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INTRODUCTION
to prove.1 In criminal trials the burden of proof is universally agreed to be of vital importance2,
and it standard is proof beyond reasonable doubt.3 This burden can be legal or evidential, the
legal burden is on the prosecution in criminal cases and it never shifts. 4 So far as it borders on
proof beyond reasonable doubt, we may ask; what happens when the prosecution has discharged
this burden? Does a discharge of it translate into automatic conviction? An attempt will be made
to give answers to these questions, as well as give the Nigerian position on the rule espoused in
the celebrated case of Woolmington v. DPP.5 This paper considers what constitute the defence of
insanity under Nigerian Law, and also examines how reasonable doubt can be deduced on behalf
"Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is
always to be seen that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the
prisoner's guilt subject to... the defence of insanity and subject also to any
1
Adrian Keane: The Modern Law of Evidence (4th edition, Butterworths 1996) page 66
2
Roderick Munday: Book Review on The Burden of Proof, edited by Albert kiralfy. (1987) vol 46 no.3 CLJ <
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4507110 > accessed 15/02/2015
3
Adrian Keane op. cit. page 67
4
Woolmington v. DPP (1935) AC 462 HL; Okoh v. The State (2014) LPELR-22589 (SC); Obed v. The State (2014)
LPELR-23123 (CA)
5
[1935] AC 462 HL, per Lord Sankey.
6
supra
statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a
reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution
or the prisoner... the prosecution has not made out the case and the
prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the
trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner
is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can
be entertained."
It can be deduced from the above that in certain instances the evidential burden on the
prosecution might shift,7 as sometimes it might be required of the accused to prove certain fact8.
One of the most striking features of the English criminal law, which largely forms the basis of
the Nigerian criminal law, is its unwillingness to convict anyone of a crimes unless there is a
very high degree of probability of their guilt.9 What then does the phrase “beyond reasonable
understood expression”10
In Lord Diplocks11 view that a case has been proven beyond reasonable doubt should be a matter
of discretion for the judge. It is to be assumed that a trial judge or magistrate has in mind the
7
See Akosa v. C.O.P. (1950) 13 WACA 43
8
See proviso to section 36 (5) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. Hereinafter
called 199 constitution
9
L.J. Blom- Cooper: The Quantum of the Burden of Proof in Criminal Trials. (1969) vol.32 no.2, The Modern Law
Review. Page 220. < http://www.jstor.org/stable/1094561 > accessed 11/02/2015
10
Barton A.C.J. in Brown v. R (1913) 17 C.L.R 570
11
Walters v. R (1969) 2 WLR 60; see L.J. Bloom-Cooper op.cit. page 220
elementary principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and that
However, it is clear that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all
doubt, as; “the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the
shadow of any doubt that the person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty
is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of justice.” 13 Prove beyond
The Evidence Act 201115 provides that the commission of a crime must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.16 Under Section 135(2) of The Act; “the burden of proving that any
person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to Section 139 of this Act, on the
person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the
action.” To discharge this burden, the prosecution must prove all necessary ingredient of an
offence. Since, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to the hilt, and all essential
ingredients of the offence charged has to be established, and once this is done, it will be idle for
the defence to argue to the contrary.17 Thus in a murder trial, the necessary ingredient laid out in
Ogedengbe v. The State18 are: That the deceased died; that the death of the deceased was caused
by the accused; that the act or omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased
was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable
consequence.
12
I.G.P. v. Adelabu (1956) 1 F.S.C. 48; see also Okonkwo And Naish: criminal law in Niigeria (2nd edition,
Spectrum Books Ltd) page 94
13
Per Okoro J.S.C in Okoh v. The State (2014) LPELR-22589 (SC) referencing Mufutau Bakere v. The State (1987)
3 SC 1 at 32
14
Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution as amended
15
As amended
16
Section 135(1)
17
Per Fabiyi J.S.C in Adamu Saliu v. The State (2014) LPELR-22998 (SC)
18
(2014) LPELR-23065 (SC) per Peter- Odili J.S.C
All these necessary ingredient can be established by: a confessional statement;
circumstantial evidence; or, evidence of eye witnesses.19 When the prosecution has relieved itself
of this burden, the accused person is not left without a way out, as the accused person then comes
under a burden of proving reasonable doubt.20 The Evidence Act does not give a guide on how
this should be done, but in all cases positive evidence has to be tendered and all necessary
objections raised.
