TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORP OF THE PHILS VS CSC

GR No. 182249 March 5, 2013

FACTS:
Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Financial Management Specialist IV
of TIDCORP, a GOCC created pursuant to PD No. 1080 as amended by RA 8494. His appointment was
included in TIDCORP’s Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) but not in the Index of Occupational
Service contrary to CSC MC No. 40 series of 1998, as amended by CSC MC No.15 s 1999, hence, it was
disallowed. The MC provides that the position title indicated in the appointment should conform with the
Position Allocation List and found in the Index of Occupational Service.
Citing its exemption from CSC rules pursuant to Sec.7, RA 8494, TIDCORP appealed the
invalidation of the appointment to the CSC-NCR and then to the CSC-CO which ruled for the denial of
appointment. TIDCORP also appealed to the CA which upheld the ruling of CSC-CO.
CSC argued that (1) TIDCORP must conform to the CSC MC, (2) TIDCORP has the duty to
endeavour to make system to conform as closely as possible to the principles and modes provided in RA
6758 as provided in Sec. 7, RA 8494 (TIDCORP’s Charter), and (3) the Administrative Code empowers
CSC to formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation of
position, maintenance and implementation of position classification and compensation.
On the other hand, TIDCORP argues that (1) Sec 7 RA 8494 exempts it from laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualifications and thus is not duty bound to
comply with civil service rules on compensation and classification, (2) that RA 8494 is a special law and
should prevail over RA 6758, and (3) that CSC previously allowed the appointment of Mayor to the same
position.

CASE:
They filed a petition for certiorari with CA asserting that the CSC-CO committed grave abuse of
discretion.The petition was denied noting that it was an improper recourse. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not De Guzman’s appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV in TIDCORP
is valid?

HELD:
YES. The Constitution, as evidence by the ConCom deliberations, grants CSC the rule-making
power, but such grant is subsumed under its designation as the government’s central personnel agency in
Const Art 9-B Sec 3. The CSC’s rule-making power is an aspect of its independence as a constitutional
commission.
CSC’s rule-making power was spelled out in concrete term in Sec.12 Book 5, Title 1-A, which
empowered CSC to implement the civil service law and other pertinent laws, and to promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for the civil service.
However, the laws that CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. The
rules that CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and
implement. The phrase “as closely as possible” allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA 6758 but it should
still try to be closely with its principles and modes. Hence, in the instant case, the CSC shall still enforce
the position classifications at TIDCORP, but must do this under the terms that TDICORO has been
established. The rules that CSC formulates should consider TIDCORP’s charter in addition to other civil
service laws. Consequently, CSC should have given due course to De Gusman’s appointment.

DOCTRINE:
The rules that CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with the law it seeks to
apply and implement.
 YAP VS LAGTAPON
GR No. 196347 January 13, 2017

FACTS:
Respondent Lagtapon instituted a civil suit against petitioner Yap for a sum of money with the
RTC of Negros Occidental. Summons were issued to Yap, but as per return of service of summons
prepared by the process server in the person of Ray Precioso, the petitioner refused to acknowledge
receipt thereof. No answer was filed and so the respondent filed motion to declare petitioner as default.
Motion was granted, and the respondent was given the right to present her evidence ex-parte. The court
rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and issued a Notice of Sale on execution, setting the auction
of the petitioner’s property. Joey Dela Paz, to whom the property was mortgaged by the petitioner, found
out and informed Yap that the annotated title of the said property is in a Notice of Embargo.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Annulment with the CA, assailing the RTC Decision on the ground
that Summons was not validly served on her. Thus prevented the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over
her person. Respondent raised that the petitioner was constructively notified by the Notice of Execution
when it was annotated in the back of the TCT of her property. The CA denied the petition and upheld the
RTC decision. The MR was likewise denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the Petition for Annulment and
ruling that the RTC had validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Yap's person through service of
summons?

HELD:
NO. The Court finds no reason to arrive at a conclusion different from that reached by the CA. It
is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official
duties and functions. Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of Summons
on petitioner Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid. Correspondingly, the Return of Service of
Precioso as process server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out.
Hence, as far as the circumstances attendant to the service of Summons are concerned, the Court
has the right to rely on the factual representation of Precioso that service had indeed been made on
petitioner Yap in person. A contrary rule would reduce the Court to a mere fact-finding tribunal at the
expense of efficiency in the administration of justice, which, as mentioned earlier.
To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the evidence
against it must be clear and convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the
presumption stands deserving of faith and credit. In this case, the burden of proof to discharge such
presumption lay with petitioner Yap.

DOCTRINE:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is an aid to the effective and
unhampered administration of government functions. To this end our body of jurisprudence has been
consistent in requiring nothing short of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary to overthrow such
presumption.
 AMPIL VS OMBUDSMAN
GR No. 192685 July 31, 2013

FACTS:
In 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a
Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to be
known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the
heart of the Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of
construction and development of the condominium building. A year after, MICO and ASB entered into a
contract of sale of the land to ASB but ownership shall vest only upon full payment.
In 2000, ASB Group of companies were entered into a Rehabilitation Plan except the JPDA. Due to
financial difficulties, ASB failed to comply with the JPDA and the contract of sale. Hence, MICO
assumed the entire responsibility for the development and completion of the Malayan Tower.
On 2005, CCTs for the 38 units were issued to MICO instead of ASB. Ampil, the petitioner who
was an unsecured creditor, wrote a letter to Cheng and Yuchengko to transferr the CCTs to ASB as the
real owner, and as such, they should have been benefited if it would be included in the Asset Pool.
CASE:
But when the respondents paid no heed to these demands, Ampil charged respondents with
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s failure
to find probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of
the Revised Penal Code, and for their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019?

