FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
1 SANTOS V. SANTOS respondent’s father. More than four years from the time
FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got
married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived
with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave
birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel
Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a
number of things aside from the interference of Julia’s
parents into their family affairs. The RTC granted the petition and declared Jerry,
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite
Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, she called her husband and promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989
but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where
he underwent a training program under AFP, he
desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued
that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate
with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter
into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
2 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA FE
ESPINOSA CANTOR
“Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old
provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes
a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief"
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.”
Facts: Jerry Cantor, the husband of respondent Maria Fe
Cantor, left their conjugal home after having a violent
quarrel about respondent’s inability to reach "sexual
climax" and Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the
1
of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the
RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code.
She stated that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry
was already dead. She allegedly exerted efforts to look
for her husband by inquiring from her in-laws, neighbors
and friends of Jerry’s whereabouts, but to no avail. She
further alleged that she checks the patients’ directory
whenever she went to a hospital hoping to find Jerry.
presumptively dead. The CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent had a well-founded
belief that Jerry is already dead.
Ruling: No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the
prior spouse was already dead. Article 41 of the Family
Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code
which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It
requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. To be able to comply
with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief"
was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate
Jerry. These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent
standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence. The respondent did not actively look for
her missing husband. She did not report Jerry’s absence
to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to
look for him. She did not present as witnesses Jerry’s
relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. There was no
other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s
claim that she conducted a diligent search. In sum, the
Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged
in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated
inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She
failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged
efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that
her husband was already dead.
3 REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
FACTS: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees
of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993. In
May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed
down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive
any communication from her husband, notwithstanding
efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had
asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of waiting,
Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On
February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision
declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10 March
2005, OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing
that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Ruling: Yes. Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment
Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief
that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The
OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal.
She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family
Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the
judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus,
not appealable.. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
which was denied. Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether the order of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
HELD: Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is
final and immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred
in granting the petition, such order can no longer be
assailed.
4 OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA
“The losing party who files another action regarding the
same controversy will be needlessly squandering time,
effort and financial resources because he is barred by
law from litigating the same controversy all over again.
Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of
their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to
have waived any defects therein.”
Facts: In 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion (Oscar) filed a
petition before the San Pablo City RTC (Civil
Case 4341-95) seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent alleging his wife’s psychological
2
incapacity. The case was dismissed upon the finding that
petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence to
warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking. In 1999,
Oscar filed another petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, this time alleging that his marriage with
respondent Edith Alcantara (Edith) was null and void
due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license.
Issue: Whether or not a final judgment denying a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity bars a subsequent
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack
of marriage license.
obtains in the present case. Petitioner forgets that he is
simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause -
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent.
What differs is the ground upon which the cause of
action is predicated.
Litigants are provided with the options on the course of
action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an
option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the
parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues
therein. The losing party who files another action
regarding the same controversy will be needlessly
squandering time, effort and financial resources because
he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy
all over again. Having expressly and impliedly conceded
the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is
now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this
reason, the Court finds that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack
of marriage license is barred by the decision in Civil
Case No. 4341-95.
5 LEOUEL SANTOS v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS
“Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.”
Facts: The marriage between Leouel and Julia took
place on September 20, 1986. In 1988, Julia went to the
US to work as a nurse. Having failed to get Julia to
somehow come home, Leouel filed a complaint to have
his marriage with Julia declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Leouel argues that Julia's failure to return home, or at the FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter
very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
Leouel asserts that "a wife who does not care to inform
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated."
The RTC and the CA both dismissed the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not Julia is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations.
