Formatted Digests

III.
NEGLIGENCE
A. CONCEPT
CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

Department Store, Counter fell Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
Jarco Marketing v. CA Accident & negligence Quasi-Delict
GR 129792 (December 21, 1999) 9 yr olds incapable of negligence
Parties:
Petitioners:
 Jarco Marketing Corporation: owner of Syvel's Department Store
 Kong, Tiope and Panelo: managers
 Defense: Zhieneth negligent, and so was her mother Criselda
Private respondents: Criselda and Conrado Aguilar: parents of 6 year old Zhienete (deceased) - Action for Damages
Short Summary:
While Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's, as accident happened. Zhieneth was pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter structure which
collapsed. Fourteen days later, Zhieneth died at the hospital, which was attributed to the injuries she sustained. Sps. Aguilar filed a complaint for damages against Jarco Marketing and the
managers. Petitioners, however, denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death of Zhieneth. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in their favor.
Held: the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence. The Court gave credency to the testimony of Gonzales, a former
employee of Jarco, who testified that while at the emergency room, he heard Zhieneth tell the doctor that she did not do anything, the counter just fell on her. He also testified that he
previously reported to the company that the counter was sturdy and unstable, but they Jarco only nailed the counter after the accident.
Doctrines:
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault
of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
 An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without
any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens."
 Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury." Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
The test in determining the existence of negligence: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
 Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen
years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law.
Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:
Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
 Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
 All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think
and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court
ZABALA 3D 2021
Applicability of Articles 1172- 1174

Diamond Ring turned to Earrings Action for Damages Breach of Contract
Sarmiento v. Sun-Cabrido Breach of Contract
GR L41258 (April 9, 2003) Damages: Actual and Moral
Parties:
Petitioners: Sarmiento: friend of Lao who asked her to find somebody to reset a pair of diamond earrings into two gold rings, alleges:
 the dismounting of the diamond from its original setting was part of the obligation assumed by the private respondents under the contract of service. Thus, they should be held liable
for damages arising from its breakage.
Private respondents: Sps Cabrido: owner of Dingding’s Jewelry Shop, contends:
 their agreement with the petitioner was for crafting two gold rings mounted with diamonds only and did not include the dismounting of the said diamonds from their original setting.
Santos (employee who broke the ring) not an employee
Short Summary:
Sarmiento, states that sometime in April 1994, a friend, Dra. Virginia Lao (Dra.Lao), requested her to find somebody to reset a pair of diamond earrings into two gold rings. Accordingly,
Sarmiento sent a certain Tita Payag (Payag) with the pair of earrings to Dingdings Jewelry Shop, owned and managed by Spouses Cabrido which accepted the job order for P400. Sun went
on to dismount the diamond from its original setting. Unsuccessful, she asked their goldsmith, Zenon Santos, to do it. Santos removed the diamond by twisting the setting with a pair of
pliers, breaking the gem. In the process. Sarmiento required Spouses Cabrido & Sun to replace the diamond with the same size and quality. When they refused, Sarmiento was forced to
buy a replacement in the amount of P30,000. Rose Cabrido (R. Cabrido), manager of Dingdings Jewelry Shop, denied having entered into any transaction with Payag whom she met only
after the latter came to the jewelry shop to seek compensation from Santos for the broken piece of jewelry. Santos denied being an employee of Dingdings Jewelry Shop.
Held: It is beyond doubt that Santos (employee) acted negligently in dismounting the diamond from its original setting. It appears to be the practice of the trade to use a miniature wire saw
in dismounting precious gems, such as diamonds, from their original settings. However, Santos employed a pair of pliers in clipping the original setting, thus resulting in breakage of the
diamond. The jewelry shop failed to perform its obligation with the ordinary diligence required by the circumstances. It should be pointed out that Marilou examined the diamond before
dismounting it from the original setting and found the same to be in order. Its subsequent breakage in the hands of Santos could only have been caused by his negligence in using the wrong
equipment. Res ipsa loquitur.
Moral Damages: Santos was a goldsmith for more than 40 years. Given his long experience in the trade, he should have known that using a pair of pliers instead of a miniature wire saw in
dismounting a precious stone like a diamond would have entailed an unnecessary risk of breakage. He went on with it anyway. Hence, respondent spouses are liable for P10,000 as moral
damages due to the gross negligence of their employee.
Doctrines:
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Corollarily, those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Moral damages may be awarded in a breach of contract only when there is proof that defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligation.
Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines: (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers
(4) Adultery or concubinage; and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
(6) Illegal search;
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution; applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
ZABALA 3D 2021
B. AS PROXIMATE CAUSE

Detonating Caps Action for Damages Not Liable
Taylor v. Manila Electric, 16 Phil 8 Attractive Nuisance; Diligence required of a Quasi-Delict
child; Proximate cause even if unlawful
Parties:
Petitioners: Taylor, minor who got injured in the face
Private respondents: MERALCO, owner of premises where the caps that exploded were found and taken by Taylor. Contention:
the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of
plaintiff on defendant's premises.
Short Summary:
Taylor and his friends wandered into Manila Electric’s power plant on a Sunday afternoon, and picked up detonating caps. They performed experiments on it, and cut it open then set fire on
it. It exploded, causing Taylor to lose an eye. His father on behalf of his minor son now comes before the trial court seeking damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Taylor, but the SC
reversed, finding no liability on Manila Electric’s part because the proximate cause of the injury suffered by Taylor is not Manila Electric’s negligent act of leaving the caps in their dumping
grounds, but Taylor’s cutting it up and lighting it up with a match stick. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a
match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a
cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to
take care of himself. He well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as
described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put
the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
Doctrines:
 (Essentially) Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance - one who maintains on his estate or premises an attractive nuisance without exercising due case to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
 While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free
from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be
determined in each case by the circumstances of the case.
 Fault or negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be the
result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown
that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Tire blow-out, Bus overturned, Torch, Bus Action for Damages Breach of Contract of Carriage
Bataclan v. Medina, 109 Phil 185 exploded resulting in death Breach of Contract of
Carriage
Parties:
Petitioners: Bataclan: passengers of Medina Bus
Private respondents: Mariano Medina: owner of bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, contention: proximate cause was the torch not the overturning of the bus
Short Summary:
While en route to Pasay, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a ditch. The bus overturned so gas leaked. Some passengers got stuck in the bus, while
others were able to get out. The four passengers who got stuck can be heard asking for help. After half an hour, 10 men came, one of them carrying a lighted torch fueled with petroleum.
They approached the bus and a fire immediately started burning the bus including the passengers trapped inside. The charred bodies were identified, one of them was Juan Bataclan.
SC held Medina liable for breach of contract of carriage

The case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was negligence
on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers,
and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus
overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity
at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns
and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and
the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and
directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Doctrines:
 'the proximate legal cause’ is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

ART. 1733, ART. 1755, ART. 1756
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Septic Tank, Davao City, Bidder and workers Action for Damages Not Liable
Fernando v. CA, 208 SCRA 714 found dead inside Quasi-delict
Parties:
Petitioners: Bertulano (bidder), with four other companions (employees), won bid for the re-emptying of a septic tank in Davao. Later found dead. Faults the city government of Davao for
failing to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded by
the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas
Respondent: Davao City

Short Summary:
SC held Davao NOT negligent.
The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of
emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception;
more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures
for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident
While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of
the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such
service. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their
personal necessities but have remained unscathed.
We also do not agree with the petitioner's submission that warning signs of noxious gas should have been put up in the toilet in addition to the signs of "MEN" and "WOMEN" already in place
in that area. Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. While
the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements.
We approve of the appellate court's ruling that "while one of the victims was invited to bid for said project, he did not win the bid, therefore, there is a total absence of contractual relations
between the victims and the City Government of Davao City that could give rise to any contractual obligation, much less, any liability on the part of Davao City."
Doctrines:
 The proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
 To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove
under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an
arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties,
there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident.
 Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering
into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
 When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do

Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender
age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. (not applicable)
ZABALA 3D 2021
Bolo, Tetanus, Remote, Sufficient intervening Criminal Complaint for Not Liable
Urbano v. IAC, 157 SCRA 1 cause Homicide
Parties: Petitioners: Urbano, hacked Javier with a bolo who later denied because of tetanus. Appeals his conviction for homicide, contending the proximate cause of the victim's death was
due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals.
Short Summary:
A quarrel between Urbano and Javier ensued because Javier opened an irrigation canal which flooded Urbano’s ricefield. Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo, injuring his hand and leg. The
parties settled their differences and Urbano just paid for Javier’s medical expenses. A few days after, Javier went back to work in his farm. 22 days after the incident, Javier was rushed to
the hospital. The next day, he died of tetanus. Thus, a criminal complaint was filed against Urbano.
SC acquitted. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause
of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime. The petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay
mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed.
Doctrines:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the
petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Girl fell into ditch, burnt from hot water coming Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
Bernal v. JV House and Tacloban Electric, from electric ice plant; contributory negligence Quasi-Delict
54 Phil 327
Parties:
Petitioners: Bernal and Enverso, parents of Purificacion (deceased)
Respondents: J.V. House: owner of Electric Ice Plant where hot water came)
Short Summary:
Purificacion attended a procession with her parents. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed
to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile appeared from the opposite direction
which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice
Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water, dead. Parents filed an action for damages against JV House
but trial court dismissed due to contributory negligence of parents.
SC held JV House liable. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was
nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running
and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result
in reduction of the damages.
Counsel for appellees point out that there is no satisfactory proof to establish the pecuniary loss. That is true. But in cases of this character the law presumes a loss because of the
impossibility of exact computation. There is not enough money in the entire world to compensate a mother for the death of her child.
Doctrines:
The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

