Pakistan Institute of International Affairs

BRITAIN AND THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT OVER EAST PAKISTAN

Author(s): Khalida Qureshi
Source: Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 25, No. 1, The India-Pakistan War, 1971 (First Quarter,
1972), pp. 32-44
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393111
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BRITAIN AND THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT OVER EAST PAKISTAN

Khalida Qureshi

With the announcement of its decision, on 30 January 1972, to terminate its

membership of the Commonwealth with immediate effect, Pakistan broke off
one of its oldest international ties. Pakistan took this decision in view of the dec-
lared intention of Britain, New Zealand and Australia to recognize "Bangla
Desh". The Pakistan Government had been informed by these countries of their
intention to do so. In Pakistan's view their decision was an unfriendly act which
struck at the very root of the principles of the Commonwealth association and
respect for the sovereignty of its members on which it was founded. It amoun-
ted to the approval, encouragement and legitimisation of an act of aggression
by one member of the Commonwealth against another.1 Subsequently Australia
and New Zealand recognised "Bangla Desh" on 31 January while Britain an-
nounced its recognition on 4 February 1972.
Whilst Pakistan's decision to quit the Commonwealth and Britain's re-
cognition of "Bangla Desh" did not create any great stir, what certainly caused
some surprise was why Britain had delayed the recognition so long. For it was
evident to any observer of the affairs of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, especially
since March 1971, which way Britain's sympathies lay. In fact, it would not be
an exaggeration to say that Britain played an important role not only in the crea-
tion and promotion of the secessionist movement in East Pakistan, but also in
the establishment of what came to be known as "Bangla Desh". A review of
the conduct of British policy in the region, before, during and after the India-
Pakistan War of 1971 would substantiate this contention.
During the period before the war Britain's interests in the area were con-
fined to the following: The promotion of the cause of "Bangla Desh", the pro-
jection of the Indian viewpoint, the conducting of an unfavourable propaganda
campaign against West Pakistan and the Pakistan Government, the exerting
of diplomatic and economic pressures on Pakistan and persuading others to
do the same, and while refusing to utilise the UN and the Commonwealth which
could have played an important role in defusing the East Pakistan situation, pro-
jecting an image of Britain as a country willing to mediate in the crisis. The British

1 Pakistan Government announcement of 30 January 1972, Pakistan News Digest, Karachi,

15 February 1972, p. 3.

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Government, social organizations, members of political parties both Labour and
Conservative, Parliamentarians, the press, television, the BBC and other news
media, with a few exceptions, all played important roles in promoting these
interests.
By granting facilities on British soil to the leaders of the "Bangla Desh
movement" and by allowing them to carry on subversive activities against the
legally constituted Government of Pakistan, Britain greatly assisted the seces-
sionist movement. Rebels and insurgents, defected Pakistani diplomatic person-
nel, and fugitives from Pakistan's justice found sanctuary in Britain and were
allowed time and facilities on the television and radio. London became a centre
of anti-Pakistan activities and Britain the sole European base for "Bangla Desh"
activities. Britain also permitted its colonies, for example Hong Kong, to be used
as bases for launching subversion aimed at the territorial integrity of Pakistan.1
A "Bangla Desh Mission" was set up in London in August 1971 and a "Bangla
Desh" newspaper was allowed to be published from Britain. On 26 July 1971,
a former Labour Minister launched "Bangla Desh" postage stamps from British
Parliament premises with the object of getting international recognition for "Bangla
Desh" covertly through the seemingly innocent device of the postage stamp.2 All
this was done with the British Government's knowledge and it seems with its
approval and encouragement. Pakistan Government's protests against these
hostile actions and the partisan attitude of the British Government, were all to
no avail.3
The British Parliament and political parties also lent strong support to the
"Bangla Desh movement". Pakistan's internal affairs were the subject of several
debates in the British Parliament, whose members generally upheld the
cause of "Bangla Desh", expressed sympathy for India and denounced Pak-
istan. MPs called for British intervention through economic sanctions.4 They
issued appeals covering full pages of newspapers calling for the recognition of
"Bangla Desh". Ten former Ministers and 211 MPs, mostly belonging to the
Labour Party, signed a resolution in the House of Commons which condemned
Pakistan Army action in East Pakistan and called on the British Government
to press for a "ceasefire" in East Pakistan.5
Whilst a "Bangla Desh" lobby already existed in the House of Commons,
on 3 December 1971, an All-Parties pro-secessionist Parliamentary group was
set up which was led by professional secessionists such as John Stonehouse and
Hugh Fraser who were earlier involved in the advocacy of secessionism during
the Nigerian Civil War.6 As for the British Parliamentarians who visited Pak-
istan, they expressed divergent views about conditions in East Pakistan. Whereas
some like Mrs. Jill Knight, Mr. James Tinn and Mr. John Osborne gave a factual
account of the East Pakistan situation, stating categorically that they saw no
evidence of atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army during their extensive

1 Dawn, Karachi, 1 September 1971.

* Ibid., 28 July 1971.
3 Pakistan s verbal protests and notes to Britam of 27 March, 5 and 7 July, 28 and 30 August
1971.
4 British Review , Karachi, 22 May 1971.
s The Observer , London, 2 May 1971 and Dawn, Karachi, 21 August 1971 .
• Dawn, Karachi, 5 December 1971.

