Grand Union Supermarket et al., v. Jose J.

Espino, Jr., et al., (1979)

G.R. No. L-48250 December 28, 1979

Lessons Applicable: Public humiliation (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
Art. 26,Art. 2214, New Civil Code

FACTS:

 Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble
Philippines, Inc, together with his wife and two daughters went to shop
at South Supermarket in Makati
 Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file which he needed for his hobby, he picked
it up and held it fearing it might get lost because of its tiny size
 While shopping, they saw the maid of Jose's aunt so as he talked, he placed
the rat tail in his breast pocket partly exposed
 At the check-out counter, he paid for their purchases worth P77 but forgot
to pay the file
 As he was exiting the supermarket, he was approached by Guard Ebreo
regarding the file in his pocket. He quickly apologized saying "I'm Sorry"
and he turned towards the cashier to pay. But, he was stopped and instead
was brought to the rear of the supermarket when he was asked to fill out
an Incident Report labeling him as "Shoplifter"
 His wife joined him since he was taking so long and they were brought to
the first checkout counter where Ms. Nelia Santos-Fandino's desk was. She
made a remark:"Ano, nakaw na naman ito". Jose told Ms. Fandino that he
was going to pay for the file because he needed it but she replied "That is
all they say, the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say...
They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them."
 Jose objected stating he is a regular customer of the supermarket
 He gave P5 to pay for the P3.85 cost of the file but Ms. Fandino said the P5
was his fine which will be rewarded to the guard. People were staring at
them. He took the file and paid the file at the nearest checkout counter
with P50 and got out as fast as they could. His first impulse was to go back
to the supermarket that night to throw rocks at its glass windows. But
 reason prevailed over passion and he thought that justice should take its
due course.
 He filed against Grand Union Supermarket et al. founded on Article 21 in
relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prays for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney s fees and 'expenses of litigation, costs of the
suit and the return of the P5 fine
 CFI: dismissed
 CA: reversed and granted damages of P75,000 by way of moral damages,
P25,000 as exemplary damages, and P5,000 as attorney's fee

ISSUE: W/N Grand Union Supermarket should be liable for public

humiliation founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code

HELD: YES. Grand Union Supermarket ordered to pay, jointly and severally moral
damages P5,000 and P2,000 as and for attorney's fees; and to return the P5 fine

 Jose did not intend to steal the file and that is act of picking up the file from
the open shelf was not criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for
on the contrary, he took the item with the intention of buying and paying
for it
 personal circumstances:
 graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P. Class 1950, employed
as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate
manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein;
honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a
Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six
months; member of the Philippine veterans Legion; author of
articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines
Free Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No.
3713; son of the late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister,
Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy
Washington
 Jose was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident
 Fine branding him as a thief which was not right nor justified
 the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him,
imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence
and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused
him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners
liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code
  It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass
and degrade the dignity of a person
 Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code)
 His forgetfullness led to his embarassment and humiliation thereby causing
him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. His act of
omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such
contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that
private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that
many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing
interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence
in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers,
hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management
to witness private respondent's predicament.
 Grand Union Supermarket acted in good faith in trying to protect and
recover their property, a right which the law accords to them. - eliminate
the grant of exemplary damages

119 Phil. 232

PAREDES, J.:
Enrique J.L. Ruiz and Jose V. Herrera from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
Civil Case No. 26601, dated February 25, 1959, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.

