That the pleading asserting the claim states no coa

Vitangcol vs. New Vista Properties

Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Facts:- On June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent of the latterswife, executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell their property
described in the SPA as located at Bo. Latian, Calamba, Laguna. Pursuant to her authority under the SPA, De
Guzman executed on August 9, 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to New Vista Properties, Inc. (New Vista) a
parcel of land.
- We interpose at this point the observation that the property delivered to and occupied by New Vista was
denominated in the SPA as Lot No. 1735 covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538, while in the deed of absolute sale in
favor of New Vista the object of the purchase is described as Lot No. 1702 covered by TCT No. (25311) 2528.
-The controversy arose more than a decade later when respondent New Vista learned that the parcel of land it paid
for and occupied, i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being claimed by petitioners Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute
Sale for Lot No. 1702 under TCT No. (25311) 2528 entered by and between Vitangcol and Maria Alipit.
- Alarmed by the foregoing turn of events, New Vista lost no time in protecting its rights by, first, filing a notice of
adverse claim over TCT No. T-482731, followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title before the RTC. Therein,
New Vista alleged paying, after its purchase of the subject lot in 1989, the requisite transfer and related taxes
therefor, and thereafter the real estate taxes due on the land. New Vista also averred that its efforts to have the
Torrens title transferred to its name proved unsuccessful owing to the on- going process of reclassification of the
subject lot from agricultural to commercial/industrial. New Vista prayed, among others, for the cancellation of
Vitangcols TCT No. T-482731 and that it be declared the absolute owner of the subject lot.
Vitangcolmoved to dismiss the complaint which New Vista duly opposed. An exchange of pleadings then ensued.
- On June 27, 2003, or before Maria Alipit and Vitangcol, as defendants a quo, could answer, New Vista filed an
amended complaint, appending thereto a copy of the 1989 deed of absolute sale De Guzman, as agent authorized
agent of the Alipits, executed in its favor. Thereafter, Vitangcol filed a motion to dismiss, followed by a similar motion
interposed by Maria Alipit which New Vista countered with an opposition.
-Unlike in its original complaint, New Vistas amended complaint did not have, as attachment, the June 18, 1989 SPA.
It, however, averred that Clemente and Maria Alipit had ratified and validated the sale of Lot No. 1702 covered by
TCT No. (25311) 2528 by their having delivered possession of said lot to New Vista after receiving and retaining the
purchase price therefor.
- the trial court denied Vitangcols and Maria Alipits separate motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
- From the above order, Vitangcol sought reconsideration.In reversing itself, the RTC made much of the fact that New
Vista did not attach the SPA to the amended complaint.
- Aggrieved, New Vista interposed an appeal before the CA. The CA faulted the RTC for dismissing the amended
complaint, observing that it was absurd for the RTC to require a copy of the SPA which was not even mentioned in
the amended complaint. Pushing this observation further, the CA held that the amended complaint, filed as it were
before responsive pleadings could be filed by the defendants below, superseded the original complaint. As thus
superseded, the original complaint and all documents appended thereto, such as the SPA, may no longer be taken
cognizance of in determining whether the amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. It, thus, concluded
that the RTC erred in looking beyond the four corners of the amended complaint in resolving the motion to dismiss on
the ground of its failing to state a cause of action. CA denied Vitangcols motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Does the amended complaint sufficiently state a cause of action?
Held: Yes!
- The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the
ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a
cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. However, this
principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of
conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts
which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded; allegations which the court will take
judicial notice are not true; and where the motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses
facts sufficient to defeat the claim
- The trial court, however, erred in ruling that, taking said SPA into account, the amended complaint stated no cause
of action. Indeed, upon a consideration of the amended
complaint, its annexes, with the June 18, 1989 SPA thus submitted, the Court is inclined, in the main, to agree with
the appellate court that the amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.
- In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of action lies on
whether or not the court, admitting the facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. And to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be shown that the claim for relief in
the complaint does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite, or
uncertain.
Columbia Pictures vs CA
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
Facts:- Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation for violation of
PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private
researchers made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine Home
Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario
- NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking the
seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were enumerated in a list attached to
the application. His testimony was corroborated by another witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingo's
deposition was also taken. On the basis of the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Rene
C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search Warrant No. 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49, as
amended, was issued by the court a quo.
- The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987 to Sunshine and/or their representatives.
Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of
Sunshine Home Video
- On December 16, 1987, a "Return of Search Warrant" was filed with the Court. A "Motion To Lift the Order of
Search Warrant" was filed but was later denied for lack of merit. A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial
was filed. The court a quo granted the said motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private respondents' motion for reconsideration,
thus lifting the search warrant which it had theretofore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset, said
appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this petition was brought to this
Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent court's retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., indismissing petitioners' appeal and upholding the quashal of the search
warrant by the trial court
- Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to be able to maintain
an action in Philippine courts. In so challenging petitioners' personality to sue, private respondents point to the fact
that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted
motion pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being
constitutive of "doing business in the Philippines" under Section 1 (f)(1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of
Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas PambansaBlg. 68, or
the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of
a license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant.
-In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the Philippines,
and contend that private respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business
here, as would require them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, other than averments in the
quoted portions of petitioners' "Opposition to Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Search Warrant" dated April 28, 1988 and
Atty. Rico V. Domingo's affidavit of December 14, 1987. Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the
ownership of such exclusive right does not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the presumption
of doing business.
Issue: May petitioner maintain a suit against private defendants?
Held: Yes!
- The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to the
maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by a foreign corporation. However, under the aforequoted
provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is
understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license required by law, and until it complies with the
law intransacting business here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts. As thus interpreted, any
foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of
action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence
of the prescribed license but "doing business" in the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign
corporation from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign corporation is without license to transact
business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary
if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines.
- For allegedly being foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents
repeatedly maintain in all their pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action before
Philippine Courts.
-Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the
complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of
capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a
plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality
or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal
capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the
complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
-Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an
unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should properly be "lackof capacity to
sue," not "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated is undeniably
such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing
requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.

