAY BE PLACED UNDER FOSTER CARE:
a. a child who is abandoned, surrendered, neglected, dependent or
orphaned;
b. a child who is a victim of sexual, physical, or any form of abuse or
exploitation;
c. a child with special needs;
d. a child whose family members are temporarily or permanently unable or
unwilling to provide the child with adequate care;
e. a child awaiting adoptive placement and who have to be prepared for
family life.
f. A child who needs long-term care and close family ties but who cannot be
placed for domestic adoption;
g. A child whose adoption has been disputed;
h. A child who is under socially difficult circumstances such as, but not
limited to, a street child, a child in armed conflict or a victim of child labor
or trafficking;
i. A child who committed a minor offense but is released on recognizance, or
one who is already in custody supervision or whose case is dismissed; and
j. A child who is in need of special protection as assessed by a social worker,
an agency or DSWD.
Provided, That in case of (b), (c), (f), (i), and (j), the child must have no family willing
and capable of caring and providing for him.
WHO MAY BE A FOSTER PARENT:
1) Must be of legal age, 16 years older than the child unless foster parent is
a relative, of good moral character, physically and mentally capable and
emotionally mature;
2) -Must have a genuine interest, capacity and commitment in parenting and
is able to provide a familial atmosphere for the child;
3) -Must have a healthy and harmonious relationship with each family
member living with him or her, have sufficient resources to be able to
provide for the family’s needs;
4) Must be willing to further hone or be trained on knowledge, attitudes and
skills in caring for a child and must not have the maximum # of children
under his foster care at the time of application or award.
5) the relatives of the child shall be deemed as best suited to become a
foster parent who is given priority if all the above qualifications are met.
6) -an alien who possessed the above qualifications and who has resided in
the Philippines for at least 12 continuous months and maintains such
residence until the termination of placement by the DSWD or expiration of
the foster family license, may also qualify.
7) Foster parents shall have the rights, duties and liabilities of persons
exercising substitute parental authority, but there is a prohibition on
inflicting corporal punishment upon the child (Article 233 Family Code).
GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION WHICH SHALL BE DONE BY THE DSWD
a. return of the child to biological parents;
b. placement for adoption of the child;
c. death of the child;
d. death of both foster parents;
e. expiration of the FPA; and
f. placement becomes prejudicial to the welfare of the child, such as but
not limited to, abandonment, maltreatment, sexual assault, violence or
other forms of abuse. In this case, the foster child with the assistance of a
registered social worker, shall have the option to apply for termination of
placement.
- Long-Term Foster Placement Authority (LTFPA)- if a child has been under the care of
the foster parent for at least 7 years, the foster parent may apply for LFTA with
following conditions:
a. return of the child to his biological parents or placement adoptive family
is not imminent;
b. foster parent continues to possess the required qualifications and a
valid foster family care license for the entire duration of the foster care;
c. a child, 10 years old or over, assisted by a social worker, gives written
consent for a long-term stay; and
d. the DSWD shall regularly monitor, asses and reevaluate the foster home
situation every 3 years to determine it is the best interest of the child to
continue living in the foster home on long-term basis.
LTFPA- does not require eventual adoption of the child but the child enjoys the rights
of the child under Article 3 of PD 603, and other laws. The foster child however, has
no mandatory rights to succession.
If foster parent unilaterally terminates the LTFPA before the child reaches the age of
majority or finishes tertiary education, the foster parent shall make provisions for the
education and basic needs of the child, in accordance with the standards in which
the child had been raised or has become accustomed to within said period if the
foster parent has the means to support the child in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
Adoption of the foster child by foster parent – conditions:
1) must have all the qualifications as provided by RA 8552 or RA 8043;
2) trial custody is waived; provided a harmonious relationship exists between
the child and his foster parent and family members;
3) procedure is governed by RA 8552 or RA 8043, as the case may be.
Assistance to a Foster Child:
1) monthly subsidy from the DSWD. Primarily for the support of the expenses
of the child to lessen the foster parent’s financial burden but may be
waived by the foster parent if financially capable.
2) an automatic PhilHealth beneficiary of the foster parent. If not, the foster
parent must seek enrollment with PhilHealth.