carromata (kalesa); runaway horse; sufficient Action for Damages Not liable
Gabeto v. Araneta, 42 Phil 252 intervening cause Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Petitioners: Gabeto, widow of Gayetano (deceased)
Respondents: Araneta: stopped the kalesa Gayetano was riding to complain that he hailed it first
Short Summary:
Gayetano rode a carromata (kalesa) to go to a cockpit. When they started to move, Araneta stopped the carromata tom complain that he called the carromata first. The driver said he
didn’t see Araneta and went on his way. The driver pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to
the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to
get out, which he did, in order to find the bridle. The driver pulled the carromata to the side. However, it runaway, with Gayetano still inside. Gayetano fell and died.
the mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner stated would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano; because it is
admitted by the driver that he afterwards got out of the carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle. The evidence is furthermore convincing to the effect that, after the driver
alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed — same witnesses say several minutes — before the horse started on his career up the street.
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate
cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot
be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Loadstar Ford collision; emergency rule; Quasi-Delict Quasi-Delict, direct and primary
McKee v. IAC, 211 SCRA 517 doctrine of last clear chance Art 2180 (negligence of employee; truck driver)
Parties:
Private Respondents Tayag and Manalo – owners of Loadstar, an International cargo truck
Galang – driver of Loadstar
Petitioner The Koh Family – owner of Ford Escort (some sustained died, others sustained injuries)
Jose Koh – driver of Ford (deceased)
Short Summary:
A truck driven by Galang, owned by Tayag and Manalo, met a head-on collision with the Ford Escort of the McKees. The accident led to the death and injuries on the passenger of the Ford
Escort. Two children were hesitant to cross the road, and in order to avoid hitting them the Ford Escort switched to the opposite lane (where the truck was approaching). The Ford already
switched the headlights of the car, applied breaks and attempted to return to its lane, however the truck and the Ford still crashed.
McKee filed 2 civil cases for damages against Tayag and Manalo. One for the death of Jose Koh, and the other for the deaths and injuries of the other Koh family members. Pending the civil
cases, an information against the driver Galang was filed and the criminal case ensued. In the criminal case, Galang was found guilty. However in the civil cases, Tayag and Manalo were
not made liable. On appeal of the civil case, the decision was reversed and Tayag and Manalo were bound to indemnify the McKees. However, through a MR, the original decision exonerating
them from liability was imposed. CA ruled that since Koh (ford) was on the wrong side of the road, he is presumed negligent.
SC held Tayag and Manalo liable. It was found that the negligence of the driver Galang was the proximate cause of the deaths and the injury.
First, Koh’s action of switching to the lane of the truck was done to avoid danger to the 2 boys crossing. This cannot be characterized as negligent. Any prudent man would do the same,
specially since the car was still a distant away and could give way. The SC likewise applied the emergency rule.
Second, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck
would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane.
 The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 48 kilometers per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed
by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Thus, presumed negligent under Art 2185.
Third, even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here.
Thus, it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the
private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of
their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage
Doctrines:
 the emergency rule - one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself
is brought about by his own negligence.
 Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
 Doctrine of Last Clear Chance - the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered
in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.
Article 2180:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.)
ZABALA 3D 2021
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of
Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt on
the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa.
Be that as it may, there was then no legal impediment against such consolidation. The present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent
civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment
has been rendered in that criminal case.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence, although already final by virtue of the denial by no less than this Court
of his last attempt to set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no relevance or importance to this case.
 "in the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action.”
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties
therein. It would have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case private respondents' liability could only be subsidiary
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have been conclusive in the civil
cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.
C. PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, Drowning; last clear chance not applicable Action for Damages Not liable
104 Phil. 397 Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Petitioners: Sps Ong, parents of Dominador (14 yrd old boyscout) who drowned. Seeks to recover damages alleging that Metropolitan Water District’s employees were negligent. Also
invokes doctrine of last clear chance.
Respondent: Metropolitan Water District – owner of natatorium or swimming pools
Short Summary:
Dominador and his 2 brothers went swimming in one of MWD’s swimming pools. They were swimming in the small pools. Dominador told his brothers that he was just going to the locker to
drink coke, and when he said that, his brothers went to the big pool. A few moments later, a boy told Abaño, the lifeguard, that someone had been underwater for a long time. Abaño
immediately responded and dove in the pool and other employees of MWD, such as the nurse, sanitary inspector, etc. came to assist, but Dominador still died
The SC absolved MWD from liability. Sps Ong failed to show that MWD and its employees were negligent, considering that MWD’s employees immediately responded and did all that they
could to bring Dominador back to life. Last clear chance not applicable considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record
discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his
lifeless body was retrieved. Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the
regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after
retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine.
Doctrines:
 Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the
damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees
 the owners of resorts to which people generally are expressly or by implication invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the management and maintenance
of such resorts, to the end of making them reasonably safe for visitors.
 Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he is not,
however, in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from
any presumption of negligence
 The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
ZABALA 3D 2021
D. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
1. Respondeat Superior
PAL v. CA, Crash landing; pilot with tumor; dizzy spells; Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
106 SCRA 391 duty extends to crew; moral damages Quasi-Delict Art 2180, Presumption of Fault under Art 1756
Parties: Petitioners: Samson – co-pilot of PAL plane from Manila to Legaspi; crashlanded; suffered periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility
Bustamante – commanding pilot; had tumor of the Nasopharynx
Short Summary:
Samson was a pilot of PAL. While being the co-pilot of Captain Bustamante on a trip from Manila to Legaspi with stops at Daet, Camarines Norte and Pili, Camarines Sur, they met an
accident. Because of Bustamante’s poor judgment and slow reaction, they overshot the airfield and hit a mangrove at the end of the landing strip. This caused Samson to hit his head on
the windshield. Samson was brought to the clinic wherein he was checked by general practitioners. However, he suffered brain concussions and continues dizziness, headache and general
debility. He asked to be sent to the US to get checked but he was denied. Because of these ailments, he was always grounded and which resulted to his dismissal. Hence, this petition.
The issue is WoN PAL could be held liable. YES. Despite knowing the sickness of Bustamante, PAL allowed him to fly out that day, which caused the accident. He was only allowed to fly
because of the waiver signed by the doctor of PAL. Also, even if he wasn’t sick, the accident was caused by Bustamante. Being the employer of Bustamante, PAL could be held liable. At
least, the law presumes the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. Also,
all the damages awarded are correct.
As awarded by the trial court, private respondent was entitled to P198,000.00 as unearned income or compensatory damages; P50,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation, or a total of P273,000.00.
Doctrines:
The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the complement operating the carrier, the
airplane in the case at bar. And this must be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will certainly result to the damage, prejudice, nay injuries and even death to all aboard the plane,
passengers and crew members alike.

 Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though
the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also
liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the
employee’s own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee’s lack of due care contributed to his
death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
 Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow-worker’s intentional or
malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or
supervision of the plaintiffs fellow-worker.
 The fact that private respondent suffered physical injuries in the head when the plane crash-landed due to the negligence of Capt. Bustamante is undeniable. The negligence of the
latter is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Article 2219, (2) New Civil Code is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages.
 The fact that private respondent suffered physical injuries in the head when the plane crash-landed due to the negligence of Capt. Bustamante is undeniable. The negligence of the
latter is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Article 2219, (2) New Civil Code is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages.
 Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employer-employee relationship between it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment, private
respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice by the appellate court, which finding We hereby affirm, applying the provisions of Art. 2220,
New Civil Code which provides that willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
 The justification in the award of moral damages under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code on Human Relations which requires that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, as applied by respondent court is also well-taken and We hereby give Our
affirmance thereto.
ZABALA 3D 2021
National Development v. CA, American raw cotton, collision both captains at Action for Recovery of Quasi-Delict
164 SCRA 593. fault; agent solidarily liable Sum of Money Solidary liability agent and princpal
Quasi-Delict
Parties:
National Development Co (NDC) – first preferred mortgagee of vessel Dona Nati involved in a collision found to have been caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the
colliding vessels.
Maritime Company Ph (MPC) – agent of NDC, MCP contends that it can not be liable solidarity with NDC because it is merely the manager and operator of the vessel Dona Nati, not a ship
agent. As the general managing agent, according to MCP, it can only be liable if it acted in excess of its authority.
 Shipment of American raw cotton and sodium (consigned to Manila Bank Corp), from California and Japan to the PH
Development Insurance & Surety Corp – insurer of shipment
Short Summary:
In accordance with a memorandum agreement entered into between defendants National Development Company and Maritime Company of the Philippines on September 13, 1962, NDC
as the first preferred mortgagee of three ocean going vessels including one with the name 'Dona Nati' appointed MCP as its agent to manage and operate said vessel for and in its behalf
and account. The E. Philipp Corporation of New York loaded on board the vessel "Dona Nati" at San Francisco, California, a total of 1,200 bales of American raw cotton consigned to the
order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and the People's Bank and Trust Company. Also loaded on the same vessel at Tokyo, Japan, were the cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd.,
consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation consisting of 200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and 10 cases of aluminum foil. En route to Manila the vessel Dofia Nati figured in a
collision at 6:04 a.m. on April 15, 1964 at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel 'SS Yasushima Maru' as a result of which 550 bales of aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton were lost
and/or destroyed. Hence, Development Insurance & Surety Corp as insurer paid Riverside Mills Corporation as holder of the negotiable bills of lading duly endorse. DISC filed this complaint
to recover said amount from NDC and MCP as owner and ship agent respectively, of the said 'Dofia Nati'vessel.
Issue is WoN both NDC and MPC are solidarily liable? SC held YES, both the owner and agent (Naviero) should be declared jointly and severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject
of the action had its origin in a tortious act and did not arise from contract.
Doctrines:
It is well settled that both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done where both are impleaded; that in case of collision, both the owner and the agent are
civilly responsible for the acts of the captain; that while it is true that the liability of the naviero in the sense of charterer or agent, is not expressly provided in Article 826 of the Code of
Commerce, it is clearly deducible from the general doctrine of jurisprudence under the Civil Code but more specially as regards contractual obligations in Article 586 of the Code of Commerce.
Moreover, the Court held that both the owner and agent (Naviero) should be declared jointly and severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a
tortious act and did not arise from contract. Consequently, the agent, even though he may not be the owner of the vessel, is liable to the shippers and owners of the cargo transported by it,
for losses and damages occasioned to such cargo, without prejudice, however, to his rights against the owner of the ship, to the extent of the value of the vessel, its equipment, and the
freight.
 Under Section 4 (2) of said Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the carrier is not responsible for the loss or damage resulting from the "act, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot or
the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship
 The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration" (Article 1753, Civil Code)
 It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code. Thus, Code of Commerce apply suppletorily.
 Article 827, the Code of Commerce: if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses and
damages suffered by their cargoes.
 Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due
to the fault or negligence of the captain. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is
merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage
ZABALA 3D 2021
International Flavors v. Argos Persona non grata, Art 33 respondeat superior Criminal Complaint: Dismissed
GR 130362 (September 10, 2001). Libel
Civil for damages:
Costa, and IFFI, in its
subsidiary capacity
Parties:
Private Respondents: Argo and Pineda general manager and commercial editor of petitioner IFFI’s Fragrance Division.
Costa – managing director to whom respondents reported to
Short Summary:
Argos and Pineda (respondents) are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of Fragrances Division. They directly reported to Costa, IFFI’s managing director who
heads the corporation’s operation in the Philippines. Due to redundancy, respondents agreed to termination of their services and they signed a “Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.” On the
same date, Costa issued a “Personnel Announcement” which described respondents as “persona non grata” and urged employees to not have further dealings with them.
Argos et al filed a criminal complaint for libel against Costa. They also filed a civil case for damages against Costa, AND IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer. RTC dismissed for failure
to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action. MR, granted. CA affirmed.
Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel
cases against petitioner's employee?
The SC ruled in the negative because respondents’ suit on subsidiary liability of IFFI is premature. Respondents’ complaint clearly shows that they are suing IFFI in a subsidiary and not
primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned.
Doctrines:
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his
primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought
against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.
However, we note that by invoking the principle of respondeat superior, respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold IFFI primarily liable for its employee's defamatory statements. But we also
find that respondents did not raise the claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce the alleged subsidiary
liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the accused in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely.
Having established that respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFI's primary liability under Art. 33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer
of Costa, prematurely, we need not delve further on the other errors raised by petitioner. Plainly both the trial and the appellate courts erred in failing to dismiss the complaint against herein
petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary liability while the criminal libel cases against IFFI's employee, Costa, were pending before the metropolitan trial court. Nothing herein said,
however, ought to prejudice the reliefs that respondents might seek at the appropriate time.

