Magalona vs.

Ermita
G.R. No. 187167 | 2011-08-16

CARPIO, J.
Doctrine: States acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

Facts:
Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcated the baselines of the Philippines and codified the right of
State parties under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I over their territorial sea.
The breadth, however, was not determined. Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting Republic Act No. 9522 to
comply with the terms of UNCLOS III. RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints and classified the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as "regimes of islands"
which generate their own maritime zones.
The petitioners are professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as
"citizens, taxpayers or legislators and they assails he constitutionality of RA 9522 on the ground that: (1) RA
9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution; and (2) RA 9522
opens the country's waters landwards of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts.
Commenting in the Petition, Ermita et al., reaised the petitioners alleged lack of locus satndi in the case.
They alseo defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving
Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the
country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Issues:
(1) WON petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit
(2) WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Held:

(1) Yes.
The court recognized petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest
in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably
difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus
satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.

(2) No.

RA 9522 is constitutional because it is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone
and continental shelf under UNCLOS III and not to delineate Philippine Territory.

UNCLOS III is not concerned with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones and continent shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits. Baseline laws are mere statutory mechanisms enacted simply to mark-out the base points
 from which baselines are drawn to serve as the starting points from which to measure the breadth of
the maritime zones and continental shelf. The baselines of the Philippines have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this law conforms to UNCLOS III. States acquire or lose territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and not by executing multilateral treaties on
the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves.

RA 9522 which classified the KIG and Scarborough Shoal as "regime of islands" does not
weaken the Philippines' claim of sovereignty. In fact, RA 9522 recognizes that the Philippines
exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over these areas.

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 complies with the Constitution's delineation of internal waters.
Whether referred to as "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or "archipelagic waters"
under UNCLOS III, Article 49 of the UNCLOS recognizes that a State party has sovereignty over
the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine
areas underneath. Sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of international law
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to burdens of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation consistent with the principle of freedom of navigation. To
comply with international law, the Congress may pass laws designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.

Funa vs. Meco

G.R. No. 193462 | 2014-02-04

Perez, J.
Doctrine: Government owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock.
Facts:
The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) was organized on 16 December 1997 as a non-
stock, non-profit corporation under Batas Pambansa 68 or the Corporation Code. On 25 August 2010, Assistant
Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum referring to Funa’s request to COA Assistant Commissioner for
disposition. In this memorandum, however, Assistant Commissioner revealed that the MECO was "not among
the agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector."
Taking the 25 August 2010 memorandum as an admission that the COA had never audited and
examined the accounts of the MECO, Funa filed the instant petition for mandamus on 8 September 2010. He
filed the suit in his capacities as "taxpayer, concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar and law book
author. He impleaded both the COA and the MECO.
Funa alleged that by failing to audit the accounts of the MECO, the COA is neglecting its duty under
Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise bona fide GOCC or
government instrumentality. It is the adamant claim of the petitioner that the MECO is a GOCC without an
original charter or, at least, a government instrumentality, the funds of which partake the nature of public funds.
Also according to him, the MECO possesses all the essential characteristics of a GOCC and an instrumentality
under the Executive Order No. (EO) 292, s. 1987 or the Administrative Code: it is a non-stock corporation
vested with governmental functions relating to public needs; it is controlled by the government thru a board of
directors appointed by the President of the Philippines; and while not integrated within the executive
departmental framework, it is nonetheless under the operational and policy supervision of the DTI.
Issue: WON MECO is a GOCC

Held:
No.
Meco is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. As defined under the Administrative Code,
Government owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock.
By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock or non-stock
corporation; second, the public character of its function; and third, government ownership over the same. In this
case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and second attributes. It is the third attribute,
which the MECO lacks.
The MECO Is Not Owned or Controlled by the Government Organization as a non-stock corporation
and the mere performance of functions with a public aspect, however, are not by themselves sufficient to
consider the MECO as a GOCC.