Guerrero vs RTC Ilocos

Facts:- Filed by petitioner as an accionpublicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension
when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should
have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise
- Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the same
failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file
any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-trial conference,
that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge
Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent
Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very
close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this
deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
-Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that since brothers by affinity are not members
of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that
Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an
affirmative defense in his answer.

-respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case." He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be
dismissed.
- the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case,
declaring the dismissal however to be without prejudice
- Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo.
Issue: Is the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted,
which efforts failed, a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction? Are brothers by affinity considered members of the
same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j),
Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be
instituted and maintained?
Held:Yes! No!
- The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous social
institution. 2 This is also embodied in Art. 149, 3 and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
-This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.Considering that
Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement is mandatorythat the complaint or petition,
which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same
failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."
- O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, 9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability
to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family, the absence of such
allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of
action
-Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a ground for
motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made."
- But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the above-quoted provisions. As early as two
decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayonthat the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the
same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that
"sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the
same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family",
we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that
petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts
towards a compromise before filing the present suit

Magellan Aerospace vs PAF

Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Facts:- PAF contracted Chervin Enterprises, Inc. (Chervin) for the overhaul of two T76 aircraft engines in an
agreement denominated as "Contract for the Procurement of Services and Overhaul of Two (2) OV10 Engines." Due
to its lack of technical capability to effect the repair and overhaul required by PAF, Chervin commissioned MAC to do
the work for US$364,577.00. MAC, in turn, outsourced the overhaul service from another subcontractor, National
Flight Services, Inc. (NFSI). Eventually, the engines were overhauled and delivered to the PAF. Satisfied with the
service, PAF accepted the overhauled engines.
- MAC demanded from Chervin the payment of US$264,577.00 representing the balance of the contract price.
Notwithstanding the release of funds to Chervin, MAC was not paid for the services rendered despite several
demands.
- MAC filed a complaint for sum of money before the RTC against Chervin together with its Managing Director, Elvi T.
Sosing (Sosing), and the PAF.
- PAF moved to dismiss the complaint averring that its contract with Chervin was one for repair and overhaul and not
for agency; that it was never privy to any contract between Chervin and MAC; and that it already paid Chervin on
January 22, 2009, and on July 13, 2010 in full settlement of its obligations.Chervin also asked the RTC to dismiss the
complaint against them asserting that MAC had no capacity to sue because of its status as a nonresident doing
business in the Philippines without the required license, and that no disclosure was made that it was suing on an
isolated transaction which would mean that the real party-in-interest was not MAC.
- RTC granted both motions to dismiss and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by MAC. Aggrieved, MAC
appealed before the CA. MAC moved for a partial reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied by the
CA. Persistent, MAC filed this petition.
Issue: Did the CA err in finding that the complaint against PAF failed to sufficiently state a cause of action?
Held: No!
- Cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. In pursuing that cause,
a plaintiff must first plead in the complaint a "concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constitutingthe cause
of action." In particular, the plaintiff must show on the face of the complaint that there exists a legal right on his or her
part, a correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right, and an act or omission of such defendant in
violation of the plaintiff’s rights.
-Such a complaint may, however, be subjected to an immediate challenge. Under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court (Rules), the defendant may file a motion to dismiss "[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim" anchored on the defense that the pleading asserting the claim stated no
cause of action.
-In making such challenge, the defendant’s issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. It has nothing to do with the merits of the case. "Whether
those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion." The
inquiry is then limited only into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. Thus, if the allegations in
the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be presented by the defendants. Conversely, the dismissal of the complaint is permitted if the
allegations stated therein fail to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.
- Accordingly, the survival of the complaint against a Rule 16 challenge depends upon the sufficiency of the
averments made. In determining whether an initiatory pleading sufficiently pleads, the test applied is whether the
court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer if the truth of the facts alleged is admitted.
- MAC asserts that the allegations stating that Chervin "acted for and in behalf" of a "principal," PAF, in tapping its
services for the overhaul of the aircraft engines, completed with the requirements of sufficiency in stating its cause of
action against PAF. MAC claims that its allegation of Chervin being "mere agents" of PAF in the overhaul contract,
establishes clearly, under the premise of admitting them as true for purposes of a Rule 16 challenge, its entitlement to
recover from PAF, the latter being the "principal" and "beneficiary."
- this case, the averment that Chervin acted as PAF’s mere agents in subsequently contracting MAC to perform the
overhauling services is not an ultimate fact. Nothing can be found in the complaint that can serve as a premise of
PAF’s status as the principal in the contract between Chervin and MAC. No factual circumstances were alleged that
could plausibly convince the Court that PAF was a party to the subsequent outsourcing of the overhauling services.
Not even in the annexes can the Court find any plausible basis for the assertion of MAC on PAF’s status as a
principal. Had MAC went beyond barren words and included in the complaint essential supporting details, though not
required to be overly specific, this would have permitted MAC to substantiate its claims during the trial and survive the
Rule 16 challenge. In short, factual circumstances serving as predicates were not provided to add to MAC’s barren
statement concerning PAF’s liability.
-What MAC entirely did was to state a mere conclusion of law, if not, an inference based on matters not stated in the
pleading. To clarify, a mere allegation that PAF, as a principal of Chervin, can be held liable for nonpayment of the
amounts due, does not comply with the ultimate fact rule. Without the constitutive factual predicates, any assertion
could never satisfy the threshold of an ultimate fact.
-Not being an ultimate fact, the assumption of truth does not apply to the aforementioned allegation made by MAC
concerning PAF. Consequently, the narrative that PAF can be held liable as a principal in the agreement between
Chervin and MAC cannot be considered in the course of applying the sufficiency test used in Section 1(g) Rule 16. It,
therefore, produces no link to the alleged PAF’s correlative duty to pay the amounts being claimed by MAC – a
necessary element of a cause of action that must be found in the pleading.
- Lacking that essential link, and after hypothetically admitting the truth of all the allegations other than those that are
ought to be excluded for not being ultimate facts, it is demonstrable that the CA correctly ruled for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of MAC’s failure to state its cause of action against PAF
- Proceeding now to whether PAF violated the three-day notice rule relative to its motion to dismiss filed before the
RTC, it has been repeatedly held that the three 3-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court as mandatory for being an integral component of procedural due process. Just like any other
rule, however, this Court has permitted its relaxation subject, of course, to certain conditions.
- Here, the Court agrees with the observations of the OSG, representing PAF. Indeed, it is a matter of record that
during the August 21, 2010 scheduled hearing, MAC’s counsel did not object to receiving the copy of PAF’s motion to
dismiss on the same day. What that counsel did instead was to ask for a period of 15 days within which to file its
comment/opposition to the said motion which the RTC granted. On September 14, 2010, MAC filed its Opposition.

