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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2018 > April 2018 Decisions > G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018 -
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.:

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G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018 - ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

ChanRobles On-Line Bar Review

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution3 dated March 20,
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

The facts are as follows:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac
City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).4
The allegations of the petition read:

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a resident of 106 Molave
street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
2. [Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat,
Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]
DebtKollect Company, Inc. 3. The [petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106
Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never
made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission,
[Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her]
beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts,
[neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a
place frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and
after more than three (3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had
been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now
necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least a
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under
ChanRobles Intellectual Property P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
Division The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City RTC. A
copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

April-2018 Jurisprudence
A.C. No. 9676, April 02, 2018 - IN RE: DECISION
DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 2012 IN OMB-M-A-10-023-A,
ETC. AGAINST ATTY. ROBELITO* B. DIUYAN
G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018 - MARCELO G.
SALUDAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-18-1911 (formerly A.M. No. 17-08-98-
MTC), April 16, 2018 - OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. WALTER
INOCENCIO V. ARREZA, JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, PITOGO, QUEZON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 218703, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO
LLAMERA Y ATIENZA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018 - ESTRELLITA
TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 212866, April 23, 2018 - SPOUSES
FREDESWINDA DRILON YBIOSA AND ALFREDO
YBIOSA, Petitioners, v. INOCENCIO DRILON,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 215387, April 23, 2018 - NORTHERN
MINDANAO INDUSTRIAL PORT AND SERVICES
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ILIGAN CEMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 218255, April 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY BUGNA Y
BRITANICO, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 194575, April 11, 2018 - ANGELITO N.
GABRIEL, Petitioner, v. PETRON CORPORATION,
ALFRED A. TRIO, AND FERDINANDO ENRIQUEZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 203435, April 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARDY AQUINO,
MARIO AQUINO, RECTO AQUINO, INYONG
NARVANTE, ROMY FERNANDEZ, FELIX SAPLAN,
BONIFACIO CAGUIOA AND JUANITO AQUINO,
Accused.; MARDY MARIO AQUINO, Accused-
Appellants.
G.R. No. 219957, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELEUTERIO
URMAZA Y TORRES, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 213225, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENANTE
COMPRADO FBRONOLA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 210446, April 18, 2018 - ANGELICA G.
CRUZ, ANNA MARIE KUDO, ALBERT G. CRUZ AND
ARTURO G. CRUZ, Petitioners, v. MARYLOU
TOLENTINO AND THE OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 200075, April 04, 2018 - SALIC MAPANDI Y
DIMAAMPAO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 216714, April 04, 2018 - SPOUSES
GODFREY AND MA. TERESA TEVES, Petitioners, v.
INTEGRATED CREDIT & CORPORATE SERVICES, CO.
(NOW CAROL AQUI), Respondent.
G.R. No. 217805, April 02, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the
Philippines (Republic).5
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N.
MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military
officer.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari.8
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and
setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:
WFIEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision
dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special
Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the
Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the instant petition as it was clear that
petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the presumption of
death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under
Article 41 of the FC.
2. Be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed
by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to
have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil
Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules
of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead—which presumption
may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent
action or proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal.
I
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an
authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set
aside.
RTC Erred in Declaring the Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the FC;
Petitioner's Petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Is Not Based on Article 41 of
the FC, but on the Civil Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's
petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, the RTC gave
the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise
filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have
warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A
reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable
for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for
the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."10
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code11as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo
was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALSARIF BINTAIB by petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Y FLORENCIO A.K.A. "LENG," Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 189590, April 23, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN,
ROMEO G. PANGANIBAN, FE L. PANGANIBAN,
GERALDINE L. PANGANIBAN, ELSA P. DE LUNA AND
PURITA P. SARMIENTO, Respondents.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been Dismissed;
A Petition Whose Sole Objective is to Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under the Civil
Code, Like that Filed by the Petitioner Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction

G.R. No. 219240, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRYAN GANABA Y objectionable.
NAM-AY, Accused-Appellant.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo
G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018 - RAYMOND A. under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our
SON, RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, AND WILFREDO E. jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the
POLLARCO, Petitioners, v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.
TOMAS, FR. ROLANDO DELA ROSA, DR. CLARITA
CARILLO, DR. CYNTHIA LOZA, FR. EDGARDO The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death
ALAURIN, AND THE COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND
DESIGN FACULTY COUNCIL, Respondents. of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death13 is merely
one of evidence that—while may be invoked in any action or proceeding—cannot be the lone subject of
G.R. Nos. 192595-96, April 11, 2018 - NATIONAL an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:
ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA),
Petitioner, v. MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to
COOPERATIVE, INC., REPRESENTED BY presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in
MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE-PALMA seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made
AREA (MAGELCO-PALMA), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and
LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, ANTONIO U. ACUB, submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or
EDGAR L. LA VEGA, RET. JUDGE TERESITA CARREON special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be
LLABAN, EMILY LLABAN, ARMANDO C. LLABAN, made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right
AUDIE D. MACASARTE, WILFREDO Q. LLABAN, to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her
EVANGELINE A. VARILLA, CORAZON TUMANG, AND absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status
PRESCILLA LANO, Respondents.; G.R. Nos. 192676-
or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does not pray for a declaration
77, April 11, 2018 - COTABATO ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (COTELCO), REPRESENTED BY that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
ALEJANDRO Q. COLLADOS AS GENERAL MANAGER, presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any
Petitioner, v. MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension
COOPERATIVE-PALMA AREA (MAGELCO-PALMA), cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the
REPRESENTED BY ATTY. LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially
ANTONIO U. ACUB, EDGAR L. LA VEGA, RET. JUDGE made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption
TERESITA CARREON LLABAN EVANGELINE A. is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
VARILLA, AND CORAZON TUMANG; AND final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DATU pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a
TUMAGANTANG ZAINAL, Respondents. case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the
controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
G.R. No. 232892, April 04, 2018 - ALFREDO
MALLARI MAGAT, Petitioner, v. INTERORIENT establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may
MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., INTERORIENT arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgement, or such right or status
MARITIME ENTERPRISE LIBERIA FOR DROMON E.N.E. determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgement on
AND JASMIN P. ARBOLEDA, Respondent. the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon
the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack,
G.R. No. 208284, April 23, 2018 - THE IGLESIA DE except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a
JESUCRISTO JERUSALEM NUEVA OF MANILA, judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard
PHILIPPINES, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
PRESIDENT, FRANCISCO GALVEZ, Petitioner, v. cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis
LOIDA DELA CRUZ USING THE NAME CHURCH OF supplied)
JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM" AND ALL
PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER,
The above ruling in Szatraw has since been used by the subsequent cases of Lukban v. Republic14 and
Respondents.
Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing petitions for the declaration of presumptive death based on Article 390
G.R. No. 223321, April 02, 2018 - ROGELIO M. of the Civil Code (and, implicitly, also those based on Article 391 of the Civil Code).
FLORETE, SR., THE ESTATE OF THE LATE TERESITA F.
MENCHAVEZ, REPRESENTED BY MARY ANN THERESE Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the
F. MENCHAVEZ, ROSIE JILL F. MENCHAVEZ, MA. considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
ROSARIO F. MENCHAVEZ, CRISTINE JOY F. disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16
MENCHAVEZ, AND EPHRAIM MENCHAVEZ, AND DIANE
GRACE F. MENCHAVEZ, Petitioners, v. MARCELINO M. 1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or
FLORETE, JR. AND MA. ELENA F. MUYCO, Respondents a. tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
G.R. No. 233325, April 16, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE 2. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PASTORLITO V.
exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles
DELA VICTORIA, Accused-Appellant.
actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there
G.R. No. 218584, April 25, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS established.
MANALIGOD Y SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391
G.R. No. 234048, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALOU same only confirms the existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The function of a
ALVARADO Y FLORES, ALVIN ALVAREZ Y LONQUIAS court to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby
AND RAMIL DAL Y MOLIANEDA, Accused-Appellants. compromised.
G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE 4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLAND MIRAÑA
Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already
Y ALCARAZ, Accused-Appellant.
established by law.
G.R. No. 202217, April 25, 2018 - PABLO C.
HIDALGO, Petitioner, v. SONIA VELASCO, Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition that—
Respondent. like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench—only seeks to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting
G.R. No. 199161, April 18, 2018 - PHILIPPINE upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the RTC
NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. JAMES T. CUA, violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore,
Respondent. was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.

