CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

University of Asia and the Pacific-Institute of Law

CASE DIGESTS

First Semester A.Y. 2019-2020

Jiemar Rilloraza Estillore
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University of Asia and the Pacific-Institute of Law

Buaya v. Polo
DOCTRINE RE: DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS OR TO QUASH
 General rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash being interlocutory in character,
cannot be questioned by certiorari and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order
is rendered, is subject to certain exceptions; Reason; The court has no jurisdiction over the
offense or it is not the court of proper venue.

DOCTRINE RE: AVERMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT

 It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried.

DOCTRINE RE: JURISDICTION OF COURT

 Jurisdiction of court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and not by the finding the court may make after the trial.

DOCTRINE RE: CONTINUING OR TRANSITORY OFFENSE

 The crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place
where any of the essential elements of the crime took place.

FACTS:

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People v. Kehaya
FACTS:
 A panel of 5 government prosecutors filed an information for murder in the CFI of Sulu against 12
accused in connection with the death of Meinhart Spielman in the sea nearest to the island of
Laminuan, Municipality of Siasi, Sulu. The RTC ruled that of the 12 accused, 2 were discharged
from the information to become state witness. Four (4) were not identified during the trial and
Ery Kehaya and Marvin Coghill were never arrested since they left the Philippines.
 Hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. The lower court rendered judgment
acquitting Marquez on the ground of reasonable doubt and finding Jubaol, Hara, and Lawing guilty.
 A year after the decision, Kehaya and Coghill filed with the court a motion to dismiss the
information against them alleging that on the basis of the evidence submitted by the prosecution,
the court completely absolved defendants Kehaya and Coghill.
 Because of the fact that they are in the US, the said accused opened their motion to dismiss the
information by stating that they are submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court for the
sole purpose of securing the dismissal of the information against them. The prosecution filed an
opposition.
 The lower court ruled that since the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Kehaya
and Coghill, it cannot render judgment or issue and order dismissing the case against them. In
spite of such, the lower court ruled that since the case will remain pending and would contribute
to the clogging of the court’s docket, it dismissed the case.

ISSUE:
 Did the court acquire the jurisdiction over the persons of Kehaya and Coghill ?

HELD:
 Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by either (a) warrant of arrest or (b) voluntary appearance.
The latter is accomplished either by pleading to the merits (filing motion to dismiss, appearing for
arraignment, or entering trial) or by filing bail. But how could accused-movants be considered to
have voluntarily appeared for the submission of their persons or bodies to the trial court when
their persons or bodies are beyond the territorial limits of the Court in which their supposed
appearance was made? To our mind, voluntary appearance is premised on the assumption that
the accused concerned are within Philippine territory, otherwise the so-called voluntary
appearance is an exercise of futility.
 Accused are half-in and half-out, for while protection is prayed from the Philippine court, yet in the
same breath they refuse to place themselves under the physical control of the said court by
remaining in the US where their arrest can never be effected in the event their motion to dismiss
is denied and the murder case against them ordered to proceed.
 Jurisdiction over the persons or bodies of the accused is indispensable for the lower court to act
on their motion to dismiss. Where there is no principal, there is no accessory. Whatever was said
by the lower court with respect to accused Kehaya and Coghill in the discussion of the evidence is
merely incidental and never intended to prove their guilt or innocence considering there can be no
trial in absentia. The judgment of the court must be distinguished from its opinion.

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Colmenares v. Villar
DOCTRINE RE: HOW VENUE IS DETERMINED IN JURISDICTION
 The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information. To determine the correct venue, the vital point is the allegation in the complaint or
information of the situs of the offense charged. If the complaint or information alleges that the
crime was committed in the place where the court has jurisdiction, then the court has jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case.

DOCTRINE RE: CRIMINAL ACTIONS

 Under the Rules of Court, criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place. Where the illegal possession of firearms was committed in the town
where the court sits, the fact that the firearms were confiscated from the accused in another town
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.

FACTS:
 On December 22, 1966, Francisco Colmenares, was found in possession of two unlicensed firearms
in the municipality of La Castellana.
 The Chief of Police of Municipal Court of La Castellana, Negros Occidental filed a complaint against
Francisco Colmenares for illegal possession of firearms. The accused thereafter filed a motion to
quash the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 The complaint claimed that venue was improperly laid, because the firearms mentioned in the
complaint were taken from the possession of Francisco Colmenares in the municipality of La
Carlota, Negros Occidental, by the La Carlota policemen, and not in La Castellana where the
complaint was filed.