The word ‘alibi’ simply means “elsewhere”.21 This is a defence used by the accused
person to allege that at the time when the offence with which he is charged was committed, he
was elsewhere.22 This defence is usually raised at the earliest possible opportunity by the accused
person to a charge by the police at the investigation stage to enable the truth or falsity of the
allegation to be established.23 Alibi would seem to be the perfect defence, although may open a
wide field of temptation to the suspect and his witness.24 This is particularly why, not all alibi
needs be investigated where there is sufficient positive evidence that places the accused person at
The question becomes: how does the defence of alibi give rise to reasonable doubt?
When an accused person raises this defence, that he was somewhere else other than the locus
delicti at the time of the commission of the offence, and gives facts of his where about, the
19
See Ogedengbe v. The State (2014) LPELR-22065 (SC); see also Igabele v. The State (2006) 2 SC (pt. II) 61
20
Section 135(3) of the Evidence Act 2011.
21
Olatinwo v. The State (2013) LPELR-19979 (SC)
22
Ozaki v. the state (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 92
23
See Adedeji v. The State (1971) 1 All N.L.R. 75; see also Adjo v. The State (1986) 2 N.S.C.C. 815
24
W. E. C. Avenagh: Review on Alibi by R. Gooderson (1978) vol. 18, No. 4. The British Journal of criminology,
page 421. < http://www.jstor.org/stable/23636148 > accessed 23/02/2015
25
Olatinwo v. The State (2013) LPELR-19979 (SC). See also Archibong v. State (2006) 14 NWLR (pt. 1000) 349;
Ibe v. The State (1992) NWLR (pt. 244) 642
prosecution is duty bound to investigate that alibi set up to verify its truthfulness or otherwise.26
The failure to do this will be fatal to the prosecution’s case, especially where there is no
sufficient evidence to connect the accused to the scene of the crime. Failure to investigate may
raise reasonable doubt and lead to the quashing of a conviction. 27 The court held in Ozaki v. The
State28 that:
“in my opinion, the alibi of the appellants not having been proved false, is
bound to create doubt in the mind of the learned trial judge as to the guilt
of the appellants and that doubt must be given in their favour. This, I
hereby do.”
The onus on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, is added to once the
accused raises the defence of alibi. There is no onus on the accused to prove the alibi beyond that
of introducing the evidence of alibi;29 instead the prosecution must disprove it to successfully
Reasonable doubt can be deduced through the prosecution’s case, where the prosecution
has not judiciously discharge the burden placed on it, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the
doubt. Also, the accused can raise objections to the admissibility of his alleged confessional
statement, and if successful may serve as establishing reasonable doubt on his behalf. Another
way is to attack the credibility of prosecution witnesses brought against him. A confessional
26
Okosi & Ors v. The State (1989) CLRN 29 at 48. See also Maikudi Alivu v. The State (2007) All FWLR (pt. 388)
1123
27
See Onafowakan v The State (1987) 2 N.S.C.C 1101
28
(1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 92
29
Bozim v. The State (1985) 2 NWLR (pt. 8) 465
statement can be objected to basically in two ways; firstly, that it was not made involuntarily. In
all cases, the court will not receive in evidence a confessional statement made by oppression of
the person who made it or, in consequence of anything said or done which affects the statements
credibility.30 When a confessional statement is objected to as being involuntary, the next huddle
is to conduct a trial-within-trial, and if a ruling is made in favour of the accused the confessional
Secondly, the accused person can retract his said confessional statement. The mere
retraction of a confessional statement by an accused person will not render it inadmissible, it may
only affect the weight to be attached to it where the accused denies making it at the earliest
opportunity.32 Where a confessional statement has been retracted it can still ground a conviction
provided there are other evidence adduced which are sufficient to corroborate the confessional
statement.33 It therefore follows that where no such supporting evidence exists to corroborate a
retracted confessional statement, no weight should be attached to it. Confessional statements are
of vital importance in any criminal trial basically because; they can sufficiently ground a
conviction. Where it is possible to make a trial judge discountenance of it during the course of
trial or, make it impossible to rely on though admitted in evidence, may be a situation of
Reasonable doubt may also be found where the prosecution fails to tender in evidence
vital material necessary to their case. This might be failure to call a very vital witness to be
cross- examined. Reasonable doubt may be raised from the presumption of withholding
30
Section 29(2) of the Evidence Act 2011
31
See the dictum of Peter-Odili J.S.C in Ogedengbe v. the State (supra) on the issue of confessional statement
32
Per Kekere-Ekun, J.S.C. in Okoh v. The State (2014) LPELR-22589 (SC); see Abdullahi v. The State (2013) All
FWLR (pt.699) 1118
33
See the judgement of Onnoghen J.S.C. in Peter Iliya Azabada v. The State (2014) LPELR-23017 (Pp. 14-15) paras
G- D
evidence.34 Where the prosecution refuses or omits to tender in evidence the accused
confessional statement where same is shown to have been made, may be sufficient to raise
reasonable doubt, whether it is favourable or not.35 The court held in The People of Lagos State
v. Umaru36 thus:
quashed and any sentence premised upon it can equally be set aside.”
