G.R. No. 208232 March 10, 2014
(CA) 141,
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R.
BAUTISTA, namely: EPIFANIA G. BAUTISTA
and ZOEY G. BAUTISTA, Petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO LINDO and WELHILMINA
LINDO; and HEIRS OF FILIPINA DAQUIGAN,
namely: MA. LOURDES DAQUIGAN, IMELDA
CATHERINE DAQUIGAN, IMELDA
DAQUIGAN and CORSINO DAQUIGAN,
REBECCA QUIAMCO and ANDRES QUIAMCO,
ROMULO LORICA and DELIA LORICA,
GEORGE CAJES and LAURA CAJES, MELIDA
BANEZ and FRANCISCO BANEZ, MELANIE
GOFREDO, GERV ACIO CAJES and ISABEL
CAJES, EGMEDIO SEGOVIA and VERGINIA
SEGOVIA, ELSA N. SAM, PEDRO M. SAM and
LINA SAM, SANTIAGO MENDEZ and MINA
MENDEZ, HELEN M. BURTON and
LEONARDO BURTON, JOSE JACINTO and
BIENVENIDA JACINTO, IMELDA DAQUIGAN,
LEO MA TIGA and ALICIA MATIGA,
FLORENCIO ACEDO JR., and LYLA VALERIO,
Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 assailing the April 25, 2013 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No.
(1798)-021 as well as its Order of July 3, 2013
denying reconsideration.
The Facts
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s
predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land
located in Poblacion, Lupon, Davao Oriental and
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. (1572) P-6144. A few years later, he
subdivided the property and sold it to several
vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized
deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two
months later, OCT No. (1572) P-6144 was
canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) were issued in favor of the vendees.1
Three years after the sale, or on August 5, 1994,
Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against
respondents before the RTC, Branch 32, Lupon,
Davao Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No.
1798,2 anchoring his cause of action on Section
119 of Commonwealth Act No.
otherwise known as the "Public Land Act," which
reads:
SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land
acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date
of the conveyance.
Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of
cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and
laches, as defenses.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case,
Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner
Epifania G. Bautista (Epifania).
Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo
later entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to
Epifania a three thousand two hundred and
thirty square meter (3,230 sq.m.)-portion of the
property as well as to waive, abandon,
surrender, and withdraw all claims and
counterclaims against each other. The
compromise was approved by the RTC in its
Decision dated January 27, 2011, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, a DECISION is hereby rendered
based on the above-quoted Compromise
Agreement and the parties are enjoined to
strictly comply with the terms and conditions of
the same.
SO ORDERED.3
Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to
Dismiss4 dated February 4, 2013, alleging that
the complaint failed to state the value of the
property sought to be recovered. Moreover, they
asserted that the total selling price of all the
properties is only sixteen thousand five hundred
pesos (PhP 16,500), and the selling price or
market value of a property is always higher than
its assessed value. Since Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the
RTCs over civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property or interest therein
where the assessed value is more than PhP
20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the complaint in question since the property
which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the
PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.
RTC Ruling5
Acting on the motion, the RTC issued the
assailed order dismissing the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. The trial court found that
Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the
value of the subject property exceeds 20
thousand pesos. Furthermore, what was only
stated therein was that the total and full refund
of the purchase price of the property is PhP
16,500. This omission was considered by the
RTC as fatal to the case considering that in real
actions, jurisdictional amount is determinative
of whether it is the municipal trial court or the
RTC that has jurisdiction over the case.
With respect to the belated filing of the motion,
the RTC, citing Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc.
v. Kemper Insurance Company,6 held that a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction may be
filed at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, the complaint for Repurchase,
Consignation, with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.7
Assignment of Errors
Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioners now seek recourse before this
Court with the following assigned errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT RTC ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS
DATED FEBRUARY 4, 2013, BELATEDLY
FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN
THE CASE.