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tour of the area, their truthful appraisal did not accord with British political
susceptibilities.1 The BBC distorted Mrs. Knight's statement at which she pro-
tested. In fact the highly exaggerated, biased and unfavourable to Pakistan account
given by the official Parliamentary delegation, led by Mr. Arthur Bottomley,
was more in line with British thinjcing.2
Besides such pressure tactics and moral support, British MPs and social
organisations rendered material and moral aid as well. They joined hands to
raise funds for "Bangla Desh". Money was not only collected for humanitarian
purposes, for example, for the East Pakistan refugees in India, but also to meet
the expenses of the "Bangla Desh Mission", for propaganda purposes and to
buy arms for "Bangla Desh" guerrillas in order to enable them to carry on sub-
versive activities against Pakistan. These funds must have been huge to pay for
the numerous appeals in support of "Bangla Desh" which appeared in the British
Press, for it was reported that a full page advertisement cost £500.3 It was also
revealed, by a "Bangla Desh" leader in Geneva, that these funds were kept in
the Jewish Hambrose Bank of Bishop Gate, London, and because the leading
London banks had refused to open an account in the name of "Bangla Desh",
the account was jointly operated by Abu Saeed Choudhry (now "President of
Bangla Desh"), Mr. Stonehouse and another British MP4.
As for the British information media, it also played a significant role. A
perusal of the British Press of those days and a review of the BBC and British
television programmes would illustrate their pro-India and "Bangla Desh" bias
and their hostility to Pakistan. From the very outset they imparted a romantic
hue to the "Bangla Desh movement". Bengal's desire for independence and
guerrilla activities were highlighted. Press reports sometimes incited the East
Pakistanis against the army, gave directions to the "Bangla Desh movement"
and produced fear among the population of the area. British correspondents
played up the possibility, even the inevitability of secession.5 Earlier too, during
the cyclone in East Pakistan and the Pakistan elections in 1970, the British Press
had accentuated the differences between the two wings of Pakistan. The BBC
and the British Press which are widely heard and read in the Indo-Pakistan sub-
continent and all over the world, greatly misguided people in East Pakistan as
elsewhere. It demoralised other Pakistanis too and thus helped the cause of "Bangla
Desh" and India.
British information media also waged a clever propaganda campaign against
Pakistan. Often, it reported not facts but produced fantasies, such as the report
about the death of the Pakistani General, Tikka Khan.6 Newspapers printed
false stories about Pakistan Army atrocities in East Pakistan conveniently forgetting
Ulster and the British Army's atrocities there. The problem of the East Pakistan
refugees was blown up out of all proportion. The press refused to publish anything

1 For the expression of their views see "British MPs' views on Pakistan", The Pakistan Society
Bulletin , London, Winter, 1971, pp. 25-41.
7 Pakistan News Digest , Karachi, 1 August 1971, p. 3.
3 Morning News , Karachi, 31 August 1971.
4 The Pakistan Observer , Dacca, 18 November 1971.
s For the role of the British news media See Hasan Zaman (ed.) East Pakistan Crisis ana India ,
Dacca, 1971, pp. 34-111, and Pakistan Economist, Karachi, 28 August - 3 September 1971,
6 pp. 5-8.
During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 also the BBC had wrongly reported the fall of Lahore.

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contrary to its anti-Pakistan policy. For example, The Times refused to publish
a letter written by a Conservative MP, Sir Frederick Bennet, in which he had
accused the paper of deliberately presenting a cockeyed version of the happenings
in East Pakistan.1 The Pakistan side of the story was either ignored or not given
any prominence. The object it seems was to create an opinion so adverse against
Pakistan that it would be isolated, and if later military operations against it were
undertaken, they would have less grave repercussions.
While it painted Pakistan black, the British news media depicted India
as the injured party. The rapidly inflating Indian figures about East Pakistan re-
fugees in India2 were faithfully reproduced by the British Press.3 India's dilemma
and the necessity for it to take action were emphasised. The idea of an Indo-
Pakistan conflict was promoted. Public opinion favourable to India was created
which eased India's task and paved the way for Indian aggression against Pak-
istan. This was necessary for world opinion generally sides with the victim of
aggression and not the aggressor, specially if the victim happens to be a small
Power and the aggressor a bigger country.
What comes to mind is why the British information media acted the way
they did? Opinions vary as to whether the bias arose from ignorance or malice.
While some argue that because Pakistan sent back foreign correspondents at the
beginning of the crisis,4 those that remained in India came under Awami League
and Indian influence and gave one sided account of events. The other view is
that Jewish and Indian vested interests coloured these accounts. The British Press,
BBC and other news media acted as the Information Department of the Indian
Government and their correspondents, especially Peter Hazlehurst, who felt at
home in the Indian External Affairs Ministry, played the part of publicity agents
for India.5 Then there are others who feel that this happened because the British
Press and BBC traditions have generally deteriorated. The Daily Telegraph com-
plained recently that the BBC had forgotten of late its duty to put truth, fairness
and objectivity before sheer entertainment value.6 Perhaps the British informa-
tion media's attitude was the product of all these factors.
It should, however, be remembered that not all Britishers misrepresented
the truth. There were occasional articles, reports and letters that were factual.
Individuals e.g. Mrs. Knight, Mr. Osborne, Mr. Rushbrook Williams and others
upheld the truth and drew attention to the British Press's unbalanced presen-
tation of happenings in East Pakistan.7 But their voices were lost in the noise
of the multitude. Their anguish is aptly described by Mrs. Knight: "...
usually I feel as though I am a little voice shouting against the volume of lies and
this is something which distresses me desperately. I don't want to be partial to
one side or unfair to the other, all I'm asking for is the truth and that we haven't
1 Dawn. Karachi, 2 August 1971.
2 B.L.C. Johnson, "Bangla Desh: A Chronolgy", Australia's Neighbours , Victoria, November
1971 - January 1972, pp. 2-3.
3 Later British correspondents, e.g. Clare Hollingworth expressed doubts about the veracity
of Indian figures. Morning News , Karachi, 2 February 1971.
4 They later returned to Pakistan.
* N.C. Chaudhrì in Hindustan Standard of 6 June 1971, reproduced in Hasan Zaman, East
Pakistan Crisis and India , op. cit., pp. 64-65.
« The Daily Telegraph , London, 9 July 1971.
7 See "British MPs views on Pakistan", The Pakistan Society Bulletin , op . dt„ pp. 25-41 and
Hasan Zaman, East Pakistan Crisis and India, op. cit.t pp. 289-292.

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 so far had...'*1 As it happened the British Press and BBC showed a slight
change when, in November 1971, India openly aggressed against East Pakistan
and when the war broke out in December 1971. Doubts were expressed then
about Mrs. Gandhi's good intentions, BBC commentators stated that the Indian
attack on East Pakistan was not defensive, The Daily Telegraph and Guardian
wrote that India was showing belligerence towards Pakistan. After the war ended
some stories appeared about the atrocities committed on the Bihari minority in
"Bangla Desh". But by then it was too late, the damage had already been done.
Economic pressures were also exerted against Pakistan by the British Govern-
ment in order to promote India's cause and the secessionist movement. Britain
suspended its development aid to Pakistan and declared that no further aid would
be given. The resumption of aid was made conditional to a political solution
acceptable to the people of East Pakistan. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, and the Minister for Overseas Development, Mr. Richard Wood,
made statements to this effect in the House of Commons.2 The British Export
Credit Guarantee Department ceased covering further transactions of exports to
Pakistan and the British Government's contribution to the World Bank Aid-to-
Pakistan Consortium was also made conditional. Britain urged others specially
Consortium countries to take joint action to pressurise Pakistan through aid
into accepting India's and the secessionists' demands.3 The British Director of the
World Bank, Peter Cargill, played an important role in this connection. He led a
team of World Bank observers to East Pakistan in June 1971, and prepared and
placed before the Consortium, a highly tendentious and politically motivated
anti-Pakistan report.4 This was later leaked out to the British and American Press.
Although controversial portions of the report were later expunged from the
World Bank's official records by orders of its President, Mr. McNamara, but
damage had been done. British correspondent Peter Hazlehurst was not making
empty boasts when he wrote that Britain had taken stronger steps than India to
• bring President Yahya Khan to his senses.5
Britain's strong measures certainly hit Pakistan hard because of the prevailing
economic situation in the country and Pakistan's dependence on aid. Around
a third of Pakistan's foreign exchange or about $400 million is obtained through
aid.6 Pakistan had been facing a balance of payments problem and its reserve
position was bad even before the East Pakistan cyclone in 1970 and the events
of March 1971. Since then, the economic situation had worsened and Pakistan
was on the verge of bankruptcy. In these circumstances Pakistan could perhaps
absorb the shock of the loss of British aid of about £10 million or more as Pre-
sident Yahya Khan and his Economic Adviser, Mr. M.M. Ahmed, stated,7 but
joint action certainly it could not bear. It made a damaging impact on Pakistan's
economy. Whilst it cut off its aid to Pakistan, Britain increased its assistance to
India and continued it even during the war. Thus it contributed to India's military
1 "British MPs' views on Pakistan", The Pakistan Society Bulletin . on. cit.. n. 40.
2 S ur »e i oj Current Affairs, London, COI» 1971-72, p. 322.
3 Dawn , Karachi, 1 August 1971.
4 Excerpts in The Times , London, 14 July 1971, see also Pakistan News Digest , Karachi, 1
August 1971.
5 The Times . London. 29 Julv 1971.
6 The Economist , London. 15 Mav 1971. o. 73.
7 The Guardian Weekly , London, 3 July 1971, p. 24.

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capability because with increased British aid India could divert its own resources
to buying arms to use against Pakistan.
Britain served India and "Bangla Desh" in another way also. It refused
to utilise the UN and the Commonwealth to prevent the East Pakistan crisis from
escalating. While taking no positive action it posed as a Power anxious to mediate
and settle the dispute. These tactics served India and the cause of "Bangla Desh"
admirably. Britain is a medium-sized Power but with considerable world-wide infl-
uence, it is an important Commonwealth member, one of the big five of the Security
Council and Pakistan's partner in the Commonwealth, SEATO and CENTO. It
could certainly have intervened in a more positive manner. Earlier in the case of
the Nigerian С ivil War the Commonwealth had acted jointly. Britain had earlier
taken a stand on the question of Kashmir and had mediated in 1965 the Rann
of Kutch dispute between India and Pakistan. During the recent crisis the UN
Secretary-General, U Thant, had pleaded with the great Powers of the Council
to act and defuse the explosive situation. Mr. Stewart, Britain's ex-Foreign Minis-
ter, and the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Mr . Arnold Smith, had
called for Commonwealth mediation.1 Mr. Rushbrook Williams had supported
the Australian suggestion to convene a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Con-
ference. But although Britain made much noise about messages to President
Yahya Khan and consultations with India and Pakistan, it made no real effort
to stop the situation from getting worse. In fact by condemning Pakistan, Britain
forfeited its influence over Pakistan and made itself unacceptable to it as a media-
tor.2 On the other hand it was not willing to displease India in any way. For
example, when Britain encountered Indian opposition to the proposal of the
posting of UN observers on India-East Pakistan border (to prevent the situation
from getting any worse), instead of using its undeniably great influence over
India to make it agree to this reasonable suggestion, Britain preferred to pursue
the matter no further. Thus Britain by its actions belied its own claims that it
was non-partisan and neutral during the crisis. In fact its attitude was pro-India
and anti-Pakistan.
When war broke out between India and Pakistan in December 1971, Britain
helped India and "Bangla Desh" by obstructing the work of the UN and by sup-
plying arms to India. Since the end of the war Britain's endeavours on behalf of
India and "Bangla Desh" can be summed up as follows: To begin with, Britain
has helped in the establishment and consolidation of "Bangla Desh" by per-
suading the international community to recognise it, by providing it with aid,
by getting economic benefits for it from others, by working on Pakistan to accept
the "reality of Bangla Desh" and settle its problems with it, and by being useful
generally to "Bangla Desh" e.g., on the question of prisoners of war. Britain has
also projected an image of India as the dominant Power of the region and is trying
to build a collective security system with India as its foundation. Britain realises
that to achieve this objective it is necessary that Pakistan be prevailed upon to
accept "Bangla Desh" and end its confrontation with India, hence it is making
diplomatic efforts to initiate talks between India, Pakistan and "Bangla Desh".