On September 11, 1950, a contract was executed between the defendant Allied Technologists Inc.,
(corporation, for short), and the Republic of the Philippines, for the construction of the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Ruiz and Herrera were stockholders and officers of the corporation. The
construction of the hospital was terminated in 1955. On August 20, 1954, and June 20, 1955, Civil Case
Nos. 2S778 and 26601, respectively, were filed by same plaintiffs herein, making as parties-defendants
in both cases, the same defendants herein, the Secretary of National Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez
(Engineer), the Finance Officer, and the Auditor of the Dept. of National Defense, Pablo D. Panlilio
and Allied Technologists, Inc. Civil Case No. 23778 was dismissed by the CFI on October 12, 1954 and
the dismissal was affirmed by this Court on July 7, 1955, in G.R. No. L-8638. Civil Case No. 26601
was also dismissed on September 13, 1955. On appeal, this Court reversed the order of dismissal, under
the impression that the real controversy was confined merely between defendant Panlilio and plaintiffs
Ruiz and Herrera over the 15 percent of the contract price, which was retained by the Department of
National Defense. The retention of the 15 percent of the contract price in the sum of P34,740.000 was
made to answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in the course of the construction. The last case,
however, was remanded to the court of origin, for further proceedings. Panlilio and the corporation
filed their amended answers, stating that the amount retained by the Department of National Defense
was already paid to defendant corporation, as sought for by the plaintiffs in their complaint. In view of
this development, the trial court invited the parties to a conference, in which the plaintiffs indicated
their conformity, to the dismissal of the complaint with respect to the retention of the 15% of the
contract price; but insisted upon the hearing of the second question, which sought the declaration and
recognition of plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, as two of the three architects of the hospital. The trial court,
nevertheless, dismissed the complaint, for being already academic and moot. Hence, this appeal by
plaintiffs-appellants, who alleged in their lone assignment of error that "the lower court grievously
erred in ordering the dismissal of the case, with costs against the plaintiffs."
Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the only ground relied upon by the lower court to dismissing the case,
without any trial, is the allegation contained in pars. 4 and (e) of the answers of the appellees Panlilio
and Allied Technologists, Inc., respectively, that the amount retained by the Department of National
Defense had already been paid; that except for this bare allegation of the appellees, no evidence was
adduced to prove the truth of the same; that even assuming for the sake of argument, that the same is
true, nevertheless the first part of the first cause of action still remains, for which they had insisted upon
a hearing in order to establish their right to be recognized as two of the three architects of the hospital;
that because the pleadings do not show any ground which might legally justify the action taken by the
lower court, the latter should not have ordered the dismissal of the entire case but should have ordered
only the striking out of the moot portion of appellants' first cause of action, citing Pacal vs. Ramos, 81
Phil. 30, 33; 27 C. J.S. 209-210; Bush vs. Murray 205 N.Y.S. 21, 26, 209 App. Div. 563; Bearden vs.
Longino, 190 S.E. 12, 183, Ga. 819). Appellants further argue in their brief that they base their cause of
action on article 21, New Civil Code.
The appeal has no merit. The order appealed from, states
"Considering tie manifestation of counsel for plaintffs that the latter would insist on the
hearing of the above entitled case for the purpose of establishing their right to be
recognized as the architects of the Veterans Hospital together with defendant Pablo D.
Panlllio, and it appearing that plaintiffs' Amended Complaint with Injunction prays, among
others, 'That this Hon. Court order defendants Secretary of National Defense, Col. Nicolas
Jimenez, and the Finance Officer and Auditor of the Department of National Defense to pay
the Allied Technologists, Inc. the balance unpaid by virtue of the contract executed on Sept.
11, 1950 (Annex 'C' hereof) for services rendered under Title and to be rendered under Title
II of said contract; that paragraph 4 of defendant Pablo Panlilio's Amended Answer to said
complaint alleges 'That whatever amounts were retained by the Dept, of National Defense
on the contract price which retention was authorized by the contract was paid by the Dept.
of National Defense to the Allied Technologists, Inc., as sought by the plaintiffs; that
paragraph (e) of the answer to the amended complaint of defendant Allied Technologists,
Inc., also alleges 'That, whatever amounts were retained by the Department of National
Defense, per the stipulations contained in the contract, have already been paid by the said
Department of National Defense to the Allied Technologists, Inc. and, therefore, the present
action seeking to compel the aforementioned Department of National Defense to pay to
defendant Allied Technologists, Inc. the amounts retained by the Department of National
Defense is academic, groundless, unfounded and malicious'; that the said allegations of the
separate answers of defendants Pablo, Panlilio and Allied Technologists, Inc., are not and
can not be denied by plaintiffs, and that it is this Court's understanding that defendant has
no objection to the dismissal of this case it Is ordered that this case be, as it is hereby
DISMISSED, with costs against plaintiffs."

A cursory reading of pars. 18 and 19 of the amended complaint with injunction and prayers (1) and (2)
thereof, reveals that appellants' first cause of action is composed of two parts, as follows:
(a) A judicial declaration or recognition that appellants .Ruiz and Herrera, together with
appellee Panlilio, were the architects of the Veterans Hospital; and

(b) An injunction restraining the appellee government officials from paying their co-
appellee Panlilio the sum retained by the former, as per stipulation contained in the contract
for the construction of the hospital because "they will not only be deprived of the monetary
value of the services legally due them, but that their professional prestige and standing will
be seriously impaired".