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT RTC ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE FOR
REPURCHASE IS A REAL ACTION.8
The Issue
Stated differently, the issue for the Court’s
resolution is: whether or not the RTC erred in
granting the motion for the dismissal of the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Arguments
Petitioners argue that respondents belatedly
filed their Motion to Dismiss and are now
estopped from seeking the dismissal of the case,
it having been filed nine (9) years after the filing
of the complaint and after they have actively
participated in the proceedings. Additionally,
they allege that an action for repurchase is not a
real action, but one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, it being founded on privity of
contract between the parties. According to
petitioners, what they seek is the enforcement of
their right to repurchase the subject property
under Section 119 of CA 141.
Respondents, for their part, maintain that since
the land is no longer devoted to agriculture, the
right of repurchase under said law can no longer
be availed of, citing Santana v. Mariñas.9
Furthermore, they suggest that petitioners
intend to resell the property for a higher profit,
thus, the attempt to repurchase. This, according
to respondents, goes against the policy and is not
in keeping with the spirit of CA 141 which is the
preservation of the land gratuitously given to
patentees by the State as a reward for their labor
in cultivating the property. Also, the Deed of
Absolute Sale presented in evidence by Bautista
was unilaterally executed by him and was not
signed by respondents. Lastly, respondents
argue that repurchase is a real action capable of
pecuniary estimation.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the
instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129,
which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.―Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level
courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which
provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.―Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
The core issue is whether the action filed by
petitioners is one involving title to or possession
of real property or any interest therein or one
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The course of action embodied in the complaint
by the present petitioners’ predecessor, Alfredo
R. Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase
the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right
of a free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141
or the Public Land Act.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a
land subject of a free patent is a civil action
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief
sought.10 In this regard, the Court, in Russell v.
Vestil,11 wrote that "in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction
is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would
depend on the amount of the claim." But where
the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable
exclusively by RTCs.12
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil
actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the
determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower
courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of
contracts;13
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.14
The Court finds that the instant cause of action
to redeem the land is one for specific
performance.
The facts are clear that Bautista sold to
respondents his lots which were covered by a
free patent. While the deeds of sale do not
explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is
subject to repurchase by the applicant within a
period of five (5) years from the date of
conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still,
such legal provision is deemed integrated and
made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by
law. It is basic that the law is deemed written
into every contract.15 Although a contract is the
law between the parties, the provisions of
positive law which regulate contracts are
deemed written therein and shall limit and
govern the relations between the parties.16
Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of
Bautista which he may seek to enforce. That is
precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to
enforce his right granted by law to recover the
lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his
action is for specific performance, or if not
strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous
to one of specific performance. Such being the
case, his action for specific performance is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and
cognizable by the RTC.
Respondents argue that Bautista’s action is one
involving title to or possession of real property
or any interests therein and since the selling
price is less than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction
is lodged with the MTC. They rely on Sec. 33 of
BP 129.
Republic Act No. 769117 amended Sec. 33 of BP
129 and gave Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all
civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos
(PhP 20,000) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
At first blush, it appears that the action filed by
Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots
he sold to respondents. Since the total selling
price is less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not
the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This
proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of
the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-
interests, the present petitioners, is but
incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of
the right by the latter to redeem said lots
pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141. The reconveyance
of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on
the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots
in question and is not the principal or main
relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of
petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is
merely the outcome of the performance of the
obligation to return the property conformably to
the express provision of CA 141.
Even if we treat the present action as one
involving title to real property or an interest
therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the
first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the
total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below
the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of
respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not
hold water. This is because respondents have
actually participated in the proceedings before
the RTC and aggressively defended their
position, and by virtue of which they are already
barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC
following the principle of jurisdiction by
estoppel.
In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was
held that the party raising defenses to the
complaint, actively participating in the
proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his
evidence, and invoking its authority by asking
for an affirmative relief is deemed estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court.18
Here, we note that aside from the belated filing
of the motion to dismiss––it having been filed
nine (9) years from the filing of the complaint––
respondents actively participated in the
proceedings through the following acts:
1. By filing their Answer and Opposition to the
Prayer for Injunction19 dated September 29,
1994 whereby they even interposed
counterclaims, specifically: PhP 501,000 for
unpaid survey accounts, PhP 100,000 each as
litigation expenses, PhP 200,000 and PhP 3,000
per daily appearance by way of attorney’s fees,
PhP 500,000 as moral damages, PhP 100,000
by way of exemplary damages, and costs of suit;
2. By participating in Pre-trial;
3. By moving for the postponement of their
presentation of evidence;20
4. By presenting their witness;21 and
5. By submitting the compromise agreement for
approval.22
Having fully participated in all stages of the case,
and even invoking the RTC’s authority by asking
for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer
assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court.