Clearly, MAC was afforded the opportunity to be heard as its opposition to the motion to dismiss was considered by
the RTC in resolving the issue raised by PAF. Objectively speaking, the spirit behind the three (3)-day notice
requirement was satisfied.

Claim or demand set forth in the pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or extinguished

Cua vs WallemPhils.
A petition for review on certiorari
Facts:- Cua filed a civil action for damages against Wallem and Advance Shipping before the RTC of Manila. Cua
sought the payment of P2,030,303.52 for damage to 218 tons and for a shortage of 50 tons of shipment of Brazilian
Soyabean consigned to him, as evidenced by Bill of Lading No. 10. He claimed that the loss was due to the
respondents’ failure to observe extraordinary diligence in carrying the cargo. Advance Shipping (a foreign
corporation) was the owner and manager of M/V Argo Trader that carried the cargo, while Wallem was its local agent.
- Advance Shipping filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, 6 assailing the RTC’s jurisdiction over Cua’s claim; it
argued that Cua’s claim should have first been brought to arbitration. Cua opposed Advance Shipping’s argument; he
contended that he, as a consignee, was not bound by the Charter Party Agreement, which was a contract between
the ship owner (Advance Shipping) and the charterers. The RTC initially deferred resolving the question of jurisdiction
until after trial on the merits, but upon motion by Advance Shipping, the RTC ruled that Cua was not bound by the
arbitration clause in the Charter Party Agreement
-Wallem filed its own motion to dismiss, raising the sole ground of prescription. Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (COGSA) provides that “the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or
damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods.” Wallem alleged that the goods were
delivered to Cua on August 16, 1989, but the damages suit was instituted only on November 12, 1990 – more than
one year than the period allotted under the COGSA. Since the action was filed beyond the one year prescriptive
period, Wallem argued that Cua’s action has been barred.
- Cua filed an opposition to Wallem’s motion to dismiss, denying the latter’s claim of prescription
- Cua filed an opposition to Wallem’s motion to dismiss, denying the latter’s claim of prescription. Cua referred to the
August 10, 1990 telex message sent by Mr. A.R. Filder of Thomas Miller, manager of the UK P&I Club, which stated
that Advance Shipping agreed to extend the commencement of suit for 90 days, from August 14, 1990 to November
12, 1990; the extension was made with the concurrence of the insurer of the vessel, the UK P&I Club. A copy of the
August 10, 1990 telex was supposedly attached to Cua’s opposition
-Wallem filed an omnibus motion, withdrawing its motion to dismiss and adopting instead the arguments in Advance
Shipping’s motion to dismiss. It made an express reservation, however, that it was not waiving “the defense of
prescription and will allege as one of its defenses, such defense of prescription and/or laches in its Answer should
this be required by the circumstances
- RTC resolved that “the Court need not act on the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant Wallem Philippines
Shipping, Inc.[,]” and required the defendants therein to file their Answer. After trial on the merits, the RTC issued its
decision on December 28, 1995, 19 ordering the respondents jointly and severally liable to pay as damages to Cua
- The respondents filed an appeal with the CA, insisting that Cua’s claim is arbitrable and has been barred by
prescription and/or laches. The CA found the respondents’ claim of prescription meritorious. Cua filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision, which was denied by the CA
Issue: Has Cua’s claim for payment of damages against the respondents prescribed?
Held: No!
- The failure to raise or plead the grounds generally amounts to a waiver, except if the ground pertains to (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litispendentia, (3) resjudicata, or (4) prescription. If the facts supporting any of
these four listed grounds are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record, the courts may consider these
grounds motuproprio and accordingly dismiss the complaint. Accordingly, no reversible error may be attributed to the
CA in considering prescription as a ground to dismiss Cua’s action despite Wallem’s supposed waiver of the defense.
The Court, therefore, need not resolve the question of whether Wallem actually waived the defense of prescription;
an inquiry into this question is useless, as courts are empowered to dismiss actions on the basis of prescription even
if it is not raised by the defendant so long as the facts supporting this ground are evident from the records. In the
present case, what is decisive is whether the pleadings and the evidence support a finding that Cua’s claim has
prescribed, and it is on this point that we disagree with the CA’s findings. We find that the CA failed to appreciate the
admissions made by the respondents in their pleadings that negate a finding of prescription of Cua’s claim.
- Respondents admitted the agreement extending the period to file the claim
- The vessel MV Argo Trader arrived in Manila on July 8, 1989; Cua’s complaint for damages was filed before the
RTC of Manila on November 12, 1990. Although the complaint was clearly filed beyond the one-year period, Cua
additionally alleged in his complaint (under paragraph 11) that “[t]he defendants x x x agreed to extend the time for
filing of the action up to November 12, 1990.”
-The allegation of an agreement extending the period to file an action in Cua’s complaint is a material averment that,
under Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, must be specifically denied by the respondents; otherwise, the
allegation is deemed admitted
- review of the pleadings submitted by the respondents discloses that they failed to specifically deny Cua’s allegation
of an agreement extending the period to file an action to November 12, 1990. Wallem’s motion to dismiss simply
referred to the fact that Cua’s complaint was filed more than one year from the arrival of the vessel, but it did not
contain a denial of the extension. Advance Shipping’s motion to dismiss, on the other hand, focused solely on its
contention that the action was premature for failure to first undergo arbitration. While the joint answer submitted by
the respondents denied Cua’s allegation of an extension, they made no further statement other than a bare and
unsupported contention that Cua’s “complaint is barred by prescription and/or laches[.]” The respondents did not
provide in their joint answer any factual basis for their belief that the complaint had prescribed.