As appellants admitted, they no longer consider the Secretary and other officials of the Department of
National Defense, as parties-defendants in the ease, said officials can no longer be compelled to
recognize the appellants, Ruiz and Herrera, as co-architects with appellee Panlilio of the Veterans
Hospital. And, as the amount retained by the Department on the contract price, which retention was
authorized by the contract, was, as sought by the appellants, already paid to the Allied Technologists,
Inc., there is nothing more for the trial court to decide, even without first ruling on the special defenses
of appellees Panlilio and the corporation.
Moreover, by discarding the Secretary and other officials of the Department of National Defense, as
parties-defendants, appellants could hot expect the trial court to order them to recognize and declare
appellants as co-architects in the construction of the hospital. And this must be so, because the
construction, agreement expressly provides that the architect being contracted by the Government was
appellee Pablo Panlilio. The said agreement states that the same was entered into by the government,
party of the first part and "Allied Technologists, Inc. x x and Mr. Pablo D. Panlilio, architect,
hereinafter called the party of the second part" and "The Allied Technologists, Inc. for rendering
engineering' services and Mr. Pablo D. Panlilio, architect, for rendering architect services". And the
contract was signed for the Government by "Ramon Magsaysay, Secretary of National Defense (party
of the first part)," and "Allied Technologists, Inc. as to By Enrique J. L. Ruiz, President, Contractor,
Pablo D. Panlilio, Architect."
Appellants maintain that their claim for recognition is divisible and separable from their allegations
regarding the non-payment by the government of a portion of the architectural fees; thereby concluding
that what the lower court should have done, should have been merely to order the striking out of the
moot, portion of appellants cause of action, and should have proceeded with .hearing their claim for
recognition. But the allegations in pars. 18 and 19 of the amended complaint, show otherwise. There is
an indivisible and single cause of action which is primarily to prevent payment exclusively to
defendant Panlilio of the amount of P34,740.00, which said appellants contend should be paid to
appellee. Allied Technologists, Inc.; the matter of recognizing them together with Pablo Panlilio as
architects of the hospital, being merely incidental thereto. The case of Pacal vs. Ramos, 81 Phil. 30,
cited by appellants is not applicable. In this case, the grounds for quo warrant are separable from the
grounds for election irregularities which are distinct and separate causes of action, entitling the
petitioner to separate and unrelated reliefs. These two grounds were alleged under separate paragraphs
and they were two independent actions improperly joined in one proceeding. In the case at bar, in one
paragraph, (par. 19 of the amended complaint), as first cause of action, the claim for recognition is
inseparably linked with their allegations regarding alleged threatened, payment of the P34,740.00 to
Panlilio alone, because "they will not only be deprived of the monetary value of the services legally
due them, but that their professional prestige and standing will be seriously impaired". When the very
defendant Allied Technologists, Inc. itself asserted in its answer to the amended complaint, that the
amount was paid to it, an assertion which was not at all denied, plaintiffs-appellants' cause of action
under said par. 19 dissipated entirely.
There is a veiled insinuation that appellants' thesis would fall under the provisions of the Rules on
declaratory relief, because appellants wanted merely a declaration of their rights in a contract in which
they were interested. The trial court, however, was correct in refusing to make such declaration,
because it was not necessary and proper under the circumstances (Sec. 6, Rule 66). Appellants were not
parties to the construction agreement. The sole object of the appeal is only to secure for them a
recognition, that they were allegedly the co-architects of Panlilio, in the construction of the hospital, so
as to enhance their professional prestige and not to impair their standing. If this is the goal of
appellants, a judicial declaration to that effect would seem unnecessary. Let us ponder over the thought
that a brilliant professional enjoys the respect and esteem of his fellowmen, even without any court
declaration of such fact, and that an incompetent one may summon all the tribunals in the world, to
proclaim his genius in vain.
But appellants invoke Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states
"Any person who wilfully cause loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages."