Simply put, considering the extent of their
participation in the case, they are, as they should
be, considered estopped from raising lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the
action.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. The April 25, 2013
and July 3, 2013 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. (1798)-021 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 in Lupon,
Davao Oriental is ORDERED to proceed with
dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. (1798)-021.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 123215 February 2, 1999
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON, ARSENIO J.
MAGPALE, and JOSE MA. P. JACINTO,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision, 1 dated September 11, 1995, of the
Court of Appeals, which dismissed the special
civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner
National Steel Corporation (NSC) to set aside
the order, dated April 6, 1994, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch LVII, City of Makati. In the
said order, the trial court denied the motion of
petitioner NSC to dismiss the complaint for
recovery of personal property which private
respondent Jose P. Jacinto had filed.
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent Jacinto was the former
owner of record of 100 shares of stock of the
Manila Golf and Country Club (MGCC) now
owned by and registered in the name of
petitioner NSC. On February 9, 1990, he filed a
complaint 2 against the NSC, alleging that —
4. In or about 1970, for valuable
considerations, Manila Golf and Country Club,
Inc. (MGCCI) issued its Stock Certificate No.
1361 to plaintiff representing 100 shares of
MGCCI.
5. From about 1972 up to the early part of
February 1986, plaintiff was abroad and could
not return to the Philippines for reasons beyond
his control.
6. When plaintiff returned to the
philippines in 1986, he discovered that Stock
Certificate No. 1361 had been cancelled and a
replacement Stock Certiftcate had been issued in
the name of NSC.
7 The cancellation and transfer of
plaintiffs Stock Certificate No. 1361 is void for
the reasons that: there was no meeting of minds,
there was no specific contract between plaintiff
and NSC or any party covering the alleged
transfer nor was there any consideration for the
same.
8. Despite repeated demands upon NSC to
return and re-transfer plaintiff's 100 shares in
MGCCI formerly covered by said Stock
Certificate No. 1361, NSC failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to comply with the same.
9. MGCCI's act in cancelling plaintiffs
stock certificate No. 1361 and issuing a
replacement certificate in the name of NSC is
without basis and illegal considering that there
was no valid document evidencing the
assignment, sale or transfer by plaintiff to NSC
of MGCCI stock certificate No. 1361.
10. In consequence of NSC and MGCCI's
illegal act in causing the cancellation and
transfer of plaintiff's Stock Certificate No. 1361
unto NSC's name:
10.1. Plaintiff suffered mental anguish for
which an award of moral damages of P1 Million
is proper;
10.2. Plaintiff was constrained to litigate and
secure the services of counsel for a fee of
P100,000.00 and for which NSC and MGCCI
should be held liable.
Based on the foregoing allegations, Jacinto
prayed:
PRAYER
WHEREFOREI it is respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering NSC to execute a deed of
assignment re-transferring unto plaintiff the
MGCCI certificate issued to the former in
replacement of Stock Certificate No. 1361 and to
surrender said Deed of Assignment, together
with the MGCCI certificate issued to NSC (in
replacement of Stock Certificate No. 1361) for
cancellation thereof and to order MGCCI to
cancel said stock certificate and issue a new one
in the name of Jose Ma. P. Jacinto:
2. If for any reason whatsoever NSC fails or
refuses to execute the deed of assignment and
surrender NSC's replacement stock certificate,
MGCCI be ordered to:
2.1 Cancel in its stock and transfer book the
stock certificate issued to NSC issued in
replacement of certificate No. 1361;
2.2 Issue a new stock certificate in the name
of NSC or the stock certificate that might have
been issued in replacement thereof;
2.3 Declare as lost and of no force and effect
the MGCCI stock certificate now outstanding
and registered in the name of NSC.
