ART.III, Section 4 Case Digest cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration.
er prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, Feb.18,2014
FACTS: The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on the
constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The Petitioners argued
that even though the Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21
separate sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of
expression and access to information.
In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary restraining order against the
government to halt enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.
Does Sec.4(b)3 of the Cybercrime Law Violate the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered
from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that
could be published?
RULING: NO. This is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently,
the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and
disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of
the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press,
whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance
is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.
Does Sec.4(c)1 of the Cybercrime Law violate the freedom of expression since private communications of
sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the
penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done “for favor” in cyberspace?
RULING: NO. The deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act give a proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize
a "private showing x x x between and among two private persons x x x although that may be a form of
obscenity to some." The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of
"engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish
prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity.
The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only
to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.
Does Sec.4(c)3 of the Cybercrime Law which penalizes spam and unsolicited advertisements violate the freedom of
expression?
RULING:YES. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails,
even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is
not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression
but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
Does Sec.4(a)3 and Sec. 5 of the Cybercrime Law suffer from overbreadth for creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on protected expression?
RULING: No. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the
area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes
what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to
others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no
connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and
private documents. The chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes
the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional
rights.
Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8,2014
Does the RH Law violate the right to free speech for compelling a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods?
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.Challengers from various sectors of
society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on various grounds.
RULING: No. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods
to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those
who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept
the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
Babe
If it is not a speech regulating statute, can the RH law be “facially challenged”?
RULING :
YES.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is
one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right
of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit
with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
GMA Network vs. Comelec, G.R. No.205357, Sept.2,2014
Facts:
"The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a 'fundamental postulate
of constitutional law.'" In a nutshell, the present petitions may be seen as in search of the answer to the
question - how does the Charter of a republican and democratic State achieve a viable and acceptable
balance between liberty, without which, government becomes an unbearable tyrant, and authority,
without which, society becomes an intolerable and dangerous arrangement?
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political
parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast
time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.
Issue:
Does Sec 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits go against the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?
Ruling:
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the "aggregate-based" airtime limits
unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said. And
where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for such dissemination
becomes critical. This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and
to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with
substantially reasonable means by which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Political
speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. "[F]reedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy." Accordingly, the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state
interest.
Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, Jan.21,2015
FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA
RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while
those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
Does the Comelec order for the removal of the Team Buhay/Team Patay tarpaulin violate freedom of speech
and expression?
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection.The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was
not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
Embedded in the tarpaulin are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by
our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully,
persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but their
parishioner's actions will have very real secular consequences. What is involved in this case is the most
sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate
contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of
the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right
to suffrage. This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is
protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen
by petitioners deserves our protection.
1-UTAK vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206029, April.14,2015
Facts:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would implement Sec 9 of RA
9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions of the Resolution provide that the posting of any
election propaganda or materials during the campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles
(PUV) and within the premises of public transport terminals. 1-UTAK, a party-list organization, questioned
the prohibition as it impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals.
Issue:
Is Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to section 7(f)of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 which prohibits
the posting( of any election campaign or propaganda material, inter alia, in PUVs and public transport
terminals repugnant to the free speech clause?
Ruling:
Yes. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the
prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals to
express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince
others to agree with them.
Issue:
What is “captive-audience doctrine”? Is Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Comelec Resolution no. 9615
which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material, inter alia, in PUVs and public
transport terminals, justified under the “captive-audience doctrine”?
Ruling:
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to
shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. Such
selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree
of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
No. A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed
“captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the commuters are not forced
or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they
incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they
may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent, G.R. No. 211362, Feb.24,2015
Does administrative segregation in the Philippine Military Academy violate the freedom of speech and expression?
FACTS:
Cadet 1CL Cudia, a cadet of the Philippine Military Academy, was reported to the PMA Honor Committee for the
violation of the Honor Code resulting from the investigation of the Delinquency Report issued by his professor
due to his tardiness. Cudia was found lying as to the reason why he was late. He was subsequently recommended
for dismissal by Vice Admiral Abogado.
RULING :
NO. In Birdwell v. Schlesinger,the"administrative segregation" was held to be a reasonable exercise of military
discipline and could not be considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.
As to Cadet 1CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the same. The Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor
Code and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In such event,
the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG Holding Center. Similarly, in the U.S., the
purpose of "Boarders Ward" is to quarter those cadets who are undergoing separation actions. Permitted
to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered therein until final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was
opined that the segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary authority of
Academy officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by Army
authorities, 'orderly government requires us to tread lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard
for the power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad
confines of constitutional due process.'"
Rappler Inc. Vs. Comelec, G.R. No.222702, April 5,2016
FACTS: Petitioner Rappler, Inc. (petitioner) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Andres D.
Bautista (respondent), in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
because Bautista granted broadcast rights to the upcoming presidential and vice presidential debates only
to the nation's biggest commercial television companies and their chosen partners.
According to petitioner, instead of ensuring a wider distribution of the debate, the Comelec Chairman
granted exclusive broadcasting and livestreaming rights to hand-picked partners – to the detriment of all
other media outlets, including the government-owned PTV4.
Online news groups were excluded from the Memorandum Of Agreement in terms of coverage and live
video streaming rights – a MOA Rappler signed based on good faith assurances that access would be
granted.
Are part VI(C), par.19 and Part VI (D), par.20 of the MOA on the 2016 presidential and vice-presidential
debates discriminatory and violative of petitioner’s freedom of the press?
RULING: No. The MOA recognizes the public function of the debates and the need for the widest possible
dissemination of the debates. The MOA has not reserved or withheld the reproduction of the debates to
the public but has in fact expressly allowed the reproduction of the debates "subject to copyright
conditions."
The MOA recognizes the right of other mass media entities, not parties to the MOA, to reproduce the
debates subject only to the same copyright conditions. The freedom of the press to report and disseminate
the live audio of the debates, subject to compliance with Section 184. l (c) of the IPC, can no longer be
infringed or subject to prior restraint.
SWS & Pulse Asia vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 208062, April 7,2015
FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc., as well as
"other survey firms of similar circumstance" to submit to COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of
all surveys published including those of their "subscribers.” SWS and Pulse Asia are social research and public
polling firms. Among their activities is the conduct of pre-election surveys. SWS conducted a pre-election survey
on voters' preferences for senatorial candidates. Thereafter, it published its findings. Later on, Rep. Tiangco
wrote to the director of the COMELEC’s Law Department asking COMELEC to "compel [SWS] to either comply
with the directive in the Fair Election Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9[6]1[5] or be liable for the violation
thereof, an act constitutive of an election offense.
Does the Comelec Resolution No.9674, insofar as it requires the disclosure of the names of “subscribers” of
election surveys violate SWS & Pulse Asia’s freedom of speech?
RULING: Basically no. CR No. 9674 is non-violative it's just that, COMELEC exceeded its authority "creating an
election offense where there was none before" in considering as an election offense any violation of Resolution
No. 9674.The Court sustained the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or pay for
election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair
Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the constitutional
policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service[.]” Section 5.2(a)'s requirement of
disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners' free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription
against the impairment of contracts.
Roque vs. AFP Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 214986, Feb.15,2017
FACTS: The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed a disbarment case against Harry Roque, the lawyer of the
slain transgender Filipino Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude, in relation to the inappropriate actions he displayed during the
intrusion of Laude's family in restricted areas at the AFP headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City where
the alleged suspect Pemberton is detained. The AFP publicly announced that a disbarment complaint had been
filed against petitioner. Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section 18, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court and put to question his professional and personal reputation.
Did respondents’ public pronouncements violate the confidentiality rule on disbarment proceedings and constitute
contempt of our court or were they within their freedom of speech and expression?
RULING: No. Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep private and
confidential. The Press Statement's coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished report that
a complaint had been filed. Such an announcement does not, in and of itself, violate the confidentiality rule,
particularly considering that it did not discuss the disbarment complaint itself. The statements were official
statements made in the performance of respondents' official functions to address a matter of public
concern.

The Court will not freely infringe on the constitutional right to freedom of expression. It may interfere, on
occasion, for the proper administration of justice. However, the power of contempt should be balanced
with the right to freedom of expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on
public matters. Freedom of expression must always be protected to the fullest extent possible.