Ruling: No. The factual settings in the this case, in no
measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Justice Sempio-
Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso
who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved. The use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances. It should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
3
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse
to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
6 YAMBAO v. REP and YAMBAO
petitioner wife) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of her marriage with respondent Patricio Yambao
(hereinafter respondent husband) after 35 years of
marriage. She invoked the ground of psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her
marriage with the respondent husband had been marred
by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the
latter’s inability to comply with the essential obligations
to married life. She elaborated by saying that through all
the years of their married life, she was the only one who
earned a living and took care of the children and that
respondent husband just ate and slept all day and would
spend time with friends. In addition, she claimed that
respondent husband would venture into several
businesses but all of these failed. Respondent husband
was also a gambler. Petitioner wife also claimed that,
when their children were babies, respondent did not even
help to change their diapers or feed them, even while
petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation,
proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about
children. Later, respondent husband became insecure and
jealous and would get mad every time he would see
petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives.
When respondent husband started threatening to kill
petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and
live separately from him. She then consulted a
psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. Respondent husband
denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he
had been trying to find a decent job, but was always
unable to because of his old age and lack of
qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long
in the jobs he had because the same could not
support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that
were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had
ventured into small businesses but they failed due to
various economic crises. Respondent further claimed
that he was not, in fact, contented with living with
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
petitioner’s relatives since his every move was being
watched with eagle eyes. He also denied that he
gambled. He alleged that even without a steady source of
income, he still shared in the payment of the
amortization of their house in BF Homes, Parañaque
City. He also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner,
considering that there was never any evidence that he
had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner
to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown. He
further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist,
and denied that he was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding that
petitioner wife’s evidence failed to support her argument
that respondent husband was indeed psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. Thus:
• The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be
unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the
union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were
able to raise three children into adulthood without
suffering any major parenting problems.
o The court also noted that respondent was faithful
to petitioner and never physically abused her.
o Likewise, when the parties lived with
petitioner’s parents, respondent got along well
enough with her family.
• The court recognized that respondent did indeed have
many faults, such as his indolence and utter
irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondent’s
failure to find decent work was due to his not having
obtained a college degree and his lack of other
qualifications. Likewise, respondent’s failure in business to lose to another man.
could not be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner
was a business partner in some of these ventures.
• RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of
respondent’s Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC
said that, although the evidence tended to show that
respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a
living for the family, there was no evidence to show that
the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the
additional financial burdens passed to her by her
husband.
• The RTC concluded that while respondent might have
been deficient in providing financial support, his
presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to
accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be
relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are
obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the
Family Code.
• Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioner’s claim that she
suffered through respondent’s overbearing jealousy. It
found that respondent only became jealous when he
thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC
determined that jealousy was not a character trait that
4
contributed to respondent’s psychological dysfunction;
much less did it amount to psychological or mental
torture on petitioner.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It
held that:
o Petitioner failed to show that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage
o Petitioner exerted efforts to find a source of
income to support his family. However, his
failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his
business ventures were not mental but physical
defects and, hence, could not be considered
“psychological incapacity” as contemplated
under the law.
o The fact that the parties lived together for 35
years and raised three children well, and the fact
that respondent never physically abused
petitioner belied the former’s psychological
incapacity.
o The respondent’s refusal to care for the children
was not psychological incapacity but “merely
constituted refusal to perform the task,” which is
not equivalent to an incapacity or inability.
• It rejected petitioner’s allegation of respondent’s
unbearable jealousy. It said that the same must be shown
as a manifestation of a disordered personality which
would make respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state. The CA
averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced
respondent’s love for his wife, whom he could not bear
o The the purported threats to kill petitioner is an
“emotional immaturity” and not psychological
incapacity.
o Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness
Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to
be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the
findings therein were not corroborated by any
other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither
the report nor petitioner’s testimony established
that respondent’s psychological condition was
grave enough to bring about the inability of the
latter to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, so that the same was medically
permanent or incurable.
ISSUE: WON the totality of petitioner wife’s evidence
establish respondent’s psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage?
HELD: No. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court
held that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
incurability. These guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be
annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to
suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was
suffering from a psychological condition so severe that
he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family.