 NCC, Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
 NCC, Article 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
 NCC, Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
 RPC, Article 100. Civil Liability of Person Guilty of Felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Castilex Industrial v. Vasquez Daddy, daddy! Art 2180 employee must be Art 2180 Not liable
GR 132266 (December 27, 1999). engaged; collision
Parties:
Vasquez – driver of Honda motorcycle, no helmet; students permit only
Petitioner Castilex – owner of Hi-Lux, driven by Abad (manager); contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not
engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should
apply.
Short Summary:
After some snacks and chat with friends at 2AM, Abad, driving Castilex’ company pick-up collided with Vasquez’ motorcycle, resulting to severe injuries and Vasquez’ death in Cebu
Doctor’s Hospital 8 days later. An action for damages was filed by Sps. Vasquez while the hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance. TC ordered Abad and Castilex to pay jointly and
solidarily. CA affirmed but made Castilex only vicariously liable.
Issue: WON Castilex may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by its managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle under Art. 2180 par. 5. SC:
NO. To hold the employer liable under par. 5, it is necessary to establish the employer- employee relationship; and that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task
when the tort was committed. In this case, the second element was not established since Abad was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a
vehicular accident. It was about 2AM which is way beyond normal working hours. Abad's working day ended; his Overtime (OT) work had already been completed.
ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28
August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his
service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Doctrines:
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees
committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their
assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions.
For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned
tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the
vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business
purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip
to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle
during the return trip
ZABALA 3D 2021
 Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle In Going To Or From Meals:
an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled
to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the
vehicle.
 Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work:
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the
absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope
of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle.
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having
the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or
hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what
has been called the special errand or roving commission rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home.
However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence
where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
 Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours:
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of
the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started
the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
2. Violation of rules and statutes

a. traffic rules

Manuel v. CA ,227 SCRA 29. Drizzle, zigzag, bus and Scout car; no license Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Manuel – owner of Superlines bus, contends it was Fernando Abcede, Jr., who was at fault. Besides, petitioners claim the Fernando Abcede, Jr., who was only 19-years old at the time of
the incident, did not have a driver's license
Ramos – owner of Scout car with ten occupants; Abcede – driver; sustained injuries
Short Summary:
Emiliano Manuel was the driver of the bus owned by Superlines Transportation Co. and the respondents in this case were passengers of an International Harvester Scout Car. The Scout car
was driving along the zigzag road in Camarines Norte when the bus being driven by Manuel hit it, the Scout car was thrown backwards against a protective railing causing serious physical
injuries to its ten occupants. Manuel was prosecuted for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence, as he could not be found after the incident the respondents filed an instant
action for damages based on quasi-delict. The court rendered judgment against Manuel and Perla Compania de Seguros that covered the insurance of the bus. The court ordered them to
pay the amount of P49,954.86 in damages.
W/N Manuel can be exempt from the liability arising from the damages adjudged against him (NO) To support his position that he is exempt from liability Manuel argued about the credibility
of some of the evidence gathered by the police from the scene of the accident (the rain erasing the skid marks from the road, the policeman who sketched the scene was not the one
assigned to do so, etc. but this is not directly related to the topic)  His other contention (relevant part in our topic) is that Abcede who was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the
accident was not duly licensed to do so. This fact could not simply exempt the petitioner’s liability because they were at fault because they encroached on the Scout car’s lane. Also, the
petitioners likewise contested the awarded damages as excessive and unsubstantiated. However the court ruled that the injured parties were able to prove their injuries and submitted
evidence to show expenses for their treatment and hospitalization. Since also the act complained of falls under the aegis of quasi-delict moral damages is likewise available to the injured
party pursuant to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code.
.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Mallari v. CA, G.R. No. 128607 Jeep overtake fiera; violation of Land Action for damages Quasi-delict
(January 31, 2000). Transportation Code; Art 2185
Parties:
Mallari – jeepney driver and operator
Bulletin – delivery van; Angeles driver
Reyes – jeepney passenger died; widow filed a complaint for damages against Mallari AND Bulletin
Short Summary:
Mallari Sr. owned a jeepney which was driven by his son, Mallari Jr. At around 5am, the jeep got into an accident with the delivery van on Bulletin Publushing Corp causing the death of one
of the jeepney passengers. The accident was because the jeep was trying to overtake a Fiera at a curve when the Bulletin delivery van was coming from the other lane. The wife of the
deceased passenger filed for damages with the RTC of Olongapo against Mallari Sr., Mallaru Jr., the driver of the delivery van, Felix Angeles, Bulletin and N.V. Netherlands Insurance. The
RTC found Felix Angeles liable for his negligence while the CA found Mallari Jr liable. The issue in this case is WoN the accident was because of the sole negligence of Mallari Jr—Yes. Mallari
Jr himself testified that he tried to overtake at a curve. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The rule is
settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he
cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to
drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is
proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court,
JR and SR failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
ZABALA 3D 2021
3. Dangerous weapons and substances (Article 2188)

Araneta v. Arreglado Ateneo-La Salle; jawbone; plastic surgery Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Araneta – boy who got shot in the jaw
Dario Arreglado – boy who shot him; transferring to La Salle
Short Summary:
Araneta and his friends teased Arreglado for leaving Ateneo and enrolling in La Salle. Arreglado got mad, pulled a gun (licensed in his father’s name), and shot Araneta. It resulted to a
degenerative injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a scar in the lower portion of the face. His behavior also changed because Araneta became inhibited and morose. Since he was only 14
years old, Arreglado was under the supervision of the Commission of Social Welfare. Later on, his case of frustrated homicide was quashed because of minority and good behavior. A case
was then filed by the Aranetas in order to recover damages. CFI ruled that Arreglado’s father was negligent and sentenced him to pay P3,943, damages and attorney’s fees. Araneta appealed
for the amount originally claimed which is 112,000.
W/N Arreglado’s father was negligent – YES, because it was his duty to safeguard the dangerous weapon at all times. He should have taken measures to prevent his son from using it. (Not
really asked in the SC since Araneta only wanted to claim more damages).
The father’s failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not called for. The damage to the jaw and the existence of the scar in
Benjamin Araneta’s face are physical facts that can not be reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be treated in order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition is
undeniable. The father’s delay, or even his negligence, should not be allowed to prejudice the son who has no control over the parent’s action nor impair his right to a full indemnity.
SC ordered Arreglado to pay the Aranetas P18,000 for the necessity and cost of corrective measures to fully repair the damage (in the PH only not in America), the pain suffered by Benjamin,
his feelings of inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the voluntary character of the injury inflicted, and further considering that a repair, however skillfully
conducted, is never equivalent to the original state.
However, SC denied the claim of Araneta’s father for moral damages suffered by him (the father).
Doctrines:
In the case, SC reminded licensed possessors of rearms of their peremptory duty to adequately safeguard such dangerous weapons at all times, and to take all requisite measures to prevent
minors and other unauthorized parties from having access thereto. Competent observers have recently called attention to the fact that the growing teen-age hooliganism in our society is
principally due to parent's complacency in and neglect of their progeny.