HELD:
YES. The court find grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition of
Ampil’s complaint.
That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" brooks no objection. The
Ombudsman’s conduct of preliminary investigation is both power and duty. Thus, the Ombudsman and
his Deputies, are constitutionalized as protectors of the people, who "shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government x x x, and shall, x x x
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof."
The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate the
Office of the Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and
fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution
of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and
misfeasances committed by public officers.
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to
determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. On this score, we have consistently hewed
to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers.
The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed
through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
 RIMANDO VS NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER
GR No. 198860 July 23, 2012

FACTS:
Naguilian Emission Testing Center has been conducting its business on a land which it claimed as
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain as certified by the DENR. The respondent filed an
application for the renewal of its business permit. The petitioner claims that since the land was owned by
the municipality, based on the tax declarations, it refused to issue permit unless the respondent executes a
contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable but with some
revisions, which however were not acceptable to the petitioner.
The respondent filed a petition for mandamus and damages at the RTC of Bauang against
Abraham Rimando, the Mayor of Naguilian at that time. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue business permit in favor of the respondent. The RTC denied
the petition for lack of merit ruling that (a) based on Tax declaration Naguilian was the owner of the land,
(b) the Municipality, being the owner of the land, has the right to require the signing of the contract, and
(c) the duty of the mayor to issue business permit is discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by
a mandamus writ.
The appeal with CA was dismissed. The petitioner filed MR but was denied, hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the duty of the mayor to issue business permit is discretionary in nature which
may not be enforced by a mandamus writ?

RULING:
YES. A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of
the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor
has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 stated that the exercise thereof
cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is
within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.
Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is
incompetent to compel the exercise of a mayor’s discretionary duty to issue business permits.

DOCTRINE:
Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

YENKO AND ESTRADA VS GUNGON

GR No. 165450 August 13, 2009

FACTS:
Raul Nestor C. Gungon, holder of professional career service eligibility, was appointed as Local
Assessment Operations Officer III in the Assessor's Office of the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Laterr on, San Juan Municipal Administrator Francisco F. Yenko issued a Memo temporarily reassigning
Gungon to the Public Order and Safety Office (POSO) wwho was later on rewuired to report as Duty
Agent, whose responsibility was "to conduct inspections within the municipal compound, apprehend any
suspicious characters roaming within the vicinity of the municipal hall and compound," and setting his
tour of duty at 12:01 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. from Monday to Friday.
Gungon wrote a letter addressed to Aguilar and to Yenko and protested his reassignment for being
violative of the Administrative Code of 1987, which prohibits reassignment that results in reduction in
rank, status or salary of an employee, that it was arbitrary, unwarranted and illegal and it violated his
constitutional right to security of tenure. Gungon requested the recall of the Memorandum dated January
7, 1998 and his reinstatement to his position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III.
Upon returning for work after his sick leave, he reported back to his office at the Municipal
Assessor's Office but then, he was informed that his action was a violation of Civil Service Rules which
might constitute a ground for dismissal from the service, and then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada
informed Gungon that he was "considered dropped from the rolls because of his absence without official
leave.
CASE:
Gungon appealed to the CSC alleging for abuse of authority amounting to oppression and a
violation of the CS Law and that Estrada’s act of dropping him from the rolls is illegal and void. It was
dismissed. The MR was likewise denied. Then he filed a Petition for review of the CSC resolutions with
the CA who ruled in favor of him except for hid plea for reinstatement on the ground that Gungon was
paid his terminal leave benefits. Upon MR, he was reinstated. Both parties filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in subjecting his reinstatement to the discretion of the Municipal
Government of San Juan?

HELD:
YES. The basis is misplaced, because what the provision means is that the separation of an
employee from government service through any of the modes enumerated in the Memorandum Circular,
which includes unauthorized absences, shall be without prejudice to his reappointment in the government
service at the discretion of the appointing authority and subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
Hence, an employee who is validly dismissed due to unauthorized absences may still be reappointed in
the government service, but the reappointment is at the discretion of the appointing authority and subject
to Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
In this case, Gungon was not validly dismissed from the service. His reassignment to the POSO, which
involved a reduction in rank and status, was void for being violative of Executive Order No. 292 and the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Hence, Gungon could not have incurred absences in the
office where he was reassigned since the reassignment was void. Consequently, his dismissal for
unauthorized absences in the office where he was reassigned was not valid. Therefore, Memorandum
Circular No. 12, series of 1994, does not apply in the case of Gungon.
In fine, Gungon is entitled to reinstatement, without qualification, for having been illegally
dismissed. A government official or employee reinstated for having been illegally dismissed is considered
as not having left his office. His position does not become vacant and any new appointment made in order
to replace him is null and void ab initio.

The Court cannot subscribe to the assertion of Municipal Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada
that mere application for terminal leave or the commutation of leave credits ended Gungon's employment
because an application for terminal leave and receipt of terminal leave benefits are not legal causes for the
separation or dismissal of an employee from the service.
 It is settled that a government official or employee who had been illegally dismissed and whose
reinstatement was later ordered is considered as not having left his office, so he is entitled to all the rights
and privileges that should accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held.40 Thus, Gungon is entitled to
payment of back salaries equivalent to a maximum period of five years.

DOCTRINE:
A government official or employee reinstated for having been illegally dismissed is considered as
not having left his office. His position does not become vacant and any new appointment made in order to
replace him is null and void ab initio.