On the contrary, respondent’s efforts, though few and far
between they may be, showed an understanding of his
duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet
with much success. Whether his failure was brought
about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by
some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating
is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide
for his family, even with his many failings, does not
suffer from psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations
and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability RULINGS: In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the
to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
That respondent, according to petitioner, “lack[ed]
effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility”
does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital
obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early
neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged
unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional
turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown
to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover,
5
even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to
psychological incapacity, it has not been established that
the same existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent
never committed infidelity or physically abused
petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the
children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that
both made an impact in the children’s upbringing. Still,
the parties were able to raise three children into
adulthood “without any major parenting problems,” and
such fact could hardly support a proposition that the
parties’ marriage is a nullity.
7 HALILI v. REP and HALILI
FACTS: Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to
declare his marriage to respondent Chona Santos-Halili
null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He
alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that
it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband and wife. However, they started
fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner
other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that
he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
ISSUE: Whether or not his marriage to respondent
ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity.
Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated that
courts should interpret the provision on psychological
incapacity on a case-to-case basis - guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church
tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder
characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive
behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
and are easily hurt by others' comments.
adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be
unable to make everyday decisions without advice or
reassurance from others, may allow others to make most
of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
to agree with people even when they believe they are
wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things
on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning
in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that was grave and incurable
and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it failed to provide material support to the family and may
has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from
psychological incapacity that effectively renders him
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage
and thus the Court declared the marriage null and void.
8 VELASCO v. VELASCO
9 BRENDA B. MARCOS v. WILSON G. MARCOS
“Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the
nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality
of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for such declaration.”
Facts: The marriage between Wilson and Brenda
Marcos was declared null and void in a petition filed by
Brenda pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. Wilson
was declared psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to
find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards Brenda and their children. However, the said
decision was reversed by the CA ratiocinating that
Wilson was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if
only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of
the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as
would make him or her unable to assume them.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling: No. The guidelines incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
6
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What
is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that Wilson
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely
no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.
10 MATIAS v. MATIAS
11 RUMBAUA v. RUMBAUA
12 CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS and
GINA LAO-TSOI
“One of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." The
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.”
Facts: On May 22, 1988, Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina
Lao-Tsoi. However, since their marriage until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. Gina then filed a complaint for
the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Chi Ming
Tsoi on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina
claims that Chi Ming Tsoi is impotent and a closet
homosexual. According to Chi Ming Tsoi, the fault lies
with his wife since everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with her, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The RTC rendered a decision
declaring the nullity of their marriage. The CA affirmed
the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not refusal to have sexual intercourse
constitutes psychological incapacity.
Ruling: Yes. One of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "to procreate children based on
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of Ruling: Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the
the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As stated by the CA, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his
wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his
alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, thereto.
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
13 LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F.
REYES
“Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a
mere inability to comply with them.”
Facts: Petitioner Leonilo Antonio filed a petition to
declare his marriage with respondent Marie Ivonne
Reyes be declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Antonio claimed that Reyes persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. Reyes
allegedly concealed the fact that she previously gave
birth to an illegitimate son, which she represented to
Antonio as adopted child of the family. She fabricated
stories, misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist, claimed Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5,
to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent and even
invented imaginary friends.
The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, which was
upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. Thereafter,
the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null
and void. Despite the rulings of the Catholic tribunals,
the CA reversed the RTC’s judgment.
7
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of the parties should
be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The
evidence to establish psychological incapacity must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were
mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
Respondent had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. Respondent’s
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. It has been shown clearly
from her actuations that respondent has that propensity
for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. In persistently and constantly lying to
petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust
and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented
by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.
The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take
into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church. Respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
14 TE v. TE
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under
2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R.
CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January
19, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
Sometimes in January 1996 Petitioner Edward Kenneth
Ngo Te first met respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez
YuTe in a gathering organized by the Filipino Chinese
association in their college. Sharing similar angst
towards their families, the two understood one another
and developed a certain degree of closeness towards
each other. In March 1996, or around three months after
their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young
and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent.
Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money and she, purchases the boat
ticket.
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month.
Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a
job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila.
Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to
his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and
Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that
she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle’s place. On April 23, 1996,
Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get
married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. Rowena
suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live on their own. Edward talked to his father he
told that he will disinherited and insisted that Edward
must go home. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should
live with his parents, she said that it was better for them into the operating room. They tried to attend counseling
to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. The trial court, on July 30,
2001, rendered its Decision declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
Issue: Whether or not the contracted marriage is void on
the ground that both parties were psychologically
incapacitated
Held: The Psychological test result and evaluation result
were both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon
swearing to their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on marriage. Although
there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.
15 REYES v. REYES
8
FACTS: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met
respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in 1972
when they were both 19 years old. Petitioner enjoyed
respondent’s style of courtship which included dining
out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted
by a university student’s budget. At that time,
respondent held a job in the family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of
the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit
of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that
respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976,
petitioner and respondent got married. They lived with
Ramon’s parents and they were supported by them. They
had a child which made their financial difficulties worse.
All the business ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful
and Socorro became the breadwinner of the family. To
make things worse, despite the fact that Socorro would
undergo an operation for removal of a cyst, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read
the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner
requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled
sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996,
petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an
extra-marital affair. RTC granted the petition. CA
reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ramon is psychologically incapacitated
HELD: Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of
personal examination and interview of the respondent, or
any other person diagnosed with personality disorder,
does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors.
Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior
manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by
his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital
affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts;
(5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job
that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7)
criminal charges of estafa.
16 CHOA v. CHOA
FACTS: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met
respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in 1972
when they were both 19 years old. Petitioner enjoyed
respondent’s style of courtship which included dining
out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted
by a university student’s budget. At that time,
respondent held a job in the family business, the
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship
the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit with Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with
of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that whom she had two children. David then filed a petition
respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976, seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the
petitioner and respondent got married. They lived with ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC declared
Ramon’s parents and they were supported by them. They the civil and church marriages between David and
had a child which made their financial difficulties worse. Sharon null and void on the ground of psychological
All the business ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful incapacity on the part of the Sharon to perform the
and Socorro became the breadwinner of the family. To essential obligations of marriage. The CA reversed the
make things worse, despite the fact that Socorro would said decision dismissing the petition.
undergo an operation for removal of a cyst, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read Issue: Whether or not aberrant sexual behavior fall
the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner within the term "psychological incapacity."
requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled
into the operating room. They tried to attend counseling Ruling: No. The difficulty in resolving the problem lies
sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996, in the fact that a personality disorder is a very
petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy
extra-marital affair. RTC granted the petition. CA analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual
reversed. Hence, this petition. infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have
ISSUE: W/N Ramon is psychologically incapacitated known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It
HELD: Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior
personal examination and interview of the respondent, or to or at the inception of the marriage.
any other person diagnosed with personality disorder,
does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Sharon's sexual infidelity or perversion and
Neither do their findings automatically constitute abandonment do not by themselves constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity
manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital manifestations of a disordered personality which make
affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
(5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her
that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
criminal charges of estafa.
18 JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL
17 DAVID B. DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS and SIAYNGCO
SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL
a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, REPUBLIC OF THE “Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
PHILIPPINES psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code.”
“Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute Facts: Manuel Siayngco filed a petition for the
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juanita
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity Siayngco on the ground of the latter's psychological
and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. Manuel alleged, among others, that his wife
incapacity.” exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude
towards him, she incessantly complained about almost
Facts: David and Sharon Dedel were married in 1966. everything and anyone connected with him like his
However, during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of
an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs,
extra-marital affairs with several men. Petitioner alleged wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters,
that despite confirmed in the Manila Medical City for she would yell and scream at him and throw objects
9
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
around the house within the hearing of their neighbors
and she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support
and encouragement. In her answer, Juanita contended
that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his
marital and family obligations and that she supported
Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering. The
RTC dismissed Manuel's petition. The CA reversed the
RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not Juanita/Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with marital obligations.
Ruling: No. What emerges from the psychological
report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of
the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential
marital obligation which Manuel was not able to fulfill,
if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per
se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
It must be shown that Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes
him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his
ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
As to the allegation of psychological incapacity on the
part of Juanita, Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s
lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with
cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature
(especially with respect to his salary), and her inability
to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any
showing that these "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. The
record clearly shows that the root cause of Juanita’s
behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their
marriage as required by law – but from her experiences
during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her
as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her
husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her
inability to conceive.
