More Machine guns, aircrafts and Bob

Denard just days after “Morthor” started

(a) Which attacks did you witness, and from where did you
witness them? `

The fact is that the Avikat was absolutely not built up to

fight the United Nations troops or movements. But there
was a growing need to defend the territories borders
against infiltrations and attacks of the central
government and Baluba rebels. Some aircrafts were
transformed to primitive bombers like the DC3 Dakota
KAT03 - C47KAT02 – and first three, but later only one
remaining Fouga Magister. We could see at least 4
Dove Havilland in the air (and one more which
exploded in the air in January 1961 - An Alouette
Helicopter KAT52 – Two Sikorsky’s S55 and S58 - A
Beechcraft, different types of Piper and Cessna - One
Do28 in august 1961 (Kipushi) followed by 4+1 more in
October (Kolwezi)… at least six Texan T6.
However I never have been a full “Air Force” specialist.
It was very surprising for me and everybody that such
a light jet aircraft could immobilize a whole army…
There was something wrong with the UN command.

Their only power resided in occupying a few places and

airfields and that was it, 90% of the region staying out of
control, but in the reach of a bombing or missile
guided Air Force.* A new way of warfare without a real
solution… only created to defend some questionable
economic values. New words such as collateral

* However in this case the UN didn't dispose of Bombers our Missiles

which made their situation desperate.
damage were invented to cover-up new issues. I could
see that around me when a small number of new
airplanes appeared in the Katanga sky.

What other planes did you see in the area that were
non-FAK?

Saab, Sabre, Canberra, DC4 and DC6, Globemaster.

The first time I shot at an aircraft was on September
17th, 1961. I shot a series of four bullets to a DC6.
I suspected that it was an ONUC airplane with
reinforcements. However some Gendarmes said to
cease shooting at it. They said that very maybe it could
be a civilian flight. It was difficult to see as there were
no visible UN marks on the airplane except maybe a
few unreadable letters or numbers.
The second time was on 7 December 1961 when a big
Globemaster flew over the square de l’ Uvira in a final
approach to Luano. I emptied a full loader of 21 rounds
in the belly and wings. The aircraft was so big and low
that I am sure that all my 21 rounds went into the plane
without any doubt. At the same time a dozen
gendarmes, armed with Mauser riffles, opened fire too.
Because they had to load their riffles after each shot
(repetition), they only fired two or three shots before the
plane was too far away. I was using a full automatic FN
FM (also called BAR). Later I heard that there was
almost a full company of Irish soldiers in it, who all sat
on their helmets to protect themselves, because they
could hear the sounds of the impacts of the incoming
fire. The aircraft could land and witnesses told that the
Kerosene was giggling all sides on the runway and that
the US ground crew was in panic because the Irish
troops had metal on their shoe soles. However nothing
happened. They were lucky that I didn’t have tracers.
One single tracer would have been enough to set the
whole plane in fire.
The third burst was direction an Indian Canberra jet
also in December 1961, and one bullet hit the cockpit
just in front of the head of the pilot without transpiercing
it. A lucky shot, especially for the pilot… of course the
hit could have be made by numerous other Katangese
firing at that jet on that day… but I couldn’t resist to
claim the shot. Afterwards.

(f) What airfields was FAK known to use?

Kipushi, KM30 Kasumbalesa road, Luano, Kolwezi,

Kisenge and Ndola, Kitwe (NR), Kamina, Kindu and
Jadotville… I only saw a few Fouga pilots in the air.
The Fouga Magister flights were hold on a territory
the size of France… So there massive appearance
on the battle field was only between September 13
and 18 with a total of less than 50 flights. This looks
a lot but only a few people have seen more than a
few of their actions…

Personally I only saw the pilots Dagonnier (RIP),

Dubois with Tshombe, and Magain in their Fouga, all
before august 1961. I do not exactly know who I have
seen in the air during operation Morthor. The name of
Magain is always mentioned as it could not be Van
Risseghem who was expelled by the UN. Of course I
met Puren, Delin, Bracco and Gurkitz and others too,
but I never saw them piloting an aircraft.
However it is very difficult to find out the whereabouts
of José Magain during the whole “Morthor”period.

Once I saw a Fouga Magister in the night of August 10,

not certain if it landed and took off again at KM30, just
past midnight.

I have also seen a piston engine aircraft (on its way)

bombing Luano after 10pm around September 16th.

I never saw air to air situations but I got a copy of a

page of a www book with a mention of it… but I did not
found back the exact site.

I only heard about one in the telegrams of Gullion in

which he stated that a commercial pilot recognized a
Fouga pilot as Van Risseghem flying wing to wing with
him. However the description of the pilot doesn’t match.
I also heard that a DC3 of the Unit Nations transporting
wounded was attacked too in the air but without
damage.

You have mentioned that a Mr. Schäfer flew a Dornier

D-28 to Katanga (possibly Kipushi) on or around 13
September 1961. Did you meet him? Did you see the
plane? Did he bring anyone else with him?

I saw a Do28, numbered 016 on the first Saturday of

September at Kipushi while visiting the small lake and
farm of a friend of us on that place with some other
smaller aircraft, kind of single engine pipers. Some
mercenaries talked briefly to us, strange new faces,
talking in a different French than ours. It was clear that
they were from France and not from Belgium. We
learned that more aircraft were expected however the
French asked us to leave the very small runway near to
the mining facilities. In the first week of November there
was a full description in the monthly review “Zondag
Nieuws” and in an English newspaper about these new
aircrafts. Most insiders in Elisabethville knew that this
was the work of Mr Cassart who had a very large facility
with assembly hall in the quartier industriel, almost on
the backside of the base terrestre. Several TexanT6
were assembled at that place but after Rumpunch the
place was emptied.
I have met (Jean) Cassart more than once in the house
of general Muke but I was not present during their
meetings in the large conference room downstairs.
Sometimes other personalities came to visit the
general, such as minister Munongo and Kimba with his
two sons, friends of Victor and me.
By the way: The majority of the own made 50 kg bombs
were dropped by the Texan-T6 FAK aircrafts. The
12,50kg were used by the Dove.

You have stated that Jan Van Risseghem told Pierre

Coppens that he was the one who shot down the
Albertina. Could you describe when Mr. Coppens told
you this?

I know Pierre since 2010 as I met him on Facebook. He

published a lot of airborne pictures and commando
training places. I could see that we both were on
several places together without meeting ourselves. We
became Facebook friends and exchanged a lot of
pictures of the 1964/66 period. He also could see that
I was in Katanga and he asked me if I knew the Pilot
Jan Van Risseghem. After a while he said to me that
Jan Van Risseghem had told him that he was the one
who shot down the Albertina.

Pierre started to give me more and more details, about

how Jan claimed to be the Lonely Ranger and invented
some simple “aiming and dropping” techniques. I had
no doubts at all about what Pierre was telling to me. I
simply didn’t know Jan Van Risseghem that way. I only
knew the activities of Jan Van Risseghem as a pilot
working with the Dakota or Dove Havilland. He found a
very handy “Bombardier” in Jerry Puren.
Beside that I always was convinced that the real
“Lonely Ranger” operating the KAT93 was the Belgian
pilot José Magain. I only did intensive research work
on the Fouga Magister because of the rumours that
there were two of them in the air. However I could never
find any evidence for it. As for its ability to execute a
very complicated air-to-air night attack with 100%
success… this is an impossibility! …
On the other hand I still believe that Jan Van
Risseghem told indeed that story to Pierre Coppens,
because maybe he needed a kind of cover-up because
he was involved in the delivery or purchase of the
famous six Do28 together with Jean Cassart. Both were
excellent friends from WWII and one saved the life of
the other. In 1963 Jean Cassart was arrested for the
illegal sale of these Dornier aircrafts but released after
eight months. So maybe Jan Van Risseghem did
spread some rumours but personally I do not think that
he did something with a Fouga.

Could you describe why you believe that the

pages in the flight log of Jan Van Risseghem
were written by his wife?

The origin of that news came for a part from Pierre

Coppens on one hand and on the other hand from the
Filmmakers of the Cold Case Dag Hammarskjöld via
their Belgian Intermediate Fons Feyaerts and later on
by their new intermediate Bruno Struys, a journalist of
the Newspaper “De Morgen”. There were also the
declarations of Roger Bracco that there were some
impossible flights and names in the Flight book of Jan
Van Risseghem showing that he was somewhere
else, far away from Ndola around the days after the
crash of the Albertina. Other messages dated just
before September 18th show he was in Brussels at
that time, again giving evidence that he was far away
from the scene. I didn’t have the opportunity to have a
look at the flight book myself but it surprises me to
hear from general Jan Vervoort that Jan only flew just
a little more than 13 hours on the Fouga Magister. On
the other hand I do not think that the other Avikat
pilots were keeping their flight plans or their Flight
books up to date. There were numerous deadly
causalities and among them probably a lot of civilians
and UN targets… all reasons to be possibly
prosecuted by justice. There is also the difficulty to get
a decent copy of the flight book as the old lady widow
Jan Van Risseghem is not found to collaborate with
 instances who are in fact accusing her husband of
murder.

You have stated that Roger Beuckels was not a pilot.

Did you know him personally? Could you describe
your interactions?

Since the story of de Kemoularia re-emerged around the

time that I started to use Facebook in 2009, the full story
of Roger Beuckels intrigued me and I was convinced that
it was an impossible story.

At that time the first private sites of Katanga veterans and

mercenaries emerged.

I became a member of at least a dozen of different of

these sites…the most important is this one:

https://www.facebook.com/Hakuna-Matata-1961-and-
Kwasiba-145747315840140/

https://www.facebook.com/groups/226514834084577/

In fact I got confirmation of what I suspected from some

old schoolmates of the military Academy of Zedelgem
(session 1963/64) that they had found a mercenary who
had served in the Mobutu Mercenary Commando Units in
1965. His name was Roger Beuckels. He should be the
pilot who shot down the Albertina. However, there was
something strange on that story. This appeared to be an
soldier without any military specialisation and certainly not
a pilot. One way or another he was contracted as a
lieutenant which was very remarkable. When I was
contacted by the filmmakers, through their intermediate
Bruno Feyaerts, one of his very first things he asked me
was “do you know a certain Beukels”. I was surprised to
see that he used the same misspelling as de Kemoularia,
of a name that I knew. I answered him that I knew a
person named Roger Beuckels, who falsely pretended to
de Kemoularia that he was the pilot whom shot down the
plane of Dag Hammarskjöld. I also said that he was not
really a subject of my investigation because he had
nothing to do with the Case Dag Hammarskjöld. I was
very surprised that Fons had a lot of information about him
about his past and even two pictures. I had only the
picture of the announcement of his dead. He also gave me
the type out versions in poor English of his activities.
Another surprising point was that Roger Beuckels had
tried to follow the same military academy as I did and for
a moment (because of the information received by Fons
Feyaerts) I thought that he could have been a roommate
of mine in the second academy year in Arlon. The letters
of Roger Beuckels and some information of Fons tells us
that he was sent away from Arlon because of serious
(criminal) behaviour. However, the information of Fons
mentioned wrong dates. Roger Beuckels was at the
infantry school of Arlon in 1959… (the same year as my
nephew François Rosez, another coincidence).

The Filmmakers invited me for an interview that would

happen in Europe or in Hong Kong. They asked me if I
knew more things about Jan van Risseghem and I
answered them that I had a good friend (I was talking
about Pierre Coppens) with an amazing story.
He had told me that Jan Van Risseghem had confessed
to him that he was the one who had shot down the
Albertina. Jan Van Risseghem and Pierre Coppens
became friends in 1965 when Jan Van Risseghem
became the pilot for a group Red Cross Airborne rescuers.
Jan Van Risseghem used to give endless stories about
the flights he did with his brother during WWII for the
(Polish) RAF and how later on he also flew for the SA
(South Africa) and RRAF (Rhodesia). He also described
his own invented technique to drop bombs. All of this was
told to me years before that the Cold Case Hammarskjöld
became hot news again.

So I told the Filmmakers about Pierre Coppens. They

asked me if I would allow them to contact Pierre Coppens
and I said to them that they had to ask Pierre himself and
I gave them his email address. They contacted him indeed
in Spain and even went over to there to have a live
interview. The filmmakers bombarded me with hundreds
of questions about several periods and events of Katanga
and the rest of the Congo. But they remained silence
about the life interview they had promised to me.
Meanwhile the Dag Hammarskjöld Case became more
and more actual and I had intense contacts with Maurin
Piccard of the newspaper “Le Soir” In New York. This very
good informed journalist even came to visit me in Hong
Kong for a live interview. He was the one who had seen
the notebook and some papers of Claude de Kemoularia
held by his daughter Elisabeth.
Here too, or again, I discovered that the investigation of
the United Nations in the past was of a very poor quality.
First of all, the wrongly named Beukel (Roger Beukels)
was a false lead maintained during more than half a
century (since 1967). Despite that it was a false lead, the
diplomat Claude de Kemoularia was wrongly accused to
have waited until the nineties to make the matter known.
Thanks to the evidences actually held by the daughter of
Claude de Kemoularia it is clear that the French diplomate
went to the “Préfet de Police” Grimaud in 1967, just days
after “de Troye(r)” came to him asking for a huge sum as
payment for the story. Claude also contacted Swedish
officials to let them know about what happened. None of
both, the French or Swedish authorities, did a thing with it.
As I was also in contact with Torben Gülstorff I decided to
publish some small articles on Facebook and Intel Today:
Text of the articles:
“We are wasting too much time looking for the case of the
diplomat Claude Demoularia and the officers (brothers) De
Troyer and Grant concerning the famous pilot Beukels who
would have descended the Albertina with on board the
secretary general of the United Nations Mr Dag Hammarskjöld.
This is a false track, the real name of this pilot is Roger
Beuckels who is not a pilot at all but a mercenary who served
in the 14th Commando in 1964/65 around Stanleyville where
he committed atrocities. It seems that he was also in Kipushi in
Katanga in 1962/63. Before that he already had a career as a
criminal … The officers De Troyer (yet occupying high positions
in the army) who brought this witness knew very well that this
Beukels was a false track … one can ask why they did this?”

I had some talks with Pierre that lasted a few years and I don’t
doubt about the fact that Jan Van Risseghem told Pierre that
he was the one who shot down the Albertina. On several places
in Brussels and Antwerp I heard for years the rumours
designing Jan as that famous Fouga Magister pilot that strafed
the “ONU” positions in Katanga. I remember to have met him
once at the airport of Deurne in Antwerp….On April 8th, 2014
News paper published an article in which a finger was pointed
to Jan Van Risseghem as the possible pilot who shot down the
DC6 of Dag Hammarskjöld. His widow Marjon said that all of
this was a mistake and that her husband couldn’t have done it
because he was somewhere else at the time. He has an alibi
as is shown in his log. But now , and Pierre confirmed me this,
there is something very strange with that log… the pages in that
log concerning the famous period of the crash are not written
by Jan Van Risseghem but by the hand of Marjon… that makes
that log a false evidence. An other strange effect is that in the
morning of September 18th, 1961 around 10:00 AM that same
Fouga Magister strafed Connor Cruise O’Brien at Elisabethville.
Just after that all the Katangese shooting stopped suddenly as
the news was spread that the plane of Dag Hammarskjöld went
down near to Ndola… How could that news have reached us
as the wreckage was only discovered at 03:30 PM ???
Another weak point in the original investigation is that “de
Kemoularia” has been blamed to have waited more than 20
years before going to the concerned authorities to tell them
about the “Beukels” claim. In his notebook we can see that he
did this already in 1968 (after the visits of 1967) when de Troyer
came to him asking for a huge amount. His notebook mentions
behind de name de Troye: refused (to pay) and the name of the
Préfet de police of Paris of that time! (Grimaud)
In a longer version I explained that the names of de Troyer
and Grant are existing names. “de Troyer Paul” was a
Belgian green beret para-commando commandant and
“de Troyer Jacques” was Major in a Belgian Genie unit.
Both served in the Katanga Gendarmerie in 1960/63.
Grant Donald and Ian were two South African brothers
serving in “Mad” Mike Hoara’s 5th commando in 1965.
(Mike Hoara was celebrating his 100th B-day this month in
Durban.) It is unthinkable that two of these four mentioned
persons were the visitors of de Kemoularia.
To make things more complicated a false information was
spread by an organization called “the Companions of the
Ommegang” pretending that the famous Roger Beuckels
was already in Katanga during the battle of Kipushi in
December-January 1962/63 under the command of a
certain Swanson. This organization is trying to stay under
the wings of what is called the humanitarian rescue
operation Red and Black Dragon done by the Belgian
Para-commando units at Stanleyville on 24/28 November
1964 at Stanleyville and Paulis. The Ommegang or 5th
mechanized Brigade arrived to late to participate on that
humanitarian operation and started to loot, plunder and
execute Simba prisoners. In 1965 Roger Beuckels
participated with these companions to clear the East
Congo. As a result the East of the Congo was completely
depopulated. Every village was looted and set on fire as
they were seen as collaborators. However the real rebel
Simba Army under command of Kabila, a force of around
6000, escaped to the neighboring countries including their
weapons and a few billion on financial values.
There are more mysteries…: Roger Beuckels served (see
his letters) in the 14th commando under commander
Tavernier. They both knew very well Jimmy “Le Belge”
Vogeleers, Charles Mazy et cetera… They all have one
thing in common with Roger Beuckels: They all were
questioned by the special police unit “Delta” concerning
their eventual participation in the deadly attacks of the
gang called “The Bende van Nijvel or in French “Les
tueurs du Brabant”)… Beuckels too was questioned a few
times by “Delta”. They had another thing in common too:
apart Beuckels who was the youngest the others knew
many things about the Avikat and the airplanes…

This note in green is not a part to publish: (personal comment).

After publication of these articles I got some “hard’ critique from
the filmmakers. They asked me not to publish topics of their
movie or information coming from them. This was very
surprising to me as I didn’t have any agreement with them. In
fact I was the one who gave them a lot of information and not
vice-versa. Beside that they didn’t keep their promise to give
me a live interview and a mention in the movie… This gave me
a bit of a sad feeling but on the other side I don’t care as much
as that about it. The reason of that is that I see the movie “The
Cold Case Dag Hammarskjöld” as a blunder. SAIMR is a hoax!

You mentioned a book that you are writing regarding the

above. Would it be possible to view an advance
manuscript or draft of this book?

I am indeed writing (or rewriting) the story of the Congo. It

has rather an extended anthropological structure than a
political one. This is accordingly to my main academically
formation.

While I was in the penultimate year Humanities

(Athenaeum), some of my friends who just finished their
High school in 1961 started a new or experimental faculty
at the Université de l’État (du Katanga) at Elisabethville.
This started just after operation Morthor.

The faculty fell under the organigram of the faculty of

Rights and carried the name “Post-colonial right” On my
demand I was admitted to the group. In a short time I had
become very mature. From a child age to be fully mature.