G.R. No. 197645, April 18, 2018 - CARLOS JAY II

ADLAWAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 231053, April 04, 2018 - DESIDERIO
DALISAY INVESTMENTS, INC., Petitioner, v. SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192797, April 18, 2018 - EXCELLENT
ESSENTIALS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v. EXTRA EXCEL INTERNATIONAL
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 218108, April 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO
ADVINCULA Y MONDANO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 195814, April 04, 2018 - EVERSLEY CHILDS
SANITARIUM, REPRESENTED BY DR. GERARDO M.
AQUINO, JR. (NOW DR. PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF
OF SANITARIUM, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ANASTACIO
AND PERLA BARBARONA, Respondents.
Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is minded to
make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception that a
court declaration is required in order to establish a person as presumptively dead for purposes of
claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent laws.18 This misconception is what
moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo and
what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for
death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).
What the Court finds deeply disconcerting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may have
been peddled by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of
practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of
presumptive death before processing the death benefits of a missing serviceman.
In view of the foregoing circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines—
culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements—to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in
making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
 G.R. No. 212785, April 04, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE 1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. GO PEI HUNG, requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of
Respondent. such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the
basis of evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles 390
G.R. No. 199513, April 18, 2018 - TERESA and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not. It must be stressed that the presumption of
GUTIERREZ YAMAUCHI, Petitioner, v. ROMEO F.
death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without need of a
SUÑIGA, Respondent.
court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are established.19
G.R. No. 226727, April 25, 2018 - UNIVERSITY OF Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to establish the
THE EAST AND DR. ESTER GARCIA, Petitioners, v. presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on
VERONICA M. MASANGKAY AND GERTRUDO R. the matter.20]
REGONDOLA, Respondents.
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or
G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018 - ABIGAEL AN
ESPINA-DAN, Petitioner, v. MARCO DAN, Respondent. the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence" which shows that the
concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and/or under the circumstances
G.R. No. 214367, April 04, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LAUREANA MALIJAN- excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
JAVIER AND IDEN MALIJAN-JAVIER, Respondents.
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the
G.R. No. 220146, April 18, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GLEN ABINA Y under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the
LATORRE AND JESUS LATORRE Y DERAYA, Accused- PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient,
Appellants. they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim. 4.
If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to
G.R. No. 202784, April 18, 2018 - JONNEL D.
invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason
ESPALDON, Petitioner, v. RICHARD E. BUBAN IN HIS
CAPACITY AS GRAFT INVESTIGATION AND thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the
PROSECUTION OFFICER II, MEDWIN S. DIZON IN HIS principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, PIAB-A, ALEU A. AMANTE
IN HIS CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT OMBUDSMAN, PAMO If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review
I, AND CONCHITA CARPIO​ MORALES IN HER with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. And finally, should such recourse still
CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
PHILIPPINES, PETER L. CALIMAG, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, REVENUE AFFAIRS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the
GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, RENATO M. foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in the
GARBO III, MA. LETICIA MALMALATEO, MARLON K. future.
TAULI, FRAYN M. BANAWA, AND JOHNNY CAGUIAT,
ALL NBI AGENTS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution
INVESTIGATION, ROGELIO M. SABADO, AND dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court
PRUDENCIO S. DAR, JR., RAILWAY POLICE, declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is presumptively dead is not a requirement
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, ANTONIO before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office or the Armed Forces of the Philippines can grant and pay the
MARIANO ALMEDA, IRENEO C. QUIZON, ARIEL benefits under Presidential Decree No. 1638.
SARMIENTO, DOMINGO BEGUERAS, JOHN DOES/JANE
DOES, NBI AND/OR PNR, Respondents. Let a copy of this decision be served to the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for their consideration.
G.R. No. 216065, April 18, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REYNANTE SO ORDERED.
MANZANERO Y HABANA A.K.A. "NANTE," MARIO
TANYAG Y MARASIGAN A.K.A. "TAGA," ANGELITO Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
EVANGELISTA Y AVELINO A.K.A. "LITO," ARTHUR
Leonen, J., dissent. See separate opinion.
FAJARDO Y MAMALAYAN, MARIO EVANGELISTA
A.K.A. "TIKYO," PATRICK ALEMANIA A.K.A. "BOBBY
PATRICK," TOYING PENALES A.K.A. "TOYING," A.K.A.
"REY," AND A.K.A. "MARLON," ACCUSED, ARTHUR
FAJARDO Y MAMALAYAN, Accused-Appellant.
May 17, 2018
A.C. No. 11821 (formerly CBD Case No. 15-4477),
April 02, 2018 - DARIO TANGCAY, Complainant, v.
HONESTO ANCHETA CABARROGUIS, Respondent. NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
G.R. No. 193572, April 04, 2018 - TSUNEISHI Sirs/Mesdames:
HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU), INC., Petitioner, v. MIS
MARITIME CORPORATION, Respondent. Please take notice that on April 25, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on May 17,
G.R. No. 199353, April 04, 2018 - LEVISTE 2018 at 3:40 p.m.
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., Petitioner, v. LEGASPI
TOWERS 200, INC., AND VIVIAN Y. LOCSIN AND