Republic of the Philippines vs. People’s Republic of China

2013-19 | 2015-10-29; 2016-07-12

Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)

Doctrine:
Facts:
 The dispute between the Philippines and China is rooted in disagreements over “maritime entitlements”
and China’s activities in the South China Sea. On January 22, 2013, the Philippines invoked arbitration under
Part XV of UNCLOS to bring claims that China had violated its UNCLOS obligations.
In summary, it asked the Tribunal to: (i) rule that UNCLOS governs the parties’ rights and obligations
with respect to waters, seabed, and maritime features of the South China Sea and that China’s claims to historic
rights encompassed in what China terms the “nine-dash line” are inconsistent with UNCLOS; (ii) determine
whether certain maritime features claimed by both parties are islands, low tide elevations, or submerged banks
under UNCLOS, as well as whether those features are capable of substantiating claims to an entitlement to
maritime zones greater than twelve miles; and (iii) recognize the Philippines’ rights within and beyond its
economic zone and continental shelf as established under UNCLOS.
China objected to the legitimacy of the proceedings and thus did not participate in the arbitration. The
Tribunal nonetheless considered that, under Article 9 of Annex VII to UNCLOS, it had the duty to satisfy itself
that it had jurisdiction over the dispute and proceeded to do so based both on jurisdictional objections reflected
in China’s public statements about the dispute, including a 2014 Position Paper and other documents, and issues
the Tribunal itself identified in the course of the proceedings.
Summary of the SCS Arbitration Awards

Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)

G.R. No. 211362 | 2015-02-24

Peralta, J.
Doctrine: Power to discipline is subsumed in the university's academic freedom

Facts:
Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military
Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber
as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy.
Cudia was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two minutes in his ENG 412 class,
other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and
were logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia incurred the
penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor Code.
Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his 4th period class ended
at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class.
Later Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a team to
conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded
not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened in the
chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict. But the HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The
Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were
issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-
instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.
Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR
issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights Violations.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia in utter disregard of
his right to due process and in holding that he violated the Honor Code through lying
(b) Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs

Held:

(a) No.

The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education, and property should
be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were exhausted. A student of a
military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interest for the proper functioning of the
institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with the
peculiar needs of the institution.

The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that
“the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival.” In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary
sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules. Thus PMA
has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets.

(b) Yes.

The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by Article VIII of the Constitution. The
court’s mandate (according to Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the courts is not only to “settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is
above the law, including the military, especially in violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Garcia vs. Drilon

G.R. No. 179267 | 2013-06-25

Perlas- Bernabe, J.
Doctrine: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.

Facts:
Republic Act No. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children) defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom the woman has a common child. The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts
to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC.
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her 3 minor children, a verified petition before
the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to RA 9262.
Rosalie alleged that during the marriage, her husband admitted to an ongoing affair with a bank
manager. The infidelity spawned a series of fights that left her physically and emotionally wounded and the
children traumatized. She is determined to leave her husband but he threatened to deny her financial support.
The RTC initially issued a Temporary Protection Order effective for 30 days which was repeatedly
renewed. Notwithstanding the TPO, the husband allegedly failed to give them financial support and continued
to commit new acts of harassment.
The petitioner husband assails the constitutionality R.A. 9262 of as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials
Issue: WON VAWC is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause
Held: No.
VAWC is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. (citing Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union)
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be (1) based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; (2) that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) that it must apply equally to each member of
the class.
R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions-- The “gender-based violence” or the unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence;
and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. Also, the distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of the law
which is to address violence committed against women and children. Furthermore, RA 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well. Lastly, The law applies equally to
all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Imbong vs. Ochoa
G.R. No. o. 203335| 2014-02-18
Mendoza, J.
Doctrine: Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception (life begins at fertilization). framers of
the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives from being unconstitutional. The clear and unequivocal
intent of the Framers in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from
enacting measures that legalized abortion.