3. Ordering NSC and MGCCI to pay
plaintiff, jointly and severally:
3.1 P1 Million as moral damages ; and
3.2 P100.000.00 as attorney's fees.
Other reliefs are also prayed for. 3
Petitioner NSC sought the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of prescription, but its
motion was denied by the trial court in an order,
dated November 9, 1990. Petitioner NSC
brought a special civil action for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, but again its petition was
dismissed by the appellate court on August 30,
1991. Its attempt to secure review in this Court
failed as its petition was dismissed in a
resolution, dated March 18, 1992.
Petitioner NSC then filed its answer, after which
trial was held. It thereafter filed a motion 4 to
dismiss the complaint against it on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. It alleged:
Plaintiff paid docket and other fees totalling
P4,040.00. The certification of Clerk of Court
Ma. Corazon Cecelia P. Cuba is attached as
Annex A.
2 Under Sec. 7(a) of Rule 141, as amended
by the Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc
dated September 4, 1990, the docket fees "for
filing an action . . . . is P600 for the first
P150,000.00 and P5.00 for each P1,000.00 in
excess of P150,000.00.
3. The actual value of the MGCCI share
certificate as of February, 1990, when the
complaint was filed, was P5,511,000.00.
A certification issued by the MGCCI attesting to
the fair market value of a MGCCI share is
attached as Annex B.
4. This means that the correct docket fee
for the filing of plaintiff's complaint is
approximately P26,805.00 and not P4,040.00
which is the amount plaintiff actually paid.
xxx xxx xxx
6. The failure of plaintiff to pay the correct
filing fees on February 13, 1990 meant that this
court did not acquire jurisdiction over plaintiffs
action. Under the ruling of Sun Insurance, and
as explained below, the plaintiff cannot now pay
the deficiency in the filing fees because it is
already "beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period."
The trial court denied petitioner's motion in an
order, dated April 6, 1994. Hence, the latter
brought a special civil action for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, but its petition was dismissed
on September 11, 1995.
The principal relief, or prayer in private
respondent's complaint is specific, for the "NSC
to execute a deed of assignment re-transferring
unto plaintiff the MGCCI certificate . . . in
replacement of stock certificate No. 1861 . . . .
There is no allegation in the complaint of any
quantified amount and/or of the actual value of
the stock certificate in question.
There is also no separate cause of action and/or
prayer in the face of the complaint that private
respondent, even in the alternative, prayed that
if the principal relief is unavailing, that
defendants be ordered to pay him the actual or
equivalent value of the stock certificate, hence
there is even no reason or basis to move for a
more definite statement or for a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred in
the complaint with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable petitioner to properly
prepare for a more responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial.
xxx xxx xxx
Perspicaciously, what should guide the office of
the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Makati,
Metro Manila, in assessing the, correct docket
fees for the filing of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 90-4051, when it was filed on February 13,
1990, is what is alleged and prayed for in the
complaint. It would be uncalled for and baseless
for the clerk of court to consider at that point in
time the supposed "actual value of the MGCCI
share certificate as of February, 1990, . . . (in the
amount of) P5,511000.00", and then and there
assess an additional docket fee of P22,765.00
(P26,805.00 minus P4,040.00), precisely
because the said sum of "P5,511,000.00" is not
alleged in the body of the complaint, and which
is not also sought to be recovered in the action.
There can be no divergence of opinion from the
allegations, designation and the reliefs prayed
for, as clearly and definitely spelled out in the
face of the complaint, that private respondent's
principal relief is for petitioner NSC "to execute
a deed of assignment re-transferring unto
plaintiff the MGCCI certificate issued to the
former in replacement of stock certificate No.
1861 . . . . And there also appears to be no hint of
any intention on the part of private respondent
to mislead the clerk of court in assessing the
correct fees, or to evade the payment of the
correct fees.
Hence, this petition raising the following
assignment of errors:
Assignment of Errors
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN CHARACTERIZING THE NATURE
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ACTION AS
ONE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND
NOT ONE FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE TACAY [v. Regional Trial Court, 180
SCRA 433 (1989)] AND BPI CREDIT [v. Court of
Appeals, 204 SCRA 601 (1991)] RULINGS.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LOWER
COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION
OVER PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT
DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE REQUIRED
FILING FEES.
Petitioner NSC correctly argues that the action
in this case is for the recovery of property rather
than for specific performance and, hence, the
docket fee should be based on the value of the
property sought to be recovered. It is similar to
an action in which petitioner seeks the execution
of a deed of sale of a parcel of land in his favor.
Such action has been held to be for the recovery
of the real property and nor for specific
performance since his primary objective is to
regain the ownership and possession of the
parcel of land. In Ruiz v. J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc., it was held: 5
Appellant contends that the present action is
transitory because it is one for specific
performance and its object is to compel J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc, to execute a final deed of sale
of the property in question in favor of appellant
founded upon compliance with the compromise
agreement wherein said company recognized the
sale made by Florencio Deudor of said property
in favor of Jose Dinglasan who, in the same
agreement, was recognized by the company as a
purchaser who had already made partial
payment of the purchased price of the land.
This contention has no merit. Although
appellant's complaint is entitled to be one for
specific performance, yet the fact that he asked
that a deed of sale of a parcel of land situated in
Quezon City be issued in his favor and that a
transfer certiticate of title covering said land be
issued to him shows that the primary objective
and nature of the action is to recover the parcel
of land itself because to execute in favor of
appellant the conveyance requested there is need
to make a finding that he is the owner of the land
which in the last analysis resolves itself into an
issue of ownership.
Similarly, if as in this case, plaintiff herein
private respondent Jacinto, seeks the execution
in his favor of a deed of assignment of shares of
stock, it follows that the action is for recovery of
personal property, the main purpose of which is
to regain the ownership and possession of the
said shares of stock.
Accordingly, as petetioner NSC contends private
respondent Jacinto should pay docket fees based
on the value of the shares of stock and the
amount of damages he seeks to recover. Under
Rule 141, §7(a) of the Rules of Court as it stood
at the time of the filing of the complaint against
petitioner, docket fees for ordinary civil actions
should be based on the total sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the
property in litigation. 6 Thus, the docket fees
should be computed on the basis on the value of
the property and the amount of related damages
claimed, exclusive of interest. As we held in
Tacay v. Regional Trial Court, 7 where the action
involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed
on the basis of both (a) the value of the property
and (b) the total amount of related damages
sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite
fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the
filing of the pleading, as of the time of full
payment of the fees within such reasonable time
as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court
should have dismissed the complaint for failure
of private respondent to pay the correct amount
of docket fees. Although the payment of the
proper docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, the trial court may allow the
plaintif in an action to pay the same within a
reasonable time before the expiration of the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 8
If the plaintiff fails to comply with this
requirement, the defendant should timely raise
the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be
considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the
balance between the appropriate docket fees and
the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be
considered a lien on any award he may obtain in
his favor. Thus, in Pantranco North Express, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, we held: 9
The petitioner raised the issue regarding
jurisdiction for the first time in its Brief filed
with the public respondent in CA-G.R. CV No.
26220 on 2 February 1991. After vigorously
participating in all stages of the case before the
trial court's authority authority in order to ask
for affirmative relief, the petitioner is effectively
barred by estoppel from challenging the trial
court's jurisdiction. Although the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is
nonetheless settled that a party may be barred
from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.
The deficiency in the payment of the docket fees
must, however, be considered a lien on the
judgment which must be remitted to the clerk of
court of the court a quo upon the execution of
the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner NSC filed in 1990 a
motion to dismiss but did not raise this point.
Instead it based his motion on prescription.