1 Ibid., 3 July 1971, p. 24 and Morning News, Karachi, 3 February 1972.

2 The Daily Telegraph , London, 22 July 1971.

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 While discussing Britain's recent role in the UN, Lord Caradon, Britain's
Permanent Representative at the UN until 1970, wrote: "We see an attempt
by the British Government not to make greater use of the instrument (UN) but
to take the lead in preventing its effective use".1 Britain's role at the UN during
the recent India-Pakistan conflict was indeed a shameful one. The Security Coun-
cil had met on 4 December 1971 to consider the conflict at the request of nine
Powers including Britain.2 During three meetings held on 4, 5 and 6 December
eight draft resolutions were introduced, four were brought to vote and one was
adopted. As a result of an impasse in the Council the matter was then transferred
to the General Assembly where meetings were held twice on 7 December and a
resolution was adopted. At the United States' request the matter was brought
back to the Council where seven meetings were held between 12 and 21 December
during which nine resolutions were introduced, two were put to vote and one
adopted3. Britain abstained on all votes except the final one.lt abstained in the
Council on the US draft resolution of 4 and 12/13 December and the 8-Power
resolution of 5 December, all of which called for an immediate ceasefire and with-
drawal of forces.4 Eleven Powers had voted each time in favour of these reso-
lutions which were vetoed by the Soviet Union. Britain abstained with eleven
others on the USSR draft resolution of 4 December which called for a political
settlement .5 While the USSR and Poland had voted for this resolution China
had cast a negative vote. Britain also abstained on the 6-Power Council resolution
adopted on 6 December which transferred the matter to the General Assembly.6
When, on 7 December, the Assembly adopted a 34-Power resolution which called
for an immediate ceasefire, troop withdrawal and return of refugees by a vote
of 104 in favour to 11 against and 10 abstentions, Britain abstained on this too.7
Later, Britain with France introduced a draft resolution in the Council on 15
December (not voted upon) calling for a ceasefire in both East and West Pak-
istan, the withdrawal of troops, the conclusion of a comprehensive political
settlement based on realities, UN Secretary-General's good offices for refugee
rehabilitation and the observance of Geneva Conventions.8 But this was done only
when the surrender of Pakistani troops in East Pakistan was a foregone con-
clusion. When finally Britain agreed to cast an affirmative vote on the 6-Power
Council resolution of 21 December,9 which called for a durable ceasefire, troop
withdrawals, observance of the Geneva Conventions and the UN Secretary-
General's good offices for the solution of humanitarian problems, Pakistan forces
had surrendered in the East and both India and Pakistan had agreed to a cease-
fire.
Throughout the debates Britain declared that unanimity and consensus were
essential. Britain's Representative at the UN said there was no practical advantage
1 Lord Caradon, "Britain's Shameful UN Role", The Guardian Weekly , London, 8 January
1972, p. 9.
2 Letter to the President of the Security Council dated 4 December 1971, S/10411.
3 For proceedings of the Security Council and General Assembly debates see UN Monthly
Chronicle , New York. UN Office of Public Information. January 1972. on. 3-46. 89-91.
4 Security Council draft resolutions Nos. S/10416. S/10446 and Rev. 1. S/10423.
s Draft resolution S/10418.
6 Security Council resolution S/RES/303 П97П.
7 General Assembly resolution A/RES/2793 (XXVI).
8 Draft resolution S/10455.
9 Security Council resolution S/RES/307 (1971).

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in supporting resolutions which had no chance of success. Tactics to delay the
work of the Council were adopted e.g., adjournment for consultations. Much
was made about Britain's behind-the-scene activities1, though even India later,
according to reports, belittled Britain's contribution to a ceasefire.2 In this man-
ner though the majority of the UN members wanted a ceasefire and withdrawals,
the Council was made ineffective and their voices were silenced. Later Britain's
inactivity was explained as "studied non-partisanship" and the object, it was said,
was that at a later date Britain could act as a mediator between India, Pakistan
and "Bangla Desh". But Pakistan's President, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's explana-
tion seems more plausible who said that Britain instead of using its influence io
change the course of affairs abstained in order to play a role.3 It wanted the fall
of Dacca and the defeat of Pakistan's forces in the East so that it could then accept
the fait accompli . It is not surprising that Britain's relations with India improved
greatly as a result of Britain's cooperative stand at the United Nations.
During the recent crisis Britain augmented India's military might by sup-
plying it with arms even when the war was going on. British factories worked
night and day to supply arms to India.4 Chartered Air India Boeings were airlifting
missiles and spares for aircraft, tanks and naval equipment.5 The British Press
revealed that Britain was supplying Tigercat low-level ground-to-air missiles
in accordance with a secret deal signed between India and the British firm, Shorts,
of Belfast. The deal was negotiated when the East Pakistan crisis began and the
British Government was reported to have been closely involved in the deal, being
the controlling share holder in Shorts. Britain had also helped the Indians to
finance the order.6 When Pakistan protested at Britain's policy, the British Foreign
Secretary was told by the Indian High Commissioner to keep in mind Britain's
economic and political interests in India and "Bangla Desh" while reviewing
the question of arms sales to India.7 Sir Alec obliged by declaring in the House
of Commons, on 13 December 1971, that there were long-standing contracts
with British commercial firms for supplying military equipment to India and that
there were no prospects of an embargo on sales of arms to India and Pakistan.8
The reference to Pakistan was unnecessary as Britain had not been a regular
supplier of arms to Pakistan for many years. Since the war ended, the British
Press has reported that India would buy 50 Jaguar attack planes built jointly by
British and French concerns to make up for its losses in the recent war with Pak-
istan9. Reports said that Britain would also be willing to sell sophisticated weapons
to India in order to make it rely less on Soviet arms.10 The possibility of Britain
assisting India in building up its Navy has also been mentioned.11 Having so re-
cently been subjected to Indian aggression, such reports naturally created appre-
hension in Pakistan and raised doubts about Britain's motives.
1 The Times , London, 20 December 1971.
2 The Daily Telegraph , London, 30 December 1971.
3 President Bhutto's speech in the Security Council of 15 December 1971, Pakistan News Digest ,
Karachi, 1 January 1972.
4 President Bhutto s statement in The Daily Telegraph, London. 20 December 1971.
s Dawn, Karachi, 9 December 1971.
6 The Sunday Times , London, 19 December 1971.
7 Morning News , Karachi, 9 December 1971.
s Ibid.. 14 December 1971. and Dawn . Karachi, 15 December 1971.
9 The Daily Telegraph , London, 2 March 1972.
The Economist , London, 12 February 1972, pp. 40-41.
1 1 The Daily Telegraph , 8 February 1972.