19 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA
QUINTERO-HAMANO
“Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness.”
Facts: In 1988, Lolita Quintero-Hamano was married to
Toshio Hamano. Eight years later, Lolita filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage
10
pursuant to Article 36 of the FC. As alleged, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only
after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to Lolita for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, she
learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child. Their marriage was declared null and void by the
RTC. The CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
Ruling: No. In Molina, the guidelines provided the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. In this case, the Court
finds that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. His act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This Lolita did not do.
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately
after the celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting
and complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
20 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT
OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
“Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.”
Facts: Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Roridel
alleged that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband
and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance;
and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
She asserted that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual. Their marriage was
declared void ab initio by the RTC which decision was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ruling: No. It appears to the Court to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter also
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing
of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married ruled in favor of Carmen.
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical. It must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
It must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
21 TING v. TING
FACTS: In 1972, Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met
each other in medical school. In 1975, they married each
other. In 1980, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor
and he practiced at the Velez Hospital (owned by
Carmen’s family). Benjamin and Carmen had six
children during their marriage. But after 18 years of
11
marriage, Carmen went to court to have their marriage
be declared void on the ground that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated.
She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the
latter was already a drunkard; that Benjamin was a
gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his
expensive hobby; that he rarely stayed home and even
neglected his children and family obligations.
Carmen presented an expert witness (Dr. Pureza
Trinidad-Oñate) to prove Benjamin’s psychological
incapacity. However, Oñate merely based her findings
on the deposition submitted by Benjamin. Oñate was not
able to personally examine Benjamin because at that
time, Benjamin was already working as an
anaesthesiologist in South Africa.
On his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also
presented his own expert witness (Dr. Renato Obra) to
disprove Carmen’s allegations. Obra was not able to
personally examine Benjamin but he also evaluated the
same deposition evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin
submitted himself for evaluation to a South African
doctor (Dr. A.J.L. Pentz) and the transcript of said
evaluated the same. Obra found Benjamin not to be
psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals,
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological
incapacity was proven.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the evidence
presented to be lacking in order to support a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of Benjamin. Said
the Supreme Court:
“we are not condoning Benjamin’s drinking and
gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his
wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Benjamin must remember that he owes love, respect, and
fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same
to him. Unfortunately, this court finds Carmen’s
testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented
by Carmen, to be too inadequate to declare Benjamin
psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.”
Carmen failed to prove that such attitude by Benjamin is
psychologically rooted so as to make Benjamin unaware
of his marital obligations. It should be remembered that
the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage.
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
Anent the issue that Benjamin was not personally
evaluated by the psychologists which deviates from the
Molina Guidelines, the Supreme Court ruled that as early
as the case of Te vs Te, the Molina Guidelines were
already relaxed. Cases involving Article 36 must be tried
on a case-to-case basis. Each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals. The Supreme Court
however emphasized that the Molina case was not
abandoned, its application was merely relaxed.
22 JORDAN CHAN PAZ v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ
“What the law requires to render a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less What the law requires to render a marriage void on the
ill will. The mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity.”
Facts: Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity psychological incapacity.
of marriage against Jordan under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Jordan allegedly had a tendency to lie
about his whereabouts. He was alleged to be a Mama’s
boy as he depended on his mother for support and
supplies of milk and diapers for their son. Jeanice also
alleged that Jordan resented their son and spent more
time with his friends rather than help her take care of
their son. Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that
Jordan was afflicted with Borderline Personality
Disorder.
The trial court granted the petition and declared the
marriage null and void. The trial court declared that
Jordan’s psychological incapacity, which was
specifically identified as Borderline Personality
Disorder, deprived him of the capacity to fully
understand his responsibilities under the marital bond.