Caltex vs Aguirre
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:- Dubbed as the Asia's Titanic, 1 the M/V Dona Paz was an inter-island passenger vessel owned and operated
by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio) traversing its Leyte to Manila route on the night of December 20, 1987, when it
collided with M/T Vector, a commercial tanker owned and operated by Vector Shipping Corporation, Inc., (Vector
Shipping). On that particular voyage, M/T Vector was chartered by Caltex (Philippines) Inc., et al. (petitioners) to
transport petroleum products. The collision brought forth an inferno at sea with an estimate of about 4,000 casualties,
and was described as the "world's worst peace time maritime disaster." It precipitated the filing of numerous lawsuits,
the instant case included.
-In December 1988, the heirs of the victims of the tragedy (respondents), instituted a class action with the Civil
District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, United States of America (Louisiana Court), docketed as
Civil Case No. 88-24481 entitled "SivirinoCarreon, et al. v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., et al." On November 30, 2000,
the Louisiana Court entered a conditional judgment dismissing the said case on the ground of forum non-conveniens.
This led the respondents, composed of 1,689 claimants, to file on March 6, 2001 a civil action for damages for breach
of contract of carriage and quasi-delict with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 28 (RTC of
Catbalogan), against the herein petitioners, Sulpicio, Vector Shipping, and Steamship Mutual Underwriting
Association, Bermuda Limited (Steamship). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 7277 entitled "Ma. Flor Singzon-
Aguirre, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et al.
-RTC of Catbalogan, motuproprio dismissed the complaint pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as the respondents' cause of action had already prescribed. In an unusual turn of events however, the
petitioners as defendants therein, who were not served with summons, filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that
they are waiving their defense of prescription, among others. The RTC of Catbalogan, however, merely noted the
petitioners' motion.
-The dismissal of the complaint prompted the respondents to have the case reinstated with the Louisiana Court. The
petitioners, as defendants, however argued against it and contended that the Philippines offered a more convenient
forum for the parties, specifically the RTC of Manila, Branch 39 (RTC of Manila), where three consolidated cases
concerning the M/V Dona Paz collision were pending
-RTC of Manila issued its Order 16 denying the respondents' motion to intervene for lack of merit. The RTC of Manila
ruled that the RTC of Catbalogan had already dismissed the case with finality; that a final and executory prior
judgment is a bar to the filing of the complaint in intervention of the respondents; and that the waivers of the defense
of prescription made by the petitioners, Sulpicio and Steamship are of no moment. The motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioners, Sulpicio and Steamship was denied
Issues: DID THE CA ERR IN RULING THAT THE ORDERS CATBALOGAN BARRED THE FILING OF THE
MOTION AND INTERVENTION BEFORE THE RTC OF MANILA? DID THE CA ERR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC OF
MANILA'S DISREGARD OF THE PETITIONERS' WAIVER OF PRESCRIPTION ON THE GROUND OF BAR BY
PRIOR JUDGMENT?
Held:No! No!
-There is no dispute that the respondents' cause of action against the petitioners has prescribed under the Civil Code.
In fact, the same is evident on the complaint itself. The respondents brought their claim before a Philippine court only
on March 6, 2001, more than 13 years after the collision occurred. Article 1139 of the Civil Code states that actions
prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. Accordingly, the RTC of Catbalogan cannot be faulted for the
motuproprio dismissal of the complaint filed before it. It is settled that prescription may be considered by the courts
motuproprio if the facts supporting the ground are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
-The peculiarity in this case is that the petitioners, who were the defendants in the antecedent cases before the RTCs
of Catbalogan and Manila, are most adamant in invoking their waiver of the defense of prescription while the
respondents, to whom the cause of action belong, have acceded to the dismissal of their complaint. The petitioners
posit that there is a conflict between a substantive law and procedural law in as much as waiver of prescription is
allowed under Article 1112 of the Civil Code, a substantive law even though the motuproprio dismissal of a claim that
has prescribed is mandated under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
- The Court has previously held that the right to prescription may be waived or renounced pursuant to Article 1112 of
the Civil Code.
- In the instant case, not only once did the petitioners expressly renounce their defense of prescription. Nonetheless,
the Court cannot consider such waiver as basis in order to reverse the rulings of the courts below as the dismissal of
the complaint had become final and binding on both the petitioners and the respondents
- The RTC of Manila denied the respondents' motion for intervention on the ground of the finality of the order of the
RTC of Catbalogan, there being no appeal or any other legal remedy perfected in due time by either the petitioners or
the respondents. Since the dismissal of the complaint was already final and executory, the RTC of Manila can no
longer entertain a similar action from the same parties. The bone of contention is not regarding the petitioners'
execution of waivers of the defense of prescription, but the effect of finality of an order or judgment on both parties.
-Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him"
because the "presumption [is] that a party who did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by
the lower court." Whether the dismissal was based on the merits or technicality is beside the point. "[A] dismissal on a
technicality is no different in effect and consequences from a dismissal on the merits."

Claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under statute of frauds

Swedish Match vs Ca
Facts:- Swedish Match AB (hereinafter SMAB) is a corporation organized under the laws of Sweden not doing
business in the Philippines. SMAB, however, had three subsidiary corporations in the Philippines, all organized under
Philippine laws, to wit: Phimco Industries, Inc. (Phimco), Provident Tree Farms, Inc., and OTT/Louie (Phils.), Inc.
- STORA, the then parent company of SMAB, decided to sell SMAB of Sweden and the latter’s worldwide match,
lighter and shaving products operation to Eemland Management Services, now known as Swedish Match NV of
Netherlands, (SMNV), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Netherlands. STORA, however,
retained for itself the packaging business
- SMNV initiated steps to sell the worldwide match and lighter businesses while retaining for itself the shaving
business. SMNV adopted a two-pronged strategy, the first being to sell its shares in Phimco Industries
- Several interested parties tendered offers to acquire the Phimco shares, among whom were the AFP Retirement
and Separation Benefits System, herein respondent ALS Management & Development Corporation and respondent
Antonio Litonjua (Litonjua), the president and general manager of ALS
-Litonjua submitted to SMAB a firm offer to buy all of the latter’s shares in Phimco and all of Phimco’s shares in
Provident Tree Farm, Inc. and OTT/Louie (Phils.), Inc. for the sum of P750,000,000.00.
- Thereafter, an exchange of correspondence ensued between petitioners and respondents regarding the projected
sale of the Phimco shares
- Litonjua in a letter dated 18 June 1990, expressed disappointment at the apparent change in SMAB’s approach to
the bidding process.
-Two days prior to the deadline for submission of the final bid, Litonjua again advised Rossi that they would be unable
to submit the final offer by 30 June 1990, considering that the acquisition audit of Phimco and the review of the draft
agreements had not yet been completed.
-Enriquez sent notice to Litonjua that they would be constrained to entertain bids from other parties in view of
Litonjua’s failure to make a firm commitment for the shares of Swedish Match in Phimco
- Rossi informed Litonjua that on 2 July 1990, they signed a conditional contract with a local group for the disposal of
Phimco. He told Litonjua that his bid would no longer be considered unless the local group would fail to consummate
the transaction on or before 15 September1990.
-Apparently irked by SMAB’s decision to junk his bid, Litonjua promptly responded by letter.. He pointed out that they
submitted the best bid and they were already finalizing the terms of the sale.
-More than two months from receipt of Litonjua’s last letter, Enriquez sent a fax communication to the former,
advising him that the proposed sale of SMAB’s shares in Phimco with local buyers did not materialize. Enriquez then
invited Litonjua to resume negotiations with SMAB for the sale of Phimco shares. He indicated that SMAB would be
prepared to negotiate with ALS on an exclusive basis for a period of fifteen (15) days from 26 September 1990
subject to the terms contained in the letter. Additionally, Enriquez clarified that if the sale would not be completed at
the end of the fifteen (15)-day period, SMAB would enter into negotiations with other buyers.
-Shortly thereafter, Litonjua sent a letter expressing his objections to the totally new set of terms and conditions for
the sale of the Phimco shares. He emphasized that the new offer constituted an attempt to reopen the already
perfected contract of sale of the shares in his favor. He intimated that he could not accept the new terms and
conditions contained therein.
-respondents, as plaintiffs, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for specific performance
with damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, against defendants, now petitioners.
The individual defendants were sued in their respective capacities as officers of the corporations or entities involved
in the aborted transaction
-Aside from the averments related to their principal cause of action for specific performance, respondents alleged that
the Phimco management, in utter bad faith, induced SMAB to violate its contract with respondents
-Respondents prayed that petitioners be enjoined from selling or transferring the Phimco shares, or otherwise
implementing the sale or transfer thereof, in favor of any person or entity other than respondents, and that any such
sale to third parties be annulled and set aside. Respondents also asked that petitioners be ordered to execute all
documents or instruments and perform all acts necessary to consummate the sales agreement in their favor.
-Traversing the complaint, petitioners alleged that respondents have no cause of action, contending that no perfected
contract, whether verbal or written, existed between them. Petitioners added that respondents’ cause of action, if any,
was barred by the Statute of Frauds since there was no written instrument or document evidencing the alleged sale of
the Phimco shares to respondents.
-RTC dismissed respondents’ complaint. Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that the series of
written communications between petitioners and respondents collectively constitute a sufficient memorandum of their
agreement under Article 1403 of the Civil Code; thus, respondents’ complaint should not have been dismissed on the
ground that it was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
Issue: Did the CA err in ruling that Statute of Frauds applies in this case?
Held: Yes!
-The Statute of Frauds embodied in Article 1403, paragraph (2), of the Civil Code requires certain contracts
enumerated therein to be evidenced by some note or memorandum in order to be enforceable. The term "Statute of
Frauds" is descriptive of statutes which require certain classes of contracts to be in writing. The Statute does not
deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulates the
formalitiesof the contract necessary to render it enforceable. writing or a secondary evidence of its contents.
-Evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the The Statute, however, simply provides the method by
which the contracts enumerated therein may be proved but does not declare them invalid because they are not
reduced to writing. By law, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all
the essential requisites for their validity are present. However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form
in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute
and indispensable. Consequently, the effect of non- compliance with the requirement of the Statute is simply that no
action can be enforced unless the requirement is complied with. Clearly, the form required is for evidentiary purposes
only. Hence, if the parties permit a contract to be proved, without any objection, it is then just as binding as if the
Statute has been complied with.
-The purpose of the Statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their
evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses, by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be
evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged
-However, for a note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute, it must be complete in itself and cannot rest partly in
writing and partly in parol. The note or memorandum must contain the names of the parties, the terms and conditions
of the contract, and a description of the property sufficient to render it capable of identification. Such note or
memorandum must contain the essential elements of the contract expressed with certainty that may be ascertained
from the note or memorandum itself, or some other writing to which it refers or within which it is connected, without
resorting to parol evidence
-Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, the exchange of correspondence between the parties hardly
constitutes the note or memorandum within the context of Article 1403 of the Civil Code. Rossi’s letter dated 11 June
1990, heavily relied upon by respondents, is not complete in itself. First, it does not indicate at what price the shares
were being sold. In paragraph (5) of the letter, respondents were supposed to submit their final offer in U.S. dollar
terms, at that after the completion of the due diligence process. The paragraph undoubtedly proves that there was as
yet no definite agreement as to the price. Second, the letter does not state the mode of payment of the price. In fact,
Litonjua was supposed to indicate in his final offer how and where payment for the shares was planned to be made
-Specifically, in the case of a contract of sale, required is the concurrence of three elements, to wit: (a) consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter,
and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. Such contract is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
-Quite obviously, Litonjua’s letter dated 21 May 1990, proposing the acquisition of the Phimco shares for US$36
million was merely an offer. This offer, however, in Litonjua’s own words, "is understood to be subject to adjustment
on the basis of an audit of the assets, liabilities and net worth of Phimco and its subsidiaries and on the final
negotiation between ourselves." Was the offer certain enough to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds?
Definitely not