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 Britain not only recognised what Sir Alec called the reality of "Bangla Desh"
but helped "Bangla Desh" in acquiring a legal status through international re-
cognition. That pressures were used by Britain on Commonwealth States for this
purpose was stated by the Maltese Prime Minister, Mr. Dom Mintoff, on 24
February 1972.1 The British Prime Minister, Mr. Edward Heath, was also reported
to be persuading the European countries to jointly recognise "Bangla Desh"
and his diplomatic efforts succeeded when, on 4 February 1972, eight European
States simultaneously accorded recognition.2 Concerted action was sought so
as to make it difficult for Pakistan to take any retaliatory measures. These tactics,
according to reports, had been agreed upon when Sheikh Mujibur Rehman (now
"Prime Minister of Bangla Desh") had met Mr. Heath and the Commonwealth
Secretary-General, Mr. Arnold Smith, in London, after his release in January
1972.3 The timing of Britain's recognition on the eve of President Bhutto's depar-
ture to Peking was also considered important. It was meant to discourage him from
getting too close to China.4 But Pakistan was not intimidated and broke off re-
lations with the Commonwealth. Incidentally this action was approved of by the
Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai.5
In Pakistan, the decision to terminate Commonwealth ties won popular
acclaim. The press generally approved of it,6 though a few newspapers did dis-
approve and called it "a petulant gesture".7 Pakistan's decision to quit the
Commonwealth was in accord with the desire of the people of Pakistan who had
raised the demand in the past also. It was neither a departure from Pakistan's
past policies nor did it cause any serious difficulties to Pakistan. Pakistan had
already delinked its rupee from the pound sterling in September 1971 and its
trade had been diversified sometime ago. The Commonwealth tariff preferences,
through which Pakistan derived economic benefits, were to end when Britain
entered the ECM in 1973. Britain's Commonwealth attachments that had al-
ready weakened would then fall away.8 The British Government later announced
(to assuage Pakistan's feelings perhaps) that the status of about 235,000 Pak-
istanis in Britain, which was regulated by the British Nationality Act of 1948,
would not be affected by Pakistan's decision.9 Both Britain and Pakistan have also
decided to continue their bilateral relations. However, Pakistan did encounter
some difficulties recently because of Britain's unfair and politically motivated
decision to place restrictions on Pakistan's textile exports to Britain.10
Besides helping "Bangla Desh" on the recognition issue Britain assisted
it in other ways too. Britain's official contribution to aid to "Bangla Desh" re-
fugees in India had totalled £14.75 million, and for relief in East Pakistan, £2
million, before the war. In January 1972, Britain gave a further £1 million, thus
bringing the total to £3 million. On 26 February 1972, Britain and "Bangla Desh"

1 Dawn, Karachi, 25 February 1972.

2 The Pakistan Times , Lahore, 6 February 1972.
3 Dawn , Karachi, 12 January 1972.
4 Pakistan News Digest . Karachi. 15 February 1972.
s Dawn . Karachi. 1 February 1972.
« Morning News , Karachi, 31 January 1972 and The Pakistan Times t Lahore, 1 February 1972.
7 Dawn „ Karachi, 1 and 5 February 1972.
8 The Times , London, 16 October 1971.
9 Morning News, Karachi, and The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 7 February 1972.
10 Dawn , Karachi, 1 April 1972.