Facts:
Various rights groups brought actions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the
Reproductive Health Law. Their claim is based on the following grounds (among others):
RH law violates the right to life of the unborn
Violates the right to health and right to protection against hazardous products
Violates right to religious freedom
Violates equal protection clause
Issue: WON the RH Law is constitutional
Held: Yes.
The court held that Sections 7, 23-A-1, 23-A-2-I, 23-A-3, 23-B, 17, 23-A-2-ii, and Section 3.01-A and J
of the IRR are unconstitutional.
Section 7 was declared unconstitutional only insofar as it: (a) requires private health facilities, non- maternity
specialty hospitals, and hospitals owned by religious groups to refer patients not in an emergency or life-
threatening situation to another health facility which is conveniently accessible (b) provides access to family
planning and RH services to minors who have been pregnant or had a miscarriage without a parental consent
• Section 23-A-1, punishes RH providers, regardless of their religious belief, who fail or refuse to
dissiminate information regarding RH services and programs.
• Section 23-A-2-i, allows a married individual not in a life-threatening case to access RH procedures without
the consent of the spouse.
• Section 23-A-3, insofar as it punishes an RH provider who fails to refer any non-life-threatening case
to another RH provider.
• Section 23-B, insofar as it punishes any public officer who refuses to support RH programs
• Section 17, which mandates a 40-hour pro bono service by private and nongovernment RH
service providers, including gynecologists and obstetricians, as a prerequisite for PhilHealth accreditation.
• Section 3.01-A and J of the RH law Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), which defines abortifacients
as "primarily" inducing abortion instead of simply inducing abortion
• Section 23-A-2-ii, which prohibits RH service providers from refusing to perform legal and medically-safe
reproductive health
Right to Life - Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception (life begins at fertilization).
framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives from being unconstitutional. The clear and
unequivocal intent of the Framers in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting measures that legalized abortion.
Right to Health – Unless provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory.
Religious Freedom – Constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Under the Free Exercise Clause, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering wit the outside manifestation of one’s belief and faith. The obligation to refer under the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.
Family Planning Seminars -- The requirement of attendance to a family planning seminar as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. Those who receive any information during their attendance in
the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject
the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
Right to Marital Privacy -- Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife. The RH Law cannot be
allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision making by giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision. Decision-making
involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them.
It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the
protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy
guaranteed by the Constitution. At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
Parental Consent - The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care
and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. There must
be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to
the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. By way of
exception, insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the
acquisition of information by the minor even without parental consent. Moreover, an exception must be made in
life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor
who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of
consent.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their
right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two
exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child, the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority.

Paje vs. Casino

G.R. No. 207257| 2015-02-03

Del Castilo, M.
Doctrine:
 ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is principally predicated on an actual
or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves
environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.

Facts:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental Compliance
Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.
` Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP
energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual environmental damage
will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws
and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both the DENR
and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that
the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a
Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues:

(1) Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan; and
(2) Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling
(1) Yes
the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan because the
Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases) allow
the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan.
(2) Yes
the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is principally
predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an
ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at
least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed
before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
 In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to
the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the
issuance of the ECC.
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which
covers and West tower condominium Corporation vs. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
G.R. No. 194239| 2015-076-16
Velasco, JR., J.

Doctrine:
Individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot grant the award
of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.
Facts:
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West
Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. Petitioner FPIC initially
disowned any leak from its oil pipeline.
On October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL, which was
already closed since October 24, 2010, but denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities on the
roads surrounding West Tower.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the
present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in
representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also
alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations
and public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the
environmental issues involved.

Issue:
(1) Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to
perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected
environment?

(2) Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under
the environmental protection order?
Held:
1. NO
To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a
Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,46 Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are
already in place, will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.

2. NO
Individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot grant the award of
damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents
are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of respondents.

LNL Archipelago Minerals vs. Agham Party List

Gr. No. 2019165| 2016- 04- 12
Carpio, J.
Doctrine:
The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an extraordinary
remedy,43 covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ is available against an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has to show
that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In the present case, the allegation by Agham
that two laws – the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act – were violated by
LAMI was not adequately substantiated by Agham.
Facts:
LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. It embarked on a project to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. It is about 25 kilometers away from the mine site.
Agham Party list filed a Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether LAMI violated the environmental laws: the Revised Forestry Code, and Philippine Mining Act;
(2) Whether LAMI flattened any mountain and cause environmental damage of such magnitured as to
prejudice the life, health, property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces
Ruling:
(1) No.
LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by CENRO and passed the evaluation conducted after the
issuance of the permit so it clearly had the authority to cut trees and did not violate Sec. 68 of the Revised
Forestry Code. The Philippine Mining Act is not applicable to the case since LAMI is not conducting
anything on the port site and it secured all the necessary permits and licenses for the construction of a port
and LAMI’s activity was limited to preparatory works for the port’s construction. The Philippine Mining
Act deals with mining operations and other mining activities.
 (2) No.
The Respondent, in accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, did not cite any law allegedly
violated by LAMI in relation to this claim. It did not present any proof to demonstrate that the local
residents in Zambales and those of the towns of Pangaisnan complained of any great danger or harm on the
alleged leveling of the land formation which may affect their lives, health, or properties. Neither was there
any evidence showing of a grave and real environmental damage to the barangay and the surrounding
vicinity.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has to show that a
law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In the present case, the allegation by Agham that
two laws – the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act – were violated by
LAMI was not adequately substantiated by Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham to establish
environmental damage were mere general allegations.The records of expert testimonies and government
entities and offiicials also show that there is in fact no mountain in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGR-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS INC.

VS. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES)
Gr. No. 209271| 2016-0-26
Villarama, JR., J.
Doctrine:
The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the direct and indirect impacts
of a project on the biophysical and human environment and ensuring that these impacts are addressed by
appropriate environmental protection and enhancement measures. It aids proponents in incorporating
environmental considerations in planning their projects as well as in determining the environment’s impact on
their project.”
Facts:
On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed between International Service for
the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the Philippines Los Baños
Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative
research and development project on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer.
The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was described
as a “bio-engineered eggplant.” The crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were
incorporated into the eggplant genome to produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic to target insect pests. The
latter is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most
destructive insect pest of eggplant.
NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which was conducted from 2007 to
3 March 2009 stating that during the conduct of experiment, all the biosafety measures have been complied with
and no untoward incident has occurred.
On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) issued biosafety permits to
UPLB.
Field testing commenced on various dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North
Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna. On 26
April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace, et.al.) filed a petition for writ of
kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field trials violate their constitutional right to health and a
balanced ecology.
On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA and UPLB,
ordering them to file a verified return. On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the following procedural
issues before the CA: (1) whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file the petition for writ of kalikasan;
(2) whether the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the alleged termination of the Bt talong field
testing; and (3) whether the case presented a justiciable controversy.

CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved that: (1) the Greenpeace, et.al. possess legal
standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it is capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3) the alleged
non-compliance with environmental and local government laws present justiciable controversies for resolution
by the court.

On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of the Greenpeace, et.al. finding that the
precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (the
Rules) finds relevance in the case.

CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI
rejecting the argument that CA violated UPLB’s right to academic freedom. The writ stops the field trials of Bt
talong as a procedure, it does not stop Bt talong research. Thus, there is no assault on academic freedom.

CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing a genetically modified plant
into our ecosystem is an “ecologically imbalancing act.”

Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI to reverse the
CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of field trials for Genetically Modified eggplants.

Issues:

(1) WON there is a violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies
(2) WON the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on projects involving the
introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country

Held:

(1) No.

The provisions of DAO 2002-08 do not provide a speedy or adequate remedy for the respondents to
determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised in this case that pertain to laws and rules
for environmental protection, thus Greenpeace, et.al. is justified in coming to the Supreme Court.

(2) Yes.

EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly petitioners DENR-EMB,
BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS system should apply to the release of GMOs into the
environment and issue joint guidelines on the matter.

The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the direct and indirect impacts
of a project on the biophysical and human environment and ensuring that these impacts are addressed by
appropriate environmental protection and enhancement measures. It aids proponents in incorporating
environmental considerations in planning their projects as well as in determining the environment’s impact on
their project.” There are six stages in the regular EIA process. The proponent initiates the first three stages while
EMB takes the lead in the last three stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.

Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should have at least been considered for EIA
under existing regulations of EMB on new and emerging technologies, to wit:
g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects not listed in any of the groups, e.g. projects
using new processes/technologies with uncertain impacts. This is an interim category – unclassified
projects will eventually be classified into their appropriate groups after EMB evaluation. (Emphasis
supplied)

All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to
undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality of environment are required to prepare a
detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.

