LOURDES L.

DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-
Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.

Facts:
Private respondents (PRs) were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo
and Aniceta Reyes. Aniceta died then Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in
1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the
latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting
Alejandro's will to probate. PRs did not appeal from said order but instead
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." Trial Court granted the
motion and issued an order declaring Petitioner as not the wife of the late
Alejandro, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo
as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors (PRs) as the only heirs of the
late spouses Alejandro and Aniceta.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that she is entitled to

some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death but it
was denied. She then appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed and the
dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989.

A writ of execution was issued by the Lower Court to implement the final
and executory Order. Consequently, PRs filed several motions including a
motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the TCTs covering the
properties of the late Alejandro. When Petitioner refused to surrender the TCTs,
private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for
issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.

Then RTC Judge Zain B. Angas set aside the final and executory Order of
the CA and the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the
ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character.
PRs filed an MR which was denied. Thus, they filed a petition before the CA,
which nullified the two assailed Orders.

Petitioner then instituted a petition for review assailing the order of the CA
upholding the validity of the of the order which declared the intrinsic invalidity
of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
ISSUE:

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically
void in an order that has become final and executor still be given effect?

RULING:

No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be disturbed or

reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.

The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof are void. Alejandro gave all the property to the
concubine. Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own.
In this case, the whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and
Aniceta. Such has become final and executor. The only instance where a party
interested in probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake
or inadvertence not imputable to negligence with circumstances do not concur
herein.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, Represented by Rogelio Lasam and Atty.
Edward P. Llonillo, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTA UMENGAN, respondent.

FACTS:

Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband, Domingo

Turingan, namely: Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo and Maria. When Domingo
Turingan passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had
two other children by him, namely: Trinidad and Rosendo. Sometime in
January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her
second husband) filed with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot. Vicenta Umengan
is the daughter of Abdon Turingan (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her first
husband).

In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the
owners of the subject lot, having inherited it from their father. Rosendo Lasam
was allegedly the sole heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel
Cuntapay. During his lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed
Vicenta Umengan to occupy the subject lot sometime in 1955. The latter and
her husband allegedly promised that they would vacate the subject lot upon
demand. However, despite written notice and demand by the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly unlawfully refused to vacate the subject lot
and continued to possess the same. In her Answer with Counterclaim, Vicenta
Umengan specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint. She
countered that when Isabel Cuntapay passed away, the subject lot was
inherited by her six children by her first and second marriages through
intestate succession.

The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam.

The MTCC gave credence to the newly discovered last will and testament
(entitled Testamento Abierto) purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay where
she bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo Lasam. On appeal, the RTC
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC. However, the CA reversed such
decision and explained that the said last will and testament did not comply
with the formal requirements of the law on wills.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the will of Isabel Cuntapay could be relied upon to establish the
petitioner‘s right to possess the subject lot.

RULING:

No. The purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not
properly be relied upon to establish petitioners‘ right to possess the subject lot
because, without having been probated, the said last will and testament could
not be the source of any right.

Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:

“No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court…..”

Following the above truisms, the MTCC and RTC, therefore, erroneously
ruled that petitioners have a better right to possess the subject lot on the basis
of the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has
not been probated. Stated in another manner, Isabel Cuntapay’s last will and
testament, which has not been probated, has no effect whatever and petitioners
cannot claim any right thereunder.

Hence, the CA correctly held that, as against petitioners’ claim,

respondent has shown a better right of possession over the subject lot as
evidenced by the deeds of conveyances executed in her favor by the children of
Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage.