Investments_Cases_Donna

Espina v Zamora

FACTS:

The case at bar deals with the question of constitutionality of Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000
Republic Act 8762) which was signed by President Joseph Estrada on March 7, 2000.

Unlike its predecessor Republic Act 1180, which absolutely prohibits foreign nationals from engaging
in retail trade business in the Philippines, the questioned law allows the said foreign trade placing
them under 4 categories. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 as it is
a clear violation of Section 9, 19 and 20 of Article II of the Constitution. The petitioners stressed that
the presence of foreign nationals would result in alien control and monopoly of the retail trade.

On the other hand, the respondents contended that the petitioners have no legal standing to file the
petition. Aside from that, the Constitution mandates the mere regulation but not the prohibition of
foreign investments in the country.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. The Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 is not unconstitutional.

The Court emphasized that the petitioners indeed has no legal standing to file the petition as there is
no clear showing that the implementation of R.A. 8762 prejudices the petitioners or inflicts damage
on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Legal standing is one of the requisites necessary before
one could validly attack the constitutionality of a certain law. Legal standing implies that one must
have personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of
the passage of that law.

Also, Section 9, 19 and 20 of Article II are not self- executing by nature, thus, are not judicially
demandable. The said sections in Article II highlight the necessity of having a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs. However, the
objective of the provisions is to simply prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our
economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. With the
assailed provision, Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kind of retail business which
the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.

The Legislative acknowledges that indeed it is integral to primarily promote the welfare of Filipino
investors as mandated by the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is equally important that holistic economic
growth must be assured for the overall development of our country’s trade industry. This can be done
by allowing entry of foreign investors that will be allowed to engage in businesses regulated by the
provisions of R.A. 8762.

Southern Cross Cement v Philcemcor

Facts:
Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the laws enacted by
Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.[3] The SMA provides the structure and mechanics
for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and
producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Its principal
stockholders are Taiheiyo Cement Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly the largest
cement manufacturers in Japan.[5]

Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation[6] (Philcemcor) is an association of

domestic cement manufacturers. It has eighteen (18) members,[7] per Record. While Philcemcor
heralds itself to be an association of domestic cement manufacturers, it appears that considerable
equity holdings, if not controlling interests in at least twelve (12) of its member-corporations, were
acquired by the three largest cement manufacturers in the world, namely Financiere Lafarge S.A. of
France, Cemex S.A. de C.V. of Mexico, and Holcim Ltd. of Switzerland (formerly Holderbank Financiere
Glaris, Ltd., then Holderfin B.V.).

the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately
denying Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do
so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.

Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[11] seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the
Tariff Commissions Report. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision[13] penned by Court
of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion,[14] partially granted Philcemcors petition.

On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA
conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or
non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding
upon the DTI Secretary.

Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was
cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that
in light of the appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding
Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures.

The Court of Appeals had held that based on the foregoing premises, petitioner’s prayer to set aside
the findings of the Tariff Commission in its assailed Report dated March 13, 2002 is DENIED. On the
other hand, the assailed April 5, 2002 Decision of the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry is hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the case is REMANDED to the public respondent
Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry for a final decision in accordance with RA 8800 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Hence, the appeal.

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in light of the
appellate courts Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors
application for definitive safeguard measures.[41] He made a determination that, contrary to the
findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of
the import surges.[42] Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of
gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag
for three years on imported gray Portland Cement. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:

Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard measures is valid.

Held:

NO, due to the nature of this case, the Court found that the DTI should follow the regulations
prescribed by SMA. The Court held that he assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is DECLARED
NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003 is also
DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. No Costs.

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in light of the
appellate courts Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors
application for definitive safeguard measures.[41] He made a determination that, contrary to the
findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of
the import surges.[42] Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of
gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag
for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.

MARINE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MARCAPI)

vs. SEC. REYES

Facts

 Sometime in July, 1988, the Department of Transportation and Communications unveiled an

P880-million project, designed to "ensure safety of lives at sea (SOLAS) through the
establishment of efficient communication facilities between coast stations and ship stations
and the improvement of safety in navigational routes at sea. It was set out to provide, among
other things, ship-to- shore and shore-to-ship public corresponding, free of charge.
 On August 1, 1988, MARCAPI, thru Atty. F. Reyes Cabigao, appealed to then Secretary
Rainerio Reyes, arguing that the engagement of government to such business would be a
threat to the entire marine radio communications industry.
 On August 17, 1988, the Secretary, in his reply, denied the Atty. Cabigao’s request for the
reasons that unlike MARCAPI, public correspondence only ranks fourth in the order of
priority of services to be offered by the Maritime Coastal Communications System Project to
be implemented by 1989 and that the confidence of the public in the competence of private
firms when it comes to safety and monitoring has already been eroded.
 On February 20, 1989, the petitioners brought the instant suit, alleging, in essence, that
Secretary Rainerio Reyes had been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
 Secretary Oscar Orbos, who replaced Sec. Reyes, informed the Court that he is adopting the
action of Secretary Reyes.
 The petitioners cited the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution, which
states that the “State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages
private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.”

Issue

W/N the DOTC acted in violation of Art. II Sec 20 of the Constitution? NO.
  The duty of the State is preeminently "to serve . . . the people, and so also, to "promote a
just and dynamic social order . . . through policies that provide adequate social services. . . .
and an improved quality of life for all.
 There can hardly be any valid argument against providing for public corresponding, free of
charge. It is compatible with State aims to serve the people under the Constitution, and
certainly, amid these hard times, the State can do no less.
 The principle of laissez faire has long been denied validity in this jurisdiction. In 1969, the
Court promulgated Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v.
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and offices, where it was held that
“the government is called upon to optionally and only because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than in any private individual or group of individuals” and
that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing
social challenges of the times.
 The Constitution does not bar, however, the Government from undertaking its own
initiatives, especially in the domain of public service, and neither does it repudiate its
primacy as chief economic caretaker of the nation.

Held

PETITION IS DISMISSED.

The Court is not of the thinking that the act complained of is equivalent to a taking without just
compensation. However, the Court held that the DOTC, by providing for free public correspondence,
is not guilty of an uncompensated taking.

Santa Rosa Mining v Leido

FACTS:
Presidential Decree No.1214 was issued requiring holders of subsisting and valid
patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to
file a mining lease of application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree.
To protect its rights, petitioner Santa Rosa Mining Company files a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition confronting the said Decree as unconstitutional in that it
amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Subsequently, three
(3) days after, petitioner filed a mining lease application, but “under protest”, with a
reservation that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of
the Decree shall have been passed upon by the Court.

The respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition and
question the Decree as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional, even assuming arguendo
that petitioners was not bound to exhaust administrative remedies for its mining
claims to be valid in the outset. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State,
as owner, over the lands of the public domain, of which petitioner’s mining claims still
form a part. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art XIV of
the 1937 Constitution.