An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as “likely to have

significant adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse” and which “include activities
that have significant environmental consequences.”

In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential
hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment, their release into the environment through field
testing would definitely fall under the category of ECP.

Agrivo vs. Swift

Gr. No. 206510| 2014-09-16
Villamar, JR, J.
Doctrine:

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a

party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.

Facts:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel
“to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

(2) Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
(3) Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

Held:
(1) Yes.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is

“a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However,
the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.

(2) YES

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy
who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they
were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

(3) NO

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian,
would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines
under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the
same violation of an environmental law.
BELGICA V. OCHOA
Gr. No. 208566| 2013-02-19
Perlas- Bernabe, J.

Doctrine:

Facts:
Several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) for being unconstitutional. Petition was dismissed for lack of pertinent evidence. The NBI
began its probe into allegations that the gov’t has been defrauded of some P10B over the past 10 years
by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various gov’t agencies. COA released
results of a 3-year audit investigation to determine the propriety of funds under PDAF and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VLP).

The pertinent findings are the ff:

 Amounts released to legislators significantly exceed their respective allocations
 Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members

Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots which have yet to be turned over to the
gov’t o Implementation of projects was not undertaken by implementing agencies themselves, but by
NGO’s endorsed by legislators o Selection of NGO’s were not compliant with law

As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle blowers allege that P900M of the gas project from
Palawan went into a dummy NGO. Several petitions declaring the PDAF unconstitutional were filed.

Issues:
(1) WON the 2013 PDAF Article violate the principles of:
a. Separation of powers
b. Non-delegability of legislative power
c. Checks and balances
d. Accountability
e. Political Dynasties
f. Local Autonomy

(2)WON the phrases (a) “and for such other pruposes as may be hereafter directed by the President
relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and to finance restoration of damanged facilities… as may be directed and authorized by the Office
of the President” are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegation of legislative power

Held:

1. PDAF

a. Separation of Powers
Yes.

Legislators are given project identification powers wherein they can identify PDAF projects for
as long as the project falls under a general program listed in the program menu. They are also
given powers of fund release and fund realignment. These post-enactment measures are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the Executive branch. From the moment the law becomes
 effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and
is thus unconstitutional.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

Yes.
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since they are allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation which is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation (Sec. 29, Art. VI). They are able to dictate
(a)how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
determine.
c. Checks and Balances
Yes.
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s veto power
(Sec. 27, Art. VI). For him to exercise his item-veto power, it is necessary that there exists a
proper “item” w/c may be object of the veto. It is concluded that an appropriation bill must
contain “specific appropriations of money” and not only “general provisions” w/c provide for
parameters of appropriation. Appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified
singular purpose (line-item).
d. Accountability

Yes.
Insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF
Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as
unconstitutional. Allowing the legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another office of the government – renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. However, while the Congressional
Pork Barrel and a legislator’s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his
PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts
and on a case-to-case

e. Political Dynasties

YES
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase “as may be defined bylaw.” It does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.

f. Local Autonomy

Yes. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. Moreover, it runs in conflict with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils which are already mandated to assist in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.

2. Presidential Pork Barrel

 a. Approriation No. An appropriation law may be detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same (Philconsa).
The Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the “primary and specific”
purpose of the law in order for and sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirement.
b. Undue Delegation

Yes. The appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up the
details or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation. The completeness test and
the sufficient standard test must be employed. Sec. 8 of PD 910 constitutions an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President’s authority w/ respect to the purpose for w/c the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice that Sec.
12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 w/c thus moots the petitioner’s
submissions.

PS Bank vs. Impeachment Court

Gr. No. 200238| 2013- 11-20
PERLAS-BERNABE, J
Doctrine:

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.
Facts:
Petitioners Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Pascual M. Garcia III (Garcia), as President
of PSBank, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullity and set aside the Resolution
of respondent Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, sitting as an Impeachment Court, which granted
the prosecution's requests for subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to PSBank and/or its
representatives requiring them to testify and produce before the Impeachment Court documents relative
to the foreign currency accounts that were alleged to belong to then Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona.