 moral damages in case of physical injuries are only recoverable by the party who suffered them and not by his next of kin, unless there is statutory provision to the contrary.
ZABALA 3D 2021
4. res ipsa loquitur
Africa v. Caltex Fire; lit cigarette; coke Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
15 SCRA 448 Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Sps Africa – homeowners whose houses were burned by the fire
Caltex – owner of gas station that caused the fire
Short Summary:
A fire broke in Caltex station while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The trial court found that Africa failed to prove negligence and that Caltex exercised due care in the premises. It also refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
The court held that the doctrine can be applied since it was already applied in a CA case. Even though CA cases don’t lay down doctrines, the SC didn’t consider this a reason for not applying
the doctrine. Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises
almost invariably from some act of man. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to
and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to
intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the second amended complaint that "the fire was caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or
permission of answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the
allegation to be true — certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken against Boquiren — it does not extenuate his negligence.
Doctrines:
While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause
of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principal that "where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control
of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from defendant's want of care."
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence.
 those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate with a danger involved ... we think it is the generally
accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and
substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor
from liability.
 There are three requisites for admissibility under section 35, Rule 123: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that
it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information
ZABALA 3D 2021
Cebu Shipyard v. William Lines, G.R. M/V Manila; fire Action for Damages Culpa Contractual
L32607,5 May 1999 Culpa Contractual
Parties:
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. - repairing of marine vessels
William Lines, Inc. the owner of M/V Manila City
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. - non-life insurance business
Short Summary:
William Lines, Inc. brought its vessel, M/V Manila City, to the Cebu Shipyard (CSEW) in Lapulapu City for annual dry-docking and repair. After subject vessel was transferred to the docking
quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting in its eventual total loss. Subsequently, William Lines, Inc. filed a COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES against CSEW, alleging that the fire, which broke out in
M/V Manila City was caused by CSEW’s negligence and lack of care. William Lines had the vessel insured by Prudential for 45 M prior to the unfortunate incident. After William Lines had
claimed said amount from Prudential, Prudential was subrogated to the claim of William Lines against CSEW for the amount of 45 M. Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled
against CSEW and held that it was negligent and liable for damages.
First, the fire that occurred and consumed M/V Manila City would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised. In other words,
some negligence must have occurred. Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the TC and the CA and as shown by the records, is Cebu Shipyard, which had control over
subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs.
The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that CSEW was really negligent. Thus, even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in light of the direct evidence on record, the
ineluctable conclusion is that the petitioner, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc., was negligent and consequently liable for damages to the respondent, William Lines, Inc.
Doctrines:
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence.

To allow CSEW to limit its liability to One Million Pesos notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered by the assured and paid for by Prudential amounted to Forty Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is ordinarily required because, then, it would not be difficult for petitioner to escape liability by
the simple expedient of paying an amount very much lower than the actual damage or loss suffered by William Lines, Inc.
ZABALA 3D 2021
D.M. Consunji, Inc. V. CA, Renaissance; elevator crash; Res ipsa loquitur Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
G.R. No. 137873,20 April 2001. v. exercise of due care Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Juego – widow of Jose who died
DMCI – construction firm; Renaissance project; does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it
was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband." In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its
leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the
safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
Short Summary:
While Jose Juego, together with his two other construction workers where performing ther work as construction workers of the 14th floor of Renaissance Tower Building, the bolt or pin which
was merely inserted (without a safety lock) to connect the chain block and the steel platform they were on board in got loose, causing the whole platform to fall down to the basement of the
building. This crushed Jose Juego to death while his two companiens luckily jumped out of safety. Jose’s widow, Maria, filed in the RTC a complaint for damages against the deceased’s
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. RTC awarded several damages. D.M. Consunji claims that the police report was hearsay and that the part which says that the bolt loosened was just the opinion
of the officer and hence, should be stricken out. The CA held that since all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur was present in the case at bar, there arose a presumption of negligence against
D.M. Consunji, and affirmed the RTC decision.
The SC held that D.M. Consunji’s contention of inadmissibility of evidence loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant
a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent
There is no dispute that Juego’s husband fell down from the 14 th floor of a building to the basement while he was working with DMCI’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of DMCI. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control
of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the DMCI or its employees. On the other hand, the Juego is not in
a position to know what caused the accident.
1. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present
2. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of DMCI[;]
thus[,] the second requisite is also present.
3. No contributory negligence was attributed to the Juego’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of DMCI’s negligence arises.
Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense
relating to the incident.
Doctrines:
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites
for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may
be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for
the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances
for the application of the doctrine has been established.
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available. It proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which
the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.
ZABALA 3D 2021
NPC v. CA, Agus Dam & River; fishponds Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
G.R. No. 124378, 8 March 2005  Quasi-Delict
Parties:
National Power Corp – constructed and managed Agus Dam
Abdulla et al – owners of fishponds which were destroyed due to flood caused by the overflowing of the water from the dam after heavy rains
Short Summary:
NPC, pursuant to Memorandum Order no. 398, was ordered to construct the Agust Regulation Dam at the mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur and to maintain a normal maximum water
level of Lake Lanao at 702 meters elevation. It was also ordered to build benchmarks to warn the inhabitants in the area that cultivation of land below said elevation is forbidden. The
owners of fishponds along Lake Lanao complained of escalation of the water level of the lake that cause the flooding that damaged their fishponds. Hadji et al filed a complaint for damages
before the RTC of Marawi City.They alleged that the negligence and inexperience of NPCs employees assigned to operate the Agus Regulation Dam were the proximate causes of the damage
caused to their properties and livelihood. NPC denied their allegations: a) the water level of Lake Lanao never went beyond 702 meters, (b) NPC employees were never remiss in the
performance of their duties, and (c) Fishponds of Hadji et al were either located below the 702-meter level, or must have been introduced when the water level was abnormally low and as
such, were within the prohibited area as defined in Memorandum Order No. 398. The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of Hadji et al. Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
WoN NPC is legally answerable for the damages endured by Hadji et al – YES, because NPC was remiss of its duty to maintain the water level of Lake Lanao. By applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the
maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters. With this dam, NPC is able to either increase or decrease the volume of water discharged into the Agus River depending on the amount of
power to be generated. When the lake level rises, especially during rainy days, it is indispensable to wide open the dam to allow more water to flow to the Agus River to prevent overflowing
of the lakeshore and the land around it. But the NPC cannot allow the water to flow freely into its outlet the Agus River, because it will adversely affect its hydroelectric power plants. It has
to hold back the water by its dam in order to maintain the volume of water required to generate the power supply. As a consequence of holding back the water, the lands around the lake
are inundated.
NPC tried to evade liability by saying that the fishpond owners built their fishponds below the 702-meter level that is prohibited by the Memorandum. However, the facts showed that although
the dam was built in 1978, the benchmarks were installed only in July and August of 1984 and that apparently, many had already worn- out, to be replaced only in October of 1986. NPC
has the duty to erect and maintain the benchmarks precisely to warn the owners of the neighboring properties not to build fishponds below these marks. Such benchmarks, likewise, serve
the evidentiary purpose of extricating NPC from liability in cases of overflooding in the neighboring estates because all NPC would have to do is point out that such constructions are below
the 702- meter allowable elevation. Without such points of reference, the inhabitants in said areas are clueless whether or not their improvements are within the prohibited area.
Fortuitous event argument: NPC staunchly asserts that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event. The rainy season is an expected occurrence and the NPC cannot stop doing its
duty when the rains fall. In fact, it is during these critical times that the NPC needs to be vigilant to make sure that the lake level does not exceed the maximum level. Indeed, negligence or
imprudence is human factor which makes the whole occurrence humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Doctrines:
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Perla Compania v. Sps. Sarangaya, G.R. Ford Cortina; car explosion; fire; Res ipsa Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
No.147746, 25 Oct. 2005 loquitur v. fortuitous event; employer’s liability Quasi-Delict
Parties:
1. Sps Sarangaya – owner of Super A building; suing Perla and Pascual for damages caused by fire from car explosion
2. PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS – leased one of the doors in Super A Building; refused liability for the accident on the ground that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its branch manager.
3. Pascual – General Manager of Perla; managed company issued Ford Cortina; insisted that the fire was purely an accident, a caso fortuito, hence, he was not liable for damages.
Short Summary:
Perla Compania was renting the 1st of Sps. Sarangaya’s 3-door commercial building in Santiago, Isabela. Its rented space was divided into Pascual’s (co-petitioner) office on the left side
and on the right side a garage for its 14-year-old Ford Cortina company car for provincial trips to towns under Pascual’s supervision. Pascual was in Pampanga for 3 days. When he came
back to the office, he tried to “warm up” the car but the car made an odd noise upon ignition. The second time, the car’s engine spewed out fire and an explosion originated from the back
of the car. The garage, and eventually the building including Sps. Sarangaya’s residence at the back of the commercial building, caught fire and were destroyed. They then filed a collection
case against Pascual and Perla Compania based on quasi-delict.
SC held Perla and Pascual solidarily liable. Pascual negligent by virtue of res ipsa loquitur; Perla liable for the negligent act of Pascual under Art 2180.
Pascual’s liability: the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed his
negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and
diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
Without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone
was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident.
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
 "Ordinary" refers to the usual course of events.
 Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
 In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning.
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
 Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding
its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned.
Perla Compania’s liability: While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily
liable for the fire. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
Here, petitioner-corporation's evidence hardly included any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions. It also did not have any guidelines for the
maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties either. Based on
these circumstances, petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascual's car or its serviceability.
Petitioner-corporation's argument that the liability attached to employers only applies in cases involving the supervision of employees in the transportation business is incorrect.
 Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees. The liability is imposed on all those who by their industry, profession or
other enterprise have other persons in their service or supervision. Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited to employers in the transportation business.
 The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was
impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to
perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident.
 A mechanical defect will not release the defendant from liability if it is shown that the accident could have been prevented had he properly maintained and taken good care of the
vehicle.
ZABALA 3D 2021
E. DEFENSES
1. Plaintiff’s negligence is the proximate cause of injury
PLDT v. CA, G.R. 57079 (September 29, Jeep; excavation; swerving; last clear chance Action for Damages NOT LIABLE
1989).  Quasi-Delict
Parties:
PLDT – dug an excavation for its conduit system
Sps Esteban – jeepney driver and passenger; swerved and fell into the excavation thereby sustaining injuries
Short Summary:
Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and
fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench, which was left
uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own
negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. (Barte) who should be held liable. The issue in this case is WoN PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by
Sps. Esteban?
The SC ruled in the negative. The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident. The perils of the
road were known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act.
 the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane of Lacson street. If it had remained on the inside lane, it would not have hit the accident mound.  
 With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights, which should have made him see the accident mound in time.  
 Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.
 As a resident of Lacson Street, Antonio passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning
signs could not have completely prevented the accident. The only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. It was not the lack
of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep to fall into the excavation, but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have
prevented the injury. It is basic that Spouses Esteban cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof.
Doctrines:
It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Kim v. Phil. AerialTaxi, 58 Phil. 838.  Iloilo flight; propeller; amputated arm Action for Damages NOT LIABLE
Culpa Contractual
Parties:
Teh Le Kim – passenger of hydroplane going to Iloilo; went to the pontoon toward a revolving propeller, injured
Phil Aerial Taxi – owner of hydroplane
Short Summary:
Teh Le Kim (Kim) bought a passenger ticket for a flight in Iloilo in one of Philippine Aerial Taxi Corporation’s (Philippine Aerial) hydroplanes. Before the flight, Kim had to wait for some time
and subsequently had to transfer to another plane because the engine of the first plane was not working properly. After the flight, the plane eventually landed on the waters of Iloilo and
taxied toward the beach. While a banca was approaching (the banca will take the passengers ashore), Kim unfastened his seatbelt, not even waiting to put on his hat, and went down the
ladder and walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. Bohn and Garrett (consignees of Philippine Aerial in Iloilo), upon seeing Kim walking toward the propeller, shouted
frantically and motioned to him to keep away from it, but he took no heed of them. Thus, the propeller first grazed Kim’s forehead and, as he threw up his arm, it was caught by the revolving
blades thereof and so injured that it had to be amputated. Issue is WoN Philippine Aerial has complied with its contractual obligation to carry Kim safe and sound to his destination – Yes
By sheer common sense, Kim ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being caught
and injured thereby.   He ought to know furthermore that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait for a banca to take him ashore. Notwithstanding the shouts and warning
signals given him from the shore by the representatives of the consignee firm, Kim, not being a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked along one of the
pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller, while the banca which was to take him ashore was still some distance away and the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe
distance from the plane.  
Doctrines:
It is not difficult to understand from the circumstances of the instant case that a person who was a passenger of a hydroplane acted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller
while it was still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to take him. That such person’s negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident is so clear that it is not
necessary to cite authoritative opinions to support the conclusion that the injury to his arm and the subsequent amputation thereof, were entirely and exclusively due to his own imprudence
and not to the slightest negligence attributable to the Carrier and its agents. Therefore, he alone should suffer the consequences of his act.
American Express v. Cordero, G.R. No. Extension charge card; Hongkong; cut in half Action for Damages NOT LIABLE
138550, 14 Oct 2005 Quasi-Delict
Parties:
AMEX – charge card issuer; Noel Cordero – holder of extension card
Short Summary:
Spouses Noel and Nilda Cordero applied for and was issued AMEX cards (wife – main card, husband – extension card respectively). Noel and his family went on a three-day trip to Hong
Kong. The group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop where Noel was going to buy some chocolate candies and paying for it with his AMEX extension card. The sales clerk verified the card
by making a telephone call to the AMEX Office in Hong Kong, but Noel refused to verify. So, the store manager confiscated the card and cut it in half with scissors. In AMEX’ defense, they
follow an inspection system (Inspect Airwarn Support System) wherein upon notice of suspicious activity, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If
the true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated. Due to Noel’s refusal to take the call to
verify his identity, the consequent confiscation of the card was inevitable. Noel filed a complaint for damages against AMEX for the humiliation he supposedly suffered due to the incident..
The issue is wheter or not lower courts gravely erred in attributingthe public humiliation Noel suffered to AMEX.
The SC held that such public humiliation cannot be attributed to AMEX’ fault. As explained by Noel himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that
indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had Noel talked to AMEX’ representative, enabling the latter to determine that Noel is indeed the true holder of
the card. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to AMEX. If at all, the cause of Noel’s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to AMEX’
representative. That Noel refused to talk to AMEX’ representative can be gleaned from the testimony of Mr. Chen Heng Kun a.k.a. Johnny Chen during the deposition in Hong Kong. Further,
according to the cardmember agreement, AMEX still has the right over the card and can revoke the same with or without notice. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on
the part of AMEX and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to Noel for damages.
Doctrines:
ZABALA 3D 2021
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. When an act which constitutes
a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff.  
2. Comparative v. Contributory Negligence

Comparative Negligence
Umali v. Bacani, Alcala Storm; Banana trees; open live wire; Action for Damages Quasi-Delict (mitigated)
69 SCRA 263  death electrocution; contributory negligence: Quasi-Delict
parents
Parties:
Fidel Saynes – 8yrold boy who got electrocuted and died to the open live wire from Alcala’s electric post
Umali – owner and manager of Alcala Electric Plant; denies liability on the ground that the proximate cause of the victim's death could be attributed to the parents' negligence in allowing a
child of tender age to go out of the house alone.
Baldomero – Alcala employee; informed by barrio captain of the open live wire but only called for help
Captain Bueno – barrio captain
Short Summary:
A storm with strong rain hit Alcala, Pangasinan during which the banana plants on an elevated ground along a barrio road near the electric lines fell over the electric posts. The live electric
wire was cut and the one end was still left hanging on the electric post. Next morning, Captain Bueno saw it and warned the people not to go near it. He also saw a laborer of Alcala Electric
Plant and asked him to fix it; latter agreed and went on looking for the lineman. Sometime later, a boy about 3y 8m named Saynes went to the banana plants and got in contact with the live
wire, causing his death via electrocution.
The SC found Umali liable because of the negligent acts of his employee although his liability is mitigated by the contributory negligence of the parents of the boy "in not providing for the
proper and delegate supervision and control over their son. It may be true, as the lower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking care
of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a nearby place cut wire was very near the house (where victim was living) where the fatal
fallen wire electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent's liability, but we cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence constituted the proximate cause of the victim's
death because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above committed by
defendants' employees and which could have killed any other person who might by accident get into contact with it.
Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parents' negligence, he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he
accidentally touched:
1. by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which were about 30 feet high and which were
higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate
winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line.
2. even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 14, 1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a
possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if
they had been cut.
We could readily see that because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees resulting in a live wire lying on the premises without any visible warning
of its lethal character, anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the same fate that befell the victim.  
Doctrines:
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants' lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt
him from liability.
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states: The owner and manager of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions.
ZABALA 3D 2021
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability
of the employer is primary and direct. In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the
family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial
Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from its finding.

Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 148 SCRA Collision; parked dump truck; cause and Action for Damages Quasi-Delict (mitigated)
353.  condition; foreseeable intervening causes; last Quasi-Delict
clear chance
Parties:
Dionisio – Volkswagen driver whose lights suddenly failed; crashed into dump truck suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss
of two gold bridge dentures.  
Phoenix Construction – owner of dump truck parked askew along General Lacuna; driver: Carbonel; urge that the truck driver’s negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio’s negligence was an "efficient intervening cause," and that consequently Dionisio’s negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the
accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.
Short Summary:
Dionisio was going home after having dinner and cocktails with his boss. After crossing an intersection, he bumped into the truck of Phoenix, which was parked askew. Dionisio is now
claiming for damages
SC found that both parties were negligent, but it was still Carbonel’s act of improperly parking the truck that was the proximate cause of the collision. Thus, it ruled that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney’s fees and costs, shall be borne by Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix
who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course
entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.
Carbonel’s negligence is the indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street. However, Dionisio was also negligent. He did not have a curfew pass. This is important because it establishes that Dionisio, as per testimony of eyewitnesses, was speeding home.
He had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of
curfew without a valid curfew pass. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an
affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
The truck driver’s negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private
respondent’s car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump
truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio’s negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver’s negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the
petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump
truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
Dionisio’s negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability
ZABALA 3D 2021
Doctrines:
We note that the petitioners’ arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these
arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the petitioners would have us adopt
have already been "almost entirely discredited."
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has
created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably
the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant
has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs
a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now
almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent
safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of
the intervening cause.
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant’s own property, and therefore to take
precautions to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. . . . In
all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant’s conduct to produce the result, and in each case the defendant’s negligence consists in failure to protect the
plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed
come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes
which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant’s responsibility.
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. . . . The standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the
plaintiff against `that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.’ Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven;
and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it.
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like
ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s — was the legal or proximate
cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate."
The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.
The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with
that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver’s own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close
to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the
risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners’ proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Doctrines:
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent
Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart v. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule — that of contributory
negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff’s negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
ZABALA 3D 2021
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine
has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ZABALA 3D 2021
PCI Bankv. CA Ford; taxes; imputed contributory negligence Action for Damages Culpa Contractual
Culpa Contractual (mitigated)
Parties:
FORD – drawer CIR – payee
Citibank – drawee
PCIBank – collecting bank
RIVERA - FORD’s General Ledger Accountant
Citibank points out that Ford allowed its very own employee, Godofredo Rivera, to negotiate the checks to his co-conspirators, instead of delivering them to the designated authorized
collecting bank (Metrobank-Alabang) of the payee, CIR. Citibank bewails the fact that Ford was remiss in the supervision and control of its own employees, inasmuch as it only discovered
the syndicate's activities through the information given by the payee of the checks after an unreasonable period of time.
PCIBank contends that the inaction of Ford despite the enormity of the amount involved was a sheer negligence and stated that, as between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer
the consequences of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible, by his act of negligence, must bear the loss.
Short Summary:
Case 1:  FORD drew and issued its Citibank CHECK 1 in the amount of P4.7M in favour of the CIR as payment of FORD’s percentage or manufacturer’s sales taxes for the Q3 of 1977.
CHECK 1 was deposited with the IBAA (now PCIB) and was subsequently cleared at the Central Bank. Upon presentment with drawee Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid to PCIB
as collecting bank. HOWEVER, proceeds of CHECK 1 was never received by the payee CIR. As a consequence, FORD was compelled to make a SECOND payment to the BIR of its percentage/
manufacturers’ sales taxes for Q3 of 1977. CHECK 1 was a CROSSED CHECK in that, on its face were two parallel lines and written in between said lines was the phrase “Payee’s Account
Only”. Moreover, BIR designated Metrobank, Alabang Branch to receive the tax payment of FORD as the authorized agent bank BIR. Hence, ideally, PCIB should only pay to Metrobank
Alabang, as designated payee. Later on NBI revealed that CHECK 1 was recalled by Godofredo RIVERA, the General Ledger Accountant of Ford (part of the syndicate). He purportedly needed
to hold back the check because there was an error in the computation of the tax due to BIR. With RIVERA’s instruction, PCIB replaced the CITIBANK CHECK 1 with two of its own (PCIB)
Manager’s Checks 
Case 2:  The same syndicate apparently embezzled the proceeds of checks intended, this time, to settle  percentage taxes appertaining to the Q2 1978 and Q1 of 1979. Ford drew 2
Citibank CROSSED checks for which BIR tax receipts were issued: CHECK 2 in the amount of P5.8M representing the percentage tax due for the Q2 of 1978 payable to the CIR. CHECK 3 in
the amount of P6.3M, representing the payment of percentage tax for the first quarter of 1979 and payable to the CIR. The checks never reached the payee, CIR. As far as the BIR is
concerned, the said two BIR Revenue Tax Receipts were considered “fake and spurious”. The findings forced Ford to pay the BIR anew, while an action was filed against Citibank and PCIB
for the recovery of the amount of CHECK 2 and CHECK 3. Investigations found that: Mr. Godofredo RIVERA, FORD’s General Ledger Accountant, prepared the FORD’s CHECK 2 for payment
to the BIR. Instead, however, of delivering the same to the payee BIR, he passed on the check to a co-conspirator named CASTRO who was a promanager of the San Andres Branch of PCIB.
In connivance with DULAY, CASTRO himself subsequently opened a Checking Account in the name of a fictitious person denominated as ‘Reynaldo Reyes’ in the Meralco Branch of PCIB
where DULAY works as Assistant Manager. After an initial deposit of P100.00 to validate the account, Castro deposited a worthless Bank of America Check in exactly the same amount as
the Check 2 (P5.8M) while this worthless check was coursed through PCIB’s main office enroute to the Central Bank for clearing, replaced this worthless check with Ford’s 5.8M CHECK and
accordingly tampered the accompanying documents to cover the replacement. As a result, the 5.8M CHECK was cleared by defendant CITIBANK, and the fictitious deposit account of
‘Reynaldo Reyes’ was credited at the PCIB Meralco Branch with the total amount of the Ford check. The same method was again utilized by the syndicate in profiting from the 6.3M CHECK
[CHECK 3] which was subsequently pilfered by Marindo, Rivera’s Assistant at Ford. 
Issues: W/N the action of Godofredo Rivera, Ford’s General Ledger Accountant was the proximate cause of the loss or damage -NO. The mere fact that the forgery was committed by a
drawer-payors confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does NOT entitle
the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer.
Summary of Liability
1. PCIBank – liable for entirety of check 1; negligent in not scrutinizing the identity of Mr Rivera on whether had the authority to recall the check. Also liable for half of check 2 and 3 because
its emloyees were involved with the syndicate
2. Citiabnk – liable for half of the amounts of Checks 2 and 3 it failed to verify the clearing stamps and did not check that the checks were actually replaced
ZABALA 3D 2021
invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both were negligent in the selection and
supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 AND 16508. Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds
of said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR. We also find thet Ford is not completely blameless in its failure to detect the fraud. Failure on the part of the depositor to examine its
passbook, statements of account, and cancelled checks and to give notice within a reasonable time (or as required by statute) of any discrepancy which it may in the exercise of due care
and diligence find therein, serves to mitigate the banks' liability by reducing the award of interest from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. As provided in Article 1172 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, respondibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
PCIBank
 PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect of PCIBank employees to verify whether his letter requesting for the replacement of the Citibank
Check 1 was duly authorized, showed lack of care and prudence required in the circumstances.
 Furthermore, it was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an agent of BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal
regarding the unwarranted instructions given by the payor or its agent
 the crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that the check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting
bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its
depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed" Having established that the collecting bank's negligence is
the proximate cause of the loss, we conclude that PCIBank is liable in the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check 1.
Citibank must likewise answer for the damages incurred by Ford on Citibank Checks Numbers SN 2 and 3, because of the contractual relationship existing between the two. Citibank, as the
drawee bank breached its contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability contributed to the damage caused to the latter. On this score, we agree with the respondent court's
ruling.
Citibank should have scrutinized Citibank Check Numbers SN 2 and 3 before paying the amount of the proceeds thereof to the collecting bank of the BIR. One thing is clear from the record:
the clearing stamps at the back of Citibank Check Nos. SN 2 and 3 do not bear any initials. Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of the clearing stamps. Had this been duly
examined, the switching of the worthless checks to Citibank Check Nos. 2 and 3 would have been discovered in time. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because
of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
Doctrines:
the imputed negligence of employer in a master-servant relationship is instructive. Since a master may be held for his servant's wrongful act, the law imputes to the master the act of the
servant, and if that act is negligent or wrongful and proximately results in injury to a third person, the negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or wrongful conduct of the master, for
which he is liable. The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concuring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter's
negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior's action against the third person, asuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
of which complaint is made.
"When title defective -- The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this Act when he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud,
duress, or fore and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud."
Pursuant to this provision, it is vital to show that the negotiation is made by the perpetator in breach of faith amounting to fraud. The person negotiating the checks must have gone beyond
the authority given by his principal. If the principal could prove that there was no negligence in the performance of his duties, he may set up the personal defense to escape liability and
recover from other parties who though their own negligence, alowed the commission of the crime.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Estacion v. Bernardo, Jeep and Isuzu truck; Sabit; contributory Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
G.R. No. 144723,27 Feb 2006 negligence Quasi-Delict (mitigated)
Parties:
Noe Bernardo – Fiera jeepney passenger; stood on the left rear portion of the jeep to give way to an old woman
Quinquillera – driver of jeep; Bandoquillo – owner
Estacion & Gerosano – owner and driver the Isuzu cargo truck which hit the Fiera jeepney causing Noe’s legs and feet to be crashed and amputated
Short Summary:
Noe Bernardo boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeep his way home. From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride, so Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full, Noe hung or stood
on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. As the jeep slowed down to pick up passengers, an Isuzu cargo truck hit the rear end of the jeep, and crushed his legs and feet, and as a result his
lower left leg was amputated. Noe, through his guardian ad litem, filed with the RTC for a complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict against Estacion and Gerosano, the owner and the
driver of the Isuzu, respectively. Gerosono would also be charged criminally for reckless imprudence. In response, Estacion and Gerosano filed a third party complaint against Bandoquillo
and Quinquillera, the owner and driver of the Ford Fiera.
ISSUE: WoN Noe is guilty of contributory negligence. YES, because Noe’s act of standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his part.
The proximate cause of the injury was the negligent and careless driving of Gerosano who was driving at a fast speed with a faulty brake. However, Noe’s act of standing on the rear carrier
of the jeepney exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his part. It showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger.
Noe – contributory negligence: act of standing on the rear carrier

Gerosano and Estacion (Isuzu) - driving at a fast speed with faulty break
Quinquillera (jeep driver) – overloading; Bandoquillo – failed to exercise due diligence in selection and supervision
Thus, Bandoquillo, Qunquillera, Estacion & Gerosano: liable for 80% (actual, moral, attys fees litigation expenses); Noe: must bear the 20%
Doctrines:
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection. It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.”
 The underlying precept of the above article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence
Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the applicant’s mere possession of a professional
driver’s license; he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service. Petitioner failed to present convincing proof
that she went to this extent of verifying Venturina’s qualifications, safety record, and driving history. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of her bus
driver, thus, remains unrebutted.