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signed an agreement under which Britain gave "Bangla Desh" £4,835,000 worth
of interest-free commodity loans, repayable on easy terms, for buying goods and
services from Britain.1 Later British officials confirmed that aid to "Bangla Desh"
would increase. British communication experts were also sent to "Bangla Desh"
for reconstruction purposes. "Bangla Desh" which acquired Commonwealth
membership on 18 April 19722 and had decided to join the sterling area, was
offered Commonwealth assistance by the Commonwealth Secretary-General
as well.3 It was reported that Britain would assist, when the time came, in sorting
out financial relations between Pakistan and "Bangla Desh"4. The British Govern-
ment was also reported to be making efforts for the early establishment of an Aid-
to-"Bangla Desh" Consortium under aegis of the World Bank. As for the ques-
tion of the trial of Pakistan prisoners of war for "war crimes" by the "Bangla
Desh Government", it was reported that the British Secretary of the International
Commission of Jurists in Geneva was seeking to associate the Commission in
their trial.5 Sir Alec, during his press conference at Lahore, had evaded the issue.
Britain's unconditional aid and other assistance to "Bangla Desh", however,
contrasted sadly with its attitude to Pakistan. For example, on 14 February 1972,
the British Minister for Aid stated that new development aid to Pakistan would
be conditional on the reorganisation of Pakistan's economy and an agreement
on debt servicing moratorium, including presumably foreign debts incurred for
East Pakistan.6
Since the war ended, Britain has also been busy projecting an image of
India as a potential great Power, capable of being "stronger than China",7 which
accords with India's own ambitions to dominate Asia. Britain's object, it seems,
is to put forward the idea of a western oriented collective security system for South
Asia and the Indian Ocean,8 as a counterpoise to the Soviet proposal for an
Asian Security Pact. As Sir Alec stated in New Delhi, Britain hopes that India
could become the "foundation and basis" of this security system,0 and would
like to assist Iñdia in this. But to make this plan feasible, it is necessary that Pak-
istan be made to accept the new situation arising out of the war and end its con-
frontation with India. Sir Alec stated that Britain was ready to help to achieve a
reconciliation between India, Pakistan and "Bangla Desh". Britain considered
an early meeting between Mrs. Gandhi, President Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur
Rehman essential and London was offered as a meeting place.10 In order to initiate
reconciliation talks, Sir Alec visited India in February 1972, Pakistan in March,
and will go to "Bangla Desh" in June. When in Pakistan, Sir Alec stated that he
wished to see an independent and prosperous Pakistan. But what Britain either
fails to realise or purposely ignores is the fact that Indian hegemony in the region
spells danger for Pakistan as well as for the other smaller countries of the region.
During the recent conflict also, Britain erroneously held the view that India was
1 Survey of Current Affairs , op. cit., 2 February 1972, pp. 62-63.
2 Morning News , Karachi, 19 April 1972.
3 Dawn , Karachi, 25 February 1972.
4 The Daily Telegraph , London, 9 February 1972.
s Dawn , Karachi. 27 March 1972.
« Ibid., 21 April 1972.
7 Sir Alec's statement, in New Delhi, Ibid., 14 February and 9 M arch 1972.
® The Economist . London, 12 February 1972, pp. 40-41.
9 The Daily Telegraph. London, 9 February 1972.
10 The Times, London, 21 March 1972 and Sir Alec Douglas-Home's press conference in L ahore
of 20 March 1972, Press release, British Information Services, Karachi, 22 March 197 2.

