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512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. Catapang

*
G.R. No. 164110. February 12, 2008.

LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. TEOFILA M. CATAPANG,

respondent.

Property; Co-Ownership; A co-owner cannot give valid consent to

another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act
tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.—As to the
issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the
dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the
person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned
property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to
his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a
co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-
owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his
or her exclusive use.

Same; Same; Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on

the co-owned property will injure the interest of the coownership and
prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their
rights.—Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership
or prevent the other coowners from using it according to their rights. Giving
consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will
injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from
using the property in accordance with their rights.

Same; Same; Alterations; Words and Phrases; None of the coowners

can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the
making of an alteration by another person in the thing owned in common,
and alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership such as the
construction of a house.—Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall,
without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the
consent of the other co-

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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Cruz vs. Catapang

owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person,

such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any
act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has
been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house
on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration
falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all
co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned
property.

Same; Same; Actions; Ejectment; Forcible Entry; Consent of only one

co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry
filed against the builder.—Consent of only one coowner will not warrant the
dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The
consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of
petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into
the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the
classification “through strategy or stealth.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Entry into a land effected

clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be
categorized as possession by stealth; The one-year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of
actual entry to the land but when entry is made through stealth, then the
one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about it.—
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because
respondent’s entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due
to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our
imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondent’s entry into the
property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and
clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom
respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected
clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be
categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting
only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing
the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a
strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As
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such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry. Petitioner’s filing of a

complaint for forcible entry, in our view,

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Cruz vs. Catapang

was within the one-year period for filing the complaint. The one-year period
within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from
the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through
stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner
learned about it. Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was
only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the
property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the
premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint
on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time
petitioner learned of the construction.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Wilfredo M. Bolito for petitioner.
     Eric P. Triste for respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:
1
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision dated
2
September 16, 2003 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250. The Court of Appeals
3
reversed the Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC),4 Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, which had earlier affirmed
the Decision dated September 20, 1999 of the 7th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Taal, Batangas ordering respondent to vacate
and

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 53-59. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with

Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 64-66.
3 Records, pp. 96-101. Penned by Executive Judge Benjamin P. Martinez.
4 Id., at pp. 67-72. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Pio M. Pasia.

515

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deliver possession of a portion of the lot co-owned by petitioner, Luz

Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the
co-owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square 5
meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. With
the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co-
owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot
adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992.
The house intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned
6
property.
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. Cruz
visited the property and was surprised to see a part of respondent’s
house intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then
made several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding
structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their property.
7
The respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.
8
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint for forcible
entry against respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas.
The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only
one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify defendant’s
construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in
9
question. The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant or any

person acting in her behalf to vacate and deliver the possession of the area
illegally occupied to the plaintiff; ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
reasonable attorney’s fees of P10,000.00, plus costs of suit.

_______________

5 Rollo, p. 53.
6 Id.
7 Id., at pp. 53-54.
8 Records, pp. 2-6.
9 Id., at p. 71.

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Cruz vs. Catapang

10
SO ORDERED.”

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On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the

MCTC’s ruling in a Decision dated October 22, 2001, the dispositive
portion of which states:

“Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed] from is hereby

affirmed in toto.
11
SO ORDERED.”

After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC,

respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the RTC’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that
there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because
respondent’s entry into the property, considering the consent given
by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made
through strategy
12
or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for
forcible entry. The Court of Appeals’ decision further held that
petitioner’s remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely
different recourse with the appropriate forum. The Court of Appeals
disposed, thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated 22 October 2001 as well as the
Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Taal, Batangas,
Branch 86, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof,
another is entered DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed
as Civil Case No. 71-T.
13
SO ORDERED.”

_______________

10 Id., at pp. 71-72.

11 Id., at p. 101.
12 Rollo, p. 58.
13 Id., at p. 59.

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Cruz vs. Catapang

After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the

Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated June 11, 2004, she filed the
instant petition.
Raised before us for consideration are the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF

COOWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE

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RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE

PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE
PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.]

II.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS

ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE
LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT
GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE
14
EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-OWNER.

III.

. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED

POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF
15
SIMPLE STRATEGY.

Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the Court

of Appeals’ decision.
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by
a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the
co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case
filed by another co-owner16against that person.
In her memorandum, petitioner contends that the consent and
knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the

_______________

14 Id., at p. 101.
15 Id., at p. 110.
16 Id., at pp. 96-105.

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Cruz vs. Catapang

action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-
ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition. 17
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum counters
that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her
entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the
consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that since
Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not
just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it
involves rights of coowners to enjoy the property.

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As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one coowner will

warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-
owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a
house on the co-owned property, we have held that a co-owner
cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the
18
prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give
valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property,
which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her
exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:

“Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he
does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a
way as not to injure the interest of the coownership or prevent the other co-
owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-
ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common, even

_______________

17 Id., at pp. 108-112.

18 See De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA
114, 127.

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though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding
of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the
common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.”

Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of
the co-ownership or prevent the other coowners from using it
according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to
construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest
of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the
property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can,
without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the
making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the
thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict

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dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has

19
been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a
house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it
is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There
being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to
construct her house on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of
the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent
given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner
and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into
the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under
the classification “through strategy or stealth.”

_______________

19 Gala v. Rodriguez, 70 Phil. 124 (1940).

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Cruz vs. Catapang

The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because

respondent’s entry into the property was not through strategy or
stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We
cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion.
Respondent’s entry into the property without the permission of
petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in
connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent
allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected
clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could
20
be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act
of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma
Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house,
can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to
enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts
constitute forcible entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view,
was within the one-year period for filing the complaint. The one-
year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is
21
counted from the time the petitioner learned about it. Although
respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in September
1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the property.
Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the
premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the

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complaint on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period

from the time petitioner learned of the construction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 16, 2003 and the Resolution dated June 11,

_______________

20 Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 755,
768.
21 Bongato v. Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002, 387 SCRA 327, 338;
Elaine v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80638, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 822.

521

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Manila International Airport Authority vs. Powergen, Inc.

2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250 are

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22, 2001
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is
REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.

     Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.

Notes.—As co-owners of the properties, each of the heirs may

properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or
any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject
properties. (Celino vs. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, 435
SCRA 690 [2004])
Every co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest
in the co-owned property and is free to alienate, assign or mortgage
his interest except as to purely personal rights. (Cabal vs. Cabal, 454
SCRA 555 [2005])

——o0o——

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