194. SUPPORT
Consists of everything indispensable for
1. Sustenance
2. Dwelling
3. Clothing
4. Medical Attendance
5. Education – profession, trade, vocation, even after reaching the age of
majority
6. Transportation – includes expenses going to and from school, and from work
Kinds of Support
1. As to amount
a. Natural Support (absolutely indispensable for sustenance of
recipient)
b. Civil Support (necessary for the circumstances and condition in
recipient’s civil and social life)
2. As to Source
a. Legal Support (provided by law)
b. Voluntary/Conventional/Patrimonial (by will- contract or
unilateral acts inter vivos/mortis causa)
c. Judicial support (springs from tribunal’s decisions; maybe
definite/provisional – pendent lite)
3. As to duration
a. Permanent, or General Support (Physical needs and lasts during
lifetime)
b. Temporary/Accidental (Intellectual development and generally
lasts during the minority of recipient)
Cessation of Support; Grounds (DWARRF)
1. Death of the Giver
 2. Reduction of Resources to a point where he cannot give 200. 2 OBLIGORS, 2 RECIPIENTS, NOT SOLIDAY
3. Recipient No longer needs allowance 1. 2 or more Obligors, the divided between them
4. Acts w/c gives rise to disinheritance 2. 2 or more Obligees, then Order except child and wife
5. When not legitimately related, and the latter being of age, is in need of 3. Not solidary- proportionate to resources of each
support due to causes imputable to his own fault or negligence (195)
6. Final Judgment granting petition for Annulment, Declaration of Nullity, or 201 AMOUNT OF SUPPOR TSUBJECT TO CHANGE
Legal Separation (198) 1. In proportion to the res9ources or means of the giver and necessities of the
a. (except when the other is the guilty spouse and still support is recipient
demandable by innocent one)
Characteristics of Support (PEEXDEPAVARE) 202 – Reduced or Increased proportionately according to reduction or increase of the
1. Personal necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person not obliged to
2. Exempt from Attachment and Execution furnish the same
3. Cannot be Compromised
4. Demandable from the time recipient needs it for maintenance but payable 203- Demandable from the time the person who has right to receive the same needs it
only from date of judicial or extrajudicial demand (203) for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
5. Payable within the 1st five days of each corresponding month demand
6. Variable in amount depending upon sources of the giver and necessities of
the recipient (202) Support pendent lite may be claimed in accordance with the RoC
7. Reciprocal on part of those bound to support one another
Payment shall be made within the 1st five days of each corresponding month. When the
195. PERSONS OBLIGED TO SUPPORT EACH OTHER; CHILDREN LEG/ILLEG recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance
1. Spouses (wife enjoys priority, except in concurrence w/child)
2. Legitimate Ascendants and Descendants 204- The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation
3. Parents and their Leg and their leg/illeg either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintain in the family dwelling
4. Parents and their Illeg and their laeg/illeg the person who has right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of
5. Leg brothers and sisters, whether full/half blood in case there is moral or legal obstacle.
NOTES:
 Support not allowable when child’s status is denied 205- the right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property
obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution.
 Husband not obliged to support wife’s adulterous child
 Well-off daughter cannot be obliged to support the abandoning mother
–Support furnished by stranger, Reimbursable
 Mere relationship not basis for support; must be imperative necessity
- Reimbursement; Requisites
 Unborn child is entitled to support
a. Support has been given to the dependent of one bound to give support, but
 Subsidiary Support: from brothers or sisters in absence of ascendants failed to do so
or descendants to grant support b. Support was supplied by a stranger
‘ c. Support was given without knowledge of the person charged with the duty
196. NOT LEGITIMATE BROTHERS OR SISTERS
1. Must support each other to the FULL EXTENT in 194 - Urgent support, furnished by stranger
2. Not imputable cause to one’s own, if 18 above - Reimbursement; Requisite
a. There is Urgent need for support
197. SOURCE OF SUPPORT b. Refusal of the Obligor to give support to a minor dependent
1. Separate property of Obligor except when none c. Maybe with or without the knowledge of the obligor
2. CPG ACP
208- When support may be a subject to attachment or execution
198 SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS General Rule:
1. Legal separation Right to give support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution (205).
2. Annulment Exception:
3. Nullity a. Contractual support or that given by Will
b. There is an excess in amount beyond that required for legal support
199 ORDER OF LIABILITY; Proximity of Relationship
1. Spouse
2. Ascendants in the nearest degree PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
3. Descendants in the nearest degree - Includes caring for and rearing of the children
4. Brothers and Sisters