contending that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any indeterminate right or
property, but also to honor or credit (I Tolentino Civ. Code, p. 67). It may be added, however, that this
article also envisions a. situation where a person has a legal right, and such right is violated by another
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; it presupposes losses or injuries,
material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show
that damages were ever asked or alleged in connection with this case, predicted upon the article
aforecited. And under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, one cannot plausibly sustain
the contention that the failure or refusal to extend the recognition, was an act contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
In view hereof, the Order appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner vs. GEORGE G. BARRIOS
AND OLGA THERESA CRUZ-BARRIOS, respondents
No. L-60859. December 27, 1982
Facts:
Spouses George and Olga Theresa Barrios filed a complaint against Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation for failure to deliver to them a cablegram admitting Olga for a rotating internship in Mercy
Hospital in New York, as a consequence, she was unable to signify her acceptance and the position was
given to someone else. The failure caused the respondents loss of earnings, serious anxiety, and
sleepless nights. RTC and CA held the company liable and awarded damages to the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not Globe Mackay should be held liable for the failure of the delivery of the cablegram.
Ruling:
Globe Mackay should be held liable, and should be corrected for public good since the company is a
quasi-public corporation with duties to the general public and is liable to any member of the public to
whom it owes a duty for damages proximately flowing from a violation of that duty.
In the case at bar, the company was grossly negligent in their duty, particularly considering that another
company was able to send an identically addressed cablegram to them. The ruling of the CA is affirmed
with modification of the damages granted which the court found to be excessive, to wit:
1. From US $5, 417 to US $2,703 in Philippine currency computed at the exchange rate on July 31,
1973, the date of the filing of the complaint;
2. Moral damages from P50, 000.00 to P5,000;
3. Exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P5,000.00;
4. Attorney’s fees from P10, 000. 00 to P8,000.00
University of the East vs Jader
TITLE: University of the East vs. Jader
CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7, 2000

FACTS:

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1st semester, he
failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete grade
remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on
February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees.
He took the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.

The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his
name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from work from April 20-
Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped
his review classes and was not able to take the bar exam.

Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UE’s negligence.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all
the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?

HELD:

SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latter’s actual
damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and
not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have been awarded
moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could
not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what CA held because it’s also
respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be
eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring
that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before
taking the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are
other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee
must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the
costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.
Valenzuela v. CA

ARTURO VALENZUELA and HOSPITALITA VALENZUELA v. CA, BIENVENIDO

ARAGON, ROBERT PARNELL, CARLOS CATOLICO and THE PHILIPPINE
AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
1990 / Gutierrez, Jr.

FACTS
Arturo Valenzuela [Valenzuela] is a general agent of Philippine American General
Insurance Company [Philamgen] since 1965. As such, he was authorized to solicit
and sell in behalf of Philamgen all kinds of non-life insurance, and in consideration
of services rendered was entitled to receive the full agent's commission of 32.5%
from Philamgen. From 1973 to 1975, Valenzuela solicited marine insurance from
Delta Motors. However, Valenzuela did not receive his full commission.
In 1977, Philamgen started to become interested in and expressed its intent
to share in the commission due Valenzuela on a 50-50 basis, but he refused. In
1978, Philamgen and its President [Aragon] insisted on the sharing of the
commission with Valenzuela, but he firmly reiterated his objection to the
proposals. Because of the refusal of Valenzuela, Philamgen and its officers took
drastic action. They reversed the commission due him by not crediting in his
account the commission earned from the Delta Motors insurance, placed agency
transactions on a cash and carry basis, threatened the cancellation of policies
issued by his agency, and started to leak out news that Valenzuela has a
substantial account with Philamgen. This resulted in the decline of his business as
insurance agent. Philamgen terminated the General Agency Agreement of
Valenzuela in December 1978.
Valenzuela filed a complaint against Philamgen, and the RTC ruled in his
favor, as his termination was found to be unjustified. However, the CA ruled in
favor of Philamgen, as CA ordered Valenzuela to pay Philamgen the amount
corresponding to the unpaid and uncollected premiums.

ISSUE & HOLDING

WON Valenzuela should be held liable for unpaid and uncollected premiums. NO.

RATIO
Under Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the remedy for the non-
payment of premiums is to put an end to and render the insurance policy
not binding.

Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance v. Woodworks (1979)

  The non-payment of premium does not merely suspend but puts an end to
an insurance contract since the time of the payment is peculiarly of the
essence of the contract.
 An insurer cannot treat a contract as valid for the purpose of collecting
premiums and invalid for the purpose of indemnity. (Citing Insurance Law
and Practice by John Alan Appleman)
 The foregoing findings are buttressed by Section 776 of the Insurance Code
(PD 612), which now provides that no contract of insurance by an insurance
company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been
paid, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary

Arce v. The Capital Insurance and Surety

 Unless premium is paid, an insurance contract does not take effect.

