Maglasang vs Cabatingan

Facts:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half
portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four other deeds of donation
were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon
petitioners Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the
provisions in the deeds are as follows:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR
does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-
described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE
should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of
no further force and effect."

When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed an action to annul the said four deeds of donation. Respondents allege that
petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita
Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the
documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of
wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents'
allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the
preparation of the instruments. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents.

Issue:
Whether the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa or inter vivos.

Held:
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita
Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing
in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.

Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.

In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken
into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior
to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no
other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis
causa in the Acceptance and Attestation clauses of the Deed of Donation.

That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify
the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.
Del Rosario vs Ferrer

Facts:
Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled “Donation Mortis Causa”
in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini del Rosario
covering the spouses’ 126-square meter lot and the house on it in equal shares. Few months after the
death of Guadalupe, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. He died in June 1972. In 1998, Jarabini filed a
petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking
his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her. After trial, the RTC
rendered a decision finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos. On Asuncion’s appeal
to the CA, the latter rendered a decision reversing that of the RTC. It held that Jarabini cannot,
through her petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s
deed of assignment in Asuncion’s favor.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation was a donation mortis causa.

Held:
Yes. It was a donation inter vivos. The fact that the document in question was denominated as a
donation mortis causa is not controlling if a donation by its terms is inter vivos. In Austria Magat v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea
of conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the act. In the present
case, the donors plainly said that it is” our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and
shall be respected by the surviving spouse.” The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes
even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Thus,
given that the donation was indeed inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and
interests in the property to Asuncion is void.
Villanueva vs Sps. Branoco

Facts:
Gonzalo, here represented by his heirs, sued spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco in the RTC of
Naval, Biliran for therecovery of a parcel of land in Leyte. He claimed ownership over the property
through purchase from Vere who in turnpurchased the property from Rodrigo in 1970. The
respondents in this case claimed ownership in their answer throughpurchase in 1983 from Rodriguez
to whom Rodrigo donated the property in 1965.The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying
that by the time Rodriguez sold the property to the respondents inthis case she had no title to transfer
because the donation to her by Rodrigo was deemed cancelled when Rodrigodecided to sell the
property to Vere instead.The respondents brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which granted
their appeal. It found the following factorspivotal to its reading of the Deed as donation intervivos: (1)
Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as ownersince 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery
of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deeds consideration was notRodrigos death but her "love
and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo
waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and
(4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations
intervivos, not devises.Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and,
conversely found the sale betweenRodrigo and petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for
Rodrigos lack of title.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a perfected Donation Inter Vivos

Held:
The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donors love and affection to
the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates
the express irrevocability of intervivos transfers." Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to
Rodrigos statement of "love and affection" forRodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to
underscore its finding.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation
intervivos.
Rioferio vs CA

Facts:
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a
widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents.

Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero and
co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate
children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the
estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.

Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint for
the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative
defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of
an administrator.

Held:
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring
suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New
Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and
obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others by his will or by operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if
an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of
advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.
Opulencia vs CA

Facts:
A complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo, herein private respondents, Aladin
Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that petitioner Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor
a contract to sell Lot 2125 that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300, 000.00 but defendant, despite
demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract.

Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as
down payment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject
of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner's father), in respect of which
a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court. At the time the contract was executed,
the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not
approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract petitioner had offered to return
the down payment received from private respondents, but the latter refused to accept it. She further
argued that the contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the probate of the will of
defendant's father Demetrio Carpena.

Issue:
Is a contract to sell a real property involved in testate proceedings valid and binding without the
approval of the probate court?

Held:
In a nutshell, petitioner contends that "where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject
of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it
without prior approval of the Probate Court." She maintains that the Contract to sell is void because it
was not approved by the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise

encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased
may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations.

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable,
because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix
or administratrix of the estate.

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of
the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was
perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the
private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and
outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the
Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate.
Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending
administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration."

Genato vs Bayhon

Facts:
Respondent Benjamin Bayhon obtained a loan from the petitioner amounting to P1,000,000.00 to be
paid monthly with 5%interest. That respondent executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
the petitioner to cover the loan which wasconditioned upon the personal assurance of the petitioner
that the said instrument is only a private memorandum of indebtedness and that it would neither be
notarized nor enforced according to its tenor. During the proceeding for there constitution of said real
estate property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 87 petitioner filed an Answer in Intervention in
the said proceeding and attached a copy of an alleged dacion en pago covering said lot. Respondent
assailed the dacion en pago as a forgery alleging that neither he nor his wife, who had died 3 years
earlier, had executed it.In separate case petitioner filed an action for specific performance, before the
RTC, Quezon City. In his Complaint, petitioneralleged that respondent failed to pay the loan and
executed on October 21, 1989 a dacion en pago in favor of the petitioner. The dacion en pago was
inscribed and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Petitioner further averred that
despite demands, respondent refused to execute the requisite documents to transfer to himthe
ownership of the lot subject of the dacion en pago. Petitioner prayed, inter alia, for the court to order the
respondent to execute the final deed of sale and transfer of possession of the said lot.In the decision
of the lower court, it stated that the dacion en pago was novated by the payments made by the
respondentand that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was void considering that respondent’s wife
was already dead during the execution of the deed.On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the CA
held that the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were both void.The appellate court ruled that
at the time the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were executed, the wife of respondent
Benjamin Bayhon was already dead. Thus, she could not have participated in the execution of the two
documents. The appellate court struck down both the dacion en pago and the real estate mortgage as
being simulated or fictitious contracts pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code. During the appeal,
respondent Benjamin Bayhon died.The Court of Appeals held further that while the principal obligation
is valid, the death of respondent Benjamin Bayhon extinguished it. The heirs could not be ordered to
pay the debts left by the deceased.

Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of the decedent can be ordered to pay the debt left by the deceased?

Held:
The Court held, with regards to the dacion en pago, the Court affirm the ruling of the appellate court
that the subject dacion en pago is a simulated or fictitious contract, and hence void. The evidence shows
that at the time it was allegedly signed by the wife of the respondent, his wife was already dead. This
finding of fact cannot be reversed. With regards to the appellate court extinguishing the obligation of
respondent, as a general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. According to
Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
he received from the decedent. The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the
case was pending before the Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan,
the debt subsists against his estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his
heirs unless the debt has first been satisfied.

Cruz vs Cruz

Facts:
Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the RTC a Complaint against her son, Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for “Annulment
of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages.” After Memoracion finished presenting her evidence in chief,
she died. The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly, of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with
the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo Cruz.

Issue:
Whether or not Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely
personal action which did not survive the death of petitioner

Held:

NO. The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the
causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental. Here, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves
property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion.
Estate of Hemady vs Luzon Surety

Facts:

The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity
agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H.
Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor. [in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of
having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors.]
The Luzon Surety Co.:
1. Prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed in
consideration of the counterbonds, and
2. Asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12
per cent interest

Issue:
Whether or not Luzon Surety can file against the Estate of Hemady a contingent claim for
reimbursement?

Held:
YES. Transmissible to the heirs . For Defendant administratrix, it averred that the doctrine refers to a
case where the surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor
What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from
the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter does not even enjoy the benefit
of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor.
The solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death. Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file
against the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement.
It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estate’s liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because
irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon Surety’s claim did state a cause of action, and
its dismissal was erroneous.