Carpio-Morales v. CA (Sixth Division) (G.R. Nos.

217126-27) (November 10, 2015)

FACTS: Carpio-Morales v. CA is a case regarding a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Petitioner Morales, as Ombudsman, assailed a Resolution by the CA which granted private
respondent Binay Jr. the prayer for TRO against the implementation of a Joint Order of
preventive suspension (preventive suspension order) suspending respondent and several other
public officers (POs) of Makati for 6 months without pay. Atty Bondal filed a complaint before the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other POs charging them of Plunder under R.A. 3019 or the
“Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”. This was due to the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking (MHP). The preventive suspension order against Binay Jr. and the POs
for not more than 6 months without pay was issued during the pendency of the Ombudsman
cases. Petitioners allege that private respondent committed grave misconduct, serious
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as charges that
may warrant removal from public service. This was evidenced by : (1) Binay Jr.’s loss of bidders
and the attested irregularities attending the MHP project; (2) documents on record which
negated the publication of bids; and (3) disbursement of vouchers, checks, and ORs showing
the release of funds.

Binay Jr. contends that he could not be administratively liable attending to the 5 phases of
the MHP project since (1) Phases 1 and 2 were undertaken before he was elected mayor
of Makati in 2010; and (2) Phases 3 to 5 transpired during his first term and that his re-
election as City mayor of Makati for a second term effectively CONDONED his
administrative liability, therefor rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic. Binay also added that there was no substantive evidence of guilt presented against
him. After the CA issued a supervening WPI in the now assailed resolution, the Ombudsman
filed another petition arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing
suspensive orders. Petitioners also add that reliance on the condonation doctrine as a matter
of defense that should have been raised by Binay Jr. during the administrative proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the condonation doctrine can apply to Binay Jr.’s case.

HELD: NO. The petition was PARTLY GRANTED. The condonation doctrine was
ABANDONED, but its abandonment is prospective in effect. However, the Court declared that
the WPI against the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

RULING: The Condonation doctrine is a limited empowerment of the electorate over the
accountabilities of their elective local officials. It DOES NOT cover criminal accountability. It
is of mere legal fiction, grounded upon a presumed knowledge of all activities and behaviour of
the elective local official. Whilst various jurisprudence applied the condonation doctrine, the
case at bar is an exception; a leading case introducing newly accepted principles. It does not
alter previous jurisprudence but merely introduces an outlier from that which has already been
decided. Since the Ombudsman had already found Binay Jr. administratively liable, the charges
against him were granted and he was given the penalty of dismissal, with the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office.