PITONG MARCORDE, RESPONDENTS. ENGR. NELSON
Q. IRASGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL Very truly yours,
BUILDING OFFICIAL OF MAKATI, METRO MANILA
AND HON. JOSE P. DE JESUS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS (SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF PUBLIC WORKS AND Division Clerk of Court
HIGHWAYS, THIRD PARTY, Respondents.; G.R. NO.
199389, April 04, 2018 - LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC.,
Petitioner, v. LEVISTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC.,
ENGR. NELSON Q. IRASGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MUNICIPAL BLDG. OFFICIAL OF MAKATI, METRO Endnotes:
MANILA, AND HON. JOSE P. DE JESUS, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Respondents. 1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 185530, April 18, 2018 - MAKATI TUSCANY 2Rollo,pp. 29-36. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MULTI-
with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring.
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
3 Id. at 38-39.
G.R. No. 223399, April 23, 2018 - FATIMA O. DE
GUZMAN-FUERTE, MARRIED TO MAURICE GEORGE
4 Id. at 46-48.
FUERTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES SILVINO S.ESTOMO
AND CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO, Respondents.
5 Id. at 78.
G.R. No. 213617, April 18, 2018 - ARCH. EUSEBIO B.
BERNAL, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND 6 Id. at 78-80. The decision was penned by Judge Ma. Magdalena A. Balderama.
STYLE CONTEMPORARY BUILDERS, Petitioner, v. DR.
VIVENCIO VILLAFLOR AND DRA. GREGORIA 7 This is actually the corrected version of the dispositive portion of the RTC decision.
VILLAFLOR, Respondents. Originally, the dispositive portion of the said decision read:
G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018 - ALONA G. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, tlie Court hereby declared (sic)
ROLDAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES CLARENCE I.
WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
BARRIOS AND ANNA LEE T. BARRIOS, ROMMEL
MATORRES, AND HON. JEMENA ABELLAR ARBIS, IN Family Code of the Philippines for purposes of remarriage. x x x x
HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 6,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AKLAN, Respondents. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 228470, April 23, 2018 - LOADSTAR The RTC issued the corrected version of the dispositive portion on the same
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC., Petitioner, v. day it issued the decision.
ERNESTO AWITEN YAMSON, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS
8 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
HEIRS GEORGIA M. YAMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN,
NAMELY: JENNIE ANN MEDINA YAMSON, KIMBERLY
SHEEN MEDINA YAMSON, JOSHUA MEDINA YAMSON 9 Executive Order No. 209, s. 1987.
AND ANGEL LOUISE MEDINA YAMSON, Respondents.
10 Rollo, p. 47.
G.R. No. 201414, April 18, 2018 - PEDRO PEREZ,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 11 Republic Act No. 386.
Respondent.
12 No. L-1780, August 31, 1948.
G.R. No. 198393, April 04, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO M. CUENCA, 13 The rule expressing the presumption of death referred to in the case of Szatraw is found
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS,
ROBERTO S. CUENCA, MANUEL I. TINIO, VICTOR
AFRICA, MARIO K. ALFELOR, DON M. FERRY AND
OSCAR BELTRAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208091, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENITO
MOLEJON, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 211232, April 11, 2018 - COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES
EFREN AND LOLITA SORIANO, Respondents.
A.C. No. 9186, April 11, 2018 - ATTY. JUAN PAULO
VILLONCO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 226590, April 23, 2018 - SHIRLEY T. LIM,
MARY T. LIM​LEON AND JIMMY T. LIM, Petitioners, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206529, April 23, 2018 - RENANTE B.
REMOTICADO, Petitioner, v. TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION
TRADING CORP. AND ROMMEL M. ALIGNAY,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 229047, April 16, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMONCITO
CORNEL Y ASUNCION, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 211187, April 16, 2018 - SCANMAR
MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND CROWN
SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioners, v. CELESTINO
M. HERNANDEZ, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018 - JAYLORD DIMAL
AND ALLAN CASTILLO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018 - ATTY. PABLO B.
FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ATTY. JOHNIELLE KEITH P. NIETO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 196020, April 18, 2018 - MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, VICENTE MONTERO, MR. BONDOC, AND
MR. BAYONA, Petitioners, v. NORDEC PHILIPPINES
AND/OR MARVEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. POTENCIANO R. MALVAR,
Respondents.; G.R. No. 196116, April 18, 2018 -
NORDEC PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, DR. POTENCIANO R. MALVAR, Petitioner,
v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, VICENTE MONTERO,
MR. BONDOC, AND MR. BAYONA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191310, April 11, 2018 - PRINCESS
TALENT CENTER PRODUCTION, INC., AND/OR LUCHI
SINGH MOLDES, Petitioners, v. DESIREE T. MASAGCA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018 - REY NATHANIEL
C. IFURUNG, Petitioner, v. HON. CONCHITA C.
CARPIO MORALES IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, HON. MELCHOR ARTHUR H.
CARANDANG, HON. GERARD ABETO MOSQUERA, HON.
PAUL ELMER M. CLEMENTE, HON. RODOLFO M.
ELMAN, HON. CYRIL ENGUERRA RAMOS IN THEIR
CAPACITIES AS DEPUTIES OMBUDSMAN, AND THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 223660, April 02, 2018 - LOURDES
VALDERAMA, Petitioner, v. SONIA ARGUELLES AND
LORNA ARGUELLES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 219953, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGELITA REYES
Y GINOVE AND JOSEPHINE SANTA MARIA Y
SANCHEZ, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), ALEJANDRO
E. GAMOS, AND ROSALYN G. GILE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 214759, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DINA CALATES Y
DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 194765, April 23, 2018 - MARSMAN &
COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. RODIL C. STA. RITA,
Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-
2224-MTJ), April 03, 2018 - ROSILANDA M.
KEUPPERS, Complainant, v. JUDGE VIRGILIO G.
MURCIA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
BRANCH 2, ISLAND GARDEN CITY OF SAMAL,
Respondent.
IPI No. 17-267-CA-J, April 24, 2018 - RE: VERIFIED
COMPLAINT OF FERNANDO CASTILLO AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIFLOR PUNZALAN-
