G.R. No.

76872 July 23, 1987

WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.

Doctrine: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
"having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon."

Facts

Sometime before 1979 petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime
of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven years, ten months and
twenty-two days to thirty-eight years, nine months and one day, and to pay an indemnity. These convictions
were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on 2 November 2000.

On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should
this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."

On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation
to the President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons.

The evidence before the Board showed that

 On 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa were then
(on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the RTC of Rizal.
 On 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal of the crime of
sedition; this conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court
 On 14 January 1986, a letter report from the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to
the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges
had been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes
including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives, and others.

On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. The respondent
Minister of Justice then issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against
petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion
of his sentence.

Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not
violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of
estafa nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926. Petitioner also contends that he was not given
an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has
been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to
serve the balance of his original sentence.

Ruling: No.

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the
offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is
not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood rules and doctrine on this matter.

It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for
a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the
ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original
sentence.

The consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the
conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted
must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he
can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged
to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against
him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159
of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict
who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon."

Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.