Upon the denial by the trial court of its motion
to dismiss, it filed an answer, submitted its pre-
trial brief, and participated in the proceedings
before the trial court. It was only in 1993 — more
than three years after filing its motion to dismiss
— that petitioner NSC again filed a motion to
dismiss the action on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner is estopped from
raising this issue. Indeed, while the lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage
of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such
question may be estopped if he has actively
taken part in the very proceedings which he
questions and he only objects to the court's
jurisdiction because the judgment or the order
subsequently rendered is adversed to him. 10
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 11, 1995, is
AFFIRMED. The deficiency in the payment of
the docket fees shall be a lien on any judgment
may be rendered in favor of private respondent
Jose P. Jacinto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for
Review filed by petitioner Marietta N. Barrido
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated November 16, 2006, and its
Resolution2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00235. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBacolod City,
Branch 53, dated July 21, 2004, in Civil Case No.
03-12123, which ordered the partition of the
subject property.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as
follows: In the course of the marriage of
respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner
Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a
property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City,
consisting ofa house and lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On
March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared
void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Since there was no more reason to maintain
their co-ownership over the property, Nonato
asked Barrido for partition, but the latter
refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato
filed a Complaint for partition before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense,
that the subject property had already been sold
to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph
Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated
September 17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the
Family Code. It ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
conjugal property of the former Spouses
Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot
covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco,
Bacolod City, which was their conjugal dwelling,
adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato,
the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain.
Furthermore, defendant’s counterclaim is
hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay
defendant ₱10,000.00 as moral damages for the
mental anguish and unnecessary inconvenience
brought about by this suit; and an additional
₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter
others from following suit; and attorney’s fees of
₱2,000.00 and litigation expenses of ₱575.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the
RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC
reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that
even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129
of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a
reversible error in adjudicating the subject
property to Barrido. Its dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision dated September 17, 2003 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
parties:
(1) to equitably partition the house and lot
covered by TCT No. T-140361;
(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph
Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by them in
payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No.
T-140361 with Philippine National Bank;
(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of
Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato
pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.5
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision
on November 16, 2006. It held that since the
property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it
clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also,
although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129
of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the
dispositive portion of its decision still correctly
ordered the equitable partition of the property.
Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was, however, denied for lack of merit.
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via
a Petition for Review. She assigned the following
errors in the CA Decision:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC HAD
JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT
COVERED BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS
CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE
CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND
JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE 129 OF
THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN
THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE ASSUMPTION
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.6

The petition lacks merit.
Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the
recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 1298 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the propertyor interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691)9
Here, the subject property’s assessed value was
merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly
does not exceed the required limit of
₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro
Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the
MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took
cognizance of the instant case.
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s
marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of
the Family Code. During their marriage,
however, the conjugal partnership regime
governed their property relations. Although
Article 12911 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically
covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them
in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed tohave been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
beowned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage
is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent
party.1âwphi1 In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies
when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impedimentto marry each other, exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage.12 It
is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated
to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. Here, all these elements are
present.13 The term "capacitated" inthe first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage.14 Any
impediment to marry has not been shown to
have existed on the part of either Nonato or
Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife. However, their marriage
was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.15
Under this property regime, property acquired
by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal
coownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima faciepresumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having
contributed to the same jointly if said party's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household.16 Efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry.17
that without the notarial seal, a document
remains to be private and cannot be converted
into a public document,21 making it
inadmissible in evidence unless properly
authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed
to prove its due execution and authenticity. In
fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her
position paper. Therefore, the subject property
remains to be owned in common by Nonato and
Barrido, which should be divided in accordance
with the rules on co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its
Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.

In the analogous case of Valdez,18 it was

likewise averred that the trial court failed to
apply the correct law that should govern the
disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
where a marriage is declared void ab
initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the
part of either or both parties in the contract of
marriage.The Court held that the court a quodid
not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article
147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the
former spouses own the family home and all
their common property in equal shares, as well
as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property that they owned in
common, the provisions on coownership under
the Civil Code should aptly prevail.19 The rules
which are set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spousesor
spouses of void marriages.20

Here, the former spouses both agree that they

acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by them in equal shares. Barrido,
however, claims that the ownership over the
property in question is already vested on their
children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside
from the title to the property still being
registered in the names of the former spouses,
said document of safe does not bear a
notarization of a notary public. It must be noted