We all questioned not only the legitimacy of the presence

of the United Nations in the Congo or in Katanga and the
empire of South Kasai. These were the internal political
matters of an independent state our states.
Any attempt to interfere was an act of violating the auto
determination of a state and its inhabitants. The ideology
that we developed went much farther than that.
We looked back in history to the Leopold II and the Congo
Free State period.
He seized first of all the different Congo territories and
later on Katanga as a separated territory, not belonging to
the Congo. The ancient empire of the Lunda.
Even thousand year before that era Katanga had always
been an independent territory with an own culture and
language and history.
Beside that the 450 different ethnical groups, all with an
own language and territory had the right to knock on the
door of the Belgian government because of “the things of
the past”. One of the main points was the displacement
of hundreds of thousands of people needed on others
places as workforce. After the independence one could
see that this would create now a huge problem.
Secondly the whole of financial reserves of the Congo
were transferred to Belgium leaving the Congo in a debt.
The situation in Katanga was different because the young
state was auto supporting. Another matter was more
delicate.
It was a common knowledge that Belgian officers were
involved in the murder of Patrice Lumumba.
However it became very predictable that a major part of
the East Congo and Stanleyville would finally fall apart.
However, after 1963 this faculty would be forbidden by
Mobutu. The whole process to demonstrate that the time
under Leopold II, as the independent Congo Free State
from 1876 to 1908, and as a colony from 1909 until 1960
under the rule the of Belgian Government as Belgian-
Congo was a criminal and inhuman affair with multiple
democides. The Lumumba case disappeared in oblivion
as well as the possible assassination of Dag
Hammarskjöld. Nevertheless once my family settled again
in Brussel in the end of the seventies we continued to
support some political refugees living in exile. Every
weekend one of the sons of Moise Kapenda Tshombe,
Jean Tshombe, came to my father’s house to enjoy a real
Katangese meal with ingredients imported from Katanga.
This was possible as my father’s second wife was a,
Lunda. On many occasions, when I was in Brussels, I
visited the Mulopwe Albert Kalonji Ditunga, ruler of south
Kasai. He liked me very much! This was because he had
knew my father in the Kasai who spook beside Kiswahili
also the Tshiluba language.
Meanwhile I did during 25 year refugee work in the
Netherlands where I did two HBO in geographical and
physical anthropology. When the internet emerged things
changed. For the first time I had access to massif
information and the works of Jules Marchal, Adam
Hochschild and Susan Williams emerged. This allowed
me to collect enough information to start writing. I hope to
finish my four Volumes, on which I am working
simultaneously, in this year (2019).
A part of Volume III is dedicated to the stories of Katanga,
Dag Hammarskjöld and the (final) investigation…
The framework of it is represented by the short accounts
that I have sent (or will send) to the office of judge
Othman.
I apologize that it will take me some time before I will be
able to work again as usual… I will try to do my best
indeed to let you have a copy or a framework of my
book(s).
 Have you heard anything else regarding the plane
crash that resulted in the death of DH that you would like
to bring to my attention? Is there anyone else I should
speak to?

The very strange effect when on September 18th,

somewhere before noon the shooting stopped at many
places for some hours, and the news (the African Tam
Tam) was spread that the plane of the SG crashed near
to Ndola. The second news wave came later in the
afternoon with the precision that the DC6 Albertina would
have been shot down by one of our planes. It is very
difficult to situate exact times as many of us were
listening to various broadcasting stations operating in
different time zones. So there could be a difference of
certainly 2 hours if you were listening to Brazzaville,
Luanda or Ndola. That’s why many testimonies are also
qualified as unreliable. There was however no immediate
mention of the participation of the Fouga albeit that next
day there was a unanimity among many that this was the
work of José Magain. But many years later, almost half a
century, suddenly a new culprit was found. Why?
This was due to a telegram from Gullion the US
ambassador in the Congo.
A commercial pilot had recognized a large “bearded”
man? Let us have a look how the Fouga Magister pilots
looked alike once they were full dressed as pilots.
This includes:
A radio set headset
A helmet with sun (optional) glazes
An oxygen mask
All part covering 100% of the face and head.
Personally I didn’t know any large and bearded pilots.
1-Fouga Magister Full helmet set

2-Joseph Delin

3- President Tshombe as co-pilot

September 13th and the interference of Bob
Denard, the Gendarmes and O’Brien in the
Clair Manoir with the Irish and Gurkhas.

In the first and second week of August, Jimmy

Hedges went to Kolwezi to assist in some night
exercises with different types of airplanes.
This included at least one night take-off and landing
at Kolwezi by Jan van Risseghem in a solo flight and
one with the assistance of Roger Bracco. This would
include a possible relay Kolwezi-Kitwe-Kolwezi at
night. However it is very difficult (impossible) to find
confirmation about this by other sources about this
as Jimmy Hedges did stay only a few days at
Elisabethville when he came back from Kolwezi
before leaving the country on UN demand. However
on the Facebook pages of 2019 one could read that
a retired Belgian general confirmed for a part these
facts. This general also pretended to have proof that
Jan Van Risseghem was at Brazzaville around
September where he also flew the D028 3016 on
eight occasions. However only one Fouga remained
as, back in early August, at one occasion we could
see a Fouga Magister in the air flying direction
Luano. I think that it was the Kat92 with some issues,
a few weeks later we got Rumpunch.The mood in
Elisabethville became very weird after Rumpunch
and the presence of UN military in the Katangese
establishments was less and less tolerated.
The “Jeunesse Katangaise or the Katangese youth”
organized their daily demonstrations and were
armed with slingshots shooting steel ball bearings to
UN cars.
It were very busy months after the celebration of the
first anniversary of the independence of Katanga
and the International Exposition. We got the military
parades all accompanied by an important number of
Belgian or foreign advisors. However, there was
order and prosperity everywhere. We often used the
week-ends to spend a night at the mine the l’Étoile
Lake or at the farms of our friend near to Kipushi.
Kipushi was very special to us as it had several bars
and a nice swimming pool. It was also home to a lot
of mercenaries. They had built a kind of a fortress on
a hill called “Simba”.
On the first week-end of September we had a kind of
reunion before the new schoolyear would start.
But the situation was fragile as we could see on the
attitude of the gendarmes and mercenaries.
On September 11 our school, the International
Institute would restart with a delay of one week, but
on arrival we were sent home with the message to
stay as much as possible inside our living places.
There was something in the Air.
Early in the morning several incidents were reported
and the school direction had taken these security
measures. My schoolmate jean-Claude (15) was
shot down. By purpose or by a stray bullet ?
When I came home in the avenue des Sapinières of
the residential area Bel Air my parents were shocked
when they hearth the story and decided to move the
following day to the Square de l’Uvira instead of
waiting until all our belongings and furniture were
moved to the avenue des Aviateurs and the square
de l’Uvira. A truck of the BCK would transport the
most important items in the late afternoon.
More details about the Kasenga tunnel incident.

On nine eleven or September 11th, 1961 I went to my

school the “Royal Athenaeum”, which carried now the
name of “Institut International”.
However we were sent home as there were rumors that
the ONUC would undertake new actions. I was on my
way to the avenue des Sapinières in the residential area
“Bel Air”. I was walking with another, younger, student on
my side.
I knew that his name was Jean-Claude. When we
crossed the railway bridge on the Chaussée de Kasenga
we saw below the pedestrian path, a roadblock with
armed Irish soldiers. Arriving on the other side we saw
a Katangese jeep with a “white” mercenary driver coming
our direction.
Jean-Claude made a few steps aside to the railing,
waving with his arms and pointing to the road blocks.
The jeep managed to make a U turn and to speed away.
A few seconds later fire was opened and I could see how
my schoolmate went down. The only thing I could do was
jumping away behind some walls and run away.
Later I heard that the wounded Jean-Claude was
transported urgently to a hospital in Kitwe where he died
a few days later.

This would change my life forever…

The apocalyptic spook sat by the door and two days later
Elisabethville woke up in its world.
Operation Morthor was started and KAT93 would made
history.
This very strategic place was respectively occupied by UN and Katangese forces in 1961.

.
My father telephoned to some colleagues and was
informed that Jean-Claude was taken away by an
ambulance. My mother decided to stay for a few day
in the shelters of the College of the White Fathers de
la Salle on demand of other woman.
To bring her to the College shelter by car, he didn’t
take the Kasenga tunnel, but made a very large
detour to avoid it.
A few days later there would be a hell of a fight
around this place that finally was won by the
gendarmes. It is from the first picture where we see
Katangese soldiers (after the takeover by them) that
the Irish shot down schoolmate Jean-Claude.
He was almost on the end of the white pedestrian
strip, 100m away from the Irish road block below and
the guards on top of the bridge, when he saw the
jeep coming and he started to wave to the driver
when it happened (see red dot on the picture). The
following first picture shows Katangese gendarmes
when they took over the tunnel after a long and
heavy fight.
The second picture shows the same place when it
was occupied by Irish ONUC, but with a kind of
double road block below the tunnel. However both
pictures are from two posterior times and showing
both sides of the tunnel.
Later on the day there were more shots and there
was a huge traffic of thousands of Baluba leaving
their homes joining the ONUC positions near to the
quartier Bel-Air.
On September 13th I wake up around 5 o’ clock in
the morning by the sound of running boots and hard
voices…
Before dawn, on 13 September 1961, at 2:30am Irish
troops marched to their positions and the official
representor of the United Nations, Conor Cruise
O’Brien launched operation « Morthor » with the
intention to put an end on the Katangese secession.
At four in the morning all strategic points of the town
were occupied or surrounded by a huge UN force.
Close to the post, just at the entry of the Belgian
Consulate a Swedish military from behind the
machine guns of a armored car summoned the
Katangese gendarmes to surrender. He gave them
an half hour to do so and added that after that fire
would be opened. But after barely five minutes
without further warning the machine guns began to
shoot on the facade and windows of the post
building. The Indians were running and preparing for
a final assault but the resistance was stronger as
expected and it would take several hours before the
building was conquered. There was only one single
platoon of 30 Katangese parachutists on duty that
day. After the events the UN blamed the Belgian
consulate that they had fired a shot while the
Swedish officers were negotiating with the
gendarmes. However, the shot came from the villa
of Munongo where the Irish were trying to arrest
Munongo. Here follows the witnessing of a friend, a
Belgian Military radio operator, who was at the
consulate looking through the window just above the
Swedish armored car (that we used to call bath
tubs). He could have jumped in it.
J.S. asked me not to mention his name:
Cher Monsieur Rosez,
Cela fait toujours plaisir de se remémorer certaines
situations et particulièrement le KATANGA.
En juillet 60 je suis parti avec les 1ers guides pour
Kamina ou nous sommes restés 2 jours.
Avec les avions à 2 queux (je ne me souviens plus
du nom) direction E'ville ou nous logeons dans les
locaux de l'université.
(C’étaient des C-119 flying Box Cars)
Puis sur l'avenue Kasaï (pas bien loi de la poste.
Etant opérateur radio, lorsque notre régiment est
reparti en août, je suis resté avec un autre volontaire
et on nous a fourrés au consulat de Belgique.
Je suis resté 15 mois au consulat.
La suite vous la connaissez expulsion par l'ONU
(j'étais payé par la gendarmerie Katangaise...).
L'attaque de la poste, je l'ai vécue de près.
En effet, je logeais chaque nuit à l'intérieur du
Consulat.
Cette nuit-là, J'étais rentré vers 2 heures du matin
après avoir été boire quelques verres au bistrot en
face de la poste tenue par une blonde...
Vers 5 heures du matin je suis réveillé par les voix
émanant d'un parlophone d'une baignoire
Onusienne garée en dessous du bâtiment sur le
rond-point.
De mon local ou je me reposais je pouvais voir une
grande partie de la poste le coin du bâtiment
ELEKAT et l'hôtel Bellevue transformée en hôpital
par l'ONU.
Quelques minutes se sont écoulées… puis les
mitrailleuses onusiennes se sont mises en routes,
j’étais aux premières loges.
Cela a duré très longtemps à un moment donné le
Colonel Van de Walle et le commandant Smal sont
venus me rejoindre sur la terrasse du consulat et
nous avons observé la scène…..
A un moment j’ai aperçu un soldat Katangais qui
venait de sauter sur les auvents des boites postales,
le pauvre a couru en sautant d’auvents en auvents
suivi par les impacts d’un mitrailleuse, le bâtiment de
l’Élakat ne m’a pas permis de connaître la suite de
cette histoire.
Le matin, c’est là que j’ai assisté au « lynchage » des
4 soldats katangais assassinés par une mitrailleuse
depuis l’hôpital ONU et dans le dos. Ils ont été
froidement abattus.
La nuit, les onusiens se sont amusés sur les
bâtiments du consulat…
Nous logions tous (+- 30 personnes) dans les
couloirs intérieurs.
Voilà ma petite histoire…
Je suis retourné au Congo par après...(stan)
Puis comme civil à L'shi (entrepreneur).
J'ai travaillé en Arabie Saoudite.
J'ai travaillé pour Forest à Kinshasa !
Au Gabon !
Et maintenant, je suis à la retraite et j'habite
Ténériffe. J.S.

Au plaisir de vous lire

An Irish UN volunteer tells us:
The second witnessing is even absolutely neutral as
it is supported by all his Irish UN friends who are
giving a similar story. Some of these young boys,
same age as me at the time became sick with
permanent horrible nightmares upon today.
It is not relevant what it did to me but I still can feel
by while, that penetrating smell of rotten human
bodies, or at other moment the smell of roasted meat
mixed with the odors of black gunpowder and other
explosives
This action, together with the events around the Post
Office in the center of the town changed completely
the attitude of the local population and expats
against the ONU. This was already visible when
operation Rumpunch started and evolved in feeling
of horror. This was the end of friendly contacts, the
abundant supplying of fresh meat, vegetables,
drinks and the tolerated of their presence in many
private areas.
One thing was clear. The Katangese population was
suddenly very aware of the fact that they were
looking to two different things. On one side we had
the Security Council with the mandate of February
1961 which didn’t allow what was going on actually
in an operation called Morthor. That’s why there
would be issued a new mandate by the SC on
September 19th. That means that one way or
another O’Brien and the Indian military command
had decided to launch Morthor prior to that mandate
despite that Khiary had promised to Dag
Hammarskjöld to wait with the action until his arrival
at Leopoldville because the legal advisors had
warned repeatedly that many aspects of what would
be called operation Morthor were illegal and even
forbidden by the SC mandate of February 1961.
The advice was not to launch the operation prior to
the eventual new SC mandate of September 19th,
1961. What Hammarskjöld didn’t know was that
O’Brian and general Raja had decided to
“exterminate all military and political power of
Katanga” in an “all out” strike. This did not only
include the capture of Munongo but eventually his
physical elimination.
The orders concerning gendarmerie resistance were
clear. No prisoners!
There were no facilities for that and the final target
was not anymore the capture of foreign advisors and
mercenaries, but the ending of the Katangese
secession.
This was trespassing (violating) largely the UN
mandate of February. Worse of all was that a large
series of bloody things that happened could be
described as crimes of war and violation of the
conventions of Genève.
This witness is also an introduction to the presence
of Bob Denard 0n September 15th who was back,
just in time, to assist in a fight which is often called
the fight of “Radio Collège” on September 15th, 1961.
A small parachutist platoon was led by some civilians
(Robert Denard, Faulques, Ropignol and others),
 OQ2AB, Radio Elisabeth, É’ville, 7150 and 11900;
OQ2AC, Radio College, É’ville, 3390, 4980 and 7200 kc.
6 and 7. In these buildings more than 100 European
refugees, many male students.
15. Shows the IMJ school for girls, more than 200
refugees all girls and woman. My mother was awaiting us
in 6 when the attacks started. We couldn’t join her that
day. I was in the house of General Muke in uniform.
Seized by Irish 14. 0913 at 8:45 pm two Irish armored car, a bus and a
jeep came looking after them but they would be
destroyed by the gendarmes and a very long fight broke
without a fight out that lasted until the evening of 0915. The Irish were
hiding in the house of “Commissaire Soete”. I was
at 4pm several times in the college between the 14th and 16th of
surrounded by September. My father too.
Gendarmes
 17 - avenue des Savonniers – Irish and Swedish Camp
18 - Tunnel chaussée de Kasenga … see also next pictures
19 - Poste
20 - Railway station
17 21 - Hôpital de la croix rouge – hospital used by ONUC as a
fortress and storage for ammunition brought by ambulances.
20 22 - Radio Katanga – see below
21 23 - The fortress Clair Manoir HQ of O’Brien see next pictures
19 24 – Avenue Droogman
18 On the avenue Delvaux the Indian troops committed horrifying
crimes of war on 30 prisoners, all buried in a temporary mass
grave by civilian citizens. After the attack the Indian military
retreated to the HO on the Clair Manoir refusing to support the
Irish unit at Radio College which would result in 4 Irish death
and the imprisonment of 24 others. The reason for their retreat
was the rumor that the gendarmes wanted to kill all the Indians
because of the massacres. They were very lucky that the HQ
Clair Manoir was a real fortress and the gendarmes didn’t
succeed to overwhelm the compound, even not with the
support of the Fouga Magister the day that Dag Hammarskjöld
died.
The college was also a safety place as it was a completely
closed square with high walls.
The number of refugees would increase every day.
An important number left Elisabethville direction North
Rhodesia where they were welcomed.

24

21
 And the participation With the participation of Ropagnol,

The fights around Radio Collège, avenue de Ruwe and Wangermée on September 15th, 1961 resulting in the imprisonment of 24 Irish ONUC soldiers by the Katangese Parachutists and the participation of
Faulques, Ropignol and Denard. Before the Irish surrendered they were hidden in the house of “Commissaire Soete”, he was the one who did disappear the body of Lumumba with sulfuric acid.
 22

23

22

Sept 15th, 1961

This must be on the night of September 15th and 16th when we were blocked for a few hours in the college because of the heavy
shooting. In the morning I saw a young schoolmate (Karel) with his Lambretta parked at the entry of one of the villas, I would meet him
back under different circumstances in December in company of Robert Denard.
In December I showed them a safety trail to go from one way of the town to the other. Karel and Robert had become good friends in
December. But on this 15th of September we could see from a distance Robert Denard together with at least 5 other mercenaries with
our volunteer Jean-Baptiste Dubois and the others were probably Faulques, Ropignol and de Saint-Paul but at that time I didn’t know
their full names that well.
They were searching in the streets and abandoned houses for eventual solitairy or escaped Irish military. The complete area around
the “Institut Marie José”, the Elisabeth hospital and the college was UN free now. However the number of gendarmes holding the area
was very small, less than two platoons, and most of other small groups were operating independently. Radio College started
broadcasting again, inciting the population to combat together with all means the presence of the ANC and the ONUC. I think that they
were on their way to the Clair Manoir of O’Brien.
Rumors said that there was a huge price on his head. General Muke was commanding the remains of the camp Massart to defend the
camp and the Union Minière installations. Many of his men were dispersed in the town and it took him some time to call them back. He
also demanded the intervention of the Avikat. He was also briefly on the base terrestre telling his men that they must hold the avenue
Saio and the way to the cemetery and avenue Savoniers. Witnesses, and some of my schoolmates (such as Karel Coeck) hiding in the
college with their parents, told us that the fight around Radio College has been terrible and the smell horrible.
And that a complete Irish platoon was destroyed, some of their armored cars, a jeep and a bus still burning. There was not a real
command. So I didn’t join the group of Gendarmes because we had to return back to the square de l’Uvira. Inside the College a few
hundred refugees, most woman and children of European agents and business men had found a secure place.
We went there to get some food and most important of all some fresh water and trying to bring my mother to our new home. But we had
to wait for dawn, we couldn’t risk to go back in an absolute dark night as electricity was cut and using the beam lights of the car was
suicidal…
I can’t remember the number of times I went on my own from the square de l’Uvira to the college or to the “base terrestre” to collect
food and ammunition.
On the morning of September 16th another news reached the small unit at the Square de l’Uvira. One of the Belgian officers, allowed
to serve by the Belgian government as “military advisors” in the Gendarmerie of Tshombe, had left the camp Massart. He was probably
on his way to the Clair Manoir to give some fire support. Unfortunately he came in the field of view of the Irish or Swedish defending the
tunnel of the Kasenga road and was shot by a sniper.
The bullet went through his neck and he probably died within minutes while the driver drove the armored car in a full speed to the
Elisabeth hospital.
But nothing could help the very well know lieutenant anymore. His name was count A. Legrelle.
After this sad news general Muke resembled al his troops of the camp Massart and chased away the Irish from this strategic place,
killing three or four of them. The Swedish troops also retreated. In the same time the Fouga Magister strafed the Luano airport destroying
several airplanes.
While we can find in many UN files that the KAT92 was flown by the Belgian pilot Major Joseph Delin, this are two wrong statements.
First of all it was the KAT93 which was the only remaining Fouga Magister of the FAK and not the KAT92 that was seized by the UN at
Luano on August 28.
Major Delin was the commander of the base at Kolwezi Airport. However he was always pretending that he was the pilot when there
were journalists and other witnesses around. He posed as the aircraft's pilot to mask the fact that it was flown by José Magain, a former
Belgian Air Force pilot.
While José Magain, the real pilot disappeared discretely, Delin stepped forward. He did that because Magain was in fact officially evicted
from Katanga on August 28th 1961, but hide himself at Kolwezi and took part in the combats.
Sometimes, Delin was accompanying Magain as co-operator on combat missions, but Magain was in fact the so called lonely ranger.
To make it more complicate Jan van Risseghem didn’t like to give his real name as there was a great difficulty in spelling or pronunciation.
So he often said “I am from Lint” but using the French language he really said “Je suis de Lint” and that sounds perfectly like “Je suis
Delin – I am Delin).
The released secret documents of the "Mission Katangaise" are showing confusing dates which have led to wrong conclusions.The
payments sheet shows that both, Bob Denard and Jan van Risseghem received 1000NFFr and 1500NFFr. (The value of the new French
Franc was 12.5 Belgian Frank or 0.25 US$. That means they received 250$ and 375$ which was their monthly salary.
This were reasonable high amounts for that time.
The payments on the sheet were done on September 16th, 1961. This led to the conclusion that both were still present in Europe on
that date. Gürkitz was also mentioned on that sheet. But other undeniable evidence shows that Bob Denard was in Elisabethville on
September 15th, where he helped to capture the 24 Irish in the area of Radio College, avenues Wangermée and Ruwe. On the other
hand, we could see Gürkitz on the airport of Ndola together with a whole bunch of other pilots and mercenaries whom all were expelled
around September 7th by the UN. Why the sheet shows different dates? The answer is very simple: the dates appearing on the Katanga
mission (and used as evidence) are not the real time dates of the events, but rather the "booking dates" of the documents (with a
probable delay of several days). It is very strange that the famous operation "Morthor" happened one week prior to the plans to issue a
new "Security Council Resolution" on September 19th. Despite that the SG had given the green light for all operations he had received
the insurance that nothing would be done before his arrival in the Congo. The filmmakers are trying to put the blame on the secretary
general by pretending that he knew in advance about "Morthor" and that he gave his fiat for the operation. A newly discovered (2017)
telegram of the SG to Linner would give evidence of that. But that is an interpretation issue already analyzed 45 years ago.
There is no reason at all to reject other points of view about it... something what the filmmakers did on several occasions, using terms
as you are wrong... you are swimming in deep waters.
All this, not in a descent private message, but openly and aggressively on a site with many members which is not theirs. This are in
general “single minded” attitudes that mostly can be found in military absolutism with their “yes sir… no sir!” style!
To understand the deeper psychology behind historical facts, one can only give a full testimony of it through the inerasable collective
emotions he experienced as being a living part of many others in a specific time and space. It is the unsuspected start of that operation,
ordered by O’Brien that caused the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and not the secret operation "Celeste" or an impossible "Fouga
Magister" night attack by Jan van Risseghem.
However the question remains open:
Where could Jan van Risseghem have been that historical night and where was the lonely and invisible José Magain that night?
Was a Do28 coming from Kipushi waiting for the DC6B...?
Who could have been its pilot and door gunner?