Nor should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi delict. As early
as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver
of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the
circumstances they are liable on quasi delict."
ZABALA 3D 2021
4. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, Drowning; last clear chance not applicable Action for Damages Not liable
Parties:
Petitioners: Sps Ong, parents of Dominador (14 yrd old boyscout) who drowned. Seeks to recover damages alleging that Metropolitan Water District’s employees were negligent. Also
invokes doctrine of last clear chance.
Respondent: Metropolitan Water District – owner of natatorium or swimming pools
Short Summary:
Dominador and his 2 brothers went swimming in one of MWD’s swimming pools. They were swimming in the small pools. Dominador told his brothers that he was just going to the locker to
drink coke, and when he said that, his brothers went to the big pool. A few moments later, a boy told Abaño, the lifeguard, that someone had been underwater for a long time. Abaño
immediately responded and dove in the pool and other employees of MWD, such as the nurse, sanitary inspector, etc. came to assist, but Dominador still died
The SC absolved MWD from liability. Sps Ong failed to show that MWD and its employees were negligent, considering that MWD’s employees immediately responded and did all that they
could to bring Dominador back to life. Last clear chance not applicable considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool.
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
The only thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what
happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion
in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to
it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application
of the doctrine.
Doctrines:
 Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the
damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees
 the owners of resorts to which people generally are expressly or by implication invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the management and maintenance
of such resorts, to the end of making them reasonably safe for visitors.
 Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he is not,
however, in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from
any presumption of negligence
ZABALA 3D 2021
PLDT v. CA, G.R. 57079 (September 29, Jeep; excavation; swerving; last clear chance Action for Damages NOT LIABLE
1989).  Quasi-Delict
Parties:
PLDT – dug an excavation for its conduit system
Sps Esteban – jeepney driver and passenger; swerved and fell into the excavation thereby sustaining injuries
Short Summary:
Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and
fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench, which was left
uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own
negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. (Barte) who should be held liable. The issue in this case is WoN PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by
Sps. Esteban?
The SC ruled in the negative. The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident. The perils of the
road were known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act.
 the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane of Lacson street. If it had remained on the inside lane, it would not have hit the accident mound.  
 With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights, which should have made him see the accident mound in time.  
 Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.
 As a resident of Lacson Street, Antonio passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning
signs could not have completely prevented the accident. The only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. It was not the lack
of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep to fall into the excavation, but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have
prevented the injury. It is basic that Spouses Esteban cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof.
Doctrines:
It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence.

Raynera v. Hiceta, Raynera = motor; Hiceta = owner of trailer Action for Damages NOT LIABLE
G.R. No. 120027 (April 21, 1999) truck no tail lights; rear vehicle Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Raynera – motorcycle driver; manager of engineering department of Kawasaki motors; REAR VEHICLE
Hiceta – owner of isuzu truck which Raynera crashed into
Short Summary:
Widow seeking damages for death of husband Raynera against Hiceta. We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had
the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of
him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind
the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
ZABALA 3D 2021
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other person was to blame
but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.

Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 148 SCRA Collision; parked dump truck; cause and Action for Damages Quasi-Delict (mitigated)
353.  condition; foreseeable intervening causes; last Quasi-Delict
clear chance
Parties:
Dionisio – Volkswagen driver whose lights suddenly failed; crashed into dump truck suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss
of two gold bridge dentures.  
Phoenix Construction – owner of dump truck parked askew along General Lacuna; driver: Carbonel; urge that the truck driver’s negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio’s negligence was an "efficient intervening cause," and that consequently Dionisio’s negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the
accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.
Short Summary:
Dionisio was going home after having dinner and cocktails with his boss. After crossing an intersection, he bumped into the truck of Phoenix, which was parked askew. Dionisio is now
claiming for damages
SC found that both parties were negligent, but it was still Carbonel’s act of improperly parking the truck that was the proximate cause of the collision. Thus, it ruled that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00
as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney’s fees and costs, shall be borne by Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be
solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to
reimbursement from Carbonel.
Carbonel’s negligence is the indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street. However, Dionisio was also negligent. He did not have a curfew pass. This is important because it establishes that Dionisio, as per testimony of eyewitnesses, was speeding home.
He had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of
curfew without a valid curfew pass. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an
affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.The truck driver’s negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.
The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent’s car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck
driver must be held responsible.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent
Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart v. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule — that of contributory
negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff’s negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine
has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like
ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s — was the legal or proximate
cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate."
The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more
ZABALA 3D 2021
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.
The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with
that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver’s own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close
to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the
risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners’ proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
In our view, Dionisio’s negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver’s negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent
cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had
parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio’s negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump
truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
Doctrines:
We note that the petitioners’ arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these
arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the petitioners would have us adopt
have already been "almost entirely discredited."
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated.
 If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable.
But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.
 The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition
has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse
of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it
a month afterward.
 "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of
case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant’s own property, and therefore to take
precautions to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source. . . . In
all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant’s conduct to produce the result, and in each case the defendant’s negligence consists in failure to protect the
plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed
come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes
which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant’s responsibility.
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. . . . The standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the
plaintiff against `that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.’ Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven;
and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Castilex Industrial v. Vasquez Daddy, daddy! Art 2180 employee must be Art 2180 Not liable
GR 132266 (December 27, 1999). engaged; collision
Parties:
Vasquez – driver of Honda motorcycle, no helmet; students permit only
Petitioner Castilex – owner of Hi-Lux, driven by Abad (manager); contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not
engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should
apply.
Short Summary:
After some snacks and chat with friends at 2AM, Abad, driving Castilex’ company pick-up collided with Vasquez’ motorcycle, resulting to severe injuries and Vasquez’ death in Cebu
Doctor’s Hospital 8 days later. An action for damages was filed by Sps. Vasquez while the hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance. TC ordered Abad and Castilex to pay jointly and
solidarily. CA affirmed but made Castilex only vicariously liable.
Issue: WON Castilex may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by its managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle under Art. 2180 par. 5. SC:
NO. To hold the employer liable under par. 5, it is necessary to establish the employer- employee relationship; and that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task
when the tort was committed. In this case, the second element was not established since Abad was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a
vehicular accident. It was about 2AM which is way beyond normal working hours. Abad's working day ended; his Overtime (OT) work had already been completed.
ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28
August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his
service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Doctrines:
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees
committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their
assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions.
For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned
tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the
vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business
purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip
to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle
during the return trip
ZABALA 3D 2021
 Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle In Going To Or From Meals:
an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled
to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the
vehicle.
 Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work:
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the
absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope
of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle.
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having
the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or
hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what
has been called the special errand or roving commission rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home.
However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence
where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
 Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours:
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of
the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started
the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
ZABALA 3D 2021
5. PRESCRIPTION (ARTICLE 1146)
Kramer v. CA, Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
178 SCRA 518  Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Short Summary:


ZABALA 3D 2021
Spouses Santos v.Pizardo, Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
G.R. No. L5L452,29 Jul 2005  Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Short Summary:


ZABALA 3D 2021
De Guzman v. Toyota Cubao, G.R. No. Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
L4t480,29 Nov. 2006 Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Short Summary:


6. FORCE MAJEUR / FORTUITOUS EVENT (ARTICLE 1174)

Gotesco Investment Corp. v. Chatto, Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
210 SCRA 18. Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Short Summary:



Servando v. Phil. Steam, Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
117 SCRA 832  Quasi-Delict
Parties:
Short Summary:



Yobido v. CA, Action for Damages Quasi-Delict
281 SCRA 1 Quasi-Delict
Parties:
ZABALA 3D 2021
Short Summary:


7. DILIGENCE (ARTICLE 2180, LAST PARAGRAPH)
8. MISTAKE & WAIVER (ARTICLES 6 AND 1170)

9. EMERGENCY OR SUDDEN PERIL DOCTRINE
F. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
IV. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY
A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY (ARTICLES 2180-2182, CC)
1. PARENTS & GUARDIANS (ARTICLES 216 TO 219,221,236, FAMILY CODE)

2. OWNERS & MANAGERS OF ENTERPRISES
3. EMPLOYERS
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE/MALPRACTICE
Ramos v CA
GR No. 124354 ; December 29 1999
Kapunan, J.
Res ipsa loquitur; Employer’s negligence
Facts:
Erlinda Ramos had complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for the
removal of a stone in her gall bladder. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, she and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka decided that
she should undergo a "cholecystectomy" operation after examining the documents presented to him. Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good
anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist.
A day before the scheduled date of operation, she was admitted at Delos Santos Medical Center. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the College of
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was also there for moral support. She reiterated her previous request for Herminda to be with her even during the operation. By 07:30
am the next day, she was prepared for operation. At the operating room, Herminda saw about 2-3 nurses and Dra. Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer
anesthesia. Dr. Hosaka only arrived by 12:15 pm.
She then saw Dra. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma- intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki
ang tiyan." Herminda thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her.
She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this
anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. The patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position — a position where the head of the
patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain. Eventually, Dr. Calderon was then able
to intubate.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Erlinda was taken to the ICU, where she stayed for a month. Since the operation, she has been in a comatose condition. She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence
of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes. After being discharged from the hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention.
Petitioners filed a civil case for damages against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. Petitioners presented the
testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the injury sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty
management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase.
Private RESPONDENTS’ defense was the cause of brain damage was Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic drug.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but CA reversed RTC decision and ruled in favor of respondents. The CA ruled that private respondents were able to show
that the brain damage sustained by Erlinda was not caused by the intubation but was due to the allergic reaction to the drug.
ISSUE:
W/N THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR SHOULD BE APPLIED
HELD: Yes. Respondents are liable for damages.

