SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS DIGESTS (WEEK 4)
It is elementary that a
1. FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA, 21 SCRA 428 (1967)
FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba, herein respondent, submitted the purported will
of the late Benedicta de los Reyes for probate. The will instituted the
petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. All claiming to be
intestate heirs, filed oppositions to the probate asked. The Court of First
Instance found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but
deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation. After
receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the
testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the
testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of
her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950
Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against
the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes
"unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will
to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same
was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that
contrary to the claim of oppositors- appellants there had been no legal
revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the
latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance. Oppositors then appealed to the SC.
ISSUES:
a) WON the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to
probate had become final for lack of appeal
b) WON the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling
the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become
final
RULING:
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a. Yes, it had become final for lack of appeal.
probate decree finally and definitely settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of
his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are
valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is
final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment
. . . where such order or judgment (a) allows or disallows a will."
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court
below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and
conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said
decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus,
the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly
dismissed.
b. Yes, it had likewise become final. In Guevara v. Guevara, the Court
ruled that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements
of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator’s
expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of
the decedent’s ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver
the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for
its violation (Revised Rule 75) It would be non-sequitur to allow
public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or
not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable
or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of
Appeals correctly so ruled.
2. MERCADO VS. SANTOS, 66 SCRA 215 (1938)
FACTS: The petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of
a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. The will judgment:
was later on admitted to probate by the Court. Almost three years
"SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. — The effect of a judgment or final order in
thereafter, the five intervenors herein moved ex parte to reopen the
an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine
proceedings, but because filed ex parte, the motion was denied. The same
Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of the United
motion was filed the second time but was also denied. Rosario Basa de
States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
Leon, the intervenor herein, subsequently filed complaints against the
follows:
petitioner for falsification or forgery of the will probated but was all
dismissed. Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal moved in the "1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
Court of First Instance of Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
petitioner was arrested four times because of these complaints. person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation
of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of
The petitioner interposed a demurrer on the ground that the will alleged to
the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the
have been forged had already been probated. This demurrer was overruled
person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of
on December 24, 1935, whereupon an exception was taken and a motion for
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator
reconsideration and notice of appeal were filed. The motion for
or intestate:
reconsideration and the proposed appeal were denied. The case proceeded
to trial, and forthwith petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of
that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, the due execution of a probated will.
further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity
"SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will
and due execution thereof. The motion was overruled and the petitioner
shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary
in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the
injunction to enjoin the trial court from further proceedings in the matter.
allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari , and dissolved the
conclusive as to its due execution."
writ of preliminary injunction.
In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said:
ISSUE: WON the probate of the will of petitioner’s wife is a bar to his criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will "The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is
usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is
RULING: The Court held that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333
also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the
and 625 of our Code of Civil Code Procedure, criminal action will not lie
time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace,
against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a
fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery."
court of competent jurisdiction.

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"A judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked collaterally
although the will was forged; and a payment to the executor names therein
of a debt due the decedent will discharge the same, notwithstanding the
spurious character of the instrument probated. It has also been held that,
upon an indictment for forging a will, the probate of the paper in question
is conclusive evidence in the defendant’s favor of its genuine character. But
this particular point has lately been ruled otherwise."
3. SUMILANG VS. RAMAGOSA, 21 SCRA 1369 (1967)
FACTS: Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of the decedent Ramagosa,
wherein the former was the sole heir to the estate. The probate was
opposed by the respondents alleging that the will was made under duress
and not intended to be the decedent’s last will and testament. When the
petitioner finished adducing evidence on his behalf, the oppositors didn’t
adduce their own but instead, they moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings, alleging that the court didn’t have jurisdiction as the will was
allegedly revoked by law when the decedent sold the parcels of land,
subject of the will, to petitioners. The motion was denied on the ground that
it goes into the intrinsic value of the will, which the probate court doesn’t
have jurisdiction to settle.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court has the jurisdiction to settle intrinsic
value of a will.
RULING: No. The petition for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry
is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator’s testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolutions of
the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions
of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on
the ground that the testators had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior
to his death, the lands disposed therein. True or not, the alleged sale is no
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ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing,
the validity of the testamentary provision is another. The first decides the
execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator
while the second relates to descent and distribution.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of
conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed.
For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
questions of revocation become superfluous: in law, there is no such will
and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation
invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely
implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties
concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy.
4. BALANAY VS. MARTINEZ, 64 SCRA 452 (1975)
FACTS: Balanay Jr. filed a petition for the probate of the will of his late
mother, which was opposed by his father and siblings. The father claims to
have been preterited and that there was an illegal partition of the conjugal
properties. Balanay Jr. then presented documents allegedly executed by his
father withdrawing any opposition to the probate proceedings as well as
the renunciation of whatever share in the estate of his late wife. The
opposition was then overruled by the court and proceedings continued.