On November 5, 2012, and during the pendency of this petition, PSBank and Garcia filed a
Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition averring that subsequent events have overtaken
the petition and that, with the termination of the impeachment proceedings against former Chief Justice
Corona, they are no longer faced with the dilemma of either violating Republic Act No. 6426 or being
held in contempt of court for refusing to disclose the details of the subject foreign currency deposits.

Issue: WON the TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing
the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?

Held:
YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing
the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to
be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice is
provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of
the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits:

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits,
that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan v. Court of
Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law
is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case of Government Service
Insurance System v. 15th Division of the Court of Appeals, the Court also held that RA 6426 is the
applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405.

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to privacy in
relation to such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has
presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while
impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an
exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426.

BURGOS V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 183711| 2010-06-22
Brion, J.

Doctrine: Section 16 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that any person who otherwise
disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court may be punished for contempt.

Facts:
At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos – a farmer advocate
and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of
four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the
ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and announced that
her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the
person abducted was her son Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and Land Transportation
Office (LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu
XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle was seized and impounded on
June 24, 2006 for transporting timber without permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas’
abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT
vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were “cannibalized.” The police was
likewise able to generate cartographic sketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview
of eyewitnesses.
On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka
Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements of the
New People’s Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas.
In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for the Issuance
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioner’s motion to declare the respondents in contempt;
and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially, the
CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection
between the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA
ruled that the AFP has the burden of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of Ka
Ramon and the allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the “Order of Battle.” As for the PNP-
CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as “rather shallow” and “conducted haphazardly.”
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is a fatal to the
grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

Held:
Yes.

Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties – Considering
the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP
and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of
their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative
shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary
diligence, is undertaken.
DISPOSITIVE:
In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following directives:
1. DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative
proceedings, including field investigations – acting as the Court’s directly commissioned agency for
purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
2. REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human
Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on Human Rights
may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;
3. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on
Human Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded
to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous submissions to the
Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights may
require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;
4. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission
on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;
5. AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and
exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives as
outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo; and
6. REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of the Resolution.

In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other
respondents who have all been impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and
actions from the Supreme Court were served on, and directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the
impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall continue to
be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo.

Boac vs. cadapan

G.R. No. 184461-62| 2011-05-31
Carpi Morales, J.

Doctrine:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. Command responsibility in its simplest terms, means the
“responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense,
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.

Facts:
June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen) and
Manuel Merino (Merino) (abductees) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were
herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.Spouses
Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court,
impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac
(Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. The
Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. By
Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that abductees are in the custody
of the military. Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas
corpus petition. The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human
Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate
investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court
with their separate reports on the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo With Prayers for Inspection
of Place and Production of Documents The petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas
corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the
Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas. Then
President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in
office. By Resolution the Court issued a writ of amparo returnable to the Special Former Eleventh
Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending
habeas corpus petition. By Decision of the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and
ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

Issue:
Whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the
heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino

Held:
No.

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. Command responsibility in its simplest terms, means the
“responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense,
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.

The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing
the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators
(as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied).
It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a
substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of
individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a
remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard
the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.

An amparo proceeding does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance or threats thereof or extrajudicial killings; it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance…

Mison vs. Gallegos

Gr. No. 210759| 2015-06-23
Perez, J.

Doctrine:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special
concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined
by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo
reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantial allegations.

Facts:
The Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request to petitioner, Hon. Siegfried
Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigation (BI) for the immediate arrest and deportation of
respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Pursuant to Summary Deportation
Order, Ku was arrested and detained at the BI detention center.
 Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge Gallegos
granted the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted.

Held:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Section 1 of the Rule in the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)
provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The Amparo rule was intended to address the intractable problem of the “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.

As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of the
RA 9851, to wit:
(a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or political
organization;
(c) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d)That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

In probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA
9851.

Guided by the parameters of RA 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come
under the statutory definition of an enforced disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI,
but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to
give information to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. More importantly,
there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Ku’s
arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented
as evidenced by the Return of Warrant of Deportation.

The RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his
whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were
unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of
amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced
disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need
for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.

Wherefore, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to deny the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.