That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with
*see Guerrero case again :)

As affirmative defenses

California and Hawaiian Sugar Co vs CF Sharp

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:-On November 27, 1990, the vessel MV SUGAR ISLANDER arrived at the port of Manila carrying a cargo of
soybean meal in bulk consigned to several consignees, one of which was the Metro Manila Feed Millers Association
(Metro for [b]revity). Discharging of cargo from vessel to barges commenced on November 30, 1990. From the
barges, the cargo was allegedly offloaded, rebagged and reloaded on consignees delivery trucks. Respondent,
however, claims that when the cargo [was] weighed on a licensed truck scale a shortage of 255.051 metric tons
valued at P1,621,171.16 was discovered. The above-mentioned shipment was insured with private respondent
against all risk in the amount of P19,976,404.00. Due to the alleged refusal of petitioners to settle their respective
liabilities, respondent, as insurer, paid the consignee Metro
-Manila Feed Millers Association. On March 26, 1992, as alleged subrogee of Metro, private respondent filed a
complaint for damages against herein petitioners. Within the reglementary period to file an Answer, petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondents claim is premature, the same being arbitrable.
Private respondent filed its Opposition thereto and petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition.
- [the RTC] issued an Order deferring the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss until the trial and directing petitioners to
file their Answer. Petitioners then moved to reconsider said Order which was, however, denied by [the RTC] on the
ground that the reason relied upon by herein petitioners in its Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration [was]
a matter of defense which they must prove with their evidence
- petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim alleging therein that plaintiff, herein respondent, did
not comply with the arbitration clause of the charter party; hence, the complaint was allegedly prematurely filed. The
trial court set the case for pre-trial
- petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Pre-Trial and Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing the Affirmative Defense of
Lack of Cause of Action for Failure to comply with Arbitration Clause, respectively. Private respondent did not file an
Opposition to the said Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing. On December 28, 1993, [the RTC] issued an Order
denying the Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing. On February 2, 1994 petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order dated December 28, 1993. On February 11, 1994, [the RTC] issued an Order denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.
- Affirming the trial court, the CA held that petitioners cannot rely on Section 5, Rule 16 of the pre-1997 Rules of
Court, because a Motion to Dismiss had previously been filed.
Issue:Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion for preliminary hearing?
Held: Yes!
-Still in effect when the case was before the trial court, Section 5, Rule 16 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, reads:
Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule, except
improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed.
-Respondent argues that the above provision cannot be applied, because petitioners have already filed a Motion to
Dismiss.
-We disagree. Respondent relies on the amendments introduced in the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure ("1997 Rules),
but ignores equally relevant provisions thereof, as well as the clear intendment of the pre-1997 Rules. True, Section
6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules, specifically provides that a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses may be
allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed. Section 6, however, must be viewed in the light of -Section 3
of the same Rule, which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits them from deferring its resolution
on the ground of indubitability. Clearly then, Section 6 disallows a preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses once a
motion to dismiss has been filed because such defense should have already been resolved. In the present case,
however, the trial court did not categorically resolve petitioners Motion to Dismiss, but merely deferred resolution
thereof.
-Indeed, the present Rules are consistent with Section 5, Rule 16 of the pre-1997 Rules of -Court, because both
presuppose that no motion to dismiss had been filed; or in the case of the pre-1997 Rules, if one has been filed, it
has not been unconditionally denied. Hence, the ground invoked may still be pleaded as an affirmative defense even
if the defendants Motion to Dismiss has been filed but not definitely resolved, or if it has been deferred as it could be
under the pre- 1997 Rules.
-Undeniably, a preliminary hearing is not mandatory, but subject to the discretion of the trial court. In the light of the
circumstances in this case, though, we find that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
grant the Motion.
-We note that the trial court deferred the resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss because of a single issue. It was
apparently unsure whether the charter party that the bill of lading referred to was indeed the Baltimore Berth Grain
Charter Party submitted by petitioners.