Res ipsa loquitur -"the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."  where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. 
Before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
The fundamental element is the "control of instrumentality" which caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant.
In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential
elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence
may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but
how and why it occurred.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is appropriate in the case at bar. The damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for
the application of res ipsa loquitur.
Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does
not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration
of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, Erlinda could not
have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
ZABALA 3D 2021
DRA. GUITERREZ’ NEGLIGENCE AS ANESTHESIOLOGIST
She is negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. This fact was attested to
by Dean Herminda.
Further, Dra. Gutierrez failed to observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this unfortunate incident. Pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior
to the administration of anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Visits with the patient are traditionally made the day before
elective surgery.
Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of
Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. Dra. Gutierrez' act of
seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
Faulty intubation is undeniably the proximate cause which triggered the chain of events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and, ultimately, her comatosed condition.
DR. HOSAKA’S NEGLIGENCE AS THE HEAD OF THE SURGICAL TEAM

As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner.
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed
proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's surgery, and was in fact over 3 hours late for the latter's
operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional
duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER’S RESPONSIBILITY

Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercie real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages.
Thu, for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Art 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not
only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or
entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage.
While the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who
should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
ZABALA 3D 2021
father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians.
Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
MR: APRIL 11 2002

The hospital filed motion for reconsideration. It argued that DLSMC “does not hire or engage the services of a consultant, but rather, accredits the latter and grants him or
her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary qualifications, such
as accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship and references. Second, it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the consultant’s fee for
services rendered by the latter. Third, a hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter may lose his or her accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital. Lastly,
when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient. The hospital’s obligation is limited to
providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the doctor, the equipment and facilities necessary for the
treatment of the patient, as well as the services of the hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks of ensuring that the doctor’s orders are carried out strictly”
The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and ruled that “[a]s explained by respondent hospital, the admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC’s
medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee thereof, which is composed of the heads of the various specialty departments
such as the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the department head of the particular specialty applied for as chairman. The Credentials
Committee then recommends to DLSMC’s Medical Director or Hospital Administrator the acceptance or rejection of the applicant physician, and said director or
administrator validates the committee’s recommendation. Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary action is lodged against a consultant, the same is initiated by the department
to whom the consultant concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Com- mittee consisting of the department specialty heads. The medical director/hospital administrator
merely acts as ex-officio member of said committee. Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered by the
latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant in respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between
respondent hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by
the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient. Further, no evidence was adduced
to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her
treatment. For these reasons, the finding of liability on the part of DLSMC for the injury suffered by Erlinda was reversed.
Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, et al.

G.R. No. 142625 ; 19 December 2006
Carpio, J.
Facts:
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales (“Corazon”), who was then 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada (“Dr. Estrada”)
beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. While Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood
pressure and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous complication of pregnancy.
Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales (“Spouses Nogales”) to see Dr. Estrada at his
home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center (“CMC”).
The following day, Corazon was admitted at 2:30 a.m. at the CMC after the staff nurse noted the written admission request of Dr. Estrada. Upon Corazon’s admission at the
CMC, Rogelio Nogales (“Rogelio”) executed and signed the “Consent on Admission and Agreement” and “Admission Agreement.” Corazon was then brought to the labor
room of the CMC. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was “hemorrhage, post partum.”
ZABALA 3D 2021
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against CMC, Dr. Estrada, and the rest of CMC medical staff for the death of Corazon.
Petitioners allege that defendant physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon’s condition. They charged CMC with negligence
in the selection and supervision of defendant physicians and hospital staff. For CMC’s liability for the acts of Dr Estrada, they allege that CMC is vicariously liable for Dr
Estrada’s negligence based on Art 2180 in relation to Art 2176 of the Civil Code and under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
In their defense, CMC pointed out that Dr. Estrada was a consultant to be considered as an independent-contractor, and that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the former and the latter.
ISSUE: Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada as its attending independent-contractor physician considering that facts of the instant case.
HELD: YES. CMC is liable not because an employer-employee relationship existed between CMC and Dr. Estrada but because of CMC’s liability based on the doctrine of
apparent authority.
No employer-employee relationship
The test in determining the existence of employer-employee relationship is the control test. Specifically, the employer must have the right to control both the means and the
details of the process by which the employee is to accomplish his task.
The Court finds no evidence pointing to CMC’s exercise of control over Dr. Estrada’s treatment and management of Corazon’s condition. Throughout Corazon’s pregnancy,
she was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. At the time of Corazon's admission at CMC and during her delivery, it was Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor,
who attended to Corazon. There was no showing that CMC had a part in diagnosing Corazon's condition. CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities when Corazon
was about to give birth, which CMC considered an emergency. Considering these circumstances, Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC, but an independent contractor.
Doctrine of apparent authority

General Rule: a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician.
Exception: the hospital may be liable if the physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent authority.”
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician:
First factor: whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee
or agent of the hospital.
 In this regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be
general and implied.
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC’s acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby
leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority.
 CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada
 CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead
 Dr. Estrada’s referral of Corazon’s profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr. Espinola who was then the Head of the Obstretrics and Gnecology Department of CMC gave the
impression that Dr Estrasa as a a member of CMC’s medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed specialists.
Second factor: patient’s reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent
with ordinary care and prudence
ZABALA 3D 2021
Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon’s delivery not only because of their friend’s recommendation, but more importantly
because of Dr. Estrada’s “connection with a reputable hospital.” In other words, Dr. Estrada’s relationship with CMC played a significant role in the Spouses Nogales’
decision in accepting Dr. Estrada’s services as the obstetrician-gynecologist for Corazon’s delivery.
Likewise unconvincing is CMC's argument that petitioners are estopped from claiming damages based on the Consent on Admission and Consent to Operation.
The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. Besides, a blanket release in favor of
hospitals "from any and all claims," which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would be contrary to public policy and thus void.
The award of interest on damages is proper and allowed under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, which states that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages
may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
Other doctors:
1.) Dr Ely Villaflor (assisted Dr Estrada) – not liable; acting only under the orders of Dr Estrada
2.) Dr. Rosa Uy - nothing shows that Dr. Uy participated in delivering Corazon's baby.
3.) Dr Enriquez (anesthesiologist) - not expected to correct Dr. Estrada's errors.
4.) Dr. Lacson - Dr. Lacson competently explained the procedure before blood could be given to the patient.
5.) Dr. Espinola (head of OBGYN) - upon hearing such information about Corazon's condition, believed in good faith that hysterectomy was the correct remedy. At any
rate, the hysterectomy did not push through because upon Dr. Espinola's arrival, it was already too late. At the time, Corazon was practically dead.
ZABALA 3D 2021
Professional Service Inc v Agana (2007)
Facts:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge.
After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy
in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad‘s husband, Enrique
Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, to perform hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In
the corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these remarks: "sponge count lacking – 2 and "announced to surgeon searched
(sic) done but to no avail continue for closure."
On April 24, 1984, Natividad was released from the hospital. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to
examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation.
On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines (they went to the US to seek further treatment and they were told that Natividad was free of cancer), However,
Natividad was still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil
proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish.
Dr. Ampil‘s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr.
Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault.
A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage.
Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery.
On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI),
owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad‘s
body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.
Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then
in the United States.
The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr.
Ampil interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
PSI alleged in its petition that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) it is estopped from raising the defense that Dr. Ampil is not its employee; (2) it is solidarily
liable with Dr. Ampil; and (3) it is not entitled to its counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contends that Dr. Ampil is not its employee, but a mere consultant or independent
contractor. As such, he alone should answer for his negligence.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice
ZABALA 3D 2021
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability –
3. Whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil – YES.
HELD:
1. NO, Dr. Ampil is liable because of his medical negligence in not informing Natividad of the two missing pieces of gauze
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider
would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the
elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it
was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties.
Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause
of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing.
That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such
injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.
2. NO, Dr. Fuentes is not liable. Under the Captain of the Ship doctrine, Dr. Ampil is liable because he was the head surgeon
Res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Element of control and management of the thing which caused injury wanting.
3. YES.
In this jurisdiction, the statute governing liability for negligent acts is Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
A derivative of this provision is Article 2180, the rule governing vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The nature of the relationship between the hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential in view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals
that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians.
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI‘s liability. Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by
estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospital‘s liability for negligent acts of health professionals.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of
agency.
Our jurisdiction recognizes the concept of an agency by implication or estoppel. Article 1869 of the Civil Code reads:
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another
person is acting on his behalf without authority.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of
Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. It "is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public to
ZABALA 3D 2021
believe that it vouched for their skill and competence." Where negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for the acts
of its ostensible agents.
We now proceed to the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility. Jurisdictions held that a hospital’s corporate negligence extends to permitting a physician
known to be incompetent to practice at the hospital.
A corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or notice given to its agents or officers within the scope of their authority and in reference to a matter to which their
authority extends.
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and
interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the
report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. This means that the knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge
of PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses’ report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not
only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed.
This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under
Article 2176.
4. STATE
5. TEACHERS/HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS (AFTICLES 218 AND 219, FAMILY CODE)
ZABALA 3D 2021

Formatted Digests

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Formatted Digests

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

III.

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

SC held Medina liable for breach of contract of carriage

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

Respondent: Davao City

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

Vasquez – driver of Honda motorcycle, no helmet; students permit only

2. Violation of rules and statutes

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

2. Comparative v. Contributory Negligence

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

Noe – contributory negligence: act of standing on the rear carrier

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

Vasquez – driver of Honda motorcycle, no helmet; students permit only

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

6. FORCE MAJEUR / FORTUITOUS EVENT (ARTICLE 1174)

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

CASE TITLE Keywords BASIS OF COMPLAINT SOURCE OF LIABILITY

Other Codal Provisions/Doctrines:

7. DILIGENCE (ARTICLE 2180, LAST PARAGRAPH)

8. MISTAKE & WAIVER (ARTICLES 6 AND 1170)

IV. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY

A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY (ARTICLES 2180-2182, CC)

1. PARENTS & GUARDIANS (ARTICLES 216 TO 219,221,236, FAMILY CODE)

HELD: Yes. Respondents are liable for damages.

DR. HOSAKA’S NEGLIGENCE AS THE HEAD OF THE SURGICAL TEAM

DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER’S RESPONSIBILITY

MR: APRIL 11 2002

Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, et al.

Doctrine of apparent authority

Potrebbero piacerti anche