While Section 135(2) of the Evidence Act places the burden of prove in criminal matters
on the prosecution, it however, made it subject to Section 139 of the same Act. Section 139(3) of
the Evidence Act 2011 provides that: “nothing in Sections 135 and 140… shall, (c) affect the
burden placed on a defendant to prove a defence of intoxication and insanity.” The primary focus
in this paper is on the defence of insanity, which is also mainly relied on in Nigerian Courts and,
which will form the basis of the next discussion in this paper.
DEFENCE OF INSANITY
From time to time the criminal courts remind us of the wide gap that exists between the
legal view of insanity and the knowledge gained by psychiatrists in the century which has
elapsed since the formulation of the "rules in M'Naghten's case."37 This shows that what might
be legally needed to establish the defence of insanity might be different from what obtains in the
34
See Section 167(d)
35
O.P. Agboola and J.L. Ayodele: Objejctions to Confessional Statements: The Law as it is. <
http://www.everylawstudent.com/2015/01/objections-to-confessional-statements.html >
36
(2014) LPELR-22466 (SC)
37
The Defence of Insanity. (1938) vol.1 no. 4027, The British Medical Journal, page 599. <
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25369260 > accessed 11/02/2015
world of science. Criminal responsibility becomes even more difficult to define when it relates to
insanity,38 it is suggested hence that any definition for criminal responsibility should be
reasonably flexible to make room for changing standard and progress in knowledge. 39 The
relevant test for the defense of insanity was laid down in M’ Naghten’s case,40 where the House
of Lords held:
his crimes, until the contrary be proven to their satisfaction; and that to
that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did
However, the concern here is on the Nigerian position on the law relating to insanity. The
issue of insanity may arise at two different stages, that is; before trial commences or during
trial.41 Where the judge perceives that the accused is of unsound mind and hence incapable of
making his defence, before the proceeding goes the judge may direct that his condition be
time of doing the act or making the omission he is in such a state of mental
38
Okonkwo And Naish: criminal law in Niigeria (2nd edition, Spectrum Books Ltd) page 129
39
Ibid.
40
(1843) 10 CI. & F. 200
41
Okonkwo and Naish, op. cit. page 132
42
Ibid; see R. v. Ogor (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 70; R v. podola (1960) 1 Q.B. 325
43
Cap C38 LFN, 2004
disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive him of capacity to
capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.”
The Criminal Code spoke not only of ‘mental diseases’ but also of ‘natural mental
infirmity’. For a proper understanding of these terms, medical views will be necessary. It will be
much more difficult to ascertain what constitute mental diseases, as opposed to the physical
counterpart.44 It is suggested that a broad view should be taken as opposed to the narrower view,
to recognize that it covers many different types of mental abnormalities.45 Further, the Criminal
Code speaks of ‘natural mental infirmity’ not merely ‘mental infirmity’, and hence it can be
taken to mean such an infirmity which did not merely developed during one’s lifetime but, which
has been from birth. In any cases, one thing is certain; the addition into Section 28, takes the rule
further.
It appears that what is important is insanity at the time of commission of the unlawful act.
The fact that an accused is sane at his trial is irrelevant. Nor, does insanity at the time of trial
prove insanity at the time of the act,46 as it can be shown that the accused was at his lucid
intervals during the commission of the unlawful act. The law also requires that there was lack of
capacity, in that: capacity to understand what he was doing, capacity to know that he ought not to
do the act of make the omission and, capacity to control his actions.47 In all cases, that an
evidence.