CASTILLO, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA.
G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARTIN NIKOLAI Z.
JAVIER AND MICHELLE K. MERCADO-JAVIER,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 210580, April 18, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LUDYSON C. CATUBAG,
Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 201225-26 (From CTA-EB Nos. 649 &
651), April 18, 2018 - TEAM SUAL CORPORATION
(FORMERLY MIRANT SUAL CORPORATION),
Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent.; G.R. No. 201132 (From CTA-
under Section 334 (24) of Act No. 190 or the Code of the Civil Procedure of the Philippines.
The section reads:
Section 334. Disputable Presumptions. - The following presumptions arc
satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but they are disputable, and may be
contradicted by other evidence:
xxxx
24. That a person not heard from in seven years is dead.
14 98 Phil. 574 (1956)
15
107 Phil. 381 (1960).
16In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw, supra note 12, in relation
to Lukban v. Republic, supra note 14 and Gue v. Republic, supra note 15.
17Valdez v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009, citing Gue v.
Republic, supra note 15.
18Rollo, p. 47.
19Manuelv People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005 citing
TOLENTINO, THE NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. I, 690. See also Valdez v. Republic, supra note
17.
20In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw, supra note 12, in relation
to Lukban v. Republic, supra note 14 and Gue v. Republic, supra note 15.
21 The "evidence" referred to include, but are not limited to, the official service records of
the missing soldier showing for how long he had been missing and his last assignments
and affidavits of persons who knew the circumstances of the missing soldiers'
disappearance.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J:
I dissent.
Petitioner is 72 years old. Her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo), a soldier with the Philippine
Constabulary, has been missing since 1979, or for almost 39 years now, after being assigned to Arayat,
Pampanga, an area heavy with the presence of the New People's Army. For decades, petitioner single-
handedly raised and supported their three (3) children. The case arose for the sole reason that petitioner
has, since 1987,1 sought the benefits due her husband under Presidential Decree No. 1638, in relation to
Republic Act No. 6948.
Considering these circumstances, on the basis of equity, I vote to grant the petition.
I
On January 15, 2012, the trial court released two (2) decisions. While the bodies of the decisions are the
same, the fallo of the first decision stated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares WILFREDO N. MATIAS
absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for
purposes of remarriage.
It is understood that this Decision is without prejudice to the re-appearance of WILFREDO
N. MATIAS.
SO ORDERED.2
The second one corrected the fallo of the first decision as to the purpose of declaring Wilfredo
presumptively dead, but still erroneously mentioned Article 413 as the applicable law:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares WILFREDO N. MATIAS
absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for
purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.
It is understood that this Decision is without prejudice to the re-appearance of WILFREDO
N. MATIAS.
SO ORDERED.4
The bodies of these decisions never mentioned Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition itself never
mentioned it. From the start, petitioner was clear that her intention in filing a case for the declaration of
presumptive death was to be able to avail of the benefits that Wilfredo had as a member of the Philippine
Constabulary. One of the requirements to claim such benefits is proof of death or a declaration of
presumptive death by the court.5
As no mention of Article 41 of the Family Code was made by petitioner or by the trial court, and
petitioner has made it clear that the petition was to claim her husband's financial benefits and not to
remarry, to my mind, it is unambiguous that Articles 3906 and 3917 of the Civil Code are applicable.
While the general rule is that the fallo "prevails over the body of the decision in case of conflict, this rule
does not apply where it is clear from the body of the decision that there was a glaring error made in the
dispositive portion, in which case the body of the decision will control."8
Asian Center for Career and Employment v. National Labor Relations Commission9 instructed:
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo
and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rest[s] on the theory that the
fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.
However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to
show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will
prevail.10 (Citation omitted)
II
The ponente relies on In re: Szatraw v. Sors,11 and Gue v. Republic12 to support the claim that pursuing
as a separate action the declaration of presumptive death of a person cannot prosper. I agree, but offer a
different appreciation of these cases.
In In re: Szatraw,13 petitioner was married to a Polish national. Three (3) years into their marriage,
petitioner's husband left their conjugal home with their only son. Upon inquiry from friends, petitioner
was told that her husband was in Shanghai. However, Polish citizens who visited Shanghai informed her
EB No. 651), April 18, 2018; COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. TEAM SUAL
CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT SUAL
CORPORATION), Respondent.; G.R. No. 201133
(From CTA-EB No. 649), April 18, 2018;
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
v. TEAM SUAL CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT
SUAL CORPORATION), Respondent.
G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018 - EFRAIM C.
GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO AND SHERYL G. SEE,
Petitioners, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND RICARDO
V. PARAS III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF STATE
COUNSEL, CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. AND THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.; G.R. No.
199034, April 17, 2018 - MA. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, Petitioner, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.; G.R. No.
199046, April 17, 2018 - JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO,
Petitioner, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND RICARDO V.
PARAS III, AS CHIEF STATE COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE AND RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 210475, April 11, 2018 - RAMON K.
ILUSORIO, MA. LOURDES C. CRISTOBAL, ROMEO G.
RODRIGUEZ, EDUARDO C. ROJAS, CESAR B. CRISOL,