 Delgado (Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Delgado) was decided in the
light of the Insurance Act before Sec. 72 was amended by the underscored
portion. Prior to the Amendment, an insurance contract was effective even if
the premium had not been paid so that an insurer was obligated to pay
indemnity in case of loss and correlatively he had also the right to sue for
payment of the premium. But the amendment to Sec. 72 has radically
changed the legal regime in that unless the premium is paid there is no
insurance.

Since the premiums have not been paid, the policies issued have lapsed.
The insurance coverage did not go into effect or did not continue and the
obligation of Philamgen as insurer ceased. Hence, for Philamgen which had
no more liability under the lapsed and inexistent policies to demand, much less
sue Valenzuela for the unpaid premiums would be the height of injustice and
unfair dealing. In this instance, with the lapsing of the policies through the
nonpayment of premiums by the insured there were no more insurance contracts
to speak of.
De Jesus vs Syquia
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber
shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia
got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he
even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to
the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to
eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth
and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where
they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant
suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of
the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence,
the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are
sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the
writing shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the
status”.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia
Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to
the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They
likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension
 BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went away and Beatriz
did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral damages.
Velez contended that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for breach of promise to
marry. However, the court did not find this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there
is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public humiliation.
ISSUE:
Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages?
RULING:
The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable
wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations,
wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the
previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she
suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant
acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push
through.
GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents
G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an
Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette,
and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was said to promise
marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that
the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of
the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment
experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent.
However, the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the
respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in
accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner.
RULING:
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a
good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the
latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since
she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that his promise to marry was true,
and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the
father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the
sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused by the petitioner against the respondents,
which qualified the claims of the respondent against the petitioner.
Tanjanco v. CA
Facts:
Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he promised her marriage, she consented to his pleas
for carnal knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her condition, she had to resign
from her work. Because she was unable to support herself and
the baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry her, she instituted an action for damages, compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral and
exemplary damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art. 21.

Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry. It
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained
intimate sexual relations with the defendant, and such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly here there is voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces for a year.
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

FACTS
Alfonso Pe works as an agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factor. He is an adopted son of a
Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of the father of Lolita Pe.

Lolita Pe is 24 year-old woman and unmarried to whom Alfonso Pe had an affair with. Prior to their
affair, Alfonso had become close with Lolita as he frequented the house of the latter as Lolita wanted to
teach him on how to pray the rosary. Consequently, the two fell in love.

Rumors about their love affair reached the parents of Lolita. Since then, Alfonso was barred from
entering their house. In fact, Lolita's parents filed deportation proceedings against him as he is a
Chinese citizen. Their relationship continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April of 1957, Lolita stayed with her siblings at their residence. Lolita disappeared from
the house. A note was found inside Lolita's aparador. Lolita's disappearnce was reported to the police
authorities and the NBI but is nowhere to be found.

After plaintiffs argued that the defendant, being a married man entered into a relationship with Lolita
caused injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy, the trial court
considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.

ISSUE
Whether the defendant cause plaintiffs injury under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

RULING
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's finding. It said that Alfonso through an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced Lolita to the extent of making her fall in love with him. The Court
reiterated that no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. It said that the wrong he has caused her and her family is
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Thus, he has committed an injury to
Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the ruling is as follows—

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations.
Costs against appellee.
Tenchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before
Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple
and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker
and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college
student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/
marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to
Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu
while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued
by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and
has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the
Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in
foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough
grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and
Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to
recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the
desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
 ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO,
respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her husband before their marriage.
Geluz performed an abortion on Nita Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage, she again became pregnant
and since she was employed in the Commission on Elections, the pregnancy was inconvenient and she
had herself aborted again by Geluz. In less than two years, she again became pregnant and had her two-
month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum of fifty pesos. Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his
election and was aware and did not give consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the award of
damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals predicated the award of damages in the sum of three
thousand pesos for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Lazo could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not
endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action
could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The damages which the parents of
an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the fetus, on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations. In this case, however, the appellee was indifferent to the
previous abortions of his wife, clearly indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental hopes and expectations.

The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.