44
Okonkwo and Naish, op. cit. page 134
45
ibid
46
Ibid. page 136
47
See generally Okonkwo and Naish, op. cit. page 136- 139
It is not the duty of the prosecution to establish that the accused person is sane. Every
person is presumed to be of sound mind and to have been of sound mind at any time which
comes in question, until the contrary is proved.48 Sanity is presumed on behalf of the prosecution
and it is for the accused person to rebut it. This burden on the defendant is not as heavy as that of
any fact or matter has been placed upon a defendant by virtue of the
probabilities.”
When dealing with the defence of insanity, medical evidence becomes relevant. This is
brought forward by expert opinion evidence. Eyewitness evidence may also be relevant. The
behavior of the accused person prior to the time of commission of the offence will be in issue. 49
In M. A. Sanusi v. The State50 His Lordship Anagiolu JSC, commenting on what is expected in
“positive act of the accused person, before and after the deed complained
period of time as to his mental state; evidence of relatives who know the
accused person intimately relating to his behavior and change which had
come upon him; the medical history of the family which could indicate
48
Section 27 of the Criminal Code, Cap C38 LFn 2004
49
See imaseun v. The State (2014) LPELE-22193 (CA); see also Ejinma v. The State (1991) 7 SCNJ (pt.1) 318
50
(1984) 10 SC 166 at 177-78
circumstance which will help the trial judge come to the conclusion that
While, in a judgment by Oputa JSC51, those other facts and circumstances may be:
evidence from prison warders who had custody of the accused and looked after him during his
trial; the reputation he enjoys for sanity and insanity in his neighbourhood, among others.52 From
the above it is clear that, the evidential burden in insanity is less compared to proving the guilt of
the accused person by the prosecution. All that is required is the preponderance of evidence or a
balance of probability.53
The reaction of the accused to the state of things as believed by him must be such that it
could be regarded as legitimate and natural reaction to such state of things for the defence of
insanity to avail the accused person.54 Although insanity is a general defence, it appears it is
mostly used in murder trials in Nigerian Courts. It important to note that, the defence of insanity
is different from the defence of intoxication. An accused person relying on the defence of
intoxication does not become worthy of the defence of insanity. The court has said:
“it is essential, from social and public stand point, to closely examine a
to avoid to take legal consequences upon claim that they are insane.”55
acquittal in this sense does not mean the accused person should be discharged, as his freedom
51
In Onyejekwe v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (pt.72) 565 at 579
52
See Edoho v. The State (2010) 4 SCNJ 100; see also; Karimu v. The state (1989) 1 NWLR (pt.96) 124; Ogbu v.
The State (1992) 10 SCNJ 88 at 99
53
See Edoho v. The State (2010) 4 SCNJ 100
54
See Nkanu v The State (1980) 3-4 SC 1; M. A. Sanuasi v. The State (1984) 10 SC 166
55
See imaseun v. The State (2014) LPELE-22193 (CA)
56
See Section 229-232 of the Criminal Procedural Act, Cap C41 LFN, 2004
can still be held under Section 35(1) (e) of the 1999 Constitution.57 The place of ‘reasonable
doubt’, is to create doubt in the mind of a judge, which can in most cases lead to the acquittal of
an accused person. A successful defence of insanity is not disproving the fact that the accused
committed a crime; it simple denies criminal responsibility on his behalf, reasonable doubt
covers not a criminal intent but also the criminal act, here the accused is simply saying; ‘I
committed the offence but, did not know what I was doing was wrong at the time’. Thus, a
successful plea of the defence does not raise reasonable doubt in favour of the accused.
CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made in this paper to demonstrate how the evidential burden of
proof is never static even in criminal trials; this issue was discussed at length, while establishing
a link with the standard of proof in murder trial. We observed that while the prosecution has
discharged the legal and evidential burden placed upon it, the accused is not left without a way
out, which can be by raising reasonable doubt on his behalf or taking advantage of the defence of
insanity. While proof of guilt of an accused person is proof beyond reasonable doubt, proof of
The role of evidence in our legal system cannot be overemphasized, while it is conceded
that mere suspicion cannot ground a conviction, it therefore means that positive evidence must
be adduced in proof of facts before the court. And proof must be according to specification, that
is; either beyond reasonable doubt or, on the balance of probability as the case may be. This has
been the standard from time immemorial it is desirable that it remains so.
57
Cap C28, LFN 2004