Description of the atrocities of Radio Katanga:

https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=gHtAnBPzy30C&pg=PA95&lpg=PA95&dq=Radio+coll%C3%A8ge+avenue+de+Kambove&source=bl&ots=Ojcjrf-
NKM&sig=ACfU3U1lLNoz95eN738EaMXi5cC_q15d1g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi9kv3jka7hAhXIQN4KHe5qAUEQ6AEwBXoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Radio%2
0coll%C3%A8ge%20avenue%20de%20Kambove&f=false
 59

and
Clair Manoir

59. Radio Katanga

High resolution zoom in for details

City Park (IMJ) – avenue de Kambove and Wangermée. On the head of the two rows there is a leading French mercenary
État du Katanga
Border
Encounter zone
with the 3016
Several options

Use of a Browning .30 with tracers and incendiary rounds

Use of a FN FN (BAR) .303 with tracers and incendiary “.
Use of a FN FALO 7.62mm “ “ “ “ “

To stabilize the Mi one or several Bungee Cords could

have been used.

As alternative a bipod or fixed tripod could be used.

The door-gunner is wearing a secured Type-X Irvin

harness (or eventually a Monkey Harness).

However the use of the lighter FALO or FNFM automatic

machine guns are very precise, even at night if in hands of
a sharpshooter…

In fact “one single tracer or incendiary head” in one of the

only half full Kerosene tanks would set fire on them
creating even a small explosion, setting the wing on fire
which would collapse into the fuselage within 2 or 3
minutes.

Almost nobody knew about the Do28 and its possibilities.

The simultaneous spread of an intervention of a Fouga, or

a Dove, or the suicide intervention of Gheysels, the
placing of a bomb by the Union Minière or others (the
name SAIMR was never used in that time), all were
investigated…. But the Dornier 28 didn’t exist.
There is another anomaly in the final approach of the Albertina. Beside that it is possible, but not usual at all, to set the flaps at 30
degrees and to set down and lock the landing gears at a distance of 11 miles while still making the last 45 degrees of the reversal turn.
This would be rather an emergency situation when the pilot decides to put down the aircraft in an emergency landing due to a severe
cause like a fire in a motor or wing. On the picture we can see that the crash site is in line with the runway. But we have to consider
that the landing gear and the flaps take a few miles of flight before they are set or locked, especially the gears. There is no doubt at all
that the Albertina was shot down

The ground troops were there just in time. On a very strange way they were using almost the same land rovers as the Rhodesian Anti-
Riot police. However the Rhodesian Land Rovers were painted in a very dark green compared to the deep blue almost black of the
ground troops. Were this still some secret units of Trinquier still in business despite being dismissed by Tshombe?
At 00:12 the ground troops on the outskirt of the runway were awaiting. Their target was to intercept the Albertina on the runway and
capture the SG, dead or alive. Then they heard the communication of the door-gunner of the 3016 announcing that the Albertina was
localized in final approach. Not aware that they could be heard by other (relay) stations Southall could suddenly hear some very short
bursts and the voice of the door gunner of the 3016:
"I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing."
At that moment all communications were closed.
It took the ground troops almost one and a half hour to reach the crash site where they found the SG projected out of the burning plane.
They set on fire other parts of the fuselage and some fuel tanks, insured themselves that there were no survivors and left the scene.
It was as predicted a very easy job. They didn’t see Julien! One or two tracer or incendiary bullets in the short bursts made by the door-
gunner were enough to set the wing on fire… in fact one single tracer would have done the job too…
The whole plan was good conceived and executed. Some of the ground troops could be found in the Astoria Hotel Bar, telling to others,
loud enough for the ears of some journalists how they shot down the Albertina using a Katangese Fouga Magister. Others said they
had seen a Dove in the air, transformed to a light bomber with a bomb dropping system in the floor and a Browning mi.30 or even a
mi.50 as shown by the newly attracted Avikat Commander Zumbach (aka Mister Brown) early 1962. Confusion was complete!
This door gunner just shot down a very small drone…
Fouga Magister fire capacity.
Only Air to Sol in daylight
What does Victor E. Rosez says about this:

While many very complicated scenarios are advanced,

one has to consider them as attempts to ridicule the
theory of an attack in the Night of 17 to 18 September,
just past midnight in the vicinity of Ndola Airport during
the 45R/180/45L reversal turn, just past the inbound
point. The D.C.-6B SE-BDY Albertina, with on board
the second Secretary General of the United Nations,
Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl crashed at 9.5 mile from the
runway of Ndola. He Died together with the 15 other
passengers, crewmembers and military.
There were also numerous attempts to create whole
series of false tracks: Van Risseghem, Gheysels, the
2kg Dynamite Bomb, and most of all that unbelievable
stupid Roger Beuckels story, launched by Claude de
Kemoularia. Meanwhile another time wasting blunder is
in the air with a late apartheids joke called SAIMR and
its commodore, launched by a filmmaker’s fantasy.
Once again: the story is very simple. There was an
invisible outsider, a Do28 with a door-gunner
connected to its pilot with an intercom system
copycatted by Zumbach aka Mister Brown when he
came in charge of the
Avikat in January 1962.
Or didn’t he copycat at
all and was he, the
inventor of the system?
Was he at Ndola, and
was he in the air that
night?

(pic: Mr. Brown early ‘62

In Katanga)
 The pilot

Did the Albertina circumnavigate the boot of Katanga (Red line),

coming from the South-East point of the Tanganyika Lake or
was the pilot going almost full south traversing over a distance
of 120km the Katanga boot, (Blue line). In both cases the
Albertina couldn’t have been far away from a Katangese runway.
In the zone with the green dashed line a Do28 (range 1680km)
or a Dove (range 2222km) could have been in the air, waiting to
meet or localize the exact position of the Albertina as there were
several radio transmissions. Another aircraft on a runway near
to the border, possibly the KAT 93, could have intercepted the
DC-6 (by Jan van Risseghem, as witnessed by P.C.!)
However more scenarios are possible too:
This little single Fouga was very confusing. It is very difficult to resume the number of attacks it did during the eight days that operation
Morthor lasted. Some estimations are talking about 50 flights or attacks. This is also the raison why it was thought that there were two
Fouga in the air. However a very long research didn’t give me the evidence that it was so.
Amother confusing thing is the real identity of the KAT93 pilot. One thing is sure, it could not have been Jan Van Risseghem for all the
attacks before September 17th. Many sources are mentioning that the pilot before that date was the Belgian José Magain. However in
a telegram of ambassador Gullion we can read that a commercial pilot was suddenly surprised by a wing to wing flight by the Fouga.
The commercial pilot could see the face of the pilot which he described as large and bearded.
None of the face of Delin, Magain, Bracco or Van Risseghem and Puren that I know are large persons or are bearded.
Let’s have a look to the main activities of the KAT93…

Several airplanes were destroyed on the ground by the Katanga Air Force Fouga Magister KAT93.
On 13 September, a DC-3 UN-209 destroyed by fire during after being hit when a Fouga Magister jet attacked at Elizabethville Airport
I didn’t witness that and I think that the Fouga came from Kisenge (via Kolwezi?).

On 14 September the Irish troops were attacked several times at the Purfina Station at Jadotville at 1pm. More than 50 trucks and the
radio were destroyed during the attacks.

On 15 September, a DC-4 OO-ADN was parked directly in front of the tower at the Elizabethville Airport (now Lubumbashi).
The KAT93 attacked the airport and dropped two 25 kg bombs, of which one made a direct hit on the DC-4.
The Fouga went on to circle and strafing several accommodations of the runway. (Some sources mention its destruction on the 14th)

On 16 September, it provided close air support to Katangese troops attacking UN troops at Jadotville and two UN companies trying to
relieve them, chased away a UN helicopter at Jadotville, attacked a parked UN DC-3 at Kamina, and carried out another airstrike on
UN troops at Elisabethville.
On 17 September I heard for the first time that the KAT93 had made an air/air attack. Finally it was nothing more than chasing a DC3
transporting wounded men. Katangese troops attacking UN position at Kamina got on several occasions air support from the Fouga that
day and a Sabena DC-4 was destroyed at the base.

On the famous Monday of 18 September 1961, the KAT93 attacked the ONUC Head Quarters of Conor Cruse O’Brien at the Clair
Manoir.
Number of attacks: 3
First was the dropping of a bomb
Second was a strafing by machine guns
Third was a flying over without further action.
Coming in from the North following probably the road to Jadotville flying high over our heads in the square d’Uvira direction Avenue
Stanley and diving to the Clair Manoir… causing a general Euphoria… it was thought for a moment that both, as well O’Brien as Dag
Hammarskjöld were killed on the same day.

KAT-93’s career was finally ended on December 5th 1961, when she was hit by bombs at Kolwezi airport by Indian Air Force Canberra’s
of the UN aerial contingent; she was subsequently transported by train to Kisenge, where repairs were ultimately abandoned due to the
non-availability of spare parts. Later on the KAT 93 was seen on the airport of Luanda in Angola.
 NO CFIT
Background to the Crash

A plane carrying the Secretary General of the United

Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, crashed while approaching
the Ndola (Zambia) airport on September 18, 1961. The
exact time of the crash is unknown, although it was around
midnight. The DC-6, named Albertina, had flown a
circuitous route from Kinshasa, the capital of the Congo, to
Ndola, a large town in what was then Northern Rhodesia.
The purpose of the flight was to bring Secretary
Hammarskjöld to a meeting with Moise Tshombe, the
president of the breakaway republic of Katanga, in which
many western (British, French, Belgian and American)
investors had large stakes in various mineral deposits.

Those corporate interests had supported independence for

Katanga after the Congolese leadership, notably Prime
Minister Patrice Lumumba, had advocated closer relations
with the Communist bloc. (Lumumba, himself, was
assassinated in January 1961, in what some researchers
now believe was part of a Central Intelligence Agency plot
to get rid of him.) For his part, Hammarskjöld believed that
the Congo ought to remain one country, and toward that
end he was flying to Ndola (just over the border of Northern
Rhodesia from Katanga) to have ceasefire talks with
Tshombe, in the hope of mediating a settlement to the
conflict. Instead, his plane crashed in the darkness, killing
fifteen of the sixteen passengers and crew aboard the DC6.
One security officer for Hammarskjöld survived for about
eight days.
Since the fatal crash, various investigative instruments,
including UN committees and independent aviation groups
in the United Kingdom and Sweden, have looked into the
cause of the crash. The initial investigation, conducted by
colonial authorities in 1961, concluded that the pilots of the
DC-6 (an experienced Swedish crew) had misjudged the
night landing on an unfamiliar approach and flew the plane
into the ground. A UN inquiry at the same time, however,
failed to reach the same conclusion, although it was at a
loss to explain the crash.

More recent inquiries, including one chaired by Stephen

Sedley and with Hans Corell and Richard Goldstone as co-
panellists, have come to more nuanced conclusions, saying
that earlier investigators lacked a true picture of the
situation on the ground and in the air around Ndola that
night to come to definitive conclusion about what happened
to the Albertina. It has led to new inquiry, originally
supported by then Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and
approved by the UN Security Council, to reopen the
investigation under the direction of the former chief justice
of Tanzania, Mohamed Chande Othman, although for the
moment the budget approved for such an exercise is little
more than $300,000 (and the information needed is literally
all over the world). All of the recent re-examinations of the
crash have concluded that the first conclusions of pilot
error might well be in inaccurate. For example, the 2013
UN Hammarskjöld Commission, for example, concluded:
“There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was
subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to
land at Ndola, which was by then widely known to be its
destination.” The 2017 report of Judge Othman concludes:
Based on the totality of the information that we have at
hand, it appears plausible that an external attack or threat
may have been a cause of the crash, whether by way of a
direct attack causing SE-BDY to crash or by causing a
momentary distraction of the pilots. Such a distraction need
only have taken away the pilots’ attention for a matter of
seconds at the critical point at which they were in their
descent to have been potentially fatal. There is a significant
amount of evidence from eyewitnesses that they observed
more than one aircraft in the air that the other aircraft may
have been a jet that SE-BDY was on fire before it crashed,
and/or that SE-BDY was fired upon or otherwise actively
engaged by another aircraft. In its totality, this evidence is
not easily dismissed.

Both reports cite evidence that British, American, French,

South African, or Belgian governments might hold but
which remain unreleased, and they urge its release for the
purpose of understanding exactly what happened to
Hammarskjöld’s plane. On November 8, 2018, when Judge
Othman last updated the UN on the progress of his
investigation, he concluded (with some frustration): “…the
fact that certain Member States have not responded to
repeated requests in 2018… or to engage with this process
at all, has a crucial bearing on the success or failure on the
full implementation of the above General Assembly
resolution.”It is where this case has gone—from the crash
zone outside Ndola to the files of the great powers—but
many countries, notably the United States and South Africa,
have refused to cooperate or done so grudgingly.

***
In addition to the various international investigations of
the crash, a professor at the University of London’s
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Dr. Susan Williams,
has published a book about what could have happened to
Hammarskjöld’s plane. The title of the book is Who Killed
Hammarskjöld? The UN, the Cold War and White
Supremacy in Africa, and it was originally published in
2011, laying the ground for the later UN inquiries.

In the book Dr. Williams lays out the facts of the plane
crash and outlines various theories—including pilot error
of the kind imagined after the plane went down—that
could explain the crash. She also talks about the
possibility that French or Belgian mercenaries had access
that night to trainer Fouga Magister jets or other attack
aircraft, and that one or several of those planes might
have shot at SE-BDY or tried to force the Albertinato the
ground (perhaps by shining spot lights into the cockpit or
by dropping flash bombs). She examines the case for pilot
error, noting that the pilots had flown a long way across
the world, beginning on September 12, 1961, when they
picked up the Secretary General in New York City). She
discusses the possibility that the pilots mis-programmed
the altimeter on the DC-6 or that someone placed a bomb
on the doomed flight.

Dr. Williams also examines theories that have speculated

on possible CIA interference with the Hammarskjöld
mission, making the point that the anti-communist CIA
had strong vested interests in wanting his African
diplomacy to fail. Dr. Williams ends her book strongly
hinting that her belief is that western mercenaries were
more likely than pilot error to have brought down the
Hammarskjöld plane, and she outlines many incongruent
aspects of the fatal night in Ndola, such as the closure of
the local airport (even though it was expecting the
Hammarskjöld plane) and the local witnesses on the
ground spoke about hearing or seeing a large flash and
bang before the “big plane” came down.

The Williams book is not a polemic for any one theory

about the Hammarskjöld plane crash. Instead, as a
serious academic, she prefers to indicate the range of
possible fates for the flight and to leave it to the reader to
come to his or her own conclusions.

***

In my case, after reading the Williams book in 2017, I

decided to visit the Hammarskjöld crash site outside
Ndola and to compare what I would see and hear there on
the ground with the words in the book. I had been
planning for some time to visit Africa and to write about
it, but having the Williams book in hand gave my visit to
Zambia a direction and purpose, even though I am not an
air-crash investigator or even a licensed pilot. Still, I
decided it would be easier to read the many
Hammarskjöld reports if I could visualize how far from
the airport the plane had crashed and what local residents
were saying on the ground about the plane.

Given the vagaries of African travel, I was not able to

spend as much time on the ground in Ndola as I had
planned. My train, from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian
city of Kapiri Mposhi, was three days late, and I had other
appointments in southern Africa, which made it hard to
spend more than a day in Ndola. Nevertheless, I did get to
the crash site, and there I met with some local
investigators and museum officials, all of whom had their
own ideas about what might have happened to the
Albertina. (Most dismiss out of hand that pilot error was
the cause.)

In particular, I learned that one local researcher had

spoken with more than twenty eyewitnesses to the crash.
Many of them were convinced that several smaller planes
had swarmed around the larger DC-6 on its landing
approach and that, prior to the crash, many people living
in the bush near the crash site saw large flashes of light,
consistent with the dropping of a bomb or bombs onto the
Albertina. But because these witnesses were African
natives of the area, their testimony was largely ignored by
colonial authorities in Northern Rhodesia when in fall
1961 the first inquiry was held.

For my part, I came away from the crash site unable to

believe that Hammarskjöld’s experienced Swedish crew
had simply flown the Albertina into the ground. Maybe if
the landscape of the crash site had been mountainous or
even hilly, I could have imagined a sophisticated group of
pilots—at night in Africa—making some fundamental
errors of navigation. But two things made me think
otherwise. First, the terrain around the crash site, while
not a completely flat plain, is devoid of any serious hills.
All I saw as I drove up to the crash site in a taxi and as I
walked around the memorial were open fields and small
clusters of forest land, none of which were very dense. The
Albertina did not crash into the jungle or a mountain; it
came down in the outskirts of Ndola where now there is
open farmland that is part of a broad African plain.

Second, I doubted that the Swedish pilots misread the

altitude of the plane, especially on a clear night. These
were professional pilots, and that’s a rookie mistake.
Nevertheless, early investigators in Northern Rhodesia
concluded that the Albertina was the victim of what in the
airline world is called Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT). But standing at the somber Ndola memorial to the
lost flight, I came to the conclusion that something other
than pilot error had driven the plane into the ground on
that fateful evening. To me it felt like an ambush.

I also concluded, while poking around the memorial in

Ndola, that my brother-in-law, Joseph Majerle III, is the
one person I know who could make sense of the technical
details in the Williams book and in some of the many
Hammarskjöld reports. Joe, as I call him, works in
aviation in Alaska, and in his long career he has visited
many crash sites and repaired many damaged planes. He
is also a voracious reader of history, especially about
aviation matters. Joe has also spent much of his adult life
talking with other pilots about various aircraft and their
deficiencies. If anyone could help me sort out the
complexities of the Ndola crash, it would be Joe, and
shortly after I got back from Africa, I mailed him a copy
of the Williams book.