MTC RULING:
 The municipal court denied this motion.

CFI RULING:
 Francisco Colmerares then went to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental raising the same
issue of improper venue, and as prayed for in the petition, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by said court, restraining the Municipal Judge of La Castellana from proceeding with the
trial.
 Respondents Municipal Judge and Chief of Police of La Castellana contended that although the
alleged unlicensed firearms were taken from the custody of Francisco Colmenares by La Carlota
policemen such unlawful act of carrying unlicensed firearms started from La Castellana; that the La
Carlota policemen intercepted Francisco Colmenares and took the firearms from him only because
they were earlier requested, by telephone, by the policemen of La Castellana, then a pursuit of the
accused, who was fleeing in a taxicab to assist them in the apprehension of Francisco Colmenares.
 The Court of First Instance ordered the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. The accused
moved for reconsideration thereof and, when it was denied, he came to this Court an Appeal,
reiterating the argument that since the firearms specified in the complaint were found in and
removed from his custody in the municipality of La Carlota, the municipal court of La Castellana
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case for illegal possession of such arms. The case was
also denied.

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ISSUE:
 Was the filing of the case in the La Castellana municipal court proper?

HELD:
 YES. The filing of the case in the La Castellana municipal court is proper. To determine the correct
venue, the vital point is the allegation of the situs of the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that is satisfied in this case. The place where the said firearms were finally
confiscated and taken away from the accused is immaterial; it could not have added anything to
the nature of the unlawful act completed and consummated earlier. Thus, for purposes of the
proceeding instituted in the La Castellana municipal court, it is sufficient that, according to the
prosecution, the accused was in possession of the unlicensed firearms while he was in La
Castellana.

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People v. Mission
FACTS:
 On April 30, 1948, Julian Yaun was working as tenant in a parcel of land of the Eugenio Mission
situated in Comon, Medellin, Cebu. In the afternoon of said day, the Eugenio Mission and his wife
Isabel T. Mission went to the land where Julian was working in order to receive their share of the
corn crop.
 When the spouses Mission arrived there, Eugenio ordered the wife of Julian to call the latter. A son
of Julian carried the message. Julian came to the accused, carrying in his belt a scythe.
 When Eugenio saw Julian, he asked the latter why he was continuing working on the land when he
had been told to discontinue his work, and scolded him.
 Julian answered that he would not get out of the land unless he was paid the sum of P500 which
he had spent for its preparation. There was a heated argument between Eugenio and Julian, during
which Eugenio alighted from his horse, pulled his pistol, calibre .45, and pointed it at Julian, asking
him whether he wanted to attack him.
 Julian answered that he did not want to fight, for he respected Eugenio who was his padrino
(sponsor of his wedding). When Eugenio pointed his pistol at Julian, the Isabel tried to snatch away
the pistol from him, but did not succeed.
 Irked by the answer which Julian gave him, the Eugenio ordered Julian to throw away the scythe
which he had in his belt. Julian obeyed. Eugenio already calm, approached Julian and patted him
on the shoulder saying: "Thanks to God because you have not assaulted me, otherwise I would
have killed you." Then Eugenio told Julian to go the next day to Eugenio’s house to ask him for
pardon and at the same time warned him not to continue working for the land.
 The accused had resented the fact that Julian had not voted for the candidate for mayor
recommended by him, and for that reason had advised Julian on a former occasion that after having
gathered the pending crop, he should cease working on the land. Eugenio Mission was accused in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu for grave coercion.

CFI RULING:
 After trial, he was found guilty of light threats and sentenced to pay a fine of P25, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

CA RULING:
 Eugenio Mission appealed to the Court of Appeals. But inasmuch as in his brief, he raised the
question of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to try the case, the Court of
Appeals certified and forwarded the case to this Court for decision. Said question is raised in
the first alleged error, which reads as follows:
o "The trial court erred in assuming and exercising original jurisdiction of the case, because
under Republic Act No. 296 original jurisdiction to try cases of threats to take human life is
conferred upon justice of the peace and municipal courts."

ISSUE:
 Did the Court of First Instance have jurisdiction of the case?

HELD:
 YES. The accused herein was charged with grave coercion, which is a different crime from that of
threat to take human life, mentioned in section 87 of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948. It is unnecessary to say that the jurisdiction of the courts in criminal cases

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is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the findings the court
may make after the trial. The penalty for grave coercion is arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
P500 which is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The fact that the court below
after trial found the defendant guilty of light threats does not deprive it of its jurisdiction. The first
error assigned has, therefore, not been committed.

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JURISDICTION
Luciano v. Mariano
DOCTRINE RE: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
 A preliminary investigation is a practical device created by statute and by mandate of our Rules of
Court, principally for the purpose of preventing hasty, malicious and ill-advised prosecutions. When
category of offense is raised, a new investigation is needed.

DOCTRINE RE: SUSPENSION ORDER; ANTI-GRAFT LAW

 Hearing must be held on the validity of the information before suspension order may issue. The
Court, in requiring such pre-suspension hearing, held definitely that “a hearing on the validity of
the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and
far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elected public official, even before his conviction
and that public interest demands a speedy determination of the issues involved in the case.”

DOCTRINE RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER

 Show-cause order is no longer necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down
its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the
information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.

DOCTRINE RE: EXPEDITIOUS PRE-SUSPENSION HEARING

 No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him

FACTS:
 On 30 May 1969, or prior to his assumption of the mayorship, petitioner Jose C. Luciano, together
with Florentino S. Rolls, was himself charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Law before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in an information signed by then Provincial Fiscal
Benjamin H. Aquino.
 To forestall his suspension from public office, Luciano filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
prohibition to restrain the Provincial Fiscal from filing the information against him. Such criminal
information was filed without the respondent fiscal having conducted a preliminary investigation
and without giving the accused Jose C. Luciano notice and opportunity to be heard.
 Although dated 29 May 1969, it was actually transmitted to the Court of First Instance of Rizal only
on 30 May 1969, the very day when the respondent fiscal took his oath of office as judge of the
Rizal Court of First Instance.
 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but without prejudice to Jose C. Luciano’s filing with
the court a quo of an appropriate motion for the conducting of a preliminary investigation and for
the suspension in the meantime of criminal proceedings.
 When Jose C. Luciano filed with the lower court a motion to allow the holding of a preliminary
investigation of the case, this motion was denied pointing out that the information carried a
verified certification by the provincial fiscal that he conducted the required preliminary
investigation on the case.
 The Supreme Court ventured the opinion that there was nothing wrong in the new incumbent
Provincial Fiscal’s conducting a reinvestigation or review of the evidence in the hands of the

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prosecution. Thus, the he was given 30 days from receipt of the order within which to signify in
writing whether or not he deemed it necessary to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
 The incumbent Provincial Fiscal B. Jose Castillo manifested that no reinvestigation of the case could
be made without any petition to this effect. Jose C. Luciano then filed on a request for the fiscal to
conduct a preliminary investigation and/or reinvestigation. Because of these incidents, his
arraignment had to be postponed several times. Jose C. Luciano was arraigned and entered a plea
of not guilty to the charge. There-upon, the court set the trial of the case without prejudice to the
outcome of the reinvestigation.
 After the preliminary investigation, taking into consideration the aforesaid evidence previously
adduced together with the memoranda of the Police Commission and the petitioner, the case be
deemed submitted for resolution; the fiscal believed that there existed sufficient evidence to
establish prima facie the guilt of the accused.
 The court issued an order in Criminal Case No. 19346 suspending the accused Jose C. Luciano from
public office pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 3019. At 2:45 in the afternoon of that day, 15
December 1969, respondent Johnny Wilson, took an oath of office as Acting Mayor of Makati
before a judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
 Luciano instituted the present proceeding in Supreme Court, originally against Johnny Wilson (who
apparently did not press his intention to occupy the position of Acting Mayor) and the Provincial
Governor of Rizal only, which was given due course on the same day. Acting on petitioner’s prayer,
Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order against respondent Provincial Governor, to
prevent him from appointing respondent Wilson as Acting Mayor of Makati, Rizal, and the latter
from usurping and intruding into the office of petitioner as Acting Mayor.
 This Court’s resolution in said precursor case of Luciano vs. Wilson specified Luciano’s two grounds
for assailing the legality of the same respondent court’s “automatic suspension order of 15
December 1969” as follows: “(a) that he was denied his day in court when the respondent Judge
reached the conclusion that the information is valid, without affording him opportunity to be
heard; and (b) that the information does not charge an indictable offense under Republic Act 3019,
and that no preliminary investigation was conducted in accordance with law.