Considering that there was only one question, which may even be deemed to be the very touchstone of the whole
case, the trial court had no cogent reason to deny the Motion for Preliminary Hearing. Indeed, it committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied a preliminary hearing on a simple issue of fact that could have possibly settled the
entire case. Verily, where a preliminary hearing appears to suffice, there is no reason to go on to trial. One reason
why dockets of trial courts are clogged is the unreasonable refusal to use a process or procedure, like a motion to
dismiss, which is designed to abbreviate the resolution of a case.
(Basta parang sa case na to, sinasabi lang grabenaman si Rtc na dinenyyung preliminary hearing eh yungmtdngani
petitioners dinefer din. Kayanganiraisenalang as an affirmative defense. Lahatnalangbaididismiss?
PakingganmunasananiRtcyungsinasabinipetitioners!)

Sps. Rasdas vs Estenor

Petition for Review under Rule 45
Facts:- The dispute centers on a parcel of land with an area of 703 square meters, situated in Ilagan, Isabela. On 29
October 1992, respondent as plaintiff filed a Complaint For Recovery Of Ownership And Possession With Damages
against petitioners as defendants
- the RTC decided Civil Case No. 673 in favor of petitioners. Respondent appealed the RTC decision before the
Court of Appeals
- the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the RTC, and declared respondent as the owner of the subject
property. As a result, petitioners were ordered to vacate the land.
- The decision became final and executory after a petition for certiorari assailing its validity was dismissed by this
Court. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution and Writ of Demolition was issued against petitioners, who were ordered to
demolish their houses, structures, and improvements on the property.
-Petitioners as plaintiffs then filed a Complaint dated 6 July 1999 against respondent for just compensation and
preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1090, and heard by
the same RTC Branch 16 that ruled on the first complaint. Notwithstanding the earlier pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals, petitioners asserted therein that they were the lawful owners of the subject property , although they
ultimately conceded the efficacy of the appellate courts final and executory decision. Still, they alleged that they were
entitled to just compensation relating to the value of the houses they had built on the property, owing to their
purported status as builders in good faith. They claimed that the Court of Appeals decision did not declare them as
builders in bad faith, and thus, they were entitled to be reimbursed of the value of their houses before these could be
demolished. They posited that without such reimbursement, they could not be ejected from their houses
- Respondent as defendant countered with a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that petitioners complaint was barred by res
judicata, owing to the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Motion to Dismiss was initially
denied by the RTC in an Order dated 4 August 1999 , and pre-trial ensued. However, before trial proper could begin,
respondent filed a motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata
- wherein the RTC declared itself constrained to apply the principle of res judicata, thus reversing its earlier order. In
doing so, the RTC concluded that the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals had already effectively settled that
petitioners were in fact builders in bad faith. The finding of res judicata was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
assailed Decision.
- Petitioners also claim that there was no identity of causes of action in Civil Case No. 673, which concerned the
ownership of the land, and in Civil Case No. 1090, which pertained to just compensation under Article 448 of the Civil
Code. Even assuming that res judicata obtains, petitioners claim that the said rule may be disregarded if its
application would result in grave injustice.
Issue: Did the RTC err in holding a preliminary hearing?
Held: Yes!
-We observe at the onset that it does appear that the RTCs act of staging preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defense of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata is not in regular order. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the allowance for a preliminary hearing, while left in the discretion of the court, is authorized only if
no motion to dismiss has been filed but any of the grounds for a motion to dismiss had been pleaded as an
affirmative defense in the answer. In this case, respondents had filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata, but the same was denied. They thus filed an answer alleging res judicata as a special affirmative defense,
but later presented a Motion for Preliminary Hearing which was granted, leading to the dismissal of the case. The
general rule must be reiterated that the preliminary hearing contemplated under Section 6, Rule 16 applies only if no
motion to dismiss has been filed. This is expressly provided under the rule, which relevantly states [i]f no motion to
dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in [Rule 16] may be pleaded as an affirmative
defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to
dismiss had been filed. An exception was carved out in California and Hawaiian Sugar Company v.
PioneerInsurance, wherein the Court noted that while Section 6 disallowed a preliminary hearing of affirmative
defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed, such hearing could nonetheless be had if the trial court had not
categorically resolved the motion to dismiss. Such circumstance doesnot obtain in this case, since the trial court had
already categorically denied the motion to dismiss prior to the filing of the answer and the motion for preliminary
hearing
-On the part of the movant whose motion to dismiss had already been filed and denied, the proper remedy is to file a
motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion. If such motion for reconsideration is denied, the ground for the
dismissal of the complaint may still be litigated at the trial on the merits.
-Clearly, the denial of a motion to dismiss does not preclude any future reliance on the grounds relied thereupon.
However, nothing in the rules expressly authorizes a preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to
dismiss has been filed and denied. Thus, the strict application of Section 6, Rule 16 in this case should cause us to
rule that the RTC erred in conducting the preliminary hearing.
- However, there is an exceptional justification for us to overlook this procedural error and nonetheless affirm the
dismissal of the complaint. The complaint in question is so evidently barred by res judicata, it would violate the
primordial objective of procedural law to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding should the Court allow this prohibited complaint from festering in our judicial system. Indeed, the rule
sanctioning the liberal construction of procedural rules is tailor-made for a situation such as this, when a by-the-
numbers application of the rule would lead to absurdity, such as the continued litigation of an obviously barred
complaint
(Mali yung procedure, perotaloparin si petitioners kasinga res judicata na :))