Joe read the book twice, took ample notes, discussed his
thinking with other pilots in Alaska (some of whom are
still flying on the DC-6), and answered my questions in
several long emails, which I have copied here but which I
also have edited (although only for the sake of clarity).

Note of VER: some pilots, without being at the scene or

having seen the totally flat landscape of the area, or who
did not see at night from the memorial emplacement the
glow at the horizon from the runway lights are able to
conclude within a few minutes that the crash of the
Albertina was due to a CFIT.

What follows might best be understood as a colloquy on

the Williams book between two people who are struggling
to make sense of a crash that happened more than fifty
years ago.

***

Why does the Hammarskjöld crash still matter? It matters

because Secretary General Hammarskjöld had
undertaken his mission just as many countries in Africa
were seeking their independence from the colonial world.
Hammarskjöld was ahead of his time in pushing back
against what today we might call the deep state—that
confluence of interests between corporate investors,
intelligence agencies, and governmental power brokers,
all of whom were eager to siphon profits out of the
breakaway territory of Katanga. Hammarskjöld thought
that Katanga (and its extensive mineral wealth) belonged
in the newly independent Republic of the Congo, and the
purpose of his mission was to oppose independence for
Katanga, which otherwise would fall under the spell of
various French, British, Belgian and American
multinational corporations.
If you believe—as I do—that Hammarskjöld was the
victim of a plot, it can be concluded that the truth about
his death has been covered up to shift the blame away
from the usual suspects, including the CIA and various
mercenary organizations that were then arming
themselves across southern Africa. Hammarskjöld and his
liberal internationalism were getting in the way of
corporate profits, if not Cold War politics, and it was
decided—somewhere, somehow—to cut him down to size.
Maybe the plotters did not intend to kill him? Maybe they
simply wanted to scare him away? But the facts about the
Hammarskjöld crash have never been fully available, in
part because invaluable transcripts (picked up in
particular by US government eavesdropping on that
night) have never been released.

What follows are the questions that I posed to Joe, and his
responses, based on his reading of the Williams book and
his lifetime as a pilot and in aviation. Neither of us
pretends that what follows is anything approaching a
“last word” in the Hammarskjöld investigation. At the
same time it shows how much several concerned citizens,
and a budget of $1500 (the cost of my African train
travels), can discover. Let’s hope that the new UN
investigation can take the Hammarskjöld matter much
further. The Secretary’s exemplary life and work demand
that the truth of his death be known.

—Matthew Stevenson talking to Majerle:

***
Stevenson: Is it possible that pilot error was responsible
for the crash of the Albertina?

Majerle: The facts that investigators admitted to in their

original reports tell a different story from their
conclusions. To me, their conclusions are laughable.

This crash was not pilot error.

Per the chart at the beginning of the Williams book, it

shows the crash site very close to the turn-back circle (on
a safe instrument approach) of the official instrument
approach path, which means that the Swedish pilots knew
exactly where they were. I don’t think any accident
investigation board in the world would dispute that that
they were properly executing the published instrument
approach procedure for Ndola airport.

The official report admitted that they were at least

nominally executing the instrument approach properly,
except that they were 1700 feet lower than they were
supposed to be, and that was the pilots’error.

On page 70, according to A. Campbell Martin, the

controller on duty, the last communication received from
SE-BDY (the code for the Albertina) was confirmation of
1021 millibars—the altimeter setting—which is
something I and every pilot I have ever flown with has
never failed to reset at the instant we are told the new
number.

To me it is inconceivable that the Albertina pilots didn’t

know their altitude at that time. If the controller had said
he never got around to telling them the current millibars
setting, they would have had a basis to sow doubt on that
subject, even though that would have been a flimsy excuse
in itself, for the following reason.

Explain to me how it is unlikely that the Albertina pilots

flew the plane into the ground.

The radio (radar) altimeter came into widespread use in

military and commercial airplanes by the end of WW2,
even in single-seat fighters such as the P-38. I would bet
that, without exception, every DC-6 was equipped with
one when it left the factory. And it is the device you base
your instrument approach on, if you have one, because a
radio altimeter is more accurate and has large
graduations up to 1000 feet AGL (Above Ground Level).

Even if the Albertina pilots didn’t have a current altimeter

setting, they would have been using their radar altimeter
anyway, assuming it was in working order. If not, I think
it’s very likely the pilot would have informed the
controller of that fact. Which, again, points to the fact that
they knew exactly where they were, in all three
dimensions.

In the book Dr. Williams writes that an evasive strategy

to “lose height, veer and head for the airfield as quickly as
possible…may possibly offer some explanation for the
low height of SE-BDY as it made its approach to Ndola—
about 1700 feet lower than it should have been.”
This conclusion is at the heart of her book and research,
and any new investigation needs to focus on what she has
written here.

To me it indicates that the Albertina pilots were already

planning to evade an attack by getting low enough to
prevent another airplane from getting beneath SE-BDY,
which to an attacker is the easiest and most preferred way
to shoot down another airplane—and there would have
been no better way to do that at night than basing it on a
radar altimeter.

Explain some of the discrepancies between the official

crash report, and the data that Dr. Williams includes in
her book, especially in regard to the crash site.

The official report stated that the ground scar at the wreck
site was 150 yards long, which is 450 feet. The published
stall speed of the DC-6 with flaps down is 92 mph, which
is almost exactly 135 feet per second. That is the absolute
slowest speed at which it would stay in the air—not the
speed at which you would make an approach.

The original Jeppesen approach plate chart for the Ndola

airport would have contained a sidebar that would have
given the time, in seconds, required to reach the airport at
several different approach speeds, usually spaced by 30
mph and 60 mph increments, which simplifies the mental
calculations the pilot would need to make or eliminates
them if it’s practical for the aircraft to fly at one of the
stated speeds exactly.
I would estimate that, in this situation, for a light-to-
moderately loaded DC-6, the pilots would have used
either 150 or more probably 180 mph, which would be
220 or 264 feet per second of forward velocity.

If, as the official report says, the pilots misjudged their

altitude and just flew the plane into the ground while
making their final approach, it is beyond a stretch of the
imagination that 80-to-90 thousand pounds of airplane
would come to a stop in no more than 2.04 seconds, and
that every last piece of it would be contained in a mere
450 feet.

This is just very basic math that a 4th-grader could do nine

out of ten times and get right. It is an insult to human
intelligence to suggest that that’s what happened.

Have you ever examined the crash site of a DC-6 airliner?

Many years ago I had opportunity several times to walk

over the crash site of a DC-7 [very similar to the DC-6]
that crashed shortly after takeoff due to an out-of-control
engine fire in which the pilots tried to crash-land into a
recently logged parcel of land.

The fuel dealer told me that he watched as an engine

caught fire almost as soon as the plane started its takeoff
run, but apparently the pilots didn’t realize it until they
were committed to fly. But after clearing the end of the
runway, they immediately angled off and headed for the
clear-cut area, obviously in an effort to get the plane back
on the ground.
It had been nine years since it happened when I first saw
the site, and in that rain forest the vegetation had
regenerated quite a bit, but the wreckage path of the DC-
7 was still obvious. The crew had left the gear and flaps
down in takeoff configuration, obviously intending to put
it down at as slow a speed as possible in this off-airport
area.

My recollection of the debris path was that it was at least

1200 feet long, with no standing trees throughout the path.
The largest piece of wreckage at the end of the path was
stopped and literally wrapped around what was at least a
6 footdiameter tree, in the flight engineers compartment.
Control cables and wiring bundles were literally wrapped
all the way around that tree. I would guess that the site is
still that way today.

There are some fairly close parallels between that crash

and Hammarskjöld’s. The DC-6B and DC-7 are very
similar airplanes; sharing the same basic wing and
fuselage with the DC-7 employing another short section
of fuselage, more powerful engines and a higher gross
weight due to the extra power, and with a higher cruise
speed also because of the power. But they are both listed
on the same type rating for pilots. Sitting side by side, you
would have to study them carefully to see the differences.

In these two cases, both planes made it to the ground

before impacting any real solid objects; in
Hammarskjöld’s case it was the anthill and in the Yakutat
crash it was tree stumps. In both cases, the immovable
objects turned the airplanes sideways while they still had
a lot of momentum, which began the breakup process
while the kinetic energy just kept them going.

If they had been able to continue moving straight ahead

they might have had a chance, more so for the passengers
aft of the cockpit bulkhead. There isn’t a lot of metal in
the nose ahead of the pilots compartment to crush and
absorb energy.

The DC-7 was known to be overloaded with fresh salmon

but would have been light on fuel. Hammarskjöld’s plane
would have had a lighter cabin load but would have had
considerably more fuel. I would assume that the DC-7 was
somewhat heavier overall, but probably not by an amount
that would have required a significant speed difference to
stay airborne.

What I am getting at here is that in both these cases the

airplanes probably hit the ground at roughly equivalent
speeds. And the DC-7’s ground scar was about three times
as long as Hammarskjöld’s, and still had some energy
when it wrapped itself around a tree.

If Hammarskjöld’s pilots had inadvertently flown the

aircraft into the ground, I think it is reasonable to assume
that it would have traveled much farther before all the
pieces came to rest.

This did not happen, which to me indicates that the

physics of the official reports are all wrong—at least when
matched to their conclusions.
What can we conclude from the configuration of the
Hammarskjöld plane as it hit the ground?

The official report stated that the landing gear was down
and locked, and the wing flaps were extended to the 30
degree position. I would have loved to cross examine the
local accident board and ask them which pilots they know
that would be 8-to-9 miles out on an instrument approach
and have 30 degrees of flaps down at that point, to say
nothing of having the gear down. (See note above, in fact
the flap were at 30 degrees and the gear was down and
locked rather at 11.5 miles from the runway than 8-to-9
miles or still at the end of the reversal turn).

Thirty degrees of flap down on a DC-6 is a lot of flap;

probably about optimal for a low speed approach over
obstacle-free terrain to make a short-field landing.
Maximum flap down angle on a DC-6 is 50 degrees,
which you would normally only use to bleed off a lot of
excess altitude, and it would require a lot of engine power
with which to maintain altitude.

In my experience no pilot would drop the landing gear

until about the point that you had crossed the “final
approach fix,” in this case the non-directional (radio)
beacon, which is at four miles or so from the end of the
runway.

At four miles out the pilots would have had plenty of time
to drop the gear and double check it before reaching the
runway end roughly 90 seconds later. Experienced crews
normally do that as late as they can just to get there sooner.
This accident board didn’t even know how to lie to make
the facts fit their case.

Recently I had opportunity to talk to a friend of mine that

flew DC-6s about thirty years ago. He currently owns and
flies two DC-4’s, a freighter and a fuel tanker, around the
state.

He confirmed to me—as I thought earlier—that a DC-6

pilot would have flown that instrument approach at 156 to
160 knots (180 to 184 miles per hour) and would
absolutely not have had gear and flaps down 8 or 9 miles
from the runway.

And if he found his wing on fire, unless on short final to

a runway, his only thought would be to get it on the
ground.

What do you think happened?

To me, all of the admitted evidence (in UN reports and in

the Williams book) adds up to one thing. The crew made
a desperate attempt to save their lives by getting the
airplane on the ground, most probably because they knew
they had a wing fuel tank on fire.

A gasoline fire at night, to my experience, is very bright

and from the cockpit side windows of a DC-6 you can see
to the inboard nacelle without straining your neck. If it
was a wing fire, the pilots would have known it. It would
have taken all of their strength not to panic and just
continue to do what needed to be done.
And here I take issue with one of the advisers to Dr.
Williams—a Mr. Kjell Peterzén—who is quoted in the
book as saying: “There is no way he would have gone
down into the darkness and the woods…” I can name six
incidents here in Alaska since 1977 in which pilots have
descended into the woods, or whatever was below
including a mountain ridge, to deliberately crash burning
airplanes in an attempt to save their own lives.

In one of these cases—coincidentally it was a DC-6—the

pilot hesitated because he didn’t want to have to do that,
even though the cockpit voice recorder picked up other
crew members urging him to get the airplane “on the
ground, NOW!” But he didn’t. The wing folded up and
moments later they all crashed to their deaths.

In all of the other cases the pilots understood how few

seconds they had to live if they didn’t “put it on the
ground.” Remarkably, most of the crews survived,
although some had bad injuries.

I would say—at least from my corner of the world—that

pilots will attempt a crash into the unknown if they
understand how quickly an airplane made from aluminum
can disintegrate in a raging fire.

Aluminum, of the kind used in the making of the

Hammarskjöld DC-6,yields at 925 degrees Fahrenheit and
liquifies at 1225 degrees Fahrenheit. When the fire gets
much above the 1225 degrees Fahrenheit point, the metal
itself actually ignites and burns up, which is why there is
normally so few pounds of airplane left after one has
burned uncontrollably.
Pilots know this, and will respond instinctively when they
see, for example, one of their wings on fire.

What’s your reaction to the conclusion that the

Albertina was simply flown into the ground, so-called
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)?

As for all of the talk about pilot error and CFIT, I still
cannot believe that no-one ever mentions the fact that they
had gear and flaps down when they were still at least three
minutes from the runway, which you just wouldn’t do,
unless you’re planning to land “very soon.”

I thought it curious when I read in the Williams book: “It

was as if the aircraft was making a perfect landing…”
That conclusion is a very astute observation. That doesn’t
happen in CFIT situations.

In my experience, CFIT planes start breaking little things

and leaving little pieces over a long area before you start
seeing the larger pieces and more ground disturbance. If
you see something that looks like a landing attempt was
being made, it usually is.And this explains why the crash
site itself was so contained in such a small area.

In the Williams book, Virving states that “an explosion a

few yards from the aircraft could have dislodged vital
control wires from their pulleys…” My reaction to that
thesis: “Ah, no, generally not.”

All type certificated aircraft are required to have a cable

guard at every pulley station to retain them and to prevent
that very thing from happening. In all my time working
on airplanes (some forty years), I have never seen that
happen unless the whole pulley mounting structure was
ripped away from the primary structure, in which case the
pulley and guard assembly would still be hanging on the
cable. But that requires the wing or fuselage or tail
component itself to be massively damaged. In this case,
the airplane was obviously under control when it started
hitting the sapling trees—in order to be “making a perfect
landing.”

It has occurred to me that, in a sense, the British

investigators were right when they said that it was a CFIT
accident. But they left out the part that it was an
INTENTIONAL controlled flight into terrain accident.

Right now, it seems really hard to believe that the original

1962 UN report did not ever advance that notion, i.e., that
no-one they consulted ever suggested that as a possibility.
To me it seems obvious.

In any new UN investigation (led by Judge Othman) of the

Hammarskjöld crash, one of the keys to discovering the
truth about what happened could be found on intercepted
transcripts of the voice communication from the
Albertina, which, as Dr. Williams reports, were picked up
at a CIA listening post on Cyprus. How would that have
been possible in 1961?

In the Williams book, someone who was at the airport that

night states that while waiting for Hammarskjöld’s plane
to arrive he “heard an airplane start up but never took off.”
I would speculate that what he heard would have been one
of the USAF DC-3’s (C-47) that were parked that night at
Ndola, and which explains how a CIA listening post in
Cyprus would have intercepted the Albertina’s voice
communications.

Here’s some background: At least some of the military C-

47’s that were kept in service after World War II had radio
rooms, for lack of a better word, that had gear that could
transmit or receive (or both) on every frequency from LF
through UHF. These rooms were state of the art. All of
this gear and their trays, mount brackets, and bulkheads
weighed over a thousand pounds.

In 1978 I did some work on a DC-3C that had recently

been surplussed, sold, and converted from a VC-47D. I
had opportunity to see all that analog electronic stuff on a
shelf for about a dozen years after that and was always
impressed.

I would suggest that the source of the radio conversation

that Charles Southall listened into on Cyprus originated
from a keyed HF microphone held into a headset speaker
on the VHF frequency of Ndola airport by the crew of an
idling USAF C-47.

They would have needed to have an engine generator

online to run an inverter because some of that radio
equipment was using AC voltage. And if it was going to
take very long, they would have run down the batteries
without a generator operating.
One of the persistent theories about the Hammarskjöld
crash is that mercenaries, perhaps flying Fouga CM.170
Magister or other aircraft, might have intercepted SE-
BDY on its approach, and either bombed it or caused the
larger plane to crash. There is speculation that a De
Havilland Dove might have been involved. What do you
think?

About the speculation that a De Havilland Dove might

have been modified to drop small bombs from above the
DC-6, I think not. That configuration has been tried since
WW I with virtually nosuccess; when it worked it was a
fluke.

In WWII, the Germans experimented with it a little and

the Japanese more, and all with a very low success rate.
The Dove also could have only kept up with the DC-6 in
the landing pattern; the DC-6 was capable of roughly
twice the Dove’s speed.

The Percival P.56 Provosts that were on the Ndola field at

that time and had forward firing armament could have had
some chance against the Albertina, but, as I recall, they
were not thought to have flown that night.

But a single tracer round from even a 30-caliber gun at

even 500 yards range could punch through the DC-6’s
relatively thin aluminum skin and ignite a fuel vapor
chamber that would break seams loose in the resulting
explosion and doom any airplane. The Fouga Magister
was known to have two such guns with a tracer in every
fifth clip of the ammo belts.
Dr. Williams cites some of the Fouga’s performance and
range specs, although other sources that I know give them
as considerably lower. But, still, if you ask me, this
operation was well within its capabilities.

When I visited the Ndola museum and spoke with some of

the guides, they explained that the Hammarskjöld plane
was flying away from the airport, in the direction of the
plane replica at the site, which is headed west. You think
it was heading toward the Ndola airport. Why?

I’m sure you heard the guide correctly; the problem is that
the guide probably does not understand what happened.
Which is really not at all surprising; even if the guide was
someone that had seen it before the pieces were hauled
away, the crash site would have appeared to be mostly
chaos in a big charred spot with a lot of garbage laying
around at random, especially if they weren’t familiar with
airplanes.

Can you describe the crash site?

The UN chart tells the story, which is corroborated by

Björn Virving’s account of the crash site. [Virving, a
Swedish citizen, was an observer to the early investigation
of the crash.]

Abeam the ant hill, way ahead of the main body of

wreckage where it came to rest, was the warning horn, the
primary function of which is to alert the pilots to the fact
that the landing gear is still up if the throttles are retarded
and is below a certain airspeed, and it is mounted in the
cockpit area.
Coming a bit closer to the main body of wreckage
(MBW), identified items are almost all from the fuselage
nose area, except for a small piece of heavy spar section
and wing fairing (fillet)—the spar section almost certainly
being from the left wing.

Included in the distant cockpit area wreckage is the radio

(radar) altimeter, I have just noticed for the first time. This
is where the pilots’ bodies start to appear also. So there is
no doubt now that it had a radar altimeter.

At the point about dead abeam the MBW, the airplane was
pivoting on its belly to the left, the left wing was folding
back and the fuselage ahead of the wing was splitting open
and folding to the left also. The right hand horizontal
stabilizer was probably catching on the tree stumps left
after the right hand wing mowed the trees down and
twisting the tail-cone loose before being sheared off
completely.

The tail control cables evidently held and didn’t fail in

tension in this case; otherwise the tail-cone section would
have ended up near the right hand tailplane.

The left wing, compromised not only by impact with the

ant hill but with the alleged inflight fire, is folded back to
lie alongside the aft fuselage with to me, surprisingly, its
engines in approximately their correct positions. I could
easily have imagined them to be found up near the ant hill.
The other surprising thing is that the main landing gear
stayed under it, in place, which is almost unheard of in a
wheels down landing out in the woods.
The chart doesn’t show, or at least so far I haven’t found,
where the main nose gear strut came to rest. Associated
parts are right where I’d expect them to be in the first third
of the wreckage path. The DC-6 pilots I know say that the
nose gear is a bit fragile; if it digs in to soft ground it will
fold up or tear off and needs to be treated carefully.

If the Albertina hadn’t had the misfortune to hit he anthill,

the skinny trees would probably have arrested its forward
movement in a fairly short distance and the passengers, if
they were strapped in, would have had a pretty good
chance of walking away.

If the chart is to scale, and it appears to be, the airplane

had already lost a lot of its momentum, i.e., it didn’t travel
more than about eighty feet or so past the ant hill, which
is not very far for a one hundred foot long fuselage. It
might even have come to a stop still standing on all three
gear. Just about like a Navy plane (on an aircraft carrier)
missing the arresting cables and running into the net
barrier.

The UN chart shows the Ndola runway orientation to be

magnetic 100 – 280, or only 10 degrees from east-west. It
says that the aircraft was on a heading (it should say
“course,” because a heading is a course when corrected
for wind) of 120 degrees, which would have been aiming
them toward the non-directional beacon, to line them up
with the runway. As I have said, they were very close to
where the instrument approach procedure wants you to be
for the procedure turn.
Can you hypothesize Hammarskjöld’s last moments?
Alone of the passengers he was found propped up against
an ant hill at the crash site, and he was not burned in any
way.

In my view, Hammarskjöld himself was probably

standing in the cockpit bulkhead doorway, behind the
flight engineer, who sits behind and in between the pilots,
facing forward in the DC-6, and all three of them would
have been strapped into their seats.

After bouncing over the ant hill, the nose would have
broken open as it would have been the first thing to hit the
ground, and Hammarskjöld, not being fastened in, would
have just been thrown out or fallen out through the
opening.

The still-moving, burning remainder of the airplane just

kept on moving past him, and was arrested by the trees as
it swung around. It all fits, really, and has been seen to
happen that way many times in history.

Can you sum up your thinking about what happened to

Hammarskjöld’s plane, SE-BDY?

I would surmise that SE-BDY (Albertina) was attacked at

the beginning of the procedure turn to return the plane to
the non-directional beacon bearing. (To me the attacking
planes had to have had the capacity to shoot bullets or
tracers. I don’t believe anyone tried to bomb the DC-6.)

The pilot then quickly decided to finish the turn back

toward where he knew there to be light and to get the
plane on the ground as soon as he could, knowing that the
runway, some three minutes away, was way too far to
expect a burning wing to get him to.

In my opinion, the pilots (by name—Captain Per

Hallonquist, Captain Nils-Erik Åhréus and Second Pilot
Lars Litton) came very, very close to pulling it off and
should be commended for their bravery and
professionalism. They knew what they were doing.

What would you like to see the new investigation of the

crash look into?

Keep in mind that all of the evidence from the crash site,
at this point, has been compromised, by age or the dictates
of the earlier crash examiners, who came to the wreckage
only with the intent to blame the pilots for the accident.
What we got from the first 1962 inquiry into the crash was
a political judgment—not the informed thinking of
experienced pilots or crash investigators. Since that time,
most of the primary evidence has been lost to time.

Most of all I would like to see the Swedish crew and

especially its pilot in command exonerated for blame in
this crash. As I said before, the pilots acted heroically and
professionally in trying to land a burning plane on the
ground in order to save the lives of their passengers.
Instead of being recognized for their valor, the crew,
themselves victims, was blamed for the crash.

I would love to believe that physical evidence of the crash

might help new investigators come to some conclusions
about the crash, but the fact is that the plane was made of
a zinc alloy aluminum that will have turned to mud and
paste after more than fifty years under ground. I am not
optimistic that the physical evidence will reveal anything
new in the inquiry.

Instead, investigators should turn their attentions to old

photographs, video, and audio recordings that might be
found in archives around the world, and from these files
try to reconstruct the last moments of the doomed flight.
They might also make a microscopic reexamination of the
original report for just the kinds of contradictions that
even a reader like myself picked up in some of the files
quoted in the Williams book. There have to be a lot more
inconsistencies in the files that professionals of today
would find.

If the files of the listening post on Cyprus were to have

any transmissions from the flight deck (personally, I don’t
think they exist), we might learn more details of what was
said once it was discovered that their left wing was on fire.
But cockpit recorders were not around in those days.

Please sum up what you think happened

In conclusion, let me state again what I think happened: I

think one of the mercenary aircraft, operating around
Ndola on that night, fired a tracer bullet into the fuel tanks
of the Hammarskjöld plane, causing the left wing to catch
on fire. Fearing that the left wing would fold up into the
fuselage of the plane, the pilots did the only thing that was
available to them: to configure the plane for a controlled
(so to speak) crash landing in the short amount of time
available to them. That action explains the 30 degrees of
flaps setting on impact (nine miles out from the Ndola
runway!), the relative slow speed at impact (they were just
above the stall speed), and the compact crash site (not
consistent with CFIT). The pilots had no choice but to put
the plane “on the ground…now!” and that they did,
skillfully, in my mind. Note of VER: nine miles, at the
end point of the crash: which means that this operation
was started at more than eleven and a half mile or 17 km
from the runway, this is almost in the end part of the
reversal 45/90/45 turn!)...With Katanga border less than a
mile away, depending the lenght of the reversal turn.
Had they succeeded and been able to tell their own story
at the inquests, we would now have a clearer picture of
what happened on that fatal approach. Because the crew
was killed on impact or in the subsequent fires, it was left
to colonial administrators—in places such as Northern
Rhodesia—to whitewash the crash scene and to blame the
pilots, who along with Hammarskjöld and his team were
also the victims. Exonerating the pilots would go a long
way in correcting an injustice that has lingered since 1961.

Finally, I hope the publishers of Dr. Williams’ book

encourage her to release yet another edition of the book.
(An updated edition did come out in late 2016.) Perhaps
she might be able to integrate into her book the more
recent findings of Judge Othman? I would hope so. As
much as anyone outside the UN system, Dr. Williams has
kept alive the tragic story of what happened to Secretary
Hammarskjöld in Ndola, and I commend her for all of the
excellent work she has done to uncover the truth. If
someone wants to know more about this case, her book,
Who Killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, the Cold War and
White Supremacy in Africa, is the best place to begin.
 Matthew Stevenson is the author of many books,
including Reading the Railsand, most recently,
Appalachia Spring, about the coal counties of West
Virginia and Kentucky. He lives in Switzerland and was
in Africa at the crash site in 2017.

Joseph Majerle has worked in aviation for the last forty-

one years, both as a mechanic and a pilot, and he has
worked on a number of historic planes. He lives in Alaska.

"Je l'ai eu. Il y a des flames. Il descend. Il s'écrase"

une seule balle traçante fut assez...!
pas des traces!

"I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing."
one tracer was enough...!
no traces!

"I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing."
one tracer was enough...!
no traces!
This story took place between the 16th and 20th of October 1961, one month after the crash of the Albertina. Here is shown that
the Avikat had also 5 additional Fouga-Magister from Welensky, but since when? Could that be before September 17th, 1961?

Exclusive Interview with the marchioness of Villa Verde.

The daughter of General Franco appears to know

more about Spain’s future and declares without
hesitation:

Juan Carlos will be

King within a year !

KATANGA IS ARMING ITSELF

I SUPPLYED
A I R C RA F T
TO TSHOMBE

Note added by Victor E. Rosez:

It was very clear that the journalist were under pressure.
They were allowed to fly with with one of the planes, the
KA 3018 from Munich to their destinaion Kolwezi in the
secessionist republic Katanga.
One of the conditions was not to mention the names of
the the pilots and the salesmen or intermediary.
There was also a disinformation about the exact number
of Do28 that would be flown. The article mentions the
number of five. That was exact execpt that one of the
Do28 was already delivered to Katanga on August 29.
In fact the 8 days long journey would be done by four
Do28. A fith, but disassembled one would folow later on
and been assembled in Brazzaville.
Og course everybody knew that one of the intermediary
From Munich to Katanga ... the most was colonel BEM Cassart and one of the earlier pilots
mysterious flight of my life! was Heinrich Schäfer ( see pic from 1963 after an
accident.

T shombe has won the first round in the

fight against the UN and against those
who did not want to recognize at all
the independence of Katanga. But
everyone feels that a second round
worse than this one, will come soon.
So both the “United Nations” and Moise Tshombe are

s
mutually reinforcing. The Katangese president must do
that in secret, no country or factory is legally entitled
to deliver him weapons.
“Sunday News” has nevertheless succeeded to offer
Its readers an exclusive story related to the aircraft
deliveries to Katanga. What is brought in this article by
our man in the field, who wants to remain anonymous ,
is no fantasy, no literature. They are just sober facts.

Translated in French and English by Victor E. Rosez. Read further on the pages 4 and 5
 De onbekende tussenpersoon was ere kolonel Cassart die in het verleden al 1600 bommen van 12,5 kg had geleverd met
I AM SORRY I COULD NOT TRANSLATE EVERYTHING lanceringssysteem voor 3 bommen en tonnen anderen dingen. DO28 (KAT3016) werd op 29 aug 61 geleverd.
Bij de tussenlanding op het vliegveld van Loanda in Angola hadden
Tshombe’s vliegtuigen heel wat bekijk. (foto 5)

De naam van de DO 28 KA 3016 piloot was Heinrich Schäfer

Onder ons duikt Kolwezi op, het koper- en kobaltcentrum

I K
De onbekende die mij te München was komen afhalen
bracht mij naar de terreinen van de vliegtuigfabriek.
Op weg naar Nice maakten wij een
Rode Nota’s zijn van Victor E. Rosez
tussenlanding te Lyon, waar
nieuwe brandstof getankt werd.
Leverde...
waar de toestellen dienen afgeleverd. De opdracht is bijna
vervuld (foto 6)
De vijf Dorniers werden in goede orde aan de grond gezet.
Op het voorplan de Fouga-Magister waarover zoveel
gesproken werd (foto 7)
Vier piloten bij vertrek waarbij vier DO28 worden getoond.
In Kolwezi zijn er vijf DO 28. Het artikel is duidelijk, er
dingen zijn waarover absoluut niet mocht gepraat worden.

Daarbij blijft het echter niet. Wij weten uit goede
bron, dat de levering voorzien is van Alouette
helikopters, van een ongekend aantal Harvard-
Jagers uit Angola, van vijf Fouga-Magisters-
straaljagers en van evenveel Sabre-jagers uit
Rhodesië. Katanga heeft daarboven ook een
aantal DC 4 transporttoestellen aangekocht.
Tevens beschikt het Katangese leger nu reeds
mij zou aanspreken en mij mijn naam zou
zeggen. Eenmaal dit gebeurd, werd ik naar een
auto geloodst die mij naar de Dornierfabrieken
bracht, waaraan ik een bezoek bracht in
gezelschap van de reeds aangekomen vier
piloten. Na een rondrit, waarbij een vijftigtal
recuperatie – Sabrejagers voor de Duitse
luchtmacht Werden ontwaard, kregen de
De Fransman die onze formatie beval, besloot
toen om door te vliegen naar Kameroen over
Nigeria heen., dat wij in feite niet mochten
overvliegen. Tegen valavond bereikten wij
N’Gaoundere, in Kameroen. Bij de landing
geraakte een wiel van de KA 0018 geklemd maar
na twee uren herstelling, waren wij weer
startklaar. Op 20 oktober begaf onze Dornier-

II
over een grote hoeveelheid springstofbommen, pilote gedurende twee uren een korte luchtstoet zich naar Libreville in Galeon en
erse en ook Katangese napalmbommen en raketten tegen gronddoelen. opleiding op de Dornier 28-toestellen. De Pointe-Marie in Frans Congo. Een wijl later
gevangenen werden De Dornier 28 toestellen, die naar Katanga piloten waren van Belgische, Duitse en Franse ontwaarden wij de Congostroom en de haven van
uitgewisseld. Gebouwen die na vlogen, hadden een belangrijke lading materieel nationaliteit. ’s Anderendaags had ik samen Matadi: Loanda in Angola, waar wij de dag
het UNO optreden te bij, onder meer voor de verpleeginrichting van met de piloten afspraak bij de toestellen die eindigden, was spoedig in het zicht. Van de

Elisabethstad bezet werden
door de troepen van de
Verenigde Naties werden
opnieuw onder bewaking
gesteld van de Katangese
Rijkswacht. Men zou kunnen
denken dat alles in de
afgescheiden provincie van
Congo nu opnieuw voor het
beste is en dat de strijdkrachten
van president Tshombe en
eenheden van de UNO legers
op vreedzame voet leven. Men
Vliegtuigen
deze vliegtuigen. Nauwkeuriger kunnen onze
gegevens niet zijn maar omwille van de
waarheidsgetrouwheid, laten wij hier het verhaal
volgen van onze medewerker die met de Dornier-
toestellen kon meevliegen:
- Ik werd opgewacht aan het Regina Palace-hotel
te München op 15 oktober omstreeks 3 uur
’s namiddags. Het ging er geheimzinnig aan toe.
Terwijl wij een kijkje gingen Men had mij eenvoudig verwittigd dat iemand
nemen bij de toestellen
bestudeerden de piloten het
plan van de vlucht.
voor de loodsen waren gerangschikt. Nog even
keken de piloten het vliegplan na en
vervolgens begaven wij ons naar Nice met een
tussenlanding te Lyon, waar wij benzine
opdeden. Vanuit Nice, waar wij de nacht
doorbrachten, ging het naar Algiers, in
Algerije, over Bosa op Sardinië en over Corsica.
De KA 3018, aan boord waarvan ik plaats had
genomen maakte de overtocht over de
Middellandse zee zonder moeilijkheid. Met de
toelating van de Franse jachtluchtmacht
hoofdplaats van de Portugese kolonie logen wij
naar Villa-Luso, eveneens in Angola, om ten slotte
onze plaats van bestemming te bereiken:
Kolwezi, de luchthaven van Katanga, van waaruit,
de troepen van Tshombe, dank zij één enkele
Fouga Magister de UNO soldaten in bedwang
hielden.
Alvorens te landen zagen wij nog hoe oude
voertuigen werden weggetrokken door de
Katangezen., die ons met hun nieuwe Dorniers
uitbundig begroetten. Meer kan en mag ik niet

zou ook kunnen hopen. Dat na
de zolang verwachte uitvoering
van het bestand tussen de
Katangezen en UNO
vertegenwoordiger Khiari, de
weg geëffend is voor een
vruchtbaar overleg tussen de h.
aan
overvlogen wij in formatie Algerië. De nacht vertellen. Dit is geen literatuur maar een
van de 18de op de 19de oktober brachten wij eenvoudige opsomming van feiten, waaruit
keuren of laken. Men kan de
door te In-Salak. Een vlucht over de Sahara volgens mij blijkt, dat men president Tshombe en
mening toegedaan zijn, dat
Katanga uiteindelijk bij Congo leidde ons naar Taman-rassel, ons volgend zijn Katangese leger niet mag onderschatten
behoort, waarvoor deze rijke bevooradingspunt.
provincie onmisbaar is
geworden.

Tshombe en de centrale
Congolese regering van eerste-
minister Adula. Deze overtuiging
zou kunnen gegrondvest
worden op de aanwezigheid van
Katan-
Voor de loodsen stonden de DO28-toestellen, waarmede men de
piloten in een minimum van tijd vertrouwd had gemaakt.
Men ziet hier vier van de zes geleverde toestellen, één ervan werd
op 29 augustus in Katanga in ontvangst genomen.
Katangese afgevaardigden te
Leopoldstad, die met moeite
door de h. Khiari naar de
Congolese hoofdstad werden
geleid.
Niets is echter minder broos
en zelf minder schijnheilig dan
de overeenkomst, die door de
UNO verantwoordelijken na
een onterende nederlaag met
de h. Tshombe werd gesloten.
De Katangezen, die getoond
hebben, dat hun leger ook
zonder vreemde officieren
doeltreffend kan optreden,
hebben de tijd gehad om zich
voor te bereiden op het verzet
tegen een nieuwe poging tot
onderdrukking van hun
afscheiding.
Men kan deze scheiding goed-
Feit is, dat Katanga zijn
onafhankelijkheid bij
ontstentenis van een
erkenning door om het even
welke mogendheid te allen
voorlopig opgeschort. Deze beslissing
vloeit niet uitsluitend voort uit
politieke overwegingen maar veeleer
uit het besef van de Congolese
legeropperbevelhebber Mobutu dat
hij Katanga niet kan veroveren met
wapens. Het Katangese leger dat
meer dan een jaar de tijd heeft
gekregen om zich te laten opleiden,
niet door avonturiers maar door
Belgische en vreemde kaders, heeft in
de strijd tegen de eerder tuchteloze
en zelf wilde Indiase UNO soldaten
bewezen dat het een te duchten
strijdmacht vormt. Terwijl de
Verenigde Naties zich in Katanga
wederbewapenen, meer m Dan
noodzakelijk is voor de eenvoudige
“bescherming van mensenlevens”,
koste wil verdedigen met de
kopen ook de Katangezen wapens.
hulp van om het even wie. Daar
Omdat men de indruk opdoet, dat
ligt precies het knelpunt van de
wederinschakeling van de eerlang opnieuw een strijd zal
gouden koperprovincie in de opflikkeren, die ditmaal zou kunnen
Congolese eenheidsstaat. uitgroeien tot een algemene
Niemand erkent officieel het burgeroorlog in de Congo.
zelfbestuur van Katanga maar Dat de Katangezen het daarom
velen helpen onderduims ernstig menen en ook precies weten
president Tshombe in zijn welk hun zwak punt is blijkt uit hun
streven naar onafhankelijkheid. betrachting vooral hun luchtmacht te
De Congolese troepen van versterken. Men zou van op een paar,
generaal Mobutu, de eenheden of meer, duizend kilometer gezien
die nog onder het gezag staan kunnen geloven dat de troepen van
van de uitermate Lumubistische de Verenigde Naties bij machte zijn
gezagvoerders te Stanleystad te een wederbewapening van het
Stanleystad, mogen opdracht Katangese leger te beletten. Niets s
gekregen hebben zich op te
minder waar. Onder de blinde of
stellen langs de grenzen van
bijziende ogen van de Indiase
Katanga, toch hebben zij hun
Gurkas, voert Tshombe wapens en
“offensief” tegen deze provincie
munitie aan.
TSHOMBE
TSHOMBE
Reconstructie en vertaling in het Frans en Engels door
Meer nog, op de vliegvelden © Victor E. Rosez
bewaakt door de troepen van de
Verenigde Naties landen
spiksplinternieuwe toestellen voor
de Katangese luchtmacht. Dit lijkt
onwaarschijnlijk en nochtans is het
6
verhaal van onze medewerker
waarheidsgetrouw. Het gaat uit, of
beter, het verwijst naar de oproep
van de Indiase eerste-minister
Pandit Neroe, die aan alle landen
vroeg de wapenleveringen aan
Katanga te schorsen. Hij was
voldoende ingelicht om te weten
waarover hij het had. Zijn, Gurkas,
gelegerd te Elisabethstad hadden
hem verwittigd dat vijf nieuwe
vliegtuigen voor de Katangese
luchtmacht te Kolwezi waren
aangekomen. Het betrof Dornier
toestellen die uit Duitsland
kwamen en de nummers droegen
van KA 0016 tot KA 0020. De
Indiase eerste-minister was goed
ingelicht maar had het geluk niet,
dat een van onze fotografen te
beurt viel die de vijf toestellen van
uit München kon vergezellen. Hij
bracht ons het bewijs dat zowel aan
de zijde van de Verenigde Naties als
aan de kant van Katanga weder
bewapend wordt, vooral dan op
het gebied van de luchtmacht.
Katanga beschikt thans over een
helikopter S55, drie Piper Cups, één
Fouga Magister straaljager, twee
Dove-verkenningsvliegtuigen en
vijf Dornier toestellen, die uit
Duitsland kwamen. (of méér?)
 German links to the Hammarskjöld case
Making the case for another possible murder weapon

Torben Gülstorff,
with thanks to Torben
who redirected me to the office of the
eminent person, Victor E. Rosez.
On 18 September 1961, at approximately 00:13, a Douglas DC-6 came down
close to the North Rhodesian town of Ndola. Sixteen passengers and crew on
board died, among them the United Nations (UN) General Secretary Dag
Hammarskjöld. The plane was carrying a UN peacekeeping delegation to a
meeting with Moise Tshombe, the self-declared prime minister of the
secessionist Congolese province of Katanga, to discuss the future state of the
province and finally put an end to the crisis that had kept the Republic of the
Congo in suspense for more than a year.