ISSUES:
 (First) Was there a proper preliminary investigation of the graft charge prior to the filing of the
information against petitioners?
 (Second) Were petitioners entitled to a new preliminary investigation?

HELD:
 (First) NO. Respondent court had reason to fault petitioners and their counsel for their imprudence
and “overconfidence” in “folding their arms” and apparently choosing not to exercise their rights
of confronting and cross-examining the complainant and witnesses against them and adducing
their own evidence, when respondent Castillo called the case for reinvestigation. But respondent
court’s factual conclusions that fiscal Castillo had indeed conducted a reinvestigation and reviewed
the evidence were far from accurate. The stenographic notes of all testimonial evidence given
before state prosecutor Barot during the hearings at the preliminary investigation of the original
charge for falsification had not yet been transcribed and could not therefore be reviewed. Upon
interpellation, Fiscal Castillo confirmed this fact, as well as the further fact that neither Fiscal
Aquino nor the stenographer had apprised him of the contents of said notes. Fiscal Castillo could
not therefore inform this Court of the factual and legal bases for the information filed by his
predecessor in office.

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 Legally, respondent court’s theory that under the same preliminary investigation for the crime of
falsification which was ordered dismissed by the investigating fiscal with the approval of then
provincial fiscal Aquino and fiscal Castillo as being “without any factual or legal basis”, that
petitioners could nevertheless be charged on the basis of the records with the graver crime of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the pendency of which under a valid
information carries mandatory suspension from office, has been rejected by this Court.
 (Second). YES. the Court finds that since the information for alleged violation of the Anti-graft Law
was filed without any previous notice to petitioners and due preliminary investigation thereof, and
despite the dismissal of the original charge for falsification as being “without any factual or legal
basis”, petitioners are entitled to a new preliminary investigation for the graft charge, with all the
rights to which they are entitled. Should respondent fiscal, after such preliminary investigation, find
sufficient evidence to establish prima facie the guilt of the accused and therefore maintain the
information for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as filed and so inform the lower court, then the
trial court must hold a hearing on the validity of the information and make an affirmative finding
of validity thereof, before it can issue the order of suspension from office of petitioner Luciano.

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Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE RE: PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
 Preventive suspension for an unreasonable length of time of an elective town mayor by the
Sandiganbayan constitutes an unconstitutional application of the Anti-Graft Act.

DOCTRINE RE: EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

 Indefinite preventive suspension of a public official violates the “equal protection clause” and
shortens his term of office.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Hernando C. Layno, Sr., is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
He was accused in an information filed by respondent Tanodbayan “of grave abuse of authority
and evident bad faith in the exercise of his official and/or administrative duties” for “knowing fully
well that he has no authority, he suspended and prohibited Vice-Mayor Bernardita Resus and three
Sangguniang Bayan members from participating and exercising their official functions” as such thus
causing them injury “consisting of the salaries due to said officials not [being] received by them.
 The information against petitioner was filed by respondent Tanodbayan with respondent
Sandiganbayan. He was charged with violating paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended. Petitioner was then arraigned on and he pleaded not guilty. However, there was earlier
submitted as far back as August, 1983 with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite. Notwithstanding petitioner’s opposition to such motion, respondent Sandiganbayan
suspended him on October 26, 1983.
 Accordingly, Sandiganbayan conducted hearings and received evidence of the prosecution. In a
resolution issued by Supreme Court, respondents were required to file an answer within ten days
from notice. That was done. There was on the whole admission that the facts were as alleged.
Respondents denied, however, that the law is as set forth in the petition. More specifically, it was
asserted that the order of the Sandiganban “suspending petitioner pendente lite does not violate
the latter’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent. he suspension is merely a precautionary
or preventive measure issued even before the case is tried on its merits, purposely to ensure the
fair and just trial of the case.”
 Before a decision could be rendered on the merits, there was an urgent motion to lift the order of
suspension. This Court is of the view that this petition need not be resolved by a ruling on the
validity of the provision on mandatory suspension. It suffices at this stage that this Court rules that
there is an unconstitutional application of the assailed provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

ISSUES:
 (First) Was there a denial of due process?
 (Second) Was there a denial of equal protection clause?

HELD:
 (First) YES. The enial of procedural due process apparent. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of
them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In
either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is
entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be
justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process

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question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had
been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of
suspension should be lifted.
 YES. Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is
therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein
enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: “In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.” It may be recalled
that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials.
The policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration.
In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the
safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.

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Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan

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