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 not out to annex West Pakistan and Mr. Heath disagreed with President Nixon
on this question at their Bermuda talks.1 Britain should realise that by following
such a policy it is making India's desire to dominate Asia possible2 and is also
endangering the safety of the smaller countries of the region.
Historical, economic and strategic considerations motivated British policy
towards the conflict. To begin with, Britain's traditional close friendship with
India and its antipathy towards Pakistan conditioned this policy. At the root of
this British-Indian affinity lies Britain's pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim bias. For it
was the Muslims of the subcontinent who resisted British rule and suffered the
most as a result, whereas the Hindus made an alliance of convenience with the
British and gained great advantages for themselves. Therefore, when the parti-
tion of India was forced upon the British by the Muslims of the subcontinent, they
reluctantly accepted the creation of Pakistan and did their best to attenuate and
weaken this Muslim State. The pro-India machinations of the last British Viceroy
of India, Lord Mountbatten. and the unfair and illogical boundary alignments
drawn by Sir Cyril Radcliffe had but one object - to make Pakistan unviable.3 The
long-standing British strategic and economic interest in India further cemented
Indo-British relations and this factor conditioned the British politicians' attitudes
in the recent conflict. That British politicians would go to any length to please
India had been demonstrated earlier when the Labour Party leader, Mr. Harold
Wilson, retracted his statement made in 1965 in which he had accused India of
aggressing against Pakistan. In the recent conflict too, when American aid to
India was stopped, Mr. Wilson advocated India's case with the US and also pro-
mised help to "Bangla Desh".4 Britain's Jewish controlled press also, motivated
by hatred for Pakistan, supported India. In view of all this it is easy tounderstand
why the British Government, politicians and the press sided with India.
The economic factor, despite Sir Alec's disawovals,5 also affected British
policy in the recent conflict for the British are a nation of traders. British assets
in India are reported to be worth about £8,000 to £10,000 million and their size
approaches the largest single block of British investments abroad in Australia
and New Zealand (£12,000 million or over).6 British trade as well as its aid to
India are also considerable. India is the largest recipient of British development
aid since 1952. From 1958 to 1971 the disbursement of official British aid to India
had totalled £421 . 6 million.7 Loans have often been free of interest and repayable
on easy terms. British investments in Pakistan and its trade with Pakistan by
comparison are negligible. Britain has been the third largest importer of Pak-
istan's goods after the US and West Germany. While exports from UK to West
Pakistan in 1970-71 came to Rs. 188.261 million plus re-exports of Rs. 4.142
million, those to East Pakistan for the same period amounted to Rs. 129.645
million.8 According to Sir Alec, British investment in West Pakistan is also higher
1 The Pakistan Times , Lahore, 22 December 1971.
2 The Economist, London, 26 February 1972, p. 33.
3 See Shahid Hamid "Squint in the British eye is not new", The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 3 Octo-
ber 1971, Razi Wasti "British policy towards Indian Muslims immediately after 1857", The
Journal of History and Political Science , Lahore, 1971-72, pp. 78-97, and Kemal A. Faruki,
"Britain Empoverished Bengal", Pakistan Economist . Karachi. 28 Aueust 1972. dd. 13-16.
4 Morning News , Karachi, 9 January 1972 and Dawn, Karachi, 11 December 1971.
5 Sir Alec's press conference at Lahore of 20 March 1972, od. cit .
^ The Subcontinental crisis-197K The role of Britain". Pnkixtnn Ttrmmmivt nn rit n л
7 " Overseas Development. London. Seotember 1971. n. 6.
« Dawn, Karachi, 15 February 1972.
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 than it is in East Pakistan.1 But the important fact remains that Britain imports
mostly cotton, textiles, skins and tobacco from West Pakistan for which it can
find alternative markets, but East Pakistan is its main source of supply of raw
jute on which British industry, specially the factories in Dundee, depend.2 British
investments in "Bangla Desh" are also substantial, amounting to over £ 100
million in jute, tea; petroleum, chemicals, tobacco, engineering and shipping.3
For these reasons Britain desired good relations with "Bangla Desh" and India,
for it could ill afford to jeopardize its jute trade with the former and its trade and
investments with the latter. India took full advantage of Britain's weakness and
at a time when it sensed that Britain might modify its policy, the Indian Prime
Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, and Foreign Secretary, Mr. Kaul, did not hesitate to
remind Britain of its assets in India and "Bangla Desh" and the repercussions that
might follow if it persisted in any such folly4. Britain's sacrifice of principles
at the altar of economic necessity certainly fetched good dividends for it. India
rewarded it by an increase in trade which grew from Rs. 18 crore 80 lakh to Rs. 24
crore 95 lakh. Britain also benefitted from the discontinuance of US aid to India.5
As for "Bangla Desh", eternally grateful for Britain's support, it too promised
gbod prospects for future British trade and investment.
In the formulation of recent British policy towards the region another pre-
disposing factor was Britain's fear of Soviet domination in the Indian Ocean area
and its littoral States. Britain feared that if any single Power dominated the region
it would disrupt the sea lanes and would adversely affect British and Western trade
and their oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.6 Soviet penetration in the area had
been referred to by Mr. Heath at the Singapore Conference of Commonwealth
Prime Ministers in January 1971. Sir Alec's statements and the British Defence
White Paper published on 16 February 19727 also drew attention to this fact.
Britain's modification of its earlier policy to withdraw East of Suez was
also the result of this fear. But what increased the fear enormously was the change
in the region resulting from America's decision to withdraw from Asia, the re-
cent phenomenal growth of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean and the
recent boost Soviet influence received in the area from its treaty with India(August
1971) and its role in the India-Pakistan conflict. Britain was afraid that India
and "Bangla Desh" fearing a Pakistan-China-US axis might lean more on the
Soviet Union and fulfil its long-standing desire by giving it bases in the region.
Britain was also aware of the existence of pro-Moscow factions in the Indian
Foreign Office8 and in the "Bangla Desh Government" that desired close relations
with the USSR. It wanted to diminish and neutralise this growing Soviet influence
in India and "Bangla Desh" by keeping intact some Western influence m these
countries. Perhaps what it desired was Indo-British coordination in the region
with the USSR looking on in a friendly fashion.9 And because a Pakistan, with
1 Sir Alec's press conference at Lahore, op. cit.
1 The Economist , London. 19 June 1971. d. 76.
3 The Daily Telegraph , London, 30 December 1971.
♦ Ibid., 7 December 1971.
s Report in Jang, Karachi, 14 March 1972.
6 British Defence Statement in Survev of Current Affairs, on. cit.. March 1972. n 101 .
7 The Daily Telegraph, London, 17 February 1972 and Survey of Current Affairs, op cit., pp. 71-
72.
8 The Dailv TeleeraDh . London. 30 December 1971.
9 Dawn , Karachi, 14 February 1971.

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its two zones united, did not fit in with the British scheme of things, Britain was
willing to sacrifice it. Britain felt that a strong Pakistan might not acquiesce in
British plans, but a reduced and weak Pakistan would neither have the capacity
nor the will to resist. This explains Britain's hostility to Pakistan and its support
to India and "Bangla Desh".
Britain's unprincipled policy during the conflict created bitterness among
the people of Pakistan. Both Presidents Yahya and Bhutto called it hostile. India
and "Bangla Desh", however, greatly appreciated it and Britain derived economic
and political benefits as a result from these countries. But Britain's policy is bound
to have far-reaching and grave repercussions. Britain's support to India in its
contravention of International Law and the UN Charter, will weaken the rule of
law and the World Organization. The help rendered to India in the dismember-
ment of Pakistan will make Britain suspect in the eyes of Afro-Asian nations.
What is more, the break up of Pakistan, which marks the beginning of endless
strife in the region, will, in the long run, endanger Britain's own interests in the
area.

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