The CA dismissed Jordan’s appeal and motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling: No. The Court has declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be
confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
12
or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Although there is no requirement that a party
to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or a psychologist,
there is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological
incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the
person alleging said disorder. In this case, the Court
notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s
psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her
interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of
stenographic notes of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial
court. Consequently, Gates’ report and testimony were
hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge
of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates’
testimony should have thus been dismissed for being
unscientific and unreliable. Moreover, contrary to the
ruling of the trial court, Jordan’s alleged psychological
incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so
permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond.
ground of psychological incapacity is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. The mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities does not constitute
23 LIM v. LIM
24 LIGELARDE v. PATALINGHUNG
FACTS: The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by
the totality of the evidence presented during trial.
Private respondent’s act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was
shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. her duties as wife and mother. His
pleas were ignored.
In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the
thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their
children, and the commitment of May to reform
dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted
to reconcile with her.
May was back again to her old ways. This was
demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and
learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched
for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she
had no more love for him. They then lived separately.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the
matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
was still young and became manifest after marriage; and
that the same was serious and incurable.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of
Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based
on the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina
Nicdao-Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It
ruled that private respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not
constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code and that the
psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause
thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically antecedence, and (c) incurability. Furthermore, the root
permanent or incurable. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage null and
void due to psychological incapacity.
HELD: Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. In this case
at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave
abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA
decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Psychological incapacity required by Art.
36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) in-curability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
It is the Court’s considered view that petitioner’s
evidence failed to establish respondent May’s
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause,
gravity and incurability of private respondent’s
condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the
root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified
13
as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not
even rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity”
that the law requires. Private respondent’s act of living
psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be
able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes
her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
25 TORING v. TORING
“A marriage will be annulled on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code if it is characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in
the complaint and duly proven. The complete facts
should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.”
FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo and Respondent Teresita
are husband and wife with three children. After 20 years
of marriage, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment
before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of,
and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage.
Therefore, he asked the court to declare his marriage to
Teresita null and void. He alleges that Teresita is a
squanderer because she did not know how to manage the
funds of the family and is always incurring debts. Aside
from this, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she
collected as sales agent of a plastic-ware and cosmetics
company. She left the family’s utility bills and their
children’s tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying
the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo
acquired for the family. He also alleges that Teresita is
an adultress because she presents herself as a single
woman and sees other men while Ricardo is away for
work as an overseas contract worker. He also suspected
that she was pregnant with another man’s child and
proved himself correct when Teresita incurred a
miscarriage. He claims that he could not have fathered
the child because his three instances of sexual contact
with Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”.
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
To bolster his position, Ricardo introduced the testimony failed to comply with the standards and guidelines
and evidence prepared by Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran. The provided for by jurisprudence. In the leading case
doctor stated that the demise of the marriage of the of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,1we held that
spouses was due to the Narcissistic Personality Disorder psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
of Teresita. Her behavioral patterns indicate this kind of Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
disorder which is considered to be grave and incurable antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis
based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the to annul a marriage.
symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is
nothing wrong in them. Interestingly, the doctor based We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code
her diagnosis from the testimony given by Ricardo and in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the
Richardson, the eldest child of the couple. This is interpretation and application of this article. These
because Dr. Albaran was not able to conduct a personal guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity,
psychiatric evaluation over Teresita. juridical antecedence and incurability established in the
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Santos case, as follows:
Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
vague and general conclusion on these parties’ rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
personality traits but not on Teresita’s psychological laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence family.
adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove
the medical cause of the alleged psychological (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
and incurable. Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
The RTC ruled to annul the marriage on the basis of the psychological – not physical, although its manifestations
evidence and testimony presented in court. However, the and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
Solicitor General appealed the case and the Court of convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
Appeals reversed the ruling on the ground that the RTC mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court person could not have known the obligations he was
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. The RTC assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
failed point out the root illness or defect that caused assumption thereof. The root cause must be identified as
Teresita’s psychological incapacity, and likewise failed a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
celebration of marriage. qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran’s
psychological evaluation do not appear to have been
drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt
mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the
CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on Teresita’s
overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate
grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if
true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal
separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the
decision of the trial court.