No motion to dismiss allowed

Tan vs Tan
A petition for review
Facts:-Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in Intramuros,Manila
- In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement
- the trial court issued a partial judgmentapproving the compromise agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court
rendered a decision declaring the marriagevoid under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual
psychological incapacityof the parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of
theparties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and property relations
-It also appears from the records that petitioner left the country bringing the children with her
- Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. The evidence presented by
respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without prior
authority of the trial court
-Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner
to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latters name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family
dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City
- Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration alleging denial of due
process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
- Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
- petitioner filed a motion to dismissand a motion forreconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed
she was no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her life had led her to the
conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of the children. She prayed that an order be issued
vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit
- the trial court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It held that the
30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-
day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party
- Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The trialcourt then issued a
Certificate of Finality of the resolution of the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
- Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if
indeed the provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the preservation of the
family.
Issue:Did the trial court err in applying Sec7?
Held: Yes!
-As for the applicability to petitioners motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section
7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides:
SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a
dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
-The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an answer, instead of
a mere motion to dismiss, so that judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or object
of the law is an important factor to beconsidered. Further, the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but
that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may
warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion is
that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage
- Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does
not apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her.
- However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17
May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary
period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The trial court
was correct in denying petitioners motion to dismiss.

Aldersgate College vs Gauuan

A petition for review
Facts:- petitioners Aldersgate College, Inc., Arsenio L. Mendoza, Ignacio A. Galindez, Wilson E. Sagadraca, and
FilipinasMenzen, together with now deceased Justino R. Vigilia, Castulo Villanueva, Samuel F. Erana and Socorro
Cabanilla, filed a case against the respondents before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). When the
SEC was reorganized pursuant to Republic Act 8799, the case was transferred to the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya for
further proceedings.
-Pre trial thereafter ensued and a Pre-Trial Order was issued.
- In a motion dated August 10, 2003, respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint or the issuance of a
summary judgment dismissing the case. On February 16, 2004, the RTC denied the motion on the ground that “there
are several issues raised which would still need the presentation of evidence to determine the rights of the parties.” A
few years later, respondents-intervenors also sought the dismissal of the complaint in their Answer-in-Intervention
with Motion to Dismiss dated February 27, 2008 raising the lack of capacity, personality or authority to sue the
individual petitioners in behalf of Aldersgate College, Inc. The RTC, in its February 6, 2009 Order, once more brushed
aside the attempt to have the case dismissed. Unfazed, the respondents-intervenors again filed in February 2010 a
Motion to Withdraw and/or to Dismiss Case, alleging that the case was instituted without any board resolution
authorizing its filing and that the incumbent members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner AldersgateCollege, Inc.
had recently passed a resolution which sought the dismissal and/or withdrawal of the case.
- RTC granted the motion despite the opposition of the petitioners, and dismissed the case on the basis of the
Resolution passed by the members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner Aldersgate College dated December 14,
2009 recommending the dismissal of the case.Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Did the Rtc err in dismissing the case?
Held: Yes!
- In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed “within the time for but before filing the answer
to the complaint” and on the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
- The rule is, however, different with respect to intra-corporate controversies. Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim
Rules of Procedure for Intra- Corporate Controversies, a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
- As this case involves an intra-corporate dispute, the motion to dismiss is undeniably a prohibited pleading.
Moreover, the Court finds no justification for the dismissal of the case based on the mere issuance of a board
resolution by the incumbent members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner corporation recommending its dismissal,
especially considering the various issues raised by the parties before the court a quo. Hence, the RTC should not
have entertained, let alone have granted the subject motion to dismiss