However, during the proceedings, one who was allegedly Balanay’s new
counsel filed a motion for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the
ground that the will is void for illegally partitioning the conjugal assets and
constituted a compromise on future legitime. The motion included that the
testate proceedings should be dismissed and replaced with an intestate
one. The court sustained the motion and dismissed the proceedings.
Balanay Jr. then averred that he didn’t authorize Montinolla to file the same
motion and that the court shouldn’t dismiss the proceedings. The trial court
held that it didn’t decide solely on the basis of the motion filed but due to
the reading of the provisions of the will itself.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court has the jurisdiction to settle intrinsic
value of a will even before its formal validity has been established.
RULING: In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity has been established. The probate of
a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue.
It was wrong however for the probate court to convert the proceedings into
an intestate one. The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several disposition
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of other dispositions,
unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such
other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made”.
“Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid
parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without
defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.”
5. PASTOR JR. VS. CA, 122 SCRA 885 (1983)
FACTS: Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their
two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor
(Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed
a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of
Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition:
a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in
the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada
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as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not
covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada
instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance
of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the
legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who
claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The
probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was
affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and
remanded the same to the probate court after denying reconsideration. For
two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of
both parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set
the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor
Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no
hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit
their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was
still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution
and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties
payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not
inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to
Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedent’s estate, of which Quemada
was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share
of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the
accumulated legacy of Quemada.
Being “immediately executory”, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ
of Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration
thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of
payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after
resolution of oppositor’s motion for reconsideration. Pending motion,
Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the writ
of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said
petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
RULING: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and
large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question
of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot
resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title. The Order sought to be
executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly
resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties.
However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein
that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a
special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will
“with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly
authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.”
It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must
proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership
and possession of real and personal properties. The Probate Court did not
resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate
inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of
controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was,
therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the
Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the
mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the
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dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator
to pay the legacy in dispute.
6. US VS. CHIU GUIMCO, 36 PHIL 917 (1917)
A court cannot make a valid order committing a person to jail for failure to
produce the will of a
deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure, e
xcept when acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the estates of
deceased persons.
FACTS: Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the
municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while visiting China.
Before his departure from the Philippines he had executed a will before
Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were
named as executors. Chiu Guimco is Joaquin Cruz’s brother. Guimco, as
attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his deceased brother, entered
into an agreement with his brother’s Filipina wife, whereby she relinquished
her claims to the estate for a consideration. He also entered into an
agreement with Uy Cuan, his brother’s Chinese wife, for the distribution of
the estate and for the payment of rentals on her interest in the real estate.
No payments have, however, been made by Guimco. Ramon Contreras,
acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to Guimco urging him to produce
the will of the decedent for the institution of lawful proceedings in
accordance therewith. Guimco replied that the will in question had never
been in his possession and that he had never seen it. A complaint was filed
under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure charging Guimco with the
failure to produce the will within the time required by law. The court found
the accused guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1800. Subsequently, the
court, believing that the will was in his possession, ordered him to produce
it but Guimco still failed to do so. The court ordered the confinement
of Guimco in the provincial jail.
Issue: Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered the
commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail?
RULING: No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of
Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a person who neglects to deliver a
will after the death of the testator without reasonable cause, can only be
applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the
administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where administration
proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under
this section, should require that there be before it some petition,
information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court
under this section appropriate. The remedy provided in section 629 of the
Code of Procedure is clearly a totally different remedy, having no relation
with that provided in section 628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not
permissible in
a prosecution under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine ther
ein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed under
Sec. 629.To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under
Sec. 628 would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere
production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had possession of
it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would constitute an
infringement of the provision of law which says that in a criminal action the
defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself. This provision
can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction
over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and where
administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before
taking action under this section, should require that there be before it some
petition. From what has been said it follows that the order of commitment
made by the lower court remanding the accused to jail should be vacated
and if subsidiary imprisonment should be imposed for insolvency the
defendant shall, under the provisions of Act No. 2557, be credited with the
time during which he was confined in pursuance of the order of the lower
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court, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the
court under this section appropriate.
7. RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA, 17 SCRA 418 (1966)
FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan
delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition
before the court to examine the purported will but which was later
withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr.
Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners
now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the
decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate
proceedings?