HELD: No, the CA is correct in reversing the decision
made by the trial court because the decision of the latter
14
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the
time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind
his/her own children as an essential obligation of from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
marriage. truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision. (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
In so far as the present factual situation is concerned,
what should not be lost in reading and applying our
established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the
application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most
serious cases of personality disorders; these are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability
of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to
the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the
psychological illness and its root cause must have been
there from the inception of the marriage. From these
requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the
Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it
simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in
the first place because the affliction – already then
existing – was so grave and permanent as to deprive the
afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to
assume or had assumed.
In the present case and guided by these standards, we
find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence to be
insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. First of
all, the testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based solely
on the testimony of Ricardo, the petitioner and their son,
Richardson. No personal evaluation was made as to the
condition of Teresita to properly conclude that she is
indeed inflicted with the Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Conclusions and generalizations about
Teresita’s psychological condition, based solely on
15
Second, it was not proven that the condition of Teresita
was present from the moment the marriage was
celebrated. The only other party outside of the spouses
who gave statements for purposes of Teresita’s
psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses’
eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a
witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have
been there when the spouses were married and could not
have been expected to know what was happening
between his parents until long after his birth.
Finally, the contention of Ricardo that the root cause of
the psychological incapacity need not be alleged in the
petition is without merit. While in other cases, the court
has allowed the petition to do away with the root cause,
it is because the root cause has been described based on
the physical manifestations which are indicative of the
psychological incapacity. The statement of the root
cause does not need to be in medical terms or be
technical in nature, as the root causes of many
psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It
is enough to merely allege the physical manifestations
constituting the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. Hence, the statement of the root cause is a
requirement that cannot be dispensed with but it may be
proven either by an express statement or through the
description of its physical manifestations.
26 MARALBE v. MARALBE
27 OCHOSA v. ALANO
Facts: Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the
onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose
was assigned in various parts of the country as an officer
in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they
lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime
in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for
rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed coup
d’etat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting
caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
He got a military pass from his jail warden and
confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and
Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and
their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in
Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona
J. Alano, based on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the
obligations of marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the
witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological
evaluation report on Bona’s mental state. The interviews
she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her
to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder, and it was traceable to
her family history.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial
court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
Court finds that Bona’s illness exhibited gravity,
antecedence, and incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA
subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the ruling
of the trial court decision.
Issue: Whether or not Bona should be deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
Ruling: No. There is inadequate credible evidence that
her defects were already present at the inception of, or
prior to, the marriage. Bona’s alleged psychological
incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of
“juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual infidelity
and abandonment are not badges of psychological
incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their
marriage.
The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which
made her prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity
existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as
credible proof of antecedence since the method by which
such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired
in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity.
Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the
16
assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other witness
testified to Bona’s family history or her behavior prior to
or at the beginning of their marriage. The two witnesses
only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986,
respectively.
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological
condition directly from the information gathered solely
from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances
evoke the possibility that the information fed to the
absence of sufficient corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225
of the Family Code.
28 ODAYAT v. AMANTE
29 YAP v. CA
30 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO v. SUSAN YEE
CARIÑO
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would
also be void.
Facts: The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two
marriages during his lifetime. The first was with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, and the second was with
respondent Susan Yee Cariño. SPO4 Cariño passed
away under the care of respondent, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Respondent filed a case
for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying
that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half
of the P146,000.00 “death benefits” which petitioner
received from various government agencies.
Respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of, and without first
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed to be in good faith since she had no knowledge
of the previous marriage. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor
of respondent, which the CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between SPO4
Santiago Cariño and petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño is
valid, thereby entitling her to the entire subject death
benefits.
Ruling: No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in
force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the
marriage void ab initio. The records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. It is beyond
cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized
without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. Under Article
40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of Rafael M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the said
a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner
and the deceased), the application of Article 148 of the
Family Code is therefore in order. The disputed
P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-
ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly remunerations, incentives
17
deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said
that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are
not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no
right whatsoever to claim the same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs.
Even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of
the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus,
one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased
shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
31 JARILLO v. PEOPLE
“He who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.”