Background to the crisis

On 30 June 1960 Belgian Congo became independent. Centralist parties
gained the majority in parliament and elected Patrice Lumumba prime minister.
Nevertheless, parties favouring a decentralized Congo still formed a strong
opposition and worked for a change of government. When on 5 July riots broke
out within Congolese military, decentralists took advantage of the country’s
unstable constitution and the government’s weakness to foster their ambitions.
On 11 July decentralist Moise Tshombe declared the Congolese province of
Katanga to be a free state, with himself as prime minister. Soon the former
colonial power, Belgium, which intervened with troops to protect its citizens,
became his prime sponsor.
The Lumumba government was unable to cope with the escalating crisis.
It called in a UN peacekeeping mission. On 15 July the first UN troops entered,
and Belgian intervention forces left the Congo, except for Katanga, where they
stayed to train and build a Katangese security force strong enough to resist the
Congolese military. UN troops took up position in Katanga as well but stayed
out of the intra-Congolese conflict. This position remained even into the new
year of 1961, when Léopoldville decentralists captured Lumumba and two of
his colleagues and deported them to Katanga where their secessionist allies
tortured and finally murdered them.
In the aftermath of these events, the UN mandate was strengthened, but
not to the point that its troops could end the secession. At that time the power
structure in the Congo did not permit such attempts.
Several months later, this situation changed fundamentally. On 2 August a
new Congolese government, led by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, uniting
centralists and decentralists, was appointed. The UN felt that the time had
come to put Tshombe under pressure. On 28 August it began Operation Rum
Punch to take control of the secessionist territory and weaken its security
forces. The self-declared country became occupied. However, its government
was not yet defeated. The UN ordered it to surrender its political hardliners,
such as the Minister of the Interior Godefroid Munongo, whom the UN believed
to be responsible for ethnic cleansing, the death of Lumumba, attacks on UN
troops and, more importantly, the preparation of a counterattack. The Tshombe
government refused. On 13 September the UN began Operation Morthor to
pre-empt such an attack and finally put an end to the Katangese secession.
However, this time Katanga resisted. Its government established a temporary
seat at Kipushi, a small town close to the border with Northern Rhodesia,
several hours drive from Ndola. All over the province security forces engaged
with UN troops, who soon had to pull back and entrench themselves.
Nevertheless, Tshombe knew very well that the Katangese resistance was
limited and he had to negotiate. Thus he invited the UN General Secretary Dag
Hammarskjöld, who was in the Congolese capital Léopoldville, to peace talks.
They agreed to meet on neutral territory, at Ndola where, on 18 September,
just after midnight, Hammarskjöld’s DC-6 crashed during its landing approach.

Aftermath
Rumours soon spread that the crash had not been an accident but an
assassination: by sabotage, or an attack from the ground or from the air. The
last soon became the most likely variant. Several official investigations
declared the crash an accident. However the rumours continued. In 2011, a
book by Susan Williams outlined several serious doubts about the accidental
character of the crash.1 Her study led to the formation of the investigative
Hammarskjöld Commission in 2012. Three years later this commission’s
findings firstly formed the basis of the constitution of a panel of experts, and
later the appointment of Eminent Person Mohamed Chande Othman at the UN.
I first came into contact with the investigation in 2015, when I read about
it in the news. I remembered several documents mentioning the Hammarskjöld

1 Susan Williams, Who killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, the Cold War and white supremacy in
Africa (London: Hurst and Company, 2011).
case that I had found while working on my PhD thesis,2 and contacted the UN.
Soon after I became a voluntary researcher. I also believe in an aerial attack.
What follows is the current state of my research.

Katanga’s air force and the UN Operations Rum Punch and

Morthor
When Tshombe declared Katanga’s independence on 11 July 1960, his decision
was enforced by the provincial security force Gendarmerie Katangaise. In the
following months, the Tshombe government enlarged this force, improved its
training and equipment, and added foreign mercenaries to foster its combat
strength. A national air force, the Force Aérienne Katangaise (FAK) also known
as Aviation Katangaise (Avikat), was also added. The Belgian Victor Volant
became its commander. Reports on the number and the types of aircraft owned
by Avikat vary. It operated across several airfields in the hinterland and three
airports in the major cities of Katanga: Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Elisabethville,
the last harbouring its headquarters. Furthermore, landing rights for several
airfields in Northern Rhodesia, perhaps also Angola, existed.
All this changed on 28 August with the UN Operation Rum Punch. The UN
took control of Katanga and seized most of the Avikat planes, which were
based at the Elisabethville headquarters at that time. Only a small number of
planes (again, numbers tend to vary), which had been based elsewhere,
remained under the control of Avikat. These included aircrafts and helicopters
of the following types: Aérospatiale-Potez-Fouga CM-170 Magister, De
Havilland DH-104 Dove, Piper PA-18 Super Cub, Piper PA-22-150 Caribbean,
Douglas C-47A, and Sikorsky S-58C.
In the aftermath of Operation Rum Punch, Avikat moved its headquarters
to Kolwezi, one of the few cities still under control of the Katangese security
forces. Victor Volant was replaced as commander by the Katangese Jean-Marie
Ngosa. Ngosa’s former adviser, the Belgian José Delin, became chief of
operations.3 On 13 September, when the UN began Operation Morthor, Avikat
deployed one fighter jet, a Kolwezi-based CM-170 Magister with the aircraft
registration code KAT-93, to support the Katangese ground operations. On 14
September KAT-93 provided close air support to Katangese units attacking UN
troops at Jadotville and carried out an airstrike on UN troops at Elisabethville.
This occurred again just one day later, when it provided close air support to

2 Torben Gülstorff, Trade follows Hallstein? Deutsche Aktivitäten im zentralafrikanischen Raum

des ‘Second Scramble’ (Berlin: Humboldt-Universität, 2016).

3Christopher Othen, Katanga 1960-63. Mercenaries, Spies and the African Nation that Waged
War on the World (Stroud: The History Press, 2015), pp. 139–147.
Victor: some events mentionned about Victor in the book of Othen are not for 100% in the right cronology.

Victor says: The KAT 93 was flown from Kisengi to Kolwezi on September 13th by Magain on orders of Ngosa. Very late
in the afternoon it tried to attack UN positions but its guns barrels were blocked due to a not fully precise overboring by
the UM technicians. This was retified within a few hours and next day the KAT 93 was back in the space of Elisabethville.
Katangese units attacking UN troops at Jadotville and Kamina and carried out
another airstrike on UN troops at Elisabethville. On 16 September, it provided
close air support to Katangese troops attacking UN troops at Jadotville and two
UN companies trying to relieve them, chased away a UN helicopter at
Jadotville, attacked a parked UN DC-3 at Kamina, and carried out another
airstrike on UN troops at Elisabethville. On 17 September, it provided close air
support to Katangese troops attacking UN troops at Kamina twice, destroyed a
Sabena Douglas DC-4 on the ground and chased away a DC-3.
Understandably, soon after the Hammarskjöld crash, KAT-93 became the
investigators’ prime target, even though no shoot-down of a UN plane by the
CM-170 Magister had been reported and, for technical reasons, its deployment
in an air-to-air combat operation on a dark night is highly questionable.
Furthermore, as by the end of 1961 Avikat began to use a De Havilland
DH-104 Dove to provide close air support to Katangese troops, investigators
became interested in this model as well.
None of the other aircraft, namely Piper PA-18 Super Cub, Piper
PA-22-150 Caribbean, Douglas C-47A, and Sikorsky S-58C, were ever seriously
considered. This also applies to another plane that was in operation in Katanga
on 18 September 1961. Due to several false reports dating its arrival not
earlier than mid-October, it has been overlooked for a long time: a Dornier
DO-28A with the aircraft registration code KA-3016.

Four plus one (plus four plus one) – selling several Dornier
DO-28As to Avikat
Altogether, five (or six or even ten) Dornier DO-28As were ordered and
received by Avikat in 1961 via the Belgian-Congolese trading company
MITRACO. Its owner was the retired Belgian Colonel Jean Cassart, who, in the
late 1950s, had become Dornier’s sales agent for Katanga. Negotiations for
buying several DO-28As had already started in July 1960. On 24 February
1961 MITRACO placed an order, and on 10 August the first receipt was signed.4
The first DO-28A, with the production number 3016, took off in Germany
on 21 August and bypassed Portuguese Angola on 28 August. It would have
reached Katanga around 29 August. Four further DO-28As, with the production
numbers 3017 to 3020, took off in Germany around 7 October and bypassed
Portuguese Angola on 15 October. They would have reached Katanga around

4 ZFST to Federal Agency for Commercial Economy, 21 December 1961, German Federal
Archive (BArch), B 102, 139598.
16 October.5 According to their production numbers, they received the
Katangese aircraft registration codes KA-3016 to KA-3020. These five planes
are already known about.
However, according to Dornier Representative Otto Wien6 and the West
German Ministry of Defence,7 at least one further DO-28A must be added to
this list. As the US State Department informed the West German Embassy in
Washington on 21 October, this further DO-28A had been disassembled, its
components shipped to Portuguese Angola and transported to Kolwezi where
they had been put together by a company technician.8 Furthermore, in the
same meeting, the US State Department also declared that four DO-28As
marked in the colours of Katanga had been seen flying through the airspace of
Gabon. These planes could have been KA-3017 to KA-3020 which probably
bypassed Gabon on 14 or 15 October. However, in November the British
newspaper the Daily Express published an unnamed eyewitness report, stating
that five DO-28As had taken off at Munich on 16 October,9 refuelled at Gabon
around 20 October, and arrived at Katanga about one day later, fitting
chronologically much better into the US State Department’s 21 October report
on five DO-28As entering African territory. In the following months, all these
DO-28As (whether five, six, or even ten) were used by Avikat for close air
support operations all around Katanga.
Yet it is only the first one, the plane with the aircraft registration code
KA-3016, that is of actual importance for the Hammarskjöld case. Only
KA-3016 arrived at Katanga around 29 August 1961, more than two weeks
before the crash on 18 September. Could KA-3016 have been used for an
attack on Hammarskjöld’s DC-6?

Making the case for a German plane: a lonesome Dornier

DO-28A
Accounts of the events of the night of the attack greatly differ. Some
5 West German Consulate in Portuguese Angola to West German Foreign Office, 19 October
1961, Political Archive of the German Foreign Office (PA AA), Section Foreign Office (AA), B 34,
254.

6 Representative Wien (Dornier) to Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West
German Foreign Office), without date, PA AA, AA, B 57, 65.

7 West German Ministry of Defence to West German Foreign Office, 8 December 1961, PA AA,
AA, B 130, 8371A.

8 West German Embassy in the USA to West German Foreign Office, 21 October 1961, PA AA,
AA, B 34, 254.

9 ‘I Took Planes to Tshombe’, Daily Express, 6 November 1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 254.
eyewitnesses claimed to have seen one plane, others two planes. Some said
that they heard a jet engine, others a piston engine. There is even uncertainty
about what kind of weapon had been utilized. Some said a machine-gun had
been used, others that a bomb had been dropped out of a plane. Consensus
exists only in so far as a bigger plane, Hammarskjöld’s DC-6, flew at lower
altitude, while being attacked by a smaller plane, flying at higher altitude.10 It
is hard to gain any evidence out of this information that could help to identify
an attacking plane. Yet perhaps a comparison of the operational capabilities of
the three most probable planes, namely a CM-170 Magister, a DH-104 Dove,
and a DO-28A, can shed some light on the case. After all, the attacking plane
did not leave the scene without leaving any clues behind.
Firstly, the attacking plane obviously had to be armed. A CM-170 Magister
was equipped with two machine guns and brackets to carry bombs and
rockets. A DH-104 Dove was a civilian plane but could be armed with machine
guns and bomb brackets. A DO-28A was also a civilian plane. In the same way
as a DH-104 Dove, it could be armed with machine guns, bomb brackets and
even rocket brackets, even though Dornier management11 and the West
German Ministry of Defence denied this possibility. In July 1961 the latter
made the official claim that Dornier planes had ‘no fighting potential’.12 The
West German Foreign Office disagreed, claiming that DO-28As, like their
predecessors, the DO-27s, had already been armoured by several buyers for
military purposes. The Portuguese army and air force, for example, had used
more than a dozen DO-27s in Angola during the indigenous uprisings of
autumn 1961. Reports of the West German Foreign Office mention machine
guns, bomb brackets,13 and even rocket launchers14 installed on DO-27s and
used in combat to ‘burn complete villages’.15 Reports from the Foreign Office
also indicate the installation of these features in the Katangese DO-28As. On
24 November 1961, the West German Foreign Office informed Dornier that a

10 Williams 2011 (see note 1), pp. 91–129

11West German Foreign Office to West German Foreign Office, 12 July 1961, PA AA, AA, B 

130, 374a.

12 West German Foreign Office, 12 July 1961 (see note 11).

13 West German Foreign Office to Representative Wien (Dornier), 24 November 1961, PA

AA,AA, B 130, 374a

14West German Consulate in Portuguese Angola to West German Foreign Office, 29 August
1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 272.

15 West German Foreign Office to West German Foreign Office, 2 June 1962, PA AA, AA, B 68,
65.
DO-28A had attacked UN and Congolese troops.16 Therefore, armament cannot
be used as a clue as all three planes had the same capabilities.
Secondly, the attacking plane had to have flight characteristics that were
fitting to attack a DC-6: a great manoeuvrability and the ability to fly at a
speed of approximately 240 to 290 km/h, to which the DC-6 would have
slowed down during its landing approach. A CM-170 Magister is a twin-engine
jet, built to train jet pilots but also able to provide close air support. Its
maximum speed lies at approximately 740 km/h, its regular speed at
approximately 550 km/h, and its slowest flying speed at approximately 144
km/h.17 A DH-104 Dove is a twin-engine propeller aircraft, built to transport
people and goods. Its maximum speed is approximately 370 km/h, its regular
speed approximately 301 km/h, and its slowest flying speed approximately 120
km/h. A DO-28A is a twin-engine propeller aircraft, also built to transport
people and goods. Its maximum speed is approximately 328 km/h,18 its
regular speed approximately 250 km/h, and its slowest flying speed
approximately 65 km/h.19 Therefore, speed cannot be used as a clue.
Manoeuvrability, on the other hand, offers the first hint. All three planes had
average to good manoeuvrability. Yet a DO-28A, as it is a Short Take-off and
Landing (STOL) plane, is able to fly in very tight and abrupt curves with a
speed of less than 100 km/h. It, therefore, is the most manoeuvrable of the
three. After all, according to a UN report, not just KAT-93 but also at least one
DO-28A was used by Avikat to intercept UN aircraft in 1961.20
Thirdly, the attacking plane had to bring down another plane on a dark
night. This requires special technical navigation equipment. KAT-93, according
to the 2017 UN report, lacked this technical equipment, even though a CM-170
Magister usually had a Lear radio compass and a Very High Frequency
Omnidirectional Range (VOR) on board.21 A DH-104 Dove usually was delivered
with an Automatic Direction Finder (ADF).22 The first DO-28A, KA-3016, is

16 West German Foreign Office, 24 November 1961 (see note 13).

17Email from Laurent Rabier, Responsable des collections d’aéronefs et de toiles d’aéronefs,
Musée Air + Espace, 23 May 2018.

18Bavarian Ministry of State for Economy and Traffic to Federal Ministry of Economics, 10
November 1961, BArch, B 102, 139598.

19 ‘DO 28 im Examen’, in Dornier Post 3/4 (1962), pp. 12–15.

20 UN General Assembly, document A/71/1042, 2017, pp. 32–33.

21 Email from Rabier (see note 17).

22 Email from Curator Alistair Hodgson, De Havilland Aircraft Museum, 16 May 2018.
reported to have been equipped with the radio compass Lear ADF 14-d-1.23
Therefore, in the case of night flying equipment, a DH-104 Dove and KA-3016
would have been the most probable planes. However not one report of a night
attack by a CM-170 Magister or a DH-104 Dove exists. This is in contrast to a
DO-28A. Here, and only here, at least one night-time attack is reported.24
Fourthly, on the night of the attack, radio signals of the attacking plane
were received by a British intelligence radio station in Cyprus.25 To reach this
station, radio signals from Ndola had to cover 5,300 km. Only High-Frequency
(HF) radio signals can cover such a distance. Therefore, the attacking plane
had to have HF radio equipment installed. A CM-170 Magister usually only had
a radio for Very High-Frequency (VHF) and Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) on
board26 and a DH-104 Dove usually was equipped with a VHF Mark VIII radio.27
Both, therefore, would have needed a transmitter to cover the distance.28 The
Hammarskjöld Commission tried to solve this problem by declaring another
plane, equipped with a transmitter, to be the radio signal’s source. To me, this
solution seems highly questionable and unlikely. KA-3016 had such HF radio
equipment, namely a Narco Marc V, and the HF transceiver Sunair 5-T-R,
specially designed for long-range communications.29 Depending on the
frequency used and the plane’s altitude, radio signals sent with this equipment
could have been received by a regular HF receiver at a distance of
approximately 30 to 800 km by day and up to 4,000 km by night. Considering
the advanced reception and amplifying possibilities of an intelligence radio
station, it is highly likely that a radio signal from KA-3016, flying above Ndola,
would have been perceived and intercepted by the Cyprus station’s radio
specialists.
Fifthly, and finally, the attacking plane would have had to be based close
enough to its target area, Ndola airport. KAT-93 was based at Kolwezi. A
CM-170 Magister has a maximum range of 925 km. The distance between
Kolwezi and Ndola, there and back, is approximately 851 km. Therefore, an
attack, well-timed to the minute, would have been possible. However, the

23 ZFST, 21 December 1961 (see note 4).

24 UN General Assembly 2017 (see note 20), p. 32.

25 UN General Assembly, document A/70/132, 2015, p. 24.

26 Email from Rabier (see note 14).

27 Email from Hodgson (see note 22).

28 UN General Assembly 2015 (see note 25), p. 28.

29 <http://www.sunairelectronics.com/web/workspace/uploads/t5d_t5r-1313017033.pdf>
document accessed by author 20 June 2018
chances of running out of fuel during the mission would have been high.
Furthermore, such an attack would have created another anomaly as, during
Operation Morthor, KAT-93 only operated within a range of 140 to 240 km
around Kolwezi. Certainly, the possibility exists that the plane was refuelled at
another airport or airfield between Kolwezi and Ndola, even though reports
indicate that no Katangese-held airport or airfield suitable for jets existed in
that area. One airfield particularly comes to mind, Kipushi, where the
Katangese government had raised its temporary headquarters. The distance
between Kipushi and Ndola, there and back, is approximately 404 km.
Nevertheless, even if KAT-93 could have handled the uneven runway at
Kipushi, it would have needed about 1.5 km to land and take off. The Kipushi
airfield was only 0.7 km in length. This was also too short for a DH-104 Dove.
That plane needs a runway of about 1 km to reach a height of 15 m, but it
does have a maximum range of 1.415 km.30 Based at Kolwezi, a DH-104 Dove
could have flown to Ndola, circled around for a while, attacked, and returned
safely to its base. A DO-28A has a maximum range of 1.220 km. Yet, as a
STOL plane, it does not need a long runway. It can take off and land in less
than 0.3 km,31 and so could have operated from the Kipushi airfield. Indeed,
sources suggest that KA-3016 was not based at Kolwezi but was, rather, at
Kipushi at the time of the attack. A report of a Dornier employee, Mr Sohn, to
the Foreign Office states that KA-3016 was solely used to transport members
of the Katangese cabinet.32 Furthermore, in a meeting with the West German
Embassy at Washington, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs at the US State Department Woodruff Wallner mentioned a
DO-28A, based at Kipushi.33 KA-3016, therefore, could easily have reached
Ndola, prepared, and finalized the attack and returned safely. Moreover, at
Kipushi, on 17 and 18 September, KA-3016 would have been in the hands of
the Katangese political hardliners, like Munongo. These were men who, fearing
accountability for their dark political doings, were willing to make every
sacrifice to secure Katanga’s sovereignty and their own political future. For
them, KA-3016 would have been an ideal tool to weaken the position of those
who were willing to compromise and eliminate the person they saw as central
to the UN’s disapproval of Katanga’s independence. This was not without good
reason. After Hammarskjöld’s death, the UN soon ended its occupation and the

30 Email from Hodgson (see note 22). ‘DO 28 im Examen’ (see note 19).

31 ‘DO 28 im Examen’ (see note 19).

32Federal Ministry of Economics to Federal Ministry of Economics, 30 October 1961, BArch,

B102, 139598.

33 West German Embassy in the USA, 21 October 1961 (see note 8).
Tshombe government was back in power.
To conclude: all three planes had the capability to attack Hammarskjöld’s
DC-6. However, KA-3016’s abilities seem to fit best with the clues that were
left behind on 18 September. What is more, a closer look at the transfer of the
DO-28As brings some suspicious details to light which support the impression
that there was something special about KA-3016.

Suspect details of a rather unusual delivery

By the summer of 1961, news of a possible deal between Dornier and Katanga
had circulated in the international press. In the aftermath, the US State
Department and the UN presented the West German Foreign Office intelligence
regarding the deliveries and expressed their worries. Understandably, the West
German Foreign Office was not amused. With the West German Ministry of
Economics, it began an unofficial investigation which revealed some odd details
of the delivery process.
Dornier employees had serious problems stating the number of planes
that Katanga had ordered. Sales agents and employees sometimes stated
five,34 other times six.35 When asked how the delivery had taken place, Dornier
representative Otto Wien answered that the planes had taken off from the
company airport at Oberpfaffenhofen,36 even though the planes had taken off
from the international airport of Munich-Riem, approximately 30 km to the
east. Usually the pilot of a plane had to write a report regarding the market
situation in the delivery area and a copy of this report was sent to the West
German Foreign Office. Yet this time, no such copy was sent.
Finally, Dornier’s management was not able to name the pilots who had
delivered KA-3016 to KA-3020. For several months, the Foreign Office and the
Ministry of Economics had to investigate. Their focus regarding this issue lay
on KA-3016 as it was this plane their investigation had started with. In early
October, Dornier Representative Otto Wien mentioned ‘a German pilot, who is

Colonel Jean Cassart was arrested in 1963 by the government of Leopoldville, for the illegal sale of SIX Do28
to the regime of Katanga.(note of Victor)

34Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West German Foreign Office) to West
German Foreign Office, 25 October 1961, PA AA, AA, B 57, 65.

35West German Foreign Office to West German Foreign Office, 5 October 1961, PA AA, AA, B
130, 374a.

36Representative Wien (Dornier) to Chief of the Aircraft Manufacturing Division Beauvais

(West German Ministry of Economics), 4 October 1961, PA AA, AA, B 57, 65.
not an employee of Dornier’.37 Later, Dornier Export Director Mr Leander38 and
Dornier employee Mr Sohn39 mentioned a German pilot who was not known to
them. By the end of October, the Dornier sales agent responsible for the
Belgian market, Mr Delattre, even identified the Belgian buyer himself, Jean
Cassart, as the pilot.40 Fortunately, in November a staff member of the Ministry
of Economics contacted the traffic department of the Munich-Riem airport,
which Otto Wien had falsely denied as the point of departure. Here, the airport
chief of traffic Kurt Bartz was finally able to name the pilot of the first delivery:
Heinrich Schäfer who, according to Bartz, was Dornier’s chief test pilot.41
However, this information was only partially accurate. The pilot of KA-3016
had been Heinrich Schäfer but on 1 March 1960 Schäfer had quit his job at
Dornier. He continued to work for the company, but as a freelance pilot.42 Bartz
also identified the four pilots of KA-3017 to KA-3020 who had taken off at
Munich-Riem around 7 October: Mr Boutet, Mr Paire, Mr Fouquet, and Mr
Bertaux. All of them were of Belgian nationality.43 Be that as it may, in the
context of this paragraph only the German pilot of KA-3016 is of further
interest. The fact that a former employee, well-known to the company’s
management, had been involved in its delivery raises one serious question: is
it probable that all the men involved in the process of selling the first DO-28A
to Katanga had not known when they were asked, and were unable to come to
know in the following days and weeks, that their former colleague Schäfer had
made the delivery?
Doubts are justified as clues even indicate the implementation of a staged
cover-up story by somebody. As already mentioned, on 6 November, the British
tabloid newspaper the Daily Express published a report, written by an
unnamed eyewitness.44 According to this witness, five DO-28As took off at
Munich on 16 October. He or she claimed that these planes had been flown by

37 Representative Wien (Dornier), 4 October 1961 (see note 36).

38Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West German Foreign Office), 25 October 

1961 (see note 34).

39 Federal Ministry of Economics, 30 October 1961 (see note 32).

40 West German Embassy in Belgium to West German Foreign Office, 31 October 1961, PA AA,
AA, B 130, 8371A.

41 Federal Ministry of Economics to Federal Ministry of Economics, 24 November 1961, BArch,

B 102, 139598.

42 ‘Chefpilot Heinrich Schäfer jetzt freier Mitarbeiter’, in Dornier Nachrichten, 4 April 1960.

43 Federal Ministry of Economics, 24 November 1961 (see note 41).

44 ‘I Took Planes to Tshombe’ (see note 9).

 British, Belgian and French pilots, marked with the aircraft registration codes
KA-3016 to KA-3020. As a proof, the witness had added a photograph, showing
KA-3016 and KA-3020 on an airfield. Was this fake news? Had this statement
been published to mislead the still ongoing investigation? Was it trying to prove
that no Dornier plane had been in Katanga earlier than late October 1961?
Another clue strengthens this assumption. Let us return to the already
mentioned US complaint about the four DO-28As flying through Gabon
airspace in mid-October for a moment. According to this complaint, a US
informant had recognized the aircraft registration codes of two of the four
planes: KA-3015 and KA-3017.45 Now, 3015 was the production number of a
DO-28A that the West German Ministry of Defence had bought for its special
air mission wing in 1961. It was marked with the aircraft registration code
CA+041 and decommissioned in the late 1960s.46 It is, therefore, rather
unlikely that it had been seen near Gabon, let alone marked with a Katangese
aircraft registration code. It is much more plausible that KA-3016 has been
misread or falsely reported by the US-American informant as KA-3015. Yet if
so, it would have been the second DO-28A, marked KA-3016, crossing Gabon
airspace in autumn 1961. Therefore, up to this point, one thing should have
become clear: efforts had been made to cover up the delivery of KA-3016 in
late August. At least so far, it is the only plane in the Hammarskjöld case for
which such a cover-up can be noted.

Conclusion

This article makes the point that a Dornier DO-28A might be the plane that
was used in a night-time air-to-air attack on UN General Secretary Dag
Hammarskjöld on 18 September 1961.
This does not mean that the company Dornier had actively participated in
the planning, preparation or execution of such an attack. It is highly likely that
the timing of the arrival of KA-3016 in late August, between Operation Rum
Punch and Operation Morthor, was pure coincidence.
The same applies to freelance pilot Heinrich Schäfer. Nevertheless, the
investigation of KA-3016 is still at an early stage and nothing should be ruled
out without more research. An analysis of Avikat’s usual combat strategy and
tactics shows quite clearly that the attack on Hammarskjöld’s DC-6 was an
anomaly. Avikat’s pilots seemed to lack the experience required to bring down

45 West German Embassy in the USA, 21 October 1961 (see note 8).

46 <https://tinyurl.com/y9va2gzt> or <https://www.klassiker-der-luftfahrt.de/geschichte/
flugzeuge/einsatzgeschichte-der-dornier-do-28-ab/653592>, document accessed by author 23
July 2018.
However, the KA3016 was used on a quiet different different approach as usual. Bringing down a plane at
night is an almost impossible thing when axial machine guns are used. Dropping a bomb is an impossible
mission too. There is only one possibility to shoot down at night a DC6 and that is with a door-gunner
connected with an intercom to the pilot.(note Victor)
another plane. UN planes were intercepted while airborne but were destroyed
only while on the ground. The downing, therefore, formed one anomaly; flying
in a dark night was another. Something must have been different in September
1961. Schäfer comes to mind. He was an experienced German Luftwaffe
fighter pilot, trained for night-time air-to-air combat operations and had
participated in more than 60 World War II combat missions over Soviet and
North African combat zones.47 But he never operated as a door-gunner.
Yet, this fact is a clue, not evidence. Currently, there is no concrete
evidence for any active involvement of Schäfer in the Hammarskjöld case.
Nevertheless, not just for this reason further research on Schäfer might be
promising. On 29 August he arrived at Katanga. Usually delivery pilots stayed
for some time at their place of destination to instruct local pilots and
mechanics. According to Dornier’s representative at Bonn, Otto Wien, the
German ‘non-Dornier’ delivery pilot of KA-3016 returned to the company right
after the delivery.48 Yet, on 2 October the US Embassy at Bonn informed the
Foreign Office that a DO-28A, obviously KA-3016, armed with machine guns
and bomb brackets, had been seen at a Katangese airfield accompanied by a
‘Dornier technician’.49 About two weeks later, US intelligence added that the
parts of the sixth disassembled DO-28A had been put together in Kolwezi with
the help of a ‘Dornier employee’.50 As Otto Wien declared that no Dornier
personnel was based at Katanga51 and Schäfer also had been a technical officer
at the German Luftwaffe,52 he may very well have been the technician US-
American intelligence had falsely identified as a Dornier ‘employee’. Therefore,
further research on Schäfer’s stay might deliver new insights into the situation
of Katanga’s available planes and pilots, perhaps even into the situation of the
exiled government at Kipushi in September 1961.
Be that as it may, at least one thing can be said definitely: if the crash of
Hammarskjöld’s DC-6 was caused by an air-to-air attack, KA-3016 has to
seriously considered as the attacking plane. As the former Katanga Gendarme

47 Schäfer to Central Verification Authority (Federal Archive) and Wehrmacht Information

Authority (WASt), 3 November 1965, BArch, Pers6, 190806.

48Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West German Foreign Office) to West
German Foreign Office, 5 October 1961, PA AA, AA, B 57, 65.

49 Representative Wien (Dornier) to Claudius Dornier Junior (Dornier), 2 October 1961, PA AA,
AA, B 57, 65.

50 West German Embassy in the USA, 21 October 1961 (see note 9).

51Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West German Foreign Office), 5 October 

1961 (see note 48).

52 Schäfer, 3 November 1965 (see note 47).

 The very first time that I saw the aircraft was indeed on September 2 or 3, 1961 (the first
week-end of September 1961). I was surprised to see its very large side-doors. (Victor)
Victor Rosez confirmed to me: ‘About the 5 Dorniers [KA-3016 to KA-3020], I
can tell you that the very first was flown by their own pilots and arrived in
Katanga by end of August 1961. This aircraft could be modified easily in a light
bomber and possibly used in an attack on another plane.’ 53 To definitely prove
or rule out this possibility, further research is necessary.

Torben Gülstorff is a German freelance historian. In 2016 he earned his

PhD in contemporary history. The history of West and East German activities
in Africa after 1945 forms one of his special subjects. He supports the ongoing
UN investigation into the death of former UN General Secretary
Dag Hammarskjöld as a voluntary researcher.

Katanga was not a second rank or ordinary country...

It already had played the main role in the most bloody event in human history
with the uranium bomb on Nagasaki and the Plutonium bomb on Hiroshima...!
The article in the "Zondag Nieuws" of November 1961 about the Journey of a number
Do28 was intendto cover up the delivery of KA-3016 at the first days of September 1961,
maybe even on August 29th of that year. By reading the article in my own
language I clearly can discover that there is a second story between the lines. The
article is talking about the delivery of five Do28 while only four pilots and aircrafts
were shown. Several times it is mentionned that the writers of the article could not
give "all details" of the operation because the Dornier Factory had insisted for such
guaranties. In fact the article would let believe that five Do28 departed on October
2016 while there were only 4 of them.
The Brittish article doesn't show that ambivalency
The story about the huge presence of German mercenaries needs a liitle bit more
explanation as we are very maybe mixing up German and Belgian military presence.
Concerning the Ka 3016, I can confirm you that I saw the aircraft as well in
Kipushi as in Kolwezi. The first time wason the first week-end of September 1961
at Kipushi, the second time was on the first or second of October 1961.
Further analyses of the Chart of Ndola are showing me some huge anomalies in the
reversal turn that airplanes use to make before engaging the landing itself. You can
follow that in the explanation of the partial pdf sent to the Eminent Person's Office.
In this pdf I am showing the possibility of the techniques of the Huey door-gunners
in Viet Nam.
The 1962 Avikat commander Zumbach was using this technique in a Dove Havilland,
using a mi.50 assisted by a radiocommunication headset with the pilots.
However o Dove Havilland was not ideally suited for intercepting a DC6-B.
The CFIT theory is very easy to debunk as you also can find in the pdf to the
eminent person.
The term CFIT has to be replaced by the "pilot's decision to make an immediat
emergency landing. No pilot put the flaps at 30 degrees and put the gears down and
locked while making a very short and sharp reversal turn.

53 Email from Victor Rosez (former member of the Katanga Gendarmerie), 25 February 2018.
Zumbach aka Mister Brown 1962.
Mi.50 (12.7mm used for ground targets.
However the Do28 door-gunner system was
much lighter and more efficient in hands of
an expierenced sharpshooter.
One has to consider that this only could have
be done to a DC6 in a final approach.

This system with the mi.30 instead of the mi.50

was already been used in spring 1961 against the
Baluba in the North.

This is a part of the at least a dozen of Belgian

"Marscompagnieën" or "Compagnies de Marche".
Most of their "homebases" were in that time in
occupied Germany which and the majority of the
soldierswere Flemisch speaking Belgians.
Flemish is a language very close to German.
As the Belgian troops, sent to maintain order,
rebellion and rescue Belgian citizens, they were
denied acces to the Congo.
Therfore large groops of the were waiting their
final orders in Brazzaville or Usumbura.

On the picture of 1961 the 1st Guides are saluting

the Swedish UN troops who came to take over the
job to "secure the population"
Hammarskjold : La mort mystérieuse du secrétaire de l'ONU et les
archives secrètes belges
18/04/18 à 09:00 - Mise à jour à 14/01/19 à 15:11 Source: De Morgen

Dag Hammarskjold a été tué le 18 septembre 1961. Son DC-6 s'était écrasé près de Ndola, en Rhodésie du Nord, l'actuelle
Zambie, alors qu'il allait négocier un cessez-le-feu pour la province du Katanga. Des témoins ont évoqué la présence d'un ou
plusieurs avions à réaction qui auraient pris en chasse l'avion avant de l'abattre. Un Fouga Magister, piloté par un Belge, est
régulièrement cité lorsqu'on évoque cet évènement qui garde son mystère des décennies après les faits. De Morgen vient de
publier un témoignage qui con rmerait cette thèse.

Dag Hammarskjöld (1905 - 1961) est un diplomate suédois. Il fut secrétaire général des Nations unies de 1953 à 1961, remarqué pour avoir su maintenir une ligne indépendante à
l'égard des grandes puissances. L'année même de sa mort, survenue dans des circonstances suspectes avant la n de son mandat, le prix Nobel de la paix lui fut décerné à titre
posthume. © LENNART NILSSON/REPORTERS

Pourquoi ? C'est le seul mot qu'on retrouve sur la couronne mortuaire de la famille du diplomate suédois, deuxième secrétaire général de
l'ONU, qui a trouvé la mort à 56 ans le 18 septembre 1961 près de Ndola, en Rhodésie du Nord (actuelle Zambie). Il effectuait alors une
mission de paix au Congo - ex-belge et nouvellement indépendant - et devait rencontrer Moïse Tshombe, le dirigeant du Katanga qui avait
fait sécession du Congo et proclamé son indépendance. Une région qui intéressait pas mal de monde en raison des richesses cachées
dans son sol. La Belgique, et ses alliés, mais aussi le Congo n'avaient pas l'intention d'abandonner ces riches mines de cuivre, d'or ou
encore d'uranium.

Dans cette époque troublée, Hammarskjold avait fait de l'instauration de la paix dans la région sa mission. Le diplomate n'économisa pas
sa peine. Par idéalisme, mais aussi parce que l'ONU était encore une organisation jeune qui avait beaucoup à prouver. Il était parvenu à
remplacer les soldats belges par 20.000 Casques bleus. Bien qu'o ciellement la Belgique ne reconnaissait pas l'indépendance du
Katanga, l'armée katangaise aurait obtenu l'aide d'o ciers belges. On estime qu'à la moitié de l'année 1961, les Forces Katangaises étaient
composées de 10 000 soldats africains et 600 Européens précise encore
De Morgen (https://www.demorgen.be/buitenland/de-vn-baas-de-crash-en-de-belgische-huurling-wordt-de-dood-van-dag-hammarskjold-
eindelijk-opgelost-b4faba34/)
.

La prochaine étape était des pourparlers de paix avec le gouvernement katangais, qui bombardait régulièrement les troupes de l'ONU.
Hammarskjöld se rendait donc en Rhodésie du Nord pour négocier directement avec le président katangais, la n des hostilités entre les
Casques bleus de l'ONUC et les forces katangaises.

En réalité cette mission ne suscitait guère d'enthousiasme. Personne ne souhaitait que la médiation aboutisse puisque cela pousserait la
riche province à retourner dans le giron congolais qu'on soupçonnait alors de connivence avec l'URSS. Pouvait-on prendre le risque de
laisser partir le cobalt et l'uranium congolais vers les ennemis russes ? Pas vraiment. Le Suédois était très étroitement espionné par les
Anglais et les Américains. Le drame de l'accident ne chagrina donc pas tout le monde.

Un prix Nobel de la paix à titre posthume

Dag Hammarskjöld (1905 - 1961) fut secrétaire général des Nations unies de 1953 à 1961. On louera particulièrement sa capacité à
maintenir une ligne indépendante à l'égard des grandes puissances. L'année même de sa mort, survenue avant la n de son mandat, le
prix Nobel de la paix lui fut décerné à titre posthume. Celui qu'on appelait Monsieur H n'était pourtant pas très populaire. En 1961, il avait
même réussi à se mettre à dos toutes les chancelleries occidentales. Partisan de l'indépendance des peuples afro-asiatiques, il s'était
mis la France et la Grande-Bretagne à dos en s'interposant durant les crises de Suez (1956) et de Bizerte (1961).

Les recherches chaotiques vont mettre dix heures à retrouver l'épave de l'avion Hammarskjolds qui n'était pourtant qu'à une dizaine de
kilomètres de l'aéroport. Sur les seize occupants, il n'y aura qu'un seul survivant : Harold Julien, le garde du corps qui raconte qu'un
incident a précédé le crash. "Quelque chose a explosé dans l'avion lorsqu'il était au-dessus de la piste, ce dernier va ensuite prendre de la
vitesse avant de s'écraser plus loin" dira-t-il.

De quoi suggérer que l'avion a été attaqué. Sauf que trois enquêtes vont dire le contraire. Qu'importe si des habitants indiquent qu'ils ont
vu une étincelle dans le ciel. Qu'importe si d'autres témoins avaient repéré un deuxième avion en l'air. Dans le régime d'apartheid de la
Rhodésie du Nord, on ne tient alors pas compte des témoignages de ces personnes "de couleur". Six jours après le crash de l'avion, Harold
Julien meurt à l'hôpital. Dans les années qui suivirent, aucune recherche ne pourra apporter une réponse dé nitive à la question de savoir
si le Douglas DC6B s'était écrasé à cause d'une erreur du pilote ou s'il a été délibérément abattu et, le cas échéant, par qui. O ciellement,
l'"Albertina s'est écrasée peu après minuit dans un bois d'acacias, train d'atterrissage verrouillé, lorsque l'extrémité de son aile gauche a
touché la cime des arbres à cause d'une altitude trop basse conjuguée à l'inexpérience et la fatigue supposées de l'équipage suédois",
précise
Le Soir (http://plus.lesoir.be/121644/article/2017-10-28/la-mort-de-dag-hammarskjold-secretaire-general-de-lonu-en-1961-netait-pas-un).