VIOLETA J. JOSEF, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN
K. ILUSORIO, AND CECILIA A. BISUÑA, Petitioners, v.
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 232247, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONILLO LOPEZ,
JR. Y MANTALABA @ "DODONG", Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 226481, April 18, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAYCENT MOLA Y
SELBOSA A.K.A. "OTOK", Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018 - PO2 JESSIE
FLORES Y DE LEON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 214886, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNIE
CONCEPCION, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 195320, April 23, 2018 - BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
v. HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA, ET AL. OF THE SPECIAL
FIRST DIVISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
AND CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.), Respondents.
G.R. No. 195962, April 18, 2018 - PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR.,
RECIO M. GARCIA, LEON O. TY, JOSE R. TENGCO, JR.,
ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, VICENTE PATERNO, RUBEN
ANCHETA, RAFAEL SISON, HILARION M. HENARES,
JR., CARMELINO G. ALVENDIA AND GENEROSO F.
TENSECO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 230473, April 23, 2018 - SEACREST
MARITIME MANAGEMENT, INC. AND/OR HERNING
SHIPPING ASIA PTE. LTD., Petitioners, v. ALMA Q.
RODEROS, AS WIDOW AND LEGAL HEIR OF
FRANCISCO RODEROS, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-18-3833 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-
4370-P), April 16, 2018 - JULIUS E. PADUGA,
Complainant, v. ROBERTO "BOBBY" R. DIMSON,
SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
VALENZUELA CITY, BRANCH 171, Respondent.
G.R. No. 226656, April 23, 2018 - ARNEL T. GERE,
Petitioner, v. ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT
PHILS., INC. AND/OR ANGLO-EASTERN CREW
MANAGEMENT (ASIA), LTD., Respondents.; G.R. No.
226713, April 23, 2018 - ANGLO-EASTERN CREW
MANAGEMENT PHILS., INC. AND/OR ANGLO-
EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA), LTD.,
Petitioners, v. ARNEL T. GERE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018 - MARGIE SANTOS
MITRA, Petitioner, v. PERPETUA L. SABLAN-​-
GUEVARRA, REMEGIO L. SABLAN, ET AL.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 200256, April 11, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NORTHERN CEMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193499, April 23, 2018 - BANCO DE ORO
UNIBANK, INC., Petitioner, v. VTL REALTY, INC.,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 222070, April 16, 2018 - EMMANUEL M. LU,
ROMMEL M. LU, CARMELA M. LU, KAREN GRACE P. LU
AND JAMES MICHAEL LU, Petitioners, v. MARISSA LU
CHIONG AND CRISTINA LU NG, Respondents.
A.M. No. 17-12-135-MeTC, April 16, 2018 - RE:
DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. ARNO D. DEL
ROSARIO, COURT STENOGRAPHER II, BRANCH 41,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (METC), QUEZON CITY.
G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BASHER
TOMAWIS Y ALI, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 227982, April 23, 2018 - MARIO DIESTA
that her husband and child could not be found in Shanghai. After an absence of seven (7) years,
petitioner filed a case to have her husband declared presumptively dead and to preserve her parental
authority over their son, should he resurface. This Court denied the petition as the case was neither for
the settlement of the estate of the husband, as he had no property with petitioner, nor was it to claim
insurance benefits, as his life was not insured.
Gue v. Republic14 involved almost the same circumstances. Petitioner was married to her husband with
whom she had two (2) children. After eight (8) years of marriage, her husband left for Shanghai, never
to be heard from again. He had not written, called, or communicated with petitioner. Despite petitioner's
diligent efforts, she could not locate her husband. They did not have any property together. This Court
quoted In re: Szatraw at length and ruled that based on the doctrine in that case, the petition for the
declaration of presumptive death must be denied.
The doctrine in these two (2) cases is not applicable to the present case as petitioner did not institute the
case independently, in a vacuum. She did so because she needed a document, an official declaration of
her husband's death in order to claim benefits. I am certain that this Court is aware of petitioner's long-
standing effort to claim from the Philippine Veteran's Affairs Office. She failed precisely because the mere
insistence that no case has to be filed for the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code was insufficient.
Nowhere in the rules and jurisprudence does it state that a case for presumptive death may only be filed
for purposes of remarriage or succession. While Article 41 of the Family Code is specific to remarriage,
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code are silent on the scope of its application. I submit that it can also
be to claim government and insurance benefits, as in this case, where money, a means of support, and
even the preservation of property, are at stake. What jurisprudence guards against is the blanket remedy
of having a person declared presumptively dead without specifying this declaration's purpose because
then, it becomes susceptible to unscrupulous use.
Moreover, while it is true that filing a case for the declaration of presumptive death may not have been
necessary, still no damage will result in granting the petition.
Under the October 12, 2005 Philippine Veteran's Affairs Office Memorandum on the Guidelines on
Disposition of Posthumous Pensions, a certified true copy of the death certificate of the member is
required to claim benefits.15 In the Philippine Veteran's Affairs Office website, the same requirement
appears with the additional requirement of a "court declaration":
Effectivity of pension:
Death of the veteran or 09 April 1990 whichever is later.
1. Surviving spouse (death result of service connected disability)
1.1 Last re-rating from [Disability Ratings Board]
1.2 Death certificate of veteran from [Local Civil Registrar] with registry number/casualty
report
1.3 Marriage contract certificates from [Local Civil Registrar] with registry number
1.4 AGO form 23
1.5 Marriage contract
....
All documents must be either or (sic) authenticated by the office which issued the same.
We do not honor photocopies. The claimant must personally file.
Note:
1. Burial permit
2. Death certificate of veteran issued b[y] the parish church
3. Late registration of court declaration16
It would be a most unjust outcome for this Court to deny this petition when the only reason the case was
filed was because petitioner was instructed that she needed a court order that establishes her husband