FACTS: On November 1979, the accused Victoria S.
Jarillo,being previously united in lawful marriage with
marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which
marriage was only discovered in 1999.
On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed
against the appellant a civil case for annulment of
marriage before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed
for declaration of nullity of their marriage against
Alocillo in 2000.
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage
to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the
time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her
marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for
lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had
prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding her
defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of
bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor.
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was
affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy when
she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy
because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had
not yet been declared null and void by the court. This
being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to
Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient
evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages
were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy
had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003,
declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage to Alocillo null and
void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In
her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction.
ISSUE: W/N CA committed a reversible error in
affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of
bigamy despite the supervening proof that her marriage
to Alocillo had been declared void.
HELD: No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy
must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered
a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment
petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and
void; the crime of bigamy was already consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise
in a judicial proceeding.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that
is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision
in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that October 12, 2004: TC denied petitioner's motion for
the guilty party entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in
the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question.
32 CHAN-TAN v. TAN
18
Facts: June 1989: Petitioner and respondent got married
at the Manila Cathedral. They had sons Justin (born in
Canada in 1990) and Russel (born in the Philippines in
1993).
Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner, then filed a case of
annulment under FC 36 (psychological incapacity)
against Jesse Tan. The parties, thereafter, submitted a
compromise agreement.
July 31, 2003: trial court issued a partial judgment
of approval of the said compromise agreement.
March 30, 2004: trial court declared the marriage null
and void, under FC 36, on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the parties. TC incorporated
the compromise agreement it previously approved in
said decision. Petitioner then cancelled the offer to
purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No.
12, Block 2 property, and authorized Megaworld Corp.
to offer it to other interested buyers. It also appeared that
the petitioner left the country with the children.
Respondent then filed an omnibus motion, seeking the
main custody of the children claiming that petitioner
brought the kids out of the country w/o his knowledge;
that said petitioner failed to settle the balance for the
Megaworld property, w/c, if forfeited, would prejudice
the interest of the children; and that petitioner failed to
turn over to him documents and titles in his name.
May 17, 2004: TC awarded respondent custody of the
children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in his name, and allowed
respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa,
QC.
June 28, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, claiming that she was denied due
process, was notable to properly present evidence due to
negligence from her counsel, and said that she was
forced out of the country due to beating she received
from the respondent. Petitioner also prayed for
an increase in the respondent’s monthly support
obligation.
reconsideration, because it was filed beyond the 15-
dayreglementary period. TC also declared petitioner
in contempt of court for non-compliance with the July
31, 2003partial judgment and the May 17, 2004
resolution. TC also denied the prayer for an increase in
monthly support obligation, since petitioner was able
 FAMILY CODE - ARTICLES 35 & 36 CASES
to enroll the children to another school by herself
without respondent's knowledge.
−
November 4, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
and a motion for reconsideration of the October
12, 2004resolution, claiming that she was no longer
interested in the suit, claiming that withdrawing from the
case would be inthe best interest of her children. She
prayed to be vacated her from all prior orders, and leave
the parties at a status quo ante the filing of the suit, or re-
instating the parties to their conditions prior the filings.
−
December 28, 2004: TC denied both November 4, 2004
motions, declaring that the March 30, 2004 and May17,
2004 decisions had become final and executory upon
lapse of the 15-day reglementary period..
−
February 15, 2005: TC again denied another motion for
reconsideration of the December 28, 2004 decision. TC
then issued a Certificate of Finality of the March 30 and
May 17, 2004 decisions.

Issue: W/N the March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004
decisions had become final and executory despite
allegations of denial of due process.

Held: Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of

the15-day reglementary period.

Alleged negligence of counsel to inform the petitioner

resulting in loss of petitioner's right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment that is valid and
regular.

Petitioner cannot claim she was denied due process,

since records showed that she was very active in court.
She also cannot claim negligence on the part of her
counsel, since said counsel issued a manifest on May 3,
2004, saying that said counsel made attempts to call
the petitioner, but failed

33 LASANAS v. PEOPLE

19