RULING: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father
Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the
Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy
only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
8. TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL G.R. NO. L-18753, MARCH 26, 1965
FACTS: Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in
the City of Manila with no ascendants or descendants. She left properties
worth P600,000.00 and a will written in Spanish which she executed at her
residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at
the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof
in the presence of three witnesses who in turn affixed their signatures
below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page
of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before a Notary Public by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full
use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or
influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat and that she freely and spontaneously executed
said will.
She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named Josefina
Mortera; and the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building to the said
spouses. However, the naked ownership of the building was left in equal
parts to the legitimate children of said spouses. She also instituted Josefina
Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties
not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will
before the Court of First Instance of Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan,
claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the same testatrix.
ISSUES:
1. Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this
proceeding?
2. Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?
3. Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should
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inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy
made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
RULING: Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene
because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the
will, because nowhere in the will was any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in
the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim
against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any interest
in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix. She would acquire such
right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our
Civil Code. It is true that she claims to be an acknowledged natural child of
Jose and also an adopted daughter of Francisca. But the law does not give
her any right to succeed to the estate of Maria because being an illegitimate
child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of
her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: “An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; … .”
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo.
On the secon issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to is
contradicted by the evidence of record. The will was duly executed because
it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is
also belied by the evidence.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the
opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in
their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was
old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from
her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove
what the instrumental witnesses had testified in court. The exercise of
improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the
mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express
the will of another rather than her own.
On the third issue, the question of whether the probate court could
determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided
by this Court in a long line of decisions. In Castañeda v. Alemany, the Court
had stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that
a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. The judgment in
such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the
court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the
will. It cannot decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another
one is valid.
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the
court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will
Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction.
Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for
he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other
pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some
relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
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9. FERNANDO V. CRISOSTOMO, G.R. Nos. L-2963-4, December 27, 1951
FACTS: On July 23, 1948, the guardian filed in the guardianship proceedings
a petition praying the court to punish for contempt German Crisostomo
(one of the administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses appointed
in the intestate proceedings above mentioned) and one Victor Dimagiba,
alleging that they had illegally taken possession of certain properties
belonging to the minor wards, inherited by them from their parents. The
Court denied the petition on the ground that German Crisostomo had the
right to possess those properties in his capacity as co-administrator of the
estate of the deceased spouses and that Victor Dimagiba was only his
overseer. The guardian filed a motion for reconsideration which the court
denied on September 16, 1948. He appealed from said order.
In case G.R. No. L-2694, entitled "Inestate Estate of the Spouses Rufino
Crisostomo and Petra Fernando," German Crisostomo filed a petition, as
next of kin, for the opening of the inestate proceedings of the himself and
Pacita Fernando, another next appointment of himself and Pacita Fernando,
another next of kin, as co-administrator of said estate. The guardian in case
G.R. No. L-2693 filed on February 28, 1948, an opposition to the appointment
of the administrators and moved for the dismissal of the inestate
proceedings on the ground that the properties left by said spouses were
already in his possession as such guardian. On April 1, 1948, the court issued
an order denying the motion to dismiss the inestate proceedings. On April
2, 1948, the guardian filed another petition reiterating the motion of
dismissal. On April 7, 1948, the court appointed German Crisostomo and
Pacita Fernando co-administrators of the estate of the above-mentioned
spouses with the appropriate bonds, impliedly denying the reiteration of
the motion for dismissal.
On June 21, 198, the guardian filed a motion for the closing, termination and
filing in the archives of the record of the inestate proceedings on the ground
that the properties involved therein had already been extrajudicially
declaring null and void the extrajudicial partition made by the guardian and
denying said motion for closing the inestate proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the the court’s appointment of Crisostomo and Fernando
as co-administrators is valid
RULING: Yes. This Court, after giving due consideration to all the facts and
arguments appearing in the original petition and in the motion for
reconsideration, passed the resolution of June 11, 1948, which reads as
follows:
In G.R. No. L-2172, Fernando vs. Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, et
al., the motion for reconsideration is denied. Respondent judge had
jurisdiction and did not exceed it in appointing the other
respondent, who are the brother and sister or nearest of kin of the
decedent, as administrators of the latter's estate. The jurisdictional
facts referred to in section 2 (a) Rule 80, are the death of the
decedent, his having left his estate in such province were probate
court is sitting, or life he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his
having left his estate in such province. The name or competency of
the person or persons for whim letters of administration are prayed
is not a jurisdictional fact, it is another additional fact to be alleged
in the petition (d); but "no defect in the petition shall render void the
issue of letters of administration" that is, shall divest the court of its
jurisdiction to appoint the administrator. A petition for certiorari
does not lie to correct errors; if the lower court has committed any
error, the proper remedy would be appeal. The guardian of the
minors father who died after the guardian had been appointed, until
said properties have been adjudicated or awarded to them either by
extrajudicial or judicial partition. No partition either judicial or extra
judicial having as yet been made adjudicating the said properties to
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the minors, the properties of the deceased have never been placed
under the administration of the guardian of his minor children.