as presumptively dead. She has long suffered in wait before the Philippine Veteran's Affairs Office where
the most definitive declaration she obtained was that Wilfredo "was declared missing since 1979 and up
to present."17 This declaration, under the Philippine Veteran's Affairs Office rules, is inadequate to claim
benefits. In this case, court action clearly had to be pursued.
Though it can be argued that the Philippine Veteran's Affairs Office must change its rules, or that it was
incumbent upon the office to honor this Court's previous pronouncements to act on the presumption as it
was merely disputable and evidentiary in nature, without prejudice to the deceased's reappearance, the
discourse will not serve the ends of justice. Petitioner will languish further in uncertainty, not knowing if
and when the Philippine Veteran's Affairs Office will release Wilfredo's benefits to her. We are here to
breathe life into law, and not to stifle the outcome it seeks to achieve. If relief can be obtained more
swiftly by petitioner, then we must, in good conscience, give it.
Another argument can be made in that petitioner should have just filed a case for the settlement of
Wilfredo's estate, and then pleaded that he be declared presumptively dead in those proceedings. Again,
I am of the opinion that petitioner should not be made to suffer when she only followed, as best she
could, the requirements of the Philippine Veteran's Affairs Office. Even amongst us there is much
discourse on how to proceed with Wilfredo's disappearance. It is unfair to expect petitioner to expertly
navigate the nuanced jurisprudence on cases involving the declaration of presumptive death.
III
Another matter I would like to raise that was no longer discussed in the Resolution is the seemingly
settled doctrine that a petition for certiorari is the proper mode of elevating matters to the Court of
Appeals in all presumptive death cases, whether under Article 41 of the Family Code or under Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
This generalization must be clarified.
Article 41 of the Family Code explicitly states that the Rules on Summary Procedure shall apply if the
declaration for presumptive death is sought for purposes of remarriage. The Rules on Summary
Procedure prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration to expedite the resolution of cases.18 Since
the decision will be final and executory, no motion for reconsideration is needed. The Office of the
Solicitor General must file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of
Appeals.19
I submit, however, that the Rules on Summary Procedure is not applicable in cases where a declaration
for presumptive death is sought to settle the estate of the deceased, or as in this case, to claim benefits.
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances where the rules on special proceedings should
apply:
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. — Rules of special proceedings are
provided for in the following cases:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
BAJARO, Petitioner, v. METRO STONERICH CORP.,
AND/OR IBRAHIM M. NUÑO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2018 - HACIENDA
LUISITA INCORPORATED, PETITIONER, LUISITA
INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION AND RIZAL
COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioners-
in-Intervention, v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER
PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID
NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL
MALLARI, AND JULIO SUNIGA AND HIS
SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA,
INC. AND WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
The provision on the settlement of a presumptively deceased person's estate appears in Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court:
Section 4. Presumption of death. — For purposes of settlement of his estate, a person shall
be presumed dead if absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code. But if
such person proves to be alive, he shall be entitled to the balance of his estate after
payment of all his debts. The balance may be recovered by motion in the same
proceeding.
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court outlines cases where appeals may be made in special proceedings:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. — An interested person
may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of
the estate to which such person, is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of
the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or
for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied).
According to Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, the manner of appeal in special proceedings is through a
record on appeal.20
From these provisions, it is apparent that in an action for the declaration of death of a person under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, whether it is to settle his estate or for other reasons apart from
remarriage, the appeal must be made through record on appeal. No exception to the application of these
rules is present. The Republic therefore availed of the wrong remedy to question the decision of the trial
court.
On substantial grounds, even assuming that a petition for certiorari was the correct mode of elevating
the case to the Court of Appeals, the Republic was still required to file a motion for reconsideration.
Generally, a motion for reconsideration must be filed before the filing of a petition for certiorari.21
Exceptions to this requirement are:
(a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where
the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may
be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and
insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is
involved; and (g) in case of urgency.22
None of these exceptions are present in this case. Again, it is my position that no damage will be caused
in granting the petition—there is no conflict with settled jurisprudence, and relief is finally afforded to
petitioner who has taken decades chasing after it.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition in order to release the benefits due to petitioner with
dispatch.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, p. 52.
2 Id. at ____.
3 FAMILY CODE, art. 41 provides:
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
4Rollo, p. 80.
5 Id. at 47.
6 CIVIL CODE, art. 390 provides:
Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence often years. If he disappeared after the age
of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order
that his succession may be opened.
7 CIVIL CODE, art. 391 provides:
Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including
the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of
the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
 missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and his existence has not been known for four years.

8 Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 638, 655 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division].

9 358 Phil. 380 (1998) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

10 Id. at 386.

11 81 Phil. 461 (1948) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].

12 107 Phil. 381 (1960) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc].

13 81 Phil. 461 (1948) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].

14 107 Phil. 381 (1960) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc].

15 PVAO Memorandum on Guidelines on Disposition of Posthumous Pensions (2005).

1. Entitlement — Pursuant to the DOJ Opinion No. 23, Series of 2001, old age,
disability and death pensions under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6948 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7696 and its implementing rules and regulations, due
the estate of a deceased veteran or his/her widow shall be claimed in due form by
his/her legal heirs by PVAO in cases only where the veteran or his/her widow/er has
duly approved application for such pension benefit.

2. Basic Requirements — In all cases and regardless of the amount of the

accrued/uncollected/posthumous pension, the following documents shall be
submitted:

a.) Certified True Copy of the Death Certificate of the deceased pensioner —
veteran/surviving spouse pensioner or with approved claim duly issued by
the NSO with corresponding Official Receipt of payment;
b.) Evidence of filiation/relationship of the person/s claiming the
accrued/uncollected/posthumous pension, e.g., birth certificate/s, marriage
certificate, certified true copies thereof issued by NSO with Official Receipts
of payments; AND
c.) Application form duly accomplished and filed by qualified claimant to the
posthumous pension, marked as PVAO PP Form A.

16 Philippines Veterans Affairs Office, Death Pension < http://server.pvao.mil.ph/Death-

Pension.aspx > (last visited on April 23, 2018).

17Rollo, p. 51.

18 REV. SUMMARY PROC. RULE, sec. 19(c) provides:

Section 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings,

motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
....
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for
reopening of trial[.]

19See Republic v. Granada, 687 Phil. 403 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].

20 RULES OF COURT, Rule 40, sec. 3 provides:

Section 3. How to appeal. — The appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal

with the court that rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The
notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, the judgment or
final order or part thereof appealed from, and state the material dates
showing the timeliness of the appeal.

A record on appeal shall be required only in special proceedings and in other

cases of multiple or separate appeals.

The form and contents of the record on appeal shall be as provided in

section 6, Rule 41. Copies of the notice of appeal, and the record on appeal
where required, shall be served on the adverse party.

21See Castro v. Guevarra, 686 Phil. 1125 (20 12) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

22Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 671 Phil. 320, 338 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division],
citing Francisco Motors v. Court of Appeals, 535 Phil. 736 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third
Division].

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