L'affaire va atterrir dans les limbes de l'histoire et ne va plus passionner grand monde.
Mais les choses changent en 2011, lorsqu'un livre de Susan Williams, de l'Université de Londres, redonne vie à la théorie qu'il existait une
conspiration pour abattre l'avion. Ce livre va faire tant de bruit, qu'en septembre 2013, une commission baptisée Hammarskojld va
reprendre l'enquête de zéro. Les preuves qu'elle accumule vont convaincre la Suède de demander à l'ONU de rouvrir une enquête. En
décembre 2014, l'assemblée générale décide que des experts indépendants vont poursuivre le travail d'investigation déjà entamé par la
Commission Hammarskojld en 2013. L'équipe d'experts est dirigée par le Tanzanien Mohamed Chande Othman, ancien procureur en chef
du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda. Il était assisté de Mme Kerryn Macaulay, représentante de l'Australie au Conseil de l'Organisation
de l'aviation civile internationale, et de Henrik Ejrup Larsen (Danemark), un expert en balistique de la police danoise. Selon la commission,
"il existe une preuve convaincante que l'avion a fait l'objet d'une forme d'attaque ou de menace au moment où il s'apprêtait à atterrir à
Ndola". Des témoins interrogés par la commission avaient notamment évoqué la présence d'un autre appareil qui aurait tiré sur le DC-6. On
parle d'un Fouga Magister de la rébellion katangaise piloté par un Belge, José Magain (décédé en janvier 2003). D'autres pistes suggèrent
d'autres noms, comme celui de Beukels.
Le Soir (http://plus.lesoir.be/121644/article/2017-10-28/la-mort-de-dag-hammarskjold-secretaire-general-de-lonu-en-1961-netait-pas-un)
évoque en effet le témoignage posthume d'un diplomate français, ex-collaborateur de Hammarskjöld à l'ONU, Claude de Kémoularia, "qui
t en 1967 une rencontre fortuite avec trois anciens mercenaires, dont deux Belges : de Troyer, Beukels et Grant. Le dénommé Beukels se
présentait comme un pilote de chasse mercenaire, qui décolla le soir du 17 septembre 1961 du Katanga à bord d'un jet de type Fouga
Magister, armé et équipé de réservoirs supplémentaires, avec ordre d'intercepter le DC-6 et de le détourner vers Kolwezi, où des dirigeants
miniers auraient tâché de convaincre Hammarskjöld de se ranger à leurs arguments pro-sécessionnistes. Un "tir de semonce" en théorie
anodin aurait sectionné les câbles de gouverne du DC-6 au moment où le pilote tentait une manoeuvre d'évasion." En n, un autre nom que
l'on voit surgir ici et là est celui du mercenaire Vam Riesseghel. Un ancien de l'armée de l'air belge et britannique qui a été décoré lors de la
deuxième guerre mondiale précise
De Morgen (https://www.demorgen.be/buitenland/de-vn-baas-de-crash-en-de-belgische-huurling-wordt-de-dood-van-dag-hammarskjold-
eindelijk-opgelost-b4faba34/)
. Il aurait , toujours selon
De Morgen (https://www.demorgen.be/buitenland/de-vn-baas-de-crash-en-de-belgische-huurling-wordt-de-dood-van-dag-hammarskjold-
eindelijk-opgelost-b4faba34/)
, dirigé les troupes de la Force aérienne katangaise dans les premiers mois de l'année 1961. L'homme qui avait eu toute sa vie soif
d'aventure meurt en 2007, en Belgique. Dans le rapport d'Othman pour l'ONU, il est précisé que l'ambassadeur américain Gullion porte de
graves accusations envers Jan van Risseghem. Il envoie le jour de l'accident dans un message aux États-Unis. "Il est possible que l'avion
ait été abattu par le seul pilote qui s'oppose aux opérations de l'ONU et qui a été identi é par une source able comme étant Vam
Riesseghel (sic), un Belge, qui offre des formations à la soi-disant Katanga Air Force. " De Morgen vient de publier
ce 14 janvier 2019, deux témoignages qui con rment cette thèse (https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/exclusief-belgische-piloot-biechtte-
moord-op-vn-secretaris-generaal-dag-hammarskjold-op-b8e3807a/)
.

Un nouveau témoignage
Pierre Coppens, un ancien parachutiste qui vit en Espagne, raconte son histoire pour la première fois. "Je sais que Jan Van Risseghem a
fait tomber l'avion, parce qu'il me l'a dit lui-même ", dit Coppens. Coppens est sûr de ce que Van Risseghem lui a dit. "Toute sa vie, il en a
été protégé par les services secrets."

Coppens le rencontre non pas au Congo, mais en Belgique quelques années après la mort de Hammarskjöld. Les deux font connaissance
lors d'un stage qui s'est déroulé de début avril à juin 1965 à l'aéroport de Moorsele, près de Courtrai. C'est Van Risseghem qui donne la
formation. Van Risseghem va trouver chez le jeune Coppens, alors âgé de 18 ans, un auditeur passionné des récits de ses exploits
pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

Van Risseghem quitte la Belgique en 1940 et rejoint la Royal Air Force. "Il s'est spécialisé dans les vols de nuit, qui avaient pour but de
prendre des photos aériennes des installations d'avions allemands à l'aube," explique Coppens. Après la guerre, Van Risseghem épouse
une Anglaise en 1948 et devient pilote pour la Sabena, mais aussi pour l'armée sud-africaine et rhodésienne (maintenant
Zimbabwe/Zambie), avant de rejoindre les troupes katangaises. Un certain Charles Southall travaillait pour le service de renseignement
américain NSA sur l'île de Chypre en 1961. Sa tâche consistait à intercepter les messages radio. Dans un rapport suédois de 1994, il se
rappelle que dans la nuit de l'accident, il a pu intercepter la voix "froide et professionnelle" d'un pilote qui disait : "Je l'ai frappé. Il y a des
ammes ! Il va s'effondrer. Il s'écrase ! Selon lui, ce devrait être le pilote connu sous le nom de Lone Ranger. "Or depuis ses vols de nuit
pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Van Risseghem était connu sous le nom de Ranger solitaire ", dit Coppens.

Il aurait effectué le raid avec un Fouga Magister, un avion qui ne dispose pas de matériel d'orientation permettant de voler de nuit. "Van
Risseghem avait démonté l'intérieur de l'avion pour perdre le plus de poids possible ", explique Coppens. Il m'a dit : "Je suis parti pour cette
mission sans parachute, sans radio, ni banquette arrière : tout ce qui était super u est resté au sol." Il savait exactement combien de
temps il avait pour s'y rendre, tirer et revenir avec cet avion."

"Ce n'était pas nous, mais les Sud-Africains"

De plus, il ne serait pas parti de l'aéroport habituel de Kolwezi, mais de Kipushi, une piste dans la brousse, à la frontière du Katanga et de la
Rhodésie, plus proche de Ndola si l'on croit un autre Belge, Victor Rosez, qui vit maintenant à Hong Kong, mais qui vivait à l'époque à
Élisabethville, près de Kipushi. "C'était plein d'avions de l'armée du Katanga ", raconte-t-il, lui qui était à l'époque dans son avant-dernière
année d'études secondaires. Le père de Rosez était à la tête d'une équipe qui effectuait des travaux de construction pour les chemins de
fer. La famille vivait dans une grande maison avec la famille du général Norbert Muke, commandant de l'armée de Katanga.

"Nous avions la visite de mercenaires presque tous les jours, y compris Van Risseghem," dit Rosez. "Quoique je ne l'appellerais pas
vraiment un mercenaire, mais plutôt une sorte d'idéaliste, pour la patrie belge." Une série de bombes de 25 kilos a été fabriquée pour le
Fouga Magister dans un atelier du quartier industriel d'Élisabethville entre mai et août 1961. Je le sais parce que j'y ai moi-même
participé", dit en Rosez dans De Morgen.

Le Magister Fouga était un avion d'entraînement, mais a été transformé en machine de combat. À l'extérieur, il y avait des attaches pour
les bombes, que le pilote pouvait ouvrir à partir du poste de pilotage. Et il y avait une mitrailleuse montée dans le nez. Le problème était
qu'il n'y avait pas de munitions disponibles", explique Rosez.

Rosez, n'a jamais entendu d'aveux de la part de Van Risseghem. Pourtant, il ne doute pas de la confession en 1965 de Van Risseghem à
Coppens. "Coppens n'est pas un vantard, pas plus que Van Risseghem", dit Rosez. Dans les années 1980, il tombe sur Van Risseghem à
l'aéroport de Deurne. "Je lui ai posé des questions et il a réagi de manière très défensive: je ne veux pas nir comme Schramme", m'a-t-il dit
en faisant référence au mercenaire qui venait d'être arrêté pour meurtre". Rosez se souvient que les jours suivants l'accident, les gens
parlaient beaucoup. "J'ai été témoin d'une conversation entre mon père et le général Muke dans laquelle il aurait dit : "Je n'ai jamais donné
l'ordre. Ce n'était pas nous, mais les Sud-Africains". Jan Van Risseghem revenait juste d'Afrique du Sud à ce moment-là. Il avait non
seulement un passeport belge et un passeport britannique, mais aussi un passeport sud-africain, en raison de son passage dans l'armée
sud-africaine.

Coppens est convaincu que Van Risseghem n'a appris qui se trouvait à bord de l'avion que quelques jours après l'incident. "Dans une
guerre, on ne fait pas ce que l'on veut."

Peu d'enthousiasme

Devant les nombreuses zones d'ombres de cette affaire, Othman demande à huit États membres, dont la Belgique qui pourrait, au vu des
témoignages cités plus haut, avoir joué un rôle, de publier des informations classi ées.
Le Katanga du début des années 1960 est un sujet qu'on n'aime que peu, doux euphémisme, aborder publiquement. Durablement marquée
par son passé colonial, la Belgique aimerait oublier l'épisode chaotique de la sécession katangaise. Tout comme son rôle ambigu dans le
meurtre de Lumumba. Un rôle qui fut lui aussi révélé par un livre et qui lui aussi t l'objet d'une commission dans notre pays et entraîna les
excuses publiques de la Belgique en 2001.

Lire :
Lumumba était assassiné au Katanga (/actualite/international/rdc-il-y-a-55-ans-lumumba-etait-assassine-au-katanga/article-
normal-451157.html)

Quoi qu'il en soit, le moins que l'on puisse dire c'est que la Belgique ne va pas répondre avec un enthousiasme délirant à cette demande.
En 2015, bien qu'un groupe d'experts de l'ONU ait reçu des informations du gouvernement belge, il est apparu que les archives secrètes
n'avaient pas été consultées à ce moment-là. Cette année-là, Bruxelles est pourtant sollicité directement par les experts de l'ONU, sur des
questions précises, précise encore
Le Soir (http://plus.lesoir.be/121644/article/2017-10-28/la-mort-de-dag-hammarskjold-secretaire-general-de-lonu-en-1961-netait-pas-un).
Par exemple, "existe-t-il des archives, même con dentielles, se rapportant précisément au crash du DC-6 ? Peut-on identi é formellement
Beukels ? Jan van Risseghem pouvait-il se trouver à Kolwezi le 17 septembre 1961 ?"

Les contradictions autour de Van Risseghem

De Morgen (https://www.demorgen.be/buitenland/de-vn-baas-de-crash-en-de-belgische-huurling-wordt-de-dood-van-dag-
hammarskjold-eindelijk-opgelost-b4faba34/)
relève que le cas de Van Risseghem pose question. Les informations de la Sécurité d'État que la Belgique a transmises à l'ONU
montreraient en effet que Van Risseghem n'a pas quitté Bruxelles avant l'accident d'avion. Selon ces sources Van Risseghem aurait déjà
été arrêté en août 1961 par l'ONU et rapatrié en Belgique début septembre. Sauf que ces informations prêtent à cautions toujours selon
le quotidien. Si Risseghem a bien un alibi grâce à "un reçu signé le 17 septembre à Bruxelles pour le paiement de la mission du Katanga.
Il est aussi noté que ce document est signé par une autre personne venue chercher en son nom l'argent", écrit le rapport de l'ONU du
juge Othman. Du coup toujours selon ce rapport "qu'il était possible qu'il soit encore à Bruxelles, ou à ce moment-là à Paris, en route
pour le Congo." En outre, les États-Unis ont envoyé eux aussi des informations à l'ONU. Un rapport de l'ancien ambassadeur américain
au Congo, dit qu'il a reconnu l'homme, quelque jours avant l'accident Hammarskjold , lorsqu'il tirait avec des missiles et des
mitrailleuses sur la mission de l'ONU et la population civile de Kamina. En outre on sait que le 15 septembre, Hammarskjold demande à
la Belgique de mettre n aux activités criminelles de Van Risseghem contre l'ONU et contre les civils. Tout cela ne signi e pas
nécessairement que la mort de Hammarskjold est le résultat d'une vendetta de Van Risseghem, ou que la Belgique a quoi que ce soit à
voir avec cela dit encore le quotidien. Comme précisé plus haut, Hammarskjold avait beaucoup d'ennemis. Les intérêts de l'Union
Minière, des États-Unis ou encore du Royaume-Uni pouvaient aussi jouer un rôle dans ce contexte de la guerre froide naissante.

Les réponses viennent avec parcimonie et sont toutes négatives : sécurité nationale oblige, on ne dira rien, dit encore le quotidien. Il y aura
une seconde démarche, en 2017, qui donnera lieu à la communication d'une dizaine de documents à l'ONU qui ne révéleront rien de
transcendant. L'ONU demandera alors à chaque pays de désigner un expert indépendant habilité à chercher lui-même dans les archives
classi ées. En mars 2017, toujours selon
Le Soir (http://plus.lesoir.be/121644/article/2017-10-28/la-mort-de-dag-hammarskjold-secretaire-general-de-lonu-en-1961-netait-pas-un),
on votera à la hâte une loi élargissant de 30 à 50 ans le délai obligatoire de versement des archives de la Sûreté de l'État aux Archives
générales du Royaume. Toujours selon le quotidien, les archives de la Sûreté coloniale et de la Force publique ont été discrètement
transférées vers la Sûreté de l'État et le Service de renseignement militaire. Hors d'accès sans commission d'enquête parlementaire en
bonne et due forme.
Katanga : des archives en n accessibles
Ce n'est qu'il y a quelques semaines qu'on a appris que certaines archives vont en n être déclassi ées. Un évènement exceptionnel pour
notre pays sur un sujet si délicat. De juillet 1961 à janvier 1964, le Katanga a fait sécession de l'État congolais tout récemment affranchi de
la tutelle coloniale belge. Durant cette période, une mission diplomatique belge a fonctionné à Elisabethville/Lubumbashi. Le ministre des
Affaires étrangères Didier Reynders (MR) a informé les députés que les archives relatives à cette mission diplomatique se trouvaient
toujours inventoriées au SPF Affaires étrangères. Stockées sur "un peu plus d'un demi-mètre linéaire et composées de cinq portefeuilles et
de cinq liasses", elles ont été déclassi ées. L'archiviste du SPF Affaires étrangères les tient à la disposition du public. Ces archives
contiennent notamment des renseignements sur Dag Hammarskjöld. Peut-être qu'on y trouvera la réponse à la fameuse question sur la
tombe de Hammarskjold.

Commentaire de Victor E. Rosez:

Il faut d'abord savoir distinguer et garder les choses séparément sans les intermélanger.

Malgré des nouveaux documents et témoignages il n'a pas encore été établi que Jan Van Risseghemen n'était pas encore au Katanga
avant le 18 Septembre 1961.
Il reste des doutes! Ces doutes proviennent du fait que sur des pages de comptabilité de la mission Katangaise il y a des dates qui ne
correspondent pas avec la réalité. On peut voir par exemple que Bob Denard et Jan Van Risseghem on touché des montants au 16
Septembre... Mais Bob Denard a été vu le 15 septembre 1961, avenue Wangermée/Ruwé lors des combats de radio collège. Il se peut
donc que Jan Van Risseghem et Bob Denard soient revenus ensemble.
Quant au Fouga Magister KAT93 et ses capacités il suffit peut-être de dire que son armement était conçu pour des attaques Sol-Air de jour et
certainement pas pour des attaques Air-Air de nuit. Le calibre 7,62mm Otan (allésé) ne convenait pas non plus.
On parle toujours de pilotes casse-cou qui sont capables des faire des exhibitions fantastiques avec leurs engins.
Mais il y des autres possibilités qui ont déjà été discutés il y a des années. Il s'agit de l'intervention combinée d'un Dove Havilland avec un
Dornier Do28 et un "door-gunner".
J'ai été un des meilleurs tireurs d'élite dans mon bataillon et je peux vous démontrer comment l'Albertina a pris feu dans son aille droite et a
fait un atterissage de détresse avant que cette aile se plia dans la carlingue....
Les troupes de sol qui étaient tout près de la piste d'atterrissage pour intercepter éventuellement le DC6 en dernier lieu se sont précipitées vers
le crash pour verifier. Peut-être ont-ils mis au feu des parties de l'avion restés intactes mais le but final avait été atteint.
L'opération était bien organisée et à voir les uniformes abandonnés portait une marque Française.
DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD
memorial at Ndola
 It is said that the Fouga Magister attacks between
0913 and 0917 were done by José Magain. Other players and
Dag Hammarskjöld direct impact data One big enigma remains: Inquiries
ORGANIGRAM Where were the other pilots?
José Marie Ghislain MAGAIN and
2nd.Lt. Dubois ?

Dag Hammarskjöld KATANGA AVIKAT Kolwezi: Fouga

18091961:0015am September 17th, 1961 Albertina take off Luano. didn’t move on the 0918 night (?)
A few shots from Square Uvira by Victor E Rosez KAT3016 Do28 was in Kipushi on 0903, 61 and
Ndola
Dag Hammarskjöld not on board. Damage repaired went to Kitwe. Pilots Schäfer or Van Risseghem
Possible attack did possibly recon before the attack.
September 17th, 1961 Albertina take off Léopoldville
Direction Ndola. No flight plan with round about flight Welensky and RRAF: support Tshombe
to avoid Fouga attack. Plan was to meet Tshombe. Presence of multiple Canberra and Vampire jets

September 18th, 1961 Albertina approaches Ndola Presence of 3 DC3 USAF Dakota with radio
intercept (and radar?).
after contact with Salisbury and makes turn to land
Other intercept post was in Cyprus (Southhall)
but crashes just after midnight. Nobody is aware of it. Another was in Ethiopia
There are more than 130 witnesses a majority
saw beside the Albertina one or more other
September 18th, 1961 Albertina found Presence of a KAT Dove at Ndola. On
(jet) aircrafts. See Rhod. Rep. A/5069/add.1 p3 at 9.5 miles from runaway at 15:10pm September 20 many mercenaries were
or almost 15 hours after the crash. flown back to Katanga with it.

Delivery of aircrafts to the Avikat including

some Fouga and Vampire jets. It is not clear
if this happened before the 17th.

How come we all knew in E’ville that DH was

Who was that commercial pilot?
killed by a shoot down before noon while
Series of wrong info: Cable of Gullion. Cable the plane was only found after 15:15Hrs??
SE-BDY
that Irish fraternized with Katangese? O’Brien
CRASH SITE Meijer short wave interception at midnight
announced end of secession while Irish
800ft long
“He’s approaching the airport. He’s turning.
surrendered at Jadotville and Elisabethville. he’s levelling. Another plane is approaching
from behind-what is that?”
Belgian secret services manipulated
the exact times that mercenaries
returned to Katanga.

It was on the demand of Gen Muke that we fabricated

25 kg bombs for the Fouga in our workplace quartier
Industriel. Belgian colonel Cassart had already
delivered 1600 bombs of 12,5kg. See J. Puren.

Presence of British intelligence agency in the area.

Britain has refused to release the Ndola files. Along with Mr. Hammarskjöld there were the following on board:
Mr. Heinrich A. Wieschhoff, Mr. Vladimir Fabry, Mr. William Ranallo,
Belgium released some documents Dec 2018 Miss Alice Lalande, Sgt. Harold M. Julien, Sgt. Serge L. Barrau, Sgt.
© Victor E. Rosez Francis Eivers, WO S.O. Hjelte, Pvt. P.E. Persson, Cpt. Per Hallonquist,
Cpt. Nils-Eric Aarheus, 2nd Pilot Lars Litton, F-E Nils Göran
Wilhemsson, Ass. Harald Noork and Radio Operator Karl Erik Rosen.
? RIP