It will be seen from the above that the principal issue in this case as to
whether the intestate proceedings should be dismissed has already been
decided by this Court in the certiorari proceedings as far back as July 2, 1948,
with the exception that if there had been errors committed in the
appointment of the guardian (not in the institution of the intestate
proceedings, which had been declared within the jurisdiction of the court)
those errors in the appointment may be corrected in an appeal. After
examining the record, we do not see any error in the appointment of
German Crisostomo and Pacita Fernando as co-administrators as they were
the brother and sister, respectively, of the deceased, no evidence having
been presented by the appellant why those persons should not be
appointed, either on account of their incompetency or lack of moral
qualifications. We, therefore, affirm the order of the court appointing them.
It should be borne in mind that the above resolutions of this Court
constitute res judicata and "the law of the case" with regard to this appeal
and they can no longer be questioned or put in issue in the present case. It
results then, that the claim of the appellant that the intestate proceedings
should be dismissed has to be denied and, as all the other questions are
dependent on said issue, they should also be decided adversely to the
appellant.
10. ARAULLO V. CELIS, 6 PHIL 459 (1906)
FACTS: Rosario Darwin Araujo inherited from her mother, Asuncion Araujo
y Belen, the hacienda known as Pangpang and other property. She
subsequently married Jose Araujo y Celis, the defendant’s son, and died on
the 22d day of January, 1888, leaving no descendants or ascendants, but
only collateral relatives, of whom the plaintiffs in this case claim to be the
nearest. They consequently alleged that they should succeed to the estate
of the said Rosario Darwin Araujo, and asked that the property inherited by
her from her mother be delivered to them as the heirs of the said Rosario.
The property in question, according to the complaint, is now held by the
defendant, who took possession of the same after the death of her son,
Jose Araujo, the husband of the said Rosario, her died a year after the death
of his wife — that is to say, in 1889.
ISSUE: WON Rosario Darwin executed a valid and legal will in the form and
manner alleged by the defendant.
RULING: As the court properly found the important question in this case is
whether or not Rosario Darwin executed a valid will in the form and manner
alleged by the defendant. If so, the defendants right to the property would
be unquestionable. If not so, thee contrary would necessarily be the result.
This point as to the will, however, was not clearly established as it should
have been. The defendant introduce no will in evidence, offered secondary
parol evidence as to its contents under the claim that the original will has
been lost. The court allowed this evidence over the objection of the
plaintiffs, and this is one of the errors assigned by them on this appeal. The
plaintiffs objection to the admission of such evidence was well taken and it
could therefore have been sustained . The loss of the alleged original will
has not been sufficiently established . Further the witness testified that the
will, a copy of which he saw and had in his possession, was signed by two
witnesses only. A will signed by two witnesses only could not under certain
circumstances be valid under the law in force at the time referred to by the
witness, and legally speaking such will could not have been probated or
recorded.
11. SOLIVIO VS. CA, 182 SCRA 119 (1990)
FACTS: Celedonia, maternal aunt of the deceased, wasdeclared as the sole
heir. 4 months later, Concordia,
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sister of the deceased’s father file a MFR claiming that
she too was an heir of the deceased. Instead ofappealing, Concordia sued
Celedonia for partition,recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
Thesuit was initiated while the probate proceedings were still pending.
Branch 26 (trial court) granted Concordia’s prayers.
ISSUE: Whether Branch 26 has jurisdiction to entertain the action for
partition pending the probate proceedings for settlement of estate
RULING: Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Courts; Jurisdiction; Trial
court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for partition and recovery of
properties belonging to the estate of a deceased person, while the probate
proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still pending in another
branch of the same court.—After a careful review of the records, we find
merit in the petitioner’s contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva’s action for partition
and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the
probate proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still pending in
Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission
and approval of the administratrix’s inventory and accounting, distributing
the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31,
Record) x x x In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing
and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did
we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, where
a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed
between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of her mother: “The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The
finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not
terminate the probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution
of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain
his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed. The
better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate.

or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through

an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge
which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed
and disposed of

Same; Same; Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem, publication of the

notice of the proceedings is constructive notice to the whole world.— The
probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place
of hearing of the petition is required to be published. Notice of the hearing
of Celedonia’s original petition was published in the “Visayan Tribune” on
April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977. Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended
petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of
the court, published in “Bagong Kasanag” The publication of the notice of
the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was
not